The Counter Terrorist Magazine Asia Pacific issue April-May by The Counter Terrorist Asia Pacific Edition

K AN S A S BOM B ER • G R E EN O N B L U E IN A FGH A NISTA N • BA C RIM • INTERN ET S E CUR I T Y

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals

Counter The

APRIL/MAY 2014

VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 2

SAUDI INFLUENCE OPERATIONS IN AMERICA

ASIA PACIFIC

EDITION An SSI Publication ®

APRIL/MAY 2014 USA/CANADA $5.99

www.thecounterterroristmag.com

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Counter

The Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals APRIL/MAY 2014

VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 2

COVER STORY: 30

SAUDI INFLUENCE OPERATIONS IN AMERICA By Dean T. Olson

FEATURES:

CONTENTS

Firsthand: GREEN ON BLUE IN AFGHANISTAN By Francis Marion

Case Study: KANSAS BOMBING DISRUPTED BY STING By Richard Marquise

BACRIM: COLOMBIAN BANDAS CRIMINALES EMERGENTES By John P. Sullivan

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT TO COUNTER-EXTREMISM: A GLOBAL IMPERATIVE By Rohan Gunaratna

INTERNET SECURITY FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENTS By Michael Gordon

COUNTERING THE SELF-RADICALISED LONE WOLF: A NEW PARADIGM? By Kumar Ramakrishna

DEPARTMENTS: 06 44

From the Editor

“An Explanatory Memorandum” from the Archives of the Muslim Brotherhood in America

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Nobel for Bangash

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Counter The

FROM THE EDITOR:

Nobel for Bangash By Chris Graham

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals

VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 2

inth grader Aitazaz Hassan Bangash was on his way to school in Pakistan on a Monday morning when someone dressed in a school uniform asked him where the school was. A witness said, “Aitazaz became suspicious… The other students backed off, but Aitazaz challenged the [person] and tried to catch him. During the scuffle, the bomber panicked and detonated his bomb.” Aitazaz and the bomber died at the scene. Witnesses say the blast injured two other people. Aitazaz may have saved the lives of hundreds of students who were in morning assembly.1 Aitazaz’s alertness, initiative and selflessness are to be commended. Who has given more to protect others? I nominate Aitazaz Hassan Bangash for the Nobel Peace Prize. The guidelines of the Nobel organization may need to be adapted to make a posthumous award possible, but Bangash’s family could, no doubt, make use of the $1 million (+) award. Naming this 14-year-old would both provide inspiration to children around the world and enhance the reputation of the Nobel committee, which has embarrassed itself with previous awards to communists, terrorists, and disgraced UN officials. If you agree that Aitazaz Hassan Bangash would make a good Nobel candidate, let the committee know at postmaster@nobel.no. Semper Fidelis,

Chris Graham Editor, The Counter Terrorist www.30-10pistol.com

APRIL/MAY 2014 Editor Chris Graham Director of Operations Sol Bradman Director of Advertizing Carmen Arnaes Production Assistants Giselle Manassa Melissa Berne Contributing Editors Kevin Freeman Jennifer Hesterman Richard Marquise Tom Nypaver Dean Olson Steve Young ASIA PACIFIC EDITION Editor Mr. Munies Pillai Director of Operations Mr. Yaniv Pertz Director of Advertizing Mr. Derick Ding Graphic Design Abdullah Al Mamun Copy Editor Laura Town Advertising Sales Chris Bell Publisher: Security Solutions International 13155 SW 134th St. • STE 204 Miami, Florida 33186

ISSN 1941-8639 The Counter Terrorist Magazine, Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals is published by Security Solutions International LLC, as a service to the nation’s First Responders and Homeland Security Professionals with the aim of deepening understanding of issues related to Terrorism. No part of the publication can be reproduced without permission from the publisher. The opinions expressed herein are the opinions of the authors represented and not necessarily the opinions of the publisher. Please direct all Editorial correspondence related to the magazine to: Security Solutions International SSI, 13155 SW 134th Street, Suite 204, Miami, Florida. 33186 or info@ thecounterterroristmag.com The subscription price for 6 issues is $34.99 and the price of the magazine is $5.99. (1-866-573-3999) Fax: 1-786-573-2090.

Zahir Shah Sherazi and Saima Mohsin. “Teen Dies Stopping Suicide Bomber at School in Pakistan.” CNN January 9, 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/09/world/ asia/pakistan-boy-stops-suicide-bomber/ accessed February 28, 2014. 1

For article reprints, e-prints, posters and plaques please contact: PARS International Corp. Web: www.magreprints.com/quickquote.asp Email: reprints@parsintl.com Phone: 212-221-9595 • Fax: 212-221-9195 Please visit the magazine web site where you can also contact the editorial staff:

6 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2014

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Firsthand:

GREEN ON BLUE IN AFGHANISTAN I write this article understanding that the human mind not only has a unique way of healing, but also of erasing some critical details of dynamic and traumatic experiences. I have done my best to recall this incident accurately.

An Afghan Soldier with the Afghan National Army, 6th Kandak, test fires his rifle, outside of an Afghan Border Police compound, in the Nazyan district, Nangarhar province, Afghanistan, March 10, 2012. Photo by: Spc. Amber Leach 8 The 8 TheCounter CounterTerrorist Terrorist~~April/May April/May 2014 2014

By Francis Marion

y purpose is to honor my teammates and provide information that other Americans, particularly senior military command staff, might learn from. This will hopefully serve to provide insight for those who continue to develop standard operating procedures (SOPs) for keeping our U.S. Special Operations Force (USSOF) personnel who conduct village

stability operations (VSOs) safe. Shortly after midnight, gunshots rang out. For the team members not in the command post, these shots sounded a great deal closer than normal, but our Afghan Local Police (ALP) did shoot at suspected Taliban attempting to cross into our area from time to time. We had become accustomed to RPGs and machine gun fire between midnight and 3 AM.

TheThe Counter Counter Terrorist Terrorist ~ April/May ~ April/May2014 2014 9 9

Afghan police officers enter a house while conducting a patrol in Kolagu, Paktia province, Afghanistan, March 9, 2012, during Operation Khoti Kheyl. Photo by: Spc. Phillip McTaggart

We later determined that the shooter was dressed in a variant of an Afghan National Police (ANP) uniform, carrying an AK-47 with an extended magazine and a chest rig containing extra magazines. He nervously walked into our command post and was immediately led back outside by one of the men who wondered how the individual was walking around alone and armed during the middle of the night in our compound. In addition to our team, we had a United Arab Emirates Special Forces (UAESF) team and an Afghan National

10 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2014

Army Special Forces (ANASF) team living in our village stability post (VSP). The UAESF rarely wore uniforms. They were prohibited from going on missions, but we believed that NATO wanted to be able to say that an Islamic nation joined the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). They served no operational purpose. Their selection for Special Forces was conducted by selecting members of a particular bloodline or socioeconomic status. They were out of shape and generally smoked hookah 24 hours a day. The ANASF, by contrast, were armed

and clothed in their uniforms almost constantly. Since they smoked hashish by night, they helped to secure our compound by standing security posts during the day. A sister team had an ANASF man climb into one of their guard towers with an RPG and fire rockets into the area where the team slept screaming â&#x20AC;&#x153;Allah Akbar.â&#x20AC;? Our team rotated operators on and off post throughout the night, alongside an American infantry squad, in order to maintain security. As soon as our infiltrator was led

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“As soon as our infiltrator was led outside the command post, he turned his weapon and fired, killing the man who accompanied him before he could draw his pistol in defense.”

outside the command post, he turned his weapon and fired, killing the man who accompanied him before he could draw his pistol in defense. Our remaining personnel inside heard the shots and reacted immediately. As the shooter reentered the command post (now knowing the exact positions of the remaining men) he shot through the walls while receiving return fire from another man’s pistol. As two men attempted to escape through the side door and flank the shooter, one of them was shot in the arm as rounds came ripping through the wall. As the shooter pushed farther into the command post, attempting to kill those who fled, the door swung open from an adjacent room where our Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) technician (already wounded) immediately engaged the shooter at less than five meters with his M4. The shooter killed him instantly, but our EOD technician halted the attack on the men who escaped out the side door. Aside from those in the immediate

12 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2014

vicinity of the command post, no one completely understood what had just happened. All that was known was that approximately 45 rounds had just been fired very close by. One of the men who escaped applied a makeshift tourniquet to his teammate’s arm, and once the bleeding was stopped he singlehandedly cleared his way to our hooches, knocking on every door to alert the remainder of the team that a lone shooter was loose in the compound. He described what the shooter was wearing, what he was armed with, his last known location, and that our team had suffered three Americans killed and one shot in the arm. Because of the warning we received, we were able to collectively respond without sustaining further casualties. Armed with a mix of small arms and limited night vision equipment, the remainder of our team systematically cleared the immediate area and maneuvered to the command post. The American infantry attachment helped to secure our perimeter while we worked inside to organize a response. Our Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) discovered the radio dedicated to controlling air assets had been shot. Team members worked to swap out the communications equipment and send the “troops in contact” report and MEDEVAC request quickly via satellite. A MEDEVAC flight arrived and transported the casualties. The escorts remained behind to help us track down the shooter. Our JTAC worked the pair of attack helicopters to scout all of the likely egress routes, while an AC-130 was tasked to look inside our compound for any lone armed individuals. We soon received a report that the shooter was not working alone. He had a small group of insurgents outside our compound walls who helped him escape the area. The report indicated that the

group used a close-by mosque as a rally point to drop their weapons, change their clothes, and begin their escape. Their final destination was predictably Pakistan. Our air assets found a group of five individuals who fit the profile attempting to move along a route that we had long known to be used by the Taliban. The gunship could not confirm if any of the five had weapons, so our hands were administratively tied. Aircraft watched the men as they used a barge to cross the river. Five motorbikes were staged in advance, facing westward in preparation for the individuals’ escape. Based on known insurgent tactics and techniques, coupled with the reporting we were receiving, we were able to establish positive identification. The Taliban knew our rules of engagement and routinely exploited them. Hiding in local mosques and compounds was a favorite technique. Our close air support asset was running low on gas and engaged four of the men. We later received confirmation that we had indeed killed four Taliban who aided the attack. We also confirmed that the shooter was still alive. It was now obvious that the fifth man had been the shooter. We begrudgingly let him live because of our rules of engagement. We later learned that this man made his way to Pakistan, where he was welcomed as a hero of the Taliban. A propaganda video was made of the man being promoted and rewarded. Eventually, we were told that he was killed by U.S. forces. It is no secret that the people of Afghanistan are the center of gravity in an Afghan counter-insurgency (CoIN) fight. The VSO approach attempts to project stability in insurgent-controlled areas by focusing on the center of gravity: the population. We lived inside the village. The question is, how can we show the Afghan population that the system of

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U.S. Marines conduct a patrol with Afghan National Police. Photo by: Sgt. Earnest J. Barnes

“The question is, how can we show the Afghan population that the system of government we intend to establish will provide a greater degree of stability and prosperity than that of the Taliban?” 14 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2014

government we intend to establish will provide a greater degree of stability and prosperity than that of the Taliban? Our team conducted this mission with enthusiasm and professionalism, often forgoing our own personal safety and security in the name of mission accomplishment. After all, we understood the increased risk, accepted it, and acknowledged that in order for us to be effective, we would have to remove as many degrees of separation as possible between us and the individuals we sought

to influence. This is the precise reason the Taliban makes executing these “green on blue” attacks a priority. We believed that our efforts were collectively the key to success in Afghanistan. A visiting senior officer said that we were a model VSP for the entire country. Everyone wanted to know what it was we were doing that was so unique: how, despite our losses, we continued to make progress. We had many vulnerabilities. We hosted many shuras in our compound and began an attempt at an expansion of

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Village elders listen to Haji Mohammad Wazir, the governor of Nawbahar district, during a shura, or meeting, at the Afghan National Police compound in the district in Zabul province, Afghanistan, March 7, 2012. Photo by: David Brandenburg

16 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2014

our influence into the surrounding areas. Our â&#x20AC;&#x153;outdoor shura roomâ&#x20AC;? was located in the middle of our compound. In order to access it, locals would enter into our compound through our main gate and would be escorted down the thoroughfare past the command post, gym, dining hall, recreation tent, and a majority of the berthing areas. The command post was easily distinguishable by the array of antennae and constant foot traffic. At the time of the attack there were no locks on any of the doors to prevent entry. We thought there were enough armed personnel constantly present to prevent unwanted entry. We hired villagers to support construction projects inside our compound in an effort to provide jobs. Our concerns as a team were voiced and dismissed as paranoia. Our main door was secured only by a small cypher lock. During the day, the foot traffic in and out of that door was immeasurable. Although we changed the code on that door regularly, the village children played a game attempting to learn the code being entered. We had numerous suicide bomb threats and other various threats of attack. Numerous times we witnessed support personnel and attachments failing to properly shield the lock when the code was being entered. As a result, we would have to immediately change the code out of fear that one of the ever-present children or elders saw it as well. Perhaps our gravest error was knocking a hole in our compound wall leading directly to the Afghan National Police (ANP) station, which was adjacent to the portion of our compound where the team slept. The walls were approximately fifteen feet tall and one and one-half feet thick, made of straw and dried mud. In that hole, we attempted to build a doorway with a light metal frame, a thin metal door, and a makeshift lock, all

cured by mud packed around the frame and left for the sun to dry and harden. Many members of the team were not comfortable with the decision to place this doorway in our compound wall. Again, our concerns were voiced and dismissed. We suspect this is how the shooter gained entry. Our compoundâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s security lighting plan was virtually nonexistent. There was no physical compartmentalization on the inside of our compound walls. We realized the high potential for an insider threat in advance and could have made it difficult for an intruder to navigate the interior successfully. There were no individually coded doorways to get from one end of the compound to another. This was thought to be an advantage if we ever had to fight from our walls to repel an assault. We would have had clearcut channels to provide weapons and ammunition resupply to the posts along the perimeter. Another key point to consider is that the entire concept of VSO hinges on the ability to screen and vet the candidates from the partner nation paramilitary forces we are tasked with building and training. Widely known incidents suggest there is no reliable criminal data base in Afghanistan. ISAF has little idea who we are giving weapons to. The regulations we have to follow in order to establish a history of enemy involvement, from which we can positively identify individuals as insurgents, mirror those of a state-side law enforcement agency, but counterinsurgency is not synonymous with police action. We were professionals who obeyed orders and achieved success no matter the hand we were dealt. Why are teams tasked with what appears to be a VSO experiment without real input from those who have lived alongside Afghans? Those who understand what Afghans

value, those who live according to Afghan customs and courtesies and even speak the languages, should drive planning. We could have saved everyone a lot of time by simply telling the policy makers that Afghans want money, roads, vehicles, food, and to be left alone. Are we too politically correct to understand that no matter what we do, we are still considered to be unbelievers and at the end of the day, we will be used as a temporary means to an end? The villagers knew we would eventually leave and that all the money and effort we put into their village would result in short-lived benefit. The Taliban is playing the long-game. President Karzai makes it publically known that he does not support our efforts. He professes that we are simply an occupation force. The villagers were grateful to be temporarily liberated from the Taliban, but

understood they had to choose their sides wisely. In a few short years, the Taliban would be back with a vengeance and would most likely cut the heads off of all of those who betrayed their faith during their absence. Some time after this green on blue attack, our VSP was demilitarized. The territory we fought to hold and stabilize is now under Taliban control. American assistance is finite. The Taliban know this, and as a result will only fight us seasonally. During the winter months, they pack up and go back to Pakistan, leaving behind a skeleton crew to continue harassment operations in support of their plan to lengthen the fight and outlast our presence. Our temporary success came with a great cost to our team. We were successful only because of the individuals on the ground who forced the concept to work.

We had to break nearly every common sense security SOP we had collectively learned as a team since day one in order to conduct this mission. While many are grateful for a temporary respite from the Taliban, Afghans have to choose sides, knowing that one side is leaving. The people of Afghanistan have significantly different values from Westerners. We overestimate the idea that a system of government based on Western Judeo-Christian principles (whether an individual considers himself Christian or not) may be a very realistic fit for the historically unmalleable Muslim people of what we call Afghanistan.

â&#x20AC;˘

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Marion (pseudonym) is a veteran of the Afghanistan war. He is a former noncommissioned officer of the U.S. military.

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Case Study:

KANSAS BOMBING DISRUPTED BY STING

18 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2014

By Richard Marquise

Most of the terrorist attacks that were committed in 2013 within the United States appear to have been committed by domestic terroristsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;those having little or no foreign influence.

Wichita Mid-Continent Airport. Photo by: 8thcountry

uring 2013, there were 34 terrorist attacks that took place in the United States. Twenty of which were committed by individuals affiliated with the Animal Rights Movement.1 Only one successful attack appears to have been influenced

by international events: the Boston Marathon attack. Few of these attacks received much notice. However, arrests were made in at least 25 cases in which a â&#x20AC;&#x153;terrorismâ&#x20AC;? charge was lodged. Of those cases, 21 appear to have been connected to international

terrorists. Many of the arrests dealt with individuals who were charged with providing material support to terrorists abroad. These include at least four arrests that involved individuals who wanted to provide support for the al-Nusra Front, a branch of al-Qaeda operating in Syria.

The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2014 19

Osama bin Laden. Photo by: Hamid Mir

Imam Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen October 2008. Photo by: Greg A L

“I have been studying subjects like jihad, martyrdom operations and shariah law… I… understand that jihad and the implementation of shariah law is absolutely demanded of all the Muslim Ummah [community].”

20 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2014

While many of these arrests may not have directly prevented attacks in the United States, a December arrest in the heartland stopped a plot which, if successful, could have been as devastating as the bombing in Oklahoma City. During 2013, 58 year old Terry Lee Loewen, an employee at the MidContinent Airport in Wichita, Kansas, began engaging in online discussions with someone he appears to have thought held beliefs similar to his own. By August, his conversations had begun to turn to violence. He stated in one conversation, “I have been studying subjects like jihad, martyrdom operations and shariah law…. I… understand that jihad and

the implementation of shariah law is absolutely demanded of all the Muslim Ummah [community].” Days later, an undercover FBI employee (UCE) offered to introduce him to someone who could help him engage in “violent” jihad.2 In later communications he wrote that he had great admiration for Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki (the New Mexico-born Islamist who inspired a number of individuals around the globe who have committed or attempted to commit significant terrorist attacks, including Nidal Hasan, the Fort Hood shooter, and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Christmas Day underwear bomber). Loewen said he had read al-Awlaki’s essay entitled “44 Ways to Support Jihad.” In one email, Loewen noted that he had “numerous ideas of ways I could perform jihad in the path of Allah but outside [prayer], none of them are legal.”3 In late August, he offered to take the UCE on a tour of the Wichita MidContinent Airport. He went on to say that he had become “radicalized in the strongest sense of the word… but direct jihad against a civilian target is not out of the question. …Point being, is my having access to airport property the primary reason for the tour- if the answer is ‘no’ then I will not bring it up again.” He described his access at the airport in emails and referred to himself as the “access guy.”4 In early September, Loewen wrote, “I believe the potential for me to do more is staggering… but I know nothing about explosives. Don’t you think with my access to the airport that I should be put to good use?” By early September, Loewen wrote that he had decided to only contribute money to “needy Muslims,” but said that if not for his family “I would have already carried out some sort of operation.”5

By early October, Loewen again expressed interest in carrying out an operation. He did express concern that he was “being set up.” On October 7, Loewen sent the UCE photographs of his airport access badge as well as pictures of the entrance gates to the tarmac and the devices used to access the gates. Loewen said he assumed there were no surveillance cameras at the gates. He did state in one email that he was going to be unable to get “gate access” until early in 2014. However, by mid-October he wrote, “Inshallah [God willing], this operation will be huge. Just to be a part of any operation with these brothers is a great honor for me, but of [sic] it can instill and [sic] great financial loss to the tagoot [those who worship other than Allah] who run this country, then I will feel truly blessed.”6 While he was communicating with the first UCE, Loewen was under the impression he was dealing with a member of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In late October, the first UCE introduced Loewen to a second UCE (UCE 2). UCE 2 had a personal meeting with Loewen and led Loewen to believe that he was a member of AQAP. On November 8, Loewen indicated to UCE 2 that he was interested in becoming a martyr. During this meeting, Loewen discussed taking a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device to the terminal, which would be near a number of planes. He suggested a second individual (possibly UCE 2) could wear a suicide vest to coincide with the explosion outside.7 On November 19, Loewen again met with UCE 2 and expressed his desire to martyr himself. He said he wanted to kill as many people as possible and provided a diagram of the terminal and tarmac, including distances between the gate areas. Loewen agreed to purchase an item

that would be needed for the explosive device. He said he would obtain all of the necessary components for the device and would wire the explosive himself, as that was something he did as a part of his job. They agreed on a final plan and once Loewen received final gate access, “they would drive to the terminal in the early

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The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2014 21

morning hours and detonate the device between the terminals for maximum casualties, and both [UCE 2] and Loewen would die in the process.”8 In early December, Loewen obtained containers in which the explosives would be housed. He also provided UCE 2 another diagram marked with an “X” to indicate where the vehicle should be parked to cause the most damage. Loewen also provided time schedules and indicated that early morning would be the best time for the attack. On December 6, Loewen renewed his access

badge and three days later used it to verify he would have gate access to the tarmac. On December 11, Loewen and UCE 2 assembled the bomb and agreed that Friday, December 13 would be the day they would carry out the attack. Loewen did not go to work that day (December 11), but spent the time writing notes to his family.9 On December 13 at 4:45 am, UCE 2 picked Loewen up at a local hotel and drove to the area where the bomb was stored. Loewen finished wiring it to make it operational (the explosive materials

provided by the FBI were inert), and at 5:19 am, the pair drove to the Wichita Mid-Continent Airport. They arrived at the gate around 5:40 am, and Loewen exited the vehicle and twice attempted to use his badge to enter the gate. He was then arrested.10 Among the items Loewen left behind was a letter for a family member. It read in part, “By the time you read this I will- if everything went as planned have been martyred in the path of Allah. There would have been an event at the airport which I am responsible for. The operation was timed to cause maximum carnage + death. …My only explanation is that I believe in jihad for the sake of Allah + for the sake of my Muslim brothers + sisters. …Fact is, most Muslims in this country will condemn what I have done. …I expect to be called a terrorist (which I am), a psychopath and a homicidal maniac…”11

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DISCLAIMER: This project was supported by Cooperative Agreement Number 2008-GD-T8-K015 administered by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/FEMA, Training and Exercises Integration Secretariat. Points of view or opinions in this document are those of the author and do not represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

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The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2014 23

Masjid al-Ikhlas, Newburgh, NY, USA, where the 2009 New York City bomb plot was hatched. Photo by: Daniel Case

On December 18, 2013, Loewen was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury in Wichita, Kansas, on three counts of Attempting to Use a Weapon of Mass Destruction, Attempted Use of an Explosive Device, and Attempted Material Support for a Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (AQAP).

24 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2014

If convicted, Loewen faces a maximum penalty of life in prison on the charge of attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction, not less than five years and not more than 20 years on the charge of attempting to use an explosive to damage property, and a maximum penalty of 15 years on the charge of attempting to

provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization.12 Loewen, who was also known as Terry Lane, was described by neighbors as someone who â&#x20AC;&#x153;pretty much kept to [himself ].â&#x20AC;? The neighbors said that he and his wife were private people. The local media reported he was an avionics

technician for Hawker Beechcraft Services and a long-time member of the Wichita community. He had only one known criminal charge and that was for carrying a concealed weapon at the Wichita airport in 2009.13 Loewen’s case is neither the first, nor will it be the last, incident of an

American-born citizen, having no connection to the Middle East or any terrorist group, planning to carry out a terrorist attack in the United States. If Loewen had been successful, the attack at the Wichita Airport may well have been devastating. Many believe that terrorists only target larger cities or special events. The Boston Marathon attacks targeted an internationally known event, and the two brothers who were involved were alleged to have told a man they had kidnapped that they planned to go to New York to carry out additional attacks, possibly at Times Square. However, dating back to 2009, significant terrorist plots were disrupted in cities of all sizes and locations. These include Riverside/Newburgh, NY (James Cromitie et al.), Charlotte, NC (Daniel Boyd et al.), Denver, CO/New York, NY (Najibullah Zazi et al.), Springfield, IL (Michael Finton), Dallas, TX (Hosam Smadi), Washington, DC (Farooque Ahmed), Catonsville, MD (Antonio Martinez), Seattle, WA (Frederick Dominique and Joseph Davis) and Killeen, TX (Jason Abdo). The media has described the Wichita case as a “sting.” One Kansas defense attorney said, “If the fragile mental state of an otherwise upstanding individual is exploited to commit a crime that the individual otherwise would not have taken steps to commit, how does that make us safe and why spend taxpayer money on prosecution?”14 A study done by researchers at Fordham University in 2011 reported that in the ten years after 9/11 the entrapment defense was used in about ten terrorism cases, and all were unsuccessful. The author of the study indicated she was not in favor of sting operations.15 It is difficult to argue with success. Many of the cases cited above utilized “sting” operations and had successful

Naiz Khan, target of an FBI terror investigation. Photo by: Thomas Good

Photo released by the U.S. Army of Pfc. Jason Abdo. Photo: U.S. Army

The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2014 25

Any investigation— especially an investigation that is potentially as sensitive as a counterterrorism investigation— needs to be closely supervised.

26 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2014

outcomes. How should the U.S. government protect citizens? If one of Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh’s conspirators had informed the government about his plot and government agents then arrested him as he acquired his materials and planned his attack, what would have been the end result? One can only guess, but Oklahoma City might only be known as a great place to live and not a city where one of the most significant terrorist attacks in history took place. In the Loewen case, government agents, in conjunction with prosecutors, likely reviewed each of the emails and recorded conversations to ensure that Loewen was only doing what he was predisposed to do. Yes, a government agent made his plot easier to advance, but if Loewen had found someone who was not a

government agent and this person was equally as disposed to carry out a criminal act, would we be talking about Wichita like we now speak of Oklahoma City? Law enforcement officers need to continue to be alert to terrorist indicators and share information with the Joint Terrorist Task Forces and state Fusion Centers. Any investigation— especially an investigation that is potentially as sensitive as a counterterrorism investigation—needs to be closely supervised. Investigations must be monitored not only by the law enforcement agents involved, but by agency leadership as well as prosecutors, to ensure that a suspect is not made to do something they would not have done on their own. Terrorism is not going away, whether the threat comes from domestic or

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The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2014 27

international terrorists. The numbers bear that out. The fact that there were 25 prevented plots during 2013 suggests that our law enforcement agencies are doing their jobs. Agencies are sharing information and they have demonstrated the tenacity to conduct long-term undercover operations to arrest individuals who want to use violence to further their agendas.

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Marquise is the Director of the Department of Justice’s, Bureau of JusticeAssistance State and Local Antiterrorism Training (SLATT) program. He is a retired FBI senior executive who led the investigation into the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 and is the author of Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation. Timothy McVeigh about to be led out of a Perry, Oklahoma courthouse two days after the Oklahoma City bombing. Photo by: Olaf Growald

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ENDNOTES “Slatt.org.” Institute for Intergovernmental Research: State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) Program, January 6, 2014. Available at: https://www.slatt.org/. 2 “United States of America v. Terry L. Loewen.” (Criminal Complaint filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas, Wichita Docket, December 13, 2013). 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 “Press release of the U.S. Attorney.” (Western District of Kansas, December 18, 2013). 13 Bill Wilson. “Neighbors Describe Terrorism Suspect Terry Lee Loewen.” The Wichita Eagle.com, December 13, 2013. Available at: http://www.kansas. com/2013/12/13/3177345/neighborsdescribe-terrorism-suspect.html. Retrieved January 6, 2014. 14 Associated Press. “Terry Lee Loewen Case: Stings Used to Fight Domestic Terrorism.” The Epoch Times, December 16, 2013. Available at: http://www. theepochtimes.com/n3/402614-terry-leeloewen-case-stings-used-to-fight-domesticterrorism/. Retrieved January 18, 2014. 15 Karen Greenberg. “How Terrorist ‘Entrapment’ Ensnares Us All.” The Guardian, December 12, 2011. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/dec/12/ how-terrorist-entrapment-ensares-us-all. Retrieved January 6, 2014. 1

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The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2014 29

SAUDI INFLUENCE

OPERATIONS IN

AMERICA By Dean T. Olson

30 The 30 TheCounter CounterTerrorist Terrorist~~April/May April/May2014 2014

Decades ago, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia began to use its phenomenal oil wealth to fund the spread of a puritanical version of Islam known as Wahhabism in Western countries, including the United States.

he Wahhabi variant of Islam has been the dominant faith of Saudi Arabia for more than two centuries. In the 30 years following the OPEC Oil Crisis of 1973, Saudis spent more than $87 billion to spread Wahhabism worldwide.1 An austere form of Islam embraced by Osama bin Laden, the Taliban and some Muslim Brotherhood factions, Wahhabism demands a literal interpretation of the Quran. It

is a militant strain of Islam known best for the hate-fueled vision that inspired the 19 suicide terrorists (15 of whom were Saudis) on 9/11. Wahhabists view Muslims not practicing their form of Islam as infidels and enemies to be subjugated or killed like Christians and Jews.2 Influence operations are a subset of psychological operations designed to convey selected information to foreign audiences to influence

their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of governments, nongovernmental organizations, other groups, and the population as a whole.3 The fundamental purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce attitudes and behavior favorable to the sponsorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s objectives. Because Wahhabism views other interpretations of Islam as heretical, a major focus of these Saudi influence operations is to

The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2014 31

Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Photo by: MorgueFile

achieve Wahhabi dominance over the practice of Islam in the West. Saudi influence operations are driven by a religious imperative to spread the faith until the entire world is under the sway of Islam. The methods used to achieve this domination are based on the Islamic concept of jihad. It is an unambiguous concept in Wahhabism, defined as holy war that seeks to force unbelievers to convert to Islam and live under the 7th century Islamic code of law called shariah.4 In the years prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the U.S. government paid little attention to the flow of money and religious propaganda exported worldwide from Saudi Arabia. Beginning in the 1960s, the Saudis funded radical movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood, to establish an elaborate network of Islamic charities,

32 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2014

foundations, student associations, and schools around the world.5 While Saudi officials continue to assert publicly and in private discussions with U.S. officials that the government cannot be held responsible for the actions of non-governmental organizations, private donors, and religious leaders, these protestations belie the fact that much of the nongovernmental organization (NGO) network in Saudi Arabia was created by Saudi government officials, providing an arm’s length relationship and plausible deniability. Many NGOs are funded by the Saudi government or members of the royal family. The Wahhabi-dominated religious hierarchy in Saudi Arabia is tightly controlled by the Saudi regime and royal family.6 The Commission investigating the terror attacks on 9/11 found: “While Saudi domestic charities are regulated by

the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, charities and international relief agencies such as the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) are currently regulated by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. This Ministry uses zakat, obligatory Islamic charitable giving, and government funds to spread Wahhabi beliefs throughout the world.”7 Wahhabism experienced explosive growth worldwide beginning in the early 1970s, when Saudi charities started funding Wahhabi schools and mosques from Islamabad, Pakistan to Culver City, California.8 Saudi efforts to spread Wahhabism in the United States began as simple proselytization called da’wa, literally “invitation to Islam” in Arabic. Saudi influence operations have blossomed into a multifaceted effort that has successfully affected the perceptions and behaviors of the institutions of

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The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2014 33

American society, including politics and religion, diplomacy, education, the judiciary, law enforcement, and the military. Members of Muslim Brotherhood front groups in the U.S. are pawns in these influence operations. The Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928 and acts as a transnational Islamist organization. Their motto is: “Allah is our objective; the Quran is our law, the Prophet is our leader; Jihad is our way; and dying in the way of Allah is the highest of our aspirations.” The English language website of the Brotherhood states the organization is “an Egyptborn Islamist organization founded for launching Jihad against the infidels in general, and the Christian West in particular, has been an ideological protectorate of Saudi Arabia for over half a century.”9 Muslim Brotherhood operatives in America strive to “present Islam as a civilization alternative.”10

In thousands of public school districts across the United States, taxpayers are unaware that they pay to disseminate proIslamic materials that are anti-American, anti-Israel, and antiJewish.

34 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2014

Mohamed Akram, a senior Muslim Brotherhood operative in the United States and chronicler of this strategy, penned a memorandum entitled “An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America.”11* In that document, Akram laid out a plan to conquer and Islamize the United States as a stepping stone toward the larger goal of ultimately establishing “the global Islamic state.” 12 Federal investigators found Akram’s memo in the home of Ismael Elbarasse, a founder of the Dar Al-Hijrah mosque in Falls Church, Virginia, after serving a search warrant in 2004. Akram’s 18-page document listed 29 likeminded “organizations of our friends” that shared the common goal of dismantling American institutions and turning the U.S. into a Muslim nation. These “friends” were identified as groups that could help convince Muslims “that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and ‘sabotaging’ its miserable house by their hands… so that… God’s religion [Islam] is made victorious over all other religions.” The list includes many Muslim Brotherhood front groups that are now routinely sought out by politicians and the media. These groups have been alleged to be “moderate” Muslims in America. The entire cultural jihad process is designed to create rapid ideological change. At its core are two organizations that coordinate and direct much of the work of the global Wahhabi movements: the Muslim World League (MWL), also known as Rabita, and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, or WAMY. Both are based in Saudi Arabia, where

they enjoy quasi-official status and strong government support.13 The Saudi Wahhabi effort to undermine our nation from within is most pronounced in our schools. Many Americans are unaware that their children are on the front lines of a hidden cultural jihad.14 In thousands of public school districts across the United States, taxpayers are unaware that they pay to disseminate pro-Islamic materials that are anti-American, antiIsrael, and anti-Jewish. Often bypassing school boards and edging out approved curricula, teaching programs funded by Saudis make their way into elementary and secondary school classrooms, often with the help of a federal program, Title VI of the Higher Education Act. Analyses of these materials have found them to be full of inaccuracies, bias and proselytizing for Islam. They also have found that many of the major history and social studies textbooks used in schools across America are highly critical of democratic institutions and forgiving of repressive ones. These materials praise and sometimes promote Islam, while criticizing Christianity and Judaism and being filled with false assertions and historical inaccuracies.15 In an ingenious deception, the system of federal subsidies to university programs of Middle East Studies under Title VI of the Higher Education Act has been serving as a kind of Trojan horse for Saudi influence over American K-12 education.16 Because federally subsidized Middle East Studies centers are required to pursue public outreach, the centers meet this obligation by designing lesson plans and seminars on the Middle East for America’s K-12 teachers. These university-distributed teaching aids slip into the K-12

*Editor’s note: See this issue’s Book Review “An Explanatory Memorandum” From the Archives of the Muslim Brotherhood, by Mohamed Akram.

Sidi Abdul Wahhab Mosque in the medina of Libya's capital Tripoli. Photo by: Abdul-Jawad Elhusuni

curriculum without being subject to the normal public vetting processes. Meanwhile, the federal government, which both subsidizes and lends its stamp of approval to these special K-12 course materials, has effectively abandoned oversight of the program that provides them. By lavishly funding several organizations that design Saudi-friendly English-language K-12 curricula, all that remains is to convince the “outreach coordinators” at prestigious, federally subsidized universities to purvey these materials to America’s teachers.17 To reinforce the effectiveness of this subversion, outreach coordinators or

teacher-trainers at a number of university Middle East Studies centers have been trained by the very same Saudi-funded foundations that design K-12 course materials. These Saudi-friendly minions happily build their outreach efforts around Saudi-financed K-12 curricula.18 Without realizing it, America’s taxpayers subsidize—and provide official federal approval for—K-12 educational materials on the Middle East that have been created under Saudi auspices. The basic outlines of the problem were exposed in 2004 by Sandra Stotsky, a former director of a professional development institute for teachers at

Harvard, and a former senior associate commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Education. Stotsky’s stint as a commissioner ran from 1999 to 2003. She was present when the Massachusetts Department of Education tried to respond to the challenge of 9/11 by organizing special seminars in Islamic history for K-12 teachers. The department accepted a proposal with participation from Harvard’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies, which, as a prestigious university and a federally subsidized Title VI “National Resource Center,” seemed an obvious choice.19 The Massachusetts Department of

The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2014 35

Education commissioned a teachertraining seminar designed to cover Islamic history and touch on key contemporary questions, such as the nature of Islamic Fundamentalism and terrorism, the lack of democracy in the Middle East, and the challenge of gaining basic legal and political rights for women in much of the Muslim world. It quickly became apparent, however, that Harvard’s outreach program had little interest in tackling these issues, or in representing a broad range of views on contemporary Middle Eastern culture. Stotsky came to feel that the Massachusetts Education Department’s efforts to achieve balance in its teacher training seminars were giving way to a “distorted” and “manipulative” political agenda.20 Stotsky found that the source of the problem with many of the supplemental resources used for history and social studies is the ideological mission of the organizations that create them.21 While their stated goal is to combat intolerance by expanding students’ knowledge of other cultures and providing them with other “points of view,” the organizations’ real goal, based on an analysis of

their materials, appears to be the indoctrination of children by bending and falsifying historical content. They compound this approach by appealing to teachers’ sense of “fairness” and their currently presumed obligation to promote “social justice” and withhold negative moral judgments about other cultures. Saudi influence enters the classrooms in three different ways. The first is through teacher-training seminars that provide teachers with graduate or continuing-education credits. The second is through the dissemination of supplementary teaching materials designed and distributed with Saudi support. Such materials flood the educational system and are available online. The third is through school textbooks paid for by taxpayers, some of them vetted by activists with Saudi ties who advise and influence major textbook companies about the books’ Islamic, Arab, Palestinian, Israeli, and Middle Eastern content.22 The process used in the attempt to indoctrinate school children begins with manipulative and incomplete supplemental resources for history

and social studies teachers, combined with equally misleading professional development workshops that propagate the distorted content and recommended teaching practices of such materials to teachers and their classrooms, thereby influencing what both teachers and students learn.23 The devious methods used to indoctrinate children include: omitting important details about the topic including those that are positive for this country or the West, or negative about non-Western cultures; providing false information; focusing attention on details of chiefly anthropological interest, thereby omitting culture-specific details of historical significance; dwelling on negative details about America or the West disproportionately to historical context; inflating the significance of a minor historical event; and making false historical analogies. More than one method is used in many cases.24 An example of particularly egregious curricular material that flagrantly falsifies history in its attempt to indoctrinate both teachers and students is the Arab World Studies Notebook, published jointly by the Middle East Policy Council and the

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Arab World and Islamic Resources and School Services (AWAIR). The Middle East Policy Council (formerly the Arab American Affairs Council) sponsors workshops about the Arab world and Islam for teachers, while AWAIR runs the workshops and distributes printed materials and videos. The 1989 version (about 300 pages long) stated among other non-facts that Yasir Arafat was president of a newly declared State of Palestine, that the United Nations General Assembly had voted to recognize this state in 1988, and that the Canaanites were the ancestors of many present-day Palestinians. The 1998 Notebook (now 513 pages long) appears to induce teachers to embrace Islamic religious beliefs, support political views favored by MEPC and AWAIR, and disseminate those religious beliefs and political views in their classrooms. Its attempt at indoctrination goes beyond presenting religious myths as matters of fact, and includes some bizarre history. One article titled “Early Muslim Exploration Worldwide: Evidence of Muslims in the New World Before Columbus” claims that Muslims from

Europe were the first to sail across the Atlantic and land in the New World in 889. It also advances the unsupported notion that West African Muslims had not only spread throughout South and Central America but had also reached Canada, intermarrying with the Iroquois and Algonquin nations so that, much later, early English explorers were to meet “Iroquois and Algonquin chiefs with names like Abdul-Rahim and Abdallah Ibn Malik.”25 ISLAM: A Simulation of Islamic History and Culture, 610-1100 was published in 1991 by Interaction Publishers of Carlsbad, California and promoted as a curriculum manual for history teachers in grades 6-12. It consists of enough material for a three-week program of instruction in which students “simulate becoming Muslims” and “learn about the history and culture of Islam.” Like the Notebook described above, it falsifies history with ludicrous claims and anachronisms.26 Among the mechanisms used for legitimating the content and providers of manipulative supplemental curricula resources, and for spreading their

“…English explorers were to meet “Iroquois and Algonquin chiefs with names like Abdul-Rahim and Abdallah Ibn Malik.” influence, the most important are professional development workshops. The use of these supplemental curricula resources fails to help students understand 9/11 and why so many Muslims hate America; Islamic Fundamentalism or Islamist terrorism; lack of democracy in the Muslim world; the lack of basic legal and political rights for women in most of the Muslim world; the lack of a free press in most of the Muslim world; the deplorable state of elementary, secondary, and higher education in the Muslim world; and the dramatic decline in intellectual creativity and scientific achievement in the Muslim world since 1500.27 The full extent of Saudi curricular funding, and the magnitude of its influence over university outreach programs funded under Title VI, was only revealed in late 2005 by a special four-part investigative report by the Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA). As

The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014 37

the JTA put it: “Saudi Arabia is paying to influence the teaching of American public schoolchildren. And the U.S. taxpayer is an unwitting accomplice… Ironically, what gives credibility to… these distorted materials is Title VI of the Higher Education Act… Believing they’re importing the wisdom of places like Harvard or Georgetown, they are actually inviting into their schools whole curricula and syllabuses developed with the support of Riyadh.”28 One of the groups Saudi money supports is AWAIR. According to the JTA, AIWAR’s founder, Audrey Shabbas, also edits the controversial Arab World Studies Notebook. Shabbas is reportedly employed by the Middle East Policy Council (MEPC) to conduct its teachertraining and seminar programs. And MEPC (formerly the Arab American Affairs Council) is headed by a former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia and allegedly receives direct funding from Saudi Arabia.29 The JTA also asserts that the Middle East Policy Council was seeking funding for its teaching efforts from Saudi Prince Alwaleed bin Talal bin Abdulaziz in late 2005. Alwaleed personally initiated

38 The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014

contacts with MEPC after hearing about its seminars designed to shape American teachers’ perceptions of the Middle East. It appears that the partnership between MEPC and Prince Alwaleed has borne fruit. In March 2007, Prince Alwaleed30 announced that he was supplementing his earlier donation of $100,000 to MEPC with a $1 million gift for its teachertraining programs.31 In 2011 U.S. Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper made the transparently false statement that elements of the Muslim Brotherhood [italics added] were “largely secular” in testimony to Congress. The 2013 Boston Marathon bombing was the 59th publicly known Islamist-inspired terror plot against the United States since 9/11.32 In recent years, the number of such plots has tripled from three per year to nine.33 And yet, on January 15, 2014, news broke that U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder would soon issue new Department of Justice (DOJ) guidelines that will prohibit religious “profiling” in terror cases.34 The FBI, part of the DOJ and the federal law enforcement agency primarily responsible for counterterrorism, had already been forced to scrub references to “Islam”

and “jihad” from its counterterrorism training materials.35 Attorney General Holder reportedly now wants to make it illegal for agents to even consider religion and national origin in their investigations. The FBI purge of antiterrorism training material and curricula deemed “offensive” occurred following a February 8, 2012 meeting between FBI Director Robert Mueller and various Islamic organizations, many of them apparent Muslim Brotherhood front groups.36 Among them were the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), and the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT). Both the ISNA and CAIR

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United States President Barack Obama is briefed on the 2013 Boston Marathon explosions, in the Oval Office, on 16 April 2013. Photo by: White House

had been named by the government in 2007 as unindicted co-conspirators in the Holy Land Foundation terrorist financing trial.37 In 2012, after CNN had already aired unambiguous photos of mortar impacts, members of the Obama administration alleged the Benghazi embassy attack was related to spontaneous “protests”. What is the source of information that has led these officials to make such illogical statements and issue such counterproductive orders?

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Olson is a retired sheriff’s department Criminal Investigation Bureau commander. He is the author of Tactical Counterterrorism: The Law Enforcement Manual of Terrorism Prevention, published by Charles C. Thomas Publishing.

40 The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014

ENDNOTES Amb. Curtin Winsor, Ph.D. (200710-22). “Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism and the Spread of Sunni Theofascism”. Global Politician. 2 Olson, Dean, 2008. Perfect Enemy: The Law Enforcement Manual of Islamist Terrorism, Charles C,. Thomas, Pub., Springfield, IL, p. 48. 3 Judicial Watch Special Report: U.S. Government Purges of Law Enforcement Training Material Deemed “Offensive” to Muslims, December 5, 2013, Judicial Watch,, Washington, DC 20024, p. 302. 4 Footnote to Surah 2:190 on page 39 of The official Wahhabi version of the Qur’an is entitled The Noble Qur’an published in Saudi Arabia by the “King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Holy Qur’an, Madinah, K.S.A.” 1

http://www.investigativeproject.org/ documents/testimony/324.pdf 6 Ibid 3. P.41 7 “..The 9-1 1 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Lipon the United States” W.W. Norton & Company: July 2004 at p. 372. 8 Ibid 3, p.40. 9 Ramashray Upadhyay, “‘Muslim Brotherhood’ – An ideological Protectorate of Saudi Arabia?,” Ikwhanweb, December 29, 2009, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article. php?id=22363&ref=search.php 10 http://www.discoverthenetworks.org/ viewSubCategory.asp?id=815 11 Ibid 3, p. 244. 12 Ibid 3, p. 48. 13 Center for Policing Terrorism, 5

n.d. Guide to Wahhabi Organizations in North America, Center for Policing Terrorism. Manhattan Institute, NY for Policy Research. www.cptmi.org/ http://www.cpt-mi.org/ WahabbiOragnziationsNorthAmerica.pdf 14 Pen vs. Sword, 2004. The Islamization of American Schools: A critique of the course and textbook on Islam taught to the 7th grade students in California Public Schools, The Pen vs. The Sword, Los Angeles, CA, December, 2004. 15 Hostein, Lisa and Fishkoff, Sue, 2005. Tainted Teachings, What Your Kids are Learning about Israel, America, and Islam, Parts 1 through 4, JTA Staff Report, Jewish Telegraph Agency, October 27, 2005, http://jta.org/schools. asp.

Kurtz, Stanley, 2007. Saudi in the Classroom: A fundamental front in the war, National Review Online, http:// article.nationalreview.com/?q=YjRhZjYw MjU4MGY5ODJmM2MzNGNhNzljM zk4ZDFiYmQ. Published July 25, 2007. 17 Ibid 16. 18 Ibid 16. 19 Ibid 16. 20 Ibid 16. 21 Stotsky, Sandra, 2004. The Stealth Curriculum: Manipulating America’s History Teachers, Thomas B. Fordham Foundation, Washington, DC. 22 Ibid 15. 23 Ibid 21. 24 Ibid 21. 25 This particular bit of fake history may soon be cleaned up at the request of the Algonquin Nation. In 2003, 16

the Algonquin Nation Secretariat, in Quebec, became aware of the academic travesty being committed in its name (i.e., English explorers meeting Algonquin chiefs with Muslim names) and issued an alert on November 28, 2003, “to state that there is no credible evidence to support these theories, in the archival record, academic study, or in oral history” and that “we are extremely concerned that such nonsense would be circulated as curriculum intended for use in schools.”[13]The Secretariat calls upon the sponsors of the Arab World Studies Notebook to render an “explanation and an apology” for “material that is so patently untrue and academically indefensible.” 26 Ibid 21. 27 Ibid 21.

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Ibid 15. Ibid 15. 30 This is the same Prince Alwaleed whose $10 million post-9/11 gift was returned by New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani because that gift was accompanied by a letter blaming American foreign policy for the attack on the Pentagon and World Trade Center. 31 Ibid 16. 32 Jessica Zuckerman, Steven P. Bucci, PhD, and James Jay Carafano, PhD, 60 Terrorist Plots Since 9/11: Continued Lessons in Domestic Counterterrorism, Special Report 137, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC. 33 Ibid, p.3 34 Apuzzo, Matt, 2014. Justice Dept. to change rules on terror investigations, New York Times, Jan. 16, 2014, p. A1. 35 Scarborough, Rowan, 2013. Obama’s scrub of Muslim terms under question; common links in attacks, Washington Times, April 25, 2013 36 Judicial Watch Special Report: U.S. Government Purges of Law Enforcement Training Material Deemed “Offensive” to Muslims, December 5, 2013, Judicial Watch,, Washington, DC 20024. 37 Johnson, Scott, 2007. AUGUST 22, 2007 Coming Clean About CAIR, CAIR finds itself among the unindicted co-conspirators of the Holy Land Foundation, http://www.nationalreview. com/articles/221895/coming-cleanabout-cair/scott-w-johnson. U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation, United States District Court, Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, CR NO. 3:04-CR-240-G, Attachment A, List of Unindicted Coconspirators. 28 29

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BOOK REVIEW

“An Explanatory Memorandum” from the Archives of the Muslim Brotherhood in America Written by: Mohamed Akram

Reviewed by: Chris Graham

n August 2004, an alert Maryland police officer observed a woman wearing traditional Islamic garb videotaping the support structures of the Chesapeake Bay Bridge from a vehicle, and conducted a traffic stop. The driver, Ismail Elbarasse, was detained on an outstanding warrant issued in connection with investigations of fundraising for Hamas. The FBI executed a search warrant on Elbarasse’s residence in Virginia. In the basement, agents found a secret room full of documents. Documents from this raid were entered into evidence during the U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation trial. One of the most important papers was entitled An Explanatory Memorandum: On the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America. Written by Muslim Brotherhood, North American Board of Directors member and senior Hamas leader Mohamed Akram, it is accessible in “An Explanatory Memorandum” from the Archives of the Muslim Brotherhood in America (Center for Security Policy, 2013). The memorandum is reproduced from the official federal court translation of government Exhibit 003–0085 3:04 – CR – 240 – G from U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation, et al. CSP’s introduction describes the memo: “It was meant for internal

America which was approved by the Shura Council and the Organizational Conference for the year [1987] is ‘Enablement of Islam in North America,’ meaning: establishing effective and a stable Islamic Movement led by the Muslim Brotherhood which adopts Muslims’ causes domestically and globally, which works to expand the observant Muslim base, aims at unifying and directing Muslims’ efforts, presents Islam is a civilization alternative, and supports the global Islamic State wherever it is.” The Muslim Brotherhood document explains: “The process of settlement is a ‘Civilization-Jihadist process’ with all the word means. The Ikwhan [Brotherhood] must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and “sabotaging” its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all other religions. Without this level of understanding, we are not up to this challenge and have not prepared ourselves for Jihad yet. It is a Muslim’s destiny to perform Jihad and work wherever he is and wherever he lands until the final hour comes, and there is no escape from that destiny…”

44 The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014

review by the Brothers’ leadership in Egypt. It was certainly not intended for public consumption… in …the United States.” The intro also asserts, “[These] papers … confirm what investigators and counterterrorism experts had long suspected and contended about the myriad Muslim-American groups in United States: nearly all of them are controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood.” The translated document states, “The general strategic goal of the Group in

The memo asserts that the role of the Brotherhood “is the initiative, pioneering, leadership, raising the banner and pushing people in that direction. They are then to work to employ, direct and unify Muslims’ efforts and powers for this process. In order to do that, we must possess a mastery of the art of ‘coalitions,’ the art of ‘absorption,’ and the principles of ‘cooperation’ …. The success of the Movement in America and establishing an observant Islamic base with power and effectiveness will be the best support and aid to the global Movement project.” Akram explains, “If we examined the human and the financial resources the Ikwhan [Brotherhood] alone own in this country, we and others would feel proud and glorious. And if we add to them and the resources of our friends and allies, those who circle in our orbit and those waiting on our banner, we would realize that we are able to open the door to settlement and walk through it seeking to make Almighty God’s word the highest.” The Muslim Brotherhood memo advocates a “gradual” process. It states, “We have a seed for a ‘comprehensive media and art’ organization: we own… audio and visual center + art production office + magazines in Arabic and English

… + photographers + producers + programs anchors + journalists + in addition to other media and art.…” The memo provides “A list of our organizations and the organizations of our friends… ISNA, Islamic Society of North America, MSA, Muslim Students Association, MCA, Muslim Communities Association, AMSS, the Association of Muslim Social Scientists, AMSE, Association of Muslim Scientists and Engineers, IMA, Islamic Medical Association, ITC, Islamic Teaching Center, NAIT, North American Islamic Trust, FID, Foundation for International Development, IHC, Islamic Housing Cooperative, ICD, Islamic Centers Division, ATP, American Trust Publications, AVC, Audio-Visual Center, IBS, Islamic Book Service, MBA, Muslim Businessmen Association, MYNA, Muslim Youth of North America, IFC, ISNA FIQH Committee, IPAC, ISNA Political Awareness Committee, IED Islamic Education Department, MAYA, Muslim Arab Youth Association, MISG, Malaysian Islamic Study Group, IAP, Islamic Association for Palestine, UASR United Association for Studies and Research, OLF, Occupied Land Fund, MIA, Mercy International Association,

ISNA, Islamic Circle of North America, BMI, Baitul Mal Inc., IIIT, International Institute for Islamic Thought, [and the] IIC, Islamic Information Center….” Muslim Brotherhood alumni support the worldwide ideology of Islamic supremacism, either by serving as a nonviolent “carrot” to subvert governments, as is advocated in An Explanatory Memorandum, or as a “stick” to deliver manipulative pressure by serving in terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, Hamas, and countless others. It is their objectives that must be defeated, not merely one of the complimenting strategies or the other. An Explanatory Memorandum should be required reading for the law enforcement agents and military personnel of all Western nations. The book is invaluable for officials who wish to avoid embarrassing themselves further with dangerous ignorance, and for citizens who wish to understand the threat they face and possess the knowledge necessary to educate friends and family.

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Graham is a former commander of a military anti-terrorism unit and he is the editor of The Counter Terrorist magazine (www.30-10pistol.com)

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BACRIM:

COLOMBIAN BANDAS CRIMINALES EMERGENTES

46 The 46 TheCounter CounterTerrorist Terrorist~ ~ April/May April/May 2014 2014

Medellín (Antioquia),Colombia Photo by: EEIM

By John P. Sullivan

Conflict and crime converge in interesting ways. As the relevance of the nation-state declines, gangsters, revolutionaries, and terrorists interact in a variety of ways that are increasingly significant.1 “Bacrim” may represent an emerging and adaptive adversary in Colombia, the epicenter of contemporary drug wars.

BACRIM: PARAMILITARY SUCCESSORS

n estimated 3,800-10,000 people are believed to participate in criminal bands formed from the remnants of Colombia’s paramilitaries.2 These groups, known as bandas criminales (criminal gangs) or bandas criminals emergentes (emerging criminal gangs)—BACRIM—are exploiting the vacuum left in the wake of the demobilization of the Autodefensas

Unidas de Colombia, or AUC (United SelfDefense Forces of Colombia) in 2006. The demobilization of the AUC left many of its 31,670 members adrift. The AUC, which was formed in the late 1990s to combat the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia/ Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), derived approximately 70% of its revenue from narcotrafficking. As a

result, many demobilizing paramilitaries saw the amnesty for armed groups as an opportunity to move into the narco trade for themselves. Former paramilitary leaders and soldiers formed new bands to exploit the lucrative drug trade.3 The term BACRIM was coined by former Colombian President Álvaro Uribe to describe the emerging criminal gangs. Alternative names for the gangs

The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014 47

Terrorist attack by the FARC with a car bomb at the headquarters of Caracol Radio. The attack left 43 people injured. Photo by: Julián Ortega Martínez

Álvaro Uribe, President of Colombia. Photo by: Center for American Progress

48 The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014

include New Illegal Armed Groups (NIAGs)4 and neo-paramilitaries. Among the gangs identified as BACRIM are: Águilas Negras, Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia, Banda Criminal de Urabá, Los Urabeños, Los Machos, Los Paisas, Renacer, Nueva Generación, Los Rastrojos, ERPAC, Cordillera, Cacique Pipintá, Grupo de Martín Llanos, Los Nevados, and La Oficina de Envigado.5 BACRIM are believed to operate in 31 of Colombia’s 32 departments. Estimates of their strength range from a National Police assessment of 3,870 members to an Institute of Studies for Development and Peace (INDEPAZ) assessment of 7,000. Human Rights Watch places the estimate higher at 10,000 members.6

The top six groups include: Los Urabeños, in the departments of Antioquía, Chocó, Bolívar, Magdalena and Norte de Santander; Los Rastrojos, in Nariño, Cauca and Putumayo; and El Bloque Meta, Los Libertadores de Vichada, Renacer and Los Machos, in Meta, Vichada and Guainía.7 In 2008 Bacrim presence was reported in 259 municipalities, by 2009 in 278, in 2010 360, and in 2011 they were found in 347 of Colombia’s 1,102 municipalities (a slight decrease). In 2011 Los Rastrojos sustained a presence in 207 municipalities, while Los Urabeños were present in 181. Águilas Negras was present in 88 municipalities, Los Paisas in 87, and ERPAC in 36 towns. The situation is reportedly most critical in

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The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014 49

Antioquía, Bolívar, Chocó, Sucre, and Valle.8 The ERPAC officially surrendered to the government in 2011, but less than half its members actually surrendered. The remaining members continue their operations as part of two rival factions: El Bloque Meta and Libertadores de Vichada.9

BACRIM ACTIVITIES

FARC guerrillas during the Caguan peace process March 22, 2006. Photo by: DEA Public Affairs

The BACRIM are involved in drug trafficking, extortion, unauthorized mining, and smuggling contraband. However, their core competency is deeply rooted in narcotrafficking, including growing coca, processing coca into cocaine, and moving cocaine to international cartels. The BACRIM are also involved in gambling, prostitution, unauthorized logging, extortion, arms trafficking and fuel smuggling.10 The BACRIM work with a range of gangs and guerrilla groups to sustain the drug trade. According to a BBC report, the Colombian government believes that, “in some regions they have joined forces with left-wing rebels [like the FARC and ELN-Ejército de Liberación Nacional] to run drug-trafficking operations, while

in other areas the new gangs and the guerrillas have clashed.”11 The various BACRIM bands also fight among themselves for turf and control of illicit trade flows. For example, battles between Los Rastrojos and Los Urabeños in 2006-2009 left 2,300 dead during that three-year timeframe.12 Public corruption is also a key feature of BACRIM activity. In order to protect their turf and business interests and gain freedom of movement, BACRIM (like other organized crime entities) suborn public officials through bribes and corruption. Over 200 contemporary Colombian anticorruption investigations involve BACRIM connections with officials. These officials include police, security forces, municipal council members, and mayors.13 The corrosive presence of BACRIMlinked corruption is believed to be the legacy of linkages between public officials and the BACRIM’s paramilitary predecessor the AUC. The current political power of the BACRIM is assessed to be less substantial than that of the AUC, but it has the potential to grow if left unchecked.

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TRANSNATIONAL CONNECTIONS BACRIM have spread their tentacles beyond Colombia’s borders. This expansion results from a dual desire to enhance profit and to elude the reach of the Colombian government. This expansion is also a consequence of the global illicit flows: the markets are global and transnational actors gain competitive advantage. Los Rastrojos are believed to be allies of the Mexican Sinaloa Cartel while their rivals Los Urabeños are linked to Sinaloa’s enemy, Los Zetas.14 Certainly, the expanding transnational reach of Mexican cartels and transnational gangs like Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) have contributed to this search for new markets. BACRIM leaders have been found in Argentina, Bolivia, Honduras, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. In addition, BACRIM are believed to be directly operating in Spain and Italy, where they can earn three times the profit they can realize from trading with Mexican cartels.15

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Operation Martillo, Spanish for hammer, is a U.S., European and Western Hemisphere partner nation effort targeting illicit trafficking routes in coastal waters along the Central American isthmus. Photo by: U.S. Navy

The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014 51

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead drives a captured semi-submersible boat while meeting with Colombian coast guard forces at Naval Base Bolivar in Cartagena, Columbia, Dec. 5, 2009. Photo by: Tiffini Jones Vanderwyst

ADAPTIVE ACTORS AND STATE CHALLENGES Colombia has been working toward demobilizing guerrilla groups. As part of a “transitional justice” initiative toward peace, the Colombian Congress approved a “Legal Framework for Peace.” As part of that framework, guerillas were recognized as actors in armed conflict and given lenient judicial treatment on their surrender. Members of the BACRIM are excluded from this approach (which was applied to ERPAC in 2011 and the AUC in 2003 on the rationale that they

52 The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014

are purely criminal actors).16 Despite this view, victims of BACRIM atrocity are eligible in Colombia for the same type of reparations afforded victims of conventional guerrilla groups.17 The BACRIM are clandestine challengers to the state. Like other “criminal insurgents,” they seek to avoid interference from the government.18 They do so by corrupting and co-opting state officials and institutions. Co-opted officials give the BACRIM cover and help them elude prosecution. The BACRIM morphed from guerrilla groups, becoming militarized criminal enterprises

(essentially third generation gangs),19 using violence as a means of seeking control of narco enterprises and other criminal activities (mainly extortion). As law professor David Attanasio observed, “BACRIM primarily affect marginalized populations of limited interest to state officials. The main areas where BACRIM have control are rural areas suitable for the manufacturing or transportation of cocaine and impoverished zones in cities.”20 While many note the BACRIM, like other brigands, have a sparse political agenda, the gangs do have a

Fuel containers modified to carry an estimated $70,000 of cocaine sit on the flight deck of the guided-missile frigate USS Carr (FFG 52) after being seized during Operation Martillo. Photo by: Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Ian W. Anderson

political dimension. In Medellín the Urabeños claimed responsibility for a drop in murders in the aftermath of a criminal pact between themselves and the Oficina de Envigado.21 The pact and drop in murder have clear political dividends, especially as the “Urabeños like to maintain the pretense they are a political organization in the mold of their paramilitary predecessors, capable of replacing the state when it fails.”22

CONCLUSION: LESSONS FOR SECURITY The BACRIM seek dominance in criminal enterprise, as well as territorial and social control in the areas they operate, in order to sustain organizational viability and profitability. In sustaining viability and profitability, they challenge the state. Two major lessons emerge. First, relying on vigilantes to combat rebels

is fraught with danger. The vigilantes (paramilitaries or autodefensas) need funds to operate and often garner them from criminal enterprises. Second, armed groups rarely totally abandon violence when the conflict is over. Opportunity for rebels, criminal soldiers, and gangsters is limited. Violence and profit (as well as plunder) often become their “reason for being.” This is a continuing concern in Colombia, where the government is negotiating a peace with the FARC. Like the AUC before them, many FARC operatives may find opportunity among the BACRIM. In addition, in Michoacán, Mexico, we are also seeing a rise of autodefensas (self-defense forces, aka vigilantes) as the state appears ineffective or insufficient for combatting drug cartels. It may be a function of time before that current crop of vigilantes mimics the BACRIM.

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Sullivan (PhD) is a senior fellow at Small Wars Journal-El Centro and an adjunct researcher at the Fundación Vortex in Bogotá, Colombia. He serves as a lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department.

ENDNOTES For an overview of converging illicit networks, see Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization, ed. Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer, National Defense University Press, 2013. 2 Ernesto Suárez Gómez. “BACRIM: Heirs to Colombia’s paramilitary groups.” Infosuryhoy, September 18, 2013. Available at: http://infosurhoy. com/en_GB/articles/saii/features/ main/2013/09/18/feature-02. 1

The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014 53

Gómez, 2013. NIAG is the term preferred by the International Crisis Group, see “Dismantling Colombia’s New Illegal Armed Groups: Lessons from a Surrender.” Latin America Report, No41, June 8, 2012. Available at: http:// www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latinamerica-caribbean/andes/colombia/041dismantling-colombias-new-illegalarmed-groups-lessons-from-a-surrender. aspx. 5 “BACRIMs, Colombia’s “New” Nightmare.” LatAm-Threads, August 18, 2012. Available at: http://latamthreads.blogspot.com/2012/08/bacrimscolombias-new-nightmare.html. 6 Gómez, 2013. 7 Gómez, 2013. 8 “Bandas criminales operan en 347 municipios.” El Espectador, November 17, 2011. Available at: http://www. elespectador.com/impreso/temadeldia/ articulo-311652-bandas-criminalesoperan-347-municipios. 9 “ERPAC.” InSight Crime. Available at: http://www.insightcrime.org/groupscolombia/erpac. 10 LatAm-Threads, 2012. 11 “Profiles: Colombia’s armed groups.” BBC News, August 29, 2013. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldlatin-america-11400950. 12 Gómez, 2013. 13 James Bargent. “Investigations 3 4

Show Reach of BACRIM in Colombia.” InSight Crime, November 5, 2013. Available at: http://www.insightcrime. org/news-briefs/over-200-investigationsshow-reach-of-bacrim-corruption-incolombia. 14 Paula Delgado-Kling. “Mexican Cartels Making Territory in Colombia, Allying with Bacrim and FARC.” Talking About Colombia, March 12, 2013. Available at: http://talkingaboutcolombia. com/2013/03/12/mexican-cartelsmarking-territory-in-colombia-allyingwith-bacrim-and-farc/. 15 Gómez, 2013. 16 Mariel Perez-Santiago. “Colombia’s BACRIM: Common Criminals or Actors in Armed Conflict?” InSight Crime, July 23, 2012. Available at: http:// www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/ colombias-bacrim-common-criminals-oractors-in-armed-conflict. 17 David Attanasio. “Emerging Voices: Drug Cartels, Bacrim, and Other Militarized Criminal Organizations–A New Role for the Inter-American System?” Opino Juris, August 29, 2013. Available at: http://opiniojuris. org/2013/08/29/emerging-voices-drugcartels-bacrim-militarized-criminalorganizations-new-role-inter-americansystem/. 18 John P. Sullivan. “From Drug Wars to Criminal Insurgency: Mexican Cartels, Criminal Enclaves and Criminal

Insurgency in Mexico and Central America, and their Implications for Global Security.” Vortex Working Paper No. 6, Bogotá: Fundación Vortex, March 2012. Available at: http://www.scivortex. org/6FromDrugWarsCriminalInsurgen cy.pdf. 19 John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker. “A Crucible of Conflict: Third Generation Gang Studies Revisited.” Journal of Gang Research, 19.4 (2012): 1-20. Available at: http://scholarship. claremont.edu/cgu_fac_pub/140/. 20 Attanasio, 2013. 21 Charles Parkinson, “Urabeños Claim Responsibility for Drop in Medellin Murders,” InSight Crime, January 13, 2014. Available at: http://www. insightcrime.org/news-briefs/urabenosand-authorities-dispute-credit-for-drop-inmedellin-murders. 22 Parkinson, 2014.

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Community Engagement to Counter-Extremism: A Global Imperative - Rohan Gunaratna

56 The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014

Introduction:

In the spectrum of national and international security threats, terrorism ranks high in most countries and regions. Since 1968, the world witnessed the rise of international terrorism. The threat posed by left and right wing and ethno-political terrorism has been eclipsed by the threat of politico-religious terrorism. Whether a struggle is legitimate or not, politically-motivated groups that seek to deliberately target civilians are terrorists. As opposed to terrorists, guerrillas target security forces personnel. A unique form of violence in the contemporary international system, terrorism threatens social and communal harmony. Terrorism is a vicious by-product of ideological extremism. Terrorismâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s precursor, extremist ideologies can be politico-religious, ethno-political, left wing, and right wing in orientation. With the heightening of extremism, threat groups will adopt a strategy of violence including terrorism. The spectrum of political violence includes insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism. Terrorists use a repertoire of tactics - intimidation, extortion, robbery, kidnapping, hijacking, assassination, ambush, armed assault, sabotage, and bombing, including suicide attacks.

With the failure of governments

to contain terrorism, most threat groups will expand and deepen their public support. Overreaction by the government to a threat generates public support and sympathy for terrorist cause. In terrorist or counter terrorist campaigns, the public are not neutral. Polarized along the ethnic and religious faultlines, communities tend to take sides. Overtime, community positions harden and eventually a tiny percentage participates in terrorist activity, sustaining a campaign of violence. If not checked, the terrorist group will develop insurgent capabilities and target both civilians and security forces personnel.

The Context:

Today, guerrilla and terrorist groups spent more time and resources politicizing, radicalizing and militarizing their support bases than mounting attacks. They replenish material losses and human wastage by generating support both within and outside their territories of operation. Due to

Professor Rohan Gunaratna spoke about the current and emerging trends and threat of terrorism and extremism during the National Community Engagement Programme (CEP) Seminar globalization, especially enhanced international travel and ease of communication, the developments in conflict zones have a far reaching impact. Although not direct participants of the conflict, co-ethnics and co-religionists living far away from conflict zones have been influenced. For instance, when innocent Muslims are killed in Iraq and Afghanistan, Palestine and Kashmir, Southern Thailand and Mindanao, their resentment and anger can translate into support and sympathy for those affected families. Even if the operations were directed against insurgents, unintended collateral damage prompted co-ethnics and co-religionists to develop hatred and revenge against national and international security forces. A few may be driven to travel to those conflict zones to support their co-ethnic and co-religionists and even participate in insurgent support and operational activity. To generate awareness and support, others organize political rallies and fundraising events. A few mount attacks against the very governments that target their ethnic and religious brethren. Although international terrorism has been a phenomenon since 1968, the nature and scale of the threat has changed during the last decade. Due to globalization especially the growing sophistication of extremist propaganda, governments are challenged. Governments can seize extremist literature from safe houses but to reappear on Internet based platforms: websites, blogs, chat rooms etc. Those living in conflict zones, neighbouring countries and far away can

be influenced. No longer is the threat confined to conflict zones. The spill over effect is manifested in migrant and diaspora support, communities especially vulnerable to such propaganda. As they live in an ideological bubble, migrant and diaspora pockets identify with developments in conflict zones. The phenomenon of self radicalized cells and individuals in North America, Europe, Singapore and Australia demonstrate the impact of such extremist propaganda. With attacks by such cells and individuals, entire communities may be demonized threatening communal relations. Often, other communities can develop prejudices and resort to violence against the community from which terrorism emerged. Some members of the targeted community can form right wing groups or individuals can react violently like Andres Behring Breivik. Disharmony can weaken and damage the social fabric of any multicultural society. As extremists strive to tare societies apart, governments should increase their interactions to hold diverse communities together. In partnership with community leaders, governments should reach out to vulnerable communities that may be influenced by extremist propaganda and carry out attacks and other communities that may retaliate to such attacks by vigilantism. As a counter to ethnic and religious baiting by extremist ideologues, governments in partnership with community organizations should promote moderation, toleration and coexistence to sustain societal and national cohesion. As terrorist groups The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014 57

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and their proxyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s exploit the Internet to spread their message virally, government and community efforts should be both in real and cyber space.

Engaging the Unengaged:

After the end of the Cold War, ethnicity and religion started to assume a new significance. To the challenge of increasing ethnic and religious polarization catalysed by extremist narratives and ideologies, different governments responded in different ways. With the increase in threat, most governments continued to strengthen their law enforcement, military and intelligence budgets. Rather than invest to sharpen traditional operational tools to detect and disrupt terrorist attacks in the planning and preparation phases, the governments that understood the problem in its totality invested in raising public awareness of the dangers of extremism affecting their people especially youth. Prevention by community immunization is emerging as a central pillar in contemporary counter terrorism strategy. A few governments built partnerships with trusted members of the community and organizations supporting

ad hoc to structured community engagement programs. Although community engagement is the best strategy to counter extremism, most governments have yet to create partnerships, built platforms, develop budgets and train personnel. Historically, governments built capabilities to engage communities but it was to fight crime. Law enforcement authorities, mostly the police realized the value of community goodwill. In the West, engaging communities as a strategy to protect them from ideological extremism has its roots in September 11, 2001. As opposed to paid informants, community sources became the eyes and ears of the communities vulnerable to terrorist penetration â&#x20AC;&#x201C; both infiltration and recruitment. Police community engagement aimed at building relations with the Muslim community was initiated by the Muslim Contact Unit of New Scotland Yard in 2002. However, until the London bombings of July 2005, community engagement programs did not take off. The attacks on underground and surface transportation by terrorists raised in Britain demonstrated the vulnerability of a segment of the British population

to extremist propaganda. As operating through front, cover and sympathetic organizations targeted communities for recruits, financial, intelligence and other forms of support, governments realized that community support is essential to prevent terrorism. In many ways, todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s governments and violent and radical extremists compete to win hearts and minds from a common and potential support base. As a strategy, engagement was the most effective tool to build support by forging trusted networks. Minority communities, politically and economically marginalized were particularly susceptible to extremist indoctrination and terrorist recruitment. By building community partnerships and promoting moderation, toleration and co-existence, the logical thinking was that the community cold be immunized from extremism. By building a norm and an ethic against extremist ideology, the community could be protected from extremist influence. Military, law enforcement and intelligence measures are insufficient to end support for politically motivated violence. As terrorist organizations present a multidimenThe Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014 59

perhaps thinking that they could influence them to embrace harmony. In addition to empowering communities to resolve their own problems, law enforcement authorities and intelligence agencies, started to work with schools, clergy and the media to influence the general population.

European governments invested in community engagement programs after the killed of the Dutch film director Theodoor â&#x20AC;&#x153;Theoâ&#x20AC;? van Gogh. sional threat, it requires confronting the threat both militarily and non-militarily. While the terrorists and guerrillas had to be confronted through military and law enforcement means resiliency against extremist ideology had to be built by engaging the community politically, ideologically, and socially. The approaches in engagement and partnership were developed by trial and error in the first decade after 9/11. As opposed to police initiated community engagement, the leaders and elite of the community initiated engagements with the police. Such engagements led to partnerships where trusted networks were built. As success of counter terrorism depends on secrecy, the sharing of counter terrorism information is sensitive. However, there is strategic information that can be shared without compromising on-going and future counter terrorism operations. When trusted, community members felt that they are stakeholders in maintaining security. That sense of ownership led community members to bring to the attention of the police suspicious activity. Rather than arrest, police developed community solutions. By arranging community elders to counsel, the police facilitated those affected by extremist ideology to re-enter the mainstream. Community participation to counter extremism including violent extremism grew over time. As opposed to an engaged community, a disengaged community unaware of the threat was likely to view counter terrorism operations as targeting the community. 60 The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014

The military, law enforcement authorities and intelligence agencies, the best informed on community radicalization, took the lead. In the battle field, the military, and off-the-battlefield, the law enforcement and intelligence services engaged community elite and their organizations. As a result of a segment of the press stereotyping and stigmatizing Muslims as terrorists, government saw the increase in number of inter-communal incidents including insults and hate crime. One single incident could have sparked a riot. Rather than blindly implement the law, enforcement and intelligence services became more sensitive to community perceptions. To counter the perception that the members of a particular community were being targeted, they briefed community elite and at times gave them access to terrorists arrested. Furthermore, they prepared and released reports to the public to make them aware of the problem. Engagement led to increasing community awareness and understanding of their problems. As some community organizations were infiltrated by extremists and terrorists, government and their partners entrusted with engagement had to be selective. While they engaged everyone, they empowered community organizations selectively. Unfortunately, in the spirit of assisting communities, many well intentioned governments in Canada, UK and Australia empowered community organizations that promoted an extremist agenda. The UK admitted and Canada stopped support but only after a decade of supporting such groups

Government not only engaged the communities but also the private sector. As the terrorists exploited hospitality, financial and other sectors, governments engaged them building their understanding to detect pre-attack indicators. With an increase in government investment, the community and private sector became partners in the fight against extremism and terrorism. By sharing the burden of security, they felt a sense of ownership to protect their own community and businesses. A few enlightened political leaders and senior bureaucrats provided guidance and local government, private sector and community institutions provided leadership. Unless and until a terrorist attack takes place, most countries take peace for granted and deny community radicalization.

Global Programs:

Community engagement programs to counter extremism can be ranked as developed, developing and emerging. The developed programs are in the UK, Saudi Arabia and Singapore; the developing programs are in Europe, Australia and North America; and the emerging programs are in South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, etc), in the Middle East (Yemen, Jordan, Morocco, etc) and in Africa (South Africa and Sahel). The impetus for almost all the community engagement programs was either a successful, failed or aborted terrorist attack. While the UK, Singapore and Saudi Arabia has structured and institutionalized programs to counter extremism, most of the other programs are unstructured and ad hoc. The British, with a long history of fighting terrorism in Northern Ireland and elsewhere, realized the value of engaging the Muslim community after 9/11. Police community engagement aimed at building relations with the Muslim community was initiated by the Muslim Contact Unit of New Scotland Yard in 2002. Although CONTEST, a strategy by the UK Home

Office was launched to engage communities in early 2003, community engagement programs took off in earnest only after the London bombings of July 2005. With government and private funding several programs emerged including STREET (Strategy to Reach, Empower and Educate), UK, Channel, Supporting individuals vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists, UK; and Quilliam, Challenging Extremism, Promoting Pluralism, and Inspiring Change. A counter-extremism think tank, Quilliam notes: “Challenging extremism is the duty of all responsible members of society. Not least because cultural insularity and extremism are products of the failures of wider society to foster a shared sense of belonging and to advance liberal democratic values.” Radical Middle Way founded in the wake of the 7/7 attacks “promote a mainstream, moderate understanding of Islam that young people can relate to. Radical Middle Way is a safe place for people to ask difficult questions and explore challenging issues... Since 2005, Radical Middle Way has delivered over 230 programmes and events in the UK, Pakistan, Sudan, Indonesia, Mali and Morocco. In the UK alone, over 75,000 people have participated. Tens of thousands more have participated.’ To engage the community under Prevent II, the UK police started to work with the local councils in 2011. After al Qaeda attacked killing 35 and injuring 160 in a compound in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the Saudi royalty and religious establishment developed a multifaceted community engagement program. The program includes engaging communities both in real and cyber space from Friday sermons to the on-line al Sakina campaign. The 1956 riots killed 13 and injured over 100 in Singapore. To stop the fault lines appearing again, the community leaders of Singaporeans met. “They called it a goodwill gathering.” However, Singapore’s community engagement program to counter-extremism was conceived after a terrorist plot was disrupted in December 2001. Due to the continuity of threat, locally, regionally and globally, the Community Engagement Program of Singapore was launched in 2006. The developing programs are in continental Europe, North America, and Australia. After Mohammed Bouyeri, a Dutch Moroccan Muslim killed the Dutch film director Theodoor “Theo” van Gogh on November 2, 2004, European governments invested in community engagement

programs. Although the Madrid training bombing conducted on March 11, 2004 killing 191 people and wounding 1,800 perpetrated by European born or raised Muslims demonstrated the threat, it was not until the van Gogh killing the Europeans realized that community radicalization had to be tackled. Not all governments agreed. In France, for instance, the government did not invest in community engagement programs. “Community approach means there is a problem between communities. The word is dangerous. In France, there are no communities. In contrast to the UK where they respect and empower communities, we want to integrate everyone into the French society. Such a program will not work in France for social and historical reasons.” A few European NGOs responded to community radicalization even before the contemporary wave of politio-religious radicalization. Among the programs created were the EXIT programme, Sweden; Violence Prevention Network, Germany; CoPPRa (Community policing and the prevention of radicalisation), Belgium; The Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism project to tackle hate speech on the Internet, Belgium. The Netherlands Ministry of Justice launched a series of programs to engage the Muslims diaspora including through the local councils. Although Canada and Australia did not suffer from terrorism on its own soil, they hosted diaspora and migrant communities that actively supported terrorism elsewhere. If not for effective intelligence and law enforcement operations, both Canada and Australia would have suffered from terrorism by homegrown groups. Their community engagement strategy was deeply influenced by UK Contest. To promote government-community collaborationCross-Cultural Roundtable on Security, jointly supported by Public Safety Canada and the Department of Justice, brought leaders of communities. They engaged with government by raising social and cultural issues. National Security Community Outreach, a local initiative of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Force, engaged radicalized segments of Canadian migrant and diaspora communities especially in Toronto and Montreal. Like the Chaplains in the UK came under government scrutiny, government encouraged and enabled universities to engage imams to promote moderation. To strengthen community relationships, the

Australian Federal Police built Community Liaison Teams. To increase awareness of diverse communities, AFP hosted annual Iftar/Eid dinners, sporting events including football matches, Muslim women’s camps and education initiatives aimed at resisting extremist narratives. In addition to developing a Community Integration Support Program, the AFP also created a Parole programs for those currently incarcerated. AFP’s three pronged approach was religious education, practical support and community relations. In addition to government initiatives, National security hotlines, that was of exceptional value, several community and civil society organizations made a change in the Australian threat landscape. For instance, the Lebanese, Somali, Pakistani and other high risk communities were engaged. From Queensland to Victoria and New South Wales, projects supported by the Office of the Attorney General of Australia were developed to “counter narrative messages to challenge Islamic militancy propaganda.” The programs in North America, continental Europe and Australia demonstrated early attempts to educate the host communities about Islam and Muslims but with limited success. Compared to the Europeans, Americans are resilient to extremist and terrorist propaganda of dividing Muslims from non-Muslims. As American ideals include equality, more than most others Americans transcend differences of religion, ethnicity, and place of birth. However, the US government focused on fighting terrorism did not invest seriously in engaging the Muslim communities on US soil until the Obama Administration. With President Obama determined to develop a comprehensive strategy, US seriously stepped into community engagement only in August 2011. Several US supported NGOs are active both on US soil and overseas. Zaytuna Institute in California headed Hamza Yusuf Hanson, an American convert to Islam, worked on both sides of the Atlantic. He invited mainstream speakers that distinguished between fundamentalist and extremism to influence community especially youth thinking. Community engagement to counter extremism is a relatively new tool in most of Middle East, Asia and Africa. Traditionally, diverse communities have lived in peace. For instance, Jewish communities lived throughout the Middle East and in Asia The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014 61

including in Iraq and Afghanistan. With ethnicity and religion assuming salience at the end of the 20th century, both governments and civil society organizations have invested in some community engagement initiatives. Although governments in the Middle East and in Muslim Asia have been fighting Muslim extremism and terrorism prior to 9/11, they did not perceive it as a community problem. Considered deviants, these governments tolerated and when the problem became significant used force and detention as tools. However, after 9/11, the rulers and religious establishment of most Middle Eastern and Asian Muslim governments realized that law enforcement and intelligence services alone cannot fight this battle. To influence the communities, both secular and religious leaders made statements promoting moderation. Some leaders such as the King of Jordan, Morocco and Brunei took a visible

civil society and community organizations built a partnership with governments beginning to counter extremism in a few countries. A few programs are supported by Western governments after September 11, 2011. Australia, UK and US openly and discretely funded projects in Indonesia to mainstream community thinking. Together with the Government of Indonesia, the U.S. Department of Justice’s International Criminal InvestigativeTraining Assistance Program (ICITAP) began a Countering Violent Extremism Project in 2010 to assess “community perspectives of enablers of community destabilization, with a focus of building strategies to counter violent extremism through community-based derived initiatives and interventions.” Similarly, NGOs in Indonesia produced films, books and cartoons targeting school. Both the Lazuardi Birru and the International Institute of Peace

programs emerged only after a terrorist event resulting in an ethnic or religious riot. While thousands of Sikhs were killed after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated in 1984, hundreds of Tamils were killed by mobs after the LTTE attacked an army patrol in northern Sri Lanka in 1983. In India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, community engagement programs take the shape of reconciliation initiatives. At the end of the conflict in Sri Lanka in May 2009, the Sri Lankan military transformed rapidly from a war fighting to a nation building force. The military and police have developed Philippines and Thailand community engagement programs to varying degrees of success. In the Philippines, both the US Embassy and Special Operations worked closely with the Philippine military to build a robust civil military operations capability. In active conflict zones, civil military opera-

VIP attendees at the Australian Federal Police 2013 Eid Dinner in Sydney and lead role. Furthermore, religious institutions were encouraged to vet the Friday sermons in some countries. Although not collectively for all mosques, these sermons influenced Muslims not to overreact to developments in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Kashmir etc. Education curricula and recommended readings were reviewed in a few countries. In a few countries, both

Building in Jakarta engage university students and former radicals through films, comics and cartoons. Both the police in Indonesia including a new body – the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) and the Special Task Force (Operations and Counter Terrorism) of the Malaysian police responded to invitation to address schools and universities. In South Asia,

tions and community engagement initiatives overlapped. With the penetration of extremist ideologies, Africa is emerging as a new theatre for terrorist operations. Following the spill over effects of the revolution in Libya, AFRICOM is planning to build a community engagement capacity in the Sahel. The South African government working with civil society and The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014 63

community organizations has built community engagement initiatives to tackle non-security issues. The development of extremism in West Africa (Nigeria), North Africa (Algeria) and East Africa (Somalia) can be resisted and contained through community engagement efforts.

Challenges and Opportunities:

In the 21st century, most governments are challenged not only by external but also internal threats. Paramount to maintaining peace and stability is managing diverse communities. Anything to do with ethnicity and religion is emotive and should be tackled sensitively. If not such political and social issues degenerated into security issues. Threats that emanated from within the community had to be best handled through a government-community partnership. However, not all governments believe that terrorism is a community problem but a challenge for intelligence and law enforcement. While some governments supported the mosaic model by empowering different communities, others advocated the melting pot model by reinforcing integration. Muslims (mostly of North African heritage) are about 5.5 million out of 65 million or about 8 percent of the French population. About 500 Salafist Jihadists who want to control mosques advocate, support and participate in violence. Although the French acknowledge that radicalization is the gateway to terrorism, they consider the number radicalized as negligible. The former Investigative Magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguiere said: “They do not trust family and community. Each individual have his or her experience. Majority have personal problems. Charismatic Imams attract those with fragile minds. Most community engagement programs worldwide werec triggered by an event or a series of events. Over time, these unstructured and ad hoc programs become structured and streamlined with national policies with a clear activity plan, objectives and goals. With institutionalization, the survivability of the program is guaranteed. Nonetheless, for such programs to be effective, it must be a partnership where it is bottom-up led by community leaders involving different strata of society with government providing the general guidelines. Rather than wait for government to initiate, everyone who desires fu64 The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014

ture peace and stability, should work for it. The strata of society are: First, government, second, community, third, private sector, and fourth, civil society. These four principal sectors should contribute with a coordinating body. The visionary leaders in government, political opposition, other political parties, business community, education sector, religious establishment, media, artists, youth organizations, NGOs and diaspora should build common platforms to promote ideals of moderation, toleration and coexistence. A common challenge was to identify charismatic religious practitioners who could reach the masses and converse both inside and outside the mosque. To influence the Muslim community, they had to work through not only the religious institutions (mosque) but the educational establishment (madrasah), and, the mainstream and social media. To build bonds by enhancing the interaction between Muslim and non-Muslim communities, they also had to engage the non-Muslims public faces. To negate the impression that community engagement programs are targeting Muslim, such programs to promote harmony should be infused to the mainstream. Political will at the highest level was required to develop and implement community engagement programs. Like rehabilitation programs, community engagement programs need sustained support and steadfast backing from the apex leadership. Visionary leaders like the then Minister of Endowments and Guidance, Judge Hamoud Al-Hittar of Yemen from late 2002 to mid 2006 developed a program to mainstream both detainees and the community. However, support for Yemen’s Religious Dialogue programme was disrupted mid way. As the program did not receive the support required from the President and the program had to be discontinued. Some limited activities such as sermons and books continued to be published but did not make a sufficient momentum to stabilize the situation. Furthermore, the success of the program was dependent on the authorities understanding the cultural context. While Saudi Arabia and Singapore developed state-ofthe-art rehabilitation initiatives, the UK met with partial success on rehabilitating terrorist offenders. Any country committed to maintaining a

cohesive society, should invest in a multifaceted community engagement programs. Creating community engagement programs is essential to bridge the disconnect between the people and government. Community engagement is also a tool to hold the diverse communities in a society together especially at times of crisis. Although not for countering extremism, Japan has an effective community engagement program designed to cope during natural disasters. When the Tsunami and nuclear disaster stuck in Japan, the Japanese responded as a nation. The public did not steal, riot or burn down the infrastructure. They realized that preserving law and order and protecting the infrastructure was for their own future. The orderly manner and patience which the Japanese demonstrated was a result of their civil mindedness and character building. The Japanese education system emphasizing nationhood and nation building paid off. Japan built a cohesive society catering to the masses, where everyone’s needs are met. “Community engagement should be for nation building. It will be a waste, if communities are engaged only for countering terrorism. The same network of people can be used in nation building.” Common security can be advanced only by social inclusion meaning not leaving behind any community. If marginalized and alienated from the mainstream, either within that community or from outside, extremist and subversive elements will exploit it for their personal and political reasons. As the entire world becomes more and more multicultural, leaders should create their own engagement initiatives to reach out to the other. This will reduce inevitable misunderstandings that may arise from time to time as a result of ethnic, religious, regional and political differences. To reconcile the hearts of those affected, a multifaceted program is essential to engage and build bonds between the communities with a potential to clash. To build long term stability and prosperity in a multicultural nation, reconciliation and harmonious living through community engagement should become a way of life. Rohan Gunaratna is Head, ICPVTR and Professor of Security Studies, S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

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INTERNET SECURITY FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENTS “Doxing” is short for document tracing and revealing information about a person, often for a nefarious reason. This information is gathered through publically available sources on the Internet, social media sites, and via social engineering or hacking.

66 The 66 TheCounter CounterTerrorist Terrorist~ ~ April/May April/May 2014 2014

By Michael Gordon

he main objectives of a person doxing a law enforcement officer include: to cause embarrassment, to harass, to blackmail, or to take revenge. The biggest challenge, however, is that once the personal information is publically disseminated, related and unrelated individuals with criminal intentions have enough information to commit a myriad of crimes.

The groups Anonymous and AntiSec perpetrated a notable example of doxing against law enforcement officers during the 2011 International Chiefs of Police Conference (IACP) in Chicago.1 A press release by Anonymous on October 21, 2011 said, “In solidarity with the Occupation Movement and the International Day of Action Against Police Brutality, allied #anonymous and

#antisec vessels took aim at the corrupt bootboys of the 1%: the police. We hacked, defaced, and destroyed several law enforcement targets, leaking over 600MB of private information including internal documents, membership rosters, addresses, passwords, social security numbers, and other confidential data. According to the IACP’s development documents, their systems cost several

TheThe Counter Counter Terrorist~ Terrorist April/May ~ April/May 2014 2014 67 67

Anonymous with Guy Fawkes masks at the Scientology area in Los Angeles. Photo by: Vincent Diamante

Doxing is not limited to technology savvy activist groups and could easily be committed by your neighbor, coworker, supervisor, or a person you may have come in contact with on the streets or arrested.

68 The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014

hundred thousand dollars. We are pleased to destroy it all for free, leaking their private info and defacing their websites in one swift blow.” Doxing is not limited to technology savvy activist groups and could easily be committed by your neighbor, co-worker, supervisor, or a person you may have come in contact with on the streets or arrested. Doxing creates many safety issues and concerns for law enforcement agents. Doxing is a high tech assault practiced in all jurisdictions today. So what would they be looking to obtain? Some of the most commonly targeted pieces of information are: • Full name • Age, gender, and date of birth • Location and place of birth • Email addresses and username

• Phone number • Social networking profiles, websites, and blogs • IP addresses • Internet Service Provider • Computer Operating Systems • Home Address • Websites • Pictures • Financial information • Medical information • Romantic/sexual information

HOW EASY IS THIS INFORMATION TO OBTAIN? The very first place someone doxing often starts is Google. Google indexes nearly everything on the Internet, sometimes even the most private information. In my two day Open

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The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014 69

U.S. Marine Cpl. Jonathan S. Ayala a Communication specialist from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (15th MEU) programs a Deployed Security Interdiction Device (DSID). Photo by: Lance Cpl. Danny L. Shaffer II

70 The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014

Source Intelligence and Social Media Research and Investigations course, I devote one portion of the class solely to advanced Google searching techniques. I am simply amazed at how easily abundant information and pictures of law enforcement professionals can be obtained through advanced Google searches, without any additional effort. Social networking sites such as Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, and Twitter are virtual jackpots for finding information on an individual. Most people, including law enforcement agents, want privacy online but post tremendous amounts of information about themselves on social media sites. “People who work for LAPD” or “People who work for Department of Homeland Security” typed into Facebook’s Graph Search yields an amazing amount of information on unwary and vulnerable law enforcement professionals. I suspect that most have no idea how much of their information is available. That brings us to the fact that most social media users are unaware of the proper security settings or unaware of how to properly set the security settings. This lack of proper security settings makes it easier for a bad guy to find out your most detailed personal information. Location and other details can often be harvested from posted photos. Twitter, for example, can be a treasure trove of information for a person simply skimming through users’ tweets. Information such as phone numbers, additional social media accounts, friends, and pictures with locations can be found in user tweets. One common problem is that most people use the same user name and email accounts for multiple social media accounts. Locating multiple social media accounts leads to more information, email addresses, pictures, and possible physical addresses. Many

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times people will leave location services turned on their mobile applications when they post pictures, status updates, or comments to social media sites, thus making the individual a much easier target to geolocate. So you say you’re not on social media? Are you mentioned in a friend’s social media? Making people searches on the Internet using websites such as Spokeo2 and Pipl3 can offer a great deal of information on law enforcement

72 The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014

agents. Most of these sites provide a great deal of information at little to no cost. During my training courses I ask the law enforcement students in attendance to use these sites so they can see how much of their sensitive information is accessible online. It hits home for my students when they see their personal details and that of their family readily accessible to anyone with an Internet connection and the desire to search. Another way your information can be

discovered is through your IP Address. Sites like whatstheirip.com4 provide links that can be sent to a targeted individual. Once this individual clicks on that link, the bad guy would receive an email with the individual’s IP Address. Making matters worse, if the targeted individual sent someone an email, the bad guy could go to a site such as whatismyipaddress. com5, insert the email source of the target, and trace the target’s IP address. Even posting a comment on a WordPress website or blog can expose your IP address. Photo tracing with websites such as tineye.com6 and Google Images7 is a quick way to see if pictures of a targeted individual have been used on any other website, or even if they are fake.

STEPS FOR PROTECTION

Counter The

Asia Pacific Edition The Counter Terrorist Magazine Asia Pacific Edition is finally available for the Asia Pacific region counter-terrorism and homeland security practitioners. The Asia Pacific Edition not only gives the readers a worldwide counterterrorism perspective but also in-depth information about counter terrorism activities in Asia. The Asia Pacific Edition provides an excellent platform for counter-terrorism and homeland solutions providers to access and penetrate the Asia Pacific market.

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Sailors conduct computer based training. Photo by: James F. Antonucci

One of the best ways to protect yourself as a law enforcement agent is to get off of social media sites. With so much information leaked from social media sites, the safest bet is to run as far from social media sites as possible. Go to the website deleteyouraccount.com8 for links to delete many of the popular social media sites. If you are unwilling to leave Facebook,

74 The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014

Instagram, or Twitter, consider a fake account with a fake name and a new email address. Remember, don’t use the same user name for each social media account you’re going to keep open. With the sophistication of facial recognition you might want to think twice about what pictures you post on your fake profile. Try the mobile app “Burner”9 to get a disposable phone number in case

you need a phone number to register and create your new social media account. Keep in mind, a fake account really does little if you continue to post what school you went to, where you work, or what neighborhood you live in. Make sure all of your Internet profiles are set to private. Use Google, Yahoo, or Bing search engines and type in your user name, email address, or name to make

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The Counter Terrorist April/May 2014Card 75 Circle 183~on Reader Service

sure all your Internet profiles are secure and private. Go to Pipl and Spokeo websites and dox yourself. If you can find your information, so can any other person snooping around the Internet. Ensure you use different email addresses for different social media sites and accounts you have online. One email with many Internet/social media accounts equals one very big problem. Making matters worse, by using the same password for each and every one of these accounts, if one gets compromised, they all get compromised.

THE BOTTOM LINE Everyone has online vulnerabilities. Even if you are smart enough to stay off social media, employing agencies, medical providers, and others routinely leak your information. Everyone leaves a digital footprint online and completely cleaning it up is impossible. Watch

what you say and expect that all online communications are permanently archived and accessible by outsiders. Being responsible online goes a long way. Those of us in law enforcement have a very small expectation of privacy in the real world and an even smaller one online. Understanding how the Internet and social media work can go a long way toward preventing you or your family from being doxed.

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Gordon is CEO of Dataveillance (www.dataveillance.us) and serves as a police officer in South Florida. Mr. Gordon is a former Marine with over 28 years of law enforcement experience. He has worked as a patrol officer, traffic investigator, recruiter, training officer, narcotics detective, and analyst.

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COUNTERING THE SELF-RADICALISED LONE WOLF: A NEW PARADIGM? -By Kumar Ramakrishna Synopsis Internet-driven self-radicalisation of the lone wolf is an increasing cause of concern for governments and societies everywhere. A new paradigm for countering self-radicalisation is suggested, comprising the five dimensions of Sender, Message, Recipient, Mechanism and Context.

Commentary FOLLOWING THE Boston marathon terrorist bombing of April 2013, US President Barack Obama acknowledged that one of the dangers we now face are ‘self-radicalised individuals’ who might “not be part of any network” – in short lone wolves. Obama offered one reason why the threat of lone-wolf terrorism has emerged in recent years: “The pressure we put on Al Qaeda and other networks that are well financed and more sophisticated has pushed potential terrorists to the margins, where they are forced to plot smaller-level attacks that are tougher 78 The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014

to track.” Only part of the story Intensified security force pressure is only part of the story, though. Ideological trends in violent Islamist circles globally since the mid-2000s have stressed operational decentralisation to small autonomous cells and lone wolves. Thus while the late Anwar alAwlaki of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) promoted lone wolf action the Al Qaeda Syrian propagandist Abu Musab alSuri likewise argued for more autonomous small scale terrorist attacks that are harder to detect and prevent. Moreover, technological trends such as easy Internet access expedite direct action by lone wolves. For instance the online English-language AQAP magazine Inspire even had an article called “Make a Bomb in Your Mom’s Kitchen” translated into Bahasa by Indonesian jihadists. While lone wolves would not be able to

cause massive 9/11 style destruction, it is all too clear what they can accomplish. For example, Timothy McVeigh was responsible for 168 deaths in the Oklahoma City bombing of April 1995, while Anders Breivik killed 77 people in Norway in 2011. Some military strategists moreover warn of so-called Fifth Generation Warfare in which ‘super-empowered’ lone wolves may in the coming decade exploit digital technology to mount crippling cyber-attacks on national infrastructure or even deploy small radiological devices (dirty bombs) against cities.

Lone wolves in Singapore Singapore has not been immune from the threat of self-radicalised lone wolves. Since 2007, six such individuals were detained, but three were subsequently released. Another group of six was placed on restriction orders that sharply circumscribed their activities and movement.

The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014 79

ideologues. This is why critical thinking skills and what the think tank DEMOS in the United Kingdom calls digital literacy – the ability to evaluate what is read or seen online – must be inculcated in young people throughout their education. This ability is arguably more important than the actual content of their religious or mainstream syllabi.

At a June 2013 retreat of Singapore’s Religious Rehabilitation Group that counsels Jemaah Islamiyah detainees and their families, Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean emphasised the significant concern posed by lone wolves who are “radicalised by what they see and read on the Internet in the privacy of their homes or through their smartphones” and that “do not leave physical traces for the security services to follow”.

Five dimensions in countering the lone wolf What can be done to counter the selfradicalised lone wolf threat? It is widely accepted that it is futile to attempt to monitor or censor the Internet by technical means to prevent extremist ideologies from proliferating. There are more than 6000 extremist websites now online, and the number is steadily increasing. More creative solutions are needed. It is suggested that, adapting and building upon ideas by leading Indonesian counter-terror expert Tito Karnavian, five dimensions need to be considered in any comprehensive, systematic strategy for countering the threat of self-radicalisation producing lone wolves: these dimensions comprise Sender, Message, Recipient, Mechanism, Context. 1 Sender: The credibility of the purveyor of the extremist ideology must be studied and potential weaknesses discovered and exploited. Many violent extremist clerics project an outward image of piety, which 80 The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014

makes their call authoritative. Furthermore they are frequently eloquent and come across as very charismatic, like the late Anwar al-Awlaki. ‘Counter-ideologues’ must therefore be found who are equally eloquent and able to couch messages in terms that would resonate with local audiences. Moreover they must also be seen by the target community to possess unimpeachable integrity. Conversely any potential character flaws on the part of the violent extremist ideologues must be discovered through targeted intelligence gathering and amplified via social media to question his credibility – and hence his ability to influence the broad masses. 2. Message: The violent extremist message that self-radicalises people is usually simple and easy to recall: “The West is at war with our religion, so we must fight back.” Counter-messaging must likewise move from highly abstract theological formulations to equally easy to recollect themes that are culturally authentic and of practical relevance to a target community. These are what Malcolm Gladwell calls ‘sticky’ messages. 3. Recipient: The vulnerable individuals in front of computer screens are usually young males whose emotional development is proceeding faster than their mental maturation. Hence they tend to think in relatively unsophisticated black-and-white terms and seek the certainty and clear answers usually provided by skillful extremist

4. Mechanism: Liberal circles argue that a free-wheeling marketplace of ideas would ensure the demolition of extremist ideologies. Others argue for imposing a ‘chilling effect’ through legal means that restrict the circulation of certain anti-social ideas. What would be particularly useful is a moderated debate between non-violent extremists and moderates either online or in the real world, so that the theological weaknesses and contradictions within extremist ideologies can be exposed and debunked. 5. Context: In societies where governance is poor and security, welfare and justice are seen to be in deficit, the chances for self-radicalisation or even more organised group radicalisation is very great. In particular, the perception by local communities of heavy-handed police and military action – such as civilian casualties caused by drone strikes in Afghanistan and Yemen and perceived over-use of force in police counter-terrorist operations in Indonesia - all strengthen the extremist narrative of a war on the entire religion. In short, context facilitates the ‘ease of transmission’ of extremist ideas, and self-radicalisation of lone wolves. In sum, given that Internet-driven selfradicalisation into lone wolves appears to be a growing and dangerous trend, it behooves governments and communities to work together - perhaps along the five dimensions described - to deal effectively with the problem. Kumar Ramakrishna is Associate Professor and Head of the Centre of Excellence for National Security at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University

INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES RING POWER When Law Enforcement officers are called to any emergency situation – they have to be prepared for the worst case scenario. Whether dealing with a hostage rescue, barricaded suspects, riot scene, or natural disaster, having the tactical advantage is critical. The Rook was custom designed with mission specific attachments that increase job safety, while also improving the ease and speed of changing attachments. The Armored Deployment Platform(APD) allows officers to approach structures with reduced exposure. A team can be placed anywhere and have a secure position from which to make better tactical decisions. Officers can also gain entry to the second story of a house or building without a ladder, allowing them to search the house from the top down without using stairways to work their way up. The ADP can also be used to deploy snipers to a rooftop. The Rook integrated video system gives visibility into areas that small robotic video cameras cannot. www.ringpower.com

TACTICAL PRODUCTS GROUP Tacprogear is a leading manufacturer of tactical equipment used by professionals around the globe. The Tacprogear product lines include apparel, armor, bags and packs, nylon pouches, accessories and more. Bridging the gap between outdoor functionality and real world requirements, Tacprogear is designing new solutions through the innovative use of lightweight materials and cutting edge manufacturing techniques. Tacprogear relies heavily upon the constant feedback and input from operators in the field, and seeks to continually evolve the product offerings. www.tacprogear.com or www.tacprogearblack.com

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SSI began life in a one-room office with three very busy people working around the clock to provide the very best training available. That was in 2004, just a few years after 9/11. Today the company has trained representatives from more than 1000 different Federal, State and Local agencies and has become the Homeland Security training leader. In 2013 alone, the company trained more than 250 SWAT team members and over 1000 sworn patrol officers from across the country in the cutting-edge MACTAC — active shooter program. In addition over 500 people attended programs such as Transit Employee IED Awareness Training, Operational Response to Mass Casualty, Radical Islam: understanding the terror threat and many more. The 9th annual Homeland Security Professionals Conference will be held in Orlando — a major event in the HS calendar. Now in its 10th year, SSI is about to celebrate the anniversary by having a traded share on the OTCBB. This will mark a new milestone in the company’s growth which has always relied on the commitment and excellence that are invested in the training; The Counter Terrorist magazine (SSI publishes the Magazine), media and even products. SSI is now going global in its second decade in countries all over the world from Singapore to Africa. Contact: Henry Morgenstern contact@homelandsecurityssi.com

The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2014 81

Innovative Products PORTABLE VEHICLE BARRIER The Portable Vehicle Barrier transfers the momentum of a moving vehicle upwards and stops it in its tracks. Two adults can deploy the barrier in minutes without any need for electricity. It can be equipped with wheels to act as a swing barrier. You can add anchoring cables and place the PVBs in a single row or more. The PVB can be folded quickly for moving and storage; it is reusable and durable. www.ssipvb.com

EXOSKEL Exoskel is designed for times when proper climbing technique is unattainable, but there is need for speed and low profile scrambling. It assists the user to rapidly ascend and negotiate obstacles, while offering lower limb protection. Armed with teeth designed to lock on to any terrain, it allows the user, via the stirrup system, to climb. www.exoskel-group.com

GAME PLAN The US government’s acknowledged debt is about $17 trillion. Analysts such as Boston University economics professor Laurence Kotlikoff place our government’s true liabilities as closer to $211 trillion. A major transformation is coming and the sharks of the world are circling. Read Kevin Freeman’s Game Plan and choose your destiny. www.secretweapon.org 82 The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014

Counter

ADVERTISER INDEX

The

APRIL/MAY 2014

VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 2

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals To request detailed product information, visit our website http://thecounterterroristmag.com/readerservicecard.php or scan this code. Select the appropriate Reader Service Number (RSN) on the web-form and submit your contact information. Individual advertiser’s websites are also provided below for your convenience.”

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54 54 53 75 71 42 4 29 49 33 22 43 17 66 76 2 21 36 26 41 43 61 3 45 39 73 59 50 67 29 28 11 42 38 65 27 15 7 13 23 63 51 58 62 65 79

Ad/Company • website and/or email...................................................................................................................RSN Number

5th Annual Border Management Southwest • www.bordersouthwest.com................................................ 113 6th Annual Soldier Equipment & Technology Expo & Summit • www.soldierequipmentexpo.com......... 115 9th Annual Homeland Security Professionals Conference & Expo • www.terrorconference.com........... 177 Adamson Police Products • www.policeproducts.com.................................................................................... 116 Advanced Homeland Security Training in Israel • www.homelandsecurityssi.com.................................... 215 ALLRed - Armadillo Tactical Gear • www.armadillotacticalgear.com............................................................ 131 American Public University • www.amuonline.com/counter-terrorist............................................................ 211 APCO 2014 - 80th Annual Conference & Expo • www.apco2014.org....................................................... 151 Armored Vehicles Training by SSI • www.homelandsecurityssi.com............................................................. 117 BioStat LLC • www.biostatllc.com........................................................................................................................ 271 Center for Rural Development • www.preventivestrategies.net...................................................................... 265 Cyalume Technologies Inc. • www.cyalume.com............................................................................................. 305 Diamondback Tactical • www.diamondbacktactical.com................................................................................ 74 Elite K9 • www.elitek9.com................................................................................................................................ 277 Exoskel • www.exoskel-group.com..................................................................................................................... 280 Fechheimer Brothers Company - 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The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014 83

The Advanced Global Security Workshop in

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Since 2005, SSI has taken nearly 500 First Responders to Israel and shown them the basics of the Israel security concept. Thanks in part to that program, we are better able to defend ourselves in the United States. In response to demand, we are now offering a once-in-alifetime experience covering the following advanced subjects:

Hezbollah - a threat as deadly as al-Qaeda - Learn about them in their own territory, along Israel’s northern border. Hostage Rescue - Discover how they go wrong. Hospital Response - Find out how Israel’s critical response hospitals handle surge and multi-casualty incidents. Israel Counter Terrorism units - Learn how they operate. Israel National Police - National Academy; See how they train? Sensitive Installations - Participate in a day-long exercise and training program in how to set up a complete security system. Secret Israel Homeland Security Simulator - See how this works at a base south of Tel Aviv.

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TRAINING REVIEW

Tactical Officer Proficiency Course By Greg Lapin

he majority of law enforcement agencies—local, state, and federal— have a continuing need for unbiased, up-to-date training. I believe most law enforcement agencies train in something like a fish bowl, and the oldest, biggest fish in the bowl usually dictates what SOPs, TTPs, and training are used. At times this leads to antiquated, or unsound tactics. Our Tactical Officer Proficiency Course (TOPC), is not a beginner’s course. It is not just a shooting package, and it is not

Photos by: VATA a CQB course. It is a skills enhancement course. We sit down with each team prior to commencing the training and do a job analysis with them. Where do they work? What type of terrain? What is their main job, threat, call out, or crime? What do they feel their greatest need is? From where and from whom did their firearms training come? Have they received or attended any outside training? What is the team’s CQB experience? What are their SOPs? Do they use strong wall, direct to threat, opposing corners, or something else?

This course is designed to enhance the skills and knowledge of a team of tactical officers. We don’t reinvent the wheel with them, but we do bring them up to date and expose them to some “best practices.” Day one is shooting. We use day one to assess officers’ marksmanship and weapons manipulation skills. We usually spend most of the day adjusting grips and making stances more aggressive. The majority of officers we deal with have good understandings of sight picture and trigger control, but once we fault The Counter Terrorist~ April/May 2014 85

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check their grips and stances, get them driving their support thumbs more on pistols, grasping the ends of the hand guards on their M4s, and opening up their stances a bit, they are amazed at the change in recoil management and gun control. At the end of the day, we work with the officers on the use of cover/ concealment and, more specifically, on understanding and mastering their optical off-set. We explain the effects of canting a weapon, given their specific zero and the engagement distance, and we get them exposing themselves less. On day two, we focus our range drills on the CQB tactics that we cover in the house and introduce the “high ready” and “breakdown” positions. They are different tools for different applications and a professional gun toter should be versed in both a low ready and a high ready. It is my experience and opinion that in the majority of CQB, the high ready (when used correctly) is safer for teammates and faster for getting the gun into the room. We show them the specifics and get them shooting range drills that utilize the high ready. The breakdown is nothing more than what the retention position is for your pistol: with both hands still on the gun in your normal grip position, the rifle is sucked back and up high underneath your arm. Your barrel is aligned to chest height and your muzzle is brought back drastically to allow you to get closer to corners and thresholds without exposing anything. It opens up your field of view, allowing you to see “hands” without compromising speed on target. The break down is almost solely for the number one man. The rest of the team should be in either the high ready or low ready, depending on the situation and their positions. At this point, guys aren’t just getting comfortable with the techniques, but start to really see the benefits. We

then move into aspects often overlooked by law enforcement personnel on the entry. We start with facades of open doorways. In most law enforcement-related entries, speed is not a massive concern. Unless you’re really worried about vital evidence getting destroyed or it’s a hostage situation, why rush? A murder suspect can’t flush himself down the toilet. We start by clearing as much of the room from outside as possible before making entry. This is not something we developed, nor is it new. Foreign special operations forces have been doing this for more than a decade in order to mitigate explosive threats and because of hardened emplacements being set up in rooms. We finish out the day getting the guys working in two to four man teams, making entry on the doorways utilizing the new techniques they’ve learned. The next three days are typically spent in the shoot house. Some teams request some open-air work; vehicle assaults or small unit patrolling techniques, so we cater each course to suit the specific unit. In the shoot house, we start by simply watching. We then start offering the officers a different way of doing things. Most often, we start by slowing the guys down, teaching them to clear rooms before they make entry and offset angles to cover threats that their buddies are exposed to. After three days of CQB, most guys start seeing the benefit of these newer methods and become much more efficient in the house. This course has been very rewarding for us. A TOPC student from a few months ago told us he could hear us yelling at him in his head during a recent intense

and tragic gun fight. Unfortunately, two of his fellow deputies, one of whom was a rookie on their SRT and also in their TOPC, were ambushed and killed by two subjects with AKs. Still visibly shaken from the incident, he recounted the incident, explaining fine details about his position, movement and awareness. The deputy was a senior deputy who was no stranger to violence. On that day he took out two lowlifes who were armed with AKs while he was armed with a pistol. He utilized cover and maneuver and worked with his teammates to end the fight. Technology changes, bad guys change and tactics must adapt. It is necessary to stay not just one, but multiple steps ahead, and to remain a humble student. The day you stop learning is the day you should find a new job. www.vatagroup.net

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Lapin is a former detective and member of a specialized tactical team. He has provided “operational support” and advanced training to U.S. government agencies in high-threat regions around the world.

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