The Counter Terrorist Magazine Asia Pacific Issue Dec-Jan by The Counter Terrorist Asia Pacific Edition

PV T. RIGBY MURDE R • MA R S OF VS . P I R AT E S • O FFI C E 3 9 C O U N T E RFE I T I N G • M O N E Y L A UN DE RIN G

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals

Counter The

DEC 2013/JAN 2014

VOLUME 6 • NUMBER 6

VBIEDS IN THE MEXICAN CRIMINAL INSURGENCY

ASIA PACIFIC

EDITION An SSI Publication ®

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www.thecounterterroristmag.com The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 1

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The Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals DECEMBER 2013/JANUARY 2014 VOLUME 6 • NUMBER 6

COVER STORY: VBIEDS IN THE MEXICAN CRIMINAL 28 INSURGENCY

By Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan

FEATURES:

CONTENTS

Firsthand: DUTCH MARINES CHASE AFRICAN PIRATES By Chris Veerke and Andrew Balcombe

Case Study: THE MURDER OF PRIVATE LEE RIGBY By Anthony Tucker-Jones

44 56

STRATEGIC COUNTERFEITING AND DPRK OFFICE 39 By Kevin D. Freeman

FROM GLOBAL TO MICRO JIHAD By Kumar Ramakrishna

82 89

A FACE AMONG THE CROWD By Prof Rohan Gunaratna

MONEY LAUNDERING IN REAL ESTATE By Jennifer Hesterman

MARITIME TERRORISM IN ASIAN WATER By Ron Malaravan

DEPARTMENTS: 06

From the Editor

Book Review

Innovative Products

Courage

…If You Are Arrested or Framed…

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Smoke fills the air after a car bomb was detonated in the parking lot of an Iraqi police station outside the gate of the Green Zone near the Al-Rasheed Hotel in Baghdad, Iraq, on Dec. 4, 2004. Photo by: Spc. Katherine M. Roth Cover Photo:

The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 5

Counter The

FROM THE EDITOR:

Courage

By Chris Graham

VOLUME 6 • NUMBER 6

n 26 August 2013, Ty Carter followed in the footsteps of fellow soldier Clint Romesha. Romesha and Carter were each honored with the Medal of Honor for their personal actions in the Battle of Kamdesh, Afghanistan. Carter’s citation reads in part: [M]ore than 300 [insurgents] attempted to overrun Combat Outpost Keating…Keating…[was] static…entirely reliant on air lines of communication, subject to frequent indirect fire, and with little capacity to influence the small, ambivalent communities in the nearby villages of Urmol and Kamdesh. Two small contingents of…Afghan National Army…co-located with Coalition Forces…proved ineffective at building meaningful ties with either village. At the time, tribal and criminal networks could call on hundreds of local fighters from Kamdesh District, even though it was comprised of fewer than 22,000 people. These networks shared little but their hostility to the intrusion of Coalition Forces and the Afghan government… [A]t 5:53 a.m., an interpreter…[reported] that the Urmol Police Chief had personally relayed a warning that 50 to 100 enemy fighters were presently staged in Urmol to attack COP Keating…six minutes after the warning had been received, the hills erupted… [A]ttackers fired from the creviced and overgrown high ground above all four sides of the combat outpost, initiating contact with rifles and…DShK heavy machine guns… Afghan soldiers fled through the wire…leaving the northeast corner undefended… [U.S.] soldiers jumped to reinforce guard posts throughout the compound… Carter…sprinted 100 meters across open ground, under concentrated fire, to the southern Battle Position… Carter ran the gauntlet a second time…to collect ammunition. The doors were locked. Without hesitation, Carter shot off the hasps…and weaved his way back… With suppression fire waning, the enemy fired a series of RPGs at the position… [T]hree to four…RPGs struck… One rocket detonated…spraying the interior with shrapnel. Larson, Martin and Carter were wounded… Carter volunteered to stay with Larson and provide covering fire for the others as they attempted to bound back… Carter and Larson left the vehicle and provided suppressing fire with their M4 carbines, while their three colleagues began displacing… Recognizing the imminent threat from the enemy…inside the wire, Carter and Larson engaged and swiftly killed two enemy combatants and wounded one… Carter found…[an] M249 light machine gun with a partial drum of ammunition… Carter suggested they delink the ammunition and employ it in the M4s… Carter killed a two-man enemy RPG team and two additional fighters… Wounded, outmanned and outgunned, Carter and Larson still suppressed the enemy’s assault teams… Carter summoned the strength to lift Mace and carried him through the hail of bullets up to the rise… [E]nemy forces had penetrated the wire in at least two places… Romesha and Hill had led a counterattack to retake a meeting hall and close the ECP. Romesha and Hill killed several enemy fighters that had penetrated the combat outpost and opened an evacuation route that was still exposed to RPG and machine gun fire… Carter and Larson then carried Mace across 100 meters of open ground still being swept with…fire. With Mace at the aid station, Carter…joined the fight…for the rest of the day. He served as a sniper providing accurate cover fire for the teams…recovering the bodies of the fallen Soldiers… The heavy firefights in the enclosed valley prevented a medical evacuation helicopter from touching down in the narrow landing zone, until the cover of darkness…1 Romesha and Carter’s actions are an inspiration to us all. The Battle of Kamdesh should be a warning to all leaders who prioritize adhering to timeless principles of war (control the high ground, do not accept “optimistic” assessments of Afghan security forces, etc.) below modern leadership whims. From the most junior patrolman and infantryman in the field to the most senior desk jockey on the President’s National Security Council, we can each learn from the courageous actions of America’s Medal of Honor recipients. May way each draw upon these lessons and face the dangers of the future with both physical bravery and the courage to speak the truth. Semper Fidelis,

Chris Graham Editor, The Counter Terrorist www.chrisgrahamauthor.com 1

http://www.army.mil/medalofhonor/carter/narrative.html, accessed October 11, 2013.

6 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals

DECEMBER 2013/JANUARY 2014 Editor Chris Graham Director of Operations Sol Bradman Director of Advertizing Carmen Arnaes Production Assistants Giselle Manassa Melissa Berne Contributing Editors Eeben Barlow Kevin Freeman Jennifer Hesterman Richard Marquise Tom Nypaver Steve Young ASIA PACIFIC EDITION Editor Mr. Munies Pillai Director of Operations Mr. Yaniv Pertz Director of Advertizing Mr. Derick Ding Graphic Design Morrison Creative Company Copy Editor Laura Town Advertising Sales Chris Bell Publisher: Security Solutions International 13155 SW 134th St. • STE 204 Miami, Florida 33186 ISSN 1941-8639 The Counter Terrorist Magazine, Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals is published by Security Solutions International LLC, as a service to the nation’s First Responders and Homeland Security Professionals with the aim of deepening understanding of issues related to Terrorism. No part of the publication can be reproduced without permission from the publisher. The opinions expressed herein are the opinions of the authors represented and not necessarily the opinions of the publisher. Please direct all Editorial correspondence related to the magazine to: Security Solutions International SSI, 13155 SW 134th Street, Suite 204, Miami, Florida. 33186 or info@thecounterterroristmag. com The subscription price for 6 issues is $34.99 and the price of the magazine is $5.99. (1-866-573-3999) Fax: 1-786-573-2090. For article reprints, e-prints, posters and plaques please contact: PARS International Corp. Web: www.magreprints.com/quickquote.asp Email: reprints@parsintl.com Phone: 212-221-9595 • Fax: 212-221-9195 Please visit the magazine web site where you can also contact the editorial staff:

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Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 7

Firsthand:

DUTCH MARINES CHASE AFRICAN PIRATES

8 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

By Chris Veerke and Andrew Balcombe

My maritime special operations force (MARSOF) team was deployed with a platoon of special operations capable (SOC) Marine infantry aboard the amphibious LPD (landing platform dock) His Netherlands Majesty’s Ship (HNLMS) Rotterdam.

he deployment was part of the NATO international counter-piracy operation called Ocean Shield. Our task was to conduct enhanced boarding of suspected ships and disrupt pirate activities. Cooperation with the SOC infantry team was a new concept. In the past, we usually boarded and completed the task with just one MARSOF team from a rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB). For this mission’s operations, our team consisted of a MARSOF team, a SOC team, a sniper team, a medic, and a small contingent of support staff. HNLMS Rotterdam was tasked with patrolling an

operations box off the Somali coast. We had two Cougar helicopters on board. Typically, one of the helicopters would conduct a recon patrol and send back reports about any suspicious-looking craft in the area. The Rotterdam would then sail to intercept the suspect vessel. En route, we would study the photos taken by our sniper team in the Cougar. Although the Cougar had a fixed onboard camera system, using a portable DSLR camera and telephoto lenses was generally more convenient. We also had a Scan Eagle UAV that we launched a couple of times per day from the Rotterdam.

Dutch MARSOF board vessel. All photos courtesy of Dutch MARSOF and Andrew Balcolmbe.

A typical deployment lasted three to four months, but for this deployment, we were on operations for five months. We carried out roughly 50 boardings during that period.

SOMALI GUNFIGHT On one occasion, we intercepted a dhow (local vessel) close to the shore in our operations box. Although we had photos from the Cougar sniper team and the Scan Eagle, the images were inconclusive. Thus, we approached the dhow for a talk, a “maritime situational awareness operation.”

The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 9

Dutch Marine guards unknown personnel. When our RHIB got within about 40 meters of the dhow, its crew suddenly opened fire. Rounds were hitting all around us. I’ve been in a lot of firefights and I know how an AK round sounds. When it’s too close, it makes a kind of whip noise. When I heard that noise, I thought fuck, this is close. We later watched video footage of the rounds hitting the water all around us. On a boat, it’s difficult to see where the fire is coming from. There’s no dust signature from the enemies’ muzzle blast, and there are plenty of holes on a dhow for pirates to hide in. Luckily, I saw oil moving in a barrel after they fired, so I had a general idea of where at least one of the pirates was. We immediately went into our contact drills and returned fire with our personal weapons and our onboard M240

machine gun. Everything slowed down. In situations like this, you know there is nowhere to hide. You can only return fire and hope to incapacitate the enemy shooters before any of your guys are hit. The sniper team was on board the Rotterdam and still quite far away from our RHIB. They switched to a longerrange rifle and engaged with good effects. Although we took some hits on the RHIB, none of our team members were injured. Soon, the dhow started burning. I believe its fuel containers had been hit. The pirates jumped into the water and tried to swim ashore. The dhow’s crew had been taken hostage by the pirates, and they jumped into the water too. Many of the crew members were injured, as the pirates had used them as shields. While all this was happening,

10 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

we also took fire from shore. The dhow was now burning so hard we couldn’t get close. We pulled the injured crew members out of the water while we were still under fire from the shore. A few of the pirates— we call them the Somali Olympic swimming team—escaped by swimming the 100 meters to shore. We took the casualties back to the Rotterdam. There were a lot of wounded, so a mass casualty area was set up. I didn’t think much about the situation; I just did my job and thought about my team members. Later on, some of my guys said I worked on a wounded person that I didn’t even remember. We had been lucky; none of my team had been hit. Most of the guys have served in Iraq and Afghanistan, and were mentally prepared for combat.

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Inserting via RHIB.

RESCUING PAKISTANIS

We didn’t know what to expect when we launched our boarding craft—in this case, a fast-raiding interception special forces craft (FRISC).

Another incident that took place during our deployment involved the hijacked fishing boat Bour ha Naour Can. We heard reports over the radio that the boat had been attacked by pirates near the coast of Yemen. The 23-man crew had been taken hostage. A German naval ship reacted to the distress call, but the pirates were already on board. They were heading to the Gulf of Aden on the north side of Somalia. Unlike us, the German ship didn’t have a boarding team and couldn’t deal with a hostage situation. We quickly learned that the pirates who took this dhow were not very well equipped or experienced. There are two kinds of pirates operating in this part of the world: guys like these and older, better-equipped, more hardened pirates. The younger teams often don’t have much of a choice and are forced into the piracy business by its ringleaders. Unlike their younger counterparts, the older, more successful pirates often have big houses and four or five women. In this particular

12 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

situation, an inexperienced low-level group wanted to take the dhow and use it as a mother ship. The dhows are often made in Iran and are fast and strong. They can take a lot of punishment when ramming other vessels. Seaborne raiders consider them a great prize. Upon encountering the Bour ha Naour Can, we took action. The Rotterdam blocked the dhow’s path to Somalia, and launched a Cougar helicopter. Our negotiators were talking with the pirates, but they wouldn’t stop their vessel. A decision was made to act, so our sniper team in the Cougar was given authorization to fire in front of the boat. Our snipers use both bolt-action and semi-automatic .50 sniper rifles. They also use HK 417 (7.62x51 mm) and Accuracy International (.338) rifles. After the warning shots, some of the Somalis put their hands in the air and the dhow stopped. The Cougar sniper team reported that they saw six pirates on board who were armed with AKs and RPGs. We didn’t know what to expect

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when we launched our boarding craft— in this case, a fast-raiding interception special forces craft (FRISC). We stayed on the Rotterdam’s blind side and didn’t have eyes on the dhow. Light conditions were less than perfect for operating. As the negotiations continued, we had to wait. The sun was going down, and we entered into twilight. The commander continued to give us updates on what the pirates were doing. We were just waiting and watching the light get worse and worse. Two hours later, we were in darkness and got the order to board. We were using two FRISCs, one to board and the other to provide cover. As we approached the target, we heard reports of two pirates standing on the bow of the dhow unarmed. We then went to the stern, where two Pakistani crew members were screaming for help through the portholes. We boarded the dhow with one Cougar

constantly hovering and observing the ship, so we had good intel. It was important to me when I was on deck to know where all the pirates were located. If we didn’t know where they were, we had to move a lot more slowly. All six of us made it on deck in short order, and we counted six pirates as we went forward, walking over the cargo. When we finally came into contact with the pirates, we cuffed and searched them. One of our three-man teams covered them, while the other team searched the boat to look for more pirates. Our SOC infantry then got the green light to come aboard from the second FRISC, and they helped with the search and found the hostages, who were very happy to see us. Because we were working with the FRISCs, we had more manpower available to us—but as team leader, I also had a lot of people to think about. Our interpreters were able to communicate

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with the Somalis, but not with the Pakistanis. Luckily, one of the crew on the Rotterdam spoke the same language as the fishing boat’s crew, and he was brought to the dhow and helped as an interpreter. We gathered evidence and took photographs of everything. We sent the pirates back to our ship where they were questioned more thoroughly and secured. The prosecutor directed us to release one of the pirates on shore because he was under age. Our medic checked out the Pakistanis. They had been hit and kicked during the hostage taking but had only light injuries. The Pakistanis then gave statements and were taken back to their own boat. They were pretty shaken up by their ordeal, so my team stayed with them on the dhow overnight and secured the area so they could get some rest. The next day, they continued on their voyage.

The pirates were kept on our ship for two weeks, until we delivered them to the Seychelles. Six months later, they were prosecuted and found guilty. I testified at the trial. The pirates received a 25-year sentence. They will probably stay in the Seychelles prison for five or six years and then go to a new prison in Puntland, Somalia.

HARD CORE PIRATES On another operation, we got a taste of what kind of individuals the more successful pirates were. This time around, we received a distress call from a large Chinese long-line fishing boat. Pirates had approached them in a skiff and fired at them but were unable to board the fishing boat. The Chinese boat had civilian security contractors on board who returned fire. Often, pirates approach a boat and shoot

at it to see whether it returns fire. If it does, they back off. If, however, the boat’s owners are not willing to provide armed security or allow the crew to defend themselves, the pirates take the vessel and hold its crew hostage. Many civilian security contractors use African-sourced AKs, but weapons are only allowed on civilian vessels in international waters. Thus, crews often have to depend on weapons traders that send boats out to them, as well as other creative legal solutions. We were patrolling our operations box when we got the report. We were close by, so we tried to cut off the pirates’ escape route back to Somalia. We stayed near the coast, and surprisingly, the skiff appeared. One of the Cougars went airborne, followed by a FRISC. The Cougar’s sniper team fired warning shots in front of the skiff. There were seven pirates on

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board—older guys who had military webbing. Their skiff was 4-5 meters long with two motors, one 50 horsepower and one 40 horsepower, and it had jerry cans full of water and fuel. We saw AK magazines taped together in the bottom of the skiff to facilitate faster changing of magazines. These pirates were obviously experienced. The only food the pirates carried was dates. In fact, pirates only ever have dates for food because they provide a lot of energy and some moisture. There were also loads of cigarettes and qat. Pirates often chew qat all day and are high on it. Qat can cause people to do unpredictable things, so you never know what to expect. We had our weapons pointed at the pirates, but they seemed unconcerned. They were not afraid of us. It was tough boarding their skiff because they weren’t cooperating, so we had to be more aggressive than usual. After boarding, we cuffed the pirates and put life jackets on them so if they fell or jumped overboard, they wouldn’t drown. Then we bagged and tagged evidence. We started the skiff’s engines and took it back to the Rotterdam for a detailed search. The skiff also gave us another opportunity to enhance our skills with a shooting exercise. We created a wooden mockup of an engine on the back of the skiff, which we towed behind the Rotterdam at speed. We then shot at the fake engines with the sniper rifles. We also performed tests on the engines to see how quickly a bullet could stop them and to see what dangers could arise, for the crew, from shooting into the engine of a skiff. We tested both our personal weapons and a sniper rifle.

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that fit 18 beds. Depending on where we were, we did cross-fit in calm seas. During the inter monsoon, the sea is like a mirror, and that is when the pirates are very active. When there was nothing to do, we worked out two times a day and did tactical shooting drills and performed maintenance. We caught up on medical and other personal skills training. More time was also spent on planning for ops/ missions and on our specializations, such as medic, breaching, demolitions, and sniper tasks. During harbor stops, we did additional programs like communications practice and working with local maritime forces. The best thing about these missions is when you have success in an operation and everyone comes home safe after a contact. There are not usually many shooting incidents with our counter-

piracy operations, but it does happen. Often, we were sailing close to Somali beaches showing the flag and would receive fire from villages onshore, so we would pull back. This was usually the only kind of shooting. Occasionally, however, when the Rotterdam intercepted a dhow, the pirates would shoot at us with the intention of making us do contact drills in order to buy time to sail back to their port and jump off. When we are in the small boats during an operation, we are very exposed. In places like Afghanistan, if there is contact, we can usually take cover, and we can use heavy weapons in an armored vehicle. On water, there is no armor except your body armor, and it’s hard to shoot accurately when the boat is moving or there are waves. I feel really exposed during a hook-on. When you are climbing the hull of a ship, you can

18 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

only hope your snipers have a clear field of view. Being complacent can get you killed. On reflection of the missions we completed, most of the pirates we encountered stood out as good seamen. You have to remember that these guys are hundreds of kilometers offshore living on only dates and water. They must know what they are doing—or else they wouldn’t survive.

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Veerke (pseudonym) is a member of the Dutch Marine Special Operations Forces. Mr. Balcombe is an Australian freelance journalist based in the Netherlands. He reports on international justice, defense and security issues.

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Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 19

Case Study:

THE MURDER OF PRIVATE LEE RIGBY Witnesses report that at approximately 1400 (local) on 22 May 2013, two men knocked down an off-duty UK soldier with their car in Woolwich, South London. Some witnesses initially assumed this was an accident, but they observed the vehicleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s occupants dismount and stab the unarmed man to death on the roadside.1 Counter The

The site of the death of Lee Rigby in Woolwich, London, with floral tributes on 30 May 2013. Photo by: kennelhamster

20 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

By Anthony Tucker-Jones

eports indicate that the attackers tried to decapitate their victim.2 As the attack unfolded, blood-soaked Michael Adebolajo asked the stunned witnesses to film him, saying, “We swear by almighty Allah we will never stop fighting you. The only reason we have done this is because Muslims are dying every day. This British soldier is an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.”3 Armed police arrived 14 minutes later—after the unarmed man had been killed—observed one of the attackers point a handgun toward them and opened fire. Michael Adebolajo, 28, and Michael Adebowale, 22, were wounded, arrested and stand

accused of murdering Private Lee Rigby. Initial claims suggested that Adebolajo and Adebowale were lone-wolf “cleanskins,” but it soon became apparent that just as in the Toulouse shooting last year and the recent bombings in Boston, the attackers were already known to the security services.4 One unique aspect of the Woolwich attack was that unlike most previously reported jihadist terror plots on the UK mainland, it did not involve an attempted bombing. In fact, there were eight major reported jihadist bomb plots in the UK between 1999 and 2010: the 2001 “shoe bomber” plot; the 2003 “Ricin bomb” plot; the

2004 “fertilizer bomb” and “dirty bomb” plots; the 2005 “21/7” plot; the 2006 transatlantic “liquid bomb” plot; and the 2007 attacks in Glasgow and London. There was also one successful attack: that of the 7/7 London bombings in 2005. Since 2010, several other bomb plots have been thwarted, including one in Birmingham.5 However, over the same period, handgun attacks do not appear to have been common. It is also unclear how often jihadist motives have been present in vehicle and edged weapon attacks, like that conducted by Adebolajo and Adebowale. Although personalized terror attacks

Drummer Lee Rigby of the 2nd Battalion Royal Fusiliers, murdered in Woolwich in May 2013. Photo by: Ministry of Defence The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 21

Newspaper headlines at Waterloo station around 15.00 hours on July 7 2005 Photo by :Ellywa

have previously been uncommon in Britain, the Woolwich attack reflects the increasing influence of Islamic supremacist groups such as al-Qaeda, Boko Haram (dubbed “Nigeria’s Taliban”), and the Somali Islamists al-Shabaab, as well as homegrown organizations like the banned alMuhajiroun and Islam4UK. For example, al-Qaeda in Iraq’s tactics have included suicide bombings, kidnappings, and beheadings, although the latter were generally not carried out on the streets. Similarly, in the late 1990s, three Britons and a New Zealander were beheaded in war-torn Chechnya. Employing vehicles to kill members of the general public, as has been done in the United States and elsewhere, was also discussed by the Birmingham-based terror cell whose ringleaders were imprisoned earlier this year. There had been talk of fitting blades onto a truck with a view to cutting

down innocent people, precisely as was advocated in the al-Qaeda magazine Insights. However, the Birmingham cell ultimately opted to mimic the 7/7 attacks using homemade rucksack bombs instead. Woolwich was not the first attempted jihadist attack on members of the British Army in the UK. In 1998, an alMuhajiroun member named Amer Mirza attempted to petrol bomb an army base. In 2005, it appears that the plots became more personal when Abu Bakr Mansha was jailed for planning to kill Iraq veteran Corporal Mark Byles. Three years later, in 2008, Parviz Khan was convicted of conspiring to kidnap and behead a British Muslim soldier as a warning to Muslims joining the British Army.6 In recent years, the Ministry of Defence has been cautious about naming British soldiers accused of misdemeanours in Afghanistan for fear of revenge attacks.

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DISCLAIMER: This project was supported by Cooperative Agreement Number 2008-GD-T8-K015 administered by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/FEMA, Training and Exercises Integration Secretariat. Points of view or opinions in this document are those of the author and do not represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

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Internationally, lone wolves are an increasing problem. Individual citizens cannot be “protected” from individual terrorists, such as US Army jihadist Nidal Hasan, who murdered 13 disarmed soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas, in 2009, or Mohamed Merah, who killed seven people in the French city of Toulouse in 2012 by anyone but themselves. The latter attacker was reportedly involved with Forsane Alizza (Knights of Pride), which is associated with Islam4UK and has links to al-Muhajiroun.7 At both Fort Hood and Toulouse, the attackers used firearms; on the streets of Woolwich, however, they used a car, knives, and meat cleavers.8 British Prime Minister David Cameron said in his House of Commons statement on Woolwich, “The responsibility for this horrific murder lies with those who committed it, but we should do all we can to tackle the poisonous ideology that

The incident took place in Wellington Street near the junction with John Wilson Street. The site of the attack is on the perimeter of the Royal Artillery Barracks. Photo by: Ianmacm

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is perverting young minds. This is not just a job for the security services and police; it is work for us all.” Cameron also acknowledged the “conveyor belt” of radicalization that is poisoning people with what he called “perverted ideas.” Given that the UK has to counter a major terrorist plot every year, he appears to be correct. Of increasing concern is the incidence of homegrown radicals, recruited by the UK’s own Islamist organisations with propagandized teachings about British troops’ involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since the 1990s, Britain has seen a steady escalation of individuals being convicted for inciting racial hatred, planning and funding terrorism, inciting murder for terrorism purposes over the Internet, and conducting terror attacks in the name of militant Islam.9 A total of 213 charges were successfully pressed in 133 separate cases between 1999 and 2010. It has been claimed that almost one out of every five individuals convicted of terrorism had links with al-Muhajiroun.10 Mr. Cameron told the House that a new task force would focus on tackling fundraising and recruitment by radical groups—in particular charities, religious schools or madrassas, and mosques. In his words, “We need to dismantle

this process at every stage—in schools, colleges, universities, on the Internet, in our prisons, wherever it is taking place.”11 Cameron’s charge is easier said than done, and it almost seems an admission that the UK’s long-running “prevent” strategy is not working. Indeed, it is nearly impossible to prevent individuals from self-radicalizing, especially in the Internet age. The degree to which there is freedom on the Internet is also the degree to which this medium may be used to advance propaganda. Thus, the Internet is a key recruiting tool for Islamists. The Woolwich attackers had already demonstrated a track record of radicalization. For example, “Mujahid” Adebolajo was arrested in 2006 following a violent demonstration outside the Old Bailey, where he was supporting a man on trial for advocating the murder of British soldiers.12 From 2005 to 2011, Adebolajo attended meetings and demonstrations run by al-Muhajiroun. He was inspired by banned imam Omar Bakri Mohammed, known as the “Tottenham Ayatollah,” who set up Hizb ut-Tahrir in the UK and then al-Muhajiroun. (Bakri Mohammed has lived in exile in Lebanon following the 7/7 attacks). Adebolajo was also arrested in 2010 on the Kenyan island of Pate.

He was accused of attempting to join al-Shabaab in neighboring Somalia and was later deported back to the UK.13 It is reported that Adebolajo had wanted to fight alongside al-Shabaab, but when his attempts were thwarted, he began to plot a terror attack in the UK.14 Resources do not exist to keep tabs on everyone thought to have been radicalized. Dame Stella Rimington, former head of the Security Service, has confirmed that monitoring all individuals on the UK terrorism watch list is simply impossible. To keep an eye on several thousand would-be terrorists would require a force 50,000 strong. Rimington has also warned that greater intelligence collection efforts can simply lead to an information deluge, which would overwhelm the agencies involved.15 In the UK, typically individuals of Pakistani, Somali, and Yemeni extraction fit the normal terror profile—not Nigerians like Adebolajo and Adebowale. Most frequently, there is a Pakistani link. For instance, Irfan Khalid and Irfan Naseer—two leaders of the Birmingham terror group—had been to training camps in Pakistan, as had four of their recruits. Furthermore, Boko Haram has not generally demonstrated hostility to British interests. However, it appears

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that, Adebolajo and Adebowale, both of Nigerian extraction and Christian converts to Islam, might have been influenced by Boko Haram. This highly violent Nigerian group is waging a terror campaign to create an Islamic state in Nigeria. It also quickly emerged that alMuhajiroun, Islam4UK, and the Somali Islamist group al-Shabaab all appear to have influenced the perspective of the 22 May terrorists. These groups all share al-Qaeda’s hatred of the West. In addition, just a week after the murder of Pvt. Rigby, it was discovered that a senior member of al-Shaabab had been lecturing in the men’s local mosque.16 Adebolajo first demonstrated an interest in militant Islam in his midteens. He converted in 2003, calling himself “Mujahid,” and his parents moved him from Romford to rural Lincolnshire in an effort to prevent him becoming radicalized. He later attended university in Greenwich, living in Eltham. Concerned family members even approached British Pakistani Moazzam Begg, a former Guantanamo Bay detainee (who runs a network called Cageprisoners to support terrorist suspects), seeking advice on what to do.17 Their actions were to no avail. Just three days after the stabbing of Pvt. Rigby, a French soldier was stabbed in the neck with a small-bladed knife in La Defense, a western business district in Paris. The victim, Private First Class Cedric Cordier, lost a lot of blood but survived.18 A few days later, a 21-yearold Muslim convert only identified as “Alexandre” was arrested, claiming he had “wanted to attack a representative of the [French] state.”19 French President Francois Hollande said there was no evidence to link the Paris and Woolwich attacks.20 The atrocity committed in Woolwich appears to be more similar to the vile

killings in Iraq and Chechnya. What is worrying, particularly in the case of Adebolajo, is that he was from a respectable middle-class Nigerian Christian family. He is yet another homegrown radical who was recruited by the UK’s own Islamist organizations that convinced him that British troops “murdered” innocent Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan. (Pvt. Rigby was a member of the Second Battalion of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers and served in Afghanistan in 2009.)21 Just as it was later revealed that Nidal Hasan had been communicating with the American al-Qaeda leader, Anwar alAwlaki (prior to his assassination), early assertions that Adebolajo and Adebowale acted as pure lone wolves appear to be incorrect. At least 10 other people have since been arrested in connection with the killing; two were released without charge, while the others are out on bail. Both Adebolajo and Adebowale have now been charged with murder and await trial. Keeping such terrorists off the streets of the world’s major cities is an ongoing challenge.

The degree to which there is freedom on the Internet is also the degree to which this medium may be used to advance propaganda. Thus, the Internet is a key recruiting tool for Islamists.

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Tucker-Jones is a former UK Defence Intelligence Officer and is a widely published consultant on the subjects of regional conflicts and counter terrorism. He is author of sixteen books, including the Rise of Militant Islam and Kalashnikov in Combat.

ENDNOTES “Woolwich murder: Lee Rigby ‘had multiple wounds,’” BBC News, May 29, 2013. 2 Con Coughlin, “The Woolwich ‘beheading’ is straight out of al-Qaeda’s terror manual,” blogs.telegraph.co.uk, May 29, 2013. 1

The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 25

Vikram Dodd, “Man killed in deadly terror attack in London street,” www. theguardian.com, May 22, 2013. 4 Vikram Dodd, Nick Hopkins, Nicholas Watt, and Sandra Laville, “Security services knew of soldier murder suspects,” The Guardian, May 24, 2013. 5 Anthony Tucker-Jones, “The British Connection,” Intersec: The Journal of International Security, 23(4), April 2013. 6 “Analysis of Islamist Extremism Warned of Attacks on UK Soldiers,” henryjacksonsocietyorg, May 23, 2013. 7 Duncan Gardham and Nick Squires, “Killer’s brother ‘may have met radicals in UK,’” Daily Telegraph, March 24, 2012. 8 Henry Samuel, “French Police turn sights on each other as nation mourns,” Daily Telegraph, March 24, 2012; Karen Brooks and Jana J. Pruet, “Hasan guilty of Fort Hood killings,” Reuters, August 24, 2013. 3

Sean O’Neill and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory: Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque, Harper Collins, London, 2006. 10 Sean O’Neill and Frances Gibb, “Police ‘must quiz radical preacher,’” The Times (UK), May 25, 2013. 11 “Woolwich killing a betrayal of Islam, says Cameron,” BBC News, June 3, 2013. 12 Tom Whitehead, David Barrett, and Steven Swinford, “Why was he free to kill?” Daily Telegraph, May 24, 2013. 13 “The Kenyan Isle where Michael Adebolajo was arrested,” BBC News, May 29, 2013. 14 Kim Sengupta, “Suspects seen with Islamist ‘but no risk,’” The Independent (UK), May 25, 2013. 15 Ruth Alexander, “Terror watch lists: Can you keep tabs on every suspect?” BBC News, June 2, 2013. 16 “Militant group had link to 9

26 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

Woolwich,” BBC News, May 29, 2013; “Woolwich attack: Somali terrorists warn Britain: ‘Your chickens are coming home to roost,’” www.telegraph.co.uk, May 23, 2013. 17 Chris Greenwood, Nick Fagge, and Ryan Kisiel, “This has brought our family profound shame and distress’: Relatives of soldier murder suspect break their silence at ‘senseless killing’ of Drummer Lee Rigby,” www.dailymail.co.uk, May 28, 2013. 18 “Knife attack on soldier in Paris treated as terrorism,” BBC News, May 26, 2013. 19 “Suspect ‘admits soldier knife attack in Paris,’” BBC News, May 29 2013. 20 Ibid. 21 Tom Coghlan, “Innocents abroad joked in the face of danger,” The Times (UK), May 25, 2013.

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The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 27

VBIEDS IN THE MEXICAN CRIMINAL INSURGENCY At least 130,000 people have been killed in the ongoing Mexican â&#x20AC;&#x153;crime war,â&#x20AC;? and many more have been kidnapped or simply gone missing.1 Yet despite the significance of these numbers, official reports and news accounts frequently underreport the toll of this war.

Counter The

Iraqi Security Police investigate a destroyed car used as a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) in which both occupants died. Photo by: Tsgt Roy Santana

28 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

By Robert J. Bunker and John Sullivan

exican cartels and gangsters clearly use violence to further their business interests. Threats and violence ward off competition and discourage interference with illegal drug transshipment points (plazas) and distribution nodes. The cartels have also directly confronted Mexico’s government, leading to a

crisis of state solvency (the net result of capacity and legitimacy) that can be characterized as “criminal insurgency.”2 So far, the majority of cartel actions have involved small arms—such as the classic cuerno de chivo (AK-47). Mass shootings, grenade attacks, dismemberments, beheadings, and blockades (narcobloqueos) are also

common tactics. Additional weapons employed by cartels include both improvised armored fighting vehicles known as narcotanques and car bombings (coches bomba). In fact, use of car bombs or VBIEDs (vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices) is a tactic that has been employed with varying frequency throughout the conflict.

The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 29

Sinaloa Cartel officer Javier Torres Felix is deported to Mexico after completing his sentence in the U.S. He was immediately arrested in Mexico for pending charges in his homeland. Photo by: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

CARTEL VBIED USE IN MEXICO VBIEDs have been employed in several attacks by cartels in Mexico, with the majority of these incidents occurring between July 2010 and July 2012. The first widely reported contemporary Mexican car bombing occurred in embattled Ciudad Juรกrez on Thursday, 15 July 2010, with four people killed in

30 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

an ambush on the Federal Police.3 The last major VBIED attack of this period occurred on 31 July 2012 in Culiacรกn, Sinaloa. Other isolated VBIED-related incidents have taken place outside of this period, however. For example, on 14 July 2008 in Culiacรกn, Sinaloa, two explosive devices integrated with gas cylinders (in an attempt to enhance lethality) were discovered in a vehicle at a cartel safe house.

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The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 31

In our monograph Cartel Car Bombings in Mexico, we tracked 20 VBIED incidents between 2010 and 2012. Two of these incidents involved multiple devices (one in 2011 with two car bombs, and one in 2012 with two vehicle-borne incendiary devices).4 The Mexican attorney general or PGR (Procuradura General de la República) reported 16 car bomb incidents for the 2010-2012 timeframe.5 Use of VBIEDs has virtually stopped since that sequence. The only reported incident since our analysis of the 2010-2012 incidents was an alleged CNG (El Cártel Nueva Generación) car bomb—actually an improvised incendiary device accompanied by a narcomanta (narco-banner)—detonated outside the Reclusorio Oriente correctional facility in Distrito Federal, Mexico City.6

VBIED DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION The VBIEDs employed by Mexican cartels have generally been low-yield devices—more “bombs in cars” than higher-yield devices that take advantage of the volume of explosives that a vehicle (especially a van or larger truck) can accommodate. Accurate information on the design and construction of these devices is limited. Payload sizes encountered have been in the 10- and 16-kilogram range. Types of explosives utilized include Tovex (a mining explosive), dynamite, and C-4. Electric detonation systems are typically triggered via cell phone activation; however, a Futaba radio controller has also been recovered. The cartels are also known to possess detonation cord.

A glimpse into the construction of one of these devices is available in a Mexican Cartel Tactical Note focusing on a VBIED recovered in January 2012. This particular VBIED was meant for detonation next to a police station in Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas, but was seized before it could be employed. Photos of the device, hidden in the trunk of a vehicle, were utilized for forensic purposes; however, due to poor photo quality, only a limited analysis was conducted.7 A limited number of 60mm mortar rounds, claymore mines, and numerous RPG rounds have been recovered in Mexico. To date, none of these munitions have been reported incorporated into VBIEDs. Conceivably, hand and rifle grenades—both older muzzle-launched forms and modern launched variants— could be bundled together for boosting purposes, along with gasoline and other highly flammable fuels (such as that found in the July 2008 VBIED incident), to augment these improvised explosive systems.

PATTERNS OF EMPLOYMENT Threats and Warnings: Cartel VBIEDs have been primarily utilized against Mexican military and police personnel, the media, and businesses to encourage or discourage certain behavior. The intent is to both threaten and warn against taking particular actions, in order to motivate a shift to activities more favorable to cartel policies and desires. Examples include warning military personnel away from cracking down on a specific cartel or threatening a newspaper from reporting on a cartel leader’s activities. In numerous incidents in which VBIEDs were left outside facilities, the detonations resulted

32 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

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in no causalities; however, the implicit threat of what would happen if unwanted behaviors continued was made clear. Psychological Warfare/Terrorism: Implicit in the above threats and warnings dynamic is the use of psychological warfare (and terrorism) principles to generate fear, terror, and the ambiguity of not knowing when or if an attack might come. The creation of an ever-present feeling of imperilment induces high levels of stress. VBIED employment patterns represent another cartel capability in addition to the use of direct assaults, snipers, kidnapping, and torture to terrorize and resocialize populations. VBIED employment against a police headquarters building in April 2012, a city hall in June 2012, and the private residence of a chief security officer in July 2012—all in the state of Tamaulipas—represents an ongoing campaign to terrorize public officials so they become compliant with cartel control. Diversion: Here, a VBIED or incendiary device is detonated to draw a police or security response and thus distract responders from another attack. This creation of a diversion is similar to the use of narcobloqueos (narco-blockades) to channelize maneuver options and is essentially an anti-maneuver tactic. Narcobloqueos typically involve large trucks or buses and frequently include tanker trucks that are set ablaze to complicate response.8 Anti-Personnel Targeting: This targeting theme can be seen in both the initial July 2010 Ciudad Juárez bombing, which drew in unsuspecting police and responder personnel, and later in the much more sophisticated attack in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, on 24 May 2012. In that incident, police personnel at a

A simulated VBIED at the National Training Center (NTC). Photo by: Master Sgt. Johancharles Van Boers

makeshift barracks at the Hotel Santa Cecilia—a small L-shaped motel—were targeted. Gunfire directed at the motel drew them out of their rooms into the parking lot. A small device was then detonated in the back of a pickup truck next to the motel. Eight officers and two civilians were wounded as a result.

34 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

Anti-Vehicular/Anti-Materiel Targeting: In an incident in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, on 20 October 2011, a Mexican military convoy was drawn into an ambush in which a parked car on the side of a road was detonated. Because none of the vehicles in the passing convoy were damaged, it is not known

whether the low-yield VBIED detonated prematurely and/or did not function properly or whether this attack was meant as only a threats and warnings incident.2 In another incident, albeit a quasi-VBIED one, in Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas, on 6 June 2012, two vehicles at a car dealership were targeted. In what appeared to be an extortion plot, the gas tanks of the vehicles were ignited either by grenades or Molotov cocktails.

PATTERNS OF EMPLOYMENT NOT DEMONSTRATED VBIEDS can be used in more destructive employment profiles than those described above. To date, Mexican cartel use of VBIEDs has been far more constrained than use of these devices by contemporary al-Qaeda-linked groups, as well as the bombings carried out by both Hezbollah and Colombian cartels during the late 1980s and early 1990s. VBIED patterns not demonstrated in Mexico include the following: Mass/Indiscriminate Killing: VBIED casualty figures in Mexico have been low, with one incident resulting in four

deaths, another in two deaths, and a further incident in one death. Upper totals for injuries have been seven in two incidents and three in three others. Numerous incidents have yielded no deaths or injuries. By comparison, the highest fatality- and injury-producing cartel incident utilizing an explosive device was a September 2008 grenade attack in the main square of Morelia, Michoacán, during a festival. In that incident, detonation of multiple fragmentation grenades resulted in eight deaths and over 100 injuries. Anti-Infrastructure Targeting: There is currently no evidence that purposeful anti-infrastructure attacks utilizing VBIEDs—with the intent of destroying buildings or other forms of infrastructure—have taken place in Mexico. The most similar style incident would be the use of arson by a gang of gunmen against the Casino Royale in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, resulting in 52 deaths and over a dozen injuries. To place this in context regarding upper casualty thresholds, the most devastating cartel VBIED attack of all time was an incident involving a security building in Medellin,

The creation of an ever-present feeling of imperilment induces high levels of stress.

Standard and Reverse Polarity Views

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The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 35

A Blackwater MD-530 responds to a VBIED in Baghdad, Iraq. Photo by Master Sgt. Michael E. Best

Colombia, in December 1989. In that attack, a 500-kilogram VBIED was detonated, killing 59 people and injuring 1,000. This was one of the largest VBIEDs to be employed in the Western Hemisphere. Suicide/Martyrdom Operations: As of September 2013, no evidence has been reported of a car or truck driver engaging, or even attempting to engage, in a suicide or martyrdom-style operation using a VBIED in Mexico. The most similar incident may be that of the July 2010 Ciudad Juárez bombing, in which a bound and wounded man was dressed as a police officer and used as an unwilling decoy in a “bait and wait” trap to kill Mexican police and first responders.9

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36 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

PRESENT AND FUTURE USE VBIED use by Mexican organized crime cartels has been dormant since August 2012, after sustained multiyear employment beginning in July 2010. The reasons for this “strategic pause” in VBIED use are unknown. Strangely, the pause correlates with the Mexican presidential elections at the end of July 2012 and the subsequent victory of Enrique Peña Nieto, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) candidate. Also interesting, an earlier period of limited cartel VBIED employment existed in the early 1990s. During that period, VBIEDs

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Truck bomb in Cali, Colombia, August 2006. Photo by: Segan were used by the cartels against one another, rather than against governmental security personnel, the press, and businesses. A cartel’s selection of tactics is driven by the environment. Although Mexico’s cartels have the capability (both knowledge and materials) to conduct

VBIED attacks, they apparently do not have need for such attacks at the present time. They are able to achieve desired results by use of other tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Both sophisticated and simple variants of VBIEDs—i.e., both car bombs and “bombs in cars”—are better used when seeking to shape strategic space.

That is, VBIEDs become more valuable when seeking to manipulate mass opinion during a campaign to secure control of turf or a contested plaza. Other tools (such as grenades or individual armed assaults) are better suited to tactical engagements or retaliation for individual transgressions against the cartel. Although the religious fervor of the Knights Templar (Cabelleros Templarios) cartel in Michoacán may at first glance raise the possibility of potential martyrdom operations (involving vehicleor person-borne devices), such attacks may not be likely. The instrumental violence of the drug wars originates in local contexts, not in the context of global jihad. Furthermore, narcocultura exploits religious imagery to sustain images of social bandits, not religious martyrs. San Nazario is a venerated icon of innate rebellion, but the local context does not mirror the Middle East. Beheadings are used to dehumanize adversaries, not mimic jihadis. Likewise, VBIEDs in Mexico must be viewed in the context of the Mexican criminal insurgency and not forced to mirror global jihad imagery that does not fit.

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VBIED spillover from the Mexican conflict into the United States is a possibility. Current probabilities are low—especially since VBIED use has presently ramped down in Mexico. However, gangsters in the U.S. have already employed bombings, and the future may make key U.S. cities or neighborhoods within those cities into contested plazas, transportation corridors, and distribution nodes. An awareness of VBIED potentials, TTPs, and response considerations is therefore prudent, in the border zone and enclaves upstream where cartel-gang interpenetration drives gang warfare.

Centro. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the position of any U.S. government agency. Mr. Sullivan is a lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department. He is coauthor of Cartel Car Bombings in Mexico (Strategic Studies Institute, 2013), Studies in Gangs in Cartels (Routledge, 2013), and Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency (iUniverse, 2012). He is also a senior fellow of Small Wars Journal—El Centro. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the position of the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

ENDNOTES

Mr. Bunker is distinguished visiting professor and Minerva Chair of the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. He is coauthor of Cartel Car Bombings in Mexico (Strategic Studies Institute, 2013), Studies in Gangs in Cartels (Routledge, 2013), and Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency (iUniverse, 2012). He is also a senior fellow of Small Wars Journal—El

Molly Molloy, “The Mexican Undead: Toward a New History of the ‘Drug War’ Killing Fields,” Small Wars Journal, August 21, 2013, http://smallwarsjournal.com/ jrnl/art/the-mexican-undead-toward-anew-history-of-the-“drug-war”-killingfields, accessed October 8, 2013. 2 See John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker, Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency: A Small Wars Journal—El Centro Anthology

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(Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2012). 3 John P. Sullivan, “Explosive Escalation? Reflections on the Car Bombing in Ciudad Juarez,” Small Wars Journal, July 21, 2010, http://smallwarsjournal.com/ jrnl/art/explosive-escalation, accessed October 8, 2013. 4 Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, Cartel Car Bombings in Mexico, Letort Paper, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, August 16, 2013, http://www. strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/ display.cfm?pubID=1166, accessed October 8, 2013. 5 “Grupos delicivos detonaron en México 16 coches bomba entre 2010 y 2012, revela PGR,” Noticias MVS, May 14, 2013. 6 “Narcos Explotan Coche en Reclusorio Oriente,” El Diario, July 31, 2013. 7 David Kuhn and Robert Bunker, “Mexican Cartel Tactical Note #15: IED Recovered from Trunk of Car by Police Station in Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas (Jan 2012),” Small Wars Journal, January 14, 2013, http://smallwarsjournal.com/ blog/mexican-cartel-tactical-note-15, accessed October 8, 2013. 8 See John P. Sullivan, “Spillover/ Narcobloqueos in Texas,” Small Wars Journal, April 1, 2013, and Texas Public Safety Threat Overview 2013, Texas Department of Public Safety, February 2013, p. 18. 9 Robert Bunker, “Mexican Cartel Tactical Note #5: Indications & Warning (I&W): VBIED Anti-Vehicular/ Anti-Personnel Ambush Capability of Los Zetas (Assumed),” Small Wars Journal, October 24, 2011, http:// smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mexicancartel-tactical-note-5, accessed October 8, 2013.

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BOOK REVIEW

…If You Are Arrested or Framed… By Dr. Al-Hajj Idris A. Muhammad

Reviewed by: Chris Graham

ave you ever wondered, What Should You Do If You Are Arrested or Framed by the Racist, Fascist, Criminal Police? Or the Racist, Fascist Criminal FBI? If so, an individual identified as Dr. Al Hajj Idris A. Muhammad has published a book by the same name (El-Amin Publishers, New York) that may provide the answers you seek. This book has been distributed in jurisdictions across the country and abroad. It has also been made available by Dave Gaubatz (http://wearenotafraid. blogspot.com/), a retired career USAF Office of Special Investigations special agent. Muhammad asserts his perspective: “Tens of thousands of innocent men, women and children, the majority of them poor fill concentration camps (prisons), hundreds of thousands more including most presumably responsible groups and individuals are subject to racist, fascist criminal police or the racist, fascist FBI agents, and military intelligence surveillance. The judicial and prison systems are to be increasingly defined as instruments for unbridled repression, racism and genocide. We must continue to [resist], and organize, and Allah (The Creator) will bless us with Victory or Paradise.” Recognizing that some subversives originate abroad, the author says, “If you are a foreign national arrested in Amerikkka, you have the right to call your consulate. The racist, fascist criminal

who suspects an informer of covert intervention can express his or her evidence to other Believers of the masjid or organization.” And, as an apparent man of irony, he goes on to say, “[t]he racist, fascist, criminal FBI collaborates with the racist, fascist, coward, pervert, homosexual, nigger, Caucasian, Zionist, Jew [media] to falsely publish racist material against the Muslim community and other political activist organizations.” Muhammad advises, “Establish security procedures appropriate for your Muslim community or your political activist organization and discuss them thoroughly with everyone involved. Control access to keys, files, letterheads, funds, financial mailing lists etc. Keep duplicates of valuable documents, safeguard address books, and do not carry them when arrest is likely to occur. Record break-ins, thefts, illegal raids, arrests, strange phone noises, harassment by the racist, fascist, criminal police.” He adds, “Arrange community meetings with speakers and political activist attorneys who have resisted similar harassment. InshAllah, make public issue of any harassment by the racist, fascist, criminal FBI or the racist, fascist, criminal police. Contact your Congressman or Congresswoman and Senator. Contact all anti-Zionist Jew media outlets…” The author quotes Koran 4:76 as saying, “Allah the exalted said; those who believe, fight in the cause of Allah, and those who disbelieve, fight in the cause of

police or the racist, fascist, criminal FBI must allow your consul to visit and speak with you. Your consul might assist you in finding a lawyer or offer other help such as contacting your family.” Muhammad claims, “If you discover that the racist, fascist, criminal police or racist, fascist, criminal FBI agents are searching for you for the alleged murder or wounding of a racist, fascist, criminal police officer or a racist, fascist, criminal FBI agent in self-defense, you should go underground and eventually leave the country. The racist, fascist, criminal police and racist, fascist, criminal FBI agents will fabricate a case against you because you are a Muslim of Arab ethnicity, a person of color or an antiracist, anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist Caucasian activist.” Finding common ground with America’s communist revolutionaries from yesterday, and acknowledging the odd relationship between avowed socialists and fiery Islamists, Muhammad demands the following: “Free Iman Jamil Abdullah al-Amin (formerly known as H. Rap Brown), Dr. Abdur-Rashid Hampton-El (the cousin of the Black Panther leader Fred Hampton), Sekou Abdullah Odinga, Jalil Abdul-Muntaqim, Bashir Hameed, Abdul-Majid, Dr. Mutulu Shakur, Dr. Sheikh Umar Abdur Rahman and all political prisoners and prisoners of war.” The author instructs readers to “[e] stablish a process through which anyone

42 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

Taghut (anything worshipped other than Allah). So fight you against the friends of Ash-Shaitan (the devil). Ever feeble is the plot of Ash-Shaitan.” Muhammad concludes, “[A ‘political prisoner’] launched the National Prisoners Campaign to petition the

United Nations to recognize the existence of Political Prisoners and Prisoners of War in Amerikkka. Progressives joined this effort, and the petition was submitted in Geneva, Switzerland.” Muhammad’s book is poorly written. It is full of misspellings, poor grammar, and

redundancy and reads like a transcript of ramblings from a confused Marxist jihadist with Tourette’s syndrome. It is also widely disseminated. Read this book and catch a glimpse of how your adversaries describe both their efforts and yours.

•

An FBI Evidence Response Team agent enters 39 Waverley Avenue in Watertown, Massachusetts. The building was the site of two arrests and an evidence raid in connection with the investigation into the 2010 Times Square car bombing attempt. Photo by: Twp

The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 43

STRATEGIC COUNTERFEITING AND DPRK OFFICE 39 Many people think of counterfeiting as a primarily criminal activity done on a relatively small scale with limited success. Everyone has seen the special highlight pens used by retailers to determine whether a bill is real or fake.

Counter The

44 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

By Kevin D. Freeman

ccasionally, you may even hear a news report state that a “ring” is at work in your area passing fake bills. These warnings pass quickly, and everyone goes back to business as usual when the counterfeiters are apprehended. Once caught, these criminals are almost always convicted. In fact, the Secret Service reportedly has a 98.8% conviction rate in prosecuting criminal counterfeiters.1 Statistics like these recently prompted Justin Peters of Slate to opine that “given its degree of difficulty and the near-inevitability of being caught, counterfeiting American currency is maybe the dumbest crime imaginable.”2

However, it is important to consider the role that inflating a country’s money supply might play in destabilizing that nation’s economy. There have been multiple well-documented cases of this sort of “economic warfare” throughout history. In my 2012 book Secret Weapon: How Economic Terrorism Brought Down the U.S. Stock Market and Why It Can Happen Again (Regnery, http:// secretweapon.org), I recounted Operation Bernhard as one example. This was an extremely sophisticated Nazi operation designed to destabilize the British economy and provide resources for German operations:

THE SOPHISTICATED GAME: OPERATION BERNHARD In 1939, members of Adolf Hitler’s Security Service (Reichsicherheitsdienst) proposed that the Germans destroy the British currency by counterfeiting millions of pounds worth of banknotes. By deceitfully inflating the British currency, the value would collapse, hindering the Brits from buying the goods and services needed to win the war. At first Hitler rejected the plan as “dishonorable,” but eventually he embraced part of it, instructing his underlings to begin paying German spies and fellow travelers with forged notes. This would serve the

The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 45

Adolf Burger displaying a forged £5 note at the Paris premiere of “Die Fälscher”, January 2008. Photo by: Thierry Caro dual purpose of allowing Germany not to pay these operatives and allowing these individuals to become dispensing points for fake currency. Major Bernhard Krueger, after whom the operation was named, led the German Security Service’s Forgery Division, creating fake papers for its operatives. Forging banknotes on this scale was an immense task—after all, banknotes are the most highly scrutinized pieces of paper in the world. Fortunately, Krueger had the

ultimate supply of cheap labor hidden away in concentration camps all over Europe. Jewish inmates were selected for the job and rewarded with better living conditions. Krueger began by having his slaves create five-pound banknotes. He mixed up the paper from Turkish flax (obtained through Italy), ensuring that every detail of the notes, down to the way the ink absorbed into the paper, was accurate. He even sent a batch of counterfeited currency to Switzerland to see if bankers could tell it

46 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

was fake—and they could not. Even the Bank of London was fooled. Every month, Krueger’s men turned out over ₤500,000 worth of currency to be distributed in Britain. Soon, demand by his distributors outstripped supply, and they asked for £50 notes. Over the course of the year, Krueger expanded his operation and increased his staff to number nearly 150. His team was creating millions worth of banknotes each month and even branching out to print U.S. dollars. The fakes were so good that they circulated quite normally— in fact, Krueger’s agents began receiving their own forged notes when trading other currencies. Krueger actually asked for—and received—medals for his prisoners. Overall, Krueger’s operation counterfeited more than $600 million worth of banknotes. It forced the Bank of England to withdraw all notes larger than £5 from circulation during the war and to change the paper on which the £5 note was printed. Near the end of the war, the Bank of England made all pound notes from £10 to £1,000 illegal. Krueger’s scheme only ended when the war drew to a close. The prisoners were lucky enough to escape.3 Despite its vast scale, Operation Bernhard wasn’t nearly comprehensive enough to truly damage the British currency—and because it was launched late in the war, it did not have much time to achieve its objectives. However, examining Operation Bernhard is instructive. If the operation had succeeded, it would have knocked the British out of the war. By adding hundreds of millions of pounds into the British economy, [the Nazis] could have seriously undermined Britain’s floating currency. It’s a lesson well worth learning, especially when we consider the many weaknesses of the U.S. dollar today. Here’s one example of the vulnerability of the American currency: the North Korean regime runs its own version of Operation Bernhard aimed at the United States.

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Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan) Photo by: carpkazu According to David Rose of Vanity Fair, North Korea (also known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) is home to a secret agency called Office 39, directly overseen by the nation’s dictator, Kim Jung Il [replaced after his death by his son]. That office used messengers to launder counterfeit “supernotes” worth millions of dollars through the casinos in Las Vegas. According to Rose, “Most of the notes have ended up in general circulation.” David Asher, head of the State Department’s Illicit Activities Initiative from 2003–2005

further explains, “In one sense, Office 39 is like an investment bank. It provides the money for the stuff Kim needs. Like any organized-crime syndicate, you’ve got a don, and you’ve got accountants, and it’s a very complicated business, keeping track of all this money and making sure the boss gets paid. But when members of the organization don’t deliver, they get killed.” Office 39, not coincidentally, handles [the leader’s] personal bank accounts in Switzerland and sells missiles to foreign countries. Overall, Office 39 rakes in between $500 million and $1 billion per year or more. That’s not enough to substantially damage U.S. currency holdings, but it spreads uncertainty that can create risks. As Rose reports, “In 2004, Taiwan’s central bank issued a warning that supernotes had been turning up on the island. This caused a panic, and the Taiwanese banks were overwhelmed by customers seeking to return $100 bills totaling hundreds of millions of dollars, most of them perfectly genuine.”4 The quality of the counterfeiting is so good that the fakes are essentially indistinguishable from the real bills. The U.S. has even had to force the shutdown of foreign banks that act as distributors for the North Korean supernotes. And the scale of the counterfeiting does not seem to be

diminishing: in 2007, the North Koreans bought enough paper to print $2 billion.5 Nazi Germany and North Korea are not alone in using counterfeiting as a weapon of warfare. In fact, those nations sponsoring or at least allowing the counterfeiting of U.S. dollars map out like a “Who’s Who” of actors who would like to see America fail. These are nations or groups that could easily be lumped into a current “Axis of Evil” from an economic warfare perspective—including Iran, North Korea, China, Russia, and Venezuela. According to the U.S. Secret Service, Peru has recently surpassed Colombia as the top counterfeiter, at least based on seizures of phony bills. Most of this effort is likely criminal activity rather than financial terrorism. However, the drug cartel tie-in is worth noting, as are the Venezuelan and al-Qaeda money laundering influences in the region. First, Peruvian counterfeiters are tied to the big drug cartels, and many of them moved operations from Colombia to Peru after a crackdown by U.S. law enforcement agencies.6 Second, Venezuela has made inroads into Peruvian politics with a decidedly anti-American bent.7 Finally, Peru has been used as a major money transfer point for al-Qaeda.8 Fortunately,

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A U.S. Soldier shows an Iraqi businessman how to use a banknote tester pen on U.S. dollars and Iraqi dinar in Zubayr, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2009. Photo by: Spc. Samantha R. Ciaramitaro

the Peruvian counterfeiters have had to work with bond paper, which makes it difficult but not impossible to spot the phony bills. According to an AP report in September 2013: For all their skill, says Portocarrero (Col. Segundo Portocarrero, chief of the Peruvian police’s fraud division), Peruvian counterfeiters’ handiwork will always get tripped up by the infrared scanner banks used to authenticate currency. That, he says, owes to their continued reliance on standard ‘bond’ paper, the variety used by consumers that is available in stores and that easily disintegrates when wet. If they were able to obtain ‘rag’ paper, the cloth type used for banknotes, all bets would be off, Portocarrero said. ‘The day they get it and perfect the finish

a bit more, (their bills) will go undetected.’9 Still, the ramped-up counterfeiting operations in Peru seem limited when compared to the often-undetected efforts in the Middle East. In that part of the world, counterfeiting U.S. currency is serious business for all sorts of purposes. For example, millions of dollars of fake U.S. currency flooded into Iraq in early 2010. Officials say these counterfeit bills “might have been an Iranian attempt to influence Iraqi elections” 10—and they are only the tip of the iceberg. There are disturbing reports of a massive Iranian counterfeiting scheme with operations on the borders of Russia and across East Asia, as well as connections in Hong Kong, Macau, Albania, England, Germany, France, and

Italy.11 In fact, a former CIA source that had infiltrated the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and now teaches at the U.S. Department of Defense’s Joint Counterintelligence Training Academy tied these operations with global drug running designed “to undermine the West through their links with global crime networks,”12 just as is advocated in the PRC (People’s Republic of China) strategy book Unrestricted Warfare. The idea of Iranian counterfeiting is uniquely significant for two reasons: • First, the Iranians recognize that the U.S. government is currently engaged in an aggressive economic war against them, using weapons such as sanctions, barriers to the international banking system, and apparent cyberattacks.13 Juan Zarate’s

The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 49

101st Airborne Division soldiers look for a known money launderer in Mosul, Iraq (2003). Photo by: Staff Sgt. Kevin Wastler new book Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare goes into great detail explaining various efforts the U.S. government has taken against the Iranian economy.14 In response, the Iranians have threatened economic retaliation15—including efforts to cripple the dollar.16 • Second, the quality of state-produced currency—including that made by Iranian counterfeiters—may be higher than that of currency produced by standard criminals. Nations have access to the best paper, inks, scientists, and equipment, and their output is sometimes so good that the fake bills are called “supernotes.” Indeed, according to Banker’s Online, “Counterfeit currency is becoming a huge problem. With the emergence of the so-called ‘supernote’—counterfeit currency so good that it can often escape detection—training of financial institution employees and education of commercial customers is more critical than ever before.”17 A 2012 Time Magazine report put it this way:

These ultra-counterfeits are light-years beyond the weak facsimiles produced by most forgers, who use desktop printers. As an anticounterfeiting investigator with Europol once put it, ‘Superdollars are just U.S. dollars not made by the U.S. government.’ With few exceptions, only Federal Reserve banks equipped with the fanciest detection gear can identify these fakes.18 High-quality counterfeit bills became so widely circulated during the 1990s that the Treasury Department redesigned U.S. currency multiple times. In the 61 years from 1929 until 1990, the only major change to bills was the addition of the words “In God We Trust,” more a statement of faith than effort to stop counterfeiters. Since 1990, however, there have been nine major changes, all focused on deterring production of fake bills.19 There will no doubt be many future alterations as well. The latest change is a redesigned $100 bill unveiled in October 2013. Its release was originally scheduled for 2010, but production difficulties emerged due to the bill’s complexity. The new $100 will have added security

50 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

features including “a blue, 3-D security ribbon and a disappearing Liberty Bell in an inkwell.”20 It is no coincidence that serious counterfeiting problems increased so greatly in the 1990s. Radical antiAmericanism, particularly in the Middle East, appears to have been paired with vastly improving technology at the same time that counterfeit dollars began circulating widely. Advanced scanners, printers, copiers, and software all became widely available, allowing skilled users to make remarkably accurate reproductions. It has also long been rumored that Iran has a U.S. printing press once sold to the Shah by our own government but captured when he was overthrown.21 Even if we change how we produce dollars, a highly trained group of statesponsored professional counterfeiters could surely adapt over time. In addition, even old bills are legal currency, and many remain in circulation today.22 This means that old counterfeits continue to affect our system. In fact, they have been a problem for many years. A 1992 report in the Los Angeles Times explained the issue as follows: The government of Iran, in an unorthodox effort to ease its own budget deficit and make trouble for the American economy, is printing and circulating billions of dollars of counterfeit U.S. $100 bills, a congressional report charged Wednesday. The counterfeit bills, described as “nearly perfect,” are being circulated with the help of Syria through the international terrorist network and are showing up in Europe, Asia, Africa and the former Soviet republics, according to the report, issued by a panel of Republican House members… “I believe there is the potential for billions of dollars of counterfeit U.S. currency to soon be in circulation, mainly outside of the U.S. banking system,” (U.S. Representative Bill) McCollum said. “Evidence in this

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report supports estimates that such sums may already be in circulation. The implications for the dollar’s role as the international medium of exchange could be serious.” According to the report, Iran is manufacturing the counterfeit money with U.S.-built printing presses at the national mint in Tehran, using U.S.-trained chemists and expertise obtained from the United States by Iran during the reign of Shah

Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. It said that the bills are being printed on a combination of locally manufactured paper and paper that can be “acquired only by governments.” The counterfeit bills are being circulated worldwide with the help of Syria, which has been receiving weekly shipments by air from Tehran, the report said. In Syria, it said, the bills are packed in small quantities for distribution through drug networks based

52 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

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in Lebanon, where they are exchanged for as much as 40 to 60 cents on the dollar… The counterfeit money has been distributed in the United States through banks that launder drug money, the report asserted. “High-quality counterfeit dollars are mixed with large cash deposits in narcomoney laundering banks, making up as much… as 10% to 30% of the deposited money,” it said. “Only a small fraction of the counterfeit money is discovered by the banks.” 23 What is so instructive about this 1992 story is how little things have changed over the past two decades. Iran and Syria remain in the headlines as sources of terrorism. Drug networks and counterfeiters continue to work handin-hand. Fake bills continue to circulate via Russia into Europe. And these events continue to threaten the dollar’s role as the international medium of exchange. Despite being a serious problem, the fact is that even with all the fake $100 bills in circulation, only a fraction of the U.S. money supply is represented by actual paper money. So, even if North Korea and Iran kept their printing presses running constantly, they would be unlikely to keep up with the regular expansion of the money supply by the U.S. government’s own Federal Reserve. That’s why many “experts” have dismissed direct counterfeiting of paper money as an effective economic weapon. The problem is, however, that successful counterfeiting can seriously undermine confidence in a country’s currency, and this decrease in confidence can be sufficient to create a collapse. For example, many supposed U.S. allies have already begun to question American solvency and have sided with Iran when they sense opportunity. A perfect example came in the $250 billion moneylaundering case brought against British

bank Standard Chartered, as reported by Reuters: Standard Chartered now stands accused of helping Iranian banks—including the central bank—circumvent U.S. sanctions by concealing roughly 60,000 transactions involving at least $250 billion from U.S. regulators, and having reaped “hundreds of millions of dollars in fees” for itself over a decade… Lest there be any doubt, SCB’s obvious contempt for U.S. banking regulations was succinctly and unambiguously communicated by SCB’s Group Executive Director in response. As quoted by an SCB New York branch officer, the Group Director caustically replied: “You f—ing Americans. Who are you to tell us, the rest of the world, that we’re not going to deal with Iranians.” 24 Clearly, $250 billion is a level sufficient for economic impact. To make matters worse, there are also reports of trillions of dollars in fake Treasury Bonds being discovered in Europe, according to a Bloomberg report: Italian anti-mafia prosecutors said they seized a record $6 trillion of allegedly fake U.S. Treasury bonds, an amount that’s almost half of the U.S.’s public debt… The fraud posed “severe threats” to international financial stability, the prosecutors said in the statement. HSBC spokesman Patrick Humphries in London declined to comment when contacted by telephone.25 Of course, it would not be an easy thing to push 6,000 fake $1 billion bonds into the market. The face value and volume would be impossible to move during normal times. But, in the face of an all-out assault on the dollar, fake $1 billion bonds might prove useful to those conspiring to do damage. Thus, in the case of fake $100 bills, the amount that can be produced does

undermine confidence but cannot likely by itself significantly diffuse the massive monetary supply and cause a full economic implosion. On the other hand, fake billion-dollar bonds have the potential to match the money supply but are virtually impossible to put into circulation. Used in combination with other economic weapons, however, counterfeit bills and bonds might prove effective if the timing were right. North Korea’s Office 39 serves as merely one example of a modern strategic counterfeiter. From the strategists of nation-states such as the People’s Republic of China26 to non-state actors such as al-Qaeda27 the stated goal is to unseat the dollar as the world’s reserve currency. Not only does the potential exist to destroy an economy by expansion of the money supply, but each conspirator may stand to gain an extraordinary profit in the process. That’s economic warfare.

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Freeman (CFA) is the author of Secret Weapon: How Economic Terrorism Brought Down the U.S. Stock Market and Why It Can Happen Again (www.secretweapon.org) and Game Plan: Your Secret Weapon to Protect Yourself from Economic Attack (Regnery, 2014). He authors the blog www.globaleconomicwarfare.com.

ENDNOTES Krystle M. Davis, “Glorifying a Master Counterfeiter,” Forbes, June 30, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/29/artof-making-money-opinions-book-reviewjason-kersten.html, accessed October 3, 2013. 2 Justin Peters, “Counterfeiting American Currency Might Be the Dumbest Crime Imaginable,” Slate, 1

The problem is, however, that successful counterfeiting can seriously undermine confidence in a country’s currency, and this decrease in confidence can be sufficient to create a collapse.

March 13, 2013, http://www.slate.com/ blogs/crime/2013/03/13/christopher_ dipasquale_robert_kowalczyk_why_ counterfeiting_money_might_be.html, accessed October 3, 2013. 3 Andreas Schroeder, Scams!: Ten Stories That Explore Some of the Most Outrageous Swindlers and Tricksters of All Time (Toronto: Annick Press Ltd., 2004), pp. 72-87; and Larry Allen, The Encyclopedia of Money (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2009), p. 306. 4 David Rose, “North Korea’s Dollar Store,” Vanity Fair, August 5, 2009, http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/ features/2009/09/office-39-200909, accessed September 2011. 5 Ibid. 6 Madison Gray, “Secret Service: Peru Top Producer of Counterfeit U.S. Dollars,” Time, September 6, 2013, http:// newsfeed.time.com/2013/09/06/reportperu-top-producer-of-counterfeit-u-sdollars/, accessed October 3, 2013.

The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 53

Robin Yapp, “Peru election: Victory for left-wing nationalist adds to fears of ‘anti-US cabal,’” Telegraph (UK), June 6, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ worldnews/southamerica/peru/8559838/ Peru-election-victory-for-left-wingnationalist-adds-to-fears-of-anti-US-cabal. html, accessed October 3, 2013. 8 Manu Pubby, “Qaeda routing money to India via Peru,” Indian Express, March 4, 2011, http://www.indianexpress.com/ news/-qaeda-routing-money-to-india-viaperu-/757494/, accessed October 3, 2013. 9 Carla Salazar, “’More profitable than cocaine’: Peru becomes top source of counterfeit US cash,” Associated Press, September 5, 2013, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_ news/2013/09/05/20338603-moreprofitable-than-cocaine-peru-becomes-topsource-of-counterfeit-us-cash?lite, accessed October 3, 2013. 10 Hannah Allam, “US believes Iran behind millions in fake money,” Sydney Morning Herald, April 17, 2010, http:// www.smh.com.au/world/us-believesiran-behind-millions-in-fake-money20100416-skh8.html#ixzz2gIWepOkZ, accessed October 3, 2013. 11 Reza Kahlili, “New report: Iran funds terror through counterfeiting, drug trade,” March 8, 2012, Daily Caller, http:// dailycaller.com/2012/03/08/new-reportiran-funds-terror-through-counterfeitingdrug-trade/, accessed October 3, 2013. 12 Ibid. 13 Sharmine Narwani, “How Iran Changed The World,” Al Akhbar English, February 17, 2012, http://english.al-akhbar.com/ blogs/sandbox/how-iran-changedworld?utm_source=feedburner&utm_ medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A +AlAkhbarEnglish+(Al+Akhbar+English), accessed October 3, 2013. 14 Jordan Chandler Hirsch, “Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of 7

Financial Warfare by Juan C. Zarate,” Washington Post, September 29, 2013, http://washingtonpost.com/opinions/ treasurys-war-the-unleashing-of-a-newera-of-financial-warfare-by-juan-czarate/2013/09/27/f33809b0-08ff-11e39941-6711ed662e71_story.html, accessed October 3, 2013. 15 Kevin D. Freeman, “Iran’s Secret Weapon Threat,” GlobalEconomicWarfare. com, February 29, 2012, http:// globaleconomicwarfare.com/2012/02/ irans-secret-weapon-threat/, accessed October 3, 2013. 16 Garry White, “Iran presses ahead with dollar attack,” Telegraph (UK), February 12, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ finance/commodities/9077600/Iranpresses-ahead-with-dollar-attack.html, accessed October 3, 2013. 17 “SuperNotes Counterfeit Currency: What You Need to Know,” BankersOnline.com, June 20, 2002, http://www.bankersonline.com/security/ supernotes.html, accessed October 3, 2013. 18 David Wolman, “How the U.S. Could Pressure North Korea Tomorrow: Quit the $100 Bill,” Time, February 24, 2012, http://business.time.com/2012/02/24/ how-the-u-s-could-pressure-northkorea-tomorrow-quit-the-100bill/#ixzz2gL55r16C, accessed October 3, 2013. 19 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “The History of U.S. Currency,” http://www. newmoney.gov/currency/history.htm, accessed October 3, 2013. 20 Martin Crutsinger, “Redesigned $100 Bill Will Be Ready By October: Federal Reserve,” Associated Press, April 24, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost. com/2013/04/24/redesigned-100bill_n_3146913.html, accessed October 3, 2013. 21 Daniel Engberg, “What Are Supernotes? The best fake money that

54 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

money can buy,” Slate, August 23, 2005, http://www.slate.com/articles/ news_and_politics/explainer/2005/08/ what_are_supernotes.html, accessed October 3, 2013. 22 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “FAQ Library,” http://www.newmoney. gov/faq/default.htm, accessed October 3, 2013. 23 Sara Fritz, “Iran Accused of Printing Fake U.S. Bills: Counterfeiting: Report by House Republicans says billions in bogus money is circulating with Syria’s help,” Los Angeles Times, July 2, 1992, http:// articles.latimes.com/1992-07-02/news/ mn-1906_1_counterfeit-bills, accessed October 3, 2013. 24 Peter Rudegeair, “Counterparties: ‘You f—ing Americans. Who are you to tell us that we’re not going to deal with Iranians.’” Reuters, August 6, 2012, http://blogs.reuters. com/felix-salmon/2012/08/06/ counterparties-you-fucking-americanswho-are-you-to-tell-us-that-we’re-notgoing-to-deal-with-iranians/, accessed October 3, 2013. 25 Elisa Martinuzzi, “Record $6 Trillion of Fake U.S. Bonds Seized” Bloomberg News, February 17, 2012, http://www. bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-17/italypolice-seize-6-trillion-of-fake-u-s-treasurybonds-in-switzerland.html, accessed October 3, 2013. 26 Qiao Liang andWang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999), http://www.terrorism.com/ documents/unrestricted.pdf, accessed October 3, 2013. 27 Kevin D. Freeman, “Was Osama bin Laden an Economic Terrorist?” GlobalEconomicWarfare.com, May 4, 2011, http://globaleconomicwarfare. com/2011/05/was-osama-bin-laden-aneconomic-terrorist/, accessed October 3, 2013.

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MONEY LAUNDERING IN REAL ESTATE The ongoing global financial crisis creates unique opportunities for organized crime. Savvy criminals and terrorists have developed new funding methods, bankrupting businesses and individuals through fraud.

Counter The

56 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

By Jennifer Hesterman

or example, the Mafia is now the only solvent “bank” in Italy, constituting 7% of the country’s gross domestic product.1 With liquid assets estimated at $80 billion, Italian organized crime groups stepped in during the European debt crisis to offer “rescue loans” or purchase failing companies and foreclosed real estate. La Cosa Nostra and the ‘Ndrangheta simultaneously took positions in government subsidized industries such as healthcare and “renewable energy.”2

Although many people underestimate their sophistication, these groups retain the agility that governments lack, exploiting crises and penetrating new markets—operating in parallel with legitimate businesses. In the United States, mortgage loan fraud is the fastest growing white collar crime, with the number of suspicious activity reports (SARs) climbing dramatically, from 4,500 in 2001 to almost 70,000 in 2012.3 As other financing methods were challenged by

the recession, al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas penetrated the unstable U.S. mortgage, loan consolidation, refinance, and “rescue” markets, not just to make, move, store, and launder money, but also to take advantage of strategic vulnerabilities.4 Meanwhile, Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) appear to be embracing the real estate debt crisis and making purchases. Known as money laundering into real estate (MLRE), this activity presents an ongoing challenge.

Biscayne Bay and the Port of Miami, Florida. Photo by: UpstateNYer The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 57

Cash-only sales are simple, making them attractive to real estate agents, buyers, and sellers.

unique opportunity not offered by other money laundering methods—namely, the actors (either alone or through proxies) legitimately own buildings and property that can be used as residences, safe houses, or storage locations for drugs, weapons, illegal aliens, fugitives, or illicit goods. In some cases, the actors leave buildings vacant, allowing squatters to use them for other illegal activities. In either situation, the resulting rise in crime and property decay may lead to decreased real estate value in the neighborhood and subsequent sell-offs, eventually providing the actors with opportunities to buy adjacent properties at a reduced price. Criminal groups aren’t just purchasing foreclosures and rundown properties, though. MLRE activities permeate all markets, and illicit funds are invested into residential and commercial real estate, as well as farmland and tourist properties. Purchased properties aren’t always used to stage illegal activities, either. Many times, MLRE generates profit through legitimate commercial activities conducted on the property, rent money collection, and potential resale profits, making it a lucrative business venture.

CASH IS KING DEFINING MLRE Dr. Louise Shelley, founder and director of the Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) and consultant on illicit financial flows and money laundering, published an article describing several key concepts of MLRE in TraCCC’s April 2013 journal.5 As with all laundering activities, the primary goals of MLRE are to make “dirty” money “clean” by entering it into legitimate markets and to store and hide assets indefinitely. However, according to Shelley, MLRE presents a

In a free-market economy, cash can be brought to a real estate closing. Cash-only sales are simple, making them attractive to real estate agents, buyers, and sellers. In fact, the percentage of all-cash real estate sales in the U.S. has doubled since 2008, and almost 60% of all home sales in 2012 were completely financed with cash.6 Foreign buyers are adding to this trend, which was originally fueled by Americans who were cautious of financial institutions after bank failures and bailouts and investors who were reacting to the real estate “bubble.” Another benefit of cash-only purchases is that new

58 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

titles can immediately be transferred to different owners in discrete transactions that are difficult to track. Today, South Florida is one example of an active MLRE region. Despite economic indicators that might predict otherwise, the sale of luxury properties is booming, and the pace of construction is rising to meet demand. For every ten homes sold in South Florida in July 2013, seven of them were bought with cash. Moreover, of those individuals using cash to buy condos in Miami, roughly 90 percent reportedly reside outside the U.S. Many developers report that like during the days of the “cocaine cowboys” in the 1980s, some foreign buyers never visit the properties prior to purchase, relying only on blueprints and photographs and using proxies to safeguard their privacy.7

USE OF PROXIES There is no need to reveal your identity when making a cash purchase. Consider the example of Walt Disney, who used blind trusts to anonymously buy multiple pieces of low-priced real estate in Florida prior to building the Disney World theme park. Disney’s secrecy kept property prices low and would-be competitors in the dark about his activities. In addition to blind trusts, another subtle method for purchasing real estate is to establish an anonymous offshore entity, which can be set up through the Internet and funded using digital currency.8 As a simpler alternative, real estate can be titled anonymously through a use of a limited liability company (LLC), which can assume a personage and protect the identity of its “members.” In the United States, an LLC can hold property, enter into agreements, create accounts, and act as a legally compliant individual while not bearing the tax obligations and filing requirements of a corporation.9

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The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 59

Members of an LLC can thus make some transactions with privacy. In some states, an LLC can even collapse without the need to reassign or restructure the company’s holdings. Creating an LLC is a simple process that requires selecting a unique name and submitting articles of organization and a filing fee to the state. In some states, like Nevada, there is no requirement to publish the names of the owners or officers in the public record, and the LLC name is used as the property buyer. Financial transactions through an LLC also promote privacy, because the trustee or representative of the company can deliver a bank draft for the total

amount of a property sale (along with any closing fees), and he or she can also sign on behalf of the actual buyer. This type of activity is prevalent not just among criminals, but also among celebrities and individuals who wish to protect their home address from disclosure.

DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS AND MLRE The U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) alleges that as much as $100 billion in drug trafficking cash moves through America’s financial system each year. This estimate

has remained unchanged since FinCEN’s first advisory in 1996. An increasing amount of this drug money is being injected into the real estate market as agents and investors are either wittingly or unwittingly used as conduits to layer transactions and obscure cartel involvement. Several prominent MLRE cases brought to court in 2013 illustrate the variety of actors and tactics that make detection challenging. These cases include the following: • José Treviño Morales, brother of Los Zetas cartel leader Miguel Angel Treviño Morales, used drug money to purchase a sprawling ranch in Oklahoma and

Horse racing at Ruidoso Downs, New Mexico. Photo credit: Bill Hirshfeld

60 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

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The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 61

Osiel Cardenas Guillen, kingpin of the Gulf Cartel being extradited to the United States from Mexico. Photo by: Drug Enforcement Administration stables in New Mexico to house and train 400 racehorses that went on to win million-dollar races. What began as a way to launder money (often through the Mexican national oil company Pemex) ended as a lucrative business venture. Morales’ trial revealed a $120 million dollar U.S. Zeta operation, as well as the deaths of at least two people associated with the horse racing business. José Morales was convicted in August 2013

and sentenced to 20 years in federal prison.10 • In San Antonio, Texas, Alejandro Sánchez Garza, son of a wealthy real estate magnate from Guadalajara, Mexico, laundered drug cartel money through purchases of land, homes, and businesses, including high-end steakhouses.11 Garza and his brother wired at least $5 million to the U.S., which was used to invest not only in

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62 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

real estate but also in other ventures, including a Hollywood movie script. Garza was a fugitive in Mexico for almost a year before he turned himself in to U.S. agents in Brownsville, Texas, in January 2013 and pleaded guilty to money laundering charges.12 Freddy Centeno, a South Texas real estate agent, was indicted for laundering money through the purchase of four properties for a drug trafficking ring linked to Mexico’s Gulf Cartel. Centeno’s activity was identified during Operation Spike Strip, a multi-agency narcotics trafficking and money laundering investigation.13 • Leonel de La Torre, of Brownsville, Texas, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to launder funds generated by narcotics trafficking and was sentenced to 13 years in jail. De La Torre was leader of a group that moved cocaine from Mexico into South Texas for distribution in Houston, Ohio, and Michigan. He then invested the proceeds in real estate.14 • Fernando Alejandro Cano-Martinez, a 55-year-old Mexican construction magnate, is accused of laundering $40 million in drug money and bribes for the Los Zetas cartel through nine real estate front companies he built in Brownsville, Texas. Cano operated the businesses for 10 years, using four local banks to store the money and provide an additional $20 million in loans to buy property in the San Antonio area.15 Cano is a fugitive with warrants out for his arrest in both the United States and Mexico. • Alvaro Lopez Tardon, accused leader of a drug gang from Spain (with ties to Colombian drug trafficking organizations), is facing trial in Miami on charges of laundering $26.4 million in drug money, mostly through the purchase of new luxury condos directly from their builders.

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The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 63

…the deal significantly undervalues or overvalues the property and your party isn’t interested in negotiating a more favorable price.

• Cynthia Marquez of Grifton, North Carolina, was sentenced to ten years in prison after being arrested during Operation No Quarter, a multiagency task force led by the DEA and designed to attack the infrastructure of Mexican DTOs in the southern U.S. Marquez distributed at least 67 kilograms of cocaine from 2010 to 2012 and laundered the proceeds through her businesses, including a nightclub, jewelry store, and real estate company, which purchased 18 properties.16

CONCLUSION When a developer unknowingly accepts and uses illicit money in its building activities, it is not expected to return the funds. However, if the buyer is on the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) list, the developer may be forced to forfeit the funds, as well as pay a $50,000 fine per transaction. Furthermore, if the buyer is a member of a foreign terrorist organization as designated by the U.S. Department of State, the developer runs the risk of being charged as an accessory. National real estate associations and community business groups are best positioned to detect money laundering in real estate. Recommended techniques for spotting money laundering in real estate deals include the following:17 • Identifying whether the funds involved in a transaction come from a country known for weak anti– money laundering laws, terrorism, or political corruption. • Recognizing that an LLC or partnership may be used to obscure the identity of the person who controls the property without a legitimate explanation. • Running names and organizations (charities, etc.) through the OFAC list.

• Taking note of situations in which the deal significantly undervalues or overvalues the property and your party isn’t interested in negotiating a more favorable price. • Observing that a buyer pays all cash, although doing so doesn’t match his or her personal characteristics, occupation, or income. • Noticing that the funds used in a deal come from an unrelated third party or business that doesn’t take an interest in the property. • Learning that a buyer immediately resells a property. • Documenting cases in which a buyer doesn’t view a property or isn’t interested in its features. Local and state law enforcement personnel can engage by communicating with realtors, developers, and title companies to learn, educate and build relationships. Ultimately, the scope of the challenge is as wide as it is because the same factors that attract the flow of legitimate money—liquidity, privacy, and simplicity—also attract the flow of criminal proceeds. Thus, those factors

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that inhibit money laundering may also have the undesired effect of deterring legitimate commerce.

•

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Ms. Hesterman is a retired USAF colonel. Her most recent book is The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus: An Alliance of International Drug Cartels, Organized Crime, and Terror Groups. CT readers get a 20% discount on the book and free shipping by ordering from http://www.crcpress.com/product/ isbn/9781466557611 and using code JWL23.

ENDNOTES Confesercenti Nationale, “Criminality’s Grip on Business,” January 2012, http:// www.confesercenti.it/. 2 William Pentland, “Italian Mafia Goes Green,” Forbes.com, July 5, 1

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Brian Bandell, “Cash, Condos, and Criminals: The Big Loophole for Money Laundering,” South Florida Business Journal, August 30, 2013, http:// www.bizjournals.com/southflorida/printedition/2013/08/30/llcs-offer-secrecy-toforeign-criminal.html. 8 Hesterman, The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus. 9 Frederick Reese, “How to Launder Drug Money: Start an LLC and Buy Real Estate,” Mint Press News, September 12, 2013, http://www.mintpressnews.com/ how-to-launder-drug-money-start-an-llcand-buy-real-estate/168778/. 10 Marty Schladen, “Three Sentenced in Zetas Scheme to Launder Money Through Horse Racing,” El Paso Times, September 6, 2013, http://www.elpasotimes.com/news/ ci_24028890/three-men-sentenced-moneylaundering. 11 United States District Court, Western 7

District of Texas, San Antonio Division, U.S. v. Mauricio Sanchez-Garcia, Alejandro Sanchez-Garcia, and Jorge Vazquez Sanchez, November 15, 2011, http://extras. mysanantonio.com/pdf/moneylaundering/ Indictment.pdf. 12 Jason Buch and Guillermo Contreras, “S.A. Ties to Drug Cash Detailed,” San Antonio Express-News, May 23, 2013, http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/ local_news/article/S-A-ties-to-drug-cashdetailed-3483020.php. 13 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Real Estate Agent Arrested for Money Laundering,” July 31, 2013, http://www. fbi.gov/sanantonio/press-releases/2013/ real-estate-agent-arrested-for-moneylaundering. 14 U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, “Brownsville Money Launderer and Former Fugitive Headed to Prison,” May 23, 2013, http://

www.justice.gov/usao/txs/1News/ Releases/2013%20May/130523%20-%20 De%20La%20Torre.html. 15 United States District Court, Southern District of Texas, Brownsville Division, U.S. v. Fernando Alejandro Cano-Martinez, May 22, 2012, http:// www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2012/1205 22brownsville2.pdf. 16 Vail Stewart Rumley, “Former Nightclub Owner Sentenced,” Washington Daily News, July 23, 2013, http://www. thewashingtondailynews.com/2013/07/23/ former-nightclub-owner-gets-hefty-sentence/. 17 National Association of Realtors, “Anti-Money Laundering Guidelines for Real Estate Professionals,” November 15, 2012, http://www.realtor.org/articles/antimoney-laundering-guidelines-for-realestate-professionals.

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Adams Industries • www.adamsindustries.com......................................................................................................................................308 Adamson Police Products • www.policeproducts.com........................................................................................................ 116 Advanced Homeland Security Training in Israel • www.homelandsecurityssi.com............................................ 215 ALLRed - Armadillo Tactical Gear • www.armadillotacticalgear.com........................................................................... 131 American Public University • www.amuonline.com/counter-terrorist.......................................................................... 211 Axis• www.axis.com/ptz...................................................................................................................................................................... 237 Barrett Firearms Manufacturing • www.barrett.net/training.......................................................................................... 121 BioStat LLC • www.biostatllc.com.................................................................................................................................................... 271 Center for Rural Development • www.preventivestrategies.net..................................................................................... 265 Counter Terror Expo • www.counterterrorexpo.com/exhibit............................................................................................. 221 Cyalume Technologies Inc. • www.visipad.com..................................................................................................................... 305 Diamond Back Tactical • www.diamondbacktactical.com.................................................................................................. 74 DSG Arms • www.dsgarms.com...................................................................................................................................................... 275 Elite K9 • www.elitek9.com................................................................................................................................................................ 277 Frazer, Ltd • www.frazerbilt.com..................................................................................................................................................... 221 George Washington University • www.cps.gwu.edu/ssl................................................................................................... 283 Golden Engineering • www.goldenengineering.com........................................................................................................... 83 Golight Inc • www.golight.com........................................................................................................................................................ 285 IDGA’s Tactical Power Summit• www.tacticalpowersourcessummit.com................................................................... 113 J & N Tactical • www.jntactical.com.............................................................................................................................................. 155 K9 Cop Magazine • www.k9copmagazine.com...................................................................................................................... 279 Lenco Industries Inc. • www.lencoarmor.com.......................................................................................................................... 13 Lithos Robotics • www.lithosrobotics.com.................................................................................................................................. 307 Longworth - 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70 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

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The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 71

TRAINING REVIEW

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hen can I pull the trigger?” This is the number-one question I’ve received from military and law enforcement personnel over the past 25 years—but the people asking this question don’t mean “trigger” as it pertains to firearms. Instead, they are asking, “When can I put debilitating injury into a perpetrator who is trying to kill me in a closein scenario when my firearm isn’t available?” Defensive tactics (DT), in general, are good at dealing with threats at the lower levels of the force continuum and rules of engagement—up until the operator faces lethal force. From this point forward, most programs fall fatally short. Many DT programs instruct the operator to “do whatever it takes” when it comes to dealing with lethal force challenges and violence at the top end of the force continuum (when the operator’s firearm is inaccessible). At every other level of the force continuum or rules of engagement, the operator is given specific training principles and methods to deal with threats, yet when the operator most desperately needs specific information, he is left hanging. I believe the reasons for this lack of preparation are twofold: A well-placed fear of liability (due primarily to misunderstanding) by most organizations regarding instruction for injuring the human body. A proliferation of combat sports training in defensive tactics and military unarmed

combat programs that does not replicate real-world violence that operators face in the field. Liability fears need to be addressed with legal definitions and accurate explanations

of when delivering injury to the human body is necessary and permitted, as well as by citing legal precedents in which use of injurious force and lethal force was found appropriate. This gives both the organization and operator the data necessary to defend such actions when

72 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

By Tim Larkin

warranted. It also allows them to articulate exactly what steps were taken during the incident that necessitated this response. But what about issues related to combat training? The parameters for DT training (or military unarmed combat training) need to first define the operator’s mission and make sure the training is appropriate for each aspect of his mission. Combat sports training is fantastic for challenging yourself in that it allows you to compete against an opponent in the same weight class who has a similar skill set and fighting ability. To have a proper competition, you need a defined area in which to compete (a ring), agreed-upon conditions (rules), an objective judge of the competition in the ring (a referee), identical armament, and equal initiative. None of these conditions are present in the field for the military or law enforcement operator, however. Moreover, the very characteristic that makes combat sports entertaining and challenging in the ring is the same characteristic that can get an operator killed in the field—that is, in order to turn violence into a game, you must extract strikes that would deliberately cause injury to the human body. Injuries happen in combat sports, but just like injuries that occur in other sports, they are accidents. In fact, any competitor who is found to deliberately injure his or her opponent in the ring will not only be banned from competition, but may face criminal charges.

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Photo courtesy of www.targetfocustraining.com. The tactical operator must be prepared for subjects that are bigger, faster, and stronger than he is; subjects who are carrying any type of weapon; multiple adversaries; unexpected encounters; and the need to fight on when injured. Designing training to face these threats as a baseline does not inhibit scaling down actions to deal with lesser threats in the force continuum. Most training tries to scale up the continuum rather than take the far more effective top-down approach. So, to design training that instructs operators about the proper use of justified lethal force, one must accomplish several objectives. First, the training must outline the legal aspects of injury to the human body as it pertains to the operator who is facing imminent violence to him or herself. Second, the training must focus on injuring the human body in order to break structure or shut down a sensory system. I designed the Target Focus Training course of instruction, Justified Lethal Force, with those two guiding principles in mind. Training is delivered over a three-day period, with approximately 25%

classroom time and 75% physical training. The operator comes away with a clear understanding of human injury and where it applies in the force continuum. This is an area that demands effective direct training methods for several reasons. Human injury is the principle determinant of punishment and liability under the United States legal system for all human-on-human uses of force. An understanding of how the human machine can be injured—and once injured, an understanding of how that injury will alter dynamics between the humans involved— can help anyone navigate the legal waters surrounding a use of force situation. This is true whether defending the use of force as a preventative measure to avoid the costs of future uses of force (e.g., avoiding avoidable situations and thus reducing potential civil liability); considering force as a currently applicable tool (in the face of imminent injury or death); or attempting to retrospectively justify, explain, or understand a particular use of force (e.g., when assisting in your own defense, explaining to seniors why you acted in a

74 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

particular fashion, deciding whether to pursue criminal charges, determining or avoiding civil or criminal liability, and/or granting or denying insurance coverage). Furthermore, an understanding of how to injure the human body, and what happens to that machine once broken, is the most direct path to understanding and explaining the legalities of what generally happens inside any use of force; what is currently happening inside a use of force; what just happened during a use of force; what may need to happen in the future if force is required or discouraged; or what could be changed, based on a past use of force, to minimize civil and criminal liability for potential future uses of force. The severity of injury will determine the scope of, or whether there should even be, civil and/or criminal liability for a violent encounter; a use of force that exceeds delegated authority; or a use of force against another human in the workplace that conflicts with legitimate goals of caring for the injured person. Every operator needs this information when he goes into the field. This course of instruction is a major step toward providing clarity in use of these tools both for survival/operational success and for appropriate/articulable decision making within the force continuum. www.targetfocustraining.com.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr. Larkin is a former military intelligence officer. He is author of the books Survive the Unthinkable: A Complete Guide to Women’s Self Protection and How to Survive the Most Critical Five Seconds of Your Life. Over the past 20 years, he has trained military special operations personnel, law enforcement units, and civilians. He is a member of the Black Belt Hall of Fame.

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From Global to Micro Jihad: Three Trends of Grassroots Terrorism

By Kumar Ramakrishna

security and intelligence agencies worldwide have co-operated to develop generally effective legal, ďŹ nancial, administrative and coercive countermeasures to detect and thwart operations conceived and implemented by organised terrorist networks

The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 77

Synopsis

�ree strategic trends- operational, ideological and technological-underlie the continued metastasis of the extremist ideology of Al Qaedaism. It will evolve further away from the original emphasis on centralised global jihad to a more decentralised micro jihad, which will take the form of grassroots-level small cell and lone wolf terrorism.

Commentary

METASTASIS, in the medical world, is the process by which a cancerous tumor spreads through the bloodstream to distant parts of the body from the original site of occurrence. In similar fashion, as argued by some terrorism scholars, the extremist ideology of Al Qaedaism, a �tumor� or �mutation� of non-violent political Islam, has likewise metastasized. �at is, thanks to the cyber bloodstream of the Internet, the stock �Al Qaeda Central� narrative of a US-led international conspiracy against the Muslim world has di�used worldwide from its original locus in the Afghanistan-Pakistan (AfPak) border region. In this respect, three mutually reinforcing strategic trends can be discerned. �ese points to the continuing transformation of the original centralised global jihad vision of the founding Al Qaeda leadership into a much more decentralised, harder-to-detect, grassroots-driven micro jihad. �ese trends are operational, ideological and technological.

Operational Trends

Operationally, intensi�ed law enforcement and military action against centralised extremist Islamist networks such as Al Qaeda Central in the AfPak region and its a�liates in Southeast Asia such as Jemaah Islamiyah have been very successful in disrupting their organisational cohesion and operations. More than a decade after the September 11 attacks, security and intelligence agencies worldwide have co-operated to develop generally e�ective legal, �nancial, administrative and coercive countermeasures to detect and thwart operations conceived and implemented by organised terrorist networks. �is has made it far more di�cult for surviving Al Qaeda Central leaders to plan and mount spectacular September 11-type operations. On the one hand, forced operational decentralisation due to the hostile security environment post-9/11 has seen the emergence of regional Al Qaeda hubs such as in the Arabian Peninsula, North Africa and Iraq. More signi�cantly, Al Qaeda Central has also had to devolve operational planning for future attacks to harder-to-detect smaller cells and individuals scattered throughout the globe. To be sure, Al Qaeda Central still played a role in training some cells and individuals who were later involved in so-called home grown plots such as the July 2005 London bombings and thwarted bomb attacks in New York City. �e important point however is that apart from the occasional training and moral inspiration provided by Al Qaeda Central, such home grown plots were not centrally planned and directed, but was largely developed by the local cells themselves.

Ideological Trends

Complementing the trend toward operational decentralisation have been ideological developments. In the past decade the Syrian Al Qaedaist ideologue Abu Musab Al-Suri published his well-known tract �e Call for Global Islamic Resistance. Al-Suri argued against reliance on centralised direction from the core Al Qaeda leadership. He was instead in favour of action by independent small cells acting on their own initiative to exploit local opportunities to strike at enemies of the Muslim world wherever they were to be found. Al-Suri's tract found ready audiences worldwide, including in Southeast Asia, where his work was translated into Bahasa Indonesia and has had a discernible impact on the evolution of the micro jihad in that country. Complementing the ideological emphasis on �small is better� has been the call for lone wolf action by organs such as the online English magazine Inspire, the brainchild of the late �bin Laden of the Internet,� Anwar AlAwlaki, who was the chief ideologue for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen. �e ideological focus on lone wolf action has been e�ective - Major Nidal Hassan, who killed US servicemen at Fort Hood in Texas in November 2009, as well as the Tsarnaev brothers who perpetrated the bombings at last month's Boston marathon, were prime examples of individuals who took to heart the stock Awlaki injunction to think globally but act locally. Taken together, the ideological buttressing of small-cell and lone wolf micro jihad, has reinforced the trend toward grassroots-driven terrorism.

78 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

“the ideological buttressing of small-cell and lone wolf micro jihad, has reinforced the trend toward grassrootsdriven terrorism.”

Complemen�ng the ideological emphasis on “small is be�er” has been the call for lone wolf ac�on

Te c h n o l o g i c a l Trends

It is however the third strategic trend of rapid technological innovation that best illumines the past and future evolutionary pathway of micro jihad. Central to this trend is the Internet. Both operational decentralisations of terrorist planning and action, as well as the ideological emphasis on small-cell and lone-wolf activity, rely on the Internet and social networking to function e�ectively. Nidal Hassan's email correspondence with Awlaki was crucial in his radicalisation process, while the Tsarnaev brothers apparently learned about the pressure cooker bombs they used from the AQAP Inspire magazine online. Ominously, Indonesian militants have also translated into Bahasa Indonesia the very same online Inspire edition on bomb making that the Tsarnaevs were said to have used. Moreover the increasing availability of cheap smartphones with highly a�ordable Internet broadband access mean that at-risk individuals globally can surf extremist websites without having to be bound to a desk � and having their sur�ng patterns detected. Finally, a recent technological development is worth �agging� the rapid rise of 3-D printing. .

“ i n c r e a s i n g availability of cheap smartphones with highly affordable Internet broadband access mean that atrisk individuals globally can surf extremist websites without having to be bound to a desk – and having their surﬁng patterns detected.” The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 79

�is is an additive manufacturing process in which a computercontrolled printer is employed to manufacture consumer items such as shoes, jewellery as well as industrial equipment. �e idea behind consumer 3-D printing is straightforward: as the printers become cheaper, instead of buying goods from shops, people will instead simply download designs and print out the items at home. �e problem is that 3-D printing can also enable manufacture of weapons or weapon parts in their homes as well. Just this week a US group called Defense Distributed, led by a self-styled cryptoanarchist law student at the University of Texas, successfully test�red a plastic gun manufactured by a 3-D printer bought for US$8000 from the online auction site Ebay. �e group even plans to make the blueprint for the plastic gun available online.

"successfully testﬁred a plastic gun manufactured by a 3-D printer”

One US Congressman, Steve Israel has warned that once the technology improves and costs begin to fall, 3-Dprinted weapons and parts could well fall into the hands of lone wolves. Technological analysts such as Sebastian Anthony point out that at the moment consumer 3-D printing works most e�ectively with plastic materials. It is when metal 3-D printing becomes more feasible and cost-e�ective, though, that he warns that: �the world will really change.� It cannot be overstated that the strategic con�uence of these three historic trends - the operational, ideological and technologicalpoints clearly to the continuing metastasis of the tumor of Al Qaedaism and the decisive shift towards grassroots-driven micro jihad. E�ectively coping with this emerging, complex phenomenon demands that a stove-piped approach to national security be discarded as obsolete and even hazardous. Instead, the only way forward is to create a vibrant community of practice e�ectively bringing together local and international multidisciplinary expertise, encompassing law enforcement and homeland security professionals, public and private sector technologists and academics.

Kumar Ramakrishna is Associate Professor and Head of the Centre of Excellence for National Security at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University.

80 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

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A Face among the Crowd: Proﬁling the Man behind the Foiled Plot to Attack Myanmar's Embassy in Jakarta

By Rohan Gunaratna

The foiled a�empt to a�ack the Myanmar embassy in Jakarta highlights the con�nued deficiencies in Indonesia's counterterrorism strategies and reinforces the need for significant investments in countering radicaliza�on and extremism. Special Detachment 88, the counterterrorism unit of the Indonesian police, prevented an a�ack against the Embassy of Myanmar in Jakarta, Indonesia that was to have taken place on 3 May 2013. At 9pm on Thursday, 2 May 2013, Indonesian police arrested Sefariano (29), the bomb‐maker of the cell behind the plot to a�ack the Myanmar embassy. Sefariano was traveling on a motorcycle with another member of the cell, Ovi, when he was arrested at Sudirman Street in Central Jakarta. The two men were on their way to meet the other members of the cell – Sigit and Tio – at Bundaran Hotel Indonesia in Central Jakarta. At the �me of their arrest, Sefariano and Ovi were carrying five pipe bombs in a black backpack that were to be used to a�ack the Myanmar embassy the following day. The backpack was to be transferred to Sigit and Tio who were responsible for placing it at the embassy. The detona�on of the bombs in the backpack was planned for around 1pm, which was a�er Friday prayers but prior to a demonstra�on scheduled to take place outside the embassy on that day. Though the cell responsible for planning the a�ack on the Myanmar embassy had no name, Sefariano said in his debriefing by Special Detachment 88 that he had planned to name it Toifah Al Mansyuroh (“The Victorious Group”/”The Ones Who Gain Support”). However, the other members – Sigit, Ovi and Tio – were not aware of this. Sefariano also claimed that the cell had not yet appointed an amir (leader) because it was s�ll rela�vely newly formed. The members of the cell all met in cyber space and had �es to mul�ple violent, radical and extremist organiza�ons.

82 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

“The members met in cyber s �es to mul� radical and organiza�ons�”

s of the cell all space and had �ple violent, d extremist �”

Radicaliza�on of Sefariano

Born in Serang, a city located in western Java, Sefariano grew up with five adopted brothers and sisters. He is married with a one year old child. Sefariano was educated at Islamic schools from 1989 to 1997 and at a technical voca�onal school from 1997 to 2000. Subsequently, he worked as a mechanic and ran a mineral water refilling business from 2010 to 2013. He had no previous record of engaging in crime or terrorism. Sefariano's radicaliza�on began in 2006 when he regularly a�ended a series of public religious study sessions that mo�vated him to wage armed jihad in Pales�ne. In his debriefing he said that “In 2008, during a war in Pales�ne (the 2008 Gaza War), I had a strong desire to join with jihad jamaah (community) to go to Pales�ne as a member of laskar (paramilitary) to fight against Israel. Therefore, I registered to join the laskar with Front Pembela Islam (FPI) [in] Petamburan, Central Jakarta. However because at that �me the laskar could not go, then I deepened my religious knowledge and looked for informa�on on Pales�ne.” In 2008, Sefariano joined Forum Umat Islam (FUI: Islamic Community Forum) located in At Taqwa mosque, Tanah Abang, Central Jakarta. FUI is a coali�on of both radical and mainstream Indonesian Muslim organiza�ons. Sefariano's membership of this organiza�on exposed him to an environment where the gradual radicaliza�on of his views took place. He o�en par�cipated in religious study sessions at the At Taqwa mosque held four �mes a week. These religious study sessions – hosted by Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) preachers – presented jihad as fardhu 'ain – an individual obliga�on of every able Muslim to wage war against their enemies. Jihad was to be conducted physically and spiritually to fight the “infidels” (non‐Muslims) and those commi�ng thoghut (a great transgression or disobedience towards Islam and it values). Par�cipants of the sessions were also referred to as firqotun najiyah (those who have remained true to Islam and will be saved by God). This concept was used to make par�cipants feel part of an exclusive group designated by God to serve and protect Islam. Firqotun najiyah has been exploited by radicals and extremists to declare what they believe to be the “superior” extent of their piety. The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 83

Sefariano rose through the ranks of FUI, which is led by Muhammad Al Khathat. Serving under Amir Askary (leader of the military division) Ciway alias Ikhwan, a security officer in an office located in Kalideres in West Jakarta, Sefariano was appointed Vice Askary. To indoctrinate the members of the military division, lectures were delivered on the concept of amar makruf nahi munkar (commanding right and forbidding wrong). This Islamic concept was misinterpreted to show that jihad is one of the commands that is right and must be fulfilled to eliminate evil on earth. As JAT shared the venue of At Taqwa mosque with FUI, the two organiza�ons o�en conducted ac�vi�es together. In 2010, Sefariano joined the Tanah Abang branch of JAT in Central Jakarta led by Ustaz Jamal. It was in a JAT‐run study session that Sefariano a�ended where Ustaz Ainur Rofiq (head of the Jakarta branch of JAT) spoke of members of the jamaah forming toifah (small groups) aimed at conduc�ng amaliyah (opera�ons). Hence the forma�on of toifah would not involve the community but a select group of commi�ed individuals. A�er handpicking the most commi�ed, an exclusive taklim (religious study session) was conducted where the focus would be on jihad as fardhu 'ain. Besides this, other physical ac�vi�es were conducted for this small group. A morning run was held every Sunday from Monas (Central Jakarta) to Blok M (South Jakarta). Hiking and outdoor camping trips were organized once in three months while self‐defense sports were conducted once a week at the At Taqwa mosque. In 2011, Sefariano came into contact with the leadership of JAT and its associated groups opera�ng from within and outside prison. He a�ended several religious study sessions conducted by the JAT leader Ustaz Abu Bakar Baasyir throughout 2010. A�er Baasyir was arrested, Sefariano visited him at Police Central Headquarters by establishing contact with his secretary Hasyim. Baasyir gave Sefariano tausiyah (religious advice). In par�cular, he discussed the concept of tauhid (oneness of God) and told Sefariano that democracy is against tauhid, stressing the importance of upholding Shariah (Islamic law). Sefariano also visited Ustaz Aman Abdulrahman at Salemba Peniten�ary to receive tausiyah. Ustaz Aman is closely associated with the wri�ngs of Abu Mohamed al Maqdisi of Jordan. Al Maqdisi's disciples include Abu Musab al‐ Zarqawi, the former leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq.

84 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

“To indoctrinate the me militar y division, le delivered on the conc makruf nahi munkar (com and forbidding wrong) concept was misinterpr that jihad is one of the com right and must be fulﬁlle evil on earth.”

embers of the ectures were cept of amar mmanding right ). This Islamic reted to show mmands that is ed to eliminate

Sefariano also visited other radical ideologues including Ustaz Abdullah Sonata, the founder of Mujahidin KOMPAK and Bintang Yuliardi in Cipinang Peniten�ary.

Sefariano's Transi�on to Violence

In early 2012, Sefariano expressed his desire to conduct an amaliyah on the “jihad ba�lefield.” Sefariano said that he “studied bomb making from the internet… I know the website from a Facebook friend named Siro Kosmos.” A�er Sefariano learnt the art of making a bomb on the Internet, he started to gradually purchase the precursors from a chemical store. Sefariano then contacted friends in JAT and offered to share his knowledge of bomb‐ making. Three individuals – Nasir, Ahmad and Izul – responded to his offer and Sefariano conducted a “lesson” for them in a rented shop house. In August 2012, Sefariano came to know an individual named Saeful, a member of Negara Islam Indonesia (NII: Islamic State of Indonesia) through Facebook. Saeful, who belonged to the NII Kebumen‐Cilacap branch of Central Java, was in contact with other NII members via Facebook, among them Imam, Siro, Ovi, Tio and Sigit. NII is an outlawed movement seeking to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia under the rule of Shariah that splintered into various fac�ons and networks. Sefariano met Saeful twice – once in December 2012 with Imam and the second �me in January 2013 where he also was introduced to Ovi and Siro. The mee�ng in January 2013 took place at Al Ikhwan mosque in Tanah Abang, where Sefariano, Saeful, Ovi and Siro discussed moun�ng an a�ack. Saeful was not in favor of conduc�ng the a�ack under the NII banner and instead wanted to form a toifah for the purpose of carrying out an a�ack. The group agreed to receive bomb making training skills from Sefariano. Subsequently, Sigit arrived at Tanah Abang and joined the group. As Sigit's house in Pamulang was vacant, Sefariano conducted the training in bomb‐ making there. Pamulang is a sub‐district in the city of South Tangerang which is part of the Greater Jakarta metropolitan area.

Planning and Preparing the Embassy A�ack

In April 2013, the discussion of developments in Myanmar among radicals reached a new high on Facebook. Sigit posted news on the persecu�on of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar which encouraged like‐minded friends of his to do the same. Sefariano recalled that on Saturday, 13 April 2013 at around 11pm, the cell met at Sigit's rented house in Pamulang. At this mee�ng, Sigit called for an amaliyah on the Myanmar embassy to retaliate against what he claimed was the genocidal repression of Muslims commi�ed by Buddhists. Furthermore, Sigit suggested �ming the a�ack with the FUI demonstra�on scheduled to take place outside the embassy.

The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 85

On Wednesday, 1 May 2013, Sefariano met Sigit and Tio to prepare the ingredients for the bombs they would use in the a�ack they had planned against the Myanmar embassy. Prior to this mee�ng, Sigit and Tio had purchased ingredients to make bombs which were brought to Sefariano's rented house at Jalan Bangka 2F near the At Taqwa mosque. The next day, Sefariano purchased piping and prepared ﬁve linked bombs. He was unable to purchase an alarm clock to use as a �mer and asked Sigit to purchase it instead.

“It is now well radicaliza�on create the mil militant jihadis

At around 8pm, Sefariano and Ovi placed the five bombs into a black backpack. In his debriefing, Sefariano recounted that he “had set the five bombs into one and it was ready to explode, just needed to be connected with a �mer, which was an alarm clock.” Sefariano and Ovi then proceeded to Bundaran Hotel Indonesia by motorcycle. They passed the Central Police Headquarters, Al Azhar School and came up to the traffic light at Senayan in South Jakarta. As Sefariano turned right and con�nued towards the Semanggi underpass, police made their arrest near the BRI building.

Implica�ons

Despite significant investments in opera�onal counterterrorism, the need to devise appropriate strategies to counter radicaliza�on remains. It is now well established that radicaliza�on and extremism create the milieu from which militant jihadists can emerge. The Internet, in par�cular, con�nues to pose a dilemma since taking down radical websites is not a solu�on and in fact disrupts efforts to gather intelligence on individuals that may poten�ally become radicalized. Furthermore, the morphing of the terrorist threat into new networks and cells such as the one that Sefariano formed highlights the enormity of the task at hand for counterterrorist intelligence agencies. Radicals and extremists not only have mul�ple organiza�onal affilia�ons, but these affilia�ons are also constantly changing with the ease of communica�on facilitated by the Internet. The con�nued misappropria�on of Islamic concepts by radical clerics is s�ll a formidable obstacle for counter‐ideology efforts. The fact remains that extremists have a far greater capacity to spread their interpreta�on of Islam. This is further complicated by the complex interac�on between radical and mainstream organiza�ons which effec�vely highlights the need to remain beyond a binary classifica�on of “us” and “them.” The cri�cs of Special Detachment 88 who wish to disband it over allega�ons of human rights viola�ons must open up to the vital role that the unit plays in preven�on of a�acks. The neutraliza�on and arrest of terrorist suspects will con�nue to remain an important tac�c in Indonesia's overall counterterrorism strategy. However, efforts must be made to highlight incidents such as the successful disrup�on of the a�ack on the Myanmar embassy to counter the campaign to disband Special Detachment 88.

86 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

“The neutraliza� will con�nue t Indonesia's over

established that and extremism lieu from which sts can emerge.”

“Radicals and extremists not only have mul�ple organiza�onal aﬃlia�ons� but these aﬃlia�ons are also constantly changing with the ease of communica�on facilitated by the Internet.”

�on and arrest of terrorist suspects to remain an important tac�c in rall counterterrorism strategy.”

Rohan Gunaratna is Head, ICPVTR and Professor of Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 87

Maritime Terrorism By Malaravan Ron

in Asian waters

The Strait of Malacca is par�cularl� prone to pirate a�acks as one of the most important and strategic passages for mari�me trade between Europe and East Asia. It supports 50 percent of the world's oil shipments, including 80 percent of petroleum imports

The tac�cs of mari�me terrorists depend on the type of vessel which is a�acked, the value of the target, the security system of a port, the mo�ves and opera�onal experience of the terrorist group, etc. The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 89

Coastal States have a responsibility to adopt and implement best security management prac�ces when opera�ng in areas with high level of probable terrorist groups or prone to sea a�acks or hijacks for ransom.

Mari�me terrorism was at its peak in 2004, however with government and private mari�me security company's interven�on, a�ack rates have fallen significantly over the years. UNCLO (United Na�ons Conven�on of the Laws of the Sea) spokesperson has men�oned that Piracy poses a serious threat to the economies of all na�ons, as 80 percent of the volume of global trade is seaborne, represen�ng 70 percent of its value, and it is expected to increase by 36 percent by 2020. The Strait of Malacca is par�cularly prone to pirate a�acks as one of the most important and strategic passages for mari�me trade between Europe and East Asia. It supports 50 percent of the world's oil shipments, including 80 percent of petroleum imports to Japan, Republic of Korea, China, Taiwan and other far East na�ons. Piracy in Malacca Straits, Indonesian Archipelagos, Philippine's Mindanao Islands, poses a serious threat to the safety and security of seafarers and fishermen, whose means of livelihood directly depend on their ability to access specific mari�me spaces and routes. Southeast Asian waters, and the many islands in this region are no excep�on. Poli�cal stability and military might of South East Asian countries tend to be the primary deterrence against Mari�me terror. Reportedly, the Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP) is comprised of the Malacca Straits Sea Patrol (MSSP), 90 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

the “Eyes‐in‐the‐Sky” (EiS) air patrols, and the Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG), which are a set of prac�cal coopera�ve security measures undertaken by the four li�oral States, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, to ensure the security of the Strait of Malacca. The Interna�onal Mari�me Bureau (IMB) aware of the escala�ng level of this criminal ac�vity decided to provide a free service to the seafarers and established the 24 hour IMB Piracy Repor�ng Centre (PRC) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Although reported incidents of piracy in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore saw a 50 percent decrease between the first half of 2011 and the first half of 2012, coastal states as well as ship owners should not become complacent. They also have to educate transi�ng merchant ships on their local fishing prac�ces and procedures in order to reduce instances of transgression of fishing gear, as well as incidents where merchant ships mistake fishing vessels for pirates. Incidents of piracy will only consistently decrease if these issues are tackled simultaneously. The I M B has been upda�ng the mari�me community regularly on reported cases such as below. Indonesia: Tanjung Priok – Jakarta / Dumai, Belawan, Taboneo, Muara Jawa waters.

Mari�me terror is not going to end any�me soon. Experts have cited that large number of a�acks had been foiled in recent months by naval ac�on or private armed guards onboard ships

Pirates/Robbers normally a�ack vessel during the night. When spo�ed and alarm sounded, pirates/robbers usually abort the a�empted a�ack. A�acks in Dumai remain a concern. Malacca Straits: Although the number of a�acks has dropped substan�ally due to the increase and aggressive patrols by the li�oral states authori�es since July 2005, ships are advised to con�nue maintaining strict an� piracy watches when transi�ng the straits. Currently, there are no indica�ons as to how long these patrols will con�nue or reduce. Singapore Straits: Vessels are advised to remain vigilant and to con�nue maintaining adequate an� piracy watch and measures. Pirates/Robbers a�ack ships while underway or while anchored at the Straits. South China Sea: Although, no a�acks reported recently in the vicinity oﬀ Anambas / Natuna / Mangkai islands / Subi Besar / Merundung area, vessels are advised to remain vigilant.

analysis of modern mari�me terrorism reveals a pa�ern – a�acks at sea are carried out primarily in developing na�ons� about �0 percent of the a�acks in the last 5 years. Updated on 31 August 2013:

Worldwide Incidents 2013: 176 reported incidents including 10 hijackings. Somali related incidents 2013: Ten reported incidents including two hijacking. Current crew / vessels held by Somali pirates: hostages ‐ 57 Nigeria related incidents 2013: 28 reported incidents including two hijacking. The analysis of modern mari�me terrorism reveals a pa�ern – a�acks at sea are carried out primarily in developing na�ons; about 90 percent of the a�acks in the last 5 years. Southeast na�ons have iden��ed certain religiously inclined terror and criminal groups. Dras�c governmental reac�on against the threat of terrorist and pirate a�acks could lead to the libera�on of na�ons from the grip of such organized crime. However this takes much �me. Accurate intelligence report from various governmental agencies help to divide mari�me terrorist a�acks into two categories: A�acks against vessels on the sea; A�acks against vessels in ports and at anchor, For example, terrorists o�en a�ack merchant vessels. Fast boats/ skiﬀs are used both at high sea and near the coast with a 'Mother vessel' to support logis�cs. In well protected ports, terrorists usually concentrate their eﬀorts only in one direc�on; it is possible though that terrorist choose to a�ack simultaneously from the sea and from the coast. The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014 91

According to IMB, three types of terror a�ack at sea can be iden�fied� The first type of a�ack is carried out by small organized criminal groups. They use slower boats and target vessels at anchorages or ports with li�le or no security measures. The pirates determine the possibility that there is valuable cargo on board and suscep�bility of the target to a�ack. A�er embarking the vessel, the a�ackers' goals are money in the ship's safe, valuable private possessions of the crewmembers or ship inventory. Expropriated possessions are transferred to pirate's fast boats. Usually, the dura�on of such an a�ack is between 30 and 40 minutes. The a�ackers o�en use violence; as a result crew members may be wounded and even killed. These type of a�ack commonly occur in the Southeast Asian na�ons out in their coastal waters and ports especially in Indonesia, Philippines and west coasts of India. The second type of a�ack includes kidnapping and Ransom. With high speed chases, the pirates move in on poten�al slow moving tankers or bulk carriers. They also observe for the presence of Armed Security on board. A�acked crews have been killed or le� to the mercy of fate in safe boats. Pirates then contact the vessel owners for ransom which can be around USD 10 million. For example, in September 2005, pirates from Somalia captured three cargo ships of the Kenyan shipping agency “Motacu” transpor�ng U N humanitarian aid for the popula�on. O�en pirates request ransom for ships, their crews and the cargo. Such a�acks are well‐ resourced, the pirates are determined and relentless. Hijacks of vessels o�en happened in coastal waters, most commonly in Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, the Persian Gulf and off the Somalia coast. The third type of a�ack is typical for the Gulf of Guniea, Nigeria. These a�acks are brutally carried out by representa�ves of local an� government radical groups with no regards for human lives. A�acks are poli�cally mo�vated. These groups have killed many Nigerian naval persons during piracy interven�on. These pirates daringly take on the fights against military forces. They are also heavily armed with weapons such as .50 caliber heavy guns mounted on their fast cra�s. Pirates kidnap members of the crew and seek ransom for their release. It is reported that many seafarers are killed over delays of ransom monies. Mari�me terror has been on the downside in Southeast Asia, this is mainly due to the combine vigilance of the Southeastern states. There is another growing terror ac�vity in Philippine Islands. The Bri�sh and Australian governments have given travel warning to its ci�zens who travel to Philippines since August 2013. 92 The Counter Terrorist ~ December 2013/January 2014

My predic�on; piracy in Southeast Asia is will start to rise again with newer tac�cs and smarter sea raiders. Governments will have to re‐look into the opera�ng support norms as pirates evolve against the deterrence. Terror ac�vists are on the rampage on the Boro and Mindano Islands it reported. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) advise against all travel to south‐west Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago because of on‐going terrorist ac�vity and clashes between the military and insurgent groups. There have been reports on Ferries and other land transports. Australia recently cau�oned its na�onals in the Philippines against a possible new terrorist threat and also advised them to take precau�ons. Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade cited "credible reports" on terrorism. "We con�nue to strongly advise you not to travel to Central and Western Mindanao, including the Zamboanga Peninsula and Sulu Archipelago, due to the very high threat of terrorist a�ack, kidnapping, violent crime and violent clashes between armed groups," it said. Currently Indonesia has the highest piracy reports with 25 incidents out of 66 worldwide in the first quarter of 2013, according to the Piracy Repor�ng Centre. The Philippine government is struggling to keep up its pace with the terror cells due to the dispersion over many islands. In conclusion, Mari�me terror is not going to end any�me soon. Experts have cited that large number of a�acks had been foiled in recent months by naval ac�on or private armed guards onboard ships and the number of ships being held by pirates each week seem to decrease there is no clear indica�on that this is sure to stay or it may increase as the uncertain�es are unpredictable and only deterrent measures speak in favour of stopping such a�acks. My predic�on; piracy in Southeast Asia is will start to rise again with newer tac�cs and smarter sea raiders. Governments will have to re‐look into the opera�ng support norms as pirates evolve against the deterrence. Intelligence report is another crucial component to support war against terrorism. With accurate and �mely reports many lives and proper�es could be saved.

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