The Counter Terrorist Magazine Asia Pacific issue April-May 2015 by The Counter Terrorist Asia Pacific Edition

Ac tiv e Shooters in Paris • Hunting S ui c i d e Bo mb e r s • Bo ko Har am • T e r r o r i n R uss i a

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals

april/may 2015

Volume 8 • Number 3

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Counter

The Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals april/may 2015 Volume 8 • Number 3

COVER story: 30

contents

FEATURES: Firsthand: 08 Hunting Suicide Bombers

By Garret Machine

Case Study: Jihadi Active Shooters in Paris By Richard Marqusie How big is ISIS Threat in Afghanistan -Pakistan? By Abdul Basit

Oil, Economic Warfare, and America’s Future By Kevin D. Freeman

46 50 63 70

Boko Haram Declares Caliphate in West Africa By Al J. Venter Paving IS Silk Road to Poso Indonesia By Rakyan Adibrata Serial Murder and Terrorism in Russia By Dmitry Shlapentokh

departments: 18

From the Editor

Book Review

Gallantry The ISIS Solution

79 Innovative Products Tacops Active Response Bag, Seal 1 CLP Plus, Flir One

83 Training Review Frank Proctor’s Performance Pistol Cover Photo: A U.S. Army soldier stands guard duty near a burning oil well in the Rumaylah Oil Fields in Southern Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Photo by: 1st Class Arlo K. Abrahamson

The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015 5

Counter The

From The Editor:

Gallantry

By Chris Graham Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals

n 13 May, 2014, Specialist Kyle White received the Medal of Honor for gallantry and intrepidity while serving with Company C, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry Regiment, 173d Airborne Brigade, during combat operations in Nuristan Province, Afghanistan. The medal citation reads in part: Specialist White and his comrades were returning to Bella Outpost from a shura with Aranas Village elders. As the soldiers traversed a narrow path surrounded by mountainous, rocky terrain, they were ambushed by enemy forces from elevated positions. Pinned against a steep mountain face, Specialist White and his fellow soldiers were completely exposed to enemy fire. Specialist White returned fire and was briefly knocked unconscious when a rocket-propelled grenade impacted near him. When he regained consciousness, another round impacted near him, embedding small pieces of shrapnel in his face. Shaking off his wounds, Specialist White noticed one of his comrades lying wounded nearby. Without hesitation, Specialist White exposed himself to enemy fire in order to reach the soldier and provide medical aid. After applying a tourniquet, Specialist White moved to an injured Marine, similarly providing aid and comfort until the Marine succumbed to his wounds. Specialist White then returned to the soldier and discovered that he had been wounded again. Applying his own belt as an additional tourniquet, Specialist White was able to stem the flow of blood and save the soldier’s life. Noticing that his and the other soldier’s radios were inoperative, Specialist White exposed himself to enemy fire yet again in order to secure a radio from a deceased comrade. He then provided information and updates to friendly forces, allowing precision airstrikes to stifle the enemy’s attack and ultimately permitting medical evacuation aircraft to rescue him, his fellow soldiers, Marines and Afghan… soldiers. Specialist Kyle J. White’s extraordinary heroism and selflessness above and beyond the call of duty are in keeping with the highest traditions of military service and reflect great credit upon himself, Company C, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry Regiment, 173d Airborne Brigade and the United States Army. 1 White’s actions are an inspiration to us all. From the most junior police officer and grunt in the field to the most senior desk-jockey on the president’s National Security Council, we can all learn from the gallantry of America’s Medal of Honor recipients. May way each draw upon these lessons and face the dangers of today and tomorrow with both physical bravery and the moral courage to speak the truth. Semper Fidelis,

Chris Graham Editor, The Counter Terrorist www.chrisgrahamauthor.com 1. http://www.cmohs.org/recipient-detail/3510/white-kyle-j.php accessed 10 December 2014.

Volume 8 • Number 3 april/may 2015

Editor Chris Graham Director of Operations Sol Bradman Director of Advertizing Carmen Arnaes Production Assistants Giselle Manassa Melissa Berne Contributing Editors Kevin Freeman Jennifer Hesterman Richard Marquise Tom Nypaver Dean Olson Steve Young Asia pacific edition Director of Operation Yaniv peretz Graphic Design Morrison Creative Company Copy Editor Laura Town Advertising Sales Maria Efremova Maria@loringlobal.com +65 90266571 Publisher: Security Solutions International 13155 SW 134th St. • STE 103 Miami, Florida 33186 ISSN 1941-8639 The Counter Terrorist Magazine, Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals is published by Security Solutions International LLC, as a service to the nation’s First Responders and Homeland Security Professionals with the aim of deepening understanding of issues related to Terrorism. No part of the publication can be reproduced without permission from the publisher. The opinions expressed herein are the opinions of the authors represented and not necessarily the opinions of the publisher. Please direct all Editorial correspondence related to the magazine to: Security Solutions International SSI, 13155 SW 134th Street, Suite 103, Miami, Florida. 33186 or info@thecounterterroristmag.com The subscription price for 6 issues is $34.99 and the price of the magazine is $5.99. (1-866-573-3999) Fax: 1-786-573-2090. For article reprints, e-prints, posters and plaques please contact: PARS International Corp. Web: www.magreprints.com/quickquote.asp Email: reprints@parsintl.com Phone: 212-221-9595 • Fax: 212-221-9195 Please visit the magazine web site where you can also contact the editorial staff:

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Firsthand:

Hunting Suicide Bombers By Garret Machine

“Come on! Come on! Get in; it’s time, go!” I heard for the second time in five minutes. I got inside our truck and waited. We waited for about half an hour and then got back out again.

8 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015

Suspected terrorist detained for interview. Photo by: Israel Defense Forces

t was summer and the night air was hot. I felt a nice breeze against my face as I sipped from my clear civilian 1.5-liter water bottle. We waited behind a fire station in a “Moshav” as some curious kids stared while passing by. A Moshav is a type of kibbutz-like commune or community in Israel that is located in the West Bank, gated in and carefully guarded by the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) and the residents. I looked out into the valleys and hills beyond the barbed wire fence and thought of how many soldiers—Persian,

Byzantine, Muslim, Crusader, Mamluk, Ottoman, Jordanian, British—had battled on this land before me, all fueled with their own cause and justification. Just then, the mission commander said, “Okay, this is it; get in, let’s go!” The unit commander was also on this mission with us and it was going to be one of his last. Our unit changed its commanding officer every two years, as with most positions for officers in the IDF, whereas an NCO (noncommissioned officer) can remain in the same assignment for twenty years. The

unit commander, Colonel A, was going to be working in the United States with the U.S. Marine Corps as a liaison, so he wanted to get some action in for old times’ sake before taking up a desk in Washington. He was a nice man, he really knew how to move the unit forward, and, most importantly, he always ensured that we got the best missions. We were working quite closely with the operational wing of Israel’s internal security force in the department of defense while the unit was attached to the army’s central command. Our very close The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015 9

affiliation and success rate strengthened our relationship and made us the go-to unit for CT operations. Again, we packed into the truck, squeezed in like sardines. So, why the delay? The best answer I can give is because you only go when you are absolutely certain that it is the optimum moment to strike. The unit commander was standing one man behind me in the truck. All of us had IR markers on our helmets turned on. These cheap little lights light up bright when viewed through night vision goggles. Once inside the truck, we checked one more time with our night vision to make sure everyone’s marker worked. They did. We

Improvised explosive belt. Photo by: Israel Defense Forces

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kept a small piece of tape over the area directly in front of the light bulb so that it was not bright enough to see with the naked eye at night in the pitch black. The unit commander noticed that my tape had fallen off, and put a fresh piece on. He had some tape wrapped around the stock of his rifle and he ripped it off just for me. At 35 years old, with fifteen years in the field, he didn’t miss a thing. He did not know whose head it was that the helmet was on, he just whispered what he was doing and placed the tape as we moved closer to an area just on the edge of one of the refugee camps (about 92 acres with a population around 12,000) in Jenin. No vehicle could drive inside because it was just too dense and the streets were way too narrow. Our target’s dwelling was right on the edge of the housing block, which was good, so we didn’t have to travel too far on foot and worry about being compromised before we could start working on our structure. We wanted our man dead or alive, but we knew that alive was the preferred option, for interrogation purposes. He was 33 years old. He and his group of militants from a Hezbollah branch operating in the territories with Hamas recruited suicide bombers. They would find confused youths (I was surprised to learn that 42 per cent of suicide bombers in this camp were under the age of 15) and introduce them to the ways of the jihad, the holy war. They taught them about what it means to become a martyr, about sacrificing themselves for the greater good of the Muslim brotherhood, and of course the most ridiculous part; the 72 virgins. That seemed to be enough motivation for them, considering that 224 of 300 reported suicide terror attacks from 1980 to 2003 involved Islamist groups1. Friends and family members aren’t recruited for this, of course, but the

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The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015 11

Concealed explosives with fragmentation visible. Photo by: Master Sgt. Buzz Farrell

When it comes down to it, they just want the bombers to blow up and take as many Jews or Israelis with them as possible, and a nonJewish Westerner is always a bonus.

12 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015

weak-minded ones are given instruction on exactly how, what, when and where to detonate. They are showered, cleanshaven, nicely dressed, and pocket their personal suicide note. When it comes down to it, they just want the bombers to blow up and take as many Jews or Israelis with them as possible, and a non-Jewish Westerner is always a bonus. If the boys consider backing out, they are given an ultimatum of violence- fully threatened and intimidated by the faction. If they do not comply, their families are destroyed: their mothers and sisters often raped, beaten and then sold, their brothers killed, and their fathers exiled. What if you were given such an ultimatum? Kill and sacrifice yourself on a kamikaze mission, or watch the lives of the people you love destroyed while you sit helplessly like a coward with nowhere to turn. It is undoubtedly twisted, but very much a reality. Our target would be armed. We expected that he would fight to the death, and we needed to be prepared for that. We also had a secondary mission to recover a suicide (explosive) belt in his house. It was go-time and I stepped into the unknown for the third time that week, at close to 1 a.m. We broke out of our truck at a fast running pace just outside the dense structures of the encampment. There was a beat-up schoolhouse to our right and the edge of the refugee camp to our left. Four of us moved down a flight of steps into the camp’s depths; everything was uneven in these places because of the natural foundation of the hillside. We made it to the side of the target house with entrances facing us in a narrow alley. The unit commander, communicator, mission commander, radio man, and two more men quickly broke open the schoolhouse entrance, which was now perpendicular

to my position on the side of the wanted man’s house. The old schoolhouse was known to be unoccupied and was our safe point to fall back on and retreat to for our pick up and departure. The most dangerous position was on the roof of the enemy’s building, which was a location held by a four-man team, also known as a “monkey squad,” that specialized in working with ladders and ropes. They used ladders and ropes to shimmy onto the roof of the three-story structure. This was not a dangerous spot due to its location, but more so because of the exposure and vulnerability of climbing onto the roof safely. One man stood back far enough in the street below the ladder, so that if someone were on the roof and approached the side of the building, the man positioned below would have a clear shot at him. Once the first man was up, he would take responsibility for clearing the roof and the safety of the climbers. Then the other three men would climb up, one at a time, while the others held the ladder and watched the street. The streets, made of cobblestone, were virtually empty. The homes were brick, stone and mortar. The building walls were lined with posters of dead, terrorists who were killed or blown up and were now idolized and glorified, further feeding the fire. I was on the side of the house with the entrances and needed to break into the house across the narrow street of steps. We descended the three levels of steps and landings and reached the door of the house that we needed to enter. At about 1 a.m., I inserted our hydraulic door splitter in the seam of the double door as the three others in my squad covered the area we came from, the rooftops, the entrances to the house with our target across the street, and the direction the steps went down.

One man pumped the device, working it in the door to get it open. The noise and commotion attracted a woman on the other side of the door. I told her: “Iftach elbab. Achna jesh,” which means, “Open the door. We are the army,” in Arabic. The steel double door had upper and lower bolts or pins. The door, which would be hard to breach quickly without the use of pyrotechnics, was common to the Middle East and this area. The woman started to open the door nervously and slowly. The pins were bent and distorted from my efforts, making it hard to open. Our terrorist had a lookout and the lookout told him we were there. The lookout was his brother, who was also in the house with him. There was a group of guys who were sleeping in shifts to guard the main entrance to the structure. Just then, a man emerged from the window with a Kalashnikov (AK-47) assault rifle. Throughout the world, Russian- and Chinese-designed AKs are among the most commonly smuggled small arms, sold to governments, rebels, and criminals alike. The same rifle carried by the Viet Cong is carried by ISIS. At 8.5 pounds, it is not very light, and it is not as accurate or reliable as our M4 either, but what do you expect from a weapon that has not changed in 60 years? The proliferation of this weapon is evidenced by more than just numbers—the AK is included in the very flag of Hamas and Hezbollah; the weapon is notorious. Our target had opened fire on us without even looking or aiming at all, basically using the spray and pray technique. He simply held the rifle out through the window and pulled the trigger on full auto. The bullets danced on the ground in front of our tight squad. Luckily no one was hit with a direct hit or a ricochet. I took a piece of shrapnel to the ankle, which barely broke the skin

thanks to my Asolo boots. I screamed at the woman, “Open the door!” in Arabic, and at this point one side of the double door was open, which is half the space of a normal doorway and with my gear I was too wide to fit through. My squad fired back at the gunman in the window, but it was too late. He had disappeared inside. At least

now we knew he was home. I dropped my backpack and forcefully squeezed through the door while the woman, in full burkha, was flustered and confused. I got in and opened the other side of the door by lifting the pin that held the concrete floor pin that gripped the ceiling. We all piled inside the house— which was exactly like being in a modern

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cave—and did a quick search. Like Fred Flintstone’s house, the ceilings were low and the walls were made of stone; it looked like a prehistoric family lived there, a lair-like structure in which everyone must walk around hunched over. It smelled like old trash. I was the first one up the steps inside the door. The

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floor plan curved around and led to the kitchen-bedroom-closet area. I put all the inhabitants (a woman and two men) in the bedroom. The woman sat on a chair and I cuffed the two men, searched them, and sat them on the bed. One soldier was downstairs manning the doorway in an alcove to the house watching for any activity that might come from across the street or in the alley. Two soldiers moved to search the rest of the building. They moved up the steps and radioed me that they were sending people my way, one at a time, who were searched but not cuffed. In about eight minutes I had twelve people in the bedroom. I searched them again, one by one, then I cuffed the men and they sat on the floor. I was looking for a weapon only the size of a hand grenade or pistol (or larger) on them. There were some children and a baby sleeping in a mother’s arms. We never physically searched the women out of concern for their safety after we left. The structure was secure. We positioned two men from my squad— soldiers K and S—on the roof, a designated marksman and a team breacher/medic. The squad leader was down at the entrance and I was with the civilians, who were being inconvenienced at 1:33 a.m. by the terrorist antics of their neighbor. Once we had control of the people and structure, we radioed for one of two squads that had moved into the old schoolhouse to come in. It was clear at this point that he would not come out without a fight, so we waited for our clearing team to kill him. The squad leader called the occupants of the adjacent house- the house that fired on us- on a megaphone and commanded them to come out one at a time, slowly, with hands raised. Eventually, I heard some shooting from outside but heard nothing of it on

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The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015 15

The entry team was just getting into the house on the side street and couldnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t see him. I took aim at his centermass through the reflex red dot optic on my weapon.

16 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015

my radio. A few of the men started to complain about the flex cuffs on their wrists, saying the cuffs were cutting off circulation. I checked them and replaced a few of them, but one of them still complained. Finally, three men were brought up blindfolded, this meant they had been identified as enemy forces. They, too, were seated on the floor of the cluttered, dirty kitchen. There was a zoo of roaches throughout the kitchen and bedroom, but no one seemed to be bothered by them. I had some of the heavier people of the group sit on overturned buckets that I found in the kitchen. One of the blindfolded ones, we later found out, was the brother of the wanted man who first spotted us. Once they were all in the small apartment, our designated marksman radioed down from the rooftop and asked to be relieved. I offered to be the one to replace him and headed up to the roof.

I could see everything: the team on the roof across the street, the old schoolhouse, and light coming from the doorway below where we came in. We were watching the windows and the side of the house. We also paid attention to the rooftops around us in case a rooftop shooter (and there are many around) noticed us. A rooftop is a dangerous place because of open exposure to fire from other rooftops on the periphery. The entry team received the order to work on the interior of the house. They were about to enter the open door across the street and securely search their way through the interior of the structure. They slowly crossed the street, one at a time, under the safe cover of each other and all of us. Just then across the street on the perpendicular side of the building, I saw some movement in one of the windows. It was coming from the second story. A

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man with a rifle slung around his back hung from the windowsill and dropped out onto the street below. I raised my rifle from the ready to sight. He looked quickly right and then left down the alley, and he ran with his AK-47 in hand in the direction of the alley we came from with all the steps. The entry team was just getting into the house on the side street and couldn’t see him. I took aim at his center-mass through the reflex red dot optic on my weapon. This sight system used a solar powered/tritium powered laser beam that illuminated the target, but was only visible through the optic. It was sighted like a regular scope and had a battery that charged by daylight and worked best at night when there was no ambient light. My target was about 65 meters away and moving. I fired once and he went down. He lay belly down and face to the left, left leg over his right. I delivered a follow-up shot for safety. The man with me on the roof radioed to the mission commander that the target was down, and that the fire was good (which means that the fire came from one of us, and that the hit was successful). The entry team was instructed to continue the search of the house as if he was still inside, and the squad on the other rooftop (his) moved to the far edge of their roof for a closer view of the body. They requested permission to fire two shots to confirm the kill. Permission was granted, and two headshots were carefully placed. Soon the alley was soaked in pooling cranial blood. Mission accomplished. Inside the house, the entry team seized three more rifles that were abandoned by his cohorts who surrendered. We were about to move to the old schoolhouse building to rally and depart when the brother—who at that point knew from all the shooting that someone was

likely dead—wanted to cut a deal. He bargained using information on the whereabouts of the suicide belt, which was scheduled for tomorrow’s delivery, in return for his temporary freedom. He pleaded on the spot, but it was too late. The entry team in the house had already located the bomb belt. We held our position while a bomb squad from the engineering division (Yalome- “Diamond” in Hebrew) moved into the house to neutralize the bomb and destroy it. Meanwhile, two soldiers went quickly to recover the weapon from the dead man. About 40 minutes later, we went to the old schoolhouse, one at a time with three blindfolded terrorists, at a jogging pace. Our transport was ready and we departed without incident. U.S. Army General Colin Powell said, “There are no secrets to success. It is the result of preparation, hard work and learning from failure.” We all shared his

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•

about the authors Mr. Machine (www. counterterrorwarfare.com) served in the Duvdevan counter-terrorism unit of the Israeli Defense Force. He was a firearms and tactics instructor for his unit and later served on personal security details for senior Ministry of Defense officials. Machine has released two DVDs on combat shooting (Pressure Makes Diamonds), and Israeli Security Concepts, a book on tactics available on Amazon.

Endnotes “Suicide Attack Database,” Chicago Project on Security & Terrorism, last modified November 2014, http:// cpostdata.uchicago.edu/search_new.php. 1

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Case Study:

Jihadi Active Shooters in Paris

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Solidarity rally for the January 7, 2015 attack of Charlie Hebdo in Luxembourg, Brussels.“Better to die standing than live on your knees.” Photo by: Valentina Calà

By Richard Marqusie

On Wednesday, January 7, 2015, two masked men, dressed in black, carrying Kalashnikov assault rifles and wearing body armor, entered a Paris business office around 11:15 a.m. After initially entering the wrong door, the men forced one of the staff of Charlie Hebdo, a weekly satirical magazine, to let them into that office.

police officer was on duty, serving as a bodyguard for the magazine’s editor because of death threats. As the gunmen entered the offices, shouting “Allahu Akbar” (Allah is great), they entered an ongoing editorial staff meeting. They shot and killed police officer Franck Brinsolaro and others.1 Some reports say the gunmen called cartoonists by name and then executed them. A survivor said, “These were no amateurs.” Another said, “They were dressed like soldiers.”2 Eleven people were killed in a five-minute attack.3

Editorial meetings were only held on Wednesdays from 10-12. It appears likely the gunmen had either conducted premission surveillance or obtained inside information as they attacked on the day and at the time of the weekly meeting. Many of the staff did not routinely work at that office.4 As the gunmen retreated, passersby heard them say, “Tell the media we are from al-Qaeda in Yemen.”5 Others nearby, attracted by the shots, began videoing the activities of the men on their cell phones. These videos led to

The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015 19

Journalists await the arrival of Charlie Hebdo writers January 9, 2015. Photo by: Camille Gévaudan

discovery of the names of three suspects They were the two Kouachi brothers and eighteen-year-old Hamyd Mourad, Said’s brother-in-law. Law enforcement officials in France and neighboring countries began looking for the three. There were several false reports of arrests during the evening hours, but around 11:00 pm, Mourad surrendered after hearing his name on the news. He would later be exonerated from involvement in the Charlie Hebdo attack.10 Just after 8:00 a.m. Thursday morning, an unarmed police officer, Clarissa Jean-Philippe, responded to what she thought was a traffic incident. She was shot and killed, and a city employee was wounded, during a confrontation with a man who was

20 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015

described as being of “African origin.” The man was said to be wearing body armor and carrying several guns. Officer Jean-Philippe had been on the job for two weeks.11,12 Around 10:30 a.m., a gas station was robbed in Villers-Cotterets, a village ninety minutes north of Paris. Two men, reportedly armed with Kalashnikovs and a rocket propelled grenade launcher, had stolen food and gasoline. Law enforcement officers flooded the area and began a search. Throughout the day, reporters speculated whether suspects had been arrested.13 At 9:30 Friday morning, media reported that the Kouachi brothers had taken a hostage at a print shop and were

surrounded by police in Dammartin-enGoele, a town nineteen miles northeast of Paris and not far from Charles de Gaulle Airport. Local schools were locked down.14 Shortly after noon, a lone gunman entered a kosher market, Hyper Cacher, at Ponte de Vincennes. The store was about twenty-five miles from where the Kouachi brothers were engaged in a standoff with police. The gunman killed four people and took what he thought were sixteen hostages. He did not realize others had escaped the main market and were hiding in a refrigerator. At 12:45 p.m., the media reported that the suspect in the shooting of Officer JeanPhilippe was connected to the brothers

The 11th arrondisement after the Charlie Hebdo shootings. Photo by: Thierry Caro

involved in the Charlie Hebdo attacks. Police identified this gunman as Amedy Coulibaly.15 At 3:00 p.m., photographs of Coulibaly, thirty-two, and his commonlaw wife, Hayat Boumeddiene, twentysix, were released as suspects in the murder of Jean-Philippe and the takeover of the kosher market.16 While the brothers were in the print shop, reporters conducted a telephone interview with Cherif Kouachi. He said he was sent by “Yemen’s al-Qaeda.” He also said he was financed by Anwar alAwlaki, an American born cleric killed by an American UAV strike in Yemen in 2011. He stated, “We are the defenders of the prophet, we don’t kill women… If someone offends the prophet then there is no problem, we can kill him… We have an honor code in Islam.”17 That same afternoon, Coulibaly gave an interview from the kosher market. He

said he had synchronized his actions with the Kouachi brothers who killed twelve people at Charlie Hebdo. He said, “They started with Charlie Hebdo and I started with the police.”18 One hostage was reported to have seen Coulibaly filming the scene in the market with a GoPro camera. He allegedly took out the memory card and inserted it into a laptop and appeared to edit the images. It has been reported that he emailed his video(s) out. He also took time to pray.19 Around 5:00 in the afternoon, gunshots and explosions were heard at the print shop where the two brothers were holed up with a hostage. A police assault on the shop commenced at about 5:10 p.m. Both brothers were killed and the hostage rescued.20 At 5:15 p.m., the police assaulted the kosher market where Coulibaly had barricaded himself and his hostages. The

The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015 21

Charlie Hebdo cartoon from Sunday January 10, 2015. Photo by: Jeanne Menj

hostages were rescued and Coulibaly was killed by French police in a firefight. His common-law wife, Boumeddiene, was not located in the market and there were initial fears that she had escaped.21 Ballistic tests on the weapons found at the market linked a Russian Tokarev pistol (7.62x25 mm) to the shooting of the jogger at Fontenay-aux-Roses on the previous Wednesday evening. The standoffs were over and information about the gunmen and their motives was becoming more clear.22 Cherif and Said Kouachi were born in France to Algerian parents. Their parents died when they were twelve and fourteen

22 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015

years old respectively. They seemed to prosper and moved to Paris around 2000. They played soccer and Cherif took a job as a pizza delivery man. In about 2003, the brothers began to attend the Adda’wa mosque (since demolished) in Paris. Some have reported that it was frequented by radical preachers. There the brothers met Farid Benyettou, an Algerian immigrant. Benyettou began to teach many young men who would later be referred to as the “Buttes-Chaumont” group after the park where they met and trained. They would normally discuss current events and several of those who participated later fought in Iraq with terrorist groups; some were killed

in Iraq. Cherif and Said also began to ask Benyettou questions about whether suicide bombings were permitted.23 In 2004, Cherif, then twenty-two, allegedly angered by mistreatment he had read about occurring at the Abu Ghurab prison in Iraq, made plans to travel there. Just before he boarded his plane, he was arrested by French LEA’s. He later said he was “relieved” and he did not “want to die there.”24 Cherif was detained for twenty months before trial. He was housed at the Fleury-Merogis prison, which has been described as the perfect setting for radicalization.25 While there, he was exposed to radical Islamic teachings and hardened criminals. He met Djamel Beghal, a man who has been described as one who could convince people to adhere to radical Islam. Beghal had worked with Usama bin Laden in Afghanistan and had been convicted in 2001 of a plot to bomb the United States Embassy in Paris. Another inmate who may have fallen under Beghal’s spell was Amedy Coulibaly. Coulibaly was born in France to Malian immigrants. He was a convicted armed robber and he likely met Cherif Kouachi during Cherif ’s incarceration there. Cherif was released before his trial in 2006 but was convicted in 2008 for attempting to travel to Iraq to fight. He was sentenced to time served and released. Cherif married soon after and took his new wife on a pilgrimage to Mecca for their honeymoon.26 There is much less documented information about Cherif’s older brother, Said. He had a couple of government jobs but did not have the prison record or criminal contacts of his brother. By 2009, Beghal and Coulibaly had been released from prison. However, Beghal was still believed to be dangerous and was placed under strict “house arrest” and surveillance by French authorities. Cherif and

Coulibaly continued to contact Beghal and were overheard on French wiretaps speaking in code to each other. Beghal began to communicate with another French prisoner, Smain Ait Ali Beckacem, an Algerian terrorist associated with the GIA, who was serving time for his role in a 1995 bombing campaign in Paris. Based on intercepted telephone calls, the police assessed that the group was planning to break Beckacem from prison.27 Beghal, Coulibaly and Cherif Kouachi were arrested, convicted and returned to prison. A judge ruled that there was not enough evidence to convict Cherif, and he was released. Coulibaly (convicted in 2013) was sentenced to five years in prison, but he was released in March 2014, despite his lengthy criminal record. Although Cherif Kouachi was not convicted in this case, his computer, which had been seized at the time of his arrest, contained a document entitled “Operation Sacrifice.” This document seemed to foretell the events of January 7, 2015. The document read, in part, “The mujahideen forces his way into …a zone where there is a group and fires at point blank range without having prepared an escape plan … The author will very likely die himself.”28 Sometime in 2011, one of the Kouachi brothers traveled to Yemen to receive training and financing. LEAs initially believed it was Said Kouachi who went. However, based on interviews with Said’s wife and Cherif ’s own words, it appears it was Cherif Kouachi who traveled to Yemen using his brother’s passport. During the standoff at the print shop, Cherif told the reporter who interviewed him that he went to Yemen and met with Anwar al-Awlaki. Al-Awlaki, an al-Qaeda figure that Ft. Hood terrorist Nidal Hassan was communicating with, allegedly provided him direction and some funding to carry out an operation.29

The Paris attacks have raised a number of issues for counterterrorism officials. Cherif Kouachi and Coulibaly were well known to French LEAs, but were not under surveillance, allegedly due to manpower shortages. Policemen were outgunned during the attacks. The policewoman who was killed was unarmed. On January 19, 2015, French law enforcement officers demanded more appropriate weapons and training, better protective gear, and a bolstered intelligence apparatus. One official noted that Officer Merabet did not “have the backup he needed and the psychology to face a paramilitary assault.” It is also unknown if the French government will reconsider gun laws that inhibit citizen self-defense.30 The French Prime Minister announced on January 21st that there are over 3,000 individuals in France who have been identified as having “jihadist ties.” He suggested these individuals should be under some form of surveillance and that the number of people in France tied to terror networks in Syria and Iraq had jumped by 130 percent in one year. He said that Coulibaly had been detained by police on December 30, 2014. A brief background check on him indicated he was “dangerous” and part of an Islamic group. Officers who encountered him had been asked to collect information about him without arousing his suspicion. The officer(s) who stopped him notified anti-terrorism police, who never responded to their query. The officer(s) then let him go.31 A week after the attacks in France, Belgian LEAs broke up a suspected plot to attack police stations and kill police officers. Belgian investigators had apparently been tracking a cell, possibly connected to the Islamic State, for some time as they had wiretaps in place. The police killed two suspects in raids and

The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015 23

Rally in front of the old town hall in Cologne. Photo by: Elya

seized liquid explosives. The Belgians did not know the specific target of their anticipated attacks. These raids were conducted as others were being carried out across Europe. Before the week was out, dozens of people had been arrested across Europe, including thirteen in Belgium, twelve in Germany, two more in France, and single arrests in Greece and England.32 The French attacks and the subsequent police raids in Belgium had been preceded by an attack on a Jewish Museum in Brussels on May 24, 2014, by a French national of Algerian origin. The attacker killed four and, when arrested, admitted responsibility for the attack. He had spent a year in Syria and when he was arrested he was in possession of a Kalashnikov rifle, a pistol, and a white sheet with markings of the terror group the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS), also known as the Islamic State.33 While the investigations into the French attacks are still ongoing, there are numerous details that still need to

24 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015

be uncovered. Shortly after the attacks, a man in Belgium came forward and said he had provided the weapons to Coulibaly and the Kouachi brothers. The cost was allegedly less than $6,000.34 The Kouachi brothers stated their attack was funded and ordered by al-Qaeda in Yemen, better known as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). An AQAP spokesman took credit for the Charlie Hebdo attack and said the order for it came from the leadership of al-Qaeda.35 The individual who released the “martyrdom video” of Coulibaly two days after he was killed at the market needs to be identified. This video showed Coulibaly wearing a white robe with a rifle resting against a wall and an Islamic banner behind him. The video seems to have been made between shooting the police woman on Thursday morning and the takeover of the Jewish market at midday Friday. He supposedly said “The brothers of our team were split into two groups… I went a bit against the police… If we did things a

bit together and a bit separately, it was to have more impact.” He also pledged allegiance to the Islamic State on the video.36 It is possible Coulibaly made the film while at the market, based on the observations of one witness. The Kouachi brothers and Coulibaly knew each other, but it is not certain that the attacks were synchronized. There was no known communication between the brothers and Coulibaly during the attacks, even though investigators found about 500 phone conversations between Coulibaly, his common-law wife, and the Kouachi brothers before the attacks.37 However, investigators did discover that Hayat Boumeddiene, Coulibaly’s common-law wife, had left France. Video of her arriving in Istanbul on January second, five days before the Charlie Hebdo attacks, was recovered by LEOs there. Officials in Turkey say she crossed the border into Syria on the eighth of January.38 The brothers claimed their attack on behalf of AQAP and an AQAP spokesman also claimed credit. Coulibaly claimed credit for the Islamic State. If the attacks were linked together and affiliated with a sponsor, would not one or the other group claim credit? These two groups compete for prestige in the jihadi world. Most Western countries, including the United States, have enemies among us. Some of our citizens are disaffected, and we have others who have come here as visitors or immigrants who may want to do us harm. Some of them have been identified and others have not. In France, they knew who these men were yet did not expel them or monitor what they were doing. Sharing information with and among law enforcement agencies are just pieces of the solution to preventing terrorist attacks. Community partnerships are as important in Paris, Texas, as they are in

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About the Author Mr. Marquise is the Director of the Department of Justice’s, Bureau of Justice Assistance State and Local Antiterrorism Training (SLATT) program. He is a retired FBI senior executive who led the investigation into the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 and is the author of Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation.

Endnotes “French Police Say Suspect in Attack Evolved From Petty Criminal to Terrorist,” by Higgins, Andrew , New York Times, 1/10/15 2 “Cherif and Said Kouachi’s Path to Paris Attack at Charlie Hebdo,” by Rukmini Callimachi and Jim Yardley, New York Times, 1/17/15 3 “One Victim Killed in Charlie Hebdo Attacks was Muslim Police Officer, Ahmed Merabet,”, by Lamiat Sabin, The Independent, 1/8/15 4 “Inside Look at how the Paris Attack Unfolded,” by Jabeen Bhatti and Angela Waters, USA Today, 1/8/15 5 Callimachi, op cit 6 Lamiat Sabin, op cit 7 “Tracking the Aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo Attack,” by Wilson Andrews et al, The New York Times, 1/9/15 8 “Paris Attacks: ID card left in car put police on trail of brothers.” By Ruadhan Mac Cormaic, Irish Times, 1/8/15 9 “French Attacker Coulibaly Linked 1

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to Shooting of Jogger,” by AFP, Business Insider, 1/11/15 10 “Three Days of Madness: A Timeline of the Charlie Hebdo Attacks,” by Jeremy Stahl, Slate, 1/9/15 11 “Police Officer Shot Dead Outside Paris, Suspect at Large: Police,” RT News, 1/8/15 12 “ Policewoman Shot Dead Two Weeks into Job,” Sky News, 1/9/15 13 Stahl, op cit 14 Ibid 15 “In a Kosher Grocery Store in Paris, Terror Takes a Deadly Toll,” by Griff Witte, Washington Post, 1/9/15 16 Stahl, op cit 17 “Paris Killer Cherif Kouachi gave Interview to TV Channel Before He Died,” by Emmanuelle Saliba, NBC News, 1/9/15 18 Andrews, et al, op cit

Callimachi, op cit Stahl, op cit 21 Ibid 22 AFP (FN #7), op cit 23 Callimachi, op cit 24 Ibid 25 “French Prisons Prove to be Effective Incubators for Islamic Extremism,” by National Public Radio, All Things Considered, 1/22/15 26 Callimachi, op cit 27 Ibid 28 Ibid 29 Ibid 30 “To Counter Terror, Europe’s Police Reconsider Their Arms,” by the Associated Press, 1/9/15 31 “French Police Get Stronger Firepower, Counter Terror Forces,” by Hana Levi Julian, 1/21/15 32 “20 Terror Suspects Arrested in 19 20

Massive Ops Across Belgium, France and Germany,” RT.com, 1/17/15 33 “Brussels Museum Killings: Suspect Admitted Attack,” BBC News, 6/1/14 34 “Arms Dealer Confesses to, Providing Paris Terrorists’ Guns,” by Steve Kornachi, 1/14/15 35 Ibid 36 “Amedy Coulibaly ‘Martyrdom’ Video Released Online, Paris Attacker Claims Allegiance to Islamic State,” by Mark Hanrahan, International Business Times, 1/11/15 37 “Charlie Hebdo: Officials establish link between gunmen in both attacks— as it happened,” by Matthew Weaver et al, The Guardian, 1/9/15 38 “Video: Hayat Boumeddiene arriving in Turkey,” by staff writer, Al Arabiya News, Al Arabiya News, 1/12/15

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Oil, Economic Warfare, and America’s Future by Kevin D. Freeman

Oil has been employed as a potent economic weapon. In 1973, OPEC launched an embargo to punish America, quadrupling oil prices, triggering a significant stock market drop, and raising the specter of “stagflation,” where prices rose even as the economy stagnated.1

30 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015

U.S. Navy fighters fly by burning oil wells in the Middle East. Photo by: Department of Defense

ith a single move, the Arab nations seemingly brought a superpower to its knees. Ultimately, the turmoil recorded a bear market loss of 46 percent for the Dow Jones Industrial Average, reordered the global monetary system, increased unemployment by 73.5 percent, caused

a 2.6 percent decline in economic activity, and raised the inflation rate to 11 percent.2 There were, of course, multiple factors at work at the time, but also little doubt that the embargo was not only a trigger but also a significant long-term cause of the worst economic turmoil America had faced since the end of the Great Depression.3

Going back a bit further, a U.S.-led oil embargo imposed on the Japanese in 1941 culminated with the Japanese attacking Pearl Harbor.4 Arab states attempted to use the oil weapon with embargoes in 1956 and 1967. Although less effective, they intended to punish the West through shortages and higher The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015 31

Gasoline dealers in Oregon displayed signs explaining the flag policy during the fuel crisis in the winter of 1973-74. Photo by: Wikimedia Commons

Oregon gas station dealers had a flag system. Photo by: David Falconer

prices.5 Usama bin Laden was a big proponent of the oil weapon as a form of economic jihad.6 Reportedly, he called for a price of $144 per barrel in the late 1990s.7 That level was briefly surpassed in the summer of 2008.8 This seemed unimaginable when oil prices were $27 per barrel just before al-Qaeda’s famous September 11, 2001, attacks.9 We cannot doubt that enemies of America understand the value of weaponizing oil. Something altogether different is at work today, but the impact will prove no less potent. Rather than pursuing higher prices and shortages, today’s oil weapon is aimed at collapsing prices through

32 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015

surplus production. Why would Saudi Arabia consider such an effort, knowing it would curtail their own revenues while simultaneously boosting the economies of oil-dependent nations? The answer to this question also lies in history. The concept is called predatory pricing, where one producer offers something below the cost of production to drive others out of the market. A famous oil-related case involved billionaire John D. Rockefeller. More than a century ago, Rockefeller was accused of forcing out competitors so he could later impose substantially higher prices as a monopoly.10 Although

some disagree with the finding, the U.S. government won its case at the Supreme Court and Rockefeller’s Standard Oil was broken into thirtyfour smaller independent companies, including behemoth heirs that exist today such as ExxonMobil, Chevron, and ConocoPhillips.11 The concept of accepting losses to hurt competitors became part of the global consciousness. The Reagan administration, in cooperation with the Saudis, reportedly fired this very weapon at the Soviet Union in the 1980s.12 The result? The decades-long Cold War was won and Mr. Gorbachev’s wall was torn down.13

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U.S Secretary of State John Kerry meets with Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud in Jeddah, Saudia Arabia on September 11, 2014. Photo by: U.S. Department of State from United States

Fast-forward a quarter century. Once again oil prices, under the leadership of the Saudis, target Russia. Only this time, the weapon is also pointed at the United States. The logic of aiming at Russia is simple. From the Saudi perspective, Russia supports Syria and Iran, serious geopolitical rivals and militant threats.14 In fact, lower oil prices seriously impact Iran directly as well. Iran may require as much as $140 per barrel to balance its budget.15 Any shortfall will foment unrest, possibly leading to the toppling of the regime.16 Given the economic war already underway between Russia and the United States over the Ukraine, Saudi Arabia can demonstrate support of American policy while achieving their own objectives.17 At the same time, the

34 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015

Saudis hope to reestablish monopoly control by knocking out American energy production.18 This isn’t just a theory. It has been openly discussed at a variety of levels.19 From a November 28, 2014 Reuters news report: “Saudi Arabia’s oil minister told fellow OPEC members they must combat the U.S. shale oil boom, arguing against cutting crude output in order to depress prices and undermine the profitability of North American producers.”20

The Shale Revolution Something that was totally unimaginable a few years ago happened last year. The United States became the world’s largest producer of both oil and natural gas, passing Saudi Arabia

and Russia.21 This capped a dramatic turnaround after several decades of decline, thanks to enhanced extraction technologies such as horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracking from tight shale formations.22 It also shifted the price curve in some amazing ways. The International Energy Agency estimated that without American shale production, the price of oil would be $150 per barrel.23 With 90+ million barrels of oil sold every day globally, the difference between $50 per barrel and $150 is of great significance.24 For Russia and OPEC, the combined difference amounts to nearly $1.5 trillion per year (based on their combined production of over 40 million barrels per day).25 Stop for a moment and consider how significant an additional $1.5 trillion annual transfer would be for OPEC and Russia, largely funded by the United States and the West. No wonder economic analysts such as Ron Insana declare, “The fracking revolution must be protected at all costs...”26 The domestic shale industry has some unique attributes, however, making it vulnerable to external price pressures. For one thing, the effort is relatively capital-intensive.27 It has blossomed in a low-interest-rate environment.28 Without access to inexpensive capital, however, oil drilling would stall.29 The second issue is that hydraulic fracking readily stirs up environmental objections.30 This creates the risk that public opinion could turn against the industry. In addition, shale oil production declines rather quickly compared to conventional extraction methods. While a traditional oil well might produce steadily for twenty years or more, a shale-play well provides

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The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015 35

strong production for about two years before a quick decline. Conventional wells might decline 2 percent per year while shale production can drop by more than 70 percent in the first year alone.31 This forces continual drilling to maintain production. So, even though the forecast has been for America to become fully energy independent in the near future, a price decline dramatically alters those hopes.32 Estimates are that, at present, our domestic shale industry needs about $70 per barrel to remain healthy.33 Of course, some fields are less costly than others.34 Current production will continue well below this price but drilling activity will plummet. We are seeing that already as rig counts have dropped. Operators are already stressed and many could enter bankruptcy. If prices are suppressed for two years, all the recent production gains would be lost. The last time low prices hit a boom like the one we had been experiencing was in the 1980s. It took decades for a recovery, even when prices ultimately rebounded.35

Political Collusion? On September 11th last year, Secretary of State John Kerry met with Saudi King Abdullah at his palace on the Red Sea.36 While they no doubt discussed Syria, Iran, and Russia, they most likely also discussed global oil prices.37 Only a day earlier, September 10, it had been reported that the Saudis were slashing their production to keep oil prices over $100 per barrel. But, following the meeting with John Kerry, something seemed to shift. On November 23rd, Secretary Kerry reconnected with the Saudi Foreign Minister in Vienna.38 This was just four days before OPEC would make a historic announcement, also

36 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015

in Vienna, that they would not defend prices.39 The sudden shift in position sent prices collapsing. What had been $100 per barrel just weeks earlier quickly slipped under $50 and below $44 by the end of January.40 What made the Saudis change their minds so abruptly? They were set to defend prices as they typically had, but soon after meeting with Secretary of State Kerry, they pivoted 180 degrees to focus on maintaining market share, essentially pumping more oil into an already oversupplied market. Everything accelerated in November, immediately after a second discussion with the Secretary of State. It is impossible to imagine that such dramatic changes were not discussed. It appears that these were strategic decisions made with the awareness and consent of the Obama Administration. Naturally, this raises a few interesting questions. Did the Obama team collude to lower oil prices in the economic war with Russia? The Russians certainly believe so and have reported as much.41 Equally important, did they do so with full knowledge that such action would hamper American energy entrepreneurs who are primarily Republican supporters?42 This theory may not be far-fetched. In the 1990s, tobacco companies primarily supported Republican candidates.43 Senior Democrats demonized tobacco, and launched an organized push to ban its use. These were even called “the tobacco wars.”44 Is it simply that these figures opposed smoking, or was money the higher priority? Given the fact that many of the same key Democrats now support marijuana legalization, the latter appears to be the answer.45 Consider that three marijuana joints can cause more lung damage than twenty tobacco cigarettes.46

Clearly, it’s also about money, politics and the exercise of power. The same may be said about energy development and the environment. President Obama clearly stated that he opposed the coal industry and openly promised that his policies would bankrupt coal plants.47 Having demonstrated antagonism to American hydraulic fracking, is it possible that the Obama administration would support policies that might bankrupt hydraulic fracking as well?48 If so, collusion with the Saudis becomes a logical consideration. Even as American oil production has risen during President Obama’s time in office, federal opposition has dramatically increased.49 Ironically, Russia has joined OPEC’s initiative to stop the American energy renaissance. Former senior KGB officers reported that they were directed to support environmental activist groups in order to hamper American productivity.50 Anders Rasmussen, former Secretary General of NATO, stated that former KGB Lieutenant Colonel (and current Russian President) Vladimir Putin has been funding anti-fracking efforts globally.51 Russian energy companies have likewise been pushing money into the American “green movement” with hopes of undermining energy production.52 Even the Chinese strategy document Unrestricted Warfare advocates “environmental warfare” and “regulatory warfare” to constrain the United States. It’s deeply concerning to note that antifracking efforts have prevented energy production in multiple states and even in Denton, Texas.53 Why do you think the United Arab Emirates funded Matt Damon’s antifracking movie?54 This has created a triangle of sorts.

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Pumpjacks on Lost Hills Oil Field in California on Route 46. Photo by: Arne Hückelheim

Saudi Arabia targets both American shale production and Russia. Russia targets American shale and threatens the Saudis through Iran. America supports the Saudi effort against Russia, but our domestic energy industry is in competition with OPEC and Russia. The Obama administration supports environmental opposition to domestic energy, making strange bedfellows with the Russians. While complicated, it is clear that oil is the primary weapon in play, and American energy independence is clearly in the crosshairs of many.

A National Security Issue Unfortunately, the issue isn’t just about money. It is truly a matter of national security. The unnatural collapse of prices threatens continued domestic drilling by making the effort financially unviable.55 It also provides the opportunity for antidrilling forces to triumph (in America

38 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015

and Western Europe only, of course) amid public apathy. Are we seeing evidence of this as President Obama proposes banning oil exploration in a large part of Alaska?56 Without fracking, oil prices would be $150 per barrel, and OPEC projects $200 per barrel before long.57 The West can’t afford the enormous wealth transfer that would ultimately occur to potentially hostile areas. To put this in context, our entire defense budget is about $600 billion per year.58 Since OPEC and Russia together produce close to 15 billion barrels of oil per year, $200 per barrel would provide them a combined $3 trillion. That does not take into account how losses in our economy will ultimately force military cuts. Low oil prices are beneficial for our economy. Artificially low prices from competitors can destroy our own energy industry. Former Director of Central Intelligence, Jim Woolsey, warns that without aggressive domestic energy

production, we will again be “funding both sides of the war on terror.”59 We must be on our guard against the oil weapon targeting us, even when it is manifested in low prices for the short term. Perhaps the issue was best summarized in an editorial by Ron Insana titled “What the U.S. Should Do to Fight this Oil War.” “The U.S. has lost too many economic wars over the last 50 years, allowing foreign producers to “dump” cheap goods onto world markets to make U.S. energy companies, textile-makers and auto-manufacturers suffer near-death experiences. The U.S. is on the edge of energy freedom … freedom from nations who use oil money to finance aggression, like Russia … to finance terror, like many in the Middle East, most recently the Islamic State and freedom from indebtedness that may one day become quite burdensome, if not cataclysmic. If this is the war to end all oil wars, the

U.S. should use every means at its disposal to win…”

How Do We Win? First, we need superior economic intelligence. We need to know precisely how long our shale industry can survive with low prices. Equally important, we need to know how long the Russians and Saudis can sustain their budgets with depressed revenues. In addition, the American people need to be educated about the importance of a strong and sustainable energy industry. Political winds can shift quickly and we can’t afford to see the promise of energy independence die from the apathy of low prices or contrived environmental activism and regulatory campaigns. Next, we should support efforts to lower the cost of production domestically. One good example is AERA, the American Energy Renaissance Act sponsored by Congressman Jim

Bridenstine of Oklahoma and Senator Ted Cruz of Texas. This legislation would reduce stifling regulation, support the development of pipelines, and adopt other measures that could help domestic producers compete effectively. Another time-tested solution to predatory pricing is to buy up any essential product that’s dumped on the markets below the cost of production if it is also below the long-term expected price. As a nation, we already have a Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) used to store oil for emergencies.60 We could increase our holdings dramatically through open-market purchases at these depressed prices, issuing 30-year Treasury bonds and backing them with the new oil asset. Assuming that oil prices will at one point exceed the current price plus the interest rate (currently under 2.5 percent) and the cost of long-term storage, such a move would not only stabilize prices but could also prove quite profitable.

As an example, the nearly 700 million barrels stored at the SPR cost an average of $29.70 per barrel, demonstrating the economic benefits available.61 Is there any doubt that oil prices will, at some point in the next thirty years, far exceed the current level? Another idea would be to open more federal lands for energy production, especially those that can be developed at lower cost. This would ensure that drilling activity remains at high levels for the foreseeable future. It is estimated that the amount of recoverable energy on federal lands is almost 1.2 trillion barrels of oil and over two quadrillion cubic feet of natural gas.62 Even at $50 per barrel, the oil resources alone would be valued at about $60 trillion, more than three times our current stated national debt.63 Yet, despite this, the government leases only about 2 percent of federal offshore areas and less than 6 percent of federal onshore lands.64

The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015 39

There are multiple solutions and we will likely need to combine several to be effective. Unfortunately, mainstream reporting on the subject is typically superficial and there is general ignorance surrounding the problem. Based on the actions of the Russians and Saudis, however, the conclusion is obvious. Oil is a weapon and this is a matter of national security and long-term survival.

â&#x20AC;˘

about the author Mr. Freeman (CFA) is the author of Secret Weapon: How Economic Terrorism Brought Down the U.S. Stock Market and Why It Can Happen Again (www.secretweapon.org). He has consulted for and briefed members of the U.S. House and Senate, CIA, DIA, FBI, SEC, DOJ, and Homeland Security on the issues of economic warfare and financial terrorism. He authors the blog www.globaleconomicwarfare.com.

Endnotes https://history.state.gov/ milestones/1969-1976/oil-embargo. 2 http://www.foxbusiness.com/ markets/2011/08/12/worst-stock-market1

40 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015

collapses-since-great-depression/ 3 http://research.stlouisfed.org/ wp/2008/2008-019.pdf 4 http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/ worldwarii/a/wwiipaccauses_2.htm 5 http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/ volume-103/issue-17/general-interest/the-oilweapon-past-present-and-future.html 6 http://www.jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/ article/viewFile/91/101 7 http://democrats.foreignaffairs.house. gov/110/kor052208.htm 8 http://www.theguardian.com/ business/2008/jul/12/oil.commodities 9 http://www.forbes.com/sites/ johndobosz/2014/09/11/biotech-energy-andgold-big-winners-since-91101/ 10 http://lawreview.usc.edu/wp-content/ uploads/slideshow/85SCalLRev_Leslie.pdf 11 http://learning.blogs.nytimes. com/2012/05/15/may-15-1911-supremecourt-orders-standard-oil-to-be-broken-up/ 12 http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/ statements/2014/mar/13/michael-reagan/ ronald-reagans-son-says-his-father-got-saudispump/ 13 http://www.washingtonpost.com/ lifestyle/kidspost/the-berlin-wall-fell-25-yearsago/2014/11/06/4d2a900c-5fab-11e4-9f3a7e28799e0549_story.html 14 http://tehrantimes.com/politics/120242saudi-arabia-launching-oil-war-against-iranand-russia-new-york-post

http://www.wsj.com/articles/oil-priceslump-strains-budgets-of-some-opecmembers-1412952367 16 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/ s/0/458e8aba-65e6-11e4-a454-00144feabdc0. html#axzz3QT19I64K 17 http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_ world_/2014/11/19/are_the_united_states_ and_saudi_arabia_conspiring_to_keep_oil_ prices_down.html 18 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/ business/comment/satyajit-das-for-the-saudislow-oil-prices-are-a-means-of-exactingrevenge-10007166.html 19 http://www.bbc.com/news/blogsechochambers-29651742 20 http://www.reuters.com/ article/2014/11/28/us-opec-meeting-shaleidUSKCN0JC1GK20141128 21 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/2014-07-04/u-s-seen-as-biggest-oilproducer-after-overtaking-saudi 22 http://www.businessinsider.com/usenergy-independence-one-chart-2014-10 23 http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/ energy-a-environment/328389-without-shaleoil-prices-would-be-a-lot-higher 24 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/2014-03-14/iea-raises-2014-oildemand-estimate-as-world-economy-recovers 25 http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/ IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=53&aid=1 26 http://www.cnbc.com/id/102228450 15

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IBID http://capitalresearch.org/2011/09/ fracking-the-latest-battlefront-in-the-greenwar-against-jobs/ 31 http://fortune.com/2015/01/09/oilprices-shale-fracking/ 32 http://www.efxnews.com/story/26507/ could-oil-price-drop-threaten-us-shalerevolution-then-economy 33 http://www.economist.com/news/ finance-and-economics/21635505-willfalling-oil-prices-curb-americas-shale-boombind 34 http://www.businessinsider.com/citibreakeven-oil-production-prices-2014-11 35 http://www.wsj.com/articles/back-to-thefuture-oil-replays-1980s-bust-1421196361 36 http://www.wsj.com/articles/ deal-with-saudis-paved-way-for-syrianairstrikes-1411605329 37 http://oilprice.com/Energy/Oil-Prices/ Did-The-Saudis-And-The-US-Collude-InDropping-Oil-Prices.html 38 http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/ middle-east/2014/11/23/Kerry-holdsmeeting-with-Saudi-FM-al-Faisal-in-Vienna. html 39 http://www.wsj.com/articles/ crude-prices-slump-as-opec-meets1417086979?mod=wsj_nview_latest 40 http://www.wsj.com/articles/crude-oilfutures-weak-in-asia-on-record-high-u-ssupply-1422511088 41 http://rt.com/op-edge/224831-davosforum-elite-switzerland-business/ 42 http://www.nationaljournal.com/newenergy-paradigm/in-2016-republicans-willhave-fracking-on-their-side-20140612 43 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/campaigns/keyraces98/stories/ wa050898.htm 44 http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/31/ nation/la-na-energy-drinks-20130901 45 http://reason.com/blog/2013/12/18/ poll-majorities-of-democrats-and-indepe2 46 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/ article-146853/Why-cannabis-greatercancer-risk-tobacco.html 29 30

http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/ obama-warned-his-policies-would-bankruptcoal-power-plant-owners_644384.html 48 http://www.washingtontimes.com/ news/2015/jan/18/editorial-obamas-waragainst-oil-and-natural-gas-p/ 49 http://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/ us-shale-oil-revolution-grave-concern-foropec 50 http://www.8newsnow.com/ story/392920/exclusive-interview-withformer-kgb-agent-part-2 51 http://www.theguardian.com/ environment/2014/jun/19/russia-secretlyworking-with-environmentalists-to-opposefracking 52 http://freebeacon.com/issues/foreignfirm-funding-u-s-green-groups-tied-to-stateowned-russian-oil-company/ 53 http://rt.com/usa/202543-texas-frackingban-denton/ 54 http://economy.money.cnn. com/2012/10/01/matt-damon-fracking/ 55 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/2014-10-21/oil-at-80-a-barrelmuffles-forecasts-for-u-s-shale-boom 56 http://www.latimes.com/nation/ nationnow/la-na-nn-obama-arctic-alaskaoil-drilling-wilderness-20150125-story. html#page=1 57 http://www.fool.com/investing/ general/2015/01/31/opec-sees-oil-pricesexploding-to-200-a-barrel.aspx 58 https://www.americanprogress.org/ issues/security/report/2014/04/24/88516/ausers-guide-to-the-fiscal-year-2015-defensebudget/ 59 http://www.stanforddaily. com/2010/02/25/former-cia-head-ties-oilterror/ 60 http://energy.gov/fe/services/petroleumreserves/strategic-petroleum-reserve/sprquick-facts-and-faqs 61 IBID 62 http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/ analysis/federal-assets-above-and-belowground/ 63 http://www.usdebtclock.org 64 http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/ analysis/federal-assets-above-and-belowground/ 47

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The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015 43

Book Review

The ISIS Solution By: Brandon Webb, Jack Murphy and Peter Nealen

n early 2014, after taking over Fallujah, Iraq, U.S. President Barack Hussein Obama made the mystifying claim that ISIS was a “JV” terrorist group. Later in the year, after ISIS had conquered even more of Syria and Iraq, President Obama made the bizarre claim that ISIS “is not Islamic.” He did, however, pledge to “destroy” the group, but essentially rescinded that pledge in the same breath by promising not to deploy U.S. ground forces to Iraq. Today, the Obama administration has unleashed an onslaught of measuredly disapproving public statements against ISIS, authorized a series of primarily symbolic airstrikes, and even broken the earlier promise not to deploy ground forces by putting a couple thousand American troops on the ground in Iraq. Of each of President Obama’s earlier ISIS statements, the most accurate one is his comment from September 2014, that he had “no strategy” for dealing with ISIS. Noticing evidence of this vacuum to this day, Brandon Webb, Jack Murphy, and Peter Nealen published The ISIS Solution (2014, Kindle and Audible); a compilation of insights based on their respective years of SEAL, Special Forces,

44 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015

and Force Recon experience, observations from deployments in support of the war previously known as GWOT (Global War On Terror), and the study of warfare in general. The authors make the insightful statement, “While ISIS has released several documents and videos giving some ideas of its strategy, even more can be determined by examining their targets, their actions in multiple spectrums

Reviewed by: Chris Graham

of warfare, politics, and information, and their history.” They add, “ISIS has stated its goals in several places, including the recent propaganda video Flames of War. At the beginning of Flames, the narrator states that ISIS is ‘a mission that would herald the return to the khilafah [caliphate] and revive the creed of tawheed [monotheism/Islam]. It was the establishment of the Islamic State nourished by the blood of the truthful mujahideen to unite the ummah [the entire Islamic religion] on one calling, one banner, one leader.’” ISIS Solution states, “From 2003 to 2012, AQI/ISI was unable to go head-to-head with the conventional coalition forces in Iraq. As a result, their strategy was limited by their logistics and available combat power. They attacked coalition forces with mostly indirect fires and improvised explosive devices, while simultaneously attacking infrastructure, conducting terror operations to dissuade the populace from supporting the coalition-backed Iraqi government, and to demonstrate the inadequacy of both that government and the coalition forces to keep them safe, and attacking the Iraqi security forces and government officials in order to break down the

government’s resistance by way of terror and assassination.” After identifying the problem, and its current growth spurts, the authors make a compelling argument that ISIS will become a larger problem over time. They acknowledge that the ideology behind terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS is “massively popular.” They suggest that beyond the immediate tactical solution to ISIS, we must make this ideology “uncool.” They suggest a comprehensive effort consisting of both white (openly attributed) and black (misleadingly attributed) propaganda to achieve this aim disseminated at the lowest possible levels. The authors state that ISIS developed from a “resistance” stage to one of conquest where, in addition to executions and torture, the group delivered aid and implemented shariah. They took note of ISIS’ operational similarities to Mao’s strategies for communist revolution. They suggest that ISIS leader Baghdadi is a figurehead, with more skilled leadership remaining in the shadows. The writers take note of the group’s de-centralized leadership architecture and advance a quote attributed to Henry Kissinger: “the guerrilla wins if he does not lose.” ISIS Solution recognizes that, while ISIS may have cheaper, less sophisticated communications technology, this is not a disadvantage when they handle the situation by allowing smaller elements to exercise initiative and take advantage of opportunities. They are also aware that American Blue Force Trackers and other advanced and expensive tracking and communications technology is a disadvantage when used to micromanage a force as Western militaries do. They correctly recognize that the common Western assumption that a group of this nature requires stable command and control is false. After arguing that the consequences

of inaction will be too horrible to imagine, the authors describe past special operations successes such as SAS commander David Stirling’s raids in North Africa and U.S. Special Forces operations in and around Vietnam. The authors propose three possible options for “destroying” ISIS. The first option advanced is to launch a blitzkrieg by U.S. ground forces with a steeled political leadership, small units permitted to make decisions, and aggressive mobile operations supported by aggressive (not symbolic) close air support. The second option, intended to accommodate a desire to minimize use of U.S. forces, is a similar operation, but spearheaded by U.S. Special Operations Forces leading foreign forces. The third option is also similar, only conducted by private military companies. The authors acknowledge the predictable, if irrational, press “freakout” and political “demonization” that this option would meet, but point out the significant benefits, such as eliminating the burden from an overstretched U.S. military that must be prepared for larger strategic challenges and accomplishing the same mission with a smaller, less expensive force of volunteers. They point out the urgent need to plan a successful postwar plan this time, as well as a war campaign. However, there are several concerns the book does not address. The authors seem to assume unlimited free-market industrial support rather than recognizing the current stifling influence from massively expanded regulation of our economy and central planning. It appears that the authors give no consideration to how close the U.S. economy may be to the precipice as a result of the U.S. government’s $18 trillion (+) admitted debt. Also, Iran has enjoyed the benefit of U.S. forces degrading Sunni competitors in the past and then unleashed surrogate

Shiite terror campaigns to ensure that a U.S. friendly government or “freedom” of the type that could be recognized by a Westerner would not spring up. The authors have not articulated a reason to believe this challenge would be addressed this time. Furthermore, I am surprised the authors advocate for more U.S. propaganda rather than advocating for an initiative to expose the propaganda of our adversaries and that which undermines the U.S. Constitution. Finally, I am not clear what action in the past six years makes the authors believe that our national leadership might be capable of competently following the roadmap they have provided. The sadistic Islamic State can be likened to a combination of the ideas of the “prophet” Mohammed, Vlad the Impaler, and the Viet Cong. They proudly post videos of machine gunning pedestrians on the Internet. They crucify Christians, rape and enslave men, women and children, and torture as they wish. As immoral as I believe war to inherently be, “destroying” these savages would be a moral campaign. Treating this growing threat as a distant priority may be an act of cowardice we one day regret. The ISIS Solution is full of valuable insight that “experts” who have never been to Iraq or talked with a terrorist may not be aware of. I pray that by the time our national leaders are “surprised” (yet again) to be drawn into an expanded and intensified conflict with ISIS they will have read The ISIS Solution.

•

about the author Mr. Graham is the former commander of a military anti-terrorism unit, the editor of The Counter Terrorist magazine and author of the highly acclaimed new novel Election: Dezinformatsiya and The Great Game (www.chrisgrahamauthor.com).

The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015 45

How big is ISIS Threat in Afghanistan -Pakistan? Abdul Basit

he meteoric rise of the terrorist group Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) in Middle Eastâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Levant region has left its mark on Afghanistan-Pakistanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ever-evolving Jihadist landscape. In recent months, pro-ISIS wall chalking, graffiti and propaganda pamphlets have been spotted in different parts of the two countries. However at the moment, the scale of ISIS influence is neither too benign to be ignored nor too large-scale to pose

46 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015

any immediate security threat. The ISIS

in last one decade, plays a very dangerous

operations in the two countries are in

inspirational role on the more radical and

their nascent phase: it is a threat in the

overambitious generation of the Jihadists

making.

in Af-Pak.

The radical-extremist ideology of ISIS

Most of ISIS supporters in Afghanistan

and its military victories in Iraq and Syria

and Pakistan are Salafi-Takfiri Jihadists.

resonates with the Jihadists groups in the

Salafism has a very limited following

region. Most importantly, ISIS success

in Afghanistan-Pakistan region (two to

in establishing the so-called Islamic

three percent). Majority of the Jihadists

Caliphate in Iraq, a fiat which Al-Qaeda

groups in the two countries are followers

and Afghan Taliban have failed to achieve

of Deobandi-Hanafi branch of Islam,

including the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. As an outsider to the region finding a foothold in Af-Pak will not be easy for ISIS, for cultural reasons and due to well-established presence of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. However, the threat can magnify exponentially if the Pakistani and Afghan fighters who have gone to fight in Iraq and Syria return and join hands with the ISIS’ Af-Pak network, or a major terror group defects to ISIS. If history is any guide, after 9/11 successive Pakistani governments have mishandled almost all emerging internal security threats which later turned into Frankenstein monsters. Be it the 2005 rise of the current Pakistani Taliban chief Mullah Fazlullah, a Ski-lift operator, in Swat; the 2006 ascendance of the head of militant group Lashkar-e-Islam (LI)

Mangal Bagh, a truck driver, in Khyber Agency or the 2007 Islamist uprising of the Red Mosque students against the state: all these threats were ignored as negligible. Later, they turned into uncontrollable monsters. Similarly, the well-publicized pro-ISIS allegiances by the radical Islamist cleric and head of the Red Mosque Maulvi Abdul Aziz, former Pakistani spokesperson Shahidullah Shahid and the Salafi Afghan Jihadist Abdul Rahim Muslim are a dangerous precedence. Such trends should be taken and dealt with seriously before they spiral out of their control. Such allegiances pose a grave challenge for three reasons; a) firstly, they can unsettle the current Jihadist landscape triggering a process of operational and ideological transformations; b) secondly,

they will make management of internal security situation more difficult; c) thirdly, such trends would necessitate remapping of the existing militant landscape for accurate threat perception. No matter how small or big, defections signify ISIS message is gaining traction within the Af-Pak Jihadist groups, especially from those militant groups which feel detached from Al-Qaeda or the Afghan Taliban. The inability of AlQaeda to carry out a terror-spectacular in last few years and Afghan Taliban’s failure to break the stalemate in Afghanistan has left many Jihadists groups in AfghanistanPakistan disillusioned. Such groups view Al-Qaeda’s circumspect and old-schoolapproach of gradualism to Jihad is out of sync with modern world realities. Moreover, Afghan Taliban’s Afghanistan-

The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015 47

“ Currently, the power-struggle for the leadership of global-Jihad between Al-Qaeda and ISIS hangs in balance as the US-led anti-ISIS air campaign has blunted ISIS advances in Iraq and Syria.

which has attracted foreign fighters from across the world to fill its ranks in Iraq and Syria, Al-Qaeda prefers local fighters for the local issues. Being sons-of-the-soil the local Jihadist groups find indigenous issues closer to their hearts rather than going and fighting in the foreign lands. So, galvanizing local support for such causes, arranging logistics and finances becomes easier. Currently, the power-struggle for

only focus is seen as power-lust which is geared more towards restoration of their toppled regime in Afghanistan rather than fighting for Islam. They see Afghan Taliban as a political rather than an Islamic force. Currently, there are three Jihadi models available to Jihadist groups in the region; ISIS propounded caliphate model, AQ espoused Ghazwa-e-Hind for South Asia (part of its overall transnational Jihadist campaign) and Afghan Taliban’s emirate model. Qualitatively, the three models differ in their modus operandi despite more or less identical ideological ends. For the new generation of Jihadists, ISIS has achieved in few months (creation of an Islamic caliphate) what Al-Qaeda has failed to accomplish in three decades. ISIS success model has provided them with an alternative option. Every pro-ISIS defection from these groups is a blow to Al-Qaeda/Taliban and a win for the former. More defections will follow if ISIS sustains its success graph in the near future. ISIS is using an articulate four-pronged strategy to create an opening for itself in Afghanistan-Pakistan. The four-pronged strategy involves; a) indoctrination and ideologization through internet propaganda (online radicalization) and

48 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015

distribution of pamphlets and booklets; b) recruitment campaign by attracting self-radicalized individuals and splinter Jihadi groups; c) establishing a physical sanctuary through local affiliates; d) and then try to expand the network by carrying out terrorist attacks and openly challenging other dominant militant groups i.e. Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban Notwithstanding ISIS successes and victories, Al-Qaeda is not a spent force. Al-Qaeda may be losing to ISIS elsewhere in the world but it is firmly entrenched in Af-Pak region. With the exception of aforementioned defections, majority of militant groups are still loyal to Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan-Pakistan. However, each defection is a blow to Al-Qaeda and more defections will expose these cracks. AlQaeda is walking on a thin ice with ISIS where downfall from the pinnacle can be at a distance of one major defection. One decisive defection from a major terror group in Af-Pak can turn the tables on Al-Qaeda central. By announcing its South Asia branch AQIS in September 2014, Al-Qaeda central has offered a more compelling model of Ghazwa-e-Hind (Battle of India) to its Af-Pak affiliates. Al-Qaeda central’s current jihadist-approach is to think global but act local. Unlike ISIS,

the leadership of global-Jihad between Al-Qaeda and ISIS hangs in balance as the US-led anti-ISIS air campaign has blunted ISIS advances in Iraq and Syria. To win the leadership of global Jihad ISIS would have to dislodge Al-Qaeda from the top of the Jihadi pyramid in Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, it will be difficult for ISIS to penetrate the veteran and well-established Jihadist entities like the Kashmiri Jihadi groups and the Afghan Taliban. However, the overambitious factions of the splintering Pakistani Taliban movement like Jamaatul-Ahrar and the anti-Shia Sunni militant groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Jandullah are up for grab. The Pakistani security establishment will have to handle TTP’s disintegration and sectarian militancy within the context of ISIS growing influence over these groups. Abdul Basit in an Associate Research Fellow working with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He can be reached at isabasit@ ntu.edu.sg

The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015 49

Boko Haram Declares Caliphate in West Africa 50 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015

Photos courtesy of the author.

By Al J. Venter

Citizens of Western nations—the United States and in Europe, in particular—should understand that their troops might soon also be fighting a ground war in West Africa. The reasons are simple.

hile the international community has seen ISIS—or more appropriately, Islamic State—make enormous strides in conquering swathes of territory east of Suez, few have bothered to follow what this fundamentalist jihadist movement

may be achieving in West Africa. In conjunction with its Nigerian affiliate Boko Haram, the terror group has surreptitiously created an entirely new country in the northern Islamic heartland of Nigeria. At 25,000 square miles, about the same size as Maryland in the U.S., it

Gunner on French infantry fighting vehicle in Mali.

even has its own capital, called Gwoza.1 There is a self-appointed Emir, Abubakar Shekau, who rules with brutal efficiency, a man who in other society would almost certainly be regarded as a maniac. A tall Kanuri tribesman who hails from a mountainous region that fringes on

The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015 51

Central African Republic—an challenging country in which to fight a jungle war.

Nigerian Army ‘Cobra’ IFV beefing up security at Emir’s palace in Bauchi.

the Cameroons, Shekau has a reputation of being well schooled in the esoterics of Salafist Islam that had its roots in postindependent revolutionary Algeria. As a group of militant jihadists, Boko Haram emerged more than a decade ago when followers of Mohammed Yusuf, a

52 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015

charismatic young preacher, advocated a strict, fundamentalist interpretation of the Koran and believed that the creation of Nigeria by British colonialists had imposed a Western and un-Islamic way of life on Muslims. Yusuf offered his followers a radical way of life that opposed conventional politics, elections included. The wearing of Western clothes is banned. Killed by the Nigerian Army in 2009, Shekau quickly stepped into the breach and subsequently claimed in a YouTube video that it was his ambition to bring all of Nigeria under his control, establish a caliphate (which he has now done, with himself at the head) and dutifully follow the example of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL / ISIS).2 I have been told by a source in London that I trust that there is evidence, that Boko Haram and ISIL have entered into a formal agreement that involves training

Boko Haram cadres. Additional evidence suggests that Afghanistan’s Taliban is also to host Boko Haram recruits for military instruction. Meanwhile, almost unopposed, this Nigerian terror group has achieved mastery over a dozen local government areas in a region that fringes on the Cameroon, the Niger Republic, and Chad and in the process killed about 10,000 people, mostly civilian Muslims who did not conform to Boko Haram’s interpretation of Islamic scriptures. In a sense, it is a repeat of the Algerian revolution with the Nigerians following the shocking examples the Salafistorientated Armed Islamic Group (alJama’ah al-Islamiyah al-Mulsallah) that made a public spectacle of slaughtering unborn children in their mothers’ wombs. Boko Haram currently holds sway over almost two million souls living in scores of towns and villages within its domain. The group regularly metes out brutal jihadist justice in the name of shariah with the almost inhuman fervor for which Islamic State has become associated in those parts of Iraq and Syria under its control. These sentences include stoning women to death for infidelity (which quite often rests solely on hearsay, settling old scores, or a man wishing to be rid of his disruptive wife), as well as the cutting off of hands for theft. Additionally educational facilities for females have been abolished, all of which slots in tidily with the terror movement’s dictum. Loosely translated, Boko Haram—in an abrogation of the Fulani language—suggests that Western education is evil. Strikingly, the movement’s activities now extend well beyond Nigeria’s frontiers. Recent months have seen this guerrilla force expand its activities into several neighboring countries including those mentioned above: sadly,

Boko Haram propaganda video. the vaunted Nigerian army and air force appear unwilling or unable to do anything about it. Case in point: prior to an attack on the fishing town of Baga in northeast Nigeria in early January (where an estimated 2,000 people were slaughtered by Boko Haram terrorists), Human Rights Watch confirmed that it had actually informed the Abuja Government that the attack was imminent. The warning was ignored.3 Another onslaught followed in late January 2015, on the Nigerian army garrison town of Monguno, a couple of hours’ drive from the regional capital of Maiduguri. Boko Haram made short shrift of overrunning the base and at the time of writing, the fate of 1,400 government troops is unclear. So too is what happened to the Nigerian army equipment—tanks, APCs, artillery, rocket launchers, grenades, and claymores, as well as several thousand

AKs—lodged at the base. A government spokesman told Nigeria’s Premium Times newspaper a day later that the army could have actually defeated the insurgents, “but there was not enough ammunition.”4 The claim symbolizes just about everything that is wrong with Nigeria’s military-led counter-terrorism approach, wrote David Alison for the Daily Maverick, part of Britain’s Guardian Africa Network.5 It also raises questions about the ability of the Nigerians to defend themselves against an insurrection that appears to be getting out of hand, especially since more than half of the country’s military comes from the north (and is Islamic). Though military spokespeople remain non-committal on the subject, whispers emanating from marketplaces all over the country—invariably the most accurate source of information in a country under

…Boko Haram—in an abrogation of the Fulani language— suggests that Western education is evil. heavy censorship—strongly suggest that there have been significant army defections to the fighting ranks of Boko Haram. What is most disturbing in the minds of average Nigerians is that Boko Haram appears to have created an unstoppable, comparatively-powerful military force. As with Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, its fighters are often fearless, believing they are laying down their lives for the greater

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54 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015

French helicopters in Mali hunting rebels.

French Air Force operational base at Kidal in Northern Mali after recaptured from al-Qaeda.

good of Allah and all mankind, which their imams tell them ensures a direct route to paradise. The truth is that Nigerian troops— even those trained for several years by United States military instructors working under the auspices of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) —are enormously fearful of contact with these fanatics. More often than not, when the word goes out that Boko Haram is on its way, entire units flee just as the U.S.trained Iraqi army did when confronted by ISIS.

Yet, Boko Haram has shown itself to be vulnerable to well-ordered and determined resistance. The disciplined Chad’s army recently demonstrated that by driving Boko Haram militants out of Malumfatori, a town in northeast Nigeria.6 Several other African regions are also coming under the influence of ISIS, including Algeria, Mali, and Libya, as well parts of the Sudan and northern Chad (where it borders on Libya). Algeria has remained a focus of dissident Islamic activity for many years (and Mali more recently) where guerrilla

involvement is mostly drawn from the Algerian and local Saharan communities (such as the Tuaregs and the Berabiche tribal clans of Mali, as well as Moroccans from city suburbs of that North African country). The outfit also has links with both Nigeria’s Boko Haram and Somalia’s al-Shabaab. The group’s official name is Organization of al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (Qaedat al-Jihad ﬁ Bilad al-Maghrib al-Islami), often shortened to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Prior to January 2007,

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Preparing for an operation to rebel positions near Timbuktu.

it was known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat and the French acronym GSPC (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat).7 In a series of personal communications, the French military attaché in London was of the opinion that AQIM had launched a 400-year war, and though fighting is sporadic, he reckoned that regions adjoining the Sahara Desert made conditions for containing this resolute group of rebels much more difficult than the original South East Asian war fought by a previous generation of Americans. He also stressed that “this was not a [series of wars] only against Muslims but rather, against people having various interests in challenging the established order.” He claimed that the Mali insurgency

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remains a classical guerrilla insurgency, but also warned, “It is taking much more than basic counter-insurgency efforts to contain it.” For a start, he reckoned, the region in which AQIM operates covers several countries and is as big as Western Europe. “The enemy is elusive, clever and remarkably well-trained, considering that these are tribal people who have made an art of slipping in and out of mountain hideaways with the kind of ease that comes with experience. Worse, they are almost always one step ahead of our security forces.” It doesn’t matter that the French military effort—quietly aided by several other countries, the United States and Britain included—is efficient, mobile, and has lots of armor, as well as helicopter gunships, AQIM’s biggest

ally is the desert. Those vast, desolate stretches of sand and rock that go on forever are his home, his “backyard,” as it were. “And it has always been that way, since the beginning of time,” declared the French colonel. The machinations of these groups are not always militarily orientated. Recruitment and jihadist proselytization forms a significant part, as does brutallyefficient intimidation, which, in plain language boils down to “join our ranks or you’re dead!” British journalist Alex West disclosed in what I believe was clearly an intelligence “leak” that at least one Islamic fundamentalist group had dabbled in biological warfare, as had al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, in trying to construct “dirty bombs.” On January 19, 2009, there had been an outbreak of bubonic plague at an AQIM training camp in the Tizi Ouzou province and at least forty jihadists died from the disease. Surviving AQIM members reportedly fled to other parts of Algeria hoping to escape infection.8 Eli Lake, in an article in The Washington Times, made the claim a day later—based on a senior U.S. intelligence official source—that the incident was not related to bubonic plague. It was an accident involving either a biological or chemical agent, he reported.9 Following the March 2012 military coup in Bamako, the Mali capital, alQaeda quickly moved into the gap, calling itself AQIM Coalition Forces. These units included home-grown Ansar Dine and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (known by its French acronym Mujao). French forces boldly opposed the onslaught. Although the Mali engagement was intended to be limited to a few thousand troops and aircraft— mainly helicopter gunships and groundsupport jets, as well as transport planes,

Sunset desert scene at Timbuktu after recapture.

Franceâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s military strength in this West African territory peaked at more than 5,000 troops and airmen by mid-2013. It took the French about three weeks to drive the rebels from almost all the northern cities, including Timbuktu, Kidal, and Gao. As French forces moved farther north, there was evidence of foreign jihadists fighting with the Taureg rebels, including Saudis, Libyans, and Egyptians, as well as squads of children who had been trained and were armed with AKs. It was also a feature of this conflict that the insurgents very rarely took prisoners.

Timbuktu air base after it was recaptured from AQIM guerrillas.

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Helicopters in Northern Mali.

By now, much of the war was being fought almost 1,000 miles north of Bamako in a region that is sometimes known as the Adagh des Ifoghas, or Mountains of the Ifoghas tribe. It is a region that has been at the core of just about every Tuareg rebellion since the country gained its independence from France in 1960.

58 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015

The main town in the area is Kidal, formerly a Foreign Legion fort and the most important forward staging point for counter-insurgency operations. As one recent visitor told the BBC, the mountains immediately to the north are also a perfect place for a guerrilla army: “The annual rains fill up the gueltas, or ponds, with drinking water for nomadic

animal herds and insurgents and there are numerous caves that offer shelter from sand storms and helicopter gunships. “The Algerian border is close and porous enough to keep supplies of food, diesel and ammunition flowing in - as long as corrupt local officials can be bribed or forced to turn a blind eye.”10 More important, it is also from this region that AQIM—in an effort to divert attention from its war efforts in Mali— launched an attack on an Algerian gas installation at Tigantourine in January 2013. The fact that the target was more than 1,000 miles from where AQIM was fighting in Mali signifies both the mobility and extent of influence of this jihadist group. The insurgents, led by “Red Beard” Moktar Belmoktar (he dyed his beard with henna) made their mark, murdering 39 foreigners and taking 800 hostages. In the broader context, the Algerian terror attack played a significant role in causing France to review its accepted “military non-participation status” in West Africa. A month later the French army and air force went into Mali in strength. What quickly became clear was that although the Mali army had undergone years of military training at the hands of American instructors, its forces

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60 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015

Unless all forces strive to raise their capabilities and standards and the most competent military forces in the world take decisive direct action, this problem will grow exponentially worse.

Brown-out in the Northern Mali desert with a Tigre chopper gunship.

succumbed to rebel advances just as quickly as the Iraqis did. Government forces were ill-disciplined and at the first sign of a concerted onslaught by the rebels, they broke ranks. According to TomDispatch.com, an outspoken critic of Washington’s military efforts abroad (and a project of The Nation Institute), Americans working under the auspices of AFRICOM have been involved in no less than 49 of 54 African countries in efforts to rebuild these nations into stable partners with robust, capable militaries. The idea stemmed from creating regional bulwarks that would be favorable to United States’ strategic interests in Africa. Yet, says TomDispatch, “over the last years, the results have often confounded the planning - with American operations serving as a catalyst for blowback…”11 Since then—as a direct result of what happened in Mali—France has reestablished a strong military presence in West Africa to counter insurgencies in its former colonies. Headquartered in the Chad capital of N’Djamena, and including specialist detachments in other Francophone African cities, this “Battleready” reaction force is able to counter insurrection at almost any level.

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ENDNOTES Blair, David, “Beware the Rise of Africa’s Own Devil State,” Sydney Morning Herald, January 24, 2015. 2 Blair, David, “Boko Haram Is Now as Islamic Mini-State with its Own Territory,” Daily Telegraph, London, January 10, 2015. 3 British Broadcasting Corporation, “Boko Haram Crisis: Nigeria Army Warned about Baga Attack,” London, January 27, 2025. 4 Akinbajo, Idris, “Inside Details of Boko Haram’s 3-Pronged Attack on Maiduguri, Konduga, Monguno,” Premium Times, http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/ headlines/175592-inside-details-of-bokoharams-3-pronged-attack-on-maidugurikonduga-monguno.html. 5 Alison, David, “Why Maiduguri City is Key to Boko Haram’s Future,” The Guardian, London, January 28, 2015. 6 “Boko Haram Crisis: Chad ‘Captures Nigerian Town from Militants,” BBC Report, London January 29, 2015. 7 Cristiani, Dario, Riccardo Fabiani, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): Implications for Algeria’s Regional and International Relations,” IAI Working Papers, April 2011. See also “Algeria”. CIA, Retrieved January 17, 2015. 8 West, Alex, “Deadliest Weapon So Far...The Plague,” The Sun, January 19, 2009. 9 Lake, Eli, “Al-Qaeda Bungles Arms Experiment,” The Washington Times, January 19, 2009. 10 “The Remote Mountains of Northern Mali—Perfect for Guerrillas,” BBC News Africa, February 4, 2013, http://www.bbc. com/news/world-africa-21326831. 11 Turse, Nick, “Tomgram: Nick Turse, American Proxy Wars in Africa,” TomDispatch.com, March 13, 2014, http:// www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175818/ tomgram%3A_nick_turse,_american_ proxy_wars_in_africa. 1

Temporary French military camp in Northern Mali.

Islamist terrorists have gained significant ground in recent years. Nigeria’s insurgency has lasted six years and in the process the Nigerian army has lost a lot of territory including many towns and settlements. In recent months, however, South African mercenaries have caused serious damage within Boko Haram’s jihadist ranks.

•

about the author Russian made Grad BM-21 multi rocket launcher deployed in Mali.

62 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015

Mr. Venter is the author of more than 50 books and is also producer and director of TV films. His most notable [Circle 299 on Reader Service Card] effort was a one-hour documentary on the war in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion at the behest of the CIA. His latest book, Mercenaries is linked to a six part series of the same name for Discovery Channel and he recently published Portugal’s Guerrilla Wars in Africa.

Paving IS Silk Road to Poso

Indonesia Rakyan Adibrata

Globalising Caliphateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Tropical Soldiers The omnipresent gaze of the caliph reaches further than Iraq and Syria. In the deep mountainous rainforest of Sulawesi, a tropical island on the eastern part of Indonesia, a small rumpus band of ruffians responded the call for a global Islamic state and pledged allegiance to Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi as the leader of the Muslim community. Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) or Eastern

Indonesia Mujahidin announced its affiliation with the Islamic State (IS) in July last year. But these adulterated jihadists would remain a persistent domestic nuisance if not for a group of Uighurs who were arrested by Indonesian authorities on the way to joining MIT in its stronghold of Poso in Central Sulawesi. The small but lethal terrorist group with big plans has transformed instantly as an important dot in the scattered line of Islamic Stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s sphere of influence. The gaze is now staring back.

Hoisting the black flag Not many people heard of MIT before 2011. The genesis of the group can be traced back to the aftermath of the dismantling of militant paramilitary training camp in Aceh by police in 2010. The camp, funded by Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (Indonesian transliteration of Jamaat Ansar al-Tawhid, the Assembly of Helpers of Monotheism) and other major Indonesian jihadist organisations, was

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one of the two running for designation as a secure base (qaida amina). With Aceh in the west and Poso in the east, JAT would envision the emergence of an Islamic state stretching provisionally across Indonesia – reviving albeit nominally the disrupted goal of an Islamic Caliphate in Southeast Asian countries espoused by its predecessor organisation, Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Congregation). The singular aspiration from both organisations owed to their leader in different times: Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Ba’asyir was sentenced for 15 years imprisonment for funding the Aceh camp. So when Aceh was no more, Poso becomes the only remaining site to realise the idea. Better still, Poso comes with geographical advantage, demographic

64 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015

bonus, and logistical carrot. Poso is a Peshawar for jihadists. From the late 1990s to the mid-2000s, Poso was home to sectarian conflict between Muslims and Christians, which claimed thousands lives. New jihadi recruits, Mindanao-trained fighters or postcolonial Darul Islam rebels could be found mingling in the city. Streams of jihadists came to fight and many chose to stay. But it was a bloody clash with police in 2007 which hardened the militants. JAT then decided to appoint a former prisoner and combatant named Santoso alias Abu Wardah to head its military wing in the area. Under his leadership, the jihadists grew in size and in expertise. Recruits came from various places and

diverse organisations, including former Aceh paramilitary camp members and hard-line Muslim groups. It even conducted trainings in nomadic camps around the island. By 2010, JAT’s Poso branch and other jihadi organisations members in Poso founded MIT as an umbrella organisation. Santoso, taking the name Abu Musab al-Zarqawi alIndunisi in reference to IS progenitor Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, declared MIT as independent of any other groups. MIT became very active in 2012, responsible for the death of six police officers and a number of bomb attacks in Central Sulawesi and surrounding areas. But they remain strictly local. Though some MIT members have been exposed

to international terrorist networks, it remains entirely consisted of Indonesians, albeit from various islands and ethnicities, and has not conducted operations outside the country. It waged jihad against Indonesian police and government officials and has not attempted to target the far enemy. Even its funding relied on local supports and is locally derived through robberies and other criminal activities. Santoso inspired a cyber-jihadist Rizki Gunawan for example to hack an online site in 2012 that gave him almost USD 800,000 with some portions of it given to fund military trainings in Sulawesi. There was also Abu Roban’s Western Indonesia Mujahidin (MIB) which operated in Java

and Sumatera robbing banks, post office, internet cafés and other commercial establishments to financially support MIT. MIT and MIB are linked to Abu Umar, a JI member with transnational network and ties to Abu Sayyaf terrorist group in the Philippines. Even when Abu Umar went to prison for 10 years and Abu Roban killed in 2013 with his network left in disarray, attacks continued to occur with terrorists and police engaged in tit-for-tat battles with a vengeance. Though police, with occasional military assistance, have conducted numerous counter-terrorism operations, Santoso remains elusive to captivity. While MIT itself mutated into insurgency guerrilla group. One of the

key influence of the transformation is Sabar Subagyo alias Daeng Koro, the MIT’s strategist who was an army elite force deserter closely linked with Abu Umar and terrorist Noordin M Top. With colourful background in separatist Darul Islam (DI) movement and Jakarta Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), he came to prominence during various religious conflicts in eastern Indonesia. Connected to terrorist networks in the Philippines and Malaysia, he had also been one of the military instructors in various terrorist camps in Sulawesi for four years until 2011. Some members of the camps came from Indonesia’s neighbouring countries. Sabar also closely associated with Aceh camp. It was his team which was behind several hit-and-run operations and bomb

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attacks against police in Poso. It would not be entirely wrong to say that Sabar is MIT true leader. Yet the violence continue unabated. Local politics, government interinstitutional rivalries, and incompetency may be contributing factors. In 2014 alone, police killed two and arrested 21 MIT members; while the terrorists shot dead two police officers, injured four others and stole more than 100 motorbikes. The year probably marked the first time MIT killed civilians which

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it had so far evaded, fearing theological complexities which had troubled JI and caused blowback leading to declining popularity of indiscriminate violent jihadists. But the overall resultant has transformed Poso as the main centre for jihadist resistance and catapulted Santoso, who was marginal figure in jihadist circles, into prominence as the only fighting jihadist leader in the country. Less than a month after IS announcing its caliphate in June 2014, MIT along with JAT and Asian terrorist groups such

Abu Sayyaf Group pledged allegiance to Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi. In his speech available in YouTube Santoso, now calling himself Abu Wardah al-Sharqi al-Indunisi to emphasise him being the leader in Eastern Indonesia, declared they were IS Eastern Indonesian soldiers who were waiting for al-Baghdadi’s “directions, commands, and helpful hands to our jihad here [in Indonesia] which is still deprived of expertise and weapons”. He called for unity crying, “we are part of the Islamic State; your victory is our victory”

teacher in a school for the disabled, he also acted as courier for Santoso and took part in a number of robbery operations. He befriended a fugitive named Mukhtar who was assigned by Santoso to welcome the Uighurs. The four Uighurs travelled from East Turkistan to Cambodia by sea before continuing to Thailand where they obtained false passport to travel to Kuala Lumpur. In Malaysia, they were recruited to IS and decided to go Poso to obtain some trainings and combat experience. On the route to Poso, they met other Uighurs and IS supporters in Java. Indonesian police and intelligence concluded that the Uighurs had planned or had someone planned their intended travel to Poso in meticulous fashion. They also discovered the Uighurs carried two billion rupiahs in cash to give to MIT.

in waging “jihad in the path of God under one flag”.

Silk road to Poso The Rubicon is crossed on 13 September 2014, when local police and Indonesian Special Counter-Terrorism Detachment 88 (Det-88) arrested an MIT member and four Uighurs near Poso. The Indonesian was identified as Saiful Priatna who graduated from an Islamic boarding school in Java closely associated with moderate Islam. Working as a substitute

The Uighurs case could underline the importance of Malaysia as possible safe haven and a transit point for terrorists – a role it played in the JI network. It also indicates possible connection between terrorism and people smuggling. Similar routes and radicalism in refugee camp perhaps helped explain the nexus. Yet jihadists are not strangers to criminal activities, especially smuggling. MIT obtains their weapons through such way and has maintained its regional networks including in Malaysia and the Philippines. Indonesian police have not ruled out the possibility of more foreign nationals in Poso working with MIT. Even Indonesian Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Tedjo Purdijatno claimed in December 2014 there were more than 100 IS foreign members in Poso. Regardless of the truth of the number, one thing is more certain: Indonesia is again in the international terrorism map. Chinese government,

for instance, had expedited counterterrorism cooperation with Indonesia, leading to an agreement signed in Beijing on 10 February 2015 with inclusion of information sharing on Uighur terrorism. President Joko Widodo may have taken the right decision to have “Poso problem” be immediately resolved in the first few months of this year. His commitment is palpable by more than four thousand strong police and military personnel surrounding Santoso’s hilly hideouts. But strength does not always translate to effectiveness. Though counter-terrorism here is best served through counterinsurgency, military role should not be a repeat of the authoritarian past and police should be of more circumspect in its use of excessive force. Lessons learned from handling the separatist Aceh Free Movement should offer a guide. More importantly in national level, law enforcement must be implemented, interinstitutional cooperation be strengthened and more legislations be introduced to curb IS influence. Indonesian government should make it clear that border limits, citizenship means, and law rules. Rakyan Adibrata is terrorism researcher more than a decade, he worked for three years as an Expert Adviser for MP at the Commission III (Law, Human Right & Security) at The Republic of Indonesia House of Representative, advising on homeland security and human right issue to the MP. He was appointed as one of the adviser to a Special Committee that drafted the Anti Financing of Terrorism Bill from 2012 until 2013. Rakyan obtained Certified Counter Terrorism Practitioner (CCTP) in 2013.

The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015 67

The Counter Terrorist Magazine Asia Pacific Edition is Finally available for the Asia Pacific region counter-terrorism and homeland security practitioners. The Asia Pacific Editionnot only gives the readers a worldwide counter-terrorism perspective but also in-depth information about counter terrorism activities in Asia. The Asia Pacific Edition provides an excellent platform for counter-terrorism and homeland solutions providers to access and penetrate

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A Russian border gaurd on patrol. Photo by: Ruslan Vahaev

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Serial Murder and Terrorism in Russia By Dmitry Shlapentokh

Oleg Batusin, a married man with five children, proclaimed himself to be an “Orthodox peasant guerrilla.” He had been in opposition to Russian governmental policies for five years.

e was displeased because of the volume of Chinese and other émigrés to whom the government was permitting entry. Russian’s concerns with immigration can include the competition for jobs, terrorism, and a worry that newcomers, especially Chinese, would marginalize ethnic Russians with their numbers and make possible the

absorption of Russia in the future. It appears that Butusin shared these views about the danger of Chinese immigration in Vladivostok because he began disseminating leaflets. These leaflets are commonly plastered on walls. He also believed that the present-day Orthodox Church was corrupt and supports the Russian government’s immigration

The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015 71

Centennial Prospect, district Nekrasov. Photo by: AdmiralHood

A person would stop at a gas station. Somebody would puncture his tire. The driver would depart, but soon stop when he noticed a flat tire.

Photo by: Gerlach

policies. In May 2013, he carried out an attack against a detachment of GAI (highway patrol) near Moscow. It is believed that he acted alone. It is not clear what weapons and tactics he employed. It is clear that some part of the local population supported his actions. Some Russians emailed him guidance on how to avoid apprehension. One individual advised him to remove the battery from his mobile phone and only to use the phone outside of his home. They encouraged him to cover his face with a hat or hood. They told him to take complicated and unusual routes home and to board and get off trains at stations far from his home. He was counseled to keep his mouth shut and share information with no one. Supporters told Batusin to cover his boots with tape to prevent identification of his footprints by investigators and to collect his empty brass after shooting.1

Serial Killings While terrorism can be used in support of any type of militant campaign, many

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in Russia appear to have been influenced by Islamic supremacism. This was one explanation given in the case of a group of Central Asians who engaged in serial murders near Moscow in the summer and fall of 2014. The group was often called “GTA,” the name of a popular computer game Grand Theft Auto (GTA), and is known to have carried out actions in Moscow beginning in July 2014. Some people believed they were inspired by the tactics displayed in the video game. Drivers were the primary targets, and it was not initially clear what the motives were, but attacks followed a common pattern. A person would stop at a gas station. Somebody would puncture his tire. The driver would depart, but soon stop when he noticed a flat tire. When he emerged from the vehicle to change the tire, a member of the group in another car would kill the driver on the spot. One of the important aspects of the murder was that it was done on the highway and not in an isolated spot. There was no apparent motive for each murder.2 Fifteen people were either killed or wounded.3 In November 2014, the band was captured; eight men and two women were arrested. Law enforcement agents uncovered their primary residence and discovered what they described as an “arsenal of weapons and ammunition.” This included several pistols, ammunition, and two hand grenades. Officials alleged they were a “group of professional murderers” and that they were engaged in “zakazy”—contract murders—as well as in robberies. According to officials, they carried out the murders of Vladimir Kirsliuk, the manager of “Flora Bank,” and Oleg Tokmachev, local policeman from NovoPeredelkino, near Moscow. The group had three leaders: one was Rustam Usmanov from Kyrgyzia. He was shot to death when he threw a grenade

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The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015 73

at police.4 He appears to have assisted the escape of two other members of the group from custody.5 The others were apprehended without resisting.6 All were from Central Asia. After taking them into custody, it became clear that they were not inspired by a video game. They were interested in property and money, which they needed in order to buy weapons for “fighters” (boeviki). There was little additional information about the “fighter’s” details. It appears likely that they thought about those who planned either jihad in Central Asia or even in the North Caucasus. The criminals, guest workers from Central Asia, found a great safe house. They lived and worked in a “zagordnyi dom” (dacha) that belonged to Aleksei Staroverov, the head of the Prosecutor General’s Office in the Russian Federation (Nachal’nik

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Upravdelami Genprokuratury). He was both a highly positioned bureaucrat and a very wealthy individual.7

Local Reaction The killings created widespread rumors such as that “the morgues are full.” Others posted comments such as “Damn …really scary” and “Panic among the populace is rising.”8 Drivers decided not to stop when their cars were broken.9 One of the reasons for widespread concern was the mystery surrounding the attacks at the time. Many people thought the attacks originated from: (1) Islamists; (2) Ukrainian nationalists; or (3) forces inside of Putin’s administration plotting against him.

Attribution Some locals immediately believed that

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the murders were committed by Islamists. One of the participants in a Russian Internet discussion suggested that these people were preparing themselves to join ISIS.10 Other comments noted that the bandits called their band “jamaat” and that they carried out “holy war for Islam.”11 This explanation became widely accepted after the killers were apprehended, but some people claimed the murders were the handiwork of Ukrainians or some internal enemies of the regime before they were caught.

share of the public’s attention in the summer and fall of 2014. Moscow mass media created the image of Ukrainian nationalists—and those who dominate Kiev’s government—as fascists and terrorists who were ready to commit any crime. Consequently, some of those engaged in the discussion stated that people in Kiev were responsible. These views seem to have been advanced by some government officials.

Enemies of Putin Some claimed that the attacks were launched by internal enemies of the regime who wanted to destabilize the country. This was the view advanced by Mikhail Vinogradov, a criminologist.12 Some believed that high ranking officials’ involvement in the plot was likely because the acts were done quite professionally.

Ukrainian Separatists Just as it is in the United States and Europe, the Islamists’ threat to the general public was downplayed by Russian officials. Since the conflict in the Ukraine, where Moscow is sided with East Ukraine, separatists took the lion’s

Some believed that it was a job of special operations personnel. This interpretation of the events was supported by the idea that killers used ammunition produced only in one factory in the Tula region for “special units” (spetspodrazdeleniia).13 It was implied, in the case of such interpretation, that it was Putin’s enemies inside the government who were behind the plot. Those who saw the murders as a political ploy regarded it as a way to destabilize the country.

Conventional Crime Robberies and related murders are not rare in Russia. Consequently, some observers believe that the terrorist attacks could be explained in a plainly criminal context and that the group members were robbers14 and used ideology to mask their criminal intentions.

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The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015 75

The explanation that people could be killed just “for fun” was justified by the case of a resident of Serpukhovo randomly shooting people with a crossbow years ago.15 There was no evident reason why he did this.16 Some claimed the killings could be a manifestation of a perverted notion of “fun,” inspired by computer games. Some believed that it was done by the “golden youth” of the Russian elite who were intoxicated with feelings of power, privilege and permissiveness. Some insisted the murderers were plain robbers, but others assumed they simply insane. Aleksander Gurov, a senior official, stated that if these people were rational, they could well understand that they were being sought and simply cease their activities before being discovered.

Conclusion Church of Our Lady's Protection (Vladivostok). Photo by: Vladimir Kobzar

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76 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015

There are several lessons that can be drawn from these incidents. This group successfully evaded apprehension for a considerable amount of time. They serve as evidence that criminals can always acquire prohibited weapons and even more uncommon items such as grenades and specialized ammunition intended for special operations units. The attackers were found in an unexpected place: a house belonging to a top law enforcement official. As the 2002 Washington, D.C. Muhammed and Malvo sniper attacks and countless others have also demonstrated, even a very small group can affect a much larger population, potentially creating panic, or at least creating the conditions for possible panic, which in itself can have unforeseeable consequences.

•

about the author Mr. Shlapentokh was educated in the former USSR at Moscow State University and at the University of Chicago (Ph.D.).

He has held research and teaching appointments in the Russian Research Center at Harvard and the Hoover Institution. He currently teaches at Indiana University-South Bend.

Endnotes Ilina, Vera, “V Podmoskov’e Poiavilis’ Pravoslavnye Lesnye Brat’ia,” Islam News, May 31, 2013. 2 Ibid. 3 “Politseiskie zaderzhali chlenov bandy GTA,” Novost@mail.ru, http:// news.mail.ru/ingregions/moscow/go/ incidnet/200557801, 6 November, 2014. 4 “Gastarbaitery chistoserdechno soznalis’ v prichasnosti k bande GTA,” http://www.islamnews.ru/news-440454. html, Islam News, 12 November, 2014. 5 Ibid. 6 “V Moskovskuiu bandu GTA vkhodili iskliuchitel’no vakhkhabity – vykhodtsy iz Uzbekistana i Tadzhikistana,” Centrasia. ru, 24 July, 2014. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 “V Podmoskov’nyi.” 10 “Ogurets Zelenyi” comments, http:// izvestiia.ru/news/579042. 11 Ivanov Ivanov comments, http:// izvestiia.ru/news/579042, 6 November, 2014. 12 “ V Podmoskov’e” 13 “Chlenami bandy GTA okazalis’ gastarbaitery – ‘vakhkhabity’ s oruzhiem spetsnaza,” Islam News, 6 November, 2014, http://www.islamnews.ru/news439868.html. 14 “Gastarbaitery”. 15 “Podmoskovnyi ‘IGIL’ terroriziruet narod,” http://www.islamnews.ru/news433813.html. 16 “Prisiazhnye vynesli verdikt’ vinoven’ v otnoshenii zhitelia Serpukhova, zastrelivshego iz arableta dvoikh muzhchin,” http://izvestiia.ru/ news/491825, Izvestiia, 9 June, 2009. 1

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The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015 77

international Resources Lewis Machine & Tool Company Lewis Machine & Tool Company (LMT(r)) was founded in 1980 to provide the US Military, law enforcement and government agencies with precision engineered, high quality weapons, components and modular weapon systems. Since the very beginning, LMT’s mission has been to meet, if not surpass, their customers’ expectations of quality, price and delivery of machined parts, weapon systems, assemblies and engineering services. All products are 100% USA made and comply with the Berry Amendment. The MRP System: Karl Lewis, President of LMT(r), designed the original Monolithic Rail Platform (MRP) as a response to the growing demand for quick-change, modular systems. Lewis’ design is a one-piece, lightweight upper receiver with an integral forend. The MIL-STD 1913 STANAG 4694 compliant rails run from front to forend on each of the four sides giving the operator optimum opportunities for placement of accessories dependent upon mission requirements, available in rifle and closequarters battle length. www.lmtdefense.com

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Innovative Products TACOPS Active Response Bag This bag includes high visibility interior fabric, modular pistol magazine and water bottle pouches for ambidextrous carry, and magnetic closures on rifle magazine flaps. Two large collapsible internal pouches each include multiple elastic loops to keep medical components and tactical equipment organized, separate and easily accessible. A center-mounted external pouch is designed to simultaneously carry shotgun shells, chemical light sticks, a flashlight and multiple door wedges (or other accessories). It is available as the bag alone or with field-ready kit. agency.tssi-ops.com

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The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015 79

Counter

advertiser index

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april/may 2015 Volume 8 • Number 3

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Page

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The Counter Terrorist Magazine Asia • sales@thecounterterroristmag.com........................................................................................... 255

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80 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015

The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015 81

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Phone: 866-573-3999 Fax: 866-573-2090 info@homelandsecurityssi.com 50 on Reader Service Card 82Circle The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015 Circle 215 on Reader Service Card

Training Review

Franks Proctor’s Performance Pistol

rank Proctor served 11 years in the U.S. Army Special Forces, deploying multiple times to Afghanistan and Iraq. While serving as an instructor at the Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat Course he began participating in competitive shooting events. He earned the United States Practical Shooting Association (USPSA) grand master ranking in the limited division and master ranking in the International Defensive Pistol Association (IDPA) stock service pistol division. He has a unique combination of firearms experience that he draws upon to provide a popular two

Proctor demos a drill. Photos by: Frank Proctor

By Chris Graham

day advanced shooting skills course he calls “Performance Pistol.” I recently had the opportunity to attend this course. On the first day, Frank started with a brief introduction and then explained some of the foundational ideas behind the training in a light-hearted and memorable way. He explained, and wrote on a cardboard IPSC target, “Performance Shootin: Applying the correctamundo ratio of speed and accuracy to dynomatical shooting situations with a goal of scoring maximum points in minimum time with 100%

accountability.” He delivered a streamlined safety brief with the final command: Keep the “pointy end” off each other and glue your trigger finger to the frame above the triggerwell when you are not firing. Proctor explained that he sees shooting consisting of four components: processing, control, mechanics, and movement. The first thing we did was a dryfire exercise. We practiced firing, retracting the weapon then projecting it again and firing. We did this several times with the nuance being the proximity he expected us to keep the pistol to our chin. We

The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2015 83

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84 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May Circle 177 2015 on Reader Service Card

practiced tapping the chin with the firing hand thumb while executing this drill repeatedly to get the proximity he was looking for correct. The intent was to maximize efficiency in our movement and keep the pistol closer to the line of sight than most shooters do. We then executed the drill live, sidestepping back and forth to project past a (inches away) close cardboard IPSC target elevated to serve as a barrier. On the cardboard “We so 3008” and “focus” was written. We were required to read the words each pass. We did it continuously, shot after shot striving to get better with each iteration. Frank told us to let our vision flow around the edge of the target and acquire the target more quickly and

more quickly. He called this drill “shake and bake.” Next we stapled printer paper to an IPSC target and shot a sight displacement drill with the front sight elevated in the rear notch, depressed, left, then right to demonstrate that at close range, hits can still be acquired with even just loosely aligned sights. At 10 yards we shot more drills designed to expand awareness. We practiced viewing the whole sight picture not specifically focusing on the front sight. We concentrated on seeing that, and muzzle rise, and ejecting shells, and trees within view, and so forth. We worked to see and register the entire panorama in view while still aligning sights on target and firing. Frank explained his view of the difference between exercises and drills. He used the idea that you don’t bench press 400 lbs. in order to be able to bench 400 lbs. to illustrate his point. He encouraged shooters to relax the arms but shoot with a firm grip. He had shooters experiment firing from a fully locked out position and with unlocked elbows and bent arms. He recommended shooting with the unlocked arm positions. We shot “shake and bake” adding in shooting while moving toward the target at the end of each repetition. We shot a drill called “thunderdome”: shooters, online next to each other, engaged a row of steel silhouettes. The first shooter drew, fired one shot, then the next shooter would engage his own target immediately after he saw his neighbor’s hit. We shot a competitive man-on-man event that individuals had to win three times in a row to win. We repeated it until the final shooter won. We shot a drill called “time machine.” Five steel targets were online, and we put two hits on each, working on cadence and efficient movement of the eyes followed by the gun from target to target.

We shot “Around the world” and “focus monster.” “Focus monster” consisted of a row of barrels lined up from 35 yards to five yards from the target. The shooter moved serpentine through the obstacles shooting five steel targets, each twice, online as he went. “Riding with a cougar” consisted of moving to a barricade and shooting to steel targets, then doing the same to three other barricades. We compared executing the drill shooting on the move and running to position, stopping and shooting. I picked up the habit of running with my pistol higher and closer to my line of sight for more speed. Other drills we shot were 180 degree pivots on steel and an exercise with a vertical line painted on a steel target. We swept the pistol across the target—with our eyes focused on the target- and pressed off shots with a general sight picture as we crossed the line. Frank encouraged shooters to “see fast,” so they could “shoot fast.” We covered a lot of ground in two days. Every shooter came away with some new ideas to play with and develop. Proctor demonstrated an easy going and professional style that helped shooters focus on the information presented. Whether you are a SWAT officer, a Marine grunt, or an armed citizen, I highly recommend Frank’s training. While anyone who can safely handle and operate a pistol will benefit from the “performance pistol” course, the greatest benefits will be enjoyed by intermediate and more advanced shooters. www.wayofthegun.us

•

about the author Mr. Graham is the former commander of a military anti-terrorism unit, editor of The Counter Terrorist magazine and creator of 30-10 Pro Pistol Training (www.30-10pistol.com).

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Sixka, the fastest growing footwear and

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