The Counter Terrorist Magazine Asia Pacific issue February March 2015 by The Counter Terrorist Asia Pacific Edition

K hob a r To w e r s • COIN at Ho me • AQI to ISIS • R adiologic al Di spersal De vices

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals

february/march 2015

Volume 8 • Number 2

Je Suis

Charlie “ Never give in. never give in. never. never.” —Winston Churchill

Asia pacific

EDITION An SSI Publication ®

FEBRUARY/MARCH 2015 USA/CANADA $5.99

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Counter

The Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals february/march 2015 Volume 8 • Number 2

COVER story: 32

islamist Terrorism in Canada By Dean T. Olson

FEATURES:

contents

Firsthand: Countering the Insurgency at Home By Nick Perna

Case Study: Khobar Towers: One More Iranian Attack By Walter Purdy

THE METAMORPHOSIS FROM AQI TO THE ISLAMIC 46 STATE OF IRAQ (2006–2011)

By Malcolm Nance

63 57

Radiological Dispersal Devices for Jihad By Al Venter

WHEN THE SAFE RETURN OF HOSTAGES IS NO LONGER TAKEN FOR GRANTED: TERRORISM AND ATROCITIES AGAINST HOSTAGES IN NIGERIA By Samuel Oyewole

Alternative Perspectives on the Radicalization of Home-grown and “Leaderless” Terrorists By Vikram Rajakumar

Batten down the Hatches for IS in Indonesia Rakyan Adibrata By Rakyan Adibrata

departments: 06

Cover Photo: Illustration by Scott Morrison

From the Editor For the Kyles:

44 Book Review: Guilty Knowledge: What the US Government Knows About

the Vulnerability of the Electric Grid, But Refuses to Fix

Innovative Products

CONVOSEC App, Phantom Warrior MT, Obama’s Blaster

Training Review NSIC Institute Founders Class The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015 5

Counter The

From The Editor:

For the Kyles:

By Chris Graham Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals

n April of 2004 I was a FAC/JTAC on my second Iraq tour spending days (and more importantly, nights,) moving between urban hides in southeast Fallujah with a radioman and a highly skilled sniper team* hunting savages with AC130, .50, 7.62 and 5.56 fire. At the same time, Chris Kyle was doing similar in the northwest of Fallujah; steadily diminishing the ranks of our enemies, day-by-day, and tour-after-tour. Eventually Chris would be identified as the most successful American sniper in history. In 2013, I attended my first SHOT show with Dan O., a SEAL friend. Not having been there before, I followed his lead. Just as Marines have our own “mafias”, the SEALs do too, and travelling with Dan I was exposed to theirs. It was with this group that I met Chris Kyle. His teammates good-naturedly demanded he give them the backstory to a well-known public controversy he had knowledge of and he did. We were introduced and briefly discussed some common experiences and highlights of projects we were both involved in. About a week later I was driving and heard on the radio that Chris Kyle and Chad Littlefield had been killed by a mentally disturbed veteran they were trying to help. I pulled off the road and cried for him, just as I had done for each Marine we lost. My recollection of Chris was a humorous, humble, sincere guy. He would have fit in on any American team and, I am certain, you would have recognized him as one of your own. Unfortunately, Chris is not the only brother lost. Sadly, each has his own, equally tragic story. The loss of Chris Kyle and each of our warrior brothers scars America forever. God bless Clint Eastwood for having the balls to make American Sniper, a movie in which a heroic American is accurately portrayed as a hero, savages are unapologetically identified as savages and the public can see (with uncommon realism) the current fight between evil and good that will determine the fate of the world. Please visit www.chriskylefrogfoundation.org when you have a free moment.

Semper Fidelis,

Chris Graham Editor, The Counter Terrorist www.chrisgrahamauthor.com *Eric P., Soucy and Sgt. E.

Volume 8 • Number 2

february/march 2015 Editor Chris Graham Director of Operations Sol Bradman Director of Advertizing Carmen Arnaes Production Assistants Giselle Manassa Melissa Berne Contributing Editors Kevin Freeman Jennifer Hesterman Richard Marquise Tom Nypaver Dean Olson Steve Young Asia pacific edition Director of Operation Yaniv peretz Graphic Design Morrison Creative Company Copy Editor Laura Town Advertising Sales Maria Efremova Maria@loringlobal.com +65 90266571 Publisher: Security Solutions International 13155 SW 134th St. • STE 103 Miami, Florida 33186

ISSN 1941-8639 The Counter Terrorist Magazine, Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals is published by Security Solutions International LLC, as a service to the nation’s First Responders and Homeland Security Professionals with the aim of deepening understanding of issues related to Terrorism. No part of the publication can be reproduced without permission from the publisher. The opinions expressed herein are the opinions of the authors represented and not necessarily the opinions of the publisher. Please direct all Editorial correspondence related to the magazine to: Security Solutions International SSI, 13155 SW 134th Street, Suite 103, Miami, Florida. 33186 or info@thecounterterroristmag.com The subscription price for 6 issues is $34.99 and the price of the magazine is $5.99. (1-866-573-3999) Fax: 1-786-573-2090. For article reprints, e-prints, posters and plaques please contact:

PARS International Corp. Web: www.magreprints.com/quickquote.asp Email: reprints@parsintl.com Phone: 212-221-9595 • Fax: 212-221-9195

Please visit the magazine web site where you can also contact the editorial staff:

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Firsthand:

Countering the Insurgency at Home

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Photos courtesy of the author.

By Nick Perna

In 2011, I was assigned to head up a gang suppression team for my department. The team was formed in response to an increase in violent crimes such as homicide, shootings, assaults, and the like.

ur marching orders were simple: decrease the level of violence and get the gang problem under control. We were a “surge” of sorts, a three-man team that augmented an existing five man street crimes team. We organized our schedules to provide coverage seven days a week. My team got the not-sohighly sought after “Sunday through Wednesday” schedule. We were given pretty wide latitude regarding how to deal with the problem and the full support of our administration. Our hours were constantly changing to keep the criminals off-guard. We did a lot of work in lowprofile operations in unmarked cars and civilian clothes. We intermingled with higher profile operations like the

Police officers in front of gang graffiti.

Street Crimes team, department patrol teams, and a County Gang Task Force, thus integrating unconventional with conventional assets. Like any good tactical unit, we gathered information regarding the

enemy (gang) activity. We identified certain areas where gang members, our version of insurgents, were congregating and consolidating. These neighborhoods were essentially hostage to this activity. To borrow a term from the Vietnam-

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015 9

A successful drug bust with money seizure from a gang member.

era counterinsurgency, we came up with a plan to “deny sanctuary” for the gangsters. We did this by conducting a zero tolerance approach to all criminal activity within those areas. I referred to this as “death by a thousand cuts.” This was the offensive phase of our COIN operation. We used a series of low profile surveillance missions to identify the main players, then armed with that information, went after them in their neighborhoods as well as anywhere else we could find them. We built cases on the major players for felonies and went after all the rest for everything from warrant arrests to minor infractions such as open container violations. This “area denial” approach succeeded in getting most of the gangsters to leave the area. In a year we arrested 192 subjects, most for gang violations. Whenever possible, we booked them into jail or juvenile hall. We worked many major cases, going after the major players committing and ordering assaults, as well as drug dealers.

Operation Red Dawn

Zero tolerance towards criminal activity in the offensive phase.

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In an attempt to go after the “worst of the worst,” we launched Operation Red Dawn. We utilized a confidential informant who targeted gang members dealing drugs. The operation involved assets from our team, our department’s Street Crimes Team, the county Narcotics Task Force, the District Attorney’s Office, and others. Arrest and Search warrants were secured for eight of the major figures in the gang. These warrants were executed in a high profile operation involving our SWAT team and other tactical teams. By identifying and going after what the military would classify as High Value Targets (HVTs), we were able to inhibit the gang’s command and control structure and significantly affect their day-to-day operations. This also decreased the number of gang-related drug sales and weakened the gang’s control over the areas they claimed as their turf. The whole

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The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015 11 10/21/13 9:52 AM

Street crimes detectives providing a high visibility presence in a gang area.

Gang affiliated targets of Operation Red Dawn.

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thing was supported by an information operations campaign in which the media was involved. This was done through press releases that were published in local newspapers and on social media. All eight suspects were convicted or pled to charges and received stiff sentences due to Californiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s laws regarding crimes committed as part of a gang conspiracy. This was followed by the defense phase. This basically involved high visibility presence patrols by all officers in the area. We did this to retain the ground we gained. Just like in combat, when you abandon an area, the enemy will move back in, regardless of how decisively you defeated them there. The stability phase for an operation like this can be difficult. Stability, in law enforcement terms, roughly translates to

citizens getting involved in the safety and security of their neighborhood. Unlike military COIN, it doesn’t involve the complete withdrawal of “combat forces.” Instead, it entails a partnership between the people who live in a particular area and the cops who are paid to protect it. To a certain extent, it might be easier on the law enforcement side since we’re technically not going anywhere, but most agencies are stretched pretty thin, so once a neighborhood has quieted down, the attention turns to another area. This means it is essential for the people who live in those neighborhoods to get involved in keeping the peace. For us, that meant reaching out by way of town hall meetings, citizen’s academies and social media, interfacing with the public, and identifying key communicators. Symbolism is important in a COIN campaign in the defense and stability phases, whether it be getting rid of reminders from the previous regime or not allowing gang graffiti to remain in an area. Either one can undermine a successful operation. One way to best facilitate this is to identify key communicators in a certain area. As a psychological operations officer in Baghdad, Iraq in 2003, I tried to communicate with district elders whenever possible. This was done in part as a sign of respect to their status in the community. It also facilitated quicker, more efficient communications. A message delivered from a respected member of a community can be more effective than a message delivered through radio, television, handbills, leaflet drops, and loudspeaker operations (traditional forms of dissemination used by Army Psychological Operations). This is a double edged sword and care must be taken not to legitimize thugs or create the impression (or worse, reality) of something other than equal treatment of all citizens. In the town where I work, we had a Polynesian street gang that was causing

Symbolism is important in a COIN campaign in the defense and stability phases, whether it be getting rid of reminders from the previous regime or not allowing gang graffiti to remain in an area. Either one can undermine a successful operation.

major problems, mainly in the form of committing street robberies and violent assaults. The members of the gang were very anti-police and difficult to deal with. One of our officers opted to speak with the father of a particularly large

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015 13

Author in Baghdad speaking with Sunni elders in 2003.

family that had many members in the gang. The patriarch in question was a well-known and well-respected member of the local Polynesian community. When problems arose with the younger family members, the “elder” would be consulted. On many occasions, he was able to intervene on behalf of the police and get the members of not only his family but members of other families to decrease the amount of violence. Another example of this is in Ramadi, Iraq in 2006. Ramadi had traditionally been a bastion of anti-coalition activity since the start of U.S. involvement there. U.S. commanders met with influential Sunni Sheiks who were opposed to the insurgency. These sheiks were able to rally forces to support U.S. forces in routing much of the insurgent activity.

RAMADI, Iraq (Feb. 18, 2005) – U.S. Marines assigned to 1st Marine Division, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, on a foot patrol in Ramadi, Iraq, Feb. 18, 2005. Photo by: Shane T. McCoy

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In both cases, we need to go into battle with a sword in one hand and an olive branch in the other.

Prior to forming the partnership with Coalition forces, these Sunni Sheiks had been fighting against the United States and her allies. Two ways the military delivers messages: HMMWVs with loudspeakers and face-to-face communications. Law enforcement relies primarily on face-toface, with social media playing an integral part as well. Stability operations in law enforcement are often led by community policing units, the civil affairs of the cop world. They conduct town meetings, “sensing” sessions, neighborhood watch programs, citizen’s academies, block parties and all the other events designed to involve and engage the community. But they can’t do everything. All officers need to interact with the public, engage them in conversation, and try to address their needs. Just like the military, we don’t want to be seen as occupiers. We prefer to be seen as liberators and defenders. Counter insurgency, both at home

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and abroad, is a difficult task. In both cases, we need to go into battle with a sword in one hand and an olive branch in the other. We walk the fine line between not doing enough and allowing evil to spread or doing too much and provoking a population that could be our greatest ally. The U.S. military’s manual on COIN, FM 3-24, states, “The more force used, the less effective it is.” This is especially true in the defense and stability phases. It is an art based on knowing when and where to crank it up, followed by the proper time to throttle it back, that ultimately determines whether or not it will be a successful campaign. The adjacent world must be taken into account. On both fronts, adversaries often step beyond the edges of the operation to return at a time of greater advantage. Warfare sometimes resembles police work, and vice versa. Fixed battles between conventional forces are rare if the attacker does not have an advantage.

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Lines are often blurred. Cops and soldiers can learn a lot from each other about how to conduct business, even while honoring and abiding by the Constitution. Comparisons can be drawn and lessons can be learned when it comes to how we handle our business when operating in less than permissive environments. For the military, this is working in towns, villages, and cities with a mix of pro-Coalition residents, anti-American fundamentalist insurgents, and folks just plain caught in the middle. In terms of law enforcement, the ghettos and hoods of America bear some similarities. I use ghettos as an example because they offer a similar brand of danger and violence as places such as Afghanistan and Iraq, albeit not generally on the same scale. COIN has been around for as long as warfare has been conducted. Successes and failures can be studied in recent examples from places like Malaya with the British in the 1950s and later with Americans in Vietnam. It has been used extensively in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. It has many facets, but at a minimum it involves the following: A) Taking the fight to the enemy and destroying his will to fight. B) Denying the enemy support and sanctuary by accomplishing (A). C) Winning the support of the local populace. D) Maintaining it (C). Itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s a little different in law enforcement. When it comes to fighting crime itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s impossible to completely eliminate crime from a particular area, but the basic tenets remain similar.

Two ways the military delivers messages: HMMWVs with loudspeakers and face-to-face communications. Law enforcement relies primarily on face-to-face, with social media playing an integral part as well.

â&#x20AC;˘

about the authors Mr. Perna is a Police Officer with the Redwood City Police Department. He has served as a gang and narcotics investigator, is a member of a MultiJurisdictional SWAT Team, and is currently a team leader. He previously served in the U.S. Army (Airborne) and is a veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

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Case Study:

Khobar Towers:

One More Iranian Attack â&#x20AC;&#x153;Iranian intelligence officers began to surveil American facilities around the world, and it was clear to us from the intelligence that they planned to attack us. And they did. Iranian intelligence, working with Saudi Hezbollah, blew up the American Air Force facility at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia.â&#x20AC;? -Richard Clarke1

U.S. and Saudi military personnel survey the damage to Khobar Towers caused by the explosion of a fuel truck outside the northern fence of the facility on King Abdul Aziz Air Base near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, at 2:55 p.m. EDT, Tuesday, June 25, 1996. Several buildings were damaged and there were numerous U.S. casualties. Photo by: DoD 18 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015

By Walter Purdy

Iran has been waging a war against the United States since 1979. On February 1, 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran after being exiled for 15 years. On November 4, 1979, Iranians stormed the U.S. Embassy in Teheran, seizing American hostages and marking the 15th anniversary of when Khomeini had been exiled.

ith the Iranian Revolution in full force, the Khomeini government began exporting the Revolution and setting up proxies to fight the enemies of the Revolution and support Shi’as worldwide. One of the first opportunities came about

with the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 by the Israeli Army. Hizbullah, “the Party of God,” was created by Shiite Muslim clerics in Lebanon and financed by Iran. Lebanon, after years of civil war, faced a new threat directed from outside. This new threat was clearly identified in

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015 19

This image appeared in the report The Khobar Towers Bombing Incident, issued August 14, 1996 by the US House of Representatives National Security Committee, chaired by Representative Floyd D. Spence. Photo by: Ydorb

Hijaz (Saudi Hizbullah), which operated in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. “From its inception in 1987, Hizbullah alHijaz was a cleric-based group aligned with Iran, modeling itself on Lebanese Hizbullah.4 The Iranians used their proxy to attack American interest in both Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Hizbullah often met and recruited members at the Sayyeda Zeinab Mosque in Damascus, Syria. Ahmed al-Mughassil, the military commander of Saudi Hizbullah met and recruited Saudi Shi’ite at the Sayyeda Zeinab Mosque. Al-Mughassil coordinated and arranged for the new recruits to travel to Lebanon and Iran for military training. Ali al-

Houri, a lieutenant of Al-Mughassil, acted not only as a recruiter and liaison “with the Iranian Embassy in Damascus, Syria, which was an important source of logistics and support for Saudi Hizballah members traveling to and from Lebanon.”5 In 1993, Ahmed al-Mughassil instructed a number of members of Saudi Hizballah to start surveillance and casing operations of sites in eastern Saudi Arabia, where Americans might be found to target. The surveillance team “produced reports, which were then passed to Al-Mughassil, then onto Saudi Hizballah chief Al-Nasser, and to officials in Iran.”6 In the summer of 1995, after

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extensive surveillance of American targets in Saudi Arabia, the cell began regular surveillance of Khobar Towers. Members of the 4404th Fighter Wing (Provisional) based at Khobar Towers were tasked with conducting the “no-fly zone mission” as designated by Operation Southern Watch, which was “intended only to carry out a temporary mission until Iraq complied with U.N. resolutions and sanctions were lifted.”7 Due to various threat factors and the bombing on November 13, 1995 of the Office of the Program Manager of the Saudi National Guard (OPMSANG) in Riyadh, a number of security measures were implemented. While the

U.S. Air Force personnel help sift through sand and dirt outside Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia, on July 1, 1996, for clues that could help the FBI in their investigation of the June 25th bombing. Photo by: Staff Sgt. Cesar Rodriguez

the Long Commission Report, which stated that “the ability of Khomeini’s Iran to mobilize a small, but violently extremist portion of the Lebanese Shiite community against the government and the LAF2 (Lebanese Armed Forces).” The leaders of Hizbullah were followers of Khomeini and were trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in the Bekaa Valley. Hizbullah worldwide became a proxy for Iranian geopolitical and military actions against its enemies. “A cleric of Hizbullah al-Hijaz argued that there is no difference between the Hizbullah groups in Hijaz, Kuwait, Lebanon or any other place.”3 One such proxy was Hizbullah al-

US and Saudi investigators gather evidence from the Khobar Towers attack. Photo by: DoD

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U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry (center) emphasizes a point as he answers questions about the terrorist bombing of Khobar Towers at a press conference in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on June 29, 1996. Photo by: Senior Airman Sean Worrell, U.S. Air Force.

terrorists conducted surveillance of the target, two vulnerability assessments were conducted by the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations and “more than 130 specific actions taken in response to the vulnerability assessments that were conducted in July 1995 and January 1996.”8 However, numerous recommendations were not implemented and not pursued with any urgency. These included extending the perimeter, coating all windows with Mylar and even moving personnel from exterior buildings to interior quarters away from the perimeter. Al-Mughassil continued his preparations to bomb Building 131, an eight story building that served as a residence for American air force personnel housed at Khobar Towers. Saudi Hizballah began smuggling explosives from Beirut, Lebanon to Qatiff, Saudi Arabia. On March 28,

1996, Saudi border guards discovered 38 kilograms of plastic explosives hidden in one such car driven by a Saudi Hizballah member who had come from Lebanon. This arrest led to three other members of Saudi Hizballah, who were soon arrested. But this did not slow down the terrorist operational planning and activities. In June 1996, the terrorists purchased a large Mercedes-Benz tanker truck and “paid about 75,000 Saudi riyals for the truck. Over the next two weeks, the conspirators worked at a farm in the Qatif area to convert the tanker truck into a large truck bomb.”9 On June 25, 1996, the temperature dropped into the nineties as the sun set over Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Air Force Security Police Staff Sergeant Alfredo Guerrero headed out to check on the security posts on the Khobar Towers compound after handling reports and

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administrative tasks. SSgt. Guerrero began checking his numerous security posts on the facility starting with the security post on top of Building 131, an eight story barracks on the edge of the compound.10 The terrorists departed Qatif in three vehicles that evening. Hani al-Sayegh was driving a Datsun “scout vehicle” and was accompanied by Abdallah al-Jarash in the passenger seat. Hussein al-Mughis was at the wheel of the get-away car, a white four-door Chevrolet Caprice, favored because the American car had a steel bumper and a big engine. Lastly, the Saudi Hizbullah military commander, Ahmed al-Mughassil, would drive the Mercedes Benz truck bomb accompanied by Ali Ali-Houri. The Datsun scout vehicle pulled into the parking lot and signaled the get-away car that the coast was clear.

Just before 10 p.m., SSgt. Guerrero was on top of Building 131 checking with Airman First Class Chris Wagar when he observed a white four-door Chevrolet Caprice pull into the parking lot. Al-Mughassil drove the truck bomb into the parking lot and backed as close to the perimeter fence as possible, closing the distance to Building 131. The two terrorists quickly exited their truck bomb and jumped into the white Caprice, which sped away. To those on the rooftop, this looked suspicious and had to be a truck bomb. Quickly, the three Air Force Security Police began going door to door, alerting the residents to evacuate the building. “Within minutes, the truck bomb exploded, devastating the north side of building 131.11 The explosion killed nineteen members of the United States Air Force and wounded 372 other Americans.” This was not the first attack, nor would it be the last conducted by the Iranians and Hizbullah.

U.S. Embassy Bombing, Beirut “It turns out that the Embassy was hit essentially by Hizbullah, even though that was not clear at the time. Hizbullah had Iranian support. It was simply a blow at the most visible symbol of American presence.” -Ambassador Robert S. Dillon12 In 1983, Beirut was one of the most dangerous cities in the world. Eight years of civil war, fighting between Christian and Muslim militias, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) under Yasser Arafat, invasions by Israel, the Syrians, and Iranians made surviving in Beirut a unique skillset. The Lebanese Civil War began on April 13, 1975 in front of the Notre Dame De La Deliverance Church in East Beirut, when PLO gunmen and Phalangist militia

U.S. Air Forces in Europe Commander Gen. Michael Ryan consoles one of the air force airman injured in the Khobar Towers explosion as their medical evacuation plane arrives at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, on June 28, 1996, from Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Photo by Tech. Sgt. James D. Mossman, U.S. Air Force.

exchanged gunfire. At the end of the gunfire, Joseph Abu Assi and four of his Phalangist bodyguards were dead. Revenge and honor are two important concepts in the Middle East. And revenge always seems to win out over honor. Phalangist militia, seeking revenge, killed 26 Palestinians who were travelling back

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015 23

Ambassador Dillon stated, “I ended up flat on my back. I never heard the explosion.”14

to the Sabra refugee camp on a bus. From that point on, no one was safe in Beirut. Especially not the Americans who found themselves caught up in the chaos as they tried to craft a peace among warring groups that were motivated to fight, not talk peace. “The Israelis barged in to get rid of Arafat. French and American troops tried to impose some kind of order. Iranian Revolutionary Guards founded Hizbullah to fight the Israelis and hunt down every Westerner they could find.”13 On April 18, 1983, a suicide bomber drove his vehicle packed with explosives into the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. The suicide bomber detonated an estimated 2,000 pounds of explosives, killing 63 individuals including 17 Americans. Ambassador Robert Dillon was in his office on the eighth floor of the U.S. Embassy, changing so he could go for a run at the American University of Beirut campus. As he changed into a shirt, covering his face, the bomb detonated, sending glass flying. Ambassador Dillon stated, “I ended up flat on my back. I never heard the explosion.”14 President Reagan recorded in his diary on Monday, April 18, 1983: “Awakened with word a car bomb did great damage to our embassy in Beirut-killed scores of people including 5 of our Marine guard detail. First word is that Iranian Shiites did it.”15 The Iranians introduced the concept of martyrdom in Lebanon honoring Mohammed Hussein Fahmideh, the 13-year-old boy whom the Ayatollah Khomeini called the chosen one. From that point on there would be no turning back. The era of the suicide bomber in the post-modern world had begun.16 Seventeen Americans perished in the opening salvo of the Iranian terrorism war. Too often in terrorist attacks, people are drawn to the numbers and forget

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that each victim was a real person with family and friends. While memories fade with time, we should never forget those Americans who lost their lives in the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. • Robert C. Ames, Chief of Near East

A view of damages to the U.S. Embassy in Beirut caused by a terrorist bomb attack. Photo by: US Army and South Asia Division, CIA • Thomas Blacka, Controller, USAID • Phyliss N. Faraci, Administrative Officer, CIA • Staff Sergeant Terry Gilden, Ambassador’s Bodyguard, U.S. Army

• Kenneth E. Haas, Chief of Station • Deborah Hixon, Agency Officer on TDY • Frank J. Johnston, Case Officer • James F. Lewis, Deputy Chief of Station • Monique Lewis, wife of James Lewis

• Staff Sergeant Ben H. Maxwell, U.S. Army • William McIntyre, Acting Director, USAID • Corporal Robert V. McMaugh, Marine Security Guard, USMC

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015 25

President Ronald Reagan (far left) and First Lady Nancy Reagan pay their respects to the caskets of the 17 US victims of the 18 April 1983 attack on the United States Embassy in Beirut. Photo by: Reagan Library • Staff Sergeant Mark E. Salazar, U.S. Army • William Sheil, Contract Employee, CIA • Janet Lee Stevens, journalist • Sergeant First Class Richard Twine, U.S. Army • Albert N. Votaw, Housing Officer, USAID They are dead; but they live in each Patriot’s breast, And their names are engraven on honor’s bright crest. -Henry Wadsworth Longfellow17 U.S. Marine Barracks Bombing, Beirut “So it was with the Marines in Beirutgood, milk-faced boys who stepped into the middle of a passion-filled conflict, of whose history they were totally innocent and whose venom they could not even imagine.”18 -Thomas L. Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem

26 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015

The mission of the U.S. Marines in Beirut was to be a “presence” between the warring parties as diplomats worked out the peace. The mission was poorly constructed, the rules of engagement were unworkable, and the environment had changed dramatically. “What originally was a permissive environment had by then dramatically changed into a killing zone.”19 A yellow Mercedes truck traveled down Airport Road, passing the FAA Civil Aviation School on the driver’s left. Just ahead, after passing by checkpoint four, was his target. October 23, 1983 would be unlike any other Sunday in Beirut. Slowly turning into the Beirut International Airport public parking lot, the suicide bomber had now taken a full measure of his target. The driver of the truck began to pick up speed and crashed through the barbed wire fence, passing between two Marine checkpoints as he raced towards his target. At 6:20 a.m., the suicide bomber crashed his truck bomb into the sandbagged sergeant of the guard’s post inside the building and then detonated. Two hundred and forty-one military personnel lost their lives that morning. Hizbullah and the Iranians were perfecting a new tactic, one that would cause death and destruction in numerous countries as other terrorist groups sought to copy and modify this new way to attack a stronger enemy. On October 14, 2014, U. S. Federal District Court Judge Royce Lamberth signed and entered an Order and Judgment holding “Iran accountable for its cowardly support of terrorism. The Court concludes that defendant Iran must be punished to the fullest extent possible for the bombing in Beirut on October 23, 1983.”20 Judge Lamberth held Iran liable for a total award of $453,596,509 in both compensatory and punitive damages. For years it

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was an unspoken truth that Iran and its proxies Hizbullah in Lebanon and Saudi Hizbullah were responsible for the bombings of the U.S Embassy in Beirut, the Marine Barracks in Beirut and Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. So why should anyone be surprised to learn that Iran’s Revolutionary Guards-Quds Forces introduced the Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs) to target U.S. military up-armored vehicles in Iraq? Make no mistake: the IRGC armed two Iranian proxies, the Mehdi Army and Badr Corps in Iraq, with EFPs to target U.S. military personnel. For thirty-five years Iran has targeted and waged a silent but lethal war against the United States. As the United States negotiates with Iran over its nuclear program as part of the P5+1 Negotiations, one must never forget that this is a government with much American blood on its hands, and a long history of deceptive practices.

•

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About the Author Mr. Purdy is the President of the Terrorism Research Center, Inc., a Virginia-based company that provides cutting-edge training and research on terrorism, counterinsurgency, and homeland security issues. His book, Blue Mako Five: Exploits in Counter Terrorism will be published this fall.

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Clarke, Richard. “Transcript of the Briefing to the Joint Congressional Inquiry on U.S. Government Counterterrorism Organizations (Before September 11, 2001) and on the Evolution of the Terrorist Threat and U.S. Response: 1986-2001.” p. 7-8. 2 Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983. (Long Commission Report) December 20, 1983. 1

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Matthiesen, Toby. “Hizbullah alHijaz: A History of the Most Radical Saudi Shi’a Opposition Group.” Middle East Journal. Volume64, No.2, Spring 2010. p. 189. 4 Ibid., p. 179. 5 United States of America v. Ahmed Al-Mughassil Indictment, US District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, 3

Alexandria Division, June, 2001. 6 Ibid., section 16. 7 U.S. Congress. House Committee on National Security, “The Khobar Towers Bombing Incident Report.” August 14, 1996. p. 11. 8 Ibid., p. 7. 9 United States v Ahmed Al-Mughassil Indictment, section 34.

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Terrorism Research Center Inc., “TRC Report: Lessons Learned After the Khobar Towers Attack.” June 25, 2011.” p. 8. 11 United States v Ahmed Al-Mughassil Indictment, section 37. 12 Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Arlington, Virginia. Interview of Ambassador Robert S. Dillon, Interviewed By Charles Stuart Kennedy, May 17, 1990. 13 Totten, Michael. The Road to Fatima Gate: The Beirut Spring, the Rise of Hezbollah, and the Iranian War Against Israel, New York: Encounter Books, 2011. p. 5. 14 Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Arlington, Virginia. Interview of Ambassador Robert S. Dillon, Interviewed By Charles Stuart Kennedy, May 17, 1990. 15 Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007. p. 145. 16 Terrorism Research Center Inc., “Suicide Bombings and Attacks-From 1980 to 2013.” December 1, 2013. 17 Longfellow, Henry Wadsworth “The Battle of Lovell’s Pond.” Maine Historical Society, Accessed November 20, 2014. http://www.hwlongfellow.org 18 Friedman, Thomas. From Beirut to Jerusalem, New York: Random House, 1989. p. 188. 19 Geraghty, Timothy, Col., Peacekeepers at War: Beirut 1983-The Marine Commander Tells His Story, Dulles: Potomac Books, 2009. p. 8. 20 Kenneth S. Spencer v Islamic Republic of Iran, Memorandum Opinion by Royce C. Lamberth, U.S. District Court Judge. October 14, 2014. Accessed November 15, 2014 http:// pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/10-14-14%20 Lamberth%20opinion%20Spencer.pdf 10

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The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015 31

Islamist Terrorism in Canada 32 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015

By Dean T. Olson

Prime Minister Stephen Harper of Canada was severely criticized for stating in 2011 that the biggest securityÂ threat to Canada is Islamic terrorism.1 Last year, Richard Fadden, then the head of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), delivered a warning to the Canadian Senate that the threat of domestic terrorism had increased significantly in the past five years.

adden warned that intelligence agencies were privy to much more chatter from Islamist terror groups about small scale threats against less predictable targets, including those in Canada. In this context, chatter refers not only to a surge in intercepted communications, such as phone, e-mail

and social media, but also includes suspicious movement of suspects and the transfer of funds and information from human sources. It is a measure of collective behavior of suspect groups or individuals that tends to be a fairly dependable indicator of planning for an attack.2

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015 33

Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work (right) meets with Canadian Deputy Minister of Defense, Dick Fadden (left) at the Pentagon in Washington D.C. Photo by Master Sgt. Adrian Cadiz

National War Memorial, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.Photo by: Johnycanal

Tragically, Harper and Fadden were vindicated when on October 21, 2014, Martin Couture-Rouleau, a Canadian convert to Islam, deliberately drove his car into two Canadian soldiers in Saint-Jeansur-Richelieu, a small town southeast of Montreal. One soldier was killed and the other injured. Couture-Rouleau was killed by police after a high-speed car chase. Two days later, in a spectacular attack on the National War Memorial and Parliament in Ottawa, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, another Canadian Muslim convert, shot and killed an unarmed soldier standing ceremonial guard at the memorial. ZehafBibeau was killed in a gunfight inside the House of Commons.

34 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015

Couture-Rouleau appeared on a list of 90 people monitored by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and had been identified as a “highrisk traveler.” The RCMP established the multi-agency High Risk Traveler Case Management System as part of the Air Carrier Protection Program established in 2002 to prevent a repeat of the Sept. 11, 2001 airline hijackings in the United States. Like the (U.S.) Federal Air Marshal program, it places plainclothes armed Mounties, known as in flight security officers, aboard select Canadian commercial flights around the world.3 The RCMP High Risk Traveller Task Force attempts to track

radicalized young Canadians at risk of joining foreign terrorist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or other extremist and rebel groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, the Middle East and North Africa.4 A RCMP tactical group identified Couture-Rouleau, who was arrested in July as he was departing for Syria. Police seized his passport but lacked the evidence to charge him, so they instead worked with his family and imam, trying to de-radicalize him.5 On October 20, Couture-Rouleau waited for two hours at a strip mall in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu before running down two unarmed Canadian Armed Forces members, killing 53-year-old Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent. He fled the scene and crashed his car while being pursued by police. Officers shot him dead after he exited the overturned vehicle and threatened them with a knife. The radicalization of both attackers is under scrutiny as counterterrorism specialists work to prevent future attacks. What appears to be a common factor in both attacks are repeated calls from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) for Muslims living in Western countries to conduct lone wolf attacks. Farah Shirdon, a Canadian of Somali descent, joined ISIS and burned his Canadian passport. He produced a propaganda video for ISIS in which he explicitly threatened Canada and the U.S., saying, “We are coming and we will destroy you with permission of Allah.”6 Another Canadian and convert to Islam who joined ISIS is known by the alias “Abu Khalid al-Kanadi.” In numerous Twitter posts, he called on “True Canadian Muslims” to launch attacks in reaction to Canada’s help to

the international military campaign against ISIS. On October 4, he wrote in his Twitter account, calling Muslims “to Fulfill your duty of Jihad in Canada.”7 AlKanadi echoed ISIS official threatening message issued on September 21, 2014, “Indeed Your Lord Is Ever Watchful,” in which all countries participating in the military coalition, including the U.S. and Canada, were warned of the threat

…threatened Canada and the U.S., saying, “We are coming and we will destroy you with permission of Allah.”6

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015 35

In a stunning lapse of security, Canada does not detain refugee seekers upon entry, even those with questionable backgrounds. Thousands of potential terrorists disappear annually into Canada’s ethnic communities.

of attacks by their own Muslim citizens, who were called upon to carry out the jihad at home, “you will pay the price as you walk on your streets, turning right and left, fearing the Muslims. You will not feel secure even in your bedrooms.”8 Former Canada Public Safety Minister Stockwell Day stated shortly after the Couture-Rouleau and Zehaf-Bibeau attacks that both men may have visited the same Internet chat rooms, where such messages are posted.9 Numerous Islamist attacks in North America and elsewhere have featured car attacks even before ISIS promoted using cars as weapons against Westerners, and it remains unclear at this point whether either man drew inspiration from the group.10 While these most recent attacks captured the world’s attention and underscored the dangers posed by radicalized Muslims in Western countries, the reality is that Canada has been a breeding ground for Islamist terror groups as far back as the late 1990s. In December 1999, Algerian terrorist Ahmed Ressam was caught trying to cross the Canadian-American border at Port Angeles, Washington with explosives in his car. Ressam belonged to a Montrealbased terrorist cell linked to both the Algerian terrorist group Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and al-Qaeda. The cell was planning a millennium terror attack at Los Angeles International Airport.11 Among the cell’s other members were Fateh Kamel, convicted in Paris in April 2001 of supplying fake passports to Islamic militants; Mokhtar Haouari, sentenced in New York in 2002 to 24 years in prison for providing a fake driver’s license and other assistance to Ressam; Samir Ait Mohamed, indicted by U.S. authorities in 2001 on charges

36 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015

of conspiring to commit an act of international terrorism; and Mourad Ikhlef, accused by Canadian officials of advising Ressam on how to handle explosives and carry out the Los Angeles Airport attack. An al-Qaeda plot to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Paris also had a Canadian connection. In June 2002, Canadian law enforcement agents arrested Algerian-born Montreal resident Adel Tobbichi, a.k.a. Amine Mezbar, who allegedly altered passports and other documents to allow members of the embassy conspiracy cell to travel throughout Europe.12 The ease with which Ressam and his fellow terror cell members entered and left Canada, and Ressam’s ability to assemble bomb-making materials in Canada, heightened concerns about border security and the apparent ease with which potential terrorists can move freely from one country to the other. According to the CSIS, terrorists from 50 different international terrorist organizations come to Canada posing as refugees.13 Nearly 300,000 immigrants are admitted each year to Canada, many of whom seek political asylum and safe haven. In a stunning lapse of security, Canada does not detain refugee seekers upon entry, even those with questionable backgrounds. Thousands of potential terrorists disappear annually into Canada’s ethnic communities. Armed with a fraudulent French passport, Ahmed Ressam exploited this lapse in security and entered Canada in 1994, claiming refugee status. More recently, Canadian security forces have thwarted many localized plots involving Islamist terrorism. Two largescale terrorist attacks were planned within Canada in the past year, one on a train

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The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015 37

traveling to the U.S., and one against the parliament building in Victoria, BC.14 In April 2013, Chihab Esseghaier, a resident of Montreal of Tunisian descent, and Raed Jaser, a resident of Markham, born in Kuwait of Palestinian descent, were arrested on suspicion of planning to blow up a VIA train on the Niagara bridge enroute to the U.S. Ahmed Abbasi, a Tunisian citizen who resided in Canada between 2010 and 2012, was arrested in the U.S. on suspicion of involvement in plans to blow up the train.15 In June 2013, John Stewart Nuttall and Amanda Marie Korody, a couple from Surry in British Columbia and converts to Islam, were arrested on suspicion of planning to use pressurecooker bombs at the July 1 Canada

Day celebration in front of the British Columbia legislature.16 According to counterterrorism sources, there are currently 63 open federal police investigations into about 100 suspected terrorists in Canada.17 Since July 2012 there have been several reported cases of Canadian citizens involved in terrorist activity, suspected of participating in terrorism, or enlisting with terrorist groups overseas, some of which are affiliated with al-Qaeda in Syria and ISIS. They include:18 July 2012 – Hassan El Hajj Hassan, holding dual nationality, Canadian and Lebanese, Hizbullah activist, member of the terrorist cell that bombed an Israeli tourist bus in Bulgaria. July 2012 – William Plotnikov, 23,

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Canadian of Russian descent. Converted to Islam and joined a terrorist group in Dagestan. Killed in gun battle with Russian security forces. November 2012 – Hussam Samir alHams, Canadian of Palestinian descent, enlisted with Hamas’ al-Qassam Brigades. Killed in an IDF operation in Gaza. December 2012 – Aaron Yoon, resident of London, Ontario. Converted to Islam and allegedly established ties to groups affiliated with al-Qaeda. Visited Mali. Arrested in Mauritania on charges of ties to terrorist groups. January 2013 – Ali Medlej and Xristos Katsiroubas, Christian converts to Islam, residents of London, Ontario, joined al-Qaeda, killed in suicide attack in Algeria, after participating in the murder of dozens of civilians. Muhajid “Ryan” Enderi, additional member of this group from London, Ontario. Traveled with them abroad and has since disappeared. February 2013 – Jamal Muhammad Abdulkader, student from Montreal, member of Kurdish family from north Syria, joined Jabhat al-Nusra, affiliated with al-Qaeda. Killed in suicide bomb truck attack in central Damascus. April 2013 – Mahad Ali Dhore, 25, Canadian of Somali descent, student at York University, joined al-Shabab group, affiliated with al-Qaeda, killed in terrorist attack in Somalia. May 2013 – unidentified individual, presumably Canadian resident, killed in Syria while planning to carry out a terrorist attack on behalf of group identified with al-Qaeda. June 2013 – Damian Clairmont, young Canadian resident of Calgary, converted to Islam, joined émigré brigade in Syria affiliated with al-Qaeda, active in fighting against Assad regime.

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July 2013 – unidentified individual, possibly Canadian resident, filmed with weapon in Homs, Syria, while fighting with rebel forces. September 2013 – Omar Shafik Hammami (Abu Mansoor al-Amriki), U.S. citizen, resided several years in Canada and married Canadian woman. Joined al-Shabab in Somalia, affiliated with al-Qaeda. Murdered in internal power struggle. September 2013 – Ali Muhammad Dirie, Toronto resident of Somali descent. Joined Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria, affiliated with al-Qaeda and killed in action. Dirie was convicted of involvement in Toronto 18 terrorist plot in 2006 and served a long prison term. The list identifies fifteen Canadian citizens or permanent residents of Canada, two individuals who resided in Canada for several years, and two unidentified individuals who may have been Canadian citizens. Five of the Canadian citizens were Christians who converted to Islam, including two who are suspected of planning a terror attack within Canada, one who carried out a suicide attack in Algeria, one suspected

of having ties to al-Qaeda, and one who enlisted with a Syrian rebel group affiliated with al-Qaeda.19 The export of radicalized Muslims from Canada is currently estimated at between dozens and hundreds. In February 2013, Canadian Security Intelligence Service director Michael Coulombe testified before the Senate national security and defense committee hearing that an estimated 130 Canadians had joined terror groups in Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa. Coulombe estimated that 30 of them had left to join groups like ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Many analysts estimate that number is now much higher. Coulombe also said that there is “very real prospect” that Canadians who have joined ISIS and other terror organizations overseas could attempt violent acts in Canada.20 Islamist terrorism casts a long shadow in Canada. Like other Western nations with democratic principles, Canada’s struggle to contain the threat of homegrown Islamist terrorism will not end anytime soon. The threat is aggravated by Canadians who have travelled to fight in the various jihadi

theaters of conflict abroad. The return of battle hardened Islamists and those who have received terrorist training overseas will add to an already elevated threat. Continued exhortations to violence by groups such as ISIS for alleged aggression against Muslims abroad will continue to resonate with some of Canada’s Muslims. When calls for religiously sanctified violence combine with unmitigated radicalism, especially among enthusiastic new or recent converts to Islam, the results are often tragic leading to acts of violence like the most recent terrorist attacks on Canadian soil.

•

about the author Mr. Olson is the former commander of the Criminal Investigation Bureau of a Midwest law enforcement agency including participation in the regional Joint Terrorism Task Force. Olson is a graduate of the FBI National Academy and is the security advisor for a division of the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization. His latest book is Tactical Counterterrorism: The Law Enforcement Manual of Terrorism Prevention (Charles C. Thomas).

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Endnotes Jonathan D. Halevi, October 30, 2013. The Islamic Terrorist Threat in Canada, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, http://jcpa.org/islamic-terroristthreat-canada/#sthash.uwCSLMuW. dpuf 2 Dean T. Olson, n.d. “The Criminal Intelligence Function,” unpublished manuscript in preparation. 3 Ian MacLeod, November 13, 2014, “RCMP adds extremist travellers to airliner stakeouts,” http://ottawacitizen.com/news/ national/rcmp-adds-extremists-travellersto-airliner-stake-outs 4 Calgary TV, Calgary Staff, October 30, 2014, ‘High risk’ Calgarians stripped of their Canadian passports, http://calgary.ctvnews.ca/high-riskcalgarians-stripped-of-their-canadianpassports-1.2080108#ixzz3K6iMr384 5 Stewart Bell and Jen Gerson, October 30, 2014, RCMP names five ‘high-risk travelers’ including girl whose parents worried might ‘go to Syria to fight,’ National Post, http://news.nationalpost. com/2014/10/30/na1030-five/ 6 Stewart Bell, October 07, 2014, New details about Canadian jihadist Farah Shirdon reveal militant ideology behind ISIS, National Post, http:// news.nationalpost.com/2014/10/07/ new-details-about-canadian-jihadistfarah-shirdon-reveal-militant-ideologybehind-isis/ 7 Rachel Ehrenfeld, October 23, 2014, Islamist Terrorism in Canada, American Center for Democracy, http:// acdemocracy.org/islamist-terrorism-incanada/ 8 Ibid, 7. 9 Tim Mak, Eli Lake and Jacob Siegel, 10.22.14. How Big Is the Canadian

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42 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015

Terrorists’ Network?, http://www. thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/10/22/ how-big-is-the-canadian-terroristsnetwork.html 10 David Frum, The Allure of Radical Islam in Canada, What’s behind the latest surge in political violence, and what Canadians can do about it. The Atlantic, October 23, 2014, http:// www.theatlantic.com/international/ archive/2014/10/radical-islam-canadaparliament-shooting/381873/ 11 Canada and Terrorism, Anti Defamation League, January, 2004, http://archive.adl.org/terror/tu/tu_0401_ canada.html#.VGIILkDnbIU 12 Ibid, 7. 13 Ibid, 7. 14 Ibid, 1. 15 Stewart Bell, July 15, 2014. Suspect in VIA Rail terror plot trained with man ‘in direct contact’ with Al-Qaeda leader: FBI, http://news.nationalpost. com/2014/07/15/suspect-in-via-railterror-plot-trained-with-man-in-directcontact-with-al-qaeda-leader-fbi/ 16 Dene Moore and James Keller, 07/03/2013, Canada Day Terror Plot: Legislature Party Continued After RCMP Assurances, , The Canadian Press, http://www.huffingtonpost. ca/2013/07/03/canada-terror-plotlegislature_n_3538676.html?utm_hp_ ref=canada-british-columbia 17 Ibid, 7. 18 Ibid, 1. 19 Ibid, 1. 20 Nadim Roberts, Aug 28, 2014. Gregory and Collin Gordon, Calgary brothers, join ranks of Canadians fighting for ISIS, CBC News, http://www.cbc. ca/news/gregory-and-collin-gordoncalgary-brothers-join-ranks-of-canadiansfighting-for-isis-1.2749673

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The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015 43

Book Review

Guilty Knowledge: What the US

Government Knows About the Vulnerability of the Electric Grid, But Refuses to Fix Compiled by: The Center for Security Policy

ur country’s adversaries have long demonstrated a preference to avoid direct confrontation and maneuver toward the places they see weakness, vulnerability, and opportunity. Terrorist groups do this with smallscale direct action operations. Others have openly stated their desire to use economic warfare, lawfare, environmental warfare, drug warfare, cyberwar, and political influence operations to achieve their aims. America’s electric grid is a potentially viable target for any of these adversaries. Guilty Knowledge: What the US Government Knows About the Vulnerability of the Electric Grid, But Refuses to Fix (Center for Security Policy) is a compilation of reports that make clear the challenge we face. The Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack (2008) states, “When a nuclear explosion occurs at high altitude, the EMP signal it produces will cover the wide geographic region within the line of sight of the detonation. This broad band, high amplitude EMP, when coupled into sensitive electronics, has the capability to produce widespread and long lasting disruption and damage to the critical infrastructures that underpin the fabric of U.S. society.” The report continues,

“Because of the ubiquitous dependence of U.S. society on the electrical power system, its vulnerability to an EMP attack, coupled with the EMP’s particular damage mechanisms, creates the possibility of long-term, catastrophic consequences.” Even natural events can cause crises. Severe Space Weather Events: Understanding Societal and Economic Impacts (2008) says: “The Carrington event is by several measures the most severe space weather event on record. It produced several days of spectacular auroral displays, even at unusually low latitudes, and significantly disrupted telegraph services around the world.” “While the socioeconomic impacts of a future Carrington event are difficult to predict, it is not unreasonable to assume that an event of such magnitude would lead to much deeper and more widespread socioeconomic disruptions than occurred in 1859, when modern electricity-based technology was still in its infancy.” The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (2009) confirms these challenges: “We note … that

44 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015

Reviewed by: Chris Graham

the United States has done little to reduce its vulnerability to attack with electromagnetic pulse weapons and recommend that current investments in modernizing the national power grid take account of this risk.” Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI) and Its Impact on the U.S. Power Grid (2010) states: “It is clear that the biggest threat is against the civil infrastructure, shutting down the control electronics associated with

the power grid, the telecom network or other parts of the critical infrastructure.” It goes on to say, “The modern civil infrastructure is very dependent on computers, which operate at logic levels of a few volts. So an intentional interference can occur at a few volts in critical circuits, causing logic upset.” In High-Impact, Low-Frequency Event Risk to the North American Bulk Power System, the authors assert, “A class of risks, called High-Impact, Low-Frequency (HILF) events, has recently become a renewed focus of risk managers and policy makers. These risks have the potential to cause catastrophic impacts on the electric power system, but either rarely occur, or, in some cases, have never occurred.” They add, “Examples of HILF risks include coordinated cyber, physical, and blended attacks, the high-altitude detonation of a nuclear weapon, and major natural disasters like earthquakes, tsunamis, large hurricanes, pandemics, and geomagnetic disturbances caused by solar weather.” In Large Power Transformers and the U.S. Electric Grid Infrastructure (2012), the U.S. Department of Energy says, “Large Power Transformers (LPTs) are custom-designed equipment that entail significant capital expenditures and long lead times due to an intricate procurement and manufacturing process.” They also say, “Because LPTs are very expensive and tailored to customers’ specifications, they are usually neither interchangeable with each other nor produced for extensive spare inventories.” They go on to warn: “The average lead time for manufacture of an LPT is between five and 16 months; however, the lead time can extend beyond 20 months if there are any supply disruptions or delays with the supplies, raw materials, or key parts” and conclude, “The United States has limited production capability to manufacture LPTs.”

The United States Government Accountability Office published Cybersecurity: Challenges in Securing the Electricity Grid. They report, “In testimony, the Director of National Intelligence noted a dramatic increase in cyber activity targeting U.S. computers and systems, including a more than tripling of the volume of malicious software….The electricity grid’s reliance on IT systems and networks exposes it to potential and known cybersecurity vulnerabilities, which could be exploited by attackers.” They also said, “The potential impact of such attacks has been illustrated by a number of recently reported incidents and can include fraudulent activities, damage to electricity control systems, power outages, and failures in safety equipment.” Terrorism and the Electric Power Delivery System (2012) asserts: “The electric power delivery system that carries electricity from large central generators to customers could be severely damaged by a small number of well-informed attackers. The system is inherently vulnerable because transmission lines may span hundreds of miles, and many key facilities are unguarded.” It also says, “Terrorist attacks on multiple-line transmission corridors could cause cascading blackouts. High-voltage transformers are of particular concern because they are vulnerable to attack, both from within and from outside the substation where they are located. These transformers are very large, difficult to move, custombuilt, and difficult to replace. Most are no longer made in the United States, and the delivery time for new ones can run to months or years.” Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds states: “The recurrence intervals of crippling solar geomagnetic storms, which are less than a century, now pose a substantial threat because of the

world’s dependence on electricity.” The NIC adds, “Until ‘cures’ are implemented, solar super-storms will pose a large-scale threat to the world’s social and economic fabric.” Edward J. Markey (D-MA) and Congressman Henry A. Waxman (DCA) staff personnel wrote Electric Grid Vulnerability Industry Responses Reveal Security Gaps (2013). They assert: “More than a dozen utilities reported ‘daily,’ ‘constant,’ or ‘frequent’ attempted cyber-attacks ranging from phishing to malware infection to unfriendly probes. One utility reported that it was the target of approximately 10,000 attempted cyber-attacks each month.” They also state, “Most utilities have not taken concrete steps to reduce the vulnerability of the grid to geomagnetic storms and it is unclear whether the number of available spare transformers is adequate.” They conclude, “Only twenty independently owned utilities, six municipally or cooperatively-owned utilities, and eight federal entities reported owning spare transformers.” The challenges our nation faces are clearly significant. Our adversaries have unsurprisingly demonstrated the preference to exploit gaps rather than attack strengths. Guilty Knowledge: What the US Government Knows about the Vulnerability of the Electric Grid, But Refuses to Fix identifies some of our most likely targets and encourages readers to visit www.securethegrid.com to help prepare an adequate defense.

•

about the author Mr. Graham is the former commander of a military anti-terrorism unit, the editor of The Counter Terrorist magazine and author of the highly acclaimed new novel Election: Dezinformatsiya and The Great Game (www.chrisgrahamauthor.com).

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015 45

THE METAMORPHOSIS

FROM AQI TO THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ (2006â&#x20AC;&#x201C;2011) Excerpted from The Terrorists of Iraq by Malcolm Nance (Taylor and Francis, 2014).

46 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015

By Malcolm W. Nance

As early as 2005 al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) had sought to carve out a national entity within Iraq. They went so far as to declare an Islamic Emirate of Iraq. At the time they only occupied a few dozen safe houses in the Western governorates, some in Baghdad and a neighborhood in Anbar Province.

he Jolan District in Fallujah had been dominated by AQI members and sympathizers starting in the months after the invasion. It was quickly lost along with more than 1,000 jihadist fighters to the U.S. Marines, who rooted them out in intense house-to-house combat. Even without occupying any land, they understood that the concept of appearing to be a virtual entity was a psychological multiplier for their fighters. Better to be considered heroes of a nation

instead of operatives in a terrorist group. Under the protection of the Iraqi Sunni community, they wanted to carve out a piece of secure terrain that would allow foreign fighters to abandon their homes and families, come via Syria to the “state” in their jihadist version of the Prophet Mohammed’s Hijra (emigration), and start a new life toward an eventual place in paradise. They could take on local wives, train, brag, and fight alongside other men like themselves. They needed

Jihadists traveling in pick up trucks. Photo by: Magharebia

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015 47

Pol-e-charki Afghan National Army base, located off the Kabul-Jalalabad Highway in the Kabul Province. Photo by: AED

An Iraqi soldier from 3rd Battalion, 1st Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division pulls weapons, explosive material and documents from a cache found in an Al-Qaeda in Iraq safe-house in the Muthana district near Thar Thar Lake in Iraq. Photo by: Department of Defense

48 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015

a place of their own where they could be involved in something bigger than themselves—they could fight like the companions of the prophet Mohammed in a real, live jihad against the “crusaders” and “apostates.” The best of them would volunteer to die in martyrdom bombings and go straight to heaven! So it was decided that even itinerant “knights” needed a base of operations to call home. Fostering this romantic image was extremely important to AQI for recruitment. Osama bin Laden wanted Iraq to become the central battlefield in the Middle East. As Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his men achieved success, they would ultimately convert or betray their Iraqi sponsors by any means necessary to start the formation of a religious nation in the mold of the Taliban’s Afghanistan. Iraq would become a safe harbor from which to spread their fighters, weapons, and ideology to destabilize other nations of the Muslim world, including Saudi Arabia and Syria. In early 2005, with the al-Qaeda chief ’s blessing, they declared an Islamic Emirate of Iraq. This rebranding never really caught on, but it was more important internally to establish a change in mindset for the fighters. Then again, previous name changes by AQI were overshadowed by al-Zarqawi’s brutality. Tenzim alQa’ida fi Balad al-Rafidayn, or al-Qaeda in Iraq, remained the battlefield name for its fighters. Besides, the news and social media loved this name. One year later al-Zarqawi was dead and the Americans were starting to discover that some Sunni tribes did not want al-Qaeda’s brand of Islam. Abu Ayyub al-Masri, a former Egyptian Army officer who operated under the nickname Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, took over AQI after al-Zarqawi’s death. Unlike al-Zarqawi, he listened to the leadership of al-Qaeda and sought to create a more inclusive

Fallujah, Iraq (Jan. 29, 2005) - U.S. Navy Seabees assigned to Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Twenty Three (NMCB 23) patrol the streets of Fallujah in 2005. Photo by: 3rd Class Todd Frantom

group where all jihadists could operate together to create the only legitimate Islamic nation-state on earth. This effort at reaching out was necessary. In some of the frontline zones Iraqi religious extremist (IRE) groups were finding that logistics and manpower were becoming difficult. Some groups were not getting supplies or fighters while taking on a large share of the day-to-day combat. Due to al-Zarqawi’s notoriety, AQI was reaping the lion’s share of foreign fighters and was accused of ignoring Iraqi Islamic groups. The operational difficulties also increased. Many of the Sunni tribes in Anbar

governorate under the influence of Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha al-Dulaimi, chief of the biggest tribe in Anbar, formed the Sawahat al-Anbar (the Anbar Awakening) to reject AQI’s operations. Abu Risha’s turning on AQI led to a series of tribal defections to the central government. That started the withdrawal of the major Sunni former regime loyalist combat forces away from the armed insurgency. At the same time, the Americans started to produce results in intelligence collection that led to the killing or capturing of senior members of many groups.

AQI and its advisory council decided that to counteract the Awakening, it would need to form its own alliance of tribes and fighters. On October 9, 2006, the Mujahideen Shura Council announced the formation of the Mutayibeen Coalition.1 Al-Masri knew he would need to bring all fighters and Sunni tribes loyal to jihad together to counteract the effect of losing the largest insurgent groups in Iraq. The Ansar al-Sunnah and jaysh al-Mohammed, the former regime loyalist terrorists, were joining the government supporting “Sons of Iraq” as part of the Awakening.

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015 49

As ex-terrorists, they were becoming lethally effective enemies. The key to doing anything in the Sunni regions relies on the direct cooperation of the tribal chiefs. Without their permission, nothing was possible—no operation was safe. Al-Zarqawi could not stand negotiation and preferred elimination of tribal chiefs who opposed him. He would kidnap their relatives and force their daughters to marry his jihadists—after they had been raped, of course. Al-Zarqawi wanted coalition by rule of the gun. He was scolded by harsh letters from al-Qaeda’s advisory council members, such as Aymen al-Zawahiri and Attiya al-Jaza’eri. They told him to work with the tribes, stop the beheadings, and rein in the foreign attacks on Jordan and Israel by AQI cells. Al-Masri understood what alZarqawi could not. Tribal politics trump everything and combat success was job number one—territorial expansion could come at a later date. Khalf al-Mutayibeen, which is Arabic for “Coalition of the Nobility,” proclaimed it would act as an umbrella organization for all Sunni jihadist groups and tribes that shared its vision of warfare and nation building. For the first time, Iraqi operatives and commanders would be allowed to take over leadership roles and directly supervise foreign fighters as equals. Al-Qaeda Central (AQC), the favored name for the original senior leadership of the group, remained hidden in Pakistan. They were wisely encouraging integration of all Iraqi groups. Al-Zawahiri dispatched a liaison officer to al-Masri, an Iraqi named Khaled Abdul-Fattah Dawoud Mahmoud al-Mashhadani. Al-Mashdani was better known as Abu Shaheed. Abu Shaheed was the highest ranking of the Iraqis in AQC’s senior management team and would be vital to meeting bin Laden’s vision of bringing all groups onboard for a unified

jihad structure. With his help, al-Masri created a truly integrated force comprised of an international jihadist collective that gave Iraqi locals a lead role since they knew the terrain and where to pressure the Shiite government. Operationally, they would all be called the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). The Mutayibeen declaration stated that the jihadists had established a free Sunni “Islamic state” composed of the eight northwest and western governorates in Iraq, as well as Baghdad. In their first collective statement, they said: These are the glad tidings coming out from the Land of the Two Rivers, the land of the Caliphates, and from Baghdad, the home of the Khilafa, may Allah free it from the Crusaders [Americans] and Saffavids [Iranians], in the blessed month of Ramadan. The fruits of the tree of Tawheed [monotheism] that the martyrs watered with their blood, have ripened and their time for harvest has come. The truthful Mujahideen in the land of the two rivers have unified and reinforced one another and announce to the Muslims everywhere and Ahl-as-Sunni in Iraq especially, the glad tiding of the establishment of the State of Truth, the State of Islam that will implement Allah’s Shariah for the people in the land, that will protect Islam and be a strong shield for Ahlas-Sunni in the land of the two rivers.2 It is the pleasure of the Media Committee to present to all Muslims the official spokesman of the Islamic State of Iraq, the spokesman of the Ministry of Information, to bring you the good news. And we call Upon all Muslims in the world, to support this state with money, men and Du’a, and Allah has full power and control over His affairs, but most of the men know not, and to Allah belongs all thanks and favour.3 The communiqué also delineated the boundaries of the Islamic State: Your brothers announce the establishment

50 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015

of the Islamic State in Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, Ninawa, and in other parts of the governorate of Babel, in order to protect our religion and our people. Further, the Mujahid delivers a special call to the tribal heads in Iraq, and to all Sunni Muslims in that country, to pledge loyalty to the Emir of the Believers, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, by their adherence and obedience.4 On July 18, 2007, Abu Shaheed was arrested by U.S. and Iraqi forces. In a brilliant display of counterintelligence, al-Mashadani soon had some U.S. interrogators convinced that there was no commander of AQI after al-Zarqawi. He claimed that Abu Ayyub al-Masri did not even exist. He also claimed that ISI was not a real organization, but just a front for al-Qaeda. Al-Mashadani was clever enough to give up enough information that was real and verifiable in order to spread his disinformation. He even stated that ISI media recordings of Ayyub al-Masri were an actor reading lines created by committee. U.S. force commanders questioned the veracity of the claim but gave it some credibility to the news media, maybe to smoke out al-Masri or to see which group would actually claim leadership. In the end, the ruse didn’t work. Intelligence indicated that there was a real person named al-Masri and that he was working with a senior Iraqi commander, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi. They were coordinating missions hand in hand. During this period al-Masri oversaw major terror operations in Iraq that included hundreds of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks and massive suicide bombings. He and Abu Umar even managed to place an IED at the house of Abdul Sattar Abu Risha for his treachery in creating the Anbar Awakening. It killed him instantly. However, it was the joint pragmatism

Suicide bombings in Iraq since 2003 have killed thousands of people, mostly Iraqi civilians. Photo by: Jim Gordon of al-Masri and Abu Umar that made ISIS flourish. They decided to allow the Iraqis to take the lead of ISI in the insurgency that would have longerlasting consequences. The 2009 inauguration of a new American president didn’t change the outlook of ISI toward the Americans. Whether the American President was George W. Bush or Barack H. Obama mattered little. They had a caliphate to

establish and the crusaders were still in Iraq so the killings would continue. Now that both Iraqi and foreign fighters were vertically integrated, the ISI suicide tactics decidedly improved. The ISI kept up a sustained suicide bombing campaign. Deploying people in trucks to blow up was safer than complex small infantry attacks. For now, they would capitalize on the Iraqi groups’ expertise at covert infiltration of men, weapons, and explosive trucks into

the cities. One of the largest bombings in Iraq’s history occurred in August 2009, when the Iraqi Foreign Ministry and Finance Ministry in Baghdad were attacked simultaneously, resulting in over 250 dead. More importantly, they targeted the hotel of the Awakening councils during a national meeting of all the tribal sheiks. The suicide truck bomb managed to kill dozens of “traitors” meeting with the Iraqi government.

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015 51

52 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015

Ubaydi, Iraq (Nov. 14, 2005) - A U.S. Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter prepares to land near Ubaydi, Iraq prior to medically evacuating a wounded Iraqi Army soldier. Photo by: Cpl. Michael R. McMaugh

AQI/ISI had been using IED and individual suicide bombs for years, but al-Masri and Abu Umar decided using multiple suicide car bomb attacks in a spectacular fashion was sure to get more satellite TV airtime, particularly if the TV crews were the target. Deliberately attacking the media would give anyone reporting in or on Iraq a messageâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;we will not be ignored. On the morning of February 16, 2010, no less than four suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (S-VBIEDs) struck at the four hotels that supported the foreign news media. The attack started when a bomb was set off near a police station in central Baghdad. It brought the journalists and TV crews to their balconies to see what was happening across the traffic circle at Firdos Square. This attack was strategically selected, as it was in direct line of sight to the mezzanine balcony in the Palestine Hotel. Virtually all television satellite crews in the world used this location as a backdrop for reporting on Iraq from the safety of the Palestine and adjacent Ishtar Sheraton Hotels. When the journalists rushed to the windows, balconies, and the roof to see the attack, a second car bomb rammed the Texas barriers that protected the buildingâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;Texas barriers are 12- to 20-foot-high interlocking concrete walls. The massive explosion breached the wall. Moments later a third human-guided truck bomb, this one a 20-ton cement mixer filled with high explosives, crawled into the opening between the two hotels. It was stuck momentarily on the concrete debris, and that was the chance the Americans needed to stop the attack. The snipers and machine gunners on the top of the Sheraton opened fire and raked the giant truck with hundreds of direct hits. An American army sniper managed to place the killing shot through the head of the driver and the vehicle ground to a

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015 53

halt halfway through the walls. But ISI prepared for that possibility too; a backup “trigger” team detonated the truck with a remote cell phone detonator attached to the cement mixer. The explosion devastated the two hotels. Fortunately for the journalists, it had not completely entered the breach; if it had, it would have most likely collapsed both buildings. On the other side of downtown, a S-VBIED raced up the ramp to the formidable Babylon Hotel and exploded in the entrance. The Babil was a massive concrete monstrosity on the south side of the Euphrates River situated directly across from the new American embassy in the Green Zone. It was a former guest hotel where Saddam would spy on his guests with listening devices built in to each room. The S-VBIED onslaught was not complete. A fourth S-VBIED in a stolen ambulance raced into the perimeter of the Hamra Hotel. This hotel was favored by freelance journalists not associated with big media outfits. Located near the Australian embassy, the Hamra’s location gave it security advantages: a narrow street blocked by armed guards and a security barrier cut it off from Karada Street, and it had a T-barrier wall that

surrounded it. Previous attempts to hit it had failed, so it was believed to be relatively safe. However, because the hotel let its guard down, an ISI car bomb in the guise of an ambulance managed to get past the security barrier and explode inside of the perimeter. The day’s tally was 36 dead and hundreds wounded, but the value of such a high-profile antimedia attack was priceless. However, the Americans were now operating at their best in counterintelligence. Having eschewed ruthless interrogation, they used effective methods of gleaning information. Intense professional interviews and cash incentives got them actionable tips. They were also working with the former Iraqi insurgents and had a good track record on helping break ISI cells. One such tip led them to carry out a combined U.S.Iraqi Special Forces raid on a house in Tikrit. On the night of April 17, 2010, the residence under surveillance was confirmed by Iraqi and U.S. intelligence assets to have one or two high-value targets (HVTs) present. The mission was handed off to the combined IraqiU.S. Special Forces. The mission was to capture the targets, but if resistance was met, they were to use any and all

54 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015

force necessary to neutralize them. As the task force attempted to take the residence, they were fired upon by the occupants. The Iraqis and Americans called in aerial missile support. Between the Hellfire missile bombardment, rockets, and gunfire, Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Umar al-Baghdadi were killed. Al-Qaeda was again decapitated. One American Army Ranger was killed when a supporting UH-60 helicopter crashed returning from the mission. The deaths of the two ISI commanders finally put to rest the notion that Abu Umar was a fictional character. A full dossier was released, including confirmation of his DNA. Quite a bit was known about Abu Umar al-Baghdadi. He was an Iraqi-born Hamid Dawud Mohamed Khalil al-Zawi. He was the senior Iraqi member of the Mujihdeen Shura Council (MSC), along with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, spiritual advisor Sheik Abd al-Rahman, and operations officer Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Shaheed, the Iraqi who was the AQC’s liaison to ISI.5 Abu Umar was highly successful at staying out of the line of fire even though the entirety of U.S. forces was searching for him. Unlike al-Zarqawi, he led operations from the rear, maintained

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Mugshot of Abu Bakr alBaghdadi taken by US armed forces while in dentention at Camp Bucca in 2004. Photo by: US Armed Forces

a high level of operational security, and managed the ISI like a CEO. He directed subordinate commanders to carry out missions and report back results, and fine-tuned the campaigns despite enormous pressure from the Americans and Iraqi government. Operating in Anbar and other Sunni areas was increasingly difficult as well, though under Abu Umar attacks were sustained, devastating, and professional. Although he was named as al-Zarqawi’s successor in 2005, he actually would not lead combined operations until 2007. For a fictional character, Abu Umar was alleged to have been captured or killed no less than three times between 2007 and 2010. Fortunately for the insurgency, the winding down of U.S. combat operations required the closing of Camp Bucca in 2009. Camp Bucca was the principal detention facility for the bulk of the Iraqi extremist insurgents captured in the five previous years. Despite the best efforts of American security forces, the detention of so many suspected and real insurgents at Camp Bucca had inadvertently created a concentrated ideas and team building environment. This location allowed the guilty, the innocent, and the unlucky to convalesce, strengthen relationships, and hobnob among the terror elite. Camp Bucca allowed the lowest key insurgents to meet, share lessons and knowledge, and conduct terror practicums on what each different group had learned from dealing with a large-scale professional force such as the Americans. The detainees knew they would eventually be released and that the Iraqi army would just be a hollow, well-equipped shell the U.S. Army designed. One of those low-key Iraqi detainees was nicknamed Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, an Iraqi held captive for 4 years in Camp Bucca. With the death of the top

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two commanders, he would be tapped to be leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq’s next generation, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).6

•

about the author Mr. Nance is a consultant for U.S. intelligence agencies. He is an Arabicspeaking former U.S. Navy intelligence collections officer, and field interrogator. He spent two decades on terrorism intelligence operations in the Middle East, North Africa, the Balkans, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. He is currently executive director of the Terror Asymmetrics Project on Strategy, Tactics, and Radical Ideologies (TAPSTRI). This article is an excerpt from The Terrorists of Iraq (Taylor and Francis, 2014).

ENDNOTES Stephen Negus, Call for Sunni State in Iraq, Financial Times, October 15, 2006, retrieved from http://www.ft.com/ cms/s/0/e239159e-5c6a-11db-9e7e0000779e2340.html#axzz35lDqWFpp. 2 Anonymous, Statement from the Islamic State of Iraq, retrieved from http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/ content/2006/10/16/5985.shtml. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 John Burns and Dexter Filkins, A Jihadist Web Site Says Zarqawi’s Group in Iraq Has a New Leader in Place, New York Times, June 13, 2006, http:// www.nytimes.com/2006/06/13/world/ middleeast/13iraq.html?_r=0. 6 Michael Daly, ISIS Leader, “See You in New York,” The Daily Beast, June 14, 2014, http://www.thedailybeast.com/ articles/2014/06/14/isis-leader-see-you-innew-york.html. 1

WHEN THE SAFE RETURN OF HOSTAGES IS NO LONGER TAKEN FOR GRANTED: TERRORISM AND ATROCITIES AGAINST HOSTAGES IN NIGERIA By SAMUEL OYEWOLE

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015 57

INTRODUCTION Recent trends in Nigeria has brought the country to be among the countries that are most effected by terrorism. Ever since the turn of the 21st century, Nigeria has recorded a striking wave of terrorism. In the 2011 Global Terrorism Index, for example, Nigeria was ranked by the Institute for Economics and Peace as the 7th most affected country in the world by terrorism. Crucial to the growing trend of terrorism in Nigeria is the emergence of groups such as the Movement for Emancipation of the Niger

Delta (MEND) and other militant groups in the Niger Delta region; the Jama’atu Ahlis Suna Lidda’awati Wal Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad), Boko Haram ( “western education is forbidden”), its breakaway faction, Jama’atu Ansarul Musilimina fi Biladin Sudan or Ansaru, meaning the Defender of Islam in the Land of Black Africa, and other militant Islamist groups in the northern region. Nigeria’s experience in regards to security in the last few years is aptly described as a season of terror. MEND’s

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attacks against infrastructural facilities and hostage seizures in the Niger Delta (southern) region of Nigeria nearly brought the most important sector of the economy into a halt between 2006 and 2009. More than 4,000 people have been killed by Boko Haram in the northern region between 2009 and 2014. Terrorist attacks have nearly become a daily phenomenon in Nigeria since 2011. Armed assaults, assassinations, bombings, hostage takings and attacks against infrastructures have recently hit a record boom in Nigeria. Amidst these, hostage

taking in Nigeria has generated enormous attention all over the world. For example, the abduction of over 200 female students of Government Girls Secondary School in Chibok in north-eastern Nigeria by Islamist Boko Haram terrorists on 14 May 2014 attracted attention across the world. Following the circumstances that surround this incident, concern for the treatment and wellbeing of hostages in captivity has grown significantly in the country. This has garnered a focus to the changing fate of hostages of politically motivated armed groups in Nigeria.

IN THE PAST, HOSTAGE SURVIVAL WAS TAKEN FOR GRANTED Hostage seizure by politically motivated armed groups in Nigeria has increased since the turn of the century. Until 2011, however, hostage seizures by politically motivated armed groups in Nigeria were largely recorded in the Niger Delta region. The targets were mostly employees of the oil industry, government officials and the security personnel in the region. Perpetrators are largely identified to be motivated by political grievances that are connected to the struggle for resource control and environmental justice against oil exploration in the region. However, few hostages have died in this process. Many of the hostages captured in this way were released by their perpetrators for ransom or other stakes, and sometimes without any demands or satisfaction of these demands. In this regard, atrocity against hostages seems to be minimal, a factor that makes the concern for the well being of the hostages in captivity of less significance in politics and academic studies. Though not totally free of violence, particularly at the points of capture and rescue, many hostages seized in Nigeria before 2011 regained their freedom

unharmed. For example, six oil workers (two German and four Nigerian employees of Royal Dutch Shell Company) that were abducted by Ijaw militants on 15 June 2005 were released unharmed. The release was based on the ground that the company will grant the perpetrators’ request for social amenities in the local communities where it operates in the region. Also, four expatriates, including citizens of Britain, Netherlands, Pakistan, and France that were abducted by the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) in June 2007 were released unharmed after they have been held for 21 days. Their release followed the release of NDPVF’s leader from prison. Nine South Korean Daewoo employees that were abducted by MEND on January 10, 2007 were released unharmed three days later. The Six seized crews, including two Russians, two Filipinos, one Ukrainians and one Indian, from a chemical tanker by MEND in July 2009 were also released unharmed after 16 days. Moreover, four abducted police officers that were kidnapped by the Odua Peoples’ Congress (OPC) in Lagos State were also released unharmed in August 2001. The OPC is based in southwest geopolitical zone of Nigeria. The struggle of the group was activated as part of the efforts to uphold the result of the annulled June 12, 1993 election and secure the release of its winner, a southwestern based businessman, M.K.O. Abiola, who was imprisoned by the military government after he declared himself as the de jure Head of State of the country. Many other groups in the region prefer payment of ransom as the pretext to release their hostages. MEND was paid 32 million nairas in ransom in October 2013 for the release of the kidnapped Augusta Douglas-Ayam, the sister of the Senior Special Adviser to the President on Research and Documentation. The mother

of the Bayelsa State Speaker of the House was also released unharmed for ransom in January 2013. Eight abducted expatriates working for an oil company in the Niger Delta were also released by MEND for a payment of 339,703 dollars in June 2007. In all these cases the hostages were not harmed. There are only a few exceptions. In 1999, for example, four police officers that were abducted by Ijaw militants were killed. The killing of Ijaw people in Lagos State at that time was given as the reason. However, the majority of the hostage incidents that involved politically motivated captors before now and were primarily located in southern Nigeria resulted in the hostages being released unharmed. The concern then was the growing business of hostage ransom in the country. To a large extent the treatment of hostages by politically motivated armed groups was less worrisome in Nigeria, it was largely taken for granted.

THE STAKES HAVE INCREASED The stake and danger of hostage seizing in Nigeria has become worrisome. Recent hostage taking incidents in Nigeria, particularly in the northern region of the country, where Boko Haram, Ansaru and al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are dominant players, have generated high stakes for the lives of the hostages. These groups have attracted the attention of domestic and international audiences and frustrated the authorities (the government and the involved security agencies) on the question of what the appropriate response should be. The survival and well being of hostages in the captivity of politically motivated armed groups in Nigeria was formally taken for granted, but now it has become worrisome. Many of the armed groups, particularly the three mentioned above, are motivated by fundamentalist religious ideas and the struggle to establish

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a Sharia state or caliphate in Nigeria and other parts of Africa. The following examples of hostage survival and welfare in captivity of these groups offer some insights on these groups. Many hostages have been killed by their captors against rescue efforts and their attempts. On December 5, 2011, for example, Ansaru abducted a Briton named Chris McManus and an Italian named Franco Lamolinara in Kebbi State, Nigeria as a punishment for the ills of the Western governments in the Muslim world. On March 8, 2012, after 301 days of abduction, British special

forces joined the Nigeria’s State Security Service (SSS), an internal intelligence force for the country to stage a rescue mission. When the success of the mission became apparent to the perpetrators, they summarily executed the two hostages. Likewise, Edgar Raupach, a German engineer working for Dantata and Sawoe Construction Company in Kano State, Nigeria was abducted by AQIM on January 26, 2012. The group demanded the release of an Austria Jihadist, Filiz Gelowicz (Um Saifullah al-Ansariyya) who was in German prison until April 2012. Raupach was killed on May 31,

2012 by his captors during an attempted rescue by some members of Nigeria’s Joint Task Force (JTF), a combined force of the Nigerian Air Force, Army, Navy, Police and SSS that has been commissioned to counter terrorism in the country. Moreover, Ansaru killed seven expatriates who were disclosed by Nigerian security officials to include a Briton, a Greek citizen, an Italian and four Lebanese, who were abducted in February 2012 from a Lebanese construction company, Setraco, in Bauchi State, Nigeria. The hostages were killed by Ansaru for the reason that British special forces and Nigerian security forces were planning rescue efforts. An additional justification was that the Europeans have committed many atrocities against Islam. In essence, the hostages were killed not during the rescue mission. This is similar to the fate of the pilot of a Nigerian Air Force jet that was shot down by Boko Haram on September 11, 2014. Boko Haram killed the pilot not during an attempted rescue mission, but to display its resilience and capability. In a video uploaded by Boko Haram, the pilot was beheaded.

THE CHIBOK SAGA In the recent past, the abduction of over 200 female students of Government Girls Secondary School, in Chibok by members of the Islamist Boko Haram group remains the most attention generated hostage taking incident in Nigeria. Various forms of activism addressing this action by Boko Haram, including various forms of protest have been recorded against the Nigerian government in this regard. More than 1.3 million tweets on “#BringBackOurGirls” were recorded within three weeks of the incident from all over the world, condemning Boko Haram for

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the abduction and emphasizing the importance of the safe return of the girls in the Nigerian government’s response. This incident has attracted attention and the assistance of the United States, Australia, Britain, China, France, Israel, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and many other actors in the international community. The circumstances that surround the kidnapping of the students have received conflicting narrations. This include conflicting numbers of the hostages, time of the operations, the responses of the security forces, the political connections or conspiracy theories among other things. In absence of any meaningful authoritative account, the best understanding of the scene remains a mixture of guesswork that is of little interest. However, it is remarkable that few days after the students were abducted, Abubakar Shekau, the Amir ul-Aam or commander of Boko Haram threatened to sell the girls in the marketplace. This was followed by other unsuitable

news about the girls that were in Boko Haram’s captivity. Primary to this concern is that the abducted girls are sexually exploited by their captors. For example, 20 year old Susan Ishaya, one of the abducted girls released by Boko Haram in September 2014, was confirmed to be four months pregnant. This was in addition to signs of sexual assault and brutal handling that were reportedly discovered on her body. The government of Nigeria faces a dilemma in the efforts to rescue the abducted girls. While the security forces have located the area where the abducted girls were kept in the Sambisa forest, the fear of Ansaru‘s previous responses to rescue missions hampered the implementation of rescue operations by the Nigerian government. This is important, given the priority given to safe return of the abducted girls in the country and beyond. However, government has been less tuned to the prisoners’ swap that was proposed by the Boko Haram terrorists. Against this background, the government of Nigeria has employed an Australian negotiator, Stephen Davies, to secure the safe release

of the girls. Beyond the hostage context, efforts have also been intensified to reopen a political option, particularly an amnesty offer to members of Boko Haram that wish to abandon terrorism in return for a state pardon. In the past the survival of hostages was taken for granted in Nigeria. As a result of recent events, the fate of hostages has recently become important in Nigeria. With a growing trend of terrorism in the country the attention that hostages generate in Nigeria has been increased. Consequently, the stake of the authority in Nigeria has also increased. The result is a positive concern for the health and well being of hostages in captivity by terrorists in Nigeria.

about the author SAMUEL OYEWOLE Department of Political Science, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria. samueloyewole47@yahoo.co.uk

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015 61

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Radiological

Dispersal Devices for Jihad 63 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015 63

by Al Venter

The ambition of British Muslim Dhiren Barot to explode a “dirty” nuclear bomb in Britain is eyeopening. “For the time being we do not have the contacts to enable us to purchase such items,” Barot wrote before his arrest.1

illiam Broad of the New York Times previously reported that Iraq under Saddam Hussein “tested a one-ton Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) in 1987 to assess its military usefulness.”2 Barot’s terror activities, of which British author Christopher Andrew gives us a glimpse, had been the basis of a major paper on the subject by Robert Wesley

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in his monologue published in Terrorism Focus by the Jamestown Foundation.3 Barot was sentenced to 30 years in prison by a British court. Apparently he had been picked by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the chief al-Qaeda planner behind New York’s Twin Tower attacks, to explode an RDD in London. Writing under the alias of Esa al-Hindi in a book titled The Army of Madinah

[Medina] in Kashmir, Barot declared that one way to counter “Western interference in Muslim lands” would be to conduct large-scale attacks that might include radiological materials. What sets the RDD apart from weapons employed by other dissident political groupings is that al-Qaeda and, by some accounts, now ISIS (ISIL) have shown an unusual interest in these

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weapons. Taking a cue from among the staunchest of al-Qaeda’s allies, antiRussian Islamic Chechen dissidents have tried several times to detonate RDDs in recent years. In the late 1990s, a “dirty bomb” containing highly radioactive caesium-137 was placed in Moscow’s Izmailovsky Park by a group of Chechen militants under the command of Shamil Basayev. The device was not exploded; somebody in the group tipped off the media. The RDD was apparently intended as a warning that the rebels had the wherewithal to cause serious damage, and if their hand was “forced” by Moscow’s intransigence, they would go forward. Having been involved in an attack that killed scores of children at a school a short while later, the threat appears to be credible. I believe there was another attempt in or around Moscow afterward, but neither detail nor confirmation was ever made public. Another RDD was uncovered a year earlier at Argun, a town near the capital of Chechnya. Unexploded, it was examined by Russian specialists who found that its core material had been obtained from a local nuclear isotope storage facility. The bomb was to have been boosted by two Soviet TM-57 antitank mines. A Stratfor Report on RDDs mentioned this incident and reveals that the two Chechen militants involved were incapacitated after carrying the extremely radioactive container for a short distance; one subsequently died. It was believed that had the Grozny RDD been detonated, it would probably have affected an area about three or four city blocks in extent and taken a year or more to decontaminate the area. Al-Qaeda operative Jose Padilla was arrested in Chicago in May 2002 while on a scouting mission for an al-Qaeda

operation in preparation for an attack with an RDD. He was tried, found guilty, and is currently serving a prison sentence. Abu Zubaydah, a senior al-Qaeda official in American custody, said that al-Qaeda was interested in producing a “dirty bomb.” He said, “They know how to do it” and that this knowledge included the use of caesium-137. A linked source alleged al-Qaeda considered using spent fuel cells from dismantled Soviet nuclear submarines being taken apart in Russia’s Kola Peninsula. There has been a constant flow of intelligence emanating from both the Middle East and Central Asia with regard to al-Qaeda’s intention to use weapons of mass destruction against the West. In America’s case, the idea is to smuggle a bomb or possibly pathogens such as anthrax onto American soil. The most common scenario suggested would be to bring it across the porous Mexican border, or secreted in a shipping container routed through a major U.S. port. A typical example of this kind of activity—without delivery details—was found in some of the research completed by the same convicted British terrorist Dhiren Barot mentioned before. Robert Wesley’s Jamestown Institute thesis elaborates on the activities of the British Islamic terrorist Dhiren Barot.4 “Barot initially conceptualized the decision to incorporate radioactive materials into his attack scenarios much in the same way as one would decide between attaching nails or ball bearings to a pipe bomb (i.e. as an after-thought).” He quickly discovered that radioactive materials had enough potential to be addressed as a primary weapon rather than simply as a secondary consideration. “Barot was able to obtain numerous public documents concerning the potential effects of RDDs, including employment scenarios.

The literature available greatly assisted Barot’s investigation of the core obstacles that would need to be overcome for a successful [radiological] operation.” He continued, “he [Barot] recommended that acquisition of radioactive sources should be based on ease of access rather than the hazardous effects of the source. The inference was that high activity sources (usually the most harmful) were also the most difficult to secure access to, and thus were to be in most cases avoided in favor of less radioactive, yet more accessible sources.” A recent CRS Report for the United States Congress on Radiological Dispersal Devices went some distance in focusing public attention on efforts to counter the use of this weapon.5 It declared that an RDD attack “might cause casualties, economic damage, and, potentially, public panic.” The impact of an RDD attack, it stated, “would depend on many variables, such as meteorological conditions, type and amount of radiological material, duration of exposure, and method of dispersal.” The report goes on: “both the threat posed by terrorist RDD use and the magnitude of impact are matters of some contention. Some experts believe that terrorists could, without great difficulty, obtain radioactive material and construct an RDD …others assert that radiation sources intense enough to cause casualties in an RDD attack would be injurious to the terrorists during acquisition and use. Most experts agree that few casualties would be likely to directly result, generally only among those close to the device, but many disagree on how attractive an RDD would be to a terrorist.” The argument is superfluous. Islamic zealots have proved many times in recent years that no matter what the risk—

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radiation sickness or otherwise—some would be happy to die for “a magnificent” cause in order to achieve their objectives. Suicide bombers are as much a feature of today’s jihadi environment as is their fivetimes-a-day call to prayer. Dr. Nic von Wielligh, who for some years was associated with Vienna’s IAEA, was advisor to the Director General and a member of Dr. Al Baradei’s Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation. Another source consulted was Dr. Mike Foley, a geologist who has made a career specializing in nuclear-related issues. Based at Washington’s Pacific Northwest National Laboratory until he retired, Dr. Foley hosted me on one of several factfinding missions for Jane’s International Defence Review, as well as Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst, from where I reported on measures being taken to counter the overland movement of potentially harmful radioactive materials that might have been stolen or smuggled. Dr. Foley’s simple warning was that weapons-radioactive materials “could be used in terror acts as pollutants rather than as fissionables.” The problem why this matter is not being addressed, he suggests, is because the effort needed would be immense. It would also be expensive, he declared, explaining that “all countries would need to expand coverage to everything including radon waste storage sites, medical waste and the rest … there is an incredible amount of radioactive waste about … not all of it safeguarded and in the Former Soviet Union, [guarded] very badly.” Of significant concern in this regard are the burgeoning numbers of incidents that involve internationally-linked nuclear smugglers. According to the IAEA, they are increasing. The Vienna-based UN watchdog organization IAEA is aware of hundreds of cases of nuclear smuggling

each year, much of it linked to uranium or plutonium. The IAEA claimed recently that the success rate tended to be limited to about one in ten or twelve known incidents. Unfortunately, for every known smuggling case there are even more that are not detected. In almost every case listed, people of Islamic or Middle Eastern extraction are named as receiving parties. IAEA investigators believe that those involved from former Eastern bloc countries are rarely ideologically motivated: their interest is financial gain. One IAEA employee who was prepared to speak as long as his identity was not revealed said, “it is of little concern to most of them whether entire cities or populations are contaminated by deadly radiation.” His fear was essentially that the criminals may have no qualms about selling to jihadist groups. He said they were doing so quite regularly, adding that al-Qaeda’s Abu Hamza al-Muhajir actually called for Muslim scientists to join the organization and experiment with radioactive devices for use against Coalition Forces while still deployed east of Suez. He also disclosed that captured al-Qaeda leaders confessed to the CIA “under duress,” that they had attempted to smuggle a radioactive device into the U.S. A report in Britain’s New Scientist June 2004 issue included details of another IAEA report. The report disclosed that there were more than 10,000 sources designed for radiotherapy, each of which contained 1000 pellets of cobalt-60. As the magazine explained, each pellet emitted 100 gigabecquerels of radioactivity, enough to put somebody over their annual safety limit within a couple of minutes. “There are also tens of thousands of large radiation sources used by industry such as gauges, sterilizers and metal irradiators,” the report stated. That was followed by the IAEA expressing concern about the security

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The report disclosed that there were more than 10,000 sources designed for radiotherapy, each of which contained 1000 pellets of cobalt-60.

Stretcher bearers move a “dirty,” or radiological contaminated patient, from a rickshaw stretcher to a bed during a mass casualty exercise aboard the Military Sealift Command hospital ship USNS Mercy. The ship’s crew is participating in a “Dirty Bomb” scenario, part of a five-day training evolution at Mercy’s homeport of San Diego, Calif. The crew consisted of over 60 Sailors from Mercy’s Reduced Operational Status or ships company, and over 600 from Balboa Naval Hospital. Mercy is one of only two hospital ships operated by the U.S. Navy. Photo by Photographer’s Mate 3rd Class Johansen Laurel.

of hundreds of thermo-generators made in Russia and the West, in which heat produced by radioactive decay drives a generator to provide power in remote areas. The IAEA’s smuggling figures did not include radiation sources that have simply gone missing. “An average of one a day is reported to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission as lost, stolen or abandoned,” the report read. There were still more than 1,000 radioactive sources unaccounted for in Iraq. Of 25 sources stolen from the Krakatau steel company in Indonesia in October 2000, only three were ever recovered. In Tbilisi, Georgia, a taxi driver named Tedo Makeria was stopped by police in May 2003 and found to be carrying leadlined boxes containing strontium-90 and caesium-137. In Belarus, customs officials seized 26 radioactive cargoes, six of them from Russia. In a large RDD blast within the confines of a city, there would obviously be a number of casualties, including people exposed to the actual blast who would succumb to the effects of the chemical explosion and the shrapnel that it disperses, as would be the case with a conventional bomb. Dr. von Wielligh pointed out that it is extremely unlikely that there will be a vast amount of radioactive material in the immediate vicinity of an RDD blast, or people would die right there from radiation. Acute radiation effects— including death—will likely appear in the days, weeks or months that follow the exposure. The main purpose of a RDD is to contaminate the surroundings and to disrupt normal commercial and other activities for an extended period. The principle initial objective of detonating a “dirty bomb” is likely to create

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Sailors test the countermeasure wash down system aboard the U.S. 7th Fleet command ship USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19). The countermeasure wash down system is used to defend the ship from a chemical, biological or radiological weapons attack. Photo by: Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Daniel Viramontes panic on a massive scale, which would unquestionably happen, should the attack take place in the heart of any major city. While the radiation effect which follows is secondary, it is important to accept that when human tissue is exposed to radiation, energy is absorbed which could lead to a variety of harmful consequences coupled to a variety of associated symptoms. The number of casualties may not be as many as some predict: a major bomb in downtown Chicago or Berlin might result in

hundreds rather than thousands of casualties, of which a limited number would die. Radiation can either have deterministic (acute) or stochastic (probabilistic) effects. Acute effects occur after high doses are delivered in a relatively short period and manifest typically within a few days. Stochastic effects typically occur after low doses of radiation are assimilated but will only manifest in years or decades after exposure and then probably as a form of cancer. As with the victims

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A Soldier, right, from 178th Engineer Company, 1st Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, gives instructions to Joe Bartlett, a Department of Defense civilian with Safety Solutions, during a field training exercise at the Combined Arms Collective Training Facility on Fort Polk, La., Dec. 6, 2011. During the exercise, held December 5-9, Soldiers were exposed to a simulated chemical environment where they had to conduct life-saving and life-sustaining operations. Soldiers of 178th Engineer Company and other elements of 1st Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, are assigned in support of the Joint Task Force Civil Support, Defense Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear Response Force. The DCRF is a total force of about 5,400 personnel consisting of primarily Army with augmentation from other services and civilians from active-duty, National Guard and reserve units, who deploy as the Department of Defense's initial response force for a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Enhanced Conventional Weapons incident. Photo by: Sgt. Ida Tate

of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki blasts, there were people still dying a generation or two after those two attacks. Even when persons are exposed to high radiation, such as the “Blue Flash” chain reaction incident associated with a plutonium criticality accident which happened at Los Alamos during the early phase of building the bomb, it will not lead to immediate death.

The scientist who, in the 1940s, experienced the very first “Blue Flash” at Los Alamos—an exposure of about 8 Gy—walked unaided to the hospital where he died four weeks later. One of the facility’s security guards standing about 12 or 15 feet away suffered no lasting injury. Using the same plutonium setup, another person involved in the Manhattan Program created a second

criticality accident nine months later and he died after about a week. Death due to radiation is seldom immediate. In both of these incidents, chain reactions were generated and the plutonium actually went critical, releasing prodigious amounts of radiation. A chain reaction in a solution of, say, enriched uranium salts in water is even more deadly. Whereas one needs scores of pounds of metal to go critical,

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Circle 329Counter on ReaderTerrorist Service Card 70 The ~ February/March 2015

about 200 grams of HEU salts in water can become critical. Many criticality accidents in laboratories in which people subsequently died, took place in solution systems during processing. Ideally, the radioactive material used in a “dirty bomb” terror attack should be something that might be dispersed by the initial explosion: most likely in the form of a powder, the finer the better. Solid and highly active spent fuel ceramic uranium oxide pellets would need to be crushed or remotely ground and the uranium metal/zirconium fuel plates would have to be remotely mechanically powdered to be of any practical use. Consequently, dispersing whole ceramic uranium oxide pellets by an explosive would make clean-up much easier as the contamination will mostly be contained in the pellets. Using spent

uranium-zirconium metal fuel would probably result in some shrapnel, but the contamination would also be localised and therefore not difficult to clean up. Spent fuel elements are thus unlikely candidates for a RDD. The radioactive material in a RDD may come from medical therapeutic sources (such as caesium-137 and cobalt-60) or from industrial radiographic equipment (in which case it would probably be cobalt-60). There are many documented cases where obsolete equipment, using such sources, have ended up in scrap heaps and were subsequently melted down and incorporated in steel, rendering it radioactive. There have been instances where entire structures have had to be torn down as a consequence. There was also a case where about 100 grams of caesium-137 in a therapeutic

device from an abandoned clinic in Goiânia, Brazil was scavenged and the glowing cesium salt sold to curious buyers. That incident resulted in the death of four people. Under normal circumstances, Cs-137 is extracted in small quantities during the reprocessing of spent fuel and must be remotely handled in so-called “hot cells.” Moreover, Cs-137 is a strong emitter of penetrating gamma rays (similar to X-rays). No glove or surgical mask will provide any protection. If terrorists with little regard for their own longevity, or the deaths of others, handle this material without protection from the emanating deadly radiation, they too will die. One nuclear scientist who was prepared to offer advice on the subject suggested that rather than go through the complicated and hazardous steps to specially prepare spent fuel in a suitable

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likely, produce lots of unwanted fission products. Because it is regarded as waste, it is only protected for its hazardous properties and not for any intrinsic value. Spent fuel reprocessing facilities are little more than large industrial plants that use special materials and can be found in France, the UK, Japan and Russia. Sources for materials for Radiological Dispersal Devices are plentiful.

form for a RDD, it would be easier to visit a scrap yard with a wheelbarrow and search for a discarded, shielded source in a developing country where regulatory oversight is weak or nonexistent. Alternatively, he said, one could steal industrial sources in their protective containers. It is known in the West that such industrial and medical sources disappear at an alarming rate all over the world. The mentioned scientist recalled a case where a container with a medical isotope was stolen from the freight section at Johannesburg International Airport in South Africa. Another possible scenario would be to get hold of the waste left after the reprocessing of spent fuel. This will not contain plutonium (extracted in the reprocessing process together with any unused uranium) but more

•

about the author Mr. Venter is the author of more than 50 books and is also producer and director of TV films. His most notable effort was a one-hour documentary on the war in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion at the behest of the CIA. His latest book, Mercenaries is linked to a six part series of the same name for Discovery Channel and he recently published Portugal’s Guerrilla Wars in Africa.

Endnotes Christopher Andrew: Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5, Allen Lane, London, 2009. 2 William J. Broad ‘Document Reveals 1987 Bomb Test by Iraq,’ New York Times April 29, 2001. 3 “British Terrorist Dhiren Barot’s Research on Radiological Weapons”, by Robert Wesley, Terrorism Focus Volume 3, Issue 44 (November 14, 2006): Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC. 4 Robert Welsey, Ibid CRS Report for the United States Congress Radiological Dispersal Devices: Select Issues in Consequence Management by Dana A. Shea Analyst in Science and Technology Policy Resources, Science, and Industry Division. 1

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Circle 303Counter on ReaderTerrorist Service Card 72 The ~ February/March 2015

Alternative Perspectives on the Radicalization of Home-grown and

“Leaderless” Terrorists

Vikram Rajakumar

Two theories used to explain criminal behaviour are adapted here to provide an alternative means of understanding the radicalization of home-grown and “leaderless” terrorists.

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adicalization is a complex issue influenced by regional and country characteristics and dynamics as well as individual circumstances. However, another way of understanding the radicalization process of home-grown and “leaderless” terrorists could involve the use of theories that explain criminal behaviour. Two such theories are discussed here – Strain Theory and Differential Association Theory – with the aim of exploring how they can improve our understanding of radicalization in order to take better preventive action as well as design more suitable de-radicalization or disengagement programs. Home-grown terrorists usually refer to individuals that are citizens or residents of the country they carry out acts of violence against. They may draw resources, expertise and leadership from external terrorist groups and networks, but this is not an essential characteristic as home-grown terrorists can also be “leaderless.” Leaderless terrorists usually have no connection to external terrorist groups or networks. They are individuals that are self-radicalized, typically through the Internet, and carry out attacks independently.

Strain Theory Robert Agnew’s General Strain Theory implies that strain is caused by a failure to achieve certain material goals. There are three parts to this: 1) the failure to achieve positively valued goods, 2) the removal of positively valued stimuli, and 3) the presentation of negative stimuli. Agnew acknowledges that individuals have varying abilities to cope with stress, peer influence, past experiences, socio-economic status and financial circumstances. Along with these, ethnic minority status and religious, cultural and linguistic differences between an individual and his peers will create strain on an individual in one way or another. For instance, when an individual’s socioeconomic status or discrimination due to being an ethnic or religious minority limits his or her ability to attain a college degree, this can reduce their opportunities to secure a well-paying job, which in turn affects whether they can realize their material desires. However these materialistic desires do not cease to exist even though they cannot be achieved, and strain occurs on the individual

The radicalization process of homegrown and leaderless terrorists is not readily explained by existing models and theories. However, in order to develop effective preventive action against the emergence of such terrorists, their radicalization process must be thoroughly understood. In light of this, Strain Theory and Differential Association Theory, which originally seek to explain the causes of criminal behaviour, are adapted here to provide an alternative perspective.

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to achieve them at some point. One possible way for individuals to resolve this strain is to circumvent the limits on their socio-economic situation and status as a discriminated ethnic or religious minority through criminal means. This encapsulates Agnew’s assertion that the compulsion to commit a crime is a result of social strain. The same concept can be used to explain one part of homegrown terrorism involving leaderless, self-radicalized terrorists. A well-known example is that of Timothy McVeigh, nicknamed the Oklahoma Bomber. When the Oklahoma City bombing occurred in 1995, one of the immediate questions that arose was how did a former soldier who had served a tour of duty in Iraq turn into a home-grown terrorist? Since young, McVeigh had a fascination for guns and the survivalist movement, which turned into obsessions by the time he was in junior high school. He joined the US military partly to satisfy his passion for weapons and survivalist behaviour, and partly out of frustration with a lack of employment opportunities. Having access to a number of weapons and a steady income was a positive stimulus to McVeigh. After his tour in Iraq during the first Gulf War, however, McVeigh was affected by failing to realize his goal of entering the US Special Forces. Furthermore, he also experienced removal of positive stimuli in the form of his friends in the military leaving for civilian life and the short conclusion of the Gulf War which robbed him of the chance to see extensive combat. After McVeigh left the military at the end of 1991, he developed anti-government sentiments. He confided his fears about the government taking away his personal collection of weapons and published

letters in local newspapers claiming that America was in decline. The presidency of Bill Clinton, which saw a campaign for gun control, presented a further removal of positive stimulus given McVeigh’s obsession with guns and his odd jobs in the gun show circuit. However, from McVeigh’s own statements regarding why he carried out the Oklahoma City bombing, there were two major negative stimuli which combined with his anti-government sentiment and finally motivated him to carry out the attack. First, the shootout in August 1992 between federal agents and survivalist Randy Weaver, in which Weaver’s wife and son were killed and second, the April 1993 siege at Waco in Texas during which members of a Christian sect were killed in a raid by federal authorities. McVeigh’s example is thus a useful indicator of Strain Theory’s value in explaining the push and pull factors involved in the radicalization of leaderless home-grown terrorists. All three indicators of the theory – the failure to achieve positively valued goods, the removal of positively valued stimuli and the presentation of negative stimuli – are seen in this case.

Differential Association Theory Edwin Sutherland’s Theory of Differential Association explains crime as a function of a learning process that could affect any individual from any background. The first principle of the theory states that criminal behaviour is learned through interactions with other persons. Although this seems an obvious fact, the theory elaborates that

individuals to criminal behaviour itself. When criminal behaviour is constantly discussed and idolized within a personal group, its legitimacy begins to shift. An illegitimate act can attain the status of perceived legitimacy and in some instances, righteousness. This aspect of Differential Association theory is particularly useful to explain the radicalization process when an individual comes into contact with a group of people that shares strong views and opinions. In the case of Tamerlan Tsarnaev, it is believed that his time in Dagestan, as well as his exposure to radical and extremist websites and literature de-sensitized his view of committing violence.

criminal behaviour is learned through intimate interactions within personal groups. Differential association may vary in frequency, duration and intensity. The extent to which criminal behaviour is learned thus depends on how it is reinforced through the interactions that take place in personal groups.

Conclusion

The same is also true of terrorist behaviour. A case study that can be used to illustrate this is that of Tamerlan Tsarnaev, one of the two brothers responsible for the Boston bombings in April 2013. In the year prior to carrying out the Boston bombing, Tamerlan Tsarnaev was reported to have spent six months in Dagestan, located in the North Caucasus region of Russia. During his time there, it is believed he came into contact with Dagestani militants during frequent interactions at a radical mosque. Furthermore, Tamerlan was actively engaged in online contact with other self-radicalized individuals such as William Plotnikov, a Russian-born Canadian who returned to Dagestan in 2010 to engage armed jihad.

Strain Theory and Differential Association Theory provide useful insight into the radicalization of home-grown and leaderless terrorists. Strain Theory helps explain the push and pull factors during the process of radicalization as seen in the case of Timothy McVeigh, while Differential Association Theory can illustrate how the internet and intimate contact within personal groups facilitates leaderless terrorists’ radicalization. As more literature continues to emerge in the study of radicalization, the theories explored here point to a useful synergy that can be developed in future between theories used to explain criminal behaviour and theories that map out radicalization and seek to explain terrorist behaviour.

Another important aspect that Sutherland identifies is the de-sensitization of

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Patriot3 Patriot3 is a premier provider and authority in elevated tactical systems, ballistic shields, complete mobile ballistic barrier systems and specialized maritime products. Patriot3 is a leader in innovation with its one-of-a-kind products designed especially for law enforcement and military agencies throughout the world. Security Solutions International LLC provides the elevated tactics training using specialized equipment and tools such as those manufactured by Patriot3. Improve your tactical surprise and force protection with additional operational options provided through elevated, special-use vehicles during this two-day introduction and awareness training. www.Patriot3.com

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SSI PVB The Portable Vehicle Barrier transfers the momentum of a moving vehicle upwards and stops it in its tracks. Two adults can deploy the barrier in minutes without any need for electricity. It can be equipped with wheels to act as a swing barrier. You can add anchoring cables and place the PVBs in a single row or more. The PVB can be folded quickly for moving and storage; it is reusable and durable. www.ssipvb.com

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Innovative Products CONVOSEC App This app was created by Surveillance One to help secure sensitive conversation in an era of increasingly aggressive attempts to compromise open air communications (such as the rogue cell towers recently discovered in Washington, DC). The app features: encrypted VOIP, 256 Bit AES encryption, callsign and countersign options for code name communications, and point to point contact based on a unique code name or alias. The manufacturer promises: no cell phone numbers or data collected, no UDID collected, and no GPS data collected. www.convosec.com

Obama’s Blaster Whether your agency has recognized the benefits of short barrel rifles for your operations, or you simply want to have your own 5.56x45 mm “pistol” with an ATF approved “stabilizing brace”, Ares Armor’s upper may be the answer for you. Given the satirical name, “Obama’s Blaster” in an homage to the unpopular president’s inadvertent policy contributions to staggering gun sales, this complete upper performs well. It includes: a 10.5" 4142 high carbon steel barrel with a black nitride coating, 1:7 twist, Harpe Free Float Rail, and a nickel boron M16 bolt carrier group. www.aresarmor.com

Phantom Warrior MT This multitask flashlight operates on standard AA batterys, has solid state bulbs and has two intensity levels on the primary forward flashlight mode. This is designed to save both your night vision and your power consumption by only using the light you need. High intensity mode shines at 100 lumens. This light also features a unique integrated side strobe/steady light. This enables teammates to locate each other by sight instead of providing locations verbally. The side lights are available in amber/white, red/blue, or red/white. The light can mount on a belt for easy access. www.phantomlights.com

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015 77

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80 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015 81

Training Review

NSIC Institute Founders Class By Chris Graham

hen Kevin Freeman, author of the best-selling books Secret Weapon: How Economic Terrorism Brought Down the U.S. Stock Market and Why it Can Happen Again and Game Plan, asked me if I would be interested in speaking at the National Security Investment Consultant Institute founders class conference, I was honored. Knowing both how important and widely misunderstood the topics he has written about are, I was motivated to move my schedule around however was necessary to participate. When he asked me when I could attend, I asked him if he objected to my attending the entire conference. I expected this would be a unique opportunity to gain valuable insight that few people have access to. On a windy November day, on the Oklahoma Wesleyan University (OKWU) campus, select financial consultants invited gathered in The Keating Center for Capitalism, Free Enterprise, and Constitutional Liberty to attend presentations from some wellknown specialists in economic warfare and related disciplines. The conference began with an introduction from former governor and current president of the American Bankers Association, Frank Keating. Dr. Everett Piper provided an introduction to OKWU and Kevin Freeman discussed his 2009 DOD report on economic

warfare that inspired his two books and his blog: www.globaleconomicwarfare. com. Freeman is one of very few prominent figures capable of accurately discussing the precarious position the United States is in. Elements of these economic warfare threats were manifest in the 2008 financial collapse. This collapse has since been demonstrated to have involved elements of deliberate orchestration. Freeman discussed the 6 May 2010 “Flash Crash,” a 13 May 2014 “de-dollarization” meeting of adversarial nations planning for a world with a destroyed dollar and several other fascinating publicly known, if widely ignored, episodes of adversaries planning and acting against the United States with

82 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015

economic warfare, influence operations and other components of modern warfare. Freeman screened a video on Unrestricted Warfare, the Chinese strategy for obliquely defeating the USA apparently being practiced by multiple national adversaries that he had been involved in creating for the popular cable news program “For The Record.” Frank Gaffney, president of the Center for Security Policy, spoke on the subject of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) threats to the U.S. power grid and chronicled unclassified assessments of several adversaries EMP capabilities and programs. He encouraged individuals to join the “Secure the Grid Coalition” at securethegrid.com. Dr. Tom Barrett spoke on the history of money. He explained that money originated as a convenience in lieu of bartering. It evolved into currency backed by something of value (such as gold) and eventually deteriorated into modern currency backed by nothing and printed at-will. He discussed ways to invest in gold. Overstock.com CEO Patrick Byrne and Mark Mitchell spoke on the subject of financial corruption. They discussed regulatory capture, hedge fund insider trading schemes, settlement system failures, systemic risk, and the economic warfare conducted by organized crime groups and foreign governments.

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While my description may sound dry, the presentation was fascinating and very specific. You can see some of their insights at www.DeepCapture.com. Brian Pardo, CEO of Life Partners, Inc., discussed his experiences facing a financial attack. He provided an interesting first-hand narrative of the actions he encountered as outside entities attempted to destroy his company. Clare Lopez, a retired CIA operations officer and the Vice President for Research and Analysis at the Center for Security Policy, provided multiple blocks of instruction. She gave specific insight to current regional conflicts and the current status of initiatives from a range of adversarial nations and groups. She spoke decisively and unapologetically on the subject of Islamic supremacist group’s direct action and influence operations. Her lectures were insightful and detailed. Joe Schmitz, former Inspector General of the DOD, spoke on the subjects of Constitutionality, “Moral Relativism” and human trafficking. He introduced his clever initiative to provide cyber security training in each state, named I-State USA. Dr. John Lenczowski, former advisor to President Reagan and President of the Institute of World Politics, held the group’s close attention with a lecture on current international challenges. He focused particularly on Russia and the People’s Republic of China. His presentation effortlessly cut through superficial trappings to the significant elements of the dilemmas American leaders currently face. I spoke briefly on the general subject of “Deception in Warfare.” The premise being that deception is universally practiced as a component of warfare. Variation only exists in the volume and

competence of deceptive activities. Most importantly, anyone who sees themselves as being at war with you sees themselves as justified to deceive you. I provided examples and encouraged individuals to be cautious when adversaries even speak to their constituents using euphemisms of war. Travis Farral, a well-known information security specialist, spoke on the subject of personal cyber security. Kelly Gaeth, the Vice President of Commercial Portfolio Risk Management and Credit Analytics for the largest privately held bank holding company in America, lectured on the topic of contingency planning. A common topic, his presentation was interesting where others sometimes fall short. His discussion of the common “incredulity response” of individuals in critical circumstances who fail to take appropriate action was particularly valuable. Ken Abramowitz, founder of www. SaveTheWest.com, spoke on the threats to Western civilization. He provided unclouded analysis with incisive, uncomplicated conclusions. Rod Martin, CEO of The Martin Organization and a founder of www. PayPal.com, spoke on the future of technology and commerce. While the conference’s focus on the threats to our country and challenges in our defensive measures was a sober topic, Martin’s presentation was optimistic and gave reason to be encouraged. Retired LtGen. William Boykin, a plank owner and former commander of the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta, talked to the group over dinner. He delivered a humorous and encouraging speech. He warned of the threats we face, requested God’s blessing, and introduced the co-author of his novel, The Coalition, Kamal Saleem. LtGen. Boykin and his co-author, former

84 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015

jihadist Saleem, took questions and gave direct answers. I found the three-and-a-half day event to be highly useful and informative. I commented to another present that I could not remember the last time I spent that much time on one activity feeling as though not a moment was wasted. As a former military officer, intelligence officer, and government consultant, I am used to being in rooms where there is a general awareness of the challenges facing our country but where aggressive self-censorship is universally practiced to appease the prevailing leadership whims of our time. I found being in a room full of people openly discussing the threats our country faces without concern for being politically correct to be disorientingly unfamiliar. I left with the same level of concern for the challenges our nation faces that I arrived with. However, I left encouraged that there are key people in the financial world viewing these challenges clearly. I believe that every American must choose between being a part of the solution or part of the problem. Upholding our oath to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic”, is how you and I can be part of the solution. Visiting www.NSIC.org is how elite financial specialists can learn how they can choose to be part of the solution and better serve their clients. www.nsic.org

•

Batten down the Hatches for IS in Indonesia Rakyan Adibrata

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015 85

hanks to the advance of technology, globalisation of jihad is no longer a far distant phenomenon but now a close and personal reality. The communication revolution which drives the new globalisation, as Anthony Giddens takes it, has certainly gone beyond individuals and profoundly altered the way institutions interact. Jihadi groups are not exception to the rule and jihadists are not immune to the transformation. Ulrich Beck correctly argued that the gain in power from technological and economic progress is immediately followed by the production of risks. To put it rather crudely, global village does not preclude jihadists in its midst.

or the Islamic State (IS). Facebook is become so much a la mode that a jihadist is apt to feel comfortable to place it as one the newest additions to their arsenal of weapons. Not only a means by which a jihadist interacts with another, it is a venue to exchange and introduce ideas: from how to make home-made bomb to recipe of pancakes for IS fighters. Another medium worth of note is news site. Arrahmah, VOA Islam, and al-Mustaqbal, for examples, keep hard-line Muslims updated with the latest in jihadi world. While Arrahmah promotes the necessity of jihad in Syria, al-Mustaqbal gets on soapbox for IS as the true caliphate all Muslims ought to pay allegiance to.

Social media has gained popularity as one of the most effective means of recruitment for the Dawlah Islamiyah

The Islamic State finds its unofficial but self-appointed mouthpiece in the form of a terrorist convict named Aman

86 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015

Abdurrahman who called himself Abu Sulaiman al-Arkhabily, apparently taking the name of the Ottoman emperor whose troops subdued parts of Europe and were at one time on the verge of conquering Vienna. Currently serving a nine years imprisonment sentence for aiding a terrorist paramilitary training camp in Aceh in 2010, Abdurrahman is a cum laude graduate of Saudi sponsored religious institution and a prolific translator of IS propaganda. Apart from online publication in alMustaqbal, his writings, smuggled outside prison, also appear in Millah Ibrahim (Abrahamâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Nation) and Tauhid wal Jihad (Monotheism and Holy War) websites. The latter takes the name from an al-Qaida affiliated terrorist group led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who was Abdurrahmanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s personal hero.

Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT), there are more than 500 Indonesians currently fighting in Syria. Not all of them directly go from Jakarta to fight. Prior to joining IS, some like Umar Mitha was a student in Syria and a humanitarian worker with HASI (Hilal Ahmar Society of Indonesia) – a radical and splinter Indonesian Red Crescent.

But Aman Abdurrahman is not alone. There are many jihadi organisations in Indonesia, though small in number but they are loud and remain potently dangerous. However many jihadists who decided to support IS often do so out of dissatisfaction, and disappointment, with their former organisations. Their jihadi spirit, somehow it seems, needs much more radical accommodation. There is such precedence in Indonesian history. Terrorist organisation Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) was founded after some members found their former organisation the Islamic separatist Darul Islam (DI) as not radical and puritan enough. Also the 2002 Bali bombers Mukhlas and Imam Samudra took their plan to action after vain expectation of the pace in the efforts of establishing an Islamic state.

The spiritual guru of Indonesian jihadists, Abu Bakar Ba’ashir recently fell under the spell of Abdurrahman. The incarcerated Ba’ashir, a Yemeni descent, who shares the same block in prison with him, pledged allegiance to IS Caliph Abu Bakar alBaghdadi. But some members of his UN designated terrorist organisation Jama’ah Ansar al-Tawhid (Community of the Helpers of Monotheism) and successor to JI, dissented. They established Jama’ah Ansar al-Shariah (JAS), headed by Ba’ashir’s own two sons. JAS, which shares similar name with a militant Islamist groups in Yemen, seems to side with alQaida affiliated al-Nusra Front. Syrian conflict dissevers Indonesian jihadi groups. According to Indonesian National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT),

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015 87

there are more than 500 Indonesians currently fighting in Syria. Not all of them directly go from Jakarta to fight. Prior to joining IS, some like Umar Mitha was a student in Syria and a humanitarian worker with HASI (Hilal Ahmar Society of Indonesia) â&#x20AC;&#x201C; a radical and splinter Indonesian Red Crescent. Recently added to US designated terrorist organisation, HASI is a front organisation for JI and has sent groups of people to fight for alNusra Front. Wanting to outdo JI, JAT acting leader Afif Abdul Majid has trained members and gathered funds to send to Syria. But some of the jihadists do go directly from Indonesia under the pretext of performing pilgrimage to Mecca or

visiting Turkey before converging in Syria. They fund their trip by selling properties like houses, food stalls, and fishing boats. But they need not to worry if they are short of cash. Support of up to IDR 20 million for the travel can easily be found through rallies and personal assistance. The Indonesian jihadists supporting IS are mainly averaging between 17 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; 25 years of age. Devoid of significant role and struggle, many jihadists have discovered Syrian conflict as an impetus as a cause for an important struggle. Albeit becoming the main force of jihad, Eastern Indonesia Mujahidin (MIT) fighting in Poso, Central Sulawesi, against the government

88 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015

chose to declare support for IS hoping to receive financial support and international recognition. Jakarta, Banten and West Java provinces are most possibly the biggest contributors of IS recruits. The reason is simple enough: many jihadists live in western part of Java. West Java and Banten are historically the base areas for DI. The 2004 Australian Embassy bomber Iman Darmawan alias Rois Abu Syaukat commands terrible influence in Banten. Almost eighty percent of terrorists held in Tangerang prison, administratively located in Banten province but practically in the outskirt of Jakarta, fully support IS. But the sentiment is not universally

received by their fellow terrorist convicts in Jakarta. Jakarta terrorist detention centres are mainly dominated by JI senior figure such as Abu Dujana and Dzulkarnain. Jakarta in general falls under Aman Abdurrahman’s sphere of influence. One of Abdurrahman’s staunch supporter Bahrum Shah, alias Abu Muhammad al-Indunisi, appears in YouTube video entitled Join the Rank, urging Indonesians to come to fight with IS in Syria. JAT also enjoys substantial supports in the three provinces. Former JAT spokesperson Ainur Rafiq, for instance, continues unabated to campaign for IS through Islamic study groups. The northern area of East Java, especially the city of Lamongan, is another main source of IS recruits. The city, where Bali bomber Amrozi was born and grew up, is plagued by Abdurrahman’s supporters who are associated with Siswanto, a religious instructor in al-Islam religious school founded by Amrozi’s family. One of Siswanto’s students Khalid Muqawwan was killed in Syria recently. There is also a growing concern elsewhere. In Solo, Central Java, where Amrozi and many Indonesian terrorists received their religious instructions, a small group which often conducted paramilitary

government must take serious measures to anticipate any possibilities on their return to the country. Police and intelligence agencies should engage them through various means including deployment of former Indonesian jihadists in Afghanistan to provide counternarratives. Lest effective counter-terrorism policies be implemented, Syrian conflict may found its hands extended into a bigger nightmare in Indonesia.

training recently professed allegiance to IS. A number of senior clerics in the area such as Salman al-Farisi is known to be IS supporter. However many jihadists in Central and East Java provinces are of JI background and not under the influence of Abdurrahman and hence lean more towards al-Nusra Front. Though never renouncing violence, they are an effective means to resist and dispel IS from the Islamist perspectives. The battle for IS has been a theological battle within Indonesian jihadists. Once caliphate is proclaimed and a caliph is appointed, it is obligatory for all Muslims to follow them. So goes the argument for IS. The crux of the matter is the question of whether Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi was the right choice and if the Islamic State is truly “Islamic” and a “state”. Regardless of the outcome of the splitting hairs in the debate, supporters of IS and its rivals in Syria cannot be taken lightly as they both project an existential threat to the Indonesian state which they considered as an invention of the perverted tyrannical infidel. Let’s suppose only half of the Indonesian jihadists fighting in Syria supported IS: it’s already too many to ignore. If only half of them have the capability to conduct successful terrorist actions, they could indeed create havoc. Indonesian

about the author Rakyan Adibrata is terrorism researcher more than a decade, he worked for three years as an Expert Adviser for MP at the Commission III (Law, Human Right & Security) at The Republic of Indonesia House of Representative, advising on homeland security and human right issue to the MP. He was appointed as one of the adviser to a Special Committee that drafted the Anti Financing of Terrorism Bill from 2012 until 2013. Rakyan obtained Certified Counter Terrorism Practitioner (CCTP) in 2013.

The battle for IS has been a theological battle within Indonesian jihadists. Once caliphate is proclaimed and a caliph is appointed, it is obligatory for all Muslims to follow them. So goes the argument for IS. The crux of the matter is the question of whether Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi was the right choice and if the Islamic State is truly “Islamic” and a “state”. Regardless of the outcome of the splitting hairs in the debate, supporters of IS and its rivals in Syria cannot be taken lightly as they both project an existential threat to the Indonesian state which they considered as an invention of the perverted tyrannical infidel.

The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015 89

90 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2015

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