The Counter Terrorist Magazine Asia Pacific issue June-July by The Counter Terrorist Asia Pacific Edition

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Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals

Counter The

june/july 2014

Volume 7 • Number 3

Sniping in the Mexican Criminal Insurgency

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Counter

The Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals june/july 2014

Volume 7 • Number 3

COVER story:

contents

Sniping in the Mexican Criminal Insurgency By Robert J. Bunker

FEATURES:

Firsthand: Flying With the Puntland Maritime Police Force By Arthur Walker and Al Venter

Understanding Radicalization and Terrorist Violence Today By Douglas R. Woodall

Case Study: Rifleman Sabotages Pacific Gas and Electric Station By Sarah Kinzer and Jennifer Hesterman

“Digital Jihad” and its Significance to Counterterrorism By Muhammad Ahsan Younas

62 72 84

ISLAM4UK By Anthony Tucker-Jones

Special Atomic Demolition Munitions By Lina Kolesnikova

The Teacher-Student Approach to Religious Rehabilitation By Mahfuh Haji Halimi, Muhammad Saiful Alam Shah Bin Sudiman, and Zulkifli Mohamed Sultan

departments: 06

From the Editor Happy Independence Day

44 Book Review The United States Constitution 69

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From The Editor:

Happy Independence Day By Chris Graham

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals

Volume 7 • Number 3

june/july 2014

any years ago, I stood in a room with my right hand raised. I stood with other volunteers, and I recited: “I, Chris Graham, do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.” As a reader of The Counter Terrorist, I know that there is nearly a 100% chance that you have taken a similar oath. If it has been awhile since you have considered this oath, I invite you to join me on this Independence Day and give it some thought. As Americans, we have much to be proud of. Our heritage is one of invention and productivity. We enjoy liberties that few in the world have ever known. We have much to protect, and we have a responsibility to be vigilant against both external aggressors and internal corruption. The Constitution is the supreme law of the United States. If you have not read the Constitution of the United States recently, please visit this issue’s Book Review. Citizens who find the Constitution lacking may work to amend it through the existing amendment process. Working to circumvent the Constitution is criminal activity. I encourage you to take the time to review the Bill of Rights with your family each Independence Day, and discuss the responsibilities of our oath with your subordinates. Is there anything less you can do and still be upholding the vow you have taken?

Semper Fidelis,

Chris Graham Editor, The Counter Terrorist www.30-10pistol.com

Editor Chris Graham Director of Operations Sol Bradman Director of Advertizing Carmen Arnaes Production Assistants Giselle Manassa Melissa Berne Contributing Editors Kevin Freeman Jennifer Hesterman Richard Marquise Tom Nypaver Dean Olson Steve Young ASIA PACIFIC EDITION Director of Operation Yaniv peretz Graphic Design Morrison Creative Company Copy Editor Laura Town Advertising Sales Chris Bell Bell@homelandsecurityssi.com 305-632-2309 Publisher: Security Solutions International 13155 SW 134th St. • STE 103 Miami, Florida 33186 ISSN 1941-8639 The Counter Terrorist Magazine, Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals is published by Security Solutions International LLC, as a service to the nation’s First Responders and Homeland Security Professionals with the aim of deepening understanding of issues related to Terrorism. No part of the publication can be reproduced without permission from the publisher. The opinions expressed herein are the opinions of the authors represented and not necessarily the opinions of the publisher. Please direct all Editorial correspondence related to the magazine to: Security Solutions International SSI, 13155 SW 134th Street, Suite 103, Miami, Florida. 33186 or info@thecounterterroristmag.com The subscription price for 6 issues is $34.99 and the price of the magazine is $5.99. (1-866-573-3999) Fax: 1-786-573-2090. For article reprints, e-prints, posters and plaques please contact: PARS International Corp. Web: www.magreprints.com/quickquote.asp Email: reprints@parsintl.com Phone: 212-221-9595 • Fax: 212-221-9195 Please visit the magazine web site where you can also contact the editorial staff:

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Firsthand:

Flying with the puntland maritime police force One of the peculiarities of the conflict formerly known as the Global War on Terror is that governments often know exactly where terrorists from groups like al Qaeda have bases, but ignore their presence. This is commonly called “head in the sand syndrome”…

8 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

All photos courtesy of the author

View from gunner’s position in the PMPF Alouette.

By Arthur Walker and Al Venter

hen I was flying armed Alouettes in Somalia’s Puntland region supporting anti-piracy operations last year, everybody at the Bosaso air base—from which we operated—was aware that al Qaeda/al Shabaab had a camp about 10 miles from our headquarters. I asked several times for permission to launch a strike, but each time the matter was referred to the president. The answer that came back was specific: do nothing! Apparently, not much has changed

since I moved back home. The camp is still there. Indeed, it is now wellestablished in the foothills of Puntland’s Golis Mountains that fringe this stretch of the north-west Indian Ocean adjacent to the Red Sea. So much so that each time aircraft or helicopters attached to the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) approach, they are fired on by Islamic militants. A reliable source of intelligence from Somalia recently returned to his home base in Pakistan. In an extensive debriefing, he

disclosed that the northernmost region of this embattled African land has become a focus of al Qaeda insurgency intent on infiltrating northern and eastern regions of Africa. In Puntland, they have already achieved a significant foothold, with the country— well suited for this purpose—being used as a conduit and for transshipment. A remote northeastern region of Somalia, Puntland broke away from the central government in 1998 because it regarded Mogadishu as “ungovernable.” The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 9

Armored Ford F350 targeted by al Qaeda in Bosaso.

Because this vast desert land lies adjacent to the Saudi Peninsula, insurgents employ small motorized “go-fast” boats and Arab dhows to cross the narrows at the southern end of the Red Sea; those who are dropped ashore take refuge in Puntland’s mountains. This region is now regarded as extremely volatile and dangerous by Western intelligence personnel. There is good reason. Puntland’s Golis mountain range is ideally situated for use by insurgents as a secure base for moving weapons, explosives and other military hardware needed by al Shabaab cadres in their war against African Union (AU) forces in and around Mogadishu. It says a lot that virtually all the suicide bombs

10 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

recently detonated in Mogadishu had their origins in Puntland, from where the material was taken southward by road, a distance of almost 1,000 miles. How they managed to get through dozens of roadblocks en route is another story. Clearly, fundamental Islam had everything to do with it. In fact, the bombs deployed in the destruction of Kenya’s largest shopping mall in December last year, in which 72 people were killed and 200 wounded, came from there.* Also in December, there were several serious attacks in Puntland itself, including a massive vehicle-borne IED attack on members of the air wing. At the time, air crews were on an end-of-

the-month visit to banks in the town of Bosaso and were clearly tracked and targeted by insurgents. There were numerous casualties, including several people killed. By some accounts, the Level-6 Ford-350 armored vehicle that took the brunt of the blast saved the lives of several PMPF members. Some of the survivors were later debriefed by four of Puntland’s senior security officials. Two had survived car bomb attacks, one survived an assassination attempt, and the fourth had his Bosaso house burned down in an al Qaeda attack. Reports that circulated afterward disclosed that the bomber was a 30-year-old man who had recently married a widow.

*Editor’s note: See Vol. 7, No. 1.

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Since my departure, even more has gone wrong in the attempted counterinsurgency in the Horn of Africa. Recent reports confirm that al Shabaab now has access to 82mm mortars, purportedly from Pakistan and Iran. Because of long-standing arms sanctions against Puntland, government security forces have nothing like that and are unable to counter this threat, even though detachments of U.S. Marines are currently training the country’s security forces.

Puntland Puntland is about the same size as Kansas. It makes up about a third of Somalia’s geographical area and has a population of about four million. The country has been a semi-autonomous state for 15 years but has still not been recognized by any country. For this reason, security and the maintenance of law and order is poor and its sparse interior provides a primitive but ideal environment for terror groups like al Qaeda and al Shabaab. Puntland is also the Somali hub of international piracy that has flourished in local waters in recent years. The PMPF air wing operates out of Bosaso air base, a short drive from the town of Bosaso itself, an untidy urban desert sprawl in the northeast of the country, originally established by American interests. I believe those involved were Erik Prince of Blackwater fame and the Washington-based Bancroft Global Development, a major Third World security provider. With the departure of Bancroft from Bosaso almost two years ago, a United Arab Emirates security firm took over. Since then security conditions have deteriorated markedly. Puntland’s only helicopter, a 40-year

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Members of a visit, board, search and seizure team from the guided-missile destroyer USS Bainbridge apprehended seven Somali pirates and released 15 Pakistani crew members off the coast of Somalia. The Pakistani master of the vessel claimed to have been pirated and used as a mother ship for more than six months. Photo by: Chief Petty Officer Deshonia Wesley

old Alouette gunship—bought from a South African commercial firm and originally deployed in the Angolan War— is no longer operational because, simply put, there are no spares. Worse, there is more than adequate money available to buy what is needed, but there is nobody in control who is prepared to act. Consequently, all reconnaissance flights out of Bosaso are currently handled by mercenary pilots at the controls of three new Ayres Turbo Thrush crop-spraying aircraft armed with four-barreled miniguns capable of firing 4,000 rpm as well as U.S.-supplied air-to-ground rockets. Adapted for close-air-support and labeled “Vigilantes,” the aircraft were originally developed for anti-narcotics

crop-spraying roles in Colombia at the behest of the U.S. Department of State. Clearly, the machines are a useful adjunct to the limited airborne capability of the PMPF, but they are hardly adequate in combating terrorism in one of the most volatile regions on the globe. A common complaint among staff is there is no backup should things go wrong with the aircraft, or if they are brought down by ground fire. One of the mercenaries said that apart from his AK, he takes along—as an emergency measure—a desert still for water, should he be forced down in the desert. Another aviation element routinely seen at the air base at Bosaso is a pair of

Puntland Maritime Police congregate around a PMPF Alouette helicopter. military Mi-17s with upgraded 2,500 hp engines. I believe they are linked to the U.S. government. No photos are allowed near the choppers or their crews and, until recently, one of the pilots was a woman. This American unit has no contact whatever with those linked to the PMPF and deals exclusively with senior military officers within the Puntland government whenever they touch down at Bosaso. The Mi-17s were completely modified to include Western avionics, which is an oddity for the Russian helicopter. Its original clamshell rear doors were

removed and a ramp installed, very much in line with what was originally sported by the French-built Super Frelon helicopter to allow for automatic weapons to be mounted and fired out of the rear. When in the area, the Mi-17s use the same shooting range for training as the PMPF helicopter, which lies a short distance from Bosaso. As expected, Puntlandâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s original split from the central Mogadishu government did not go smoothly. Immediately after declaring itself independent, sporadic fighting broke out between Puntland and Somaliland over the ownership of Sool

and Sanaag regions, which are claimed by Puntland on the basis of ethnicity. Violence also accompanied a political power struggle in 2001 between rival claimants to the Puntland leadership. More recently, vast deposits of oil have been discovered in a succession of desert regions to the south of Bosaso and more problems are likely to follow. Though Puntlandâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s newly elected president Abdiweli Mohamed Ali Gas visited Mogadishu in early February 2014 and was well received by the president of the central government, the oil issue topped the agenda in discussions that took place.

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 13

Dr. Abdiweli Mohamed Ali. Photo by: Hans-Petter Fjeld

He stated that every Puntland minister, security officer and police head—from the president down—got their cut of the loot. Pirates Differences over piracy also featured prominently. Since 2005, Puntland has become infamous as the hub of a burgeoning piracy operation in the seas around Somalia, particularly in the Gulf of Aden, where armed boats prey on key international shipping lanes to and from the Suez Canal. For more than a decade, this issue has achieved a high international profile and several nations, including the U.S., India, Russia, France, Britain and other NATO countries, China, and a dozen more have deployed warships around Somalia to protect shipping. There is no question that ships taken

14 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

hostage by Puntland’s buccaneers and sailed to secure anchorages along that country’s coast are a major source of income for President Ali Gas’s government. This was clearly demonstrated last year when two European freighters were released against a ransom payment of $12 million. Another mercenary source close to the PMPF disclosed that once the money had been handed over, activity in the entire country came to a halt while the loot was divided. He stated that every Puntland minister, security officer and police head—from the president down—got their cut of the loot. There is no question that piracy has brought vast amounts of money into the region. This has led to accusations that the government tends to turn a blind eye to the problem. The country’s leaders have frequently promised to curb piratical activities, but with little success. Still more ominous, this illegal activity is widely viewed as a socially acceptable and lucrative lifestyle that has attracted to its ranks former fishermen and exmilitiamen, as well as technical experts needed to keep pirate boats and their mother ships at sea. There are many in Somalia who defend attacks on foreign ships. They maintain, often with vehemence, that it is a justified response to illegal fishing and the dumping of toxic waste along Somalia’s long and poorly policed coastline. What is axiomatic about these anomalies is that having established the Puntland Maritime Police Force as a reasonably effective body dedicated to countering piracy, those airmen, ground forces and support elements at Bosaso who are involved in these activities are actually working against the government that pays them. I believe that because security in the Horn of Africa has deteriorated in the

past year, the former French enclave of Djibouti—the focus of U.S. action against Yemeni- and Somali-based militants linked to al Qaeda—is now used by the Pentagon for drone operations in the surrounding regions. Originally, the Americans took over Camp Lemonnier, a former French Foreign Legion base on the Red Sea, but because of security concerns, these operations were moved to a remote desert area near the Danakil Depression in the interior. I believe the Pentagon runs Predator surveillance drones that have resulted in a series of significant air-to-ground strikes against Islamic rebel groups from there. And while attacks on Bosaso town are sporadic, nobody working for the PMPF goes to town without a bodyguard of at least six soldiers. Though served by a twice-weekly Antonov flight from Berbera in quasiindependent Somaliland 300 miles to the west, it is not a reliable air link. What does run like proverbial clockwork is the brand new Dash-8 plane that arrives at Bosaso at 0800 hours every morning of the week, Sundays included. It lands with the region’s supply of qat leaf, the amphetamine drug chewed by the entire nation and much of the rest of the Horn of Africa and Yemen. Also at Bosaso air base, about 300 miles east of Djibouti, there is an Antonov-26 with a rotating Russian crew. This aircraft is used to bring in supplies and for troop rotation as well as delivering fuel and equipment to PMPF elements on distant operations. This includes dropping 44-gallon drums of fuel at sea for the PMPF’s three Zodiac RHIBs, fast craft fitted with 400hp Volvo twin-screw inboards and 12.7mm DshKa heavy machine guns mounted on their prows. There are some moves at hand to acquire new aircraft, but whether that will

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eventually take place is anybody’s guess. I suggested that a BK-117 (9-seater in a two plus seven configuration) be acquired for the PMPF. The Alouette (potentially one plus six pax) can take only the pilot plus two over the long distances this machine is required to traverse with a full fuel load. It takes 90 minutes’ flying time to reach Garowe, the capital, in the distant interior, and another 90 minutes to Bargaal. There is an even longer haul to get to the coastal town of Xaafuun. In between, the terrain is almost entirely desert with no water or fuel points and very erratic security force patrols. Small wonder that al Qaeda likes the place. There are other nefarious activities that take place in Puntland with relative impunity. I have heard of a significant amount of human trafficking from Yemen. Some of these victims arrive in Arab dhows. Several months ago, a convoy of five

16 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

dhows with a large number of illegals onboard was apprehended by the PMPF Alouette. The boats were escorted to Bosaso, where their crews were arrested and boats impounded. Weeks later, in keeping with many of the illogical decisions made by Puntland’s central government, both boats and crews were released and permitted to leave the country. The word on the street was that somebody in Yemen had paid an “incentive” to local officials for this to be allowed to happen. A notable success involving “freelance” aviators more recently was the rescue of 22 sailors who had been held hostage by pirates onboard the Panamanianregistered freighter Iceberg 1 for three years off the coast of Somalia. Several members of the crew had died during this period and others were savaged and tortured by their Somali guards. The Iceberg’s chief engineer had his ears cut off because he “did not listen,” and then the

captors crushed his leg with a steel bar so that he could not escape. Aware of the fate of these men, the Puntland government tried to negotiate with the pirates after it became clear that the Pakistani owners would not pay ransom. But their entreaties to release prisoners were rejected. Finally, a year ago, a small group of South African mercenaries in the employ of the PMPF attempted a rescue. About 20 ground troops (including a Puntland detachment led by former Executive Outcomes veteran Rudolf van Heerden with Puntland Rear Admiral Abdurizak Diri Farah in overall control) launched an attack. I supported the effort in the gunship. Having brought some heavier weapons to bear—including a Soviet 82 mm smoothbore B-10 recoilless gun as well as RPG-7s—the onslaught ended 12 days later when the pirates, using cellphones, called their leaders to negotiate a truce through diplomatic elements. It reveals just about everything that these calls were made to Yemen. Finally, the Puntland Government agreed to exchange the hostages for the freedom of the pirates holding them. It was the first known time an independent military group rescued hostages from captivity while still at sea in the modern era. The presence in Puntland of increased numbers of al Shabaab fighters was recently underscored when local residents reported an Arab dhow, purportedly out of Yemen, that had entered one of the lagoons along the northern coast and unloaded a cargo. When curious locals approached, this contraband was hurriedly buried and the boat fled. A search with the helicopter, as well as PMPF ground forces was launched the following day and a cache of arms was uncovered. It soon became apparent that

only part of the cargo had been unloaded. It consisted of 220 RPG-7 rockets but no launchers, about 90 pounds of TNT, 200 electric detonators incorporating the latest Iranian technology, four rolls of cortex and 50 pounds of ammonium nitrate in sacks, which could have been mistaken for fertilizer. A quantity of B-9 ammunition, but no barrels (the B-9 is of Soviet origin and slightly smaller than the B-10 recoilless gun), as well as boxes of AK and PKM ammunition and hand grenades was also recovered. One of the peculiarities of the conflict formerly known as the Global War on Terror is that governments often know exactly where terrorists from groups like al Qaeda have bases, but ignore their presence. This is commonly called “head in the sand syndrome”, the logic being a hope that by tomorrow, the menace will have gone away without confrontation. The situation in this part of Somalia is

a debacle. There is nobody in the country that is in control. Any kind of decision involving security is either shelved or indefinitely delayed. Worse still, the Arabs who run the air wing at Bosaso are from the Gulf States and they have no real commitment to turn things around. It is an endless cycle of mayhem. In the meantime the number of suicide bombings in the country will increase because there is nothing in place that might curtail it… no planning… no counter-measures… security is at an alltime low. Throughout the process, a large number of pirates remain active and acquire tens of millions of dollars from hijacking, kidnapping and ransom payments. The line of individuals who profit from this enterprise is long and diverse. It does not appear that instability in Africa or anywhere else is in danger of being resolved any time soon.

about the authors Mr. Walker is one of the most illustrious helicopter pilots to emerge from the African mercenary ranks in decades. He fought in South Africa’s “border wars” and was twice awarded that country’s highest military honor for bravery under fire. He has been flying an Alouette in anti-piracy operations in Somalia. Mr. Venter is the author of more than 50 books and is also producer and director of TV films. His most notable effort was a one-hour documentary on the war in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion at the behest of the CIA. His latest book Mercenaries is linked to a six part series of the same name for Discovery Channel and he recently published Portugal’s Guerrilla Wars in Africa.

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Understanding Radicalization and Terrorist Violence Today

Going beyond the mainstream thinking, the negative images of Americans living abroad, alternative social spaces fostering radicalization and using the wrong targeting approach against a terrorist network could be considered important catalysts leading to radicalization and terrorist violence. 18 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

By Douglas R. Woodall

n the first six months of 2013, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) documented 5,100 terrorist attacks across the globe. This was a substantial increase compared to 8,500 terrorist attacks for the whole of 2012, and the wave of violence has shown few signs of ebbing in the second half of 2013. Though there are no dearth of efforts to understand the fundamental beliefs and perceptions that motivate terrorists to carry out attacks, this has done little to stem the scale or scope of violence perpetrated. Underlying these attacks are fundamental beliefs and perceptions that fuel terrorists’ will to fight. Closer examination of longterm strategic objectives will help to achieve the elusive strategic outcome of winning the contest of wills. Gaining a better understanding of key factors fuelling the adversary’s will to fight is the first step. Some of the important factors contributing to radicalization and extremist violence today are discussed in the following section.

to interacting with local populations in government or military capacities, and therefore have the ability to influence foreigners’ perceptions of America in other countries. A significant numbers of Americans live abroad, and more importantly, are engaged in activities that impact not only the politics of the concerned countries but also the social and cultural aspects of the host society. In this context, the impact of their activities, whether as an individual or as a group, may have consequences that cannot be ignored. In some cases,

their perceived extravagant lifestyles fuel further misconceptions of what America represents. American actions and attitudes abroad are also something that jihadists attempt to exploit, as was evident from the attack against expatriate communities in Saudi Arabia. One specific example is the 12 May, 2003 attacks against expatriate compounds in Saudi Arabia. Al Qaeda played a prominent role in these attacks, and the majority of the victims in the attacks were Americans. The segregation of

Americans Abroad It is already well-established that America’s image overseas has contributed, in part, to the motivation of some extremist and terrorist groups. However, what receives much less attention is the role played by Americans living and serving overseas in exacerbating the negative portrayal of the US. Americans based abroad are not limited

Afghan wtnesses testify at Staff Sergeant Bales’ trial. Image by AP /Lois Silve Image source: http://blog.thenewstribune.com/military/2013/05/29/jblms-staff-sgtrobertbales-to-plead-guilty-to-killing-afghan-civilians/ The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 19

“ … access to spaces that have the ability to influence students is a strategic prize for terror groups, especially if it results in the successful recruitment of individuals to work as operatives in Western countries.”

the expatriate communities and the local population in Saudi Arabia fuels jihadists’ perceptions that amoral or corrupt lifestyles are followed by the expatriates. This may encourage thoughts that the existence of Westerners is corrupting members of the host nation. The attacks resulted in the killing of 36 people and wounding a further 160. The massacre of 16 Afghan civilians by American Staff Sergeant Robert Bales fanned the flames of extremism and created a damaging public image of American Soldiers serving in Afghanistan. Even though Staff Sergeant Bales was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, Afghans have expressed outrage that Bales is not being put to death, with some calling for him to be tried in Afghanistan. The brother of Mohammad Daud, who was slain in the massacre, told CBS News that not putting Bales to death shows that “America is encouraging its soldiers to

20 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

kill Afghan people, destroy and torch their houses, then come to America (and receive) a Medal of Honour.” This example highlights challenges that arise when Americans’ actions overseas are not necessarily representative of American society, its culture and values.

Alternative Spaces of Radicalization Since 9/11, madrasahs have been in focus when it comes to investigating sources of terrorist indoctrination, but other spaces also exist including those in tertiary academic institutions in the West. The radicalization of Umar Farouk Abdulmuttalab is a worthy example. Abdulmuttalab, a young Nigerian man, gained notoriety for attempting to blow up a Northwest Airlines Christmas Day flight from Amsterdam to Detroit in 2009. Before he was recruited in the jihadist movement, he matriculated at the University College London (UCL). Abdulmuttalab was the president of UCL’s Islamic Society, and he sought to bring extremist and radical speakers to the campus. An investigation by UCL concluded that the university was not responsible for Abdulmuttalab’s radicalization and worldview. Nevertheless, the investigating team recommended introducing a system to review the credentials of guest speakers in the aftermath of the investigation. In this particular case, access to spaces that have the ability to influence students is a strategic prize for terrorists and extremists, especially if it results in the successful recruitment of individuals to work as operatives in Western countries. The key person among the 9/11 hijackers - Mohammed Atta - could be another example in this context.

As reported in an article in the Prospect magazine in 2002, “Atta in Hamburg,” Martin Ebert, a friend of Atta at the Technical University of Hamburg-Harburg in Germany, described the academic environment as anti-American. Ebert mentioned to a reporter about a dialogue involving Atta, which gave Ebert the impression that Atta perceived that “America is rolling over us.” This is, of course, not to say that the majority of Western academic institutions are susceptible to be exploited by radical students, but some of these could allow environments conducive to solidifying radical ideas against the West in impressionable students. This is of a particularly serious concern, as many students may possess so-called clean passports and a generally low profile from the purview of law enforcement, which makes them strategic assets for terrorist groups looking to bypass immigration and customs entry points. At the same time, there have been cases of students (and other individuals) that support the jihadist agenda or are susceptible to radicalization by terrorists who have citizenship in Western countries. Anwar al-Aulaqi is an example of one such terrorist with US citizenship, and whose actions radicalized a large number of followers, to include influencing Abdulmuttalab.

Targeting Approaches Another contributory factor to radicalization could be the choice of targeting approach used for neutralizing terrorist groups. Successful targeting operations in April 2010 led to the death of two leaders in Al Qaeda’s Iraqi

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The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 21

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Asia Pacific Edition The Counter Terrorist Magazine Asia Pacific Edition is finally available for the Asia Pacific region counter-terrorism and homeland security practitioners. The Asia Pacific Edition not only gives the readers a worldwide counter-terrorism perspective but also in-depth information about counter terrorism activities in Asia. The Asia Pacific Edition provides an excellent platform for counter-terrorism and homeland solutions providers to access and penetrate the Asia Pacific market.

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~ June/July 2014

branch – Abu Ayyub al- Masri (also known as Abu Hamza al-Muhajir) and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. At that time, the deaths of al-Masri and al-Baghdadi dealt a significant blow to Al Qaeda in Iraq. This was a successful intelligence driven operation, providing critical information to facilitate the elimination of these key leaders. However, the surgical elimination of key leaders may not necessarily be the best or the only option to disrupt terrorist groups for long-term strategic effects. For instance, it is not entirely clear whether Iraq is better-off today after targeting al-Masri and al-Baghdadi. Masri and Baghdadi were marginal leaders, and their lack of visibility among Al Qaeda’s fighters could be a severe blow to the overall morale within the organization. Interestingly, the elimination of Baghdadi led to a speculation as to whether he was a real person, or a fictional leader. Their elimination nevertheless enabled a period of decline for Al Qaeda in Iraq. However, focusing on decapitation tactics without regard to careful analysis of the second order (removing bad leadership) and third order (allowing more effective leadership to advance) effects of the same, reinforced a focus on leader elimination for counterterrorism operations. While this strike was a resounding tactical and operational success, removal of these leaders eliminated their rather ineffective leadership, and opened a path for more charismatic/ committed leadership to emerge and re-energize a declining organization. The new leader, Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali Badri, also known as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Abu Dua, is currently one of the most wanted terrorists in the world, with a US $10 million price offered for his killing or capture by the United States.

Abdulmuttalab, the Christmas Day Bomber Photo source: http://www.examiner.com/article/raw-video-umar-faroukabdulmutallabarrives-at-court-for-attack-on-flight-253-watch-video

Abu Dua’s operations in Iraq and expansion of his group’s influence into Syria not only demonstrate his own effectiveness in terms of increasing lethality of Al Qaeda in Iraq under his leadership, but also the counterproductive nature of a pure attrition strategy from a counterterrorism perspective. In this case, the removal or neutralization of ineffective leaders led the way for more dynamic leadership to assume control, with noticeable impact. In this context, it is also interesting to examine the case of Muhammad alKhulayfi, a member of Takfir wal-Hijra, a radical Islamist group linked to Al Qaeda based in Egypt. In February 1994,

“… neutralization of ineffective leaders led the way for more dynamic leadership to assume control …”

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 23

al-Khulayfi declared Osama bin Laden an infidel and attempted to assassinate him. Even as the group failed in its attempt, the attempt served as the catalyst for bin Laden to portray a purer and more radical image to reconstruct how his organization and its supporters perceived him, such as devoting more energy to avoiding extravagant displays and living an austere lifestyle. Thus, elimination of terrorist leadership is not a panacea in counterterrorism. Better strategic

outcomes may result from manipulating the internal dynamics of the group, including the promotion of ineffective leadership to precipitate the groupsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; implosion, or accelerating its destruction by internal turmoil. The timing and objectives of counterterrorism operations against terrorists at the leadership level should therefore be tempered with the consideration of the long-term strategic and possible counterproductive outcomes if any.

Way Forward There is clearly a need to improve Americaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s image abroad in coordination with aggressive information operations to project positive American values or positive ideas about America. More specifically, initiatives designed to build international trust through the personal example, conduct and professionalism of Americans living and serving abroad will help to mitigate the negative perceptions of America abroad. Spaces that provide environments enabling terrorists to grow and solidify their uncompromising beliefs should receive more public scrutiny. More importantly, a long-term strategy for counterterrorism should not rely exclusively on the speed of targeting or on the ability to neutralize terrorist leaders. Rather, careful analysis and understanding of social systems and the internal dynamics of terrorist groups could lead to better strategic outcomes. Allowing terrorist groups to implode through poor leadership or creating the conditions for popular movements against them are alternative options that merit consideration. Successful tactical and operational victories in the short-term must not be the goal when the risks of more lethal threats persist in the long-term.

About the author Douglas R. Woodall is the first United States Army War College Fellow selected to serve at RSISICPVTR. He is an active duty Army Lieutenant Colonel with over 20 years of service, to include combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the US Government. Abu Dua: An Improved and More Effective Leader Photo by National Counterterrorism Center ; Image source: http://content.time.com/time/covers/europe/0,16641,20131216,00.html

24 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

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Case Study:

Rifleman Sabotages Pacific Gas and Electric Station â&#x20AC;&#x153;There are ways that a very few number of actors with very rudimentary equipment could take down large portions of our grid.â&#x20AC;?1 Jon Wellinghoff, Former Chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)

26 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

By Sarah Kinzer and Jennifer Hesterman

On April 16, 2013, the day following the Boston Marathon bombings, an attack was executed against the Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s (PG&E) Metcalf Transmission substation near San Jose, California. The Metcalf station serves a population of over one million, including Silicon Valley, and is an important part of the West Coast grid.

he operation to cripple the station appeared to be planned and executed with precision by an unknown number of attackers. At 0058, the perpetrator(s) entered manholes, cutting AT&T phone lines in an underground vault2, which knocked out local 911

and landline service to the substation, and some cell service in the area. Three minutes later, lines belonging to Level 3 Communications were also cut, knocking out the substation’s Internet service.4 At 0131, one or more shooters fired over 100 rounds of 7.62 x 39mm

ammunition into the plant’s cooling mechanisms.5 In the span of 19 minutes, 17 transformers were damaged, although it would be another 15 minutes before oil loss caused them to overheat and crash. A failure message was sent to PG&E’s notification system at 0145. To prevent

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 27

San Jose, California Photo by: About the_tahoe_guy/Michael a blackout, workers rerouted power and asked other power plants in Silicon Valley to produce more electricity to compensate for the lost capability.6 A worker in a nearby building with functioning phones heard the shots and called the police at 0141. Police arrived at the north end of

28 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

the station approximately one minute after the shooting stopped, while the attackers successfully fled, presumably to the south. The police were unable to unlock the gate to the station, and after a cursory search revealed nothing, they left. Shortly after their departure, the system

crashed. In all, 10,000 gallons of oil leaked from the damaged substation and repairs took 27 days.

The Investigation What began as a routine vandalism investigation quickly turned complex.

Stacked rock piles were found in the area where the shooter(s) stood, suggesting the possibility of casing and rehearsals. Abandoned shell casings were free of fingerprints. The attacker(s) evaded surveillance cameras, but cameras did pick up what appear to be light signals at the beginning and end of the attack, possibly a coordination measure initiating the exfiltration phase of the mission when police approached.7 The cutting of the phone and Internet lines and choice of aim points within the transformer structure demonstrated knowledge of both communication and power grid configuration. The perpetrators may have known the transformers were unlikely to ignite, and they appear to have anticipated how police would respond.

Shooting Facts Public sources indicate that the

weapon(s) used was an AK-47. 7.62x39mm is consistent with AK style rifles but not exclusively consumed by these. The AK-47 is a cheaply constructed, rugged and widely available tool. The rifle is a Russian design but is manufactured and obtainable all over the world. It is not a precision rifle. It is not a long range rifle. The 7.62x39mm round is not a uniquely destructive round. We believe, based on independent analysis of video of the scene and maps of the area, that shooting distances appear to be between approximately 50-200 meters. Engaging a bus-sized target such as the transformers with an AK or other 7.62x39mm rifle, could successfully be achieved with nothing more than a rudimentary level of skill (if illumination was favorable or quality night optics were available). It is unclear if the shooters were spraying targets or methodically

The perpetrators may have known the transformers were unlikely to ignite, and they appear to have anticipated how police would respond.

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Pacific Gas and Electric 500 kV power lines crossing California State Route 36 in Tehama County, Northern California. Photo by: Cheers engaging transformers. Firing 100 rounds in 19 minutes means the shooting could be as slow as 10 rounds per minute, or one shot every six seconds. Even after conducting three (30 round) magazine changes, a moderately skilled shooter is easily capable of firing 100 rounds in less than a few minutes from an AK. A 100

round drum magazine would streamline the time required. California has some of the most restrictive laws toward private gun ownership in the country. These laws did not inhibit the PG&E shooter(s).

Suspects Information about the Metcalf attack

was not publicized for 10 months. This appears to be an attempt to prevent inspiring copycats. Most signs pointed toward a professional sabotage operation, a feeling confirmed when U.S. military specialists from the Joint Warfare Analysis Center were called in to take a look.8 The FBI alleges the incident was

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DISCLAIMER: This project was supported by Cooperative Agreement Number 2008-GD-T8-K015 administered by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/FEMA, Training and Exercises Integration Secretariat. Points of view or opinions in this document are those of the author and do not represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

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The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 31

Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2. Photo by: TVA Web Team

not an act of terrorism. This opinion is not universal (the opposition includes some former FBI counterterrorism agents).9 Furthermore, Jon Wellinghoff, former Chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), called it the most significant incident of domestic terrorism involving the grid that has ever occurred in the U.S.

32 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

The perpetrators are likely still at large. Wellingoff, who since stepped down, gave closed-door, high-level briefings to federal agencies, Congress and the White House expressing his concern that a larger attack could be in the works and publicly acknowledged the incident out of reported concern that national security is at risk and critical electric-grid

sites arenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t adequately protected.10 Mark Johnson, a former vice president for transmission operations at PG&E agrees, and briefed a security conference his views that Metcalf was a â&#x20AC;&#x153;dress rehearsal for future attacks.â&#x20AC;?11 It should be noted that this infrastructure is not uniquely vulnerable, whether analyzing the United States or any other country.

West Bar Nuclear Plant, Tennessee Less than one week later, on April 21st, an intruder opened fire at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant in Spring City, Tennessee. A security guard on a routine perimeter check spotted a man inside a clearly marked restricted area of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant in Spring City, Tennessee. The intruder tied his boat to the end of a dock that was located on plant property but outside the plant’s fences. Not feeling threatened, the officer spoke with the perpetrator from afar. The man produced a weapon and fired several shots at the officer, striking his vehicle.12 The officer was not injured and returned fire, but apparently failed to hit his target. Law enforcement officers combed the area with helicopters and on foot over the next 12 hours with no success in locating the shooter. The plant implemented a heightened security posture, and the FBI and Nuclear Regulatory Commission took control of the investigation. There are no suspects. There is no indication of sophisticated capability in this attack.

Little Rock, Arkansas The FBI is investigating three attacks against the Arkansas power infrastructure in September and October, 2013. A perpetrator fastened a cable to a 100-foot transmission tower and laid it across a nearby railroad track in what investigators believe was an attempt to use a moving train to bring down the tower. High voltage lines were brought down during the operation, alerting officials to the tampering before trains passed through the area. There was also a fire set at a nearby substation with the message “You should have expected us.” and an incident where a stolen tractor with an extendable arm and saw

500 kV to 161 kV substation near Little Rock, Arkansas. Photo by: Nickthestick26

blade was used to physically cut down key power poles.13

Vulnerabilities Power plants have been regarded as both tactical and strategic targets. U.S. Special Operations Forces deliver long-range precision fires against key

There was also a fire set at a nearby substation with the message “You should have expected us.”

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 33

equipment as a standard mission set that is not uncommon in the world. Successfully targeting just one or two facilities in a region has the potential to create widespread disruption physically, economically, and psychologically. The scale of the attack can be tailored to suit the perpetrator’s aims. It has been alleged that the Metcalf incident resulted in the leakage of sensitive data into the public domain.14 There have been threats and attempts to blow up or penetrate nuclear reactors in Argentina, Russia, Lithuania, Western Europe, South Africa, and South Korea.15 According to the 9/11 Commission Report, al Qaeda also considered attacks on a nuclear power reactor as part of its early plans.16 Perhaps most dangerous

34 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

would be a knowledgeable lone wolf suicide terrorist with no concern for high radiation exposure. Cyber attacks against the electric grid are similarly well documented. In 2013, the energy sector accounted for 59% of the cyber incidents reported to the Department of Homeland Security’s industrial control systems cyber emergency response team.17 While cyber engagements require a high level of sophistication to plan, they are easier to stage since physical location and detection aren’t factors. And while malware has been used to destroy hardware, some experts believe recovering the grid from a cyber attack will be easier since these attacks are usually short in duration and don’t generally involve physical destruction.18

Physical Hardening Challenges If the national defense strategy were to be based upon defending individual targets, there are an unlimited number of potential targets to defend. Encouragingly, the infrastructure of national adversaries is similarly vulnerable. Non-state actors must be targeted with greater precision, but they do not lack targets and vulnerabilities of their own. According to former FERC Chairman Wellinghoff, “There are probably less than 100 critical high voltage substations on our grid in this country that need to be protected from a physical attack. It is neither a monumental task, nor is it an

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inordinate sum of money that would be required to do so.”19 However, one must acknowledge the likelihood that attackers may not be married to the idea of attacking power stations specifically, but whatever target will most easily advance their objectives or interests. High voltage stations are only a small number among many potential high value targets.

Way Forward The challenge of protection is twofold—safeguarding the grid, the hard target and electricity’s users, the soft target. In addition to physical hardening, “psychological hardening” against threats also serves the national interest. Citizens must be prepared for the challenges of a major blackout and serve as ‘eyes and ears’ for threat detection. Public awareness is the best way to lower fear.

•

About the Authors Ms. Kinzer is a reserve U.S. Air Force intelligence officer and senior intelligence consultant at Patch Plus Consulting. Ms. Hesterman (PhD.) is a retired U.S. Air Force colonel. Her forthcoming book is Soft Target Hardening: Protecting People from Attack (Taylor & Francis, CRC Press, http://www.crcpress.com/product/ isbn/9781482244212.)

Endnotes http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/ posts/2013/12/24/power-stationmilitary-assault 2 http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ SB100014240527023048511045793591 41941621778 3 http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/ posts/2013/12/24/power-stationmilitary-assault 1

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http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ SB100014240527023048511045793591 41941621778 5 http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/ posts/2013/12/24/power-stationmilitary-assault 6 http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ SB100014240527023048511045793591 41941621778 7 Santa Clara Sherriff’s Department Video from Metcalf Station shooting, http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=RQzAbKdLfW8 8 http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ SB100014240527023048511045793591 41941621778 9 http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=AbGLTUcHcqk 10 http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ SB100014240527023048511045793591 41941621778 11 http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/ posts/2013/12/24/power-stationmilitary-assault 12 http://www.timesfreepress.com/ news/2013/apr/22/watts-bar-intrudershooting-under-federal/ 13 http://www.nytimes. com/2013/10/09/us/power-grid-isattacked-in-arkansas.html?_r=0 14 http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ SB100014240527023040201045794336 70284061220?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWha tsNewsCollection&mg=reno64-wsj 15 Matthew Bunn and George Bunn, “Strengthening Nuclear Security Against Post- September 11 Threat of Theft and Sabotage,” Journal of Nuclear Materials Management (Spring 2002), 16 The 9/11 Commission Report (2004), 245 17 http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2014/03/17/ cyberattack-could-cause-blackouts/ 18 http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2014/03/17/ cyberattack-could-cause-blackouts/ 19 http://counterjihadreport. com/2014/03/14/americas-electricalgrid-vulnerability-to-sabotageterrorismrevealed-in-federal-study/ 4

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The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 37

Sniping

in the Mexican Criminal Insurgency

Photo: U.S. Air Force

38 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

By Robert J. Bunker

Mexico has been held in the grip of increasing narcorelated strife for many years, with well over 80,000 killed and another 20,000 missing. Gun battles and engagements between opposing cartels and drug gangs and between criminal groups and Mexican law enforcement agencies and the military have become daily events throughout many regions of the country.

hese criminal groups have paramilitary capabilities, utilize tactics that are both terrorist- and insurgent-like, and possess light infantry arms. Cartel enforcers donning body armor, carrying assault rifles fitted with grenade launchers, and driving armored SUVs are quite common, as is the use of fragmentation grenades. Car bombs have also been used in the past, and light antitank weapons such as LAW rockets

and RPGs are occasionally encountered. Of all of these weapons, one of the most feared is the sniper rifleâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;not only those of standard rifle caliber that can be used to deliver precision fire at long rangeâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;but also heavier rifles in calibers such as .50 and 12.7mm. These rifles can defeat light armor, punch through buildings and vehicles, and deliver devastating effects on flesh and bone. Unfortunately, much of our understanding of sniper rifle patterns

of use in the Mexican criminal insurgency is based on incomplete information due to the covert nature of their employment and the competing interests and motivations regarding tracking and disseminating this information. Additionally, since the new administration of President Enrique PeĂąa Nieto came into office in December 2012, reports coming out of Mexico have diminished. This is mostly due to new governmental policies. However, regions

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 39

Nuevo Leon Tamaulipas

of the country such as Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon are also seeing a press black out dictated by the cartels themselves.

Cartels Using Sniper Rifles

President Enrique Peña Nieto. Photo by: World Economic Forum

40 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

Small arms and heavier man-portable weapons have proliferated across the major criminal organizations in Mexico. The following drug gangs and cartels have been identified as possessing “sniper rifles”: • Arellano Felix Organization (AFO) • Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO) • Cartel del Golfo (CDG) • The Federation/Sinaloa • La Familia Michoacana (LFM)

and its successor, the Knights Templar Cartel • Juarez Cartel • Los Zetas No reliable information exists on the number of such weapons currently in the arsenals of the various Mexican criminal organizations. A conservative estimate would likely be in the high double digits, but this could very well extend into over a hundred of such dedicated rifles. Once again, at best this is an educated guess. Well over one hundred sniper rifles have been seized from the cartels to date, including more than 60 .50 caliber rifles either in cartel possession or intercepted while in transit for delivery.

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Types of Rifles and Optics Seized Two types of rifles commonly identified as “sniper rifles” have been seized from the drug gangs and cartels in Mexico: quasiand dedicated-sniper rifles. Dedicatedsniper rifles, in turn, can be further divided into standard rifle calibers and large caliber variants. Quasi-Sniper Rifles: These “improvised sniper rifles” are created by employing optics with magnification on AR-15 and other styles of semi-automatic rifles and assault rifles. These are unsophisticated attempts to replicate the capabilities of “Designated Marksman Rifles” or “Special Purpose Rifles.” They can be used for delivering intermediate range precision fires. Dedicated-Sniper Rifles: These are rifles designed for tactical employment at long ranges. Hunting rifles are likely counted in this category, as gun data is often collected and disseminated with a lack of precision, for a variety of reasons. Bolt action variants generally deliver greater precision, but are limited to specialized use when

…about 34 or so Barrett .50 caliber rifles were allowed to be taken south of the border and delivered to the drug gangs as part of the infamous Fast and Furious operation.

facing opponents with standard semi-auto or select-fire rifles. Standard caliber variants: The “QuasiSniper Rifles” are often 5.56 x 45mm, while “Dedicated Sniper Rifles” are often 7.62x51mm or similar calibers. Large caliber variants: These are .50 caliber and 12.7mm rifles, as well as 20 mm and like calibers. Each of these can disable vehicles and have some armordefeating capabilities. Optics seized from gang and cartel members and discovered in weapons caches have fallen primarily into the category of basic optics: simple daylight telescopic sights. Electro-Optical (battery powered) sights appear evident in a few of the seizures. No evidence of night-vision devices has appeared in press photos of these seizures, though the Mexican narco museum has one example of what appears to be a laser targeting device mounted on a large caliber rifle. However, the cartels— and mercenaries in their employ—are known to possess night-vision devices. The volume of use of suppressors and special purpose ammunition is undetermined.

42 weapons recovered by the Mexican military in Naco, Sonora, Mexico, 20 Nov 2009. Photo by: ATF

42 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

Cooperation of the forces special advanced of the Mexican army in the searches carried out in Michoacan. Photo by: Diego Fernández

Sources of Sniper Rifles and Snipers Firearms employed by Mexican crime groups are purchased from corrupt government forces in Latin America, stolen from government armories and stockpiles, purchased from international vendors in shipments coming from China, India, and elsewhere, and on occasion purchased in the U.S. In fact, about 34 or so Barrett .50 caliber rifles were allowed to be taken south of the border and delivered to the drug gangs as part of the infamous Fast and Furious operation. Attempts to smuggle sniper

rifles off of U.S. Army and Marine bases for delivery to the cartels have also been reported. Cartel snipers have come from Mexican special forces, army, and law enforcement deserters, and from the Kaibiles (Guatemalan special forces). Mercenaries—including former U.S. military personnel (who may have gang ties)—have also offered their services to the cartels.1 The actual number of cartel snipers who have been deployed over the last decade is unknown. Who would qualify as an actual sniper is also up for debate. The best working

assumption is that a minimum figure would be in the dozens, with a potential threshold of a few hundred. However, only a fraction of such cartel personnel and mercenaries could be considered competent snipers; many individuals are simply unsophisticated operators of rifles with optics.

Deployment Patterns Military sniper teams typically operate in two man teams with a shooter and a more senior spotter who may also provide security. In Mexico, tactics, terrain, and opposition forces readily modify sniper

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 43

Kaibiles (Guatemalan Special Forces soldiers) may have offered services to the cartels. Photo by: Cpl. Daniel A. Negrete

deployment, as do the training level of the sniper personnel themselves, and the hardware available. Past incident patterns suggest that cartel snipers are typically employed without the benefit of a spotter, with comparatively low levels of competence at limited engagement ranges. Antipersonnel: The classic use of a sniper is to stealthily kill a high value individualâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;one shot, one killâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;with the sniper escaping undetected. Politicians, military and policing officials, and the plaza bosses of competing cartels primarily represent high value targets in this conflict environment. From June 2007 through June 2011, at least ten Mexican soldiers have been killed by reported cartel snipers. Antivehicular/Antimateriel: Larger caliber sniper rifles can easily be directed against infrastructure. Numerous photographs exist of sandbagged police stations in Mexico. Countersniper: This deployment pattern has not been confirmed in the Mexican criminal insurgency but is assumed to have taken place in engagements between cartels similarly

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First detachment of the BEPGS in pass magazine by superiority. Photo by: Pmsinaloa armed with sniper rifles. Technologybased shot spotters and countersniper systems are said to exist with some Mexican governmental forces, but no record of their successful use against a cartel sniper has been reported. Area/Aerial Denial: Snipers can be tactically deployed for area (ground) and aerial (air) denial missions. Both uses have been alleged in the Mexican criminal insurgency. In urban ground operations,

area denial is utilized to deny responding forces entry to support adjacent forces during an engagement and also to create pre-planned kill zones by means of intentionally channeling opposing forces though pre-selected avenues of approach. Harassment & PSYOPS: Ongoing sniping can have a detrimental and debilitating effect on an opposing police, paramilitary, or military unit. While this is not normally mentioned in regard to

cartel snipers, the implicit assumption exists that such snipers deployed over time can degrade the morale of an opposing force as part of targeted psychological operations. Note: Given the governmental special operations origins of Los Zetas, it is assumed that this technique has been employed over the years by that cartel. Integrated Small Unit Tactics: Snipers in overwatch positions can also be

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The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 45

integrated in support of tactical units for both defensive and offensive operations. The complex crime and warfare environment found in the Mexican criminal insurgency—the above militarylike deployment patterns of snipers—falls within broader organized crime, narcoterrorism, and criminal-insurgency themes.

INCIDENTS OF INTEREST Sniper rifles have been utilized in the Mexican states of Baja California, Chihuahua, Michoacan, Nayarit, Nuevo Leon, Sonora, and Tamaulipas, and have been seized in the states of Durango, Sinaloa, and Veracruz. The following two relatively recent incidents show examples of sniper rifle use in Mexico by the cartels and drug gangs: • The commander of the State Investigation Agency, Gustavo Gerardo Garza Saucedo, was assassinated during the early morning of 19 February 2013. An individual reportedly used a .50 caliber rifle to shoot him when he arrived home in Apodaca, 20 kilometers northwest

46 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

Mexican special operations helicopter. Photo by: Wikiwritermex

of the capital of Nuevo Leon. The standoff range was reported to be 60 meters, about 66 yards away. This is the distance where a tripod (possibly an improvised item) was reportedly found abandoned along with a shell casing, which possibly suggests a low level of skill and/or the desire for a symbolic act. The items were reported found in a vacant lot

near the Commander’s home. The target was hit in the back with the lot, providing a clear line of sight to the parking and/or door of the residence.2 • On 18 December 2013 in the resort of Puerto Penasco in the northwest of Sonora, an engagement took place between two Mexican government helicopters and a cartel

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Three policemen on the roof of the Huejotzingo municipal palace providing security during the 2011 Huejotzingo Carnival. Photo by: Thelmadatter element of ten SUVs fleeing a luxury condo complex next to the beach. The vehicles were hit by air-to ground fire that resulted in their being destroyed, with five gunmen killed at the scene. The engagement was a result of a Mexican governmental attempt to arrest Gonzalo Inzunza, a top lieutenant of the Sinaloa cartel. It was reported, “Police found 14 sniper or assault rifles at the scene, which one federal official confirmed were of heavy caliber.”3 Video of the exchange, shot by an American tourist, seems to record the sounds of .50 caliber

48 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

rounds being fired during the gun battle, which suggests the cartel members may have been returning fire against the helicopters, though Mexican government forces also employ .50 rifles.4 For a listing of earlier cartel sniper incidents, see the Mexican Cartel Tactical Note listed in the references section.

Cross Border Potential Rifle fire from across the Southern border into the U.S. has been an intermittent affair over the years. For example, in Imperial Beach, California,

in 1997, seven incidents took place, with one resulting in a Border Patrol agent being grazed by a bullet in the forehead.5 In 2005, a rash of at least six cross-border sniping incidents occurred in the Douglas, Arizona area against Border Patrol agents, with a vehicle and a surveillance camera being hit.6 By 2006, Congressional concerns had escalated regarding the possibility that U.S. Border Patrol agents could be subjected to .50 caliber sniper rifle fire from Mexican cartel personnel.7 In 2010, smugglers even threatened to use snipers against Nogales police officers unless they quit engaging in off-duty drug seizures.8 During this period and up to the present, numerous encounters between armed cartel personnel and U.S. border patrol and LE officers have taken place. Further, sporadic cross-border use of lasers to harass and intimidate U.S. law enforcement has taken place. Accurate numbers regarding cross border fire against law enforcement officers seems not to have been tracked. While Mexican drug gangs and the cartels possess the “capability” to target U.S. law enforcement officers via snipers across the border and inside our country, especially in desolate smuggling areas— such as in the Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas sectors—widespread ‘intent’ to do so does not presently appear to exist. What would change this present equation is unknown. This only adds to the present ambiguity of the sniper threat related to the drug gangs and cartels operating in Mexico. The Border Patrol appears to be taking some precautions. In September 2013 it was reported that: To arm the precision marksmen who are part of the U.S. Border Patrol Tactical Unit’s precision marksman/

observer program, CBP plans to procure 40,000 rounds of .308 Hornady 168 grain, A-MAX Tactical Application Police ammunition.9 Only time will tell if the Mexican criminal sniper capability will evolve to maximize the use of the cartels’ equipment, or when there will be another cross-border sniper threat.

•

About the author Mr. Bunker is a Distinguished Visiting Professor and Minerva Chair, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. The views expressed in this essay are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government.

ENdNotes For instance, see Deborah Hastings,

“U.S. soldiers accepting cash, drugs for Mexican drug cartel contract hits.” New York Daily News. 13 September 2013, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ national/drug-cartels-mexico-hire-us-soldiers-assassins-article-1.1454851; and “Ex-Army sniper arrested, charged with doing security for drug cartel.” UPI News. 28 September 2013, http://www. upi.com/Top_News/US/2013/09/28/ Ex-Army-sniper-arrested-charged-withdoing-security-for-drug-cartel/UPI90661380397822/. 2 Directly quoted from Robert Bunker, “Sniper Executes a Police Chief of Nuevo Leon with a .50 Caliber Rifle (Translation).” Chivis (a Mexican blogger with Borderland Beat) provided a translation of the incident in support of this note. Small Wars Journal—El

Centro. 25 February 2013, http:// smallwarsjournal.com/blog/sniperexecutes-a-police-chief-of-nuevo-leonwith-a-50-caliber-rifle-translation. 3 Mark Stevenson, “Helicopter gunships used in Mexico resort battle.” Associated Press. 20 December 2013, http://news. yahoo.com/helicopter-gunships-usedmexico-resort-battle-221805708.html. 4 “At least 5 killed in gunfight in Rocky Point’s resort area.” Arizona Daily Star. 18 December 2013, http://azstarnet. com/news/local/border/at-least-killedin-gunfight-in-rocky-point-s-resort/ article_7d63a9e4-6807-11e3-b0570019bb2963f4.html 5 Anne-Marie O’Connor, “Border Sniper Incidents Making Agents Wary.” Los Angeles Times. 14 July 1997, http:// articles.latimes.com/1997/jul/14/news/

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mn-12527. 6 “Snipers target border agents.” The Washington Times. 3 February 2005, http://www.washingtontimes.com/ news/2005/feb/3/20050203-1250171369r/?page=1. 7 “Senator Feinstein Warns of Threat to Border Patrol Agents from .50-Caliber Sniper Rifles.” 24 March 2006, http:// www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index. cfm/press-releases?ID=7929e5fd-7e9c9af9-7ec0-f35187000f02. 8 Sean Alfano, “Mexican drug cartel threatens to harm U.S. police officers who bust drug shipments while off-duty.” New York Daily News. 22 June 2010, http:// www.nydailynews.com/news/national/ mexican-drug-cartel-threatens-harm-u-spolice-officers-bust-drug-shipments-offduty-article-1.181411. 9 Jacob Goodwin, “Border Patrol wants 40,000 rounds of .308 Hornady ammo for its top marksmen.” Government Security News. 6 September 2013, http://www. gsnmagazine.com/node/32898?c=border_ security.

Selected References Robert Bunker and Jacob Westerberg, “Mexican Cartel Tactical Note #19: Sniper Rifle Use in Mexico.” Small Wars Journal—El Centro. 16 July 2003, http:// smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mexican-carteltactical-note-19-sniper-rifle-use-in-mexico. Victor Hugo Michel, “Calibre .50. ¿Francotirador del narco?” Milenio. 21 Noviembre 2011, http://www.milenio. com/cdb/doc/noticias2011/46f0d414226d 25e2a5d84a0f19f01749. Victor Hugo Michel, “Comprar una Barrett, toda una ganga en EU.” Milenio. 22 Noviembre 2011, http://www.milenio. com/cdb/doc/noticias2011/9ba077ad2721 32591cfa416dc171d54d.

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â&#x20AC;&#x153;Digital Jihadâ&#x20AC;? and its Significance to Counterterrorism By Muhammad Ahsan Younas

52 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

Background In December 2009, five young American boys from Virginia, Ramy Zamzam, Ahmad Minni, Umar Chaudhry, Waqar Khan, and Aman Yemer, aged between 18 and 25, were detained by Pakistani Police of the Punjab province on suspicion of terrorism. These boys had slipped from their homes without intimating to their parents about their destination or their decision to follow a jihadist career against the United States of America, although, reportedly, they had left video showing images of wars in different countries where the US was involved. Subsequent investigations revealed that these boys were lured by an online jihadist recruiter named Saif Ullah with links to Al Qaeda. Minni got noticed by Saif Ullah for his repeated â&#x20AC;&#x153;likingâ&#x20AC;? of jihadist videos posted on YouTube.

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 53

he boys were convicted by the Anti-terrorist Court in Pakistan and sentenced for ten years of imprisonment. They have filed an appeal in the High Court against this judgment in hope of a reduced sentence, which is presently under hearing (which is a probable reason for the delay in the request for their extradition to the US). This incident reverberated in the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the Committee for Homeland Security in the House of Representatives and was the subject of its hearing on “Jihadist Use of Social Media: How to Prevent Terrorism and Preserve Innovation” on 6 December, 2011. Although it was observed that jihadist

media is not a game changer in the US, it was concluded that the monitoring of social media is essential because of the impact on viewers, which has been confirmed by a Online sites are used by jihadists and terrorists as forums for the discussion on the state of global jihad, propagation of anti-US sentiments and related issues. Social media has certainly increased jihadist appeal and following. For example, the Facebook page, Ansarullah Urdu, which posts radical content, has 24,740 “likes” (members who can follow the page) as of November 2013. Presently, jihadist groups such as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and Al Qaeda mostly use online social media and network sites such as YouTube and

Facebook to post detailed reports of their activities, photographs, videos, policy statements, future plans and responses to criticisms of their organizations. For example, in December 2012, Al Zahwari threatened to take the jihadist fight to the cities of Kenya to take revenge upon the Kenyan Army for curbing terrorism in Somalia, and subsequently the Westgate shopping mall terrorist attack was carried out the following year in September 2013. General content that is beneficial for counterterrorism efforts are also posted. For example, the cover page of the June 2012 issue of Nawai-Afghan Jihad posted on the Facebook page of Ansarullah included a world map which highlighted in red, countries and

Figure 1 – Extremist content posted on Bab-ul-Islam jihadist online forum (https://bab-ul-islam.net) Translation of Urdu on image: “An introduction and overview of the important victories of ‘the Movement for Caliphate and Jihad’ waging an armed struggle in Pakistan for last two-and-half years.” Image source: https://bab-ul-islam:net

54 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 55

regions in which Al Qaeda has a presence: Afghanistan, Central Asian countries, Xinjiang region of China, Turkey, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Palestine, Libya, Algeria, Mali, Somalia and Indian subcontinent. Presently, it is evident through the study of jihadist media that the jihadist leadership has begun to focus its attention on Morocco and Sudan.

Rise of Jihadist Media

“A study of the emerging languages used in jihadist media is important in assessing future trends of jihadist activity and presence.”

56 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

In The State of Global Jihad Online (2013), Aaron Y. Zelin stated that jihadists are using web forums, websites and social media networks for their routine conversations, exchange of tactics, socialisation, propaganda and recruitment. Osama Bin Laden, in his letter to Mullah Omar in Afghanistan in 2002, emphasized the importance of media and observed that, “It is obvious that the media war in this century is one of the strongest methods; in fact, its ratio may reach 90% of the total preparation for the [our] battles.” Zelin divided the progress of jihadist media into four phases. The first phase started in 1984, when important jihadist leaders such as Abdullah Azam delivered sermons, wrote essays, printed magazines and newsletters. They also made use of audio-visuals by making audio and video tapes to circulate their lectures and sermons. The second phase started in the 1990s, with websites owned by individuals connected with Al Qaeda and similar radical groups. Al Neda is considered to be the first jihadist website linked to Al Qaeda. The third phase started in the 2000s, with the introduction of interactive online forums such as the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF), where the administrators who managed the sites and their content were from jihadist groups. Content was contributed to these forums by the

members of these groups as well; as done for example in the online forums Al Hasbah, Jamia Hafza, Urdu Forum and Al Ansar by Al Qaeda. This phase was important as these forums empowered the jihadists to control and influence a group of supportive or susceptible individuals, thus allowing them to extend their sphere of influence and expand their membership. The fourth phase, which we are experiencing today, started in 2007, with the worldwide mass popularization of online social network/ media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube as well as personal blogs. In this phase, the individual has become more important as the jihadists’ online audience has expanded exponentially.

Languages of Jihadist Media While Arabic is the main language used in jihadist online sites and propaganda material such as DVDs, the English language is widely used in jihadist media for global outreach and is presently deemed the second most commonly used language in jihadist media by some analysts. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’s magazine, Inspire, available online, is a clear manifestation in this regard. This magazine was the initiative of Anwar Al Awlaqi and Sameer Khan who developed jihadist media into having transnational appeal. Since Awlaqi and Khan were killed by drone attacks, US-born Mujahid Sheikh Adam is now leading this mission. The Global Islamic Media Front (GISM) is one of the oldest jihadist media houses in English language. The Ansarullah and Bab-ul-Islam online forums of Al Qaeda are operational in multiple languages, and they are also available on Twitter and Facebook. Various segments of Al Qaeda have their own media houses

like Al Sahab (in Central Asia), Al Andulus (in Morocco), Al Malahim (in the Arab Peninsula), Al Kataib Media of Mujahideen Youth Movement (Al Qaeda Central) , Al Qadsia (in Libya), Al Furqan (in Iraq and Syria) and Omer Media (in Afghanistan). In his testimony before the US House of Representatives on 6 December, 2011, Brian Michael Jenkins stated that Al Qaeda is the first terrorist organization to fully exploit the internet, and that it regards itself as a global movement and sees its mission as not simply creating terror among its foes, but “awakening” the Muslim community. Jenkins said that its leaders view communications as 90 percent of the struggle. The other two major languages used in jihadist media are Bahasa Indonesia (the language of Indonesia) and Urdu, spoken in Pakistan and the Indian subcontinent. A study of the emerging languages used in jihadist media is important in assessing future trends in jihadist activity and presence. Pashto, the native language of the Pashtun people of Afghanistan and Pakistan, has gained importance in jihadist media, as many jihadists are Pashtuns from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pashto is used in inspirational jihadist songs and interviews, including for propaganda material distributed in CDs/ DVDs. The use of Bangla (Bengali) and Turkish is also increasing; as almost all major contributions in jihadist media are being translated into Bangla and Turkish. Bangla is spoken in Bangladesh and the Indian state of West Bengal, and Turkish is spoken mainly in Turkey with small communities of speakers also in Central Asia and the Caucasus (and other parts of Eastern Europe as well as in Germany, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Northern Cyprus and Greece). This is perhaps indicative of regions where jihadist influence is growing, as readers/ viewers seem to be

following jihadist media vigorously. The Russian language is also used as many jihadist works have been translated into Russian regularly since the year 2009. Al Qaeda in Qokaz (the Caucasus) has always tried to show itself as a relevant and active organization attacking the Russian Army. In recent months it has suffered serious losses including the death of its leader Shiekh Doku Umrof, President of the Islamic Emirate of Caucasus, popularly known as the Bin Laden of the Caucasus. However, there have been very few contributions to jihadist literature in French or Spanish, which may indicate that France and Spain (or other French or Spanish-speaking countries) are presently not inclined to be theatres of jihadist terrorism in the near future.

Online Monitoring Justified? Snowden’s leaks on the US government’s expansive surveillance programs have triggered a great debate on the justification of surveillance of all types of communications, including internet/web-based communications by intelligence agencies, and its consequences on the rights and liberties of citizens. While the respect for individual liberties is extremely important, intelligence gathering is greatly augmented through online monitoring as described above. To further illustrate, Al Shabab was tweeting on seven accounts of Twitter during their attack of the Westgate mall in Kenya. Thus, if continuous monitoring of these accounts had existed, authorities may have been in a position to respond to the crisis quicker and more effectively. Moreover, terror threats have been successfully curtailed by effective monitoring of jihadist chat rooms and

“Presently, there are scarcely any counter narrative media on social media and network sites that is administered by authentic Muslim scholars or Islamic governments.”

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 57

social media. The arrests of Hosam Smadi (2009), Antonio Martinez (2010), Awais Younus (2010) and Khalid Ali (2011) in the USA, are just a few examples of terror plots foiled by counterterrorism practitioners through effective monitoring and follow-up operations. Effective monitoring of online jihadist sites and forums including social media and network sites have led to more accurate threat assessments, and therefore, jihadist media are considered to be an easy and important source of intelligence. In May 2013, a plot to bomb the Embassy of Myanmar in Indonesia was detected and foiled when one of the terrorist perpetrators, Separiano, a.k.a. Mambo Wahab, revealed his plans to execute the attack through a Facebook status update (Separiano and the other conspiring militants claimed that the planned attack was to avenge the plight of Rohingya Muslims). The monitoring of online Jihadist media has also been supportive in terrorism investigations in unearthing terrorist networks and their sympathizers, as every upload and download leaves a trace. Monitoring jihadist sites have also been used for launching sting operations to capture terrorists, including new recruits to terrorist groups. However, checks and balances should exist by way of, for example, making it compulsory to obtain approval from the court after authentication by a responsible officer, and then imposing subsequent accountability mechanisms. It can be noted here that jihadists are at present more aware of the possibility of getting tracked by the authorities through the internet, and are thus engaged in an effort to launch encryptions and authentications to secure online communications between members, although the encryptions are far from perfect. Anwar Al-Awlaqi is believed to have started this process by advising his followers to download such encryptions to secure their

58 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

communications. The monitoring of jihadist social media can be helpful in devising counter narratives for Al Qaeda’s version of jihad, especially in Muslim countries, as the jihadist propaganda is often wholly devoid of truth in relation to Islam. The creation of counter narrative or counterideology and its widespread availability on the internet, including on social media and network sites, are crucial for the prevention of radicalization of individuals which leads them to support or commit acts of violence. To effectively curtail the jihadist appeal, counter narrative media must be produced in a manner which appeals to the youth. Thus, its availability on social media and network sites is crucial. Presently, there are scarcely any counter narrative media on social media and network sites that is administered by authentic Muslim scholars or Islamic governments.

Blocking of Extremist Sites and its Constraints In many countries, state response has been to block sites managed by terrorist organizations, as the material posted on these sites such as bombmaking manuals are extremely dangerous, and the content of these sites fall under the category of hate material directed at inciting violence and extremism. However, states are aware that, as Jonathan Kennedy and Gabriel Weimann in “The Strength of Weak Terrorist Ties” (US Institute of Peace Press, 2006) assert, there is no guarantee that these initiatives are effective in minimizing Al Qaeda’s use of the internet. For example, when the Pakistani government blocked jihadist online forums such as Ansarullah and Bab-ul-Islam, the activity manifested on Facebook and Twitter. China has also

not been fully successful in blocking its spree of jihadist (micro) blogs. As Brian Jenkins also noted in his testimony before the US House of Representatives Committee on 6 December, 2011, “Faced with the shutdown of one site, jihadist communicators merely change names and move to another, dragging authorities into a frustrating game of “whack-amole,” and depriving them of intelligence while they look for the new site.” Thus, blocking can never be a complete solution in countering the online presence of terrorist organizations, although it can be effective if applied selectively. In addition to passive monitoring of websites to gather intelligence, authorities can create confusion and mistrust between forum members by contaminating the contents, for example by producing fabricated statements by terrorist organizations. However, sites that publish materials on tradecraft involving bomb-making and other types of violence (also called “Do-it-Yourself Jihadist” sites or “DIY Jihadist” sites) should be blocked at once before radicalization occurs and violence is incited. In fighting the jihadist propaganda tactics, governments are also constrained by the rights and liberties of their respective citizens. The “freedom of speech” as practiced in the West, for example, which is considered sacrosanct and inviolable by the populace, is at the same time viewed by Muslims across the globe as a factor which encourages hate speech, as exemplified by the caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad published in a Danish newspaper. This is exploited by the jihadist media as they claim to represent the cause of Islam and Allah by releasing analytical essays against the West and audio and video productions on subjects such as Islamic Law (Shariah), issuing religious decrees (fatwa) and

conducting lessons on Islam, all based on their radicalized beliefs.

Conclusion The monitoring and analysis of jihadist media has shed insight into the organizational structure of jihadist groups such as Al Qaeda, and their affiliates, ideology, goals and future plans in the agenda for global jihad, and continued monitoring will shed further light. The study of jihadist media gives a glimpse into how these groups function, which are otherwise shrouded in mystery. The understanding gained has contributed to the development of strategies and counter narrative to overcome this challenge. The continued utilization of these sites will facilitate intelligence collection in terror and criminal investigations and counterterrorism operations in the future. Thus, state authorities, while blocking sites which incite violence directly, should not ignore the monitoring of these forums and chat rooms for respect of civil liberties, for it is in the pursuit to protect civilian life that online monitoring is conducted. Just before he was killed, Sameer Khan, as one who revolutionized jihadist media, stated that the present leadership in the jihadist movement understands the importance of media in modern warfare and the need to use it as an important tool in jihad. He said that a forceful media release is equal to an operation because of its impact, and that the success of the media is measured by the spread of hatred towards the US among Muslims. He boasted that even though there are a number of mainstream media outlets, like Al Jazeera, CNN, BBC and Fox News, the US is beginning to lose the battle on the media front. Sameer attributed the success of the jihadist media to factors such as hard work, technical know-

how, superior production, continuous availability on the internet and failure of the US to respond promptly. The speed of production of the contents in the jihadist media matches that of international media houses. The content itself has been attractive, which include details of an operation from the planning stage to its completion, which has increased the credibility and popularity to jihadist media in the eyes of their supporters. Thus, to support national counterterrorism initiatives, it is apparent that a cooperative and responsible transnational monitoring mechanism should be developed involving all the international community, in order to counter the transnational nature and media reach of terrorist organizations at present. Encouragingly, the US and Turkey are creating the Global Fund for Community Engagement and Resilience (GFCER) to stem extremism. The US $200 million fund aims to undercut the ideological and recruiting appeal of jihadists in places like Somalia, Yemen and Pakistan. This article advocates the creation of a â&#x20AC;&#x153;Global Centre for Research and Monitoring on Terrorism and Jihadist Social Mediaâ&#x20AC;? under GFCER, which would be helpful for counterterrorism operations and intelligence worldwide as well as in countering the terror rhetoric and terrorist radicalization strategies propagated internationally through online media and social network sites.

About the author Muhammad Ahsan Younas (Muhammad_Younas@hks.harvard.edu) is a senior police officer from Pakistan with expertise in risk assessment, social media in terrorism studies and security, and is presently a Lee Kuan Yew Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government.

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 59

Book Review

The United States Constitution By George Washington, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, et al.

any years ago, I stood in a room with my right hand raised. I stood with other volunteers, and I recited: “I, Chris Graham, do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.” As a reader of The Counter Terrorist, I know that there is nearly a 100% chance that you have taken a similar oath. If it has been awhile since you have considered this oath, I invite you to join me on this Independence Day and give it some thought. Amendment One: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or bridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and petition the government for redress of grievances. The 1st Amendment of the Constitution’s Bill of Rights prevents a ruler from compelling, prohibiting, coercing, or manipulating your spoken, written, and electronic communications. This is not the norm. Only a tiny fraction of the human beings who have lived have

60 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

enjoyed this protection. Without the First Amendment it would be legal to censor the Internet and other media as is done elsewhere. Amendment Two: A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed. The 2nd Amendment recognizes the need of citizens to be armed and encourages them to band together when necessary to defend against criminals, bandits, paramilitary formations, and foreign ground forces. It acknowledges the value of deterring power-hungry politicians or bureaucrats from becoming oppressors. Most governments fear an armed citizenry. International bodies create ever more creative regulatory initiatives. But Americans celebrate individual firearms ownership and recognize the obligation and responsibility for self-defense. Amendment Three: No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. The Constitution repeatedly prioritizes private property rights over the desires and demands of the powerful. Amendment Four: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall

Reviewed by: Chris Graham

not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Espionage against non-U.S. citizens is necessary to prevent attack and avoid strategic surprise. But, without the 4th Amendment it would also be legal for a ruler to intercept, read, or store your written and electronic communications without a judge’s warrant, or have a third party do this for him or her. Without the 4th Amendment, it would be legitimate for judges to write broad warrants targeting thousands, rather than “particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” Amendment Five: No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, excepting cases rising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when an actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, will be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. The Constitution offers the greatest protection possible against “Kangaroo

Courtâ&#x20AC;? justice and harassment of individuals who fail to please the powerful. The Constitution repeatedly prioritizes private property rights. Amendment Six: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by the partial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. Amendment Seven: In suits at common law, with the valuing controversy shall exceed $20, the right of trial to be by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. Amendment Eight: Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. American citizens are bestowed with compulsory protections uncommon through history and uncommon in the world. Amendment Nine: The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. Government has limited powers over citizens, and though the Constitution is explicit on some rights, this does not limit rights not explicitly outlined. Amendment Ten: The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited

by it to the States, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. The United States government has a narrow range of legitimate powers and responsibilities. Anything beyond this is the concern of individual citizens and their states. The Constitution is the supreme law of the United States. If you have not read the Constitution of the United States recently, you may obtain a personal copy from the National Center for

Constitutional Studies (www.nccs.net). Citizens who find the Constitution lacking may work to amend it through the existing amendment process. Working to circumvent the Constitution is criminal activity. I encourage you to take the time to review the Bill of Rights with your family each Independence Day, and discuss the responsibilities of our oath with your subordinates. Is there anything less you can do and still be upholding the vow you have taken?

â&#x20AC;˘

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 61

ISLAM4UK In late 2010, an extremist preacher from the UK was imprisoned in Lebanon on terror charges. Syrian-born Omar Bakri Muhammad characterized himself as a “harmless clown,” and others saw him as a publicity-seeking crank. Over the past decade, however, he has been the inspiration behind one of the UK’s leading Islamic supremacist groups.

62 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

By Anthony Tucker-Jones

e was also a member of the notorious “Londonistan unholy trinity.” These individuals provided the motivation behind many of the key terror plots unmasked in the UK and in Europe. They were effectively al-Qaeda central. Since 9/11, successive British governments have sought to counter the ongoing threat of jihadist attack in the

UK. On average, one major bomb plot is thwarted every year;, with the exception of the tragic London bombings in 2005. Despite this, there is a steady stream of British nationals prepared to wage jihad against their own country. Some find the UK’s “Prevent” strategy—designed to counter grassroots Islamist radicalization and Islamist recruiting in the UK’s prisons—to be an unmitigated failure.1

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 63

Anjem Choudary Photo by: Snapperjack

64 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

This has certainly been the case with the British Government’s handling of the “Londonistan unholy trinity.” Whilst most militant groups operate in the shadows, trying to avoid the security services, one particular British-based organisation has continued to attract public scrutiny with provocative actions. Despite being regularly banned, it has morphed into four different groups over the years, though they remain quite similar. Though claiming to be a nonviolent organisation, it has reportedly inspired a number of terrorist attacks within the UK in recent years. This is not unlike the common technique employed where terrorist groups conduct violent operations to manipulate governments while “non-violent” activists with aligned goals agitate for favourable governmental policies and concessions, a sort of carrot and stick approach that can be either closely or only peripherally coordinated. Most notably, Michael Adebolajo, convicted of killing British soldier Lee Rigby in 2013, is known to have attended group rallies.2 Until 2010, the UK’s key “non-violent” hard-line Islamist group was known as Islam4UK. Prior to that, it operated as al-Muhajiroun (the emigrants), The Saviour Sect, and Al-Ghurabaa. Its desire to see a return to the Islamic Caliphate— mirroring the Muslim Brotherhood, alQaeda and others—stems from its Saudi Salafi-Wahhabi roots. Although it has always claimed to be a peaceful group, there is significant evidence to show that it has contributed to radicalising British citizens who have gone on to plot terrorist activity. In addition, its members have had violent confrontations with groups such as the British National Party and the English Defence League.3 Islam4UK was allegedly motivated by a deep seated sense of outrage at Britain’s involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq.4

One of its members, Abu Ibrahim, told the BBC, “if you start the war we won’t turn the other cheek.”5 Islam4UK has always claimed it abhors bloodshed, accusing the British Government of hypocrisy for its violent policies of confronting terrorists and warlords in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as laws alleged to stand against the UK’s Muslim community. Its leaders, including selfstyled Sheikh Omar Bakri Muhammad, claim “terrorism for the British regime translates as anyone calling for the implementation of shariah and the liberation of Muslim land.”6 Bakri, born in Syria in 1958, fled his homeland after joining the Muslim Brotherhood in a failed revolt against President Assad in 1982. He lived in exile, first in Beirut in neighbouring Lebanon before moving on to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When the Saudis expelled him he came to the UK and was granted indefinite leave to remain. He became leader of the British branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir (the Islamic Liberation Party), which openly advocates a non-violent revolution to establish an Islamic state. In 1996 Bakri split with the international leaders of Hizb ut-Tahrir and established al-Muhajiroun.7 British political leaders consistently underestimated Bakri, who had an almost Walter Mitty-like persona in the press.8 His call for Prime Minister John Major’s assassination and for Bosnian Muslims to “eat” Serbs rather than accept Western aid were, apparently, not taken seriously. Behind the scenes he travelled up and down the UK, fuelling a sense of grievance amongst young British Muslims and agitating against Britain’s policies in the Middle East, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. While his Egyptian rival Abu Hamza was preaching radicalization from the Finsbury Park Mosque in London, al-

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The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 65

Mosque from Finsbury Park Station. Photo by: John Salmon Muhajiroun targeted local communities. Bakri claimed that the global Muslim community was a victim of Western aggression, and that as a result British Muslims who are part of this wider Islamic world were also suffering.9 Hamza’s supporters attended Bakri’s events to recruit those who didn’t just want to talk about jihad, but actually wage it. Abu Hamza was arguably more dangerous than Bakri, as was the third member of the “Londonistan’s unholy trinity,” the Jordanian national Abu

66 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

Qatada. He considered himself the spiritual leader of the other two, and had taught Hamza. Qatada was viewed as “alQaeda’s spiritual ambassador in Europe” by Western intelligence agencies, and was held indirectly responsible for the 2004 Madrid train bombings.10 While Bakri, Hamza and Qatada all jostled for prominence and notoriety, they shared the same goals. The influence of these three individuals on impressionable young British Muslims was considerable. Notably, the attackers commonly called “the 7/7 bombers”—

Shehzad Tanweer, Jermaine Lindsay, and Mohammed Sidique Khan—had all listened to Abu Hamza preach his sermons of hate against the West. The Finsbury Park mosque was also found to have links with a well known ricin terror plot. Similarly, Mostafa Kamel, Abu Hamza’s eldest son, spent three years in a Yemeni prison on terror charges. Bakri’s al-Mujahiroun came to prominence in 2002 when it held a conference for the “Magnificent 19,” praising the 9/11 attackers. The following year, on April 29, 2003, Asif Hanif, who

People praying at Finsbury Park, in north London. Photo by: Mohsin had attended al-Muhajiroun’s meetings, carried out a bombing in Israel that killed three and wounded 60. Hanif was accompanied by another British Islamist, Omar Sharif Khan, but Sharif ’s explosives failed to detonate. Ed Husain, former Hizb ut-Tahrir radical turned academic, recalled, “Sharif was a mathematics undergraduate at King’s College London. During his first year he started to attend meetings organised by Hizb ut-Tahrir on campus… Soon Sharif became close to Omar Bakri and followed him when he left the Hizb to form al-Muhajiroun.”11

Shortly afterwards, anti-terrorist police raided the group’s headquarters as well as the homes of its leaders, Sheikh Omar Bakri Muhammad and Anjem Choudary. The group followed the standard practice of claiming innocence in a statement issued to the press, “al-Muhajiroun are known world-wide for their ideological and political struggle against man-made law and their struggle to establish the Khilafah—the Islamic state. They are not known to involve themselves in military activities or recruiting people for operations despite the hype from sections

“al-Muhajiroun are known world-wide for their ideological and political struggle against man-made law and their struggle to establish the Khilafah—the Islamic state.”

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 67

Ambulances at Russell Square, London after the July 7 bombings. Photo by: Francis Tyers

of the media.”12 Bakri’s right-hand man, Anjem Choudary, was born on the outskirts of London to a working class family of Pakistani origin. Following his education at Southampton University, he qualified as a lawyer but subsequently became radicalised. Bakri and Choudary first

came into contact through London’s Woolwich mosque. Like Bakri he made outrageous statements such as calling for the execution of the Pope. Their extremist views appealed to a hardcore of disenchanted British Muslims. In 2001, a poll found that 15 percent of British Muslims supported the 9/11

attacks on America.13 Three years later, in 2004, a poll showed that 13 percent of British Muslims thought further terrorist attacks on America were justified.14 Such views could not be allowed to fester, especially when MI5 estimated that at least 400 al-Qaeda terrorist were at large in the UK (double the previous estimates), which included up to 60 hardcore trained fighters capable of carrying out attacks.15 Equally alarming, it was found that one in ten supported the London terror attacks on July 7, 2005 and five percent said that more attacks in the UK would be acceptable.16 Few people were ready to accept that Britain had become al-Qaeda’s principal recruiting ground in Europe, as well as a prime target for terrorism.17 Bakri antics became such that the British Government banned alMujahiroun in 2005. He publicly blamed the British people for the 7/7 London terror attacks and promptly fled to Lebanon. “The terrorist attacks on London were conducted by suicide bombers from Beeston, Leeds, home to three of the four bombers,” says Ed Husain. “Omar Bakri had preached in Beeston. He emphasized to the media

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that he was not responsible for the suicide bombings, but he desperately wished that he had been. It was, in Bakri’s eyes, a praiseworthy act.”18 Bakri was barred from the UK after the British Home Secretary ruled his presence was “not conducive to the public good.”19 From Lebanon, Bakri said the decision to ban his organisation would “increase the popularity of al-Muhajiroun” and “force them underground.”20 He was right as his followers re-branded themselves as The Saviour Sect and al-Ghurabaa and continued to cause mischief and propagate supremacist views.21 Even after he had left the country, Bakri attempted to raise money in the UK for extremist causes. His son, Abdul Rahman Fostok, was stopped by British anti-terror police at Heathrow Airport on October 24, 2006. They seized £13,000 destined for Bakri in Lebanon. The money was held under the Proceeds of Crime Act, pending investigation, but Fostok was allowed to board his flight.22 The following year, in 2007, five Muslims with connections to alMuhajiroun were convicted in the UK for planning an attack known as the “fertiliser” bomb plot. Members of the

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banned organisation then re-merged in June 2009 as Islam4UK/al-Muhajiroun.23 With Bakri in Lebanon leadership was taken over Anjem Choudary. The following January, Islam4UK/ al-Muhajiroun announced plans to demonstrate at Wootton Bassett, the town through which British fatalities from Afghanistan were repatriated on their way from RAF Lyneham. The massive public outcry contributed to the British Government banning the organisation and its three affiliates (al-Muhajiroun, al-Ghurabaa and The Saviour Sect) under the UK Terrorism Act 2000 on January 14, 2010.24 Once more, the organisation was swift to protest its innocence. “The banning of ideological and political movements such as al-Muhajiroun and Islam4UK who have never advocated or been involved in any violent or military style activities is an evident failure for democracy and freedom.”25 Few were convinced that its supporters were not intent on stirring up sectarian violence. Certainly had the demonstration gone ahead, there would have been an ugly confrontation between Islam4UK and incensed service personnel families angered by the lack of respect for

the fallen. The strength of public feeling against Islam4UK was such that over 400,000 people joined a Facebook group opposing the march.26 The “Londonistan’s unholy trinity” has since been scattered and Islam4UK was forced underground. Bakri remains in Lebanon, banned from ever returning. Abu Hamza was arrested in the UK on August 26, 2004 and went on trial the following year. He was found guilty under British terrorism legislation and was finally extradited to America to face terror charges on October 5, 2012. After another long, drawn out and very costly legal battle, Abu Qatada was deported to Jordan on July 7, 2013 to face terrorism charges stemming from an absentia conviction made in 1999. Nonetheless, the preaching of these three men and their supporters still appeals to a minority segment of the UK’s Muslim population. These groups appear to pursue the uninspired, but not ineffective, technique of exploiting Western laws while agitating for abhorrent demands. As a result, the threat from British organisations such as Islam4UK and their affiliates remains far from defeated.

•

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 69

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mr Tucker-Jones is a former UK defence intelligence officer and is a widely published consultant on the subject of regional conflicts and counter terrorism. He is the author of nineteen books including the Rise of Militant Islam and Kalashnikov in Combat.

ENDNOTES See Dr Douglas Weeks, “Regarding Radicalisation,” intersec The Journal of International Security, March 2014 plus Anthony Tucker-Jones, ‘Incubators of Jihad – Part 1 & Part 2, intersec, January & February 2014 2 Anthony Tucker-Jones, “The Murder of Private Lee Rigby,” The Counter Terrorist, Dec 2013/Jan 2014 3 Richard Watson, “al-Muhajiroun,” BBC News, April 29, 2004 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Mr Anjem Choudary & Sheikh Omar Bakri Muhammad, “al-Muhajiroun/ Islam4UK ban is a victory for Islam and Muslims,” Press Release, January 12, 2010 7 Sean O’Neill & Daniel McGory, The Suicide Factory Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque, Harper Perenial, London 2006, p.105-106 8 Dominic Casciani, “Profile:Islam4UK,” BBC News, January 5, 2010 1

Bakri Mohammad had tried to get the job at Finsbury Park mosque but Abu Hamza had impressed the selection panel with his better oratory skills. See the Suicide Factory, p.106 10 Ibid, p.107 11 Ed Husain, The Islamist – Why I joined radical Islam in Britain, what I saw inside and why I left, Penguin Books, London 2007, p.263 12 “Police raid Islamic group,” BBC News, July 7, 2003 13 BBC/ICM poll, November 2001 14 Guardian/ICM poll, March 2004 15 cited David Leppard, Sunday Times, April 10, 2006 16 Guardian/ICM poll, July 2005 17 See Melanie Phillips, Londonistan – How Britain is creating a terror state within, Gibson Square, London 2007 18 The Islamist, p.277 9

6th Annual

“Police seize £13,000 from son of exiled Muslim cleric,” The Scotsman, October 25, 2006 20 Casciani, “Profile:Islam4UK” 21 Ibid. 22 The Scotsman, October 25, 2006 23 Watson, “al-Muhajiroun,” 24 “Islam4UK banned under terror laws,” BBC News, January 12, 2010. Under the UK’s Terrorism Act 2000 a group can be banned if it ‘commits or participates in acts of terrorism, prepares for, promotes or encourages terrorism or is otherwise concerned in terrorism.’ 25 “al-Muhajiroun/Islam4UK ban is a victory for Islam and Muslims” 26 “Top officer says Muslims hate preacher ‘DOES’ have right to march’ as 400,000 join Facebook group against Wootton Bassett protest,” Daily Mail, January 5, 2010 19

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The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 71

Special Atomic

Demolition

Munitions The 1950s and 1960s were the golden age of nuclear weapons. Scientists of the USA and USSR tried to miniaturize nuclear bombs and to create â&#x20AC;&#x153;tactical nuclear weapons.â&#x20AC;?

72 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

By Lina Kolesnikova

ATO faced a difficult reality: the USSR exceeded them in conventional weapons and manpower. Therefore, it was necessary to look for some technical solutions to reach parity. In the 1950s, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower proposed the New Look Strategy, which attempted containment of Soviet power by lower-budget means, including the threat to use nuclear

weapons if the USA were to be attacked. The USA started to develop a â&#x20AC;&#x153;special atomic demolition munitionâ&#x20AC;? (SADM) for possible use in the deep rear areas of the enemy, far behind borders or a forward line of transgression (FLOT).

The USA identified the places where such weapons could be placed and detonated and trained selected U.S. Army Special Forces personnel to emplace them.1 In turn, the Soviet Union developed a similar program. The Soviet Union,

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 73

U.S. officials examine a M-388 Davy Crockett nuclear weapon. It used the smallest nuclear warhead ever developed by the United States. Photo by: U.S. federal government

Igor Dmitriyevich Sergeyev, Defense Minister of the Russian Federation. Photo by: http://www.defenselink.mil/

74 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

and later Russia, never publicly admitted to having SADM programs. There are several verbal and unofficial testimonies suggesting that the SADM program existed. Dr. Alexey Yablokov, who was initially part of former Russian President Yeltsinâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s cabinet and a member of the Russian Security Council, testified on several occasions that such devices were being built for the Ministry of Defence (for GRU to be precise), as well as for the KGB. They were intended for external operations, and he personally knew people involved in the design and production process.2 Curt Weldon, a Representative in Congress from the state of Pennsylvania, testified in 2000 that Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev, during their meeting in Moscow, confirmed that the

USSR built SADMs during the Cold War.3 So, what is a SADM? In the USSR and Russia, such devices would often be referred to as nuclear mines or the like. As the name suggests, such devices are close to conventional mines in terms of purpose and use, but with a much higher yield. A SADM is a device that would have a typical yield of about 1 to 10 kilotons, and would be constructed as small and lightweight as possible to allow being carried by one person. Originally, this was a uranium-fired and uraniumfuelled device that would basically be encased inside a metal pipe that would have the appropriate activation devices included. In the USSR, at least two types of nuclear mines/SADMs were built, according to the testimony of Alexey Yablokov and others.4 General Lebed once spoke about a device measuring 60 x 40 x 20 cm and weighing about 40kg. That device could have a yield of 1 kiloton. The arming time to activate such a device might be 20 minutes for one person. Later testimony suggests,

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The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 75

Carrying case for the W54 Special Atomic Demolition Munition (SADM), the smallest nuclear warhead produced by the United States between 1964 and 1988. Photo by: U.S. federal government 76 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

there was also another type of mine (SADM). These mines weighed about 30 kg, measured 45 x 35 x 30 cm, and had a yield from 0.2 kilotons.5 Lebed stated that these (latter) devices were made to look like suitcases. In these 30 kg nuclear suitcases, the nuclear charge may consist of plutonium or a combination of

uranium or plutonium with californium. Important considerations were always the necessity of having electronics, explosives, a source of neutrons, access controls, and other mechanisms, as well as operational validity periods (think of “expiration periods”). By achieving all the requirements in a small size, producers allowed such mines to be placed into an ordinary shopping bag. Maksim Schteinberg, who was involved in Soviet nuclear programs, described portable explosive devices such as a “nuclear knapsack”6 He wrote that these devices weigh about 25 kg and have a thermonuclear charge in which thorium and californium elements are used.7 Colonel Stanislav Lunev, the highest ranking Russian GRU military intelligence officer ever to defect to the West, in his book Through the Eyes of the Enemy, claimed that the USSR also made it possible to produce those devices in different shapes. They could be constructed in the form of bricks or rocks, but they could be something else as well. The alleged shapes of these bombs also points to the possible and/ or intended use. Stanislav Lunev insisted that part of the Soviets’ plan called for the use of portable tactical nuclear devices, to be used to commit sabotage against highly protected targets. He travelled around the USA to scout sites and construct special caches for hiding weapons, means of communications, etc. Lunev did not know if the sites he identified were ever used. He also stated that Soviet special operations forces had trained groups of people, specifically selected and educated for the use of these devices.8 Another Russian defector, Vasily Mitrokhin, pointed out that drop sites were established all over the United States and Western Europe. In the 1990s, there were also speculations in the Russian mass

to keep them. Following Curt Weldon’s testimony, Minister Igor Sergeyev once admitted that Russia knew that the USA destroyed her SADMs and that he would have all of the Russian small atomic demolition munitions destroyed by the year 2000.11 It is publicly unknown if the SADM production program still exists. The remaining question, however, is

what happened to the SADMs produced earlier. Curt Weldon claimed that on May 30, 1997, he met General Alexander Lebed. For the first time, Lebed revealed that one of his responsibilities, when he worked for Yeltsin, was to account for 132 suitcase-size nuclear devices. According to Lebed, he learned of the existence of these weapons developed

Meeting The Challenges 2N D A N N UA L H-912 transport container for SADM at the National Atomic Museum. Photo by: RTC media that the USSR planted tactical nukes on the border with China during and around the time of the Domanski Sino-Soviet crisis.9 In 1995, Russian military journal Voennaya Mysl’ published an article, written by Colonel Aleksander Kadetov (from GRU), “The employment of Special Task Forces in Contemporary Situations.” It says that Russia should look to have reconnaissance, commando, and other special services equipped with compact nuclear ammunition, weapons, mines, explosives, and other special means and equipment that have substantially increased the capabilities of reconnaissance and other special groups and detachments.10 Assuming the SADM program was indeed developed in the USSR, it is clear that consideration was given to the continuation versus discontinuation of SADM by post-Soviet Russia, certainly during the 1990s. It is unknown whether the end game was to remove such devices from arsenals, or

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The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 77

Ruins of the secret “Laboratory B”. Photo by: Alex Alishevskikh

…claiming that the Russian military had lost track of more than 100 suitcasesized nuclear bombs. 78 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

for special operations only a few years before. While being the national security adviser to Yeltsin, he commissioned a study to report on the whereabouts of these devices. Lebed was fired as national security adviser on 17 October 1996, leaving the question open. According to Weldon, General Lebed could locate only 48. On September 7, 1997, the CBS newsmagazine 60 Minutes referred to Aleksandr Lebed claiming that the Russian military had lost track of more than 100 suitcase-sized nuclear bombs. Lebed supposed back then that they could have been destroyed or they could be securely stored. Of course, they

also could have been put on the black market for sale to third parties. Lebed also argued that this unlikely option (of SADMs being lost and falling into undesired hands) cannot be ignored and needs further verification as instability in the Russian army could have provoked military officers to sell technology around the world. At the same time, Lebed insisted that this story only concerned GRU, which handled special operation forces commanders, with the need to operate worldwide. There was also a speculation, based on Lebed’s statements, that some of these devices were not located in Russia, but elsewhere. This raised multiple questions, including the possibility that these devices could find a way into the hands of international terrorists or other countries. While most if not all information regarding this matter is highly classified, Lebed made one more statement later on. He admitted, presumably as a result of the verification process originally inspired by him that these nuclear weapons were found in the intended hands. One may presume that he was referring to GRU.12 There is another possibility that could indirectly confirm such a conclusion. In the early and mid-90s, there was an allegation made by Islamic militant commander Dudaev during the first Chechen conflict (1994-1996) that he had a small atomic demolition device. One immediately thought of one of the Soviet SADMs. There were other considerations too: eventual access by rebels to the old medical radiological materials (e.g. testers). Whatever the basis was, the USA took the information very seriously and sent agents to work with the Russians to find out whether or not Dudaev did in fact have a small atomic demolition device. In August 1996, Secretary of Security Council General Lebed officially

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Could someone find the devices and get beyond the access control?

•

about the author

A Russian Mi-8 helicopter shot down by Chechen fighters near the Chechen capital, Grozny. Photo by: Mikhail Evstafiev

Ms. Kolesnikova is a Russian, Brusselsbased fellow of the Institute of Civil Protection and Emergency Management (ICPEM). She is a Member of the advisory board of the Crisis Response Journal and CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter. Ms. Kolesnikova provides consultancy in the area of security, risk and crisis management to organizations within private and public sectors.

Footnotes appointed the commission of Colonel Denisov to validate information about Chechen separatists possibly having a SADM in their possession. After three meetings, the Commission confirmed that the USSR indeed had these weapons but that Chechen rebels did not possess them.13 It is unknown whether such a conclusion was reached based on the ability of the Commission to locate and identify all devices, their ability to acquire insider information from the Chechen rebels’ side, or both. Given the history of the topic and all modern developments, one should assume that there are several countries in the world, Russia included, that still have ready-for-use or potential capabilities to produce SADMs. There are no overt signs, however, indicating that these capabilities are used today. The existence, destruction or loss of the previously produced devices is an entirely different concern. Were all SADM devices produced by Russia (and other countries) found and controlled? Were any of them actually lost beyond evidence of control? Could they be sold to a 3rd party? Do SADM devices still exist today or have they all have been destroyed?

80 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

Those questions are very serious and touch national security matters. No doubt tactical nuclear weapons present high value for state players, as well as for non-state ones. As it is possible to activate such weapons beyond one’s own borders, and the explosion would likely destroy any evidence, this might be considered by some as a way to avoid the blame as a party starting a nuclear war. This, of course, represents higher risk for those unstable or failing states under dramatic internal and external pressures. For responsible states these devices might be critical too, for example, porous borders can be exploited. Forces can place SADMs along borders to deter invasions; in particular, when the conventional defence mechanisms might be inadequate or disadvantaged by the modern means of attack. Along with the existence of these devices, there are other questions that have not yet been answered. For example, were drop sites ever used to store portable nuclear devices, as alleged by Lunev? If yes, were these sites located and are the devices there? Assuming the worst, do SADMs placed there have self-liquidation controls or can they detonate accidentally?

Adam Rawnsley and David Brown. The Littlest Boy. Retrieved on 24 March 2014 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ articles/2014/01/29/the_littlest_boy_ cold_war_backpack_nuke Problem of so-called nuclear suitcase. Trud 07.09.1999. Retrieved on 24 March 2014 http://lib.rin.ru/doc/i/158711p2. html Russian threats to United States security in the post-cold war era. Hearing before the Committee on government reform. House of Representatives. January 24, 2000. Serial No. 106-158. Retrived on 14 March 2014 http://www.fas.org/irp/ congress/2000_hr/hr_012400.htm Problem of so-called nuclear suitcase. Trud 07.09.1999. Retrieved on 24 March 2014 http://lib.rin.ru/doc/i/158711p2. html Konstantin Chuprin. Knapsack with H-bomb. From the history of nuclear weapons. Retrieved on 24 March 2014 http://www.promved.ru/articles/article. phtml?id=377 Problem of so-called nuclear suitcase. Trud 07.09.1999. Retrieved on 24 March 2014 http://lib.rin.ru/doc/i/158711p2. html Konstantin Chuprin. Knapsack with

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The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 81

Lance Cpl. Brantley Bollant, a combat engineer supporting Military Police Detachment, Combat Logistics Battalion 8, 2d Force Service Support Group (Forward), uses his Army Navy Portable Search System 14, equipped with ground-penetrating radar, to sweep and clear an area known for past emplacement of mines and Improvised Explosive Devices by insurgent forces. The MPs conduct security patrols along certain major roadways in the Fallujah area to eliminate the insurgent threat and ensure safe passage for Coalition Forces. Photo by: Cpl. John E. Lawson Jr.

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H-bomb. From the history of nuclear weapons. Retrieved on 24 March 2014 http://www.promved.ru/articles/article. phtml?id=377 Stanislav Lunev Through the eyes of the enemy. Retrieved on 24 March 2014 http://www.scribd.com/doc/75766630/ Lunev-Through-the-Eyes-of-the-Enemy Konstantin Chuprin. Nuclear belt. Retrieved on 24 March 2014 http:// topwar.ru/6131-yadernyy-poyasvostochnyh-sovetskih-territoriy.html Russian threats to United States security in the post-cold war era. Hearing before the Committee on government reform. House of Representatives. January 24, 2000. Serial No. 106-158. Retrived on 14 March 2014 http://www.fas.org/irp/ congress/2000_hr/hr_012400.htm Idem Idem Problem of so-called nuclear suitcase. Trud 07.09.1999. Retrieved on 24 March 2014 http://lib.rin.ru/doc/i/158711p2. html

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84 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

The Teacher-Student Approach to Religious Rehabilitation

Mahfuh Haji Halimi Muhammad Saiful Alam Shah Bin Sudiman Zulkifli Mohamed Sultan

The teacher-student approach of the education discipline is used in the religious rehabilitation programs for radicalized individuals in Singapore. Concepts such as “functioning knowledge,” the “deep approach to learning” and “constructive alignment” can be used to describe methodologies that are being used in religious rehabilitation in relation to Islamist ideologies, to cultivate a higher level of learning within the cognitive domain. The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 85

To meet these goals, religious Religious rehabilitation programs are The Importance rehabilitation programs activate generally directed at countering the of Functioning higher cognitive levels through radicalization of individuals with the aim Knowledge established educational concepts such of reintegrating them back to society. in Religious as “deep learning” and “constructive Also known as deradicalization programs, Rehabilitation alignment.” However, it should be these initiatives seek to reverse the Programs noted that cognitive, affective and viewpoints of individuals who are wholly A religious counsellor, taking the behavioural changes in an individual or partially radicalized. Radicalization, in role of a teacher, would have a clear goal are interrelated. Religious rehabilitation the context of extremism and terrorism, of what he or she wants the student to programs adopt a teacher-student occurs when groups or individuals come learn. This means that the teacher should approach, where the counsellor to accept the use of violent means to be able to stipulate how well each topic plays the role of the teacher, and mitigate certain grievances and/or change on Islam needs to be understood by the the radicalized individual, the role the status quo in favour of an alternative student on a topic by topic basis. As a of the student. Similarly, a religious system which they perceive or believe teacher, he or she must also be able to counselling session is treated as a to be more acceptable. Thus, the focus make a distinction between “declarative student-centred religious learning of deradicalization programs in relation religious knowledge” and “functioning session, where the focus is on the to Islamist ideologies is to remove the religious knowledge,” as described student’s learning rather than the negatively imbibed ideologies from the in the article “Aligning Teaching for teaching or counselling imparted by the minds of radicalized individuals, and then Constructing Learning” (2003) by John teacher. Thus, the following terms will introduce a positive understanding of Biggs. Declarative religious knowledge be used interchangeably in this article: mainstream religious concepts through refers to religious knowledge religious counselling. that can be communicated Religious counselling in orally or in writing. Religious the context of Islam, involves learning sessions usually attempt attempts to familiarize the Declarative Functioning to instil declarative religious radicalized individuals with the knowledge in students. While Islamic intellectual heritage, this may be effective in some which is far greater in scope Religious cases, limiting the students’ than the narrow radical ideology Learning learning to declarative religious they have been exposed to. knowledge in lessons needs Deradicalization programs are to be done selectively, as it meant to induce changes in The two types of learning/ knowledge: declarative (surface) and functioning (deep) is the lowest of the six levels the radicalized individuals in of cognitive complexity in three different domains, namely Bloom’s taxonomy of learning the cognitive, affective and domains: remembering, understanding, religious counsellor also referred to as behavioural. The challenge, however, is applying, analysing, evaluating and a teacher, a radicalized individual also to ensure that religious rehabilitation creating. Learning outcomes at the level referred to as a student, and a religious programs successfully wean these of “remembering,” means that the student counselling session also referred to individuals from the radical worldview. is able to recall or recognise information, as a religious learning session. In Religious rehabilitation programs must ideas and principles in the approximate taking a teacherstudent approach to also ensure that the individuals that have form in which they were learned. rehabilitation, two key aspects are gone through these programs will be To gain declarative knowledge means focussed upon: how the student learns able to interact well with other members that the student is able to articulate to and how a religious learning session of society, especially those that they others the religious knowledge he or she supports his or her learning. had previously been hostile towards, has learned. It also means that the student and ultimately integrate them with the is able to express in his or her own broader community.

86 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 87

Islam needs to be understood by the student on a topic by topic basis. As a teacher, he or she must also be able to make a distinction between “declarative religious knowledge” and “functioning

interrelated. Religious rehabilitation programs adopt a teacher-student approach, where the counsellor plays the role of the teacher, and the

Levels of Cognitive Complexity Creating Evaluating Analysing

Functioning Knowledge

Applying Understanding Remembering

Declarative Knowledge

Bloom’s Taxonomy of Learning Domains Figure 2 – Bloom’s Taxonomy of Learning Domains

religious knowledge,” as described in the article “Aligning Teaching for Constructing functioning approach allows the student words what the teacher has recently been so, the student will not only remember, Learning” (2003) by John Biggs. Declarative individual, the role to of not theonlystudent. critically analyse radical teachingradicalized about religion. However, lessons understand and apply the religious religious knowledge refers to but religious Similarly, a religious counselling session is treated religious ideas, but also evaluate these ideas based on imparting declarative knowledge knowledge gained, also useknowledge it to that can be communicated orally or in writing. with established Islamic concepts and analyse and evaluate the different do not stimulate the student to achieve as a student-centred religious learning session, knowledge ensures learning life circumstances he or she will face. a higherwhere level ofthe learning Religious sessions usually attempt to instil focuswhere is onthe the student’sprinciples. learningFunctioning rather that the student’s thinking patterns are Learning in this manner provides the student can apply the religious knowledge declarative religious knowledge in students. While than the teaching or counselling imparted by the gained to think critically about religion or deepen his or her understanding of the Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis religion independently (of the teacher). Thus, in many religious rehabilitation programs in Singapore, a higher level of learning is achieved though the transferring of functioning knowledge, which allows the student to also understand, apply, analyse, evaluate and create based on the knowledge gained. To stimulate a deep or functioning approach to learning religious knowledge, the student is encouraged to understand fundamental Islamic religious concepts and underlying principles first. This enables the student to relate new religious ideas as well as life experiences to these concepts. In taking the deep approach to learning religion, the student also checks for evidence and examines the logic of an argument cautiously and critically before reaching a conclusion. Thus, the deep or

88 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

changed, allowing him or her to perceive ideas and issues which caused his or her radicalization in perspective. In fact, an individual who has been successfully 32 deradicalized will also speak and otherwise behave/function within an elevated cognitive domain, indicating also his/her readiness to be reintegrated back to society.

Factors which Support Functioning Religious Learning Functioning religious knowledge is developed in a student when religious learning sessions embrace a “deep approach to learning,” where the student is able to ascribe meaning to the new (religious) knowledge gained. This requires the teacher to guide the student in building personal meaning and “real world” connections to the learned religious knowledge. By doing

student with the ability to comprehend the world by constantly re-applying the Volume 6, Issue 2 March 2014 religious knowledge he or she has gained during a religious learning session. Thus, the learning outcome of a lesson, and the focus of learning activities in it, should be to develop in a student the ability to apply religious knowledge gained in the lesson to the real world. The teacher must also pay close attention to how a student learns most effectively, as the effectiveness of a lesson is judged not by how the teacher delivers the religious content, but rather by how well the student absorbs the content. Thus, religious learning sessions should be tailored to suit the way in which a student learns, as a student may respond better to a particular learning style which could be verbal-linguistic, logicalmathematical, visual-spatial, bodily-kinaesthetic, musical, interpersonal, intrapersonal or naturalistic,

among others. Effective religious learning sessions will accommodate different learning styles, which adds variety to the learning activities as well as retains the attention of the student for longer periods. This is the manner in which the student should be actively involved in religious learning sessions. The deep approach requires that the student is placed in a learning environment that is conducive to remembering, understanding, applying, analysing, evaluating and building upon the religious knowledge imparted in a lesson. However, it should be noted that the higher the student’s cognitive capacity, the deeper the level of understanding he or she will gain from lessons which impart functioning religious knowledge. As stated previously, the teacher is responsible for setting the stage for effective teaching which encourages active learning in the student. A crucial

learning outcome for the teacher to consider is the ability of the students to think critically. If the religious learning sessions are centred only on what the teacher does, it is far more difficult to achieve the intended learning outcomes. There are also other additional “personal transferable skills” for the student to gain among the desired learning outcomes, such as problemsolving skills, communication skills and working cooperatively with others. These additional skills are required to allow religious knowledge and understanding to be used appropriately and effectively in the student’s future interactions and collaboration with others.

Quality Learning through Constructive Alignment

The deep or functioning approach to learning religious knowledge depends on the teacher’s ability to set an effective learning environment and design lessons that are outcomebased and employ constructive alignment. Students will not be able to take a deep approach to learning in the absence of a clear alignment between the intended learning outcomes, teaching methods, learning activities and assessments. In the context of religious rehabilitation, constructive Different Styles of Learning alignment is Image source: ConnectionsAcademy.com

achieved when teaching methods, learning activities and assessments support the ultimate learning outcome of deradicalization. It has proven helpful for the teacher to indicate to the student the desired outcomes of a religious learning a session, including the level of understanding the teacher expects the student to achieve on each topic. The teacher can also assure the student that by fully engaging in the lessons that the teacher has designed, the student is more likely to attain intended learning outcomes. It will also help the teacher to continuously assess the student’s progress towards attainment of these outcomes. In conclusion, successful rehabilitation programs encourage functioning or deep learning of religious knowledge by students. In order for religious learning sessions to support deep learning, the religious counsellor must ensure constructive alignment of lessons where the intended learning outcomes, teaching methods, learning activities and assessments are in agreement with each other. In so doing, the deep approach to religious rehabilitation leads to the cognitive, affective and behavioural transformation required for the deradicalization of an individual.

About the authors Mahfuh Haji Halimi is an Associate Research Fellow with ICPVTR and the Team Leader of ICPVTR’s CounterIdeology and Rehabilitation (CIREH) Program. Muhammad Saiful Alam Shah Bin Sudiman is an Associate Research Fellow with ICPVTR focusing on Rehabilitation. Zulkifli Mohamed Sultan is an Analyst with ICPVTR focusing on CounterIdeology.

The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 89

international Resources Ring power When Law Enforcement officers are called to any emergency situation – they have to be prepared for the worst case scenario. Whether dealing with a hostage rescue, barricaded suspects, riot scene, or natural disaster, having the tactical advantage is critical. The Rook was custom designed with mission specific attachments that increase job safety, while also improving the ease and speed of changing attachments. The Armored Deployment Platform(APD) allows officers to approach structures with reduced exposure. A team can be placed anywhere and have a secure position from which to make better tactical decisions. Officers can also gain entry to the second story of a house or building without a ladder, allowing them to search the house from the top down without using stairways to work their way up. The ADP can also be used to deploy snipers to a rooftop. The Rook integrated video system gives visibility into areas that small robotic video cameras cannot. www.ringpower.com

Exoskel Exoskel™ is designed for times when proper climbing technique is out, replaced by the need for speed and low profile scrambling. Exoskel™ assists the user to rapidly ascend and negotiate obstacles, while offering enhanced stabilization and lower limb protection. After constantly failing to negotiate obstacles when rushed and weighed down, and after multiple cuts and damaged lower limbs, Exoskel™ was developed. Armed with teeth to lock on to any terrain, it lifts the user, via the stirrup system, up, over, and on… • Assists the operator rapidly ascend and negotiate obstacles • Stabilizes the firing or anchor position on irregular terrain • Shin protection • Close Quarter Battle tool • Perpetrator restraint • Injury Prevention • Berry Compliant The Exoskel™ guards hold in excess of 1000 lbs (450kg), on the teeth, buckle and stirrup, and each weight only 1.1 lbs (500g). They are Berry Compliant, and are made from high specification specialty engineering grade Polyamide which is: high impact, puncture, UV, hydrolysis, and flame resistant - UL94 VO rated. “If Exoskel-Group Inc can assist one operator get over one obstacle one second faster, it will have achieved its aim”. www.exoskel-group.com

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SSI PVB The Portable Vehicle Barrier transfers the momentum of a moving vehicle upwards and stops it in its tracks. Two adults can deploy the barrier in minutes without any need for electricity. It can be equipped with wheels to act as a swing barrier. You can add anchoring cables and place the PVBs in a single row or more. The PVB can be folded quickly for moving and storage; it is reusable and durable. www.ssipvb.com

Innovative Products Barrett Optical Ranging System The BORS is an integrated ballistics computer that mounts directly on the riflescope and couples to the elevation knob. BORS is designed to take care of the data work by drawing from several tables and taking into account a number of real-time external factors so a shooter can focus on the task of achieving first round hits. After determining the range to target, simply turn the elevation knob until the BORS screen matches your target’s distance. Internal sensors automatically calculate the ballistic solution. BORS compensates for temperature and barometric pressure, calculates angle cosine and displays rifle cant. www.barrett.net

CELOX Gauze In tests conducted by the US Navy, subjects treated with Celox had the highest rate of survival versus those treated with competing products or plain gauze. It is in use by military forces the world over due to its ability to treat a wound with less total blood loss. Celox is designed for any first response, tactical or emergency wound care. In many of the worst injuries, the blood lost causes the body’s natural clotting abilities to fail, but Celox acts independently of the body’s mechanism and continues to work in this situation, where other treatments that work by accelerating the body’s own clotting process can fail. www.celoxmedical.com

LED Stryker The LED Stryker upgrade boasts a 50% increase in intensity compared to its halogen counterpart. By utilizing P-Vex lens technology coupled with the LEDs, the LED Stryker is able to generate a Peak Beam Intensity of 320,000 candela. Additionally, the “hot spot”, the most intense portion of the beam, comprises nearly 70% of the beam circumference. The LED system emits light at significantly greater color temperature than with halogen—6000 k— which creates a “whiter” light, comparable to daylight. The LED technology utilized in the new Stryker model generates nearly 4 times as many lumens per watt as a traditional halogen light source. www.golight.com The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 91

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Training Review

USAMU Designated Marksman By Chris Graham

A Marine Force Recon Designated Marksman fires prone from the 600 yard line.The USAMU encourages stabilizing the rifle for prone fire by bracing the magazine against the ground.

have long marveled at how many agencies buy rifles and only train their personnel to shoot them out to 50 or 100 yards. Admittedly, the missions of some personnel make close range engagements most likely, but does that

94 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

mean that longer range engagements should be ignored? What virtue is there in having a tool that you only have the skill to operate within narrow parameters? Why do agencies buy 1000(+) dollar rifles with optics costing 100’s of dollars

when a cheap AK with iron sights could handle the fight within the parameters they are training to? Are you capable of operating your Patrol Rifle to the limits of its’ capabilities? I have always been a believer in obtaining good equipment, but devoting the majority of your time and effort to mastering the use of what you have. The U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit (USAMU) is home to the national champion, international champion and even Olympic shooters of the army. In addition to competition shooting, the soldiers of USAMU provide training to army and DOD personnel sharing the best of their hard won experience. So, when I had the opportunity to attend their Squad Designated Marksman Course, I jumped at it. About 40 students from three military branches were admitted. Nearly half were provided 16 inch Knights Armament “Special Purpose Rifle” uppers on a variety of lowers and the other half were provided 14.5 inch FN M-4s. All were 5.56x45 mm and featured 4x32 ACOG optics. Some students brought M-4s from their units with ELCAN sights mounted. Due to weather, the first day was spent entirely in the classroom. Staff Sergeant Brandon Green, our course’s lead instructor stated that the mission of the Designated Marksman, is to support his squad with precision fire from 300 to 600 meters. The storms, rain and wind remained with us throughout the two week course. The first thing we did at the range was zero iron sights. All shooting was done on 20 inch by 40 inch paper humanoid silhouette targets. We fired five rounds prone at the 100 yard line to confirm we

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The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014 95

were on paper, then moved to the 300 yard line to zero. We fired 10 rounds while the second half of the class pulled and marked the targets in “the pits”. Then we fired a five round group, observed the markings and fired another five round group. We did this a second time for score, and then fired “snaps”; four second iterations to fire two rounds. We did the same at 400 yards, then traded places with the students operating targets. On the third day, we zeroed optics at 100 yards, then shot the standard course of fire of 10 ‘pull and marks’, two five round groups, and ‘snaps’ at 500 yards. We did the same at 400 yards and 300 yards. The next day, we fired from the 400, 500 and 600 yard lines adjusting for a right to left wind. We multiplied the first digit of the range (meters) by the estimated wind speed (mph) and divided by seven to come up with the minutes of angle (MOA) to correct against the wind as we had been instructed to do. Then we multiply the number by the first digit of our range to convert MOA to inches, and we estimated that same number of inches of ‘hold’ into the wind and fired. Of course the calculations had to be continuously revised as the wind changed. We practiced five round groups sitting and kneeling at the 200 yard line. On Friday, we practiced 20 rounds of ‘pull and mark’ fire at each 100 yard line from 300 to 600. We then went to the 300 yard line for prone fire against moving targets. We used the formula of seven inches of lead for every hundred meters (plus or minus the wind) for targets moving at a 3 mph walk. We fired five rounds at targets moving from left to right, and five more for the opposite. On the next day of training, we had some more classes and reviewed. We discussed our homework problems and we did some more shooting. We practiced

96 The Counter Terrorist ~ June/July 2014

An FN M-4 with 4 x 32 ACOG. holds with known winds and without at 300, 400 and 600 yards. On Tuesday, we had classes on range estimation and angle fire. We delayed scored events for the inclement weather and practiced sitting at 300 yards, kneeling at 200 yards and standing at 100 yards. I practiced both a ‘competition’ stance and a ‘CQB’ stance. The next day we fired scored events with lighter but still unpredictable winds. We shot 20 ‘pull and marks’ at 600 yards and 10 ‘pull and marks’ and two five shot groups at 500. We did the same at 400, then removed the optics and shot the identical course of fire at 400 and 300 yards with iron sights. After the scored events, we broke into five man teams for an unscored competition. The game was to sprint from the 400 yard line to the 300, recover a bandolier and have four team members shoot as many rounds as possible into their targets, then do the same from 300 to 200 yards in one minute. The team I was on won, even with an entertaining face-plant at the 300 by an air force JTAC. After dark we fired 20 rounds at

the 300, 200 and 100 yard lines with PEQ-15 infra-red lasers and PVS-14 night vision goggles. On the final day, we fired the remainder of our scored events. We fired 10, five and five standing at 100 yards then five rounds against movers from left to right and five more against the reverse. We fired the same course of fire kneeling at 200 and sitting at 300. At 400 yards we fired prone against five movers from the left and five from the right. We took two written exams and got to practice each of the wind, movement and angle formulas on paper as well as prove we retained the lectured material. The course was challenging and with the stormy weather and winds, few people were confident they had earned enough points to graduate. It was a combination of good instruction and enjoyable training. Those of us that passed received certificates of completion and we all left improved and with new insights. The students were a good group of guys that represented the army well, and the instructors brought very interesting insights to the table. As much training as is conducted focused on minimum standards, it was great to see a program dedicated to expanding top-end capabilities. The USAMU’s courses are a great opportunity to shoot with some highly skilled shooters and pick their brains with questions. This is a nexus between the worlds of competition shooting and combat shooting that enhances both communities.

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about the author Mr. Graham is the former commander of a military anti-terrorism unit. He is the editor of The Counter Terrorist, and creator of 30-10 training (www.3010pistol.com).

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