ISRAELI C ARRY • HISTORY OF SELOUS SC OUTS • FLYING ARMED • SE CURIT Y C ONSEQUENCES
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VOLUME 9 • NUMBER 1
SECONDARY AND TERTIARY EXPLOITATION OF EVENTS
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The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March2015 2016 3 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November
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The Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals FEBRUARY/MARCH 2016 VOLUME 9 • NUMBER 1
COVER STORY: 20
SECONDARY AND TERTIARY EXPLOITATION OF EVENTS by Dr. Clairissa D. Breen, PhD, CAS
FEATURES:
CONTENTS
20
8
34
08 14 34 42 54
HISTORY OF THE SELOUS SCOUTS by Lieutenant Colonel Ron Reid-Daly CLM, DMM, MBE, Selous Scouts
73 77 81
GLOBAL THREAT FORECAST: THE RISE OF ISIS by Prof Rohan Gunaratna
ISRAELI CARRY FOR ARMED AND RESPONSIBLE CITIZENS by Ken Pagano LESSONS FROM THE RECENT WAVE OF ATTACKS by John Gomez POTENTIAL SECURITY CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW AMERICAN COLLEGE CAMPUS by Joseph J. Kolb
INDONESIA THREAT FORECAST by Muh Taufiqurrohman MALAYSIA THREAT FORECAST by Stefanie Kam and Nur Azlin Mohamed Yasin
DEPARTMENTS: 06
32
42
FLYING WITH FIREARMS by Garret Machine
From the Editor If the U.S. does not negotiate with terrorists, then why are they arraigned in Civilian court?
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The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016 5
Counter The
FROM THE EDITOR:
If the U.S. does not negotiate with terrorists, then why are they arraigned in Civilian court? by Garret Machine
Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals
VOLUME 9 • NUMBER 1
FEBRUARY/MARCH 2016 Editor Garret Machine Director of Operations Carmen Arnaes
S
hould a terrorist be given the same civil rights and due process of law that a criminal would have? Every society is plagued with crime, but only some are plagued with terrorism. If a perpetrator is actively engaging in violent deadly behavior, does it matter what their ideology is? No, in the moment it makes no difference. Can a first responder to an active shooter know in that moment the motivation of the shooter and will they have enough information in that moment to decide the appropriate level of force? In real time, no they will not. We need to make a shift in our way of thinking and it can only come from the top down. If a person is stabbing, shooting, running over, etc., they are a terrorist, an enemy of our society, and must be dealt with swiftly. Until we recognize this as parallel to an enemy combatant invading our country and intent on destroying our way of life, we will not be able to effectively fight it. You cannot defeat terrorism because it is decentralized and the parameters for its success are undefined. You can, however, suppress it. Let me tell you a quick story to illustrate the point. In 2008, a terrorist stole a front loader or bulldozer from a construction site on Jaffa Street in Jerusalem, Israel. This street in this city is equivalent to the main street in downtown Anytown, U.S.A. at midday. The terrorist then proceeded to crush cars, run over people, and flip over a city bus. A twenty-year-old off-duty soldier (who had recently been drafted into the IDF) happened to be walking down the street when this happened. The soldier ran up to a security guard, grabbed his pistol, sprinted up to the bulldozer, and climbed up to the cockpit. He shot the terrorist in the head at point blank range as the terrorist was yelling “Allahu akbar.” There was no arrest, no court of public opinion, no investigation of the soldier’s actions, no lawyers, and no secondguessing his reaction. He was commended for his aggression, decisiveness, bravery, and for ridding the world of evil by the Prime Minister himself.
Garret Machine Editor, The Counter Terrorist
Director of Advertizing Sol Bradman Administrative Ashley Villegas Contributing Editors Dr. Clairissa D. Breen Lieutenant Colonel Ron Reid-Daly Ken Pagano John Gomez Joseph J. Kolb ASIAN PACIFIC EDITION Director of Operations Yaniv Peretz Graphic Design Morrison Creative Company Copy Editor Laura Town Advertising Sales Maria Efremova Maria@loringlobal.com +65 90266571 Publisher: Security Solutions International 13155 SW 134th St. • STE 103 Miami, Florida 33186 ISSN 1941-8639 The Counter Terrorist Magazine, Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals is published by Security Solutions International LLC, as a service to the nation’s First Responders and Homeland Security Professionals with the aim of deepening understanding of issues related to Terrorism. No part of the publication can be reproduced without permission from the publisher. The opinions expressed herein are the opinions of the authors represented and not necessarily the opinions of the publisher. Please direct all Editorial correspondence related to the magazine to: Security Solutions International SSI, 13155 SW 134th Street, Suite 103, Miami, Florida. 33186 or info@thecounterterroristmag.com The subscription price for 6 issues is $34.99 and the price of the magazine is $5.99. (1-866-573-3999) Fax: 1-786-573-2090. For article reprints, e-prints, posters and plaques please contact: Security Solutions International at villegas@homelandsecurityssi.com or call 786-573-3999 Please visit the magazine web site where you can also contact the editorial staff:
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HISTORY OF THE SELOUS SCOUTS 8 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016
by Lieutenant Colonel Ron Reid-Daly CLM, DMM, MBE, Selous Scouts
The first serious terrorist incursions into Rhodesia took place during 1967/68. In the military operations which were swiftly mounted by the Rhodesian security forces when these incursions were detected, the terrorist forces were annihilated almost to a man.
S
urvivors of these actions who managed to re-cross the Zambezi River and return to their bases sat down with their leaders to find out what had gone wrong so that they could revise their strategy and tactics. They realized that their first mistake had been to enter the uninhabited game areas of the Zambezi Valley, which the Rhodesian security forces knew like the backs of their hands. For the Rhodesian forces it was simply a matter of finding their tracks, following them, and neutralizing the terrorists when they were brought to contact. This
they did with considerable efficiency. The terrorist hierarchy became aware that they had ignored the major tenet of Mao Tse-tung: if the guerrilla is to enjoy any measure of success, he must have the support of the people who will feed him, hide him, guide him, and act as his eyes and ears against the security forces. Having grasped this fundamental truth, the terrorist forces set to work on implementing this strategy. The first fruits of their success came about in December 1972, when the terrorists opened up a new campaign in the northeastern border areas of
Rhodesia, using FRELIMO infrastructure as base areas. Intelligence, that vital ingredient in insurgent warfare, dried up, leaving the Rhodesian forces baffled and dispirited because they could not get to grips with their enemy. Fortunately for the Rhodesians, at this time a small experimental “pseudogroup� had commenced operations. This group, modeled on the pseudo-gangs that had been used in the Mau Mau campaign in Kenya, set out to make connections with the real terrorists with the aim of initiating a contact. This new dimension in the Rhodesian Bush War was an
The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016 9
‌68% of terrorist kills in the internal operational areas were officially credited to Selous Scouts operations. Operational areas of the Rhodesian Security Forces during the Bush War in the 1970s. Photo by: Cliftonian
A Rhodesian soldier questioning villagers near the border of Botswana in the fall of 1977. Photo by: J. Ross Baughman
10 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016
immediate success and produced a major breakthrough in the means of acquiring of hot, accurate intelligence. Plans were immediately initiated to create a new unit to specialize in pseudo-operations, and the Selous Scouts were born. Volunteers from all units in the Rhodesian Army were called for, a selection and training course was decided on, and in January 1974 the first Selous Scouts troop deployed into the operational area. The second and third troops followed and by the end of March 1974 the Selous Scouts had the capability of deploying three troops into the field. The impact of these men in their operational areas was immediate and electrifying. The Fire Force concept was initiated, and with the Selous Scouts locating terrorist targets for the Fire Force to neutralize, the kill rate rose to an all-time high. The morale of the security forces, which had taken a definite dip as a result of the terrorists changing
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The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016 11
their tactics, rose with the kill rate. The impact of the Selous Scouts on the war is best illustrated by the fact that 68% of terrorist kills in the internal operational areas were officially credited to Selous Scouts operations. However, despite these successes, the war spread into new areas because the terrorists, taking advantage of the collapse of the Portuguese, organized an infrastructure of base and training camps in Mozambique. It was obvious that if these camps were not neutralized, the Rhodesians would be fighting a losing battle, because the rate of attrition in the operational areas was nowhere near the terrorist influx into Rhodesia. But before these camps could be neutralized, it was necessary to have an exact pinpoint of their position. And so yet another dimension was added to the Selous Scouts’ armory in the shape of a specialist external reconnaissance group. The foremost exponent of the art of reconnaissance was, without doubt, Captain Christopher Schulenburg. Under Schulie’s inspiration, a small dedicated
group of black and white scouts was formed to pinpoint external terrorist targets. These men, operating in pairs, one black and one white, would be dropped by means of free-fall parachute, mostly by night, into target areas in Mozambique and Zambia. When enough data had been collected the camps would be attacked, often by motorized raiding columns. The Selous Scouts operated from January 1974 until March 1980, when Rhodesia was sold out. The operations carried out by this unit were many and varied, ranging from internal pseudo-operations to operations designed to destroy FRELIMO and Zambian infrastructure such as trains, bridges and long stretches of railway line. Neutralizing external camps and administration bases was also undertaken and perhaps the best external operation was when seventy-two men entered a Communist terrorist camp in Mozambique dressed up as FRELIMO troops. When the attack had been completed, 1,028 terrorists lay dead in the camp.
Rhodesia is no more and has joined the pages of history. But her security forces can be proud of the fight they carried to the enemy, for they won all their battles but lost the political war. And the Selous Scouts Regiment can stand tall and proud at the forefront of these fine men. The Selous Scouts operators were innovative, imaginative, and brought a new dimension to counterinsurgency on a scale never before seen in any guerrilla war. And perhaps the greatest strength of the Selous Scouts Regiment was its tremendous esprit de corps, which was such that it pulled together not only men of different races and tribes, but even turned terrorists, and bonded them into a unique brotherhood.
•
ABOUT THE AUTHOR The author was a proud member of the Selous Scouts. For a comprehensive account of the origins and history of the famous special forces unit as told by the men of the unit themselves please review Selous Scouts—the Men Speak by Jonathan Pittaway.
Mineproofed armoured vehicles of the Zimbabwe National Army at Methuen Barracks, 1980. Photo by: John Wynne Hopkins
12 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016
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TheThe Counter Terrorist ~ February/March Counter Terrorist ~ February/March2015 2016 73 13
FLYING WITH FIREARMS
14 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016
by Garret Machine
Everyone has heard the phrase “have gun will travel”; well, some take it more seriously then others. Over the last five years I have been traveling all over the country teaching civilians, security, and police the strategies for combating terrorism through live fire training seminars.
I
have been fortunate enough to fall in with the right group of people and have had the pleasure of making my way through 35 states and Canada plus a few other countries. But this is not about the training; it’s about the traveling from state to state by commercial aircraft with firearms. If you work in this field for long
enough, then you too will have to travel with your weapon at some point. So, this is for you.
THE BASICS We all know that the TSA has the very important responsibility of keeping air travel safe and incident free. The
TSA has three simple rules: the firearm must be unloaded and separated from ammunition, locked in a hard sided container, and declared at the checkin counter. But unfortunately, it’s not that simple. Each airport has its own procedure and each airline has its own regulations as well. What I have found,
The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016 15
Screening Checkpoint at Boston Logan International Airport. Photo by: U.S. Federal Government
after traveling twice a week with fifteen pistols and two rifles in tow, is that it is up to the discretion of the individual person at the checkin counter to interpret those rules and regulations. This can make the difference between an uneventful flight and a hassle that will cost you time and money. Some incidents and lessons learned: • If you read the TSA rules, you may believe that ammunition in a magazine is an acceptable way of transporting it. It is not. It’s a $1,000 fine for having
16 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016
a loaded magazine stored in the same container as the unloaded firearm. “Firearm magazines and ammunition clips, whether loaded or empty, must be securely boxed or included within a hard-sided case containing an unloaded firearm.” And “Small arms ammunition, including ammunition not exceeding .75 caliber for rifle or pistol and shotgun shells of any gauge, may be carried in the same hard-sided case as the firearm, as described in the packing guidelines above.”
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They let me throw the ammunition in the trash right there at the terminal so I could check in and make the flight.
Detroit Wayne County Airport. Photo by: Minseong Kim
18 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016
In one incident I experienced, it was the individual agent who made the “loaded” determination, even after the police officer in the terminal inspected the weapon and called it “unloaded by definition.” • An airline ticket agent in a separate incident refused to accept ammunition even when it was in a separate locked container, but in the same larger suitcase. They let me throw the ammunition in the trash right there at the terminal so I could check in and make the flight. • At another airport, a check-in agent refused to accept fifteen firearms even after the TSA cleared them to fly. I had to have a friend from a local gun shop come pick up the firearms so I could make the flight. • Sometimes, the weapon cases come out on the belt with the rest of the baggage, and other times they come out with oversized bags. In some cases, the guns were “lost” and returned later after
I didn’t even need them because the training had passed. • On three separate occasions I have had the cases destroyed by the airline to the point that the weapons had to be removed and put in a separate cardboard box. In one such incident the firearms case was dragged behind the baggage tractor across the runway. Perhaps a simple solution to hassle-free airline travel would be a unified procedure followed by all air carriers and all terminals with regard to firearm check-in. Seeing as the TSA is the official governing body, one would think that their regulations trump airline-specific rules. However when reading the rules, each individual agent is left with their own interpretation due to the ambiguity and the sheer number of employees and terminals. In the meantime, I have found that being overly nice, polite, and excessively friendly makes an enormous difference.
9TH ANNUAL
FOLLOW UP The moral of the story is to drive when you can. If not, use frequent flyer miles to upgrade yourself to first class, and then they are noticeably more inclined to help your luggage make it to where it is supposed to be. When you do need to fly with weapons, the fewer the better. Don’t even bother bringing ammo. Get it where you are going. Finally, if you’re using training guns or Sim guns, they get checked in as weapons, but let them know that they are training tools and not actual deadly weapons. This also makes a difference when they look alike to untrained persons.
•
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR Garret Machine is a Certified Protection Professional and Board Certified in Security Management. www.MilitaryRadarSummit.com Circle 113 on Reader Service Card
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The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016 19
SECONDARY AND TERTIARY
EXPLOITATION OF EVENTS
20 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016
by Dr. Clairissa D. Breen, PhD, CAS
Douglas MacArthur once said that “there is no such thing as security, there is only opportunity.� The primary function of terrorism is to exploit any available opportunity.
A
ny event can be exploited by terrorists. Events are a resource that can be used and manipulated by terrorists for a variety of purposes. However, it is not necessary for terrorists to participate in an event in order to exploit it. Secondary and tertiary exploitation of events by terrorist organizations refers to a variety of ways in which terrorists can use an event that may have had nothing to do with
terrorism for their own benefit. It is more likely that terrorists are not directly involved in the events that provide the most opportunities for exploitation. In some cases, the event in question is naturally occurring, such as a hurricane. Military events not directed at a terrorist organization are also easily exploited. Any event that has social or political ramifications can be exploited by a terrorist organization.
Community members gather around a firepit during the fifth night of demonstrations outside the Minneapolis Police Department's 4th Precinct following the police shooting death of Jamar Clark. Photo by: Tony Webster
The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016 21
The East German delegation marching in the opening ceremonies of the 1972 Summer Olympics. Photo by: Gahlbeck Friedrich
Front view of the Israeli apartment at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich where the athletes were held hostage during the Munich massacre. Photo by: ProhibitOnions
The concept of secondary or tertiary exploitation of events by terrorists is not new. Members of the Narodniki in the 1800s kept abreast of current events around the world and used letters to newspapers in response to events, such as the assassination of President McKinley, to acquire a platform for their cause on the global media stage.1 The Black September chose multiple means of exploiting the 1972 Summer Olympic Games in Munich, Germany to present their message to the world, acquire supporters, and embarrass the German government.2 Terrorists cannot
22 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016
accomplish any goal in a vacuum; they need an audience. Changes in the availability of contact with a larger audience have allowed terrorists to reach more supporters, more recruits, and more targets. It has become far easier for a wide range of terrorist groups to become household names with far less effort than ever before. There are a variety of ways to exploit an event. The first is offense collection. For both individual terrorists and organizations, the collection of offenses is important. Most terrorists like to portray themselves as responding to slight or
aggression rather than being the instigator. Offense collection allows individual terrorists and organizations to respond to allegations or dissent with a list of terrible actions perpetrated by their targets or victims. For domestic right-wing terrorists, like Timothy McVeigh, the litany of offenses perpetrated by the Federal Government includes Ruby Ridge, where U.S. Marshals and later the FBI engaged in a fatal standoff with the white separatist family of Randy Weaver, and Waco, where state and federal law enforcement supported by the military laid siege to the Branch Davidians’ compound in Texas, a siege that ended with a tragic fire and the death of over eighty supporters of the cult in 1993.3 For international terrorists, the list of offenses can include the Mohammed cartoons, military operations, alliances between target nations, and diplomatic and/or economic sanctions. For singleissue terrorists such as eco-terrorists, animal rights extremists, and violent antiabortionists, changes in legislation can be seen as a failure of government to protect their cause and can be collected as offenses just as easily as actual cases of pollution, animal experimentation or cruelty, or abortions.4,5 Likewise, media attention to their cause, investigative reports, articles, or documentaries can be seen as popular support, as much as they provide evidence to support offense collection. Popular opinion can be very important to certain terrorist organizations. While some organizations have engaged in social programs to assist individuals in areas where they operate, train, or recruit in order to buoy popular opinion, event exploitation provides a new way of swaying popular opinion. This form of event exploitation rarely includes natural disasters, unless the exploiting
This is the last photograph of Vicki Weaver before she was killed by an FBI sniper August 22, 1992 in the Ruby Ridge standoff. Photo by: U.S. Marshal Service
Terrorists cannot accomplish any goal in a vacuum; they need an audience.
The Mount Carmel Center engulfed in flames on April 19, 1993. Photo by: Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016 23
Underground damage after the 1993 World Trade bombing. Photo by: Bureau of ATF 1993 Explosives Incident Report
Procession of emergency vehicles at the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Photo by: Eric Ascalon
terrorist organization is a single-issue environmental group, which then can argue that the natural disaster has taken place because of some previous counter-environmental action or neglect. Political, economic, or social actions are the easiest events to exploit in this fashion, especially in the era of instant opinion. A terrorist organization can exploit any speech, any economic downturn, any social movement to benefit its standing in popular opinion, mostly by highlighting the opposition as weak, wrong, dangerous to its own people, insensitive, war-mongering, or forcing the terrorist organization to respond in a negative fashion. In the case of military events, the accidental destruction of civilian sites is easily exploited to show the opposition as more aggressive and disregarding human life. These situations are among those best used for embarrassing the target of terrorist activity.
24 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016
Embarrassing the target is event exploitation that highlights some action by the target that is shameful domestically or internationally. A political or social failure, an incident that brings condemnation to the target country from outsiders, a military mistake, a protest, a riot, or any of the signs that there is malcontent in the target country, can be easily exploited to embarrass it. Hamas has actively used civilian areas to launch attacks against Israel, forcing Israel to attack areas that increase the likelihood of civilian casualties, such as schools, refugee camps, and hospitals. These death tolls can later be exploited by Hamas in the popular press to embarrass Israel on the world stage. Similar actions seek to embarrass one target nation due to its connection to another, such as Ramzi Yousef ’s motivations for the 1993 World Trade Center attack, stating that the primary motive was to end the United States’ political, military, and financial support to Israel. State supporters of terrorism have often highlighted protests and riots in enemy locations as a sign of weakness in that country and as signs of the way policies or ideology in that country is failing in comparison to their own system. A combination of exploiting popular opinion and embarrassing target nations can be used to gain supporters. When terrorists use event exploitation to gain supporters, they can be doing so to gain financial support, without actively seeking recruits. Terrorist organizations that create shell charities easily gain support through secondary and tertiary exploitation of events by requesting financial support for widows or orphans associated with an event. In these cases, photos from the exploitable event are used to create the personal response
Police officers using tear gas during the first wave of the Ferguson Riots. Photo by: Loavesofbread that draws financial support. For more opportunistic terrorist organizations, fake charities for a wide range of natural disasters have been created for funding, exploiting the desire of people to help those in need in response to a hurricane or tsunami. Recruitment of supporters by exploiting events can be accomplished in a variety of ways. For some, the event itself is galvanizing enough to draw the individual to an organization or to
self-radicalize and prepare for lone wolf operations. For others, it is the careful exploitation of events and the associated personal response of the recruit that can be used to draw an individual into a terrorist organization. For example, the Black Lives Matter movement has drawn a wide range of groups and individuals together to highlight violence against and within the AfricanAmerican community. For radical white supremacist organizations, the protests,
marches, rallies, and sometimes riots can be exploited for recruitment, as well as action, as in the case of Allen Lawrence “Lance� Scarsella III, Nathan Gustavsson, 21, and Daniel Macey, who shot five people at a Black Lives Matter encampment in Minneapolis.6 On the other side of the same series of events, supporters of the Black Lives Matter movement have highlighted and exploited the events leading to the creation of the movement to target
The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016 25
NYC action in solidarity with Ferguson. Mo, encouraging a boycott of Black Friday Consumerism. Photo by: The All-Nite Images
26 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016
Photo by: The All-Nite Images
and kill law enforcement, leading to the deaths of Wenjian Liu and Rafael Ramos.7 Protests and groups that have called for the assassination of white police officers include the African American Defense League.8 Another way in which events can be exploited is to allow terrorist organizations and individuals to gain access to targets. Events that open an area to the general public provide opportunities for terrorist organizations and individuals to gather information about a target, to conduct surveillance, and to prepare for future attacks. These can be public or personal events, such as David Headley’s use of seeking a venue for an upcoming wedding to conduct surveillance on the hotel chosen for the Mumbai attack.9 The increased use of a wide range of social media platforms means that additional information such as the average number
Black Lives Matter supporters and allies gather inside the Minneapolis City Hall rotunda on December 3, 2015, after an early morning raid and eviction of demonstrators occupying the space outside the Minneapolis Police Department's 4th Precinct, following the police shooting death of Jamar Clark. Photo by: Tony Webster
The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016 27
Events around the world, from the lighting of Christmas trees to rock concerts, can all be expxloited as opportunities for attack.
28 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016
of individuals attending a public event can be identified and extrapolated by terrorist organizations and individuals for future attacks. On occasion, terrorist organizations will seek to exploit an event to show the extent of their reach or influence. This has been actively encouraged by both al-Qaeda and ISIS through their propaganda magazines Inspire and Dabiq, respectively, where potential followers and supporters are advised to engage in attacks without input, training, or financial support from these terrorist organizations, and state their connection to al-Qaeda or ISIS. Then, those groups would claim them as followers.10,11 In these cases, there is a delay in terrorist organizations claiming responsibility for attacks, and it muddies the water regarding the true extent of a terrorist organization. This activity was previously seen in organizations such as the Earth and Animal Liberation Fronts, who told supporters to engage in terrorist action and use graffiti to show that the event was associated with the organization.4 In other cases, terrorist organizations have claimed unrelated events in efforts to show that they are more capable of attacking a target than previously believed, such as the claim by Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan chief Baitullah Mehsud that they were behind the shootings at the American Civic Association in Binghamton, NY in 2009.12 Another way in which events are exploited by terrorists is for the purposes of radicalization. In cases of self-radicalization, the benefit of the continuous exploitation of an event can be used to perpetuate the development of a personal ideology based on views of what that event symbolizes. Events to which an individual has created a
personal connection can be turning points in self-radicalization. Sovereign Citizen Jerry Kane became increasingly radical in his anti-government beliefs before he and his son were involved in the murder of Officers Brandon Paudert and Bill Evans through a series of interactions with law enforcement, courts, and banks. Each one of these events perpetuating his beliefs in government enslavement and the likelihood that his next interaction with law enforcement would be violent.13 For others, successful terrorist events or activities can provide a reference point for radicalization, such as the Fort Dix Six and repeated viewing of the videos of the Baghdad Sniper,14 or the many videos and writings of Anwar al-Awlaki, who has inspired a wide range of individuals to engage in terrorist activities, including the Tsarnaev brothers in Boston, Hasan in Fort Hood, Texas, and Carlos Bledsoe in Little Rock, Arkansas. Al-Awlaki continues to do so despite his death in 2011.15 Events around the world, from the lighting of Christmas trees to rock concerts, can all be exploited
2013 Boston Marathon site after bombings. Photo by: AaronTang
The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016 29
as opportunities for attack. Military operations, political speeches, rallies, marches, riots: each can be seen as a means to gain support for terrorist ideas and action. Once an event has occurred, it can be repackaged and presented to supporters of terrorism—potential
recruits or even generous innocents— to provide social or financial gain to terrorist organizations. Instant access to information and audiences through social media allows for continuous and immediate exploitation of events, opinions, and audiences. It is not
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necessary for an event to be terroristic in nature for it to be exploited by terrorist organizations, nor is it necessary for individuals who begin to exploit events for terroristic purposes to have any direct connection to an existing terrorist organization or ideology. Terrorists will continue to exploit events. It is part of their nature. However, increased vigilance and wider collaboration between local, state, federal, and international agencies can counteract the negative impact of terrorist exploitation of events.
•
ABOUT THE AUTHOR Dr. Clairissa D. Breen, Ph.D. CAS, is program director for criminal justice and homeland security studies at Cazenovia College. She received her PhD from Temple University and is certified as an anti-terrorism specialist by the anti-terrorism accreditation board. Her primary research interests include catastrophic criminology, terrorism, hate groups, political and historical crime. Dr. Breen gives talk and seminars around the world. She can be reached at clairissa. breen@yahoo.com for consultation.
ENDNOTES Vera Figner, Memoirs of a Revolutionist (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2001). 2 Simon Reeve, One Day in September: The Full Story of the 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and the Israeli Revenge Operation “Wrath of God” (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2000). 3 Mark Hamm, Apocalypse In Oklahoma: Waco and Ruby Ridge Revenged (Lebanon, NH: Northeastern University Press, 1997). 4 United States Congress Senate Committee, Eco-terrorism Specifically 1
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Examining The Earth Liberation Front and The Animal Liberation Front (Scholar’s Choice, 2015). 5 Elanor Bader and Patricia Baird Windle, Targets of Hatred: Anti-Abortion Terrorism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015). 6 David Neiwert, “Three Men Who Shot Black Lives Matter Protesters Emerged From Internet’s Racist Swamps,” Southern Policy Law Center, November 25, 2015, https://www.splcenter.org/ hatewatch/2015/11/25/three-men-whoshot-black-lives-matter-protesters-emergedinternet%E2%80%99s-racist-swamps. 7 Benjamin Mueller and Al Baker, “2 N.Y.P.D. Officers Killed in Brooklyn Ambush; Suspect Commits Suicide,” The New York Times, December 21, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/ nyregion/two-police-officers-shot-in-theirpatrol-car-in-brooklyn.html. 8 “African American Defense League,” Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/ pages/African-American-DefenseLeague/759646587404526. 9 Kaare Sørensen and Cory Klingsporn, The Mind of a Terrorist: David Headley, the Mumbai Massacre, and His European Revenge (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2016). 10 Al-Qaeda, Inspire Magazine, 2010. 11 ISIS, Dabiq Magazine, 2012. 12 Anwal Iqbar, “FBI Rejects Mehsud’s Claim for NY Attack,” Dawn, April 4, 2009, http://www.dawn.com/ news/454907/fbi-rejects-mehsudaes-claimfor-ny-attack. 13 Zack McMillin and Marc Perrusquia, “Police killers identified as activists on mission to spread anti-government message,” Knoxville News Sentinel, May 22, 2010, http://www.knoxnews.com/news/ nation-and-world/police-killers-identifiedactivists-mission-spread.
Graham, Troy, “Jurors see videos taken from defendants Some appeared to be pained,” Philly.com, October 23, 2008, http://articles.philly.com/2008-1023/news/25264414_1_video-fort-dixshain-duka. 14
Bergen, Peter, “The American who inspires terror from Paris to the U.S.,” CNN, January 11, 2015, http://www. cnn.com/2015/01/11/opinion/bergenamerican-terrorism-leader-paris-attack/ index.html. 15
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BOOK REVIEW
Bombs, IEDs, and Explosives: Identification, Investigation, and Disposal Techniques by Paul R. Laska © 2016, Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
C
oming from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and living in Israel for the better part of a decade, I feel a little numb to the idea of explosives and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) when compared to the layman. Granted, I participated in several operations involving breaching and responded to potential suicide bombers. However, the truth is that I was never a hot breacher or a bomb tech, so my familiarity with the subject matter of this book is still quite limited. After working with the IDF, I trained on IEDs for security operations but never really took much of a personal interest in the topic. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) is its own technical profession and a high-stress field within an already intense line of work. This book was a great way for me to refresh my memory, expand my perspective, and get some details about U.S. bomb disposal, how it is organized, and how it operates in various law enforcement and emergency response scenarios. The book starts off with the history of IEDs, including investigation and disposal techniques, and it is interlaced with case studies and relevant images,
Reviewed by Garret Machine
most of which are entertaining and a nice break from the depth of knowledge in the book. Then the subject matter moves to the structure of EOD and bomb disposal in the civilian law enforcement and emergency response field. This was a great overview and very educational for me, as I knew little about U.S. civilian EOD and HAZMAT as they relate to the various agencies and training bodies. Next, the book explores the specifics of EOD investigation, organization, training, legal considerations and response. After that, the focus turns to equipment, evidence handling, and documentation. Finally, the last few chapters of the book are dedicated to detailed case studies. Needless to say, the book is well organized and informative for the layman, as well as for the law enforcement professional who is interested in career advancement. My recommendation to anyone new to the technical topics presented in this volume would be to read slowly—and read the book twice. In fact, I would say that this book could even serve as one of the manuals for an actual EOD course, or at least as required reading.
32 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016
•
IDF forces uncovered four improvised explosive devices in the bags of two Palestinians at Beka'ot Crossing, north of Jericho. The devices were safely detonated by a team of sappers. Photo by: Israel Defense Forces
The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016 33
ISRAELI CARRY FOR ARMED AND RESPONSIBLE CITIZENS
34 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016
Marines practice drawing their pistols at a moment’s notice during a V.I.P. security course at the Indoor Small-Arms Range. For three days, Marines from Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan, trained with former members of the Israeli Special Forces in tactics used in V.I.P. protection. Photo by: U.S. federal government,
by Ken Pagano
The ancients had a saying: “The wicked flee when no one is pursuing, but the righteous are bold as a lion.” To broach this topic upon American soil is not for the faint of heart. Believe me, I know.
I
have been an advocate of the Israeli method of carry for almost forty years. While the topic could be applied to others’ focus groups, in this case I will specifically be concerned with civilians who carry a concealed firearm. I purposefully choose to sidestep and refuse to respond to the common gun range and Internet chatter. Such comments as, if you don’t have a round
in the chamber you might as well carry a brick; an unloaded gun is just an expensive paperweight; or anyone who carries a gun with the chamber empty must be afraid of their gun or doesn’t have proper training. All such comments are banal nonsense. I grew up in a family that possessed a deep respect and admiration for firearms. For the most part we were just ordinary civilians. Albeit, I did have relatives who
The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016 35
Muslim Quarter. Photo by: James Emery
36 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016
served as police, deputy sheriffs and federal agents. I had thirteen uncles who fought during WWII. But when it was all said and done, when they came home they returned to their civilian life. But they all had an appreciation for guns as citizens. I myself grew up hunting and sport shooting in the Northeast when guns were still popular. I was a gun guy, as a civilian, before I served in the U.S. Marine Corps, and I am still a gun guy today. Before I started serving as a deputy sheriff, I was a gun guy, and see myself still being a gun guy when I no longer have active police powers. I do not believe that firearms should be limited to military and police. I fully respect and admire military, police, and all other first responders. I am one and have been, off and on, for the past forty years. But my passion lies with training civilians, the ordinary man or woman who carries a firearm primarily for self-defense. They are not police, nor do they wish to be. They carry a gun to protect themselves or their loved ones from harm. In fact, they are often the true first responders when a situation goes “sideways,” often before 911 is called and help arrives. I call them “self-responders.” My goal is to train average civilians in a safe and effective system that will help them become responsible armed citizens. This means they must be just as responsible when not using their firearms as they would be if they had to deploy one in self-defense. Since the object of the article has been established, namely the armed responsible civilian, let me now explain the subject. It is what I have found to be the best method of training for citizens, the Israeli carry system. Notice that I used the word “system.” The Israeli method of carry comprises so much more than what the average person would normally think when hearing this
terminology. Let me begin by stating what the Israeli method of carry is not. It is not merely the carrying of a firearm without a round in the chamber. Although the majority of Israelis do indeed carry without a chambered round, some specialized military/police units do not. Yet they still carry “Israeli.� Why? Because the Israeli technique is a complete system that begins with a proper mindset and embraces other topics such as open hand self-defense, first aid, and physical conditioning, to name a few. It is a close-quarters fighting system that relies primary on point shooting. The body position, gun presentation, and operating under stress are part and parcel of the Israeli method. Merely carrying a firearm without a chambered round is just a small piece of the puzzle. Yet when most people hear of the Israeli method or carrying Israeli, they think of a pistol sans a loaded chamber. I was first introduced to Condition 3 carry, also known as Cruiser carry, while a young man in the Marines almost forty years ago. As I began to expand my training with firearms, I would later come to logically understand and fully embrace the Israeli carry method. The technique of carrying chamber empty is not restricted to the Israelis, nor did they develop it. It goes back to the days of Fairbairn and Sykes, when they worked with the Shanghai Municipal Police during the 1920s and ‘30s. Their method was later adopted and enhanced by one Hector Grant-Taylor, whose teaching later became the basis for The Palestinian Police Force Manual. The manual provided the foundation for Israeli method. It acquired that label because the Israelis popularized it as a method of carry and developed an entire system around empty-chamber carry utilizing point shooting. And their reasons for doing so are as valid today as
they were then: Israeli carry provides a means that allows safe carry with quick response time for a population largely untrained in the use of firearms, in close quarters urban environment. This is quite often the same situation when training civilians to prepare for concealed carry. Most have semi-auto of various calibers and design and are urbanites who have little or no prior training. In this climate the Israeli method flourishes. The method of carrying with a loaded magazine in the gun without a chambered round has been around since the advent of semi-auto pistols. Some would argue that the practice was around in the Old West, when single action revolvers ruled the day, and many would not carry with a round under the hammer. Currently the commonly known conditions of carry that are based upon the usage of the 1911, single-action semi-auto are: Condition 1, loaded magazine in the weapon, a round in the chamber, the hammer cocked and locked. Condition 2 is a loaded magazine in, a round in the chamber and hammer fully down or in the half cock position. Condition 3, which has become known as Israeli carry, is a loaded magazine in the weapon but no round in the chamber. The gun must be drawn and the slide cycled in order to chamber the first round. Condition 4 is the weapon without a round or magazine in the chamber and the slide locked back in the open position. Condition 3 carry is a valid method and is still taught and practiced by our military in certain venues. It is a practice utilized by some of the largest civilian armed security companies across the globe. And it is often the primary fashion that most civilians feel comfortable when first beginning to carry a semiauto firearm. Some states even teach in their mandated Department of Criminal Justice Training (DOCJT) curriculum
The gun must be drawn and the slide cycled in order to chamber the first round.
The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016 37
that a single action handgun, be it pistol or revolver, should not be carried with a round in the chamber or under the hammer. Since 9/11, with the rise of terrorism, the concern with active shooter events, and the vast majority of states allowing for concealed carry, there are now more armed civilians then ever before. And as some states consider expanding concealed carry of firearms to include public schools, some policy makers need to consider balancing the mitigation of one type of vulnerability, the potential of an active shooter, with
the introduction of another, the potential of a negligent discharge. Bearing all this in mind, I think it is safe to say whether or not one agrees with this fashion of carry, it is still valid option in which teaching needs to be provided. The primary reason for Israeli carry has always been safety. The Israeli army is made up of conscripts, young men and women who not only want but also have to serve in the military. Many if not most have no prior firearms training. It is a reasonable and safe practice to introduce these young soldiers to firearms training
Soldiers of the Caracal co-ed battalion during a platoon exercise in southern Israel. Photo by: The Israel Defense Forces
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without a live round in the chamber. It is a safe and effective method that I too learned many years ago. I am convinced now more than ever, under normal daily conditions, that this is still the best method of carry, especially for civilians. All one needs to do is a quick Internet search on the topic of negligent/ accidental discharges (NDs/ADs) to understand the reasoning behind carrying Israeli. The number of NDs by trained professionals, such as law enforcement officers (LEOs), is mind numbing and somewhat embarrassing, to say the least. Most of these NDs occur during administrative handling of the firearm, such as drawing, holstering, or cleaning of the weapon. Some will argue that this boils down to a training issue, to which I have no quarrel. If one would simply keep their finger off the trigger, most of this discussion would be moot. However, sometimes it is also due to an equipment failure such as a faulty holster. There may be other factors such as the weapons platform itself, that make it easier for an ND to occur, but that is for another discussion. The fact remains that NDs still occur, and perpetrated by people who are considered to be the trained professionals. Sad but true, many officers only practice with their firearms when qualifications are due. Many never take their guns from their holsters until this time. Routinely, most don then remove their gun belts without even touching the sidearm, which is often secured in a multiple retention holster. And even then, there are still reported cases of negligent discharges. So how much more likely are these to occur for the average civilian? One who most likely uses a simple concealment holster, level, who may be removing their firearms multiple times in the course of the day, depending on their circumstances? Every time a gun
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The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016 39
A civilian who is proficient in the Israeli draw can draw, from concealment, in about 1.5–2.5 seconds, some less.
is handled, the risk potential goes up. And since these individuals are not LE, they arguably are more likely to shoot themselves with their own firearm by means of administrative handling then they are of being shot in a gunfight. As a general proposition, the risk of a ND from carrying C1 is far greater than the risk of being killed because someone is carrying Israeli. That is the simple truth for most civilians who carry a concealed firearm. The preponderance of self-defense situations, of which I am aware, do not include an ambush or other such circumstances that require a one-hand only, instant response. Part and parcel of training for responsible citizens is to prepare for the worst but practice for what is most probable. Knowing how to clear a double feed, with your support hand only, while in the prone position, is a good thing. But the practice of safely handling a firearm on a daily basis in one’s normal civilian setting, I think, is better. To truly look at the safety issue, we need to move beyond the “I’m in a gunfight right now” mentality and move more toward the “What is the risk involved in carrying a gun on a daily basis?” Honestly, for the average civilian, being involved in an
40 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016
actual gunfight is not that likely; it’s a once in a lifetime. And if it does happen, it is going to involve a few seconds of my life. Admittedly, they are going to be extremely important seconds, but I have to balance that against the thousands of hours I will carry the gun, and the thousands of times I will administratively handle the gun. Only then can I do a honest and responsible risk assessment. Israeli carry without a round in the chamber, for the average citizen, is the safest manner of carry, bar none. As an instructor, I can attest to the fact that the vast majority of those who carry a firearm are not as proficient as they should be. They are unconsciously incompetant. It is a sad fact that most are not “gun people.” Most who reject the Israeli method of carry do so because they believe it is too slow on the draw and takes more time to chamber the round. Having been trained in both chambered and unchambered Israeli methodologies, I can attest that the Israeli method of carry is less than .5 seconds slower than chambered carry, if you are proficient. I have been timed and have timed others who are proficient in the Israeli technique, and this has been proven to be true.
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A civilian who is proficient in the Israeli draw can draw, from concealment, in about 1.5–2.5 seconds, some less. I will concede that the Israeli method will add perhaps .5 seconds to the draw compared to C1 carry. As a trained, responsible, and logical civilian, I can afford the extra .5 seconds on the draw. What I cannot afford is the chance of an ND/AD. An ND/AD has the potential to wreck my life and that of my friends or family. And that may well be true even if the round does not strike anyone. If the extra .5 seconds will make a difference in a critical incident, I confess perhaps I let my guard down on my situational awareness and that I probably need do something else before going to my firearm. I cannot out-draw a trigger pull. If my threat already has drawn on me, I need to do something else. Action trumps reaction. If a bad guy with a knife is suddenly upon me, well perhaps I need to seek a means of escape or engage my attacker with open hand techniques, if space permits. Do the math: if the attack comes in less than 2.0 seconds, it will not matter what condition my weapon is in because any holstered weapon would be to slow. If the attack comes in over 2.5 seconds, then any condition will be fast enough. So I am really only concerning myself with an
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attack between 2.0 and 2.5 seconds. I will say that you must train in the Israeli method at least as much as you would any other carry method. I think it is fair to say that most people will gravitate to that which they know and often how they have been trained. Me too. For some, it is difficult to understand or embrace a different methodology. But if I am to be a responsible civilian carry holder, I must explore and examine multiple techniques and find what best fits my current needs and conditions. Under stress, you will revert back to your training. The entire methodology of Israeli carry is different. But different does not mean inferior. In fact, the Israeli method has been found to be time tested on the mean streets of the Middle East, and has been more than a little successful. It works with those of various ages and abilities and those who carry a multitude of different weapon platforms. It works under stress and is safe. The system focuses upon instinctive body responses and utilizes constant repetitions of drills to develop muscle memory. Chamber empty is not only a safe method of carry but also helps to overcome possible training complications
due to a weapon’s design. No playing with different safety mechanisms. Simply draw, cock, and shoot. Frankly, I have found the training that goes with the carrying of a weapon without a chambered round to be quite superior to much of what I have seen on today’s market. While the Israeli method of carry may not be for all people, I do think it has more going for it, for the responsible civilian concealed carry holder, than most people care to admit. Live fire demonstrations of the Israeli method can be found at www.youtube. com/TrainWithTheIDF.
•
ABOUT THE AUTHOR Ken Pagano has been teaching students in the Israeli method for almost 40 yrs. He is a graduate of the FBI’s Police Firearms Instructor course, a member of IALEFI, a certified NRA instructor, as well as, an instructor trainer for Private Armed Security Guards and Concealed Carry of Deadly Weapons in his state of residence. He also currently serves as a deputy sheriff and may be contact at kbpagano59@gmail.com or Facebook at https://www.facebook.com/IsraeliTactical-Sport-Shooting-AssociationIsraeli-Combat-Sport-Shooting.
The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016 41
LESSONS FROM THE RECENT WAVE OF ATTACKS
42 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016
by John Gomez
Any terrorist attack is undoubtedly going to lead to a variety of assumptions, most of which are based on less than solid intelligence. This was especially true for the recent terrorist attacks in California.
W
ithin hours of the San Bernardino attacks, several media outlets began interviewing experts in regard to their assumptions of what had occurred and what was meant. Unfortunately, much of what was presented by experts was somewhat dated and did not align with real-world
operational intelligence. One of the key takeaways from this event, especially in terms of the early speculation and guidance, is that our understanding of terrorism is rather limited and still developing. Most Law Enforcement Line Officers (Street LEOs), even at the federal level, are not well versed in the ideology,
Blood and sand on the ground in front of Le Petit Cambodge/ Carillon on the day following November 2015 Paris attacks. Photo by: Maya-Anaïs Yataghène
operational methods, or tactics utilized by global terrorists, specifically those associated with radical Islamic ideology and objectives. This lack of understanding was not only prevalent in the hours and days after the San Bernardino attacks, but also was a key construct of the Paris attacks. As was
The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016 43
The suspect's vehicle involved in a shootout with the police in the 2015 San Bernardino shooting. Photo by: San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department
Four of the guns believed used by the couple who killed 14 people and injured 21 others at the 2015 San Bernardino shooting. The rifles were identified as the DPMS Panther Arms model A15 and a Smith & Wesson M&P15. The 9mm handguns were from Llama arms and Springfield Armory. Photo by: San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department
the case in California, investigators and experts (advisors, etc.) made statements and assumptions that were not in line with the actual operational tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) employed by today’s leading terrorist organizations, such as ISIS. In this article, I will examine some of the assumptions that were made by those either involved in the investigation or those speculating and adding color commentary from the sidelines. My hope is that by sharing some of the counter-intelligence work that my firm put together publicly, it will help those in leadership positions realize that their assumptions may need to evolve. Sun Tzu, in the classic work The Art of War, coached that it is critical to know one’s
44 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016
enemy. In today’s world of global terrorism, understanding the enemy has never been so critical, because frankly, so much has never been at stake. I have done what I can to present responses to common assumptions that were made specifically after the California attacks. These responses are limited in scope, but do a good job, I believe, of representing the broader counterintelligence workup that was developed by Group Espada. In some cases I have purposefully refrained from providing detail or naming sources, given that this is an ongoing investigation. That stated, the information presented here should provide a fresh basis for planning and decisionmaking for those who are responsible for responding to terrorist attacks.
ASSUMPTION: A female does not fit the profile of the average terrorist or jihadist.
RESPONSE: The belief that there is such a thing as an “average” terrorist or jihadist is counter to following the evidence. The evidence shows that this terrorist incident did involve a female. Further, we have seen the employment of females in various terrorist incidents in the past several years. This includes the attacks in Paris as well as Australia and a large percentage of homicide bomber attacks in the Middle East. The employment of females, and in some cases children, is not atypical. Terrorist organizations employ females because they realize that most anti-terror agents or others (civilian population) do not view females as threats. The employment of a female playing the role of a lost person, pretending to be helpless, or using other charms, dates back well before the modern age of terrorism. There is no restriction in the Koran or Hadith for the employment of woman in direct action or support roles related to jihadist activities. The assumption that this was an evolution of tactics is false and does not contribute to our ability to prepare effectively and employ counter intelligence or action. Women are integral part of the terrorist force and are heavily relied-upon assets.
ASSUMPTION: Why would the attackers stay in the area and not exit? RESPONSE: It is my belief that the attackers planned to return to their base or other location (storage facility, secondary support area, staging area) and resupply, and that they did not plan to stay in the area. My reasoning for this belief is based on several factors,
including the amount of explosives found at their home, which were not part of a trap. Based on their TTP and other details, it is my belief that the attackers became overzealous in their pursuit of accomplishing their first mission. After the explosives in the county building did not detonate, I suspect they returned to the area, or waited in the area discussing what they should do, to successfully detonate the explosives. Upon being spotted by police, they attempted to flee. They did not stand and fight; they did not move to a hardened location: they attempted to continue with their secondary mission(s). Their operational mistake cost them their lives, but it is naive to believe they stayed in the area on purpose. This assumption does not follow the evidence.
There is no restriction in the Koran or Hadith for the employment of woman in direct action or support roles related to jihadist activities.
points to secondary targets. The amount of explosives at their base, the state of their personal luggage (packed and ready to go), and other indicators show that they were planning to return, resupply, and continue their operations. What is unknown is if the secondary targets would be engaged directly or after a period of time. A large factor in this is that they wore masks. If their goal were not to continue the fight, but to martyr themselves, they would have no need for anonymity. Anonymity is only employed when your goal is continued execution of operations, escape, or evasion.
to embrace. Most jihadists are not martyrs. Jihadists are warriors focused on winning the war, not simply the battle. Those selected for martyrdom are few and far between, when compared to the overall number of jihadists employed on missions. There is no requirement for a jihadist to commit martyrdom. Further martyrdom does not always require the practitioner to end their life. Martyrdom is traditionally a complete and total devotion to a way of life or belief. Some may be martyrs simply by carrying out a mission with conviction and yet continue to fight another day. That said, any jihadist who dies in battle is entitled to the heavenly rewards described in their religious texts, at least as it relates to Islam. This was a well thought out mission and the goal was not to end their lives, but to fight on.
ASSUMPTION: They weren’t martyrs so this is workplace violence.
ASSUMPTION: They must have had help building the pipe bombs.
RESPONSE: This is another
RESPONSE: It is possible they
ASSUMPTION: There are no secondary targets.
RESPONSE: All of the evidence
unqualified assumption that is dangerous
did have assistance, but the fact is that
The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016 45
Driver license photo of Syed Rizwan Farook. Photo by: Department of Motor Vehicles
relatively unskilled individuals can build pipe bombs. In this case specifically, the male attacker was highly skilled in the repair of cars, understood the use of tools, had the ability to read plans, and had an engineering background. He had access to plans (Inspire Magazine, etc.) and access to the materials. His job at the county also provided opportunity and access to compounds without raising concern. Although they may have had help, and possibly did, they did not have to have help. The attackers had the
skills and determination to build close to twenty pipe bombs on their own. This also fits the pattern of operational security that they employed for what appears to have been two years or longer. It is important to understand this, because the notion that a cell requires tremendous support or funding is a very dangerous assumption.
ASSUMPTION: He wasn’t radicalized and this wasn’t an ISIS mission, since they didn’t take credit.
Tactical belt used by one of the shooters at the 2015 San Bernardino shooting. Photo by: San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department
46 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016
The Counter Terrorist Magazine Asia Pacific Edition is Finally available for the Asia Pacific region counter-terrorism and homeland security practitioners. The Asia Pacific Editionnot only gives the readers a worldwide counter-terrorism perspective but also in-depth information about counter terrorism activities in Asia. The Asia Pacific Edition provides an excellent platform for counter-terrorism and homeland solutions providers to access and penetrate
The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016 47
RESPONSE: Radicalization does not require a pledge, membership, or trip to a country. It might help, might make things easier, but radicalization only requires a personal commitment to a cause. There is no fanfare required, no requirement to post something to social media or to take an oath. In fact, doing so may not be the best operational security and at worst is somewhat dramatic. To believe that you must have a handler, affiliation, or proof of such connection is a Western belief, not a factual understanding of jihadist or terrorists overall. No mission approval is required, or command and control. Once a personal decision is made to fight, access to resources is plentiful. We should also keep in mind that ISIS has repeatedly called for lone wolf attacks; this is a clear lone wolf attack and demonstrates the effectiveness and danger of such a personal decision in which there is no
overt or covert connection to a cause. This is franchising without the legal paperwork and is highly effective, with a tremendous return on investment.
ASSUMPTION: The GoPro was so they could film their martyrdom videos. RESPONSE: The GoPro was not for martyrdom, but rather for socialization of their cause and demonstration of what can be accomplished. The attackers, I believe, wanted to use the GoPro video to show others what they could do and how easy they could do it—and still live to fight another day. There is no evidence they were martyrs. Further, a martyrdom video is done prior to the operation and part of a ritual, which includes cleansing. None of this evidence was found. These were highly intelligent attackers who would have probably submitted the video to
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ISIS, who would in turn utilize it for further marketing, specifically in the U.S. The very fact that this was part of their planning and objectives demonstrates the level of patience and professional detail employed in planning these attacks.
ASSUMPTION: They really wanted a fight with police. RESPONSE:
This is not what the evidence shows. They disposed burner cell phones, hard drives, and other intelligence, which were recovered by police, after the operation. This action does not fit with the actions of someone wanting to fight. You don’t dispose of evidence if your goal is to die fighting; in fact you don’t even think of evidence disposal. Their goal was to continue the mission and to fight on. This is a very critical lesson to be learned by law enforcement as it speaks to the potential
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to deal with prolonged operations, something most U.S. Law Enforcement agencies do not train for and are not equipped to manage.
ASSUMPTION: The 3,000 rounds of ammunition was a lot of ammunition and required tremendous funding. How could they get that on his salary? RESPONSE: A lot of ammunition is subjective. This is not that much ammunition and actually is similar to what was owned by the Aurora attacker. The cost of 3,000 rounds of ammunition is approximately $650, including shipping. It is not an extreme economical challenge, and does not require sophisticated funding or tactics. Since the attacks in California, much more has come to light, including trips to Saudi Arabia, wedding gifts, and possible participation by neighbors or family members of the attackers. Although that evidence is important to understand, the real goal of this article is to drive change in our tactics as law enforcement. Life has dramatically changed, and our understandings of the life cycle of a terrorist event, our response and pre-planning, cannot be based on false assumptions, outdated information, or limited Western perspectives that do not match the reality of our enemies. If you wonder just how drastically false perceptions or assumptions hinder our effectiveness, I will share with you a quote from a member of the French CT teams, who are extremely well trained. “Nous ne crovions qu’ils etaient ce bien, ce bien equipe, ce professionnel or ce sophistiquee.” Translation: “We never believed that they were this good, this well equipped, this professional, or this sophisticated.”
If you don’t think what you assume, believe, or think matters, think again!
FROM PARIS Within days of the Paris attacks, French authorities began to decipher the after action reviews from the various law enforcement agencies that responded to the terrorist attacks in and around Paris. Many lessons were learned and much of that will be incorporated into go-forward training programs. The top three lessons,
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Soldiers from France’s First Infantry Regiment march down Camps del Elysee during the 2012 14th of July parade in Paris. Photo by: U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Benjamin Wilson
in my opinion, that were learned were as follows.
SPEED AND COORDINATION MATTER One of the biggest challenges was the ability of ground teams to move quickly and coordinate. There was a slowing of responses, in some cases, because there was a lack of coordination.
TRAIN AND PLAN FOR SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS November 18, 2015—French police search for suspects after the Paris attacks in Saint-Denis. Photo by: Chris93
A key learning point of the Paris attacks, is that terrorist cells can effectively execute coordinated attacks
50 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016
that are either simultaneous or waterfall in nature. It is imperative that organizations responsible for responding to terrorist events train and plan for dealing with situations where resources are challenged with multiple highly sophisticated events.
OPERATOR PSYCHOLOGY MATTERS A key challenge that came out of Paris is that the requirements of entry teams may have changed forever. The Paris attacks forced the entry teams to make a rather heroic choice. Stay outside and continue to hear their countrymen
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being slaughtered by the attackers or enter the theatre and face near certain death. Although all entry teams realize there is a risk, few are asked to enter a location with multiple attackers wearing homicide vests, who have planned to detonate themselves. The Paris entry teams knew the attackers had explosives, they knew that they were being taunted to enter and yet they had no choice but to enter. This is a major psychological challenge that leaders in law enforcement must address. Asking your entry team to enter, knowing they will most likely die, is vastly different than asking a team to enter with a good chance of winning the fight due to their conditioning.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR John Gomez is CEO of Group Espada and has a background in special operations, counter terrorism and cyber-warfare. www.groupespada.com
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52 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016
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POTENTIAL SECURITY
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OF THE NEW AMERICAN COLLEGE CAMPUS For generations, American universities have fomented radical beliefs through the free exchange of ideas critical of the dominant culture. These ideas ultimately traveled down dangerous paths.
54 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016
by Joseph J. Kolb
T
he recent wave of demonstrations on American campuses to ensure cultural and personal sensitivity of race and religion at the expense of open dialogue could be detrimental to understanding and preventing Islamic radicalization on campus. This could incite some students to commit acts of violence, either on or off campus. A generation ago, a harbinger of domestic radicalism was put forth by Bernadine Dohrn. “All over the world,
people fighting American imperialism look to America’s youth to use our strategic position behind enemy lines to join forces in the destruction of the empire,” Dorhn said in the Weather Underground’s 1970 Declaration of a State of War. The Weather Underground was a militant spinoff of the Students for a Democratic Society and responsible for taking the rhetoric operational with numerous domestic bombings. Now a new generation of college
students are taking up the disturbing mantle, albeit naively, of radicalism. There is an inherent ambivalence among most American college students as to the root causes of terrorism as well as the implications of international events on domestic security. The elimination of open dialogue about religion and its implications to acts of terrorism, a refusal to recognize an event such as 9/11 for no other reason that
United Airlines Flight 175 crashes into the south tower of the World Trade Center complex in New York City during the September 11th attacks. Photo by: Robert J. Fisch The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016 55
Photo by: Bsstu
it being potentially Islamaphobic,1 the growing sense of anti-Semitism through the nationwide boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) against Israel campaigns, and an unknown demographic of Muslim students, such as Faisal Mohammad, who investigators identified as being a troubled, isolated young man who knew few people on campus, may actually create a sense of empowerment to execute an act of terrorism.2 On November 10, the (University of ) Minnesota Student Association voted against a resolution to annually recognize 9/11 on campus out of fear of offending Muslim students on campus.1 This seemingly benign decision was preceded on November 4, when at The University of California, Merced, eighteen-year-old freshman Faisal Mohammad went on a stabbing spree on the campus. In the 2013–2014 college school year there were some 400 anti-Israel events calling for the boycott, divestment, and sanctions in an attempt to dismantle/disrupt Israel.3 A more tangible incident occurred in August 2007, when two University of South Florida students, Ahmed Abdelatif Sherif Mohamed and Youssef Samir Megahed, were stopped by a Berkley County sheriff deputy not far from a Naval installation in Goose Creek, S.C., that housed enemy combatants. In the trunk of the student’s car were pipe bombs. Megahed would be found not guilty of federal charges in 2009. In 2008, Mohamed pleaded guilty to aiding terrorists and was sentenced to 15 years in prison after a YouTube video he produced showed how to make a bomb detonator out of a toy remote control. In the video, Mohamed admitted he wanted to target “infidels,” including American troops overseas, without “martyrs” having to sacrifice their lives.4 It was also revealed that he used USF equipment at night, when no one else was
56 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016
around, to upload the video. Mohamed “embraces a violent and extreme ideology” and “has a particular dislike of Americans,” said Assistant U.S. Attorney Robert Monk at the time of Mohamed’s sentencing.4 The consequences of unilateral expression while suppressing free speech through intimidation creates a hostile environment eliminating the ability to have an atmosphere of philosophical checks and balances to prevent some theories to evolve to the operational level. We will likely never know what was in the mind of Faisal Mohammad when he went on a stabbing spree at The University of California, Merced in November 2015 that resulted in four people being wounded and his ultimate death by police, but the subsequent discovery of an ISIS flag among his belongings and the utilization of the very same knifing tactic being employed by Palestinians against Israelis is a point that can’t be ignored. The narrative that Mohammad went on his violent attacks because he was removed from a study group may very well be true, but the opportunity for him to stew in his anger and hate to the point this random act of violence could have been fueled by a festering disdain for American society, and his victims merely served as a catalyst for the opportunity. In Mohammad’s two-page manifesto, he described taking students hostage then summoning campus police to steal an officer’s firearm, which he then planned to use to kill students at a dormitory. Investigators contend that the model for the attack may have been an extremist group.2 The similarity between Mohammad’s attacks and those carried out by Palestinians against Israelis could not be ignored. Mohammad was killed by police before carrying out the plan. The ingredients for subsequent radical Islam-inspired campus attacks are rapidly
Palestine Columbia Students for Justice in Palestine organized a mock Israeli Checkpoint to raise awareness of human rights abuses and subsequent obstruction of education. In respose pro Israeli groups on campus handed out a factsheet describing checkpoints as a "necessary evil" essential for preventing terrorist attacks. Photo by: Andra MIhali
emerging, not only of actual group members, but those disenfranchised and living on the fringes of society, who will be attracted to the glamor of the jihad that can flourish in the “tolerant� college environment. Mohammad was identified as a loner, but investigators are staunchly claiming his violent act was out of revenge for being snubbed from the study group despite having an ISIS flag replica in his backpack. At the heart of the emerging antiIsrael sentiment is the Muslim Students Association (MSA) and Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP), who have been inciting a groundswell of student involvement to urge universities to
Students for Justice in Palestine at UC Berkeley. Photo by: Ariel Hayat
The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016 57
August 2, 2014—Students for Justice in Palestine march. Photo by: William Stadtwald Demchick
boycott, divest, and create sanctions against Israel, in large part for its alleged repression of Palestine. ProIsraeli supporters such as author David Horowitz says the two student groups were created by members of the Muslim Brotherhood, forerunner to al-Qaeda and Hamas.5 Subsequent to vitriolic levels of anti-Israel sentiment, Horowitz devised a Top 10 list of American universities “friendly to terrorists.”5 • Brandeis • Columbia
• Harvard • Rutgers-New Brunswick • San Francisco State University • University of California-Irvine • University of California-Los Angeles • University of San Diego • University of Michigan • University of New Mexico “The increase in programs and initiatives designed to isolate, defame, and delegitimize Israel on college campuses have resulted in increased tension between students and can foster
58 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016
a hostile atmosphere for pro-Israel and Jewish students,” said Oren Segal, director, Center on Extremism, AntiDefamation League.6 “That in and of itself is troubling and should be rejected. But there is little evidence to suggest that these same student groups are incubating hard core extremists that view foreign terrorist organizations such as ISIS as a legitimate force.” Horowitz alleges that schools such as UNM (and the others) are a breeding ground for terrorists and practice a
double standard contending that the universities have a Code of Conduct and would never tolerate such behavior against non-Jewish students.7 Not mentioned on the list is the University of South Florida. USF has been the focus of law enforcement attention in the past because of former computer engineering Professor Sami al-Arian’s acknowledged connection to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad organization. USF also gained attention in 2006, when two Saudi students attending
the university were arrested on trespass charges after hitching a ride on a school bus transporting high school students.8 With the environment of antiSemitism through the BDS campaign fueled by a robust radical Islamist social media campaign, disgruntled students such as Faisal Mohammad may pick up the mantle to carry out campus attacks. In a similar vein, the University of South Florida students planning the attack in South Carolina used their student status as a cover.
This acceptance of countercultural beliefs already instilled in many of these institutions presents a daunting conundrum between free speech and religious freedom. Efforts to prevent student dissent and protest from accelerating in violence, an atmosphere of what may appear to be forced tolerance for one group at the expense of the right to free speech and expression, or the ability for nefarious individuals to plot and execute an attack under the cover of this newfound tolerance, cannot be ignored. Michael Fagel, Ph.D, Adjunct Professor at the Illinois Institute of Technology in Chicago, where he teaches in the Master of Public Administration program, focusing on homeland security and emergency planning topics, said the inherent nature of the university structure is capable of breeding radicalization. “Universities are afraid to disenfranchise a student population that generally are high revenue students,” Fagel said.9 Fagel goes on to say that many schools are hotbeds of unrest and free thinking, as many tenure track professors are radicals themselves as a throwback to the late 60s and 70s generation, and due to the fact that many universities are stuck in the politically correct mode versus the patriotic mode. What is particularly disconcerting given the open university atmosphere is the absence of any universal strategies to identify or mitigate campus radicalization. “IACLEA does not have a specific policy on identifying Islamic radicalization, as that is an operational decision of each individual institution, and its public safety organization which is influenced by national policy set by the federal government,” said Kendra Pheasant, Associate Director International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators.10 Fagel says such programs are few and far between.
The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016 59
In 2005, the FBI launched the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board, a seventeen-member panel that includes presidents from top public and private research schools. The board meets approximately three times a year and provides a forum for FBI leadership and university presidents to discuss national security issues of mutual concern. The College and University Security Effort—or CAUSE—allows FBI Special Agents in Charge to meet with the heads of local colleges to discuss national security issues and to share information and ideas. These discussions include the national security implications these world-renowned research facilities may be facing and how and why some foreign governments may be attempting to pry loose their research and intellectual property creations. “As we do our work, we wish to be sensitive to university concerns about
international students, visas, technology export policy, and the special culture of colleges and universities,” said then-FBI Director Robert Mueller.11
WARNING SIGNS Prevention is paramount to prevent campus radicalization. Warning signs may be as subtle as a course major or personality traits. Burton and Stewart suggest that the major of a potential jihadist could be a compelling factor.8 Although there is no evidence at this point to indicate that Megahed was anything but a normal student, past cases suggest that radical Muslim youth studying the applied sciences are disproportionately more prone to embrace jihadism than are those who pursue studies in social sciences, humanities, liberal arts, or business.8 Evidence might include surreptitious
use of university computer equipment, as Mohamed had done with his training video. Students who are disenfranchised with the “American Dream” and exist on the fringe of the social strata could also be susceptible to radicalization. Kamran Bhatti, a Canadian volunteer outreach social worker, says he has observed four signs of potential radicalization among youth, especially in the wake of the death of four young Canadians in January 2015, who left to fight for ISIS in Syria.12 Mulholland referenced 24-year-old John Maguire, a former University of Ottawa student who advocated domestic attacks on Canadian, as well as three Somali-Canadian cousins from Edmonton.12 Bhati warns that some students display an obsession with Islam as a result of an underlying mental illness; some show an attraction to an extremist
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ideology obsessed with fighting the mainstream norms; some are religious zealots (these are the most dangerous and most likely to strike); and some are disgruntled, typically immigrant youths striking back at society for their inability to assimilate.12
APPLIED SECURITY MEASURES Universities are typically cities themselves operating with their own police departments and policies of behavior. The notion these institutions are capable or even willing to structure and prepare their public safety departments, faculty, and staff on the current day anti-terrorist war fighting has been slow to materialize, largely for the very reason the problems may fester. The concern over First Amendment rights and student privacy are intractable issues on campuses.
The signs of an emerging radicalized student can be as subtle as a student isolating themselves from the greater class or student body. Other signs include computer searches, hardcopy notes or manifestos, or inexplicable outbursts against other students or university faculty and staff. It is for these reasons that universities need to expand their awareness programs to include everyone from campus police, to students, faculty, and clerical and maintenance staff.
SOCIAL MEDIA Internet and social media outlets have become the primary source of recruitment, radicalization, training, and operational incitement for extremists. Al-Qaeda quickly caught the wave of popularity in the relatively new medium during its more operational phases, but most recently, ISIS has perfected it. To
combat potential digital radicalization on campus, the University of New Mexico has joined 44 other universities around the world in participating in the Peer to Peer (P2P) Extremism initiative.13 The U.S. Department of State-sponsored program creates student teams to “create digital media content in the form of an initiative, product, or tool that empowers networks of youth to counter the social media presence and effectiveness of violent extremists’ online messaging.” Identifying, preventing, and mitigating operational level radicalization on college campuses is a daunting proposition. However, with the rise and digital influence of ISIS and al-Qaeda, failure to do so will be catastrophic in an age where active shooter incidents have exponentially increased.
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The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016 61
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
html?referrer=https://search.yahoo.com/#. VkqitHarSM8. 4 Elaine Silverstrini, “Former USF Student Gets 15 Years for Aiding Terrorists,” The Tampa Tribune, December 18, 2008, http://www2.tbo.com/news/ northeast/2008/dec/18/ex-usf-studentmohamed-gets-xx-terrorism-casear-114406/. 5 Jacob Kamaras, “Watchdog Lists ‘Top Ten American Universities Friendly to Terrorists,’” Stop the Jihad on Campus, November 9, 2015, http://www. stopthejihadoncampus.org/. 6 Oren Segal, Anti-Defamation League, e-mail interview, November 28, 2015. 7 Caleb James, “Students and Muslim Groups, UNM Denounce Report Calling University ‘Terrorist Friendly,’” KOB4, November 17, 2015, http://www.kob. com/article/stories/s3966495.shtml#. VnRrkMArIy4. 8 Fred Burton and Scott Stewart, “Traffic Stops and Thwarted Plots,” Stratfor Global
Joseph J. Kolb, M.A., is the founder of the Border Security Studies Program in the Criminal Justice Department at Western New Mexico University.
ENDNOTES Kasey Carpenter, “MSA Rejects Moment of Recognition Resolution for 9/11,” The Minnesota Republic, November 11, 2015, http://www. mnrepublic.com/msa-rejects-moment-ofrecognition-resolution-for-911/. 2 R. Parsons, B. Calix, and M. Morgante, “UC Merced Stabbing Investigation Leads to Questions on Student’s Background,” The Modesto Bee, November 10, 2015, http://www.modbee.com/news/ article44189529.html. 3 Anti-Defamation League, “BDS on American College Campuses: 2013-2014 Year in Review,” June 4, 2014, http:// www.adl.org/israel-international/antiisrael-activity/bds-on-american-college. 1
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Intelligence, August 8, 2007, https://www. stratfor.com/traffic_stops_and_thwarted_plots. 9 Michael Fagel, e-mail interview, December 3, 2015. 10 Kendra Pheasant, e-mail interview, December 4, 2015. 11 FBI, “FBI Director Appoints National Security Higher Education Advisory Board,” September 15, 2005, https:// www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/ fbi-appoints-national-security-highereducation-advisory-board. 12 Angela, Mulholland, “Identifying Radicals: The Four Types of Youth Attracted to Extremism,” CTV News, January 16, 2015, http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/ identifying-radicals-the-four-types-ofyouth-attracted-to-extremism-1.2192009. 13 Reuters, “University of New Mexico to Participate in P2P: Challenging Extremism Initiative,” October 2, 2015, http://www. reuters.com/article/2015/10/02/unm-p2pcampaign-idUSnPnCxmW6+52+PRN2015 1002#ABV70uIGCCP1RrYb.97.
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Save the Date
TACKLING GLOBAL SECURITY THREATS JUNE 7–9, 2016 WASHINGTON, DC Three of the leading organizations in global security: The Anti Money Laundering Association, (The AMLA) Quaynote Communications and Security Solutions International-SSI will be hosting the first Tackling Global Security Threats conference in Washington DC on June 7–9, 2016. Each organization will showcase best practices vital to tackling Global Threats for corporations. Besides their expertise, all three organizations are well known for their very successful conferences. Against a background of heightened tensions across the Globe this conference is imperative for corporations that are concerned with optimizing their response to the current environment.
64 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016
WHO SHOULD ATTEND? • Human Resources directors • Risk managers • Security directors and managers • Crisis management executives • Business continuity executives • Insurers, lawyers, medical, operational, travel and procurement professionals • AML or BSA executives • C-Suite executives
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Day 1 organized by Quaynote Communications— will answer the question: What does it take to enhance corporate sustainability in high risk environments?
Day 1 is dedicated to examining issues of corporate liability and duty of care of organisations towards their employees, especially when sending them overseas to work. “It is often the C-Suite Executives who responsible for duty of care policy issues”, explained Lorna Titley, Director at Quaynote, “so we are therefore including a session targeting this group and asking the critical issue of whether effective risk mitigation can simultaneously address duty of care and protect the bottom line”.
JUNE 8
Tactical and strategic responses to Global Security Threats
Day 2 organized by Security Solutions International—will answer the question: How should corporate security departments react to complex physical and cyber security challenges
Day 2 will concentrate on new strategies for assessing risk and threat in a fast paced challenging environments by hearing from SSI partners, Israeli corporate security specialists. Red Teaming as a tactical tool will be examined for its contribution to auditing corporate security. In the second part of the Day our cyber security partners will speak about the new challenges for corporate cyber security and the necessity and vulnerability caused by social media in the enterprise. Creating comprehensive policies for both Cyber security and social media will also be discussed. In addition, the value of having a social media targeting program will be discussed by one of the creators of the leading social media targeting platform.
Henry Morgenstern: +1-305-401-6906 contact@homelandsecurityssi.com
JUNE 9 Organized by the AMLA—The Anti
Money Laundering Association Lorna Titley: +1-604-538-3353 lorna@quaynote.ca
Day 3 The AMLA—this one day conference will focus on the financial institution sector crimes such as money laundering, fraud, cyber threats, terrorist financing and more. This is a must for the AML, BSA and other professionals dealing with reporting unusual or suspect activity.
Mary Miele: 407-864-532 mary@theamla.com The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016 65
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FEBRUARY/MARCH 2016 VOLUME 9 • NUMBER 1
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TRAINING REVIEW
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their campuses you will find the alphabet soup of agencies and quite a few I bet you have never even heard of. Back when was I was working for the Israeli Ministry of Defense as a physical security specialist, I became interested in the different units, agencies and training offered by partner nations. I thought FLETC was an interesting entity because it accomplished
something that I felt was critical in the field of law enforcement and security combat doctrine. It standardized it, much the way it is in Israel, so I thought. Fast forward a few years, and I ended up in a place I had never imagined possible, as a student in a basic law enforcement academy, at you guessed it: FLETC. I went on to take a few other
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70 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016
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advanced courses there and always look forward to going back there. Here is what you need to know about FLETC: you will be treated like a first class professional and receive training in the finest facilities and have all the resources you need to that end. Food is good and living conditions are nice as well: you can have your car there and keep business hours +/-. For someone like me, I loved the various education and opportunities that only a place like that can provide.
THE CONCEPT FLETC sets a standard with end-state objectives; how you get there is agencyspecific. Meaning that I was trained with firearms by GS staff, defensive tactics by contractors, and academic classes by agency-specific instructors. While each agency and organization will use different firearms, calibers, and targets, the end result must be a level of
proficiency that adheres to industry best practices. Getting a FLETC diploma is a prestigious thing. Consolidating the training of several government law enforcement entities makes resources available that would otherwise not be, meaning you will get training that is as realistic as it can safely get. The vetting process for instructor staff is extensive. I made friends with the staff because of mutual respect. All the while, they knew when to turn up the pressure on my class to get us where we needed to be. We shot every day, did physical training every day, had defensive tactics every day, and class every day. We kept long hours and were constantly tested, the way it should be. I have several friends who attended different courses offered through FLETC, from air marshals to high-speed vessel pursuit, and each came away with what they expected. Most law enforcement officers will attend a local academy for
their initial certification at the state level, which depending on your municipality can be hit-or-miss.
SUMMARY I am a big proponent of standardization of tactics, techniques, procedures, use of force policy, weapons, ammo, and training doctrine. You will not get exactly that, but this is defiantly as close as it is going to get in the foreseeable future. There is a lot to be said for standardization and reciprocity among high liability skill sets. Looking back over the last fifteen years, we can see a trend of skills and experiences trickling down from the military to civilian LE. This is a good thing, and I hope our industry continues to grow in this direction.
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GLOBAL THREAT FORECAST
The Rise of ISIS Rohan Gunaratna
With the emergence and the growing clout of Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS), the terrorist threat confronting the international community has undergone a profound and dangerous transformation. At the same time Al Qaeda is still in the game – a bit diminished but lethal. Unfortunately however, governments – individually and collectively - continue to be ambivalent about the threat leading to lacklustre responses highlighted by lack of understanding of the threat, political will and coordination of operations against these groups.
INTRODUCTION The rise of ISIS in 2014 and its claim of the establishment of the Islamic State have introduced a threat of unprecedented magnitude to the international community. Even as the Al Qaeda remains significant despite having diminished in size, strength and influence, the threat from the group and its affiliates and supporters has begun to eclipse due to ISIS. With territorial control, huge resources, savviness in exploiting modern communication technology, especially the social media and brutality and barbarism, ISIS has
presented a new version of extremism and terrorism to the world. Despite counter-offensives like aerial bombings and ground combat on multiple fronts, ISIS continues to survive and has been able to demonstrate its robust and lethal capabilities with attacks in many countries and to spread its influence worldwide. In a recent development, the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) mounted a terrorist attack in the Indonesian capital city of Jakarta on 14 January 2016. The terrorist attack in Jakarta was portrayed as a success by ISIS.
The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016 73
The possibility of future similar attacks by ISIS remains, unless their capabilities in Southeast Asia are dismantled.
BACKGROUND ISIS (originally Islamic State of Iraq - ISI) evolved out of Abu Musab al Zarqawi-led Al Qaeda in Iraq. Though the initial objective of ISI was to create a Sunni enclave in Iraq to counter the growing dominance of the Shias and the Kurds, instability in the country together with disbanding of the Iraqi military and intelligence apparatus and dismantling of Ba'ath party and its affiliated governmental apparatus let the group to grow and expand. The post-Arab Spring chaos in many Middle Eastern countries specifically in Iraq’s neighbourhood allowed to group to capture territory and establish its rule projecting it as the Islamic State – the Caliphate. As Al Qaeda’s leadership of the jihadist movement began to wane especially after the killing of Osama bin Laden, many groups and individuals that Al Qaeda mentored with ideology, training and financing are now increasingly turning to ISIS and Abu Bakr al Baghdadi for strategic leadership and inspiration.
ISIS’ STRATEGY Today, ISIS has become a transnational phenomenon with an estimated 80,000 fighters including 30,000 Iraqis and Syrians and 20,000 foreigners combating in Iraq and Syria and hundreds of thousands of supporters worldwide. According to Western security and intelligence estimates ISIS fighters in Syria and Iraq grew from 30,000 in 2014 to 50,000 in 2015 and likely to increase further in coming months as the group grabs more territory. ISIS strategy is to govern the areas it
controls in Iraq and Syria and expand to other Muslim territories by accepting pledges of allegiance from local jihadist groups. At present, more than hundred groups have pledged allegiance to ISIS and Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. Specifically ISIS seeks to control territory and administer the caliphate; expand the caliphate into other permissive areas; and exploit and destabilise areas not under its control. By demonstrating the establishment of the Islamic State, propagating the idea of a global caliphate and at the same time undermining competing groups and co-opting likeminded groups, ISIS is garnering more support and resources including manpower thereby the potential for future expansion. ISIS has also inspired individuals to carry out attacks in their home countries as it become increasingly challenging for foreign recruits to travel to Syria and Iraq. This nevertheless benefits the group in its quest for global expansion.
DYNAMICS OF ISIS’ EXPANSION ISIS grew in territories where states failed to govern. This has been mostly the case in Iraq and Syria. As the rulers got entrapped in state-building initiatives (Iraq) or dealing with the chaos induced by Arab Spring (Syria), ISIS was able to grab territory, amass wealth and armaments from all vulnerable sources including oil and natural gas production and distribution systems, financial institutions like banks and even the disbanding Iraqi army. The group also aims to establish more satellites of the Caliphate known as wilayats (governorates or provinces) in other permissive areas across the world. For example, in Afghanistan, poor governance, lax security and fractionalisation of the Taliban after Mullah Omar’s death allowed ISIS to
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grow, where it refers to itself as Wilayat Khorasan. Though Taliban is still the key player in most of Afghanistan, ISIS has occupied the eastern Nangarhar province, adjacent to the tribal areas of Pakistan operating from more than eight districts in the province and expanding. Wilayat Khorasan has conducted multiple attacks targeting Hazara Shi'ites and the security forces in Afghanistan and released an array of brutal beheading videos. This group comprises members largely of breakaway factions of the Pakistani Taliban who are based on Afghan soil. The group has expanded further into other parts of Nangarhar in the east, Farah in the north and Helmand in the south in Afghanistan. It also maintains influence in specific parts of Pakistan. ISIS has also been engaged in sporadic clashes with the Taliban, which refuses to acknowledge the former as a stakeholder in the Afghan state. With the drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan ISIS is likely to emerge as a formidable force posing a challenge to the Taliban in the mid to long term. ISIS has also expanded in to Libya. Numerous terrorist groups took roots in the country after Muammar Gaddafi was killed in 2011. Majlis Shura Shabab Al Islam (Islamic Youth Consultative Council) and a faction of Ansar Al Sharia in Libya pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi creating Wilayat Al Barqah, Wilayat Fizzan and Wilayat Al Tarabulus respectively. In addition to consolidating control in the declared provinces, ISIS is likely to expand further. Sirte, a backup capital for ISIS, has become a base for the group’s operations, logistics and training. Similarly, Boko Haram based mainly in northern Nigeria pledged allegiance to Al Baghdadi and subsequently renamed itself Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) also known as Wilayat Gharb Afriqiya. In Algeria, ISIS created Wilayat
al-Jazair; in Yemen, Wilayat Sanaa; and in Saudi Arabia, Wilayat al-Haramayn. In addition to mounting attacks in Algeria, ISIS conducted and claimed attacks against the Houthis in the Yemeni provinces of Lahij, Aden, Abyan, Shabwah, Sa’ada, Sana’a, Ibb, Taiz, al-Jawf, al-Bayda, and Hadramawt. On 20 March 2015, ISIS targeted two Zaydi mosques in Sana’a and a government facility in Sa’ada killing 137 and injuring 345. ISIS also seeks to attack Saudi Arabia to take control of Islam's two holiest shrines in Mecca and Medina before attacking Israel to take control of Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem - the third holiest site in Islam. Calling for the overthrow of the House of Saud, ISIS has carried out attacks in Saudi Arabia's Najd and Hejaz provinces and likely to target the ruling family in Saudi Arabia. In June 2015, ISIS proclaimed Wilayat Qawqas in northern Caucasus under the leadership of Abu Muhammad Al Qadari. The terrorist groups in the four out of six sub-divisions that come under Al Qaeda's Islamic Emirates of the Caucasus have pledged allegiance to ISIS. Moreover, Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, an Egyptian militant group that pledged allegiance to Al Baghdadi in 2014, creating Islamic State of Iraq and Levant - Sinai Province or ISILSP (Wilayat Sayna), bombed the Russian airliner killing 224 on 31 October 2015. The attack was carried out in retaliation to the Russian support for the Assad regime and bombing of ISIS positions in Syria.
MAPPING THE THREAT IN TO THE FUTURE A number of issues characterise the future trajectory of the threat. First, despite losing territory in Syria and Iraq, ISIS will continue to attempt to expand into parts of Africa, Middle East, Balkans, Caucasus and Asia. ISIS is actively
recruiting in western Balkans, including Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo, the Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro. Similarly, ISIS is recruiting in Southeast Asia with the intention of declaring a Wilayat either in Eastern Indonesia or southern Philippines. In 2015, Bahrun Naim from ISIS external operations wing issued instructions to Southeast Asian groups to attack both domestic and coalition targets. With recruitment of Chinese Muslims, ISIS is likely to declare a Wilayat in Western China where a large number of Uighur recruits and their families from Xinjiang have joined ISIS though some have also joined its rival group - Jabhat al Nusra which is an Al Qaeda affiliate. Second, using its newly constituted external operations wing staffed by foreign fighters, ISIS will attempt attacks including spectaculars like 9/11 in the countries which, either individually or jointly are in offensive against the group in Iraq and Syria. The November 2015 Paris attacks demonstrated ISIS’ capability to collaborate with locals to strike overseas. The Paris-template, a copycat version of the attacks in Mumbai in India in November 2008, is likely to be repeated in a number of countries. Third, online activity will continue to garner recruits for ISIS and help it radicalise more Muslims from vulnerable segments all over the world. ISIS ideology of hatred seeks to replace mainstream Islamic teaching among Muslim communities. However, even as about 80 to 90 percent of social media sites transmitting ISIS propaganda are hosted on U.S. and European servers, lack of political will and clear strategy have failed the governments and their agencies from counter-messaging, taking down ISIS platforms and degrading ISIS’ strategic communication and information capabilities.
Fourth, without unanimity and unity among the countries, offensives against ISIS will continue to be ad-hoc and ineffective. Until now cooperation at the strategic level and coordination of operations beyond exchange of information and intelligence has eluded the countries fighting ISIS or being affected by its atrocities. Last but not the least, refugees and asylum seekers from conflict zones to the West are susceptible to ISIS’ message. ISIS is likely to exploit them to target its enemies in the countries that the refugees are flocking to in large numbers. Unfortunately countries involved do not have effective policies and plans of action to mitigate the humanitarian crisis arising out of the outflow of refugees in such a large number.
RESPONDING TO THE THREATS Today, ISIS presents a four dimensional threat to most governments - ISIS Core in Syria and Iraq, ISIS Branches, ISIS Global and ISIS online. Countering these threats requires both conventional combat strategies including boots on the ground and creation of new capabilities especially those involving communication management to produce and disseminate counter narratives against radical messages. It also involves community engagement. More specifically, these capabilities include expanding elite counter terrorism tactical units; increasing the numerical strengths of national security services; developing a robust legal framework on preventive detention; raising dedicated units to police the cyber domain; and an integration of capabilities by shifting from counterterrorism cooperation to collaboration. Arguably, the key to dismantling the ISIS core in Iraq, Syria and Libya is increased intelligence-led military operations to kill
The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016 75
or capture its leaders, dismantle its support and operational structures, training camps and financial infrastructures. Both special and general purpose forces on the ground, in addition to air campaign, is essential to degrade and destroy ISIS. Governments must take steps to deny ISIS the opportunity to expand its territorial control. This involves identifying and securing vulnerable areas as a physical deterrent. Building trust among the inhabitants of these areas for their respective governments is equally important. Moreover, tempo of ISIS attacks in Iraq and Syria created the momentum for the spawning of associated groups outside the primary theatre. In order to break this momentum, it is paramount to focus on both the core area and the satellite provinces and break their nexus. New executive and legislative tools are necessary to proscribe entities and personalities that advocate, support and participate in ISIS activities. They should be investigated, charged, and prosecuted. Given ISIS’s growing presence in the virtual domain, governments should step up their efforts to prevent extremist and terrorist exploitation of the internet through a robust legal and governance framework. This also requires partnerships with business firms, civil society and community groups. The key to building enduring and effective partnerships lies in complementing the whole-ofgovernment approach with a whole-of-
society approach. The strategy is to build and sustain a community of experts including religious scholars to develop and disseminate counter- narratives to the extremist propaganda through the internet, more specifically through the social media to prevent radicalisation. It also involves measures to implement deradicalisation programmes to rehabilitate those that have already fallen victims to extremist propaganda. Most importantly, governments, irrespective of whether they are directly affected by the threat and despite political and ideological differences, must put their acts together and present a common front to degrade and destroy ISIS, Al Qaeda and other similar groups. However as mentioned earlier the responses have so far been ad hoc, piecemeal and lacking in cooperation and coordination which have largely been ineffective and often counterproductive.
CONCLUSION Terrorism is not new to the world. Throughout the ages it has manifested in many forms most notably from ethnopolitical and left and right wing terrorism as the predominant source of political violence of the 20th century to its current politico-religious variety spearheaded by groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS. While the previous versions of political violence could be contained though not eliminated altogether, it is not easy to speculate how and when the current threat can at least be
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managed. This is due to the peculiar nature of the threat itself – a hybrid with potent mix of distorted religiosity with pseudo politics that moreover does not recognise any constraint in the use of violence. The world, led by the U.S. fought Al Qaeda and significantly degraded its core capabilities including its core leadership. With ISIS, a newer version of the threat confronts the international community. But it will be naïve to believe that groups like ISIS can overthrow the existing world order. ISIS has sustained itself so far due mostly to inaction or ineffective response. Notwithstanding the current capabilities of these groups there are key vulnerabilities like territorial control and increasing revulsion among the Muslims themselves due to extreme brutality and barbarism by these groups that the governments can exploit. On a positive note, a consensus of sorts is slowly emerging among the countries involved with regard to the strategy to deal with ISIS, especially with the Vienna plan and its aftermath though it is difficult to speculate on its implementation. But there is no substitute to a multi -pronged and multi-national response to the type of threat that groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS pose against humanity. Professor Rohan Gunaratna is head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU.
Indonesia Muh Taufiqurrohman Throughout 2015, Indonesia continued to experience militancy and a steady growth of supporters for the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS), particularly in the provinces of East Java, Lampung in Sumatra, South, West and Central Sulawesi. The Indonesian government, especially the police, as well as Shi’ite, Buddhist and Christian communities, remained the main targets of terrorist attacks. Detachment 88, Indonesia’s counter-terrorism unit, made at least 57 arrests and killed some five members of the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) – an ISIS-linked terrorist group led by Santoso operating out of Poso.
MAJOR PLAYERS On 14 January 2016, a team of four men armed with explosions and guns carried out a terrorist attack on an affluent shopping area on MH Thamrin Street in Central Jakarta. The attacks killed eight people, including the four attackers and four civilians, and injured at least 24 others. The attackers were all killed following a rapid counter attack conducted by Indonesian police. ISIS claimed responsibility for this attack, saying that it had sent its fighters to kill Indonesian police and foreigners whom ISIS viewed as being a part of the crusader coalition. This was the first major attack in the country targeting foreigners after the July 2009 hotel bombings in Jakarta. One of the attackers is believed to be Afif alias Sunakim, a student of Aman Abdurrahman, ISIS’ spiritual leader who is based in Indonesia. The others include Muhamad Ali, Ahmad Muhazan bin Saroni and Dian Joni Kurniadi. Bahrun Naim, the
mastermind of the attack, is believed to be in Syria. In 2015, Indonesian authorities foiled a number of attacks, including a planned bombing on 17 August 2015 in Central Java. Unfortunately, Indonesian authorities failed to prevent the killings of three civilians in Central Sulawesi in September 2015. These attacks were encouraged by ISIS leaders or directed by Indonesians fighting for ISIS in Syria. Police believe that the foiled Central Java bombing in particular was funded and directed by Bahrun Naim of ISIS’ external operations wing. The attacks were targeted at the Pasar Kliwon police precinct, a church, and a Confucian temple in Solo. The assailants intended to bring chaos in the province during Indonesia’s Independence Day festival. The motivations for the attacks and killings so far appear to be linked to a combination of factors, including the Indonesian police crackdown on suspected terrorists, and ISIS supporters’ perceived oppression and persecution of Muslims. Despite these attempts and attacks, the capability of ISIS supporters to launch large-scale attacks appears to be limited. As evidenced in the case of the foiled bomb attack in Central Java in August, the perpetrators had learned to make rudimentary bombs following instructions on a website. Nonetheless, this has not deterred ISIS supporters in Indonesia from preparing for attacks in the future. In October 2015, ISIS supporters reportedly conducted military training sessions for some 71 men in the Bogor area, West Java. Given present trends, ISIS supporters will remain the likely
perpetrators of terrorist attacks in Indonesia – although these attacks may be limited in terms of scale and scope. The Indonesian police, Christian, Shi’ite and Buddhist communities will continue to remain the primary targets of these attacks, together with the U.S. and other countries that are involved in airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Additionally, the Syrian conflict continues to inspire interest in militant jihad among Indonesian ISIS supporters. A handful of these, when arrested, told the police about their interest to link up with MIT militants based in Poso. The majority of these supporters prefer moving to Poso than to Syria due to the geographical proximity and costs of migrating to Poso as compared to Syria. Finally, ISIS supporters in East Java, West Nusa Tenggara and South Sulawesi have established a network of support among the locals in Poso with safe houses and other logistics. As such, this has enabled them to move into Poso to provide MIT with the manpower and financial support.
TACTICS AND TARGETS The grouping of its supporters into public and private fronts, the frequent changing of the group’s name, the use of sophisticated communication platforms, and the recruitment of women for logistical support – constituted some of the key tactics employed by ISIS supporters in Indonesia in 2015. This reflects a shift from 2014, when ISIS supporters openly expressed their support for ISIS even on social media platforms.
The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016 77
Support for ISIS in Indonesia has manifested itself on two fronts, both publicly and privately. The public front, which gathers around an organisation called Panitia Bersama Pembela dan Pendukung Khilafah (the Joint Committee of Caliphate Defenders and Supporters), advertises itself as a moderate Islamic organisation. In contrast, the private front is centred on a group called Junud Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara (the Army of the State in the Archipelago). Junud Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara conducts secret meetings, military trainings, and has been involved in planning attacks. Its members have also been drafting plans to migrate to Syria. ISIS supporters in Indonesia have frequently united under different names to evade detection by authorities. In 2014, ISIS supporters mostly gathered under the banner of the Forum Komunikasi Aktivis Syariat Islam (the Forum of Activist for Islamic Sharia/FAKSI) and Umat Islam Nusantara (Islamic Community in the Archipelago). In 2015, when the Indonesian police began arresting prominent figures of these two groups, ISIS supporters changed the group’s name to Forum Komunikasi Dunia Islam (the Communication Forum of Islamic World/FKDI).
The FKDI, led by Syamsudin Uba, a Bekasi-based ISIS preacher, changed its name to Panitia Bersama Pembela dan Pendukung Khilafah and came under the collective leadership of Syamsudin Uba, Fauzan Al Anshari, Nanang Ainur Rofiq, Abu Nusaybah, Abu Mush’ab, Abu Abdillah and Anwar. In addition to that, ISIS supporters also refer to themselves as Anshor Khilafah (Helpers of the Caliphate), Anshor Daulah Indonesia (Indonesian Helpers of the Islamic State) and Anshor Daulah Nusantara (Helpers of the Islamic State in the Archipelago). There has also been a noticeable shift in ISIS supporters’ preferred mode of communication. In 2014, ISIS supporters mostly used online forums, as well as social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. In 2015, ISIS supporters have shifted to the use of mobile messaging application services ranging from Blackberry Messenger, WhatsApp to Telegram. Harnessing encrypted platforms for communication has enabled ISIS supporters to evade detection by authorities – a lesson that they learnt from the mistakes of Indonesian jihadists who exposed themselves in the past to the police by communicating openly through
78 The Counter Terrorist ~ February/March 2016
Facebook. ISIS supporters share religious teaching, intelligence and military training materials via Daulah Islamiyah Baqiyyah, a WhatsApp chat group and Wa Iddu, a Telegram chat group. In addition, compared to 2014 in which men were involved heavily in running ISIS networks in Indonesia, in 2015, women within the community of ISIS supporters in Indonesia played important managerial and logistical roles. The women are also responsible for providing logistics and for assisting ISIS supporters with organising gatherings and fundraising activities on the ground. In January 2015, police arrested the wife of a Poso-based ISIS supporter and member of the MIT who was reportedly assisting MIT’s military training participants.
INTERNAL CONFLICTS Despite a relatively strong facade, the community of ISIS supporters in Indonesia appear to be beset by internal divisions, mostly stemming from power struggles and security-related paranoia; sources of which may serve to drive the groups apart. The divisions and dissentions have divided ISIS supporters into several factions. The various factions are unable to come to an agreement on attack strategy and thus are incapable of successfully executing any large scale attacks so far. The growth of mistrust and suspicion among the ISIS supporters may bring about further divisions among ISIS supporters.
FLOW OF INDONESIANS INTO SYRIA Despite the efforts of the Indonesian police and the Turkish government, ISIS supporters in Indonesia continue to go to Syria. According an estimate by the Indonesian National Police, at least 384 Indonesians have joined ISIS so far, with
70 of them having returned to Indonesia. Some of these returnees, such as Afif Abdul Majid, have been arrested and sentenced to four years imprisonment. However, he was sentenced not for joining ISIS but for his involvement with other terrorism activities, including the 2010 Aceh military camp. Some others, like Syamsudin Uba, live freely and continue to recruit people for ISIS. This has been a major weakness in Indonesia’s criminal justice system and a significant security concern from a counter-terrorism perspective. Moreover, ISIS supporters have managed to circumvent restrictions through discussions on group chats on mobile messaging applications to disseminate tips for evading the Indonesian police’s monitoring and surveillance and the Turkish security apparatus’ screening or ambush.
LOOKING AHEAD The flow of Indonesians to Syria highlights the rise in ISIS supporters and the need for the Indonesian government to take further steps to deter and disrupt existing ISIS supporters and would-be ISIS supporters. The emergence of groups with new names reflect the need for the Indonesian government to shift away from targeting extremists in Indonesia using a group-based approach to targeting extremists at the individual level. The fact that women have increasingly become involved in terrorist activities in the country also reinforces the need for intervention; from both the Indonesian government and by the society at large. The presence and activities of ISIS supporters indicate the need for close monitoring and surveillance brought about by the mobilisation of security resources and the transferability of such resources towards a national database. Ideally, this database should be shared among security
agencies and immigration office so as to facilitate the enforcement of restrictions on persons linked to ISIS and to prevent those planning to plot terrorist attacks from entering. More importantly, as violent radicalisation remains a key challenge for the country, the Indonesian government and parliament should start working together to pass legislations regulating the laws against speech and narratives that lead to exclusivist practices, including justifications for the killings of those with a different belief system.
Spread in Southeast Asia. The New York Times, January 14. Accessed January 15, 2016.
Muh Taufiqurrohman is a Senior Researcher with the Centre for Radicalism and Deradicalisation Studies (PAKAR), a nongovernmental organisation based in Indonesia.
Wibowo, Ary Wahyu. 2015. Bom Rakitan Sugiyanto Cs Siap Ledakan Solo saat 17 Agustus. Sindo News, August 14. Accessed October 14, 2015.
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Setiawan, Ruben, and Cape, Erick. 2015. Anggotanya Tewas Oleh Brimob, Kelompok Santoso Penggal Warga. Suara, September 17. Accessed October
Januarius, Fabian Kuwado. 2015. Densus 88 Tangkap Lima Terduga Teroris Anak Buah Santoso. Kompas, March 9. Accessed October 10, 2015. Fakhri, Fakhrizal. 2015. Polisi Tangkap 5 Pendana & Perekrut ISIS Indonesia. Okezone, March 22. Accessed October 15, 2015. Pos Kota. 2015. Polisi Tangkap Terduga ISIS di Tulungagung. March 27. Accessed October 22, 2015.
Antara News. 2015. Polisi tangkap satu terduga teroris di Makassar. Accessed October 1, 2015. CNN Indonesia. 2015. Densus 88 Tangkap Tersangka Teroris di Hotel Santika. CNN Indonesia, November 4, 2015. Accessed October 12, 2015. Cochrane, Joe and Fuller, Thomas. 2016. Jakarta Attack Raises Fears of ISIS’
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Malaysia
Stefanie Kam and Nur Azlin Mohamed Yasin In 2015, Malaysian authorities foiled a handful of terrorist plots to the country and detained at least eight militants under the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 on their return from the Middle East. Individuals with links to the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS), and those with groups linked to Al Qaeda, continue to present a grave security concern for Malaysia.
2015: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN MALAYSIA In 2015, the detention and arrests of suspects returning from the Syrian conflict were of particular importance for Malaysia. In December, Malaysian police detained a 19-year-old Malaysian student at the Kuala Lumpur International Airport. The suspect, who was studying at a university in Cairo, Egypt, had joined Jund al Aqsa, an Al Qaeda-linked group, in 2014, after contacting cell members through Facebook. He was believed to have travelled from Cairo to Turkey, then onwards to Syria where he was trained to use weapons, including rocket-propelled grenades, machine guns, anti-tank weapons. He was among one of eight militants to have been detained by the police on their return. The other seven suspects had been charged, and two were already serving sentences. Malaysia also arrested five suspects, four of which were foreign nationals. These included a 44-year-old European who had links with Al Qaeda and allegedly
participated in militant activities in Afghanistan and Bosnia. Three other suspects – a 31-year-old Indonesian, a Malaysian and a Bangladeshi were part of a cell linked to ISIS tasked with recruiting volunteers to take part in militant activities overseas. In addition, Malaysian courts charged a 39-year-old Indonesian national, Hani Yahya Assagaf, for possessing items related to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). He is also a suspect in the plot to attack the U.S. embassy and the tourist hotspot Jalan Alor in Kuala Lumpur. The penetration of militant jihad influences within the country’s security apparatus has also become a matter of serious concern. Amid reports that a number of Malaysian Special Forces were found to be ISIS sympathisers, a number of civil servants were also detained by Malaysian authorities for links to Tandzim al Qaeda (a group inspired by Al Qaeda) and ISIS. The men, aged between 22 and 36, were nabbed in simultaneous operations in the states of Selangor, Johor and Perak. In June 2015, there were reports suggesting that Malaysian extremists were working with foreign jihadists based in the Philippines’ Mindanao region. One of the jihadists was reportedly from the Malaysian Special Forces, and working with the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The men were suspected to be linked to ISIS through one of the ASG’s members. The presence of foreign terrorists, including Malaysians, in Sulu and Basilan, was confirmed by the Philippines’ Armed Forces Public Affairs
Office chief, Lt. Col. Harold Cabunoc. In August 2015, Malaysian police stated that they had arrested and were investigating 10 Malaysians – six of which were from Malaysian security services – for links to ISIS. Evidence of human smuggling networks assisting ISIS in their radicalisation, recruitment and training efforts in the region, especially in Malaysia, have also surfaced in recent times. In September 2015, the head of Indonesia's national counter-terrorism agency warned that ISIS is working with people-smuggling networks to bring foreign fighters from Malaysia to Sumatra and then to Poso in Central Sulawesi. Against this backdrop, a number of training camps being used by the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) are based in the Poso area. In addition, ISIS is also suspected to have used the area as a training ground for its militants. Malaysia also issued a number of arrest warrants for Malaysians who were alleged to have facilitated the movement of the suspects of the August 17 2015 Erawan Shrine attack in the Thai capital of Bangkok, which killed at least 22 people and left more than a hundred others injured. Furthermore, there has been increased evidence of Malaysians in ISIS-held areas in positions ranging from janitorial and guard posts to combat ranks – serving as snipers, bomb makers and suicide bombers. In October 2015, Malaysia’s counterterrorism director Ayub Khan stated that ISIS was relying on Malaysians “to carry
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out strike missions against several key structures in Iraq… in a bid to reclaim territory in Iraq that government forces had taken over.” In the same month, there were reports that three Malaysians – Zid Saharani Mohamed Esa, Muhamad Syazani Mohd Salim and Fadzly Ariff Zainal Ariff – had been killed in Iraq while carrying out special operations for ISIS. To date, at least 14 Malaysians fighting alongside ISIS with various militant groups have been killed in both Syria and Iraq. In all, these developments – sympathisers within the Malaysian security apparatus; evidence of links between ISISlinked individuals in Malaysia with people smuggling networks; and the involvement of Malaysians in combat activity – suggests that the threat of terrorism to Malaysia remains dynamic and complex. Furthermore, the continued appeal of ISIS’ Malay Archipelago combat unit the Katibah Nusantara Lid Daulah Islamiyyah (The Malay Archipelago Unit of the Islamic State), established in 2014 and comprising mainly Indonesian and Malaysian nationals, has sparked concerns that alliances and friendships formed in Syria and Iraq could be exploited by the fighters to stage attacks in the Southeast
Asian region.
ONLINE RADICALISATION, RECRUITMENT AND FUNDRAISING The existence of extremist websites and social media platforms has also led to an increase in radicalisation, recruitment and funding of terrorist activity. Individuals in Malaysia have been arrested for their roles in promoting, recruiting and financing trips to Syria. On 25 May 2015, Malaysia’s Home Minister informed the Parliament that the Malaysian police was stepping up efforts to monitor social media sites for possible terrorist activities. The announcement came after it was revealed that seventyfive percent of Malaysian ISIS militants were recruited through social media. Since 2008, online extremist narratives in support of the use of violence have played an important role in the radicalisation and recruitment of Malaysians, and Southeast Asia has seen a rise in such content in the online domain. In an ASPI-RSIS joint report released in 2008, it was stated that there were some 117 extremist websites, most of them in Bahasa Indonesia on the internet. Currently, there are at least 1,000 such
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sites in Bahasa Indonesia and Malay language ranging from pro-ISIS, non-ISIS and anti-ISIS leanings. The Singapore-based International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) has detected between 70 and 90 websites and blogs and at least 500 social media accounts in Bahasa Indonesia. The Malaysian Police is reported to have identified 500 pro-ISIS Malaysian social media accounts. Some notable examples of recruiters in Malaysia include the infamous Dr. Sham, also known as Green Bird of Jannah. Dr. Sham maintained an active online presence until mid-2015, when she ceased posting on her Tumblr and Twitter online pages. Another is the account of Malaysian fighter Akel Zainal who had reportedly recruited a Malaysian female named Syamimi Faiqah on Facebook. Syamimi Faiqah later travelled to Syria to marry Akel Zainal. A prominent example of a Malaysian militant with a social media presence is Mohd Lotfi Ariffin, a former Pan Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) leader and Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM) member who subsequently travelled to Syria to join Ajnad al Sham, a group which adheres to the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. When Mohd Lotfi Ariffin first started out, he was able to garner around 27,000 followers on Facebook. Authorities have also detected traces of fundraising elsewhere by extremist groups and individuals in promoting, recruiting and financing trips to Syria. When faced with challenges travelling to Syria, individuals have sought donations online. These pleas are commonly made through more private communication platforms such as telegram or via private messages on Facebook. In April 2015, some Malaysian militants were also observed to have solicited donations through social media.
MALAYSIAN RESPONSE In September 2015, the Prevention of Terrorist Act (POTA) was put into effect to strengthen Malaysia’s counter-terrorism legislative mechanisms. Since February 2013, Malaysian authorities have arrested 123 suspected militants, including 106 Malaysians, 12 Indonesians and two Iraqis. The Malaysian government has been careful not to create unnecessary alarm with regards to the increasing signs of interest in ISIS across the country. For instance, in October 2015, ISIS flags were sighted in several states in Malaysia, including Perak, Terengganu, Kedah and Selangor. To avoid generating panic, Malaysia’s Bukit Aman Special Branch Counter Terrorism Division head, Datuk Ayub Khan was quick to dispute concerns about these flags, adding that the Malaysian authorities have been closely monitoring the situation, especially regarding the recruitment of Malaysians by ISIS. With Malaysian security forces stepping up efforts to disrupt terrorist attacks, so far, none of alleged plotters have been able to carry out terrorist attacks in the country. Nevertheless, the vigilance of the Malaysian security forces was put to the test several times this year. For instance, in March 2015, in a one-minute video posted on a YouTube Channel ‘ISIS Malaysia 69’, a group of four masked men threatened to set Malaysian courthouses on fire. In April 2015, 17 suspected militants were detained for allegedly plotting to carry out terrorist acts in the country’s capital city, Kuala Lumpur. In September 2015, police in Kuala Lumpur arrested three men – a Syrian, a Malaysian and an Indonesian – for their alleged links to ISIS. According to official accounts, these plots have involved returnee fighters from Syria and Iraq, members of the security forces, and foreign nationals.
The ability of Malaysian authorities to successfully thwart the said attacks highlights the robustness of the security apparatus in the country. However, this has not stopped ISIS from maintaining an active online presence, with the aim of carrying out radicalisation, recruitment and fundraising activities in the country and the region.
LOOKING AHEAD Based on recent assessments, Malaysia faces a moderate threat of terrorism in the coming years. However, it should continue to exercise caution and remain vigilant in mitigating threats to public safety. Given evidence that Malaysian and Indonesian suspects have collaborated in attempts to recruit individuals for ISIS, Malaysian authorities should continue to remain cautious about signs of an evolving threat of terrorism in the country as well as in the region. Continued regional collaboration and cooperation and increased surveillance and intelligence-sharing, particularly among Malaysia’s neighbours, will be needed to counter the threat from both the physical and online domains. In the long-term, there is a need for sustained efforts by the civil society to mount public education campaigns and outreach efforts both online and on the ground, so as to discredit extremist ideologies and to mitigate the threat from ISIS’ virulent propaganda and its likes. Stefanie Kam is an Associate Research Fellow with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU.
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU. Her research expertise is on online extremism in Southeast Asia.
REFERENCES: Bergin, Anthony, Sulastri Bte Osman, Ungerer, Carl and Nur Azlin Mohamed Yasin. 2009. Countering Internet Radicalisation in Southeast Asia. Australian Strategic Policy Institute: Special Report, March 6. Accessed November 23, 2015. Nur Azlin Yasin, Jasminder Singh, Omer Ali Saifudeen and Teo Hwee Kuan. 2015. Southeast Asian Militants in Syria and Iraq: What Can the Online Realm Reveal? RSIS Commentaries, August 31. Accessed November 23, 2015. Rodzi, Nadirah H. 2015. Malaysian cops: ISIS camps training children as young as 2 to kill. Asia One, December 13. Accessed December 14, 2015. Sageman, Marc. 2008. Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the TwentyFirst Century. University of Pennsylvania Press. The Straits Times. 2015. 500 Facebook accounts used to entice Malaysians to join ISIS: Police. March 6. Accessed February 13, 2015. The Straits Times. 2015. Malaysian youth who joined Syrian Al-Qaeda terror cell detained at KLIA. December 11. Accessed December 14, 2015.
Nur Azlin Mohamed Yasin is an Associate Research Fellow with the
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