The Counter Terrorist Magazine Asia Pacific issue October-November by The Counter Terrorist Asia Pacific Edition

B er g da h l T rade • M i l e Lon g S h ot • I S I S W ea l t h • Lonewo l ves

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals

Counter The

OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2014

Volume 7 • Number 5

WHY WE LOST IRAQ AND...

Asia pacific

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www.thecounterterroristmag.com The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014 1

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Counter

The Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals october/november 2014 Volume 7 • Number 5

COVER story: 29

FEATURES:

contents

why we lost iraq and Afghanistan and… By Chris Graham

Firsthand: the mile long shot By Steve Reichert

Case Study: bowe bergDahl: pow trade or closing Guantanamo on the installment plan? By Kenneth E. Brooten, Jr. Of isis CybeR TeRRORism 37 Risks Lars G. A. Hilse isis: the richest terrorist group? 53 By Steve Young lone-wolf terrorism and 65 the misuse of the term

By Dean T. Olson

DeRaDiCalizaTiON Of lTTe leaDeRs: key mOTivaTiONs aND impliCaTiONs Rajni Gamage

departments: 06 From the Editor Fraud, Waste, and Abuse

Book Review

Innovative Products

PMII Digital Rifle Scopes, BRO-PG5P, Election: Dezinformatsiya and The Great Game

Training Review

The Prince

The Atropian War

Cover Photo: Two insurgents in northern Iraq. Photo by: Menendj The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014 5

Counter The

From The Editor:

Fraud, Waste, and Abuse

By Chris Graham

Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals

n 2009, the U.S. government’s debt was $10 trillion, and shortly afterward, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen said that “debt was our greatest vulnerability.” Despite the Islamist wildfire intensifying around the world, the rise of the PRC and Vladimir Putin, and each of the other challenges our nation faced, I agreed with him. Today, our government reports debt figures of about $18 trillion, but I no longer believe debt is America’s greatest challenge. Internal corruption may be an even greater threat. In 2012, IRS unit director Lois Lerner planted a question for herself in a public forum in order to deliver a statement under misleading circumstances. Lerner’s statement claimed that the IRS’s improper targeting of groups critical of the President’s policies or supportive of the Constitution was happenstance and has said that this originated locally at junior levels. These claims have been proven incorrect. Ms. Lerner testified to Congress that she was innocent, but she provided no [additional] testimony claiming Fifth Amendment rights against criminal selfincrimination. The IRS now claims that relevant subpoenaed emails from 2009 through 2011 were “lost” and no redundancy exists. Felony convictions have not yet occurred. Was this a voter suppression campaign for the 2012 presidential election? Since President Obama’s administration assumed power, the US government has circulated flyers to Latin American countries promising American food stamp benefits for illegal aliens in the USA. In addition, the President’s hand-picked attorney general (who was previously held in contempt of Congress for other misdeeds) has filed lawsuits against states for attempting to enforce immigration laws he chooses to ignore, as well as against states that wanted to require citizens to show identification to vote. A recent, ongoing tidal wave of illegal aliens is quietly dispersed across the country rather than being immediately deported to their nations of origin as one would expect. Is this the groundwork for a historically massive, future get-out-theillegal-alien-vote campaign? In 2010, Democrat representatives passed the Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”)—without a single supporting vote from the opposing party—insisting that the act was not a tax and would reduce spending and debt, benefitting the economy. Later, they sent lawyers to the Supreme Court to argue that the act was a tax so that the Constitution could be interpreted “creatively” and the unpopular act could stand. Do you think this economic atomic bomb will benefit our economy? If we do not want our nation to become another banana republic and our children to live in the poverty that correlates with a lack of productivity, those in a position to expose corruption in government must do so. Those who have the ability to report wrongdoing cannot look away, and those of us in a position to prosecute criminality must uphold our oath to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic.” Has your representative done everything in his or her power to assist Representative Darrell Issa and Representative Trey Gowdy in exposing and prosecuting corruption? Did they quietly look the other way, or worse yet, were they champions of high-volume obfuscation? I challenge you to encourage your friends and family to consider these questions before returning your representatives to office in this November’s election. Semper Fidelis, Chris Graham Editor, The Counter Terrorist www.chrisgrahamauthor.com

6 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014

Volume 7 • Number 5

october/november 2014 Editor Chris Graham Director of Operations Sol Bradman Director of Advertizing Carmen Arnaes Production Assistants Giselle Manassa Melissa Berne Contributing Editors Kevin Freeman Jennifer Hesterman Richard Marquise Tom Nypaver Dean Olson Steve Young Asia pacific edition Director of Operation Yaniv peretz Graphic Design Morrison Creative Company Copy Editor Laura Town Advertising Sales Maria Efremova Maria@loringlobal.com +65 90266571 Publisher: Security Solutions International 13155 SW 134th St. • STE 103 Miami, Florida 33186

ISSN 1941-8639 The Counter Terrorist Magazine, Journal for Law Enforcement, Intelligence & Special Operations Professionals is published by Security Solutions International LLC, as a service to the nation’s First Responders and Homeland Security Professionals with the aim of deepening understanding of issues related to Terrorism. No part of the publication can be reproduced without permission from the publisher. The opinions expressed herein are the opinions of the authors represented and not necessarily the opinions of the publisher. Please direct all Editorial correspondence related to the magazine to: Security Solutions International SSI, 13155 SW 134th Street, Suite 103, Miami, Florida. 33186 or info@thecounterterroristmag.com The subscription price for 6 issues is $34.99 and the price of the magazine is $5.99. (1-866-573-3999) Fax: 1-786-573-2090. For article reprints, e-prints, posters and plaques please contact:

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Please visit the magazine web site where you can also contact the editorial staff:

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The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014 7

Firsthand:

the mile

long shot In April 2004 I found myself participating in one of the fiercest battles ever fought inside Iraq’s “Triangle of Death.” What started off as a normal squad patrol with 15 Marines ended with hundreds of Marines battling their way through a town.

8 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014

By Steve Reichert

or years I have thought about my actions on that day and what could have been done differently. This is why I insist that everyone who carries a weapon for a living should bust their ass and train hard. You never know where you may end up and whose lives may be on the line. On 5 April 2004, F Co 2/2 participated in a five-day battalion operation to protect Shia pilgrims along Highway 8, also known as “Route Jackson.” Over the course of the week, thousands of Iraqi Shia were expected to travel on foot between Baghdad

Photo by: James Gordon

and the cities of Najaf and Karbala in honor of the Shia religious event known as Arba’een. This was the first time in decades that the pilgrimage had been permitted, and the number of people participating was greater than anticipated. First Platoon occupied a firm base in the Karch Oil Facility, and the rest of the company occupied a firm base several miles to the south in an ice factory. I was the platoon sergeant for First Platoon at the time and was responsible for taking care of my Marines and the platoon’s operational control while advising the

platoon commander. We had set up a patrol base the day prior in an abandoned building the locals turned into a trash collection area. It wasn’t the best place, but it didn’t stink and we could get all the vehicles and Marines under shade. The night prior, the platoon commander and I climbed one of the highest tanks in the field. We did it at sunset so we could get eyes on patrol routes and hopefully not skyline ourselves in the process. A long line of tracers appeared overhead, then hit the oil tank. Simultaneously, two mortar

The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014 9

Millions of Shia Muslims gather around the Husayn Mosque in Karbala after making the Pilgrimage on foot during Arba'een. Arba'een is a forty day period that commemorates the martyrdom of Husayn bin Ali, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, and seventy-two of his followers at the Battle of Karbala in the year. Photo by: Larry E. Johns

Iraqi Police drive by a crowd of Arba'een pilgrims as they provide security for their long journey. Photo by: Katrina Beeler

rounds impacted in the area. We quickly slid down the backside of the tank to take cover. The attack was over in 20 seconds but drove home the fact that we were always being watched and the insurgents would exploit any opportunity we gave them. Once we got off the tank, we launched a

squad on patrol. Their first checkpoint was the area from which the insurgents had launched their attack. The squad planned to head north while skirting the city on the east. They didn’t expect contact, since the insurgents typically don’t attack and stay in an area. However, as soon as the patrol got to their northernmost checkpoint,

10 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014

they were heavily engaged. To make things worse, Murphy’s Law came into play and all communications with the squad went down. I remember looking to the north and seeing tracers flying through the air in all directions. I felt like a father watching his kid get into his first fight in school… and hoping that he came out unscathed. Just as two other squads were preparing to depart and link up, communications were re-established. No one was hurt, and the squad was returning to base. Once they got back, I debriefed the squad. Plans for first light were to launch another squad into the same area to search for evidence left behind. You might not think this would be important, but it really does help to know where your enemy set up, how long they were waiting, if

Photo courtesy of the author. The author mans a Barrett .50 rifle in Iraq.

they were employing multiple belt fed machineguns, bolt guns, etc.. Every bit of intel you can gather is important. The next morning I had the Marines assist in reinforcing an observation post on top of the tallest tank in the field. This would allow us to keep an eye on the patrols andâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;more importantlyâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;an eye on the town. I took up a Barrett M82A3 (.50 cal sniper rifle) and an M40A3 (7.62 mm sniper rifle), as well as a Marine who could call wind. Cpl. Tucker had been a range coach on Parris Island prior to getting to our unit. So, he had a great understanding of how wind affects bullets and how to read the wind.

The patrol left the base around 07:00 that morning. As soon as they were moving toward the town, Cpl. Tucker noticed a dead animal on the side of the road through his spotting scope. Not unusual. However, he did pick up a slight reflection coming off the animal. I got behind the glass and noticed the same glint. The squad was notified of a possible IED and proceeded with caution. As they approached the dead animal, they saw wires leading into it, so they set up a cordon per SOP. Shortly after the cordon was set, we noticed women and children slowly clearing out of the area. All the Marines

on the ground knew what that meant, but they were unsure where the attack might come from. Cpl. Tucker and I were actively scanning the area to their north for any sign of insurgent activity. EOD was called, and they gave a 45 minute ETA. Moments later, a motorcycle with two men on it drove by the squad, dropping two grenades as they passed. By the time the grenades went off, the bike had disappeared behind buildings. Then all hell broke loose, and the squad started taking heavy fire from the northwest. I immediately called for our remaining two squads to mount up, link up with the squad in contact, and extract them. After

The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014 11

The squad in contact was taking more fire as the minutes went on, so they started moving to find a defensible position.

that call, both comm systems I had on the tower stopped working. The first shots I fired were just over a thousand yards. Not an issue for the M82A3, especially since the one I had with me was one of the few that “drilled.” At the time, Cpl. Tucker and I were both lying on a metal roof, surrounded by metal barriers. This combination reflects a lot of sound and nearly deafened us. We took four seconds to jam in some ear protection. The effect the Mk211 rounds had on the insurgents was devastating. Each guy who caught one of my rounds was blown into pieces and left a pinkish mist in the air. The insurgents were trying to flank the squad on the east, but our precision fires kept this from happening. As all this was taking place, the other two squads at the patrol base were getting ready to drive into the fight. Meanwhile, the company commander and second platoon left the ice factory to assist. The squad in contact was taking more fire as the minutes went on, so they started moving to find a defensible position. As they moved north, two Marines became separated from the squad, and the insurgents tried to maneuver against them. However, Cpl. Tucker and I kept mixing metal and meat, and the two Marines were able to rejoin the squad. Soon, the squad found themselves deep in the town. In their search for a stronger position, they kept moving northwest. This made supporting them from my position harder. As they bounded from one area to another, Cpl. Tucker and I scanned for targets of opportunity and killed them as they popped up. Unlike how Hollywood might depict, it was not “one shot, one kill” 100% of the time. Most of the targets were moving and stopped for only seconds at a time. Furthermore, they were at various

12 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014

distances, and the winds were coming from multiple directions and gusting. If a round did miss the target and Cpl. Tucker saw the “splash,” he fed me instant corrections and the next round was sent a second later. This enabled us to connect a number of times on distant targets under bad conditions. The squad finally located a small building they could easily defend. They cleared the building and set in for one hell of a fight. The structure turned out to be a schoolhouse, and they were being surrounded by insurgents the second they took it over. While the squad was defending themselves, Cpl. Tucker and I kept the insurgents off the rooftops. If they got access to a vantage point, they could have dropped effective machine gun fire and killed Marines. We noticed three insurgents with belt-fed machine guns heading up a tall building north of the schoolhouse. If they reached the rooftop of that building, the insurgents would have been able not only to fire down into the schoolhouse, but also to keep reinforcements from arriving. Taking out this team became our priority. The first round we sent was off by a few mils. Cpl. Tucker picked up the splash and gave me a correction. The second round was also off, but a lot closer. The third round landed on the stairway wall the insurgents were crouched behind. The backside of the wall turned red, and we didn’t see any activity from that point on. During the debrief at the combat operations center (COC) the next day, we determined that the distance from our position to the insurgent machine gun team was 1,614 meters, as measured on Falcon View. EOD arrived with one of the battalion’s CAAT (combined anti-armor team) sections. As they approached the squad’s position, the CAAT section saw the muzzle blasts from our position and

mistook those fires for an enemy sniper. They engaged us with .50 cal machine gun fire as they attempted to link up with the squad. This went on for a while. We would fire, then get a volley of .50 cal back at us from multiple machine guns. When the rounds started impacting the oil tank, I became a little worriedâ&#x20AC;Ś After all, we were sitting on top of hundreds of thousands of gallons of flammable liquid. Lucky for us, the Russians who built the

tanks built them well, and they withstood the hundreds of rounds of .50 cal that slammed into the side. Due to the massive amount of fire received, the company had to find an alternate route to reach the squad. The company CO, the BN FAC (forward air controller), and the Second Platoon commander (along with a squad from his platoon) moved to establish eyes on the enemy when they were engaged from the

An Iraqi Army soldier stands guard at a new Iraqi guard station. Photo by: Katrina Beeler

The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014 13

east-west road on the south side of Hy Salaam and a palm grove. They returned fire and attempted to move to a location where they could better observe the enemy positions and call for air support. As they were moving further east, I noticed an insurgent heading down an alleyway with what looked like an RPK. As he turned, I could see the forend and a scope. He wasn’t a machine gunner; he was a sniper. By the time my round made it out there, he jumped a wall and was gone. Seconds later, Cpl. Speer (a squad leader in Second Platoon) was shot as he came around a corner. I did not know that at the time. The QRF from First Platoon also had two casualties that needed to be airlifted out. I later learned that as the First Platoon QRF came under heavy fire, Marines that I once considered lazy, unmotivated, or weak-minded were stepping up and taking charge. The Battalion QRF was called in along with a Huey to evacuate the dead and wounded. When the BN QRF showed up with a full company (150+ Marines) and the BN jump command post, both companies got on line to clear the town from south to north. Fighting was intense for a few hours, but once the FAC got the jets rolling, the insurgents started to head for home and time was on our side. From our vantage point, we could see insurgents running with weapons in hand. Most would go inside and not come back out; those who did were now targets of opportunity. I remember one middle-aged man who ran to the hut in the back of his house. He dropped off his RPG, came back out with a pitchfork, and began working his garden. The first round out just missed him, and he ducked behind a palm tree. However, an Mk211 round doesn’t just penetrate armor—it also penetrates palm trees! The next round thus made another pink mist cloud. These were bad people who

had been trying to kill Marines. In my mind (and in accordance with the rules of engagement), they all needed to die. As the day wound down, there were fewer and fewer people who needed killing. People started storing weapons and ammunition in coffins atop vehicles so they could drive them south out of the town past the Marines. I saw one group dump a body out of a coffin and fill it back up with weapons. We were bingo on Mk211 by that time, and using my M40 would have not been effective. Had we more rounds for the .50, I would have enjoyed dropping more bodies around the coffin. The sun was starting to set, so Cpl. Tucker and I packed up shop and got off the tower. When we got back to the patrol base, we were not surprised that everyone was gone, so we walked over to the guard building of the oil field. Inside we found nine Iraqi guards with AK-47s. We did our best to ask for a key to one of the trucks, and eventually Cpl. Tucker was able to talk the men into providing one. Cpl. Tucker was a very diplomatic man who had certain abilities to persuade people. As we walked outside the building, the guards followed us and started looking around for other Marines. The hair went up on the back of my neck, and I started to talk on my non-operable radio. I then started pointing to various locations in the field and waving. The guards also started looking. I pointed to my sniper rifle, then to more locations. I was trying to give the guards the impression that we were under observation from multiple sniper teams. It must have worked, because the guards got quiet and went back inside. As Cpl. Tucker and I were walking out to grab one of the vehicles and drive it back to base, one of the CAAT teams drove in to pick us up. As this was the last day of the Arba’een pilgrimage and the

14 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014

operation had concluded, the company consolidated on Route Jackson and returned to FOB Mahmudiyah. Once we linked back up with the platoon, I learned of our two casualties and Cpl. Speer. When I heard what had happened to him and where it happened, it was a kick in the balls. All I could think of was the insurgent with the scoped rifle. I wondered if he was the one who killed Cpl. Speer. The ride back to the FOB was depressing. When we got back, I went to the company CP to pick up my platoon’s mail. Next to First Platoon’s mail was Second Platoon’s. On top of Second’s stack was a letter from Cpl. Speer’s wife, with kisses all over it and little hearts. I knew she would be getting a visit by some Marines in dress blues shortly, and it’s a visit no one wants to get… It’s one of those thoughts that will never leave you, always wondering “What if?” Could I have done something different? Could you have trained harder? Should I have had that area inside my field of view? I was surprised that no other Marines were killed in that battle. It was 12+ hours of constant fighting with the sound of gunfire never leaving the town until sunset. This can probably be chalked up to the tactics the Marines employed and the leadership of the commanders. From that day on, I never missed an opportunity to train myself and those under my charge.

•

about the authors Mr. Reichert served as ASO3’s Senior Executive Vice President, where he was responsible for special access programs that integrated technologies with special operations requirements. He previously founded Tier 1 Group (T1G). The author served 12 years in the United States Marine Corps, being medically retired after exposure to an IED blast in Iraq (www.SteveReichert.com).

Ministers of public security/internal security/ internal affairs Mayors, municipal CEOs and security chiefs, emergency & safety directors Police commanders (including counter terror, riot control, intelligence, cyber investigation, aerial units and more) First responders and emergency authorities Security chiefs of critical infrastructure, such as air and sea ports, power plants, oil and gas infrastructure, IT and cyber centers, and border control facilities Prison and correctional facility authorities National security and intelligence agencies National cyber security agencies and organizations VIP protection units HLS industry manufactures, integrators and suppliers

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The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014 15

Case Study:

Bowe Bergdahl: POW Trade or Closing Guantanamo on the Installment Plan?

â&#x20AC;&#x153;As I said earlier this week, we are committed to winding down the war in Afghanistan, and we are committed to closing Gitmo.â&#x20AC;? President Barack Obama, Bergdahl Rose Garden Ceremony May 31, 2014 16 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014

Bowe Bergdahl, an American soldier who was captured during the War in Afghanistan. Photo by: United States Army

By Kenneth E. Brooten, Jr

A brief yet critical objective review of prior actions taken by President Obama and his Administration to close the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba is central to understanding the significance of multiple legal and constitutional issues arising from the trade of five high level Taliban commanders who were specifically designated by the Taliban for one U.S. prisoner.

n a previous article I authored for The Counter Terrorist entitled: Closing Guantanamo a Legal Analysis1 I noted that on his first full day in Office January 22, 2009, President Barack Obama issued his first three Executive Orders. EO 13942 mandated that the Detention

Center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba be closed within one year. My previous Article provides an in depth U.S. and International Legal analysis of those three Executive Orders which need not be repeated here. However the clear intention of President Obama and his

Administration during the past six years has been directed to closing the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. When Congress enacted The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (H.R. 1540) and (S. 1253), it contained detailed, strict prohibitions and

The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014 17

President Barack Obamaa speaks about the values that guide his foreign policy decisions, including the closing of Guantanamo, at the National Archives. Photo by: Pete Souza Link

JTF Guard Force Troopers transport a detainee to the detainee hospital located adjacent to Camp Four, Dec. 27, 2007. Photo by: Michael Billings

mandates action by the Executive Branch relating to detainees at Guantanamo. The Act also mandates 30 day priornotice before any detainee may be transferred from Guantanamo and specifically provided that the mandates, prohibitions and tight restrictions were

effective until February, 2017, after President Obama leaves office. Thus, Federal Law specifically prohibits the use of the appropriated funds to transferring detainees to the U.S. or to any other country. The notification requirements to transfer any detainee to another country

18 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014

are detailed and carefully crafted.2 The specific prohibitions; mandates and obligations of the Executive Branch are set forth in Title X, Subtitle D, Sections 1021-1034 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. One need not be an attorney to read and understand the clear specific provisions of the law, which may be viewed on the provided GPO official link. The intent of both the House and Senate is clear as to the obligations of the Executive Branch of our Government. However, notwithstanding the clear language of Federal Law, on 21 August, 2014 the non-partisan General Accountability Office found that the Department of Defense violated Section 8111 of the NDAA when DOD transferred the 5 Senior Taliban Commanders from Guantanamo at a cost of $988,400.00 without first advising the Congress at least 30 days prior to the transfer as mandated by the NDAA and the expenditure of the funds constituted a direct violation of the Antideficiency Act. A legal and constitutional review of the facts not in dispute indicates two major legal and constitutional issues. First, was the trade of five senior Taliban commanders who were specifically selected by the Taliban to exchange for one U.S. Prisoner of War, without the knowledge or consent of the Congress a knowing and willful violation of Federal Law? Application of the Facts to the Law indicates that President Obama and his Administration clearly violated the prohibitions of the NDAA. Second, did violation of the specific provisions of the NDAA constitute a violation of the Constitutional Doctrine of Separation of Powers? Article I of our Constitution vests all Legislative powers with the Congress. Article II vests â&#x20AC;&#x153;The Executive power with the President.â&#x20AC;? Article III places the judicial power of

GUANTANAMO BAY, Cuba – A humvee from the Puerto Rico Army National Guard’s 480th Military Police Company patrols the perimeter of detention facilities, Oct. 7, 2009. Photo by: Sgt. Jim Wagner

the United States in one Supreme Court and “in such inferior Courts as the Congress may establish.” Where, as here, Congress placed clear restrictions and mandates on funding provided by the NDAA and made such provisions the controlling law until February, 2017, the President not only did not follow that law but he clearly violated it. Separation of Powers though not expressly stated is by operation of the first three Articles of the U.S. Constitution what constitutes our system of checks and balances

within our Constitutional Democracy. One Administration spokesperson is quoted as saying: “Events were moving so fast that we did not have time to notify the Congress.” Even a cursory analysis of that statement does not include the fact that according to NBC News, Harry Reid was advised the day before the actual transfer. Obviously, if true, Harry Reid made the decision not to advise any of his colleagues about the impending trade and return of an American POW.3 Foreign Policy Magazine made even

The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014 19

Pentagon Press Secretary Navy Rear Adm. John Kirby briefs the media during a press conference held in the Pentagon Press Briefing Room, June 10, 2014. Kirby fielded questions about Army Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl's recent release from Taliban captivity. Photo by: Glenn Fawcett

further disclosures: Sgt. Bowe Bergdahlâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s release by the Taliban in the border region of eastern Afghanistan was so rushed that not even the Afghanistan war commander or the top commander in the region knew a deal had been struck until just before or

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after it had been finalized, according to multiple administration officials.4 Bowe Bergdahl, Deserter or bona fide Prisoner of War? While that issue has gained hours of media attention that fundamental issue remains to be

determined. Bergdahl is an American who enlisted in the U.S. Army and was held by the Taliban for five years. When, why, how Bowe Bergdahl left his post and his unit in Afghanistan in the legal and Constitutional context is nothing more or less than one of several convenient distractions from other fundamental and even more consequential legal and Constitutional issues. A review of the facts not in dispute indicates that Americans were carefully presented with well-planned and well executed optics to shape American public opinion. The first optic we were treated to was replete with US special operations personnel, circling in a Blackhawk helicopter somewhere in the eastern region of Afghanistan. Conveniently, a video cameraman was already in place on the ground to film Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl sitting in a pickup truck blinking at the

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camera waiting to be escorted by the Taliban to the Blackhawk helicopter. Next we were treated to second optic, a Rose Garden ceremony with the President flanked on each side by Bowe Bergdahl’s parents announcing “This morning, I called Bob and Janie Bergdahl and told them that after nearly five years in captivity, their son, Bowe is coming home.”5 The President then invited Bob and Jani to make their remarks. Jani Bergdahl made a short statement thanking President Obama and everyone who supported Bowe. Then a fully bearded Bob Bergdahl began by saying: “I would like to say to Bowe right now, who is having trouble speaking English (speaks in Pashto) I’m your father Bowe.” The official White House Transcript does not contain what Bob Bergdahl says, it only shows what is stated above (speaks in Pashto.) What none of the media

…a video cameraman was already in place on the ground to film Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl sitting in a pickup truck blinking at the camera waiting to be escorted by the Taliban to the Blackhawk helicopter.

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Members of Bergdahl’s army unit in Afghanistan repeatedly stated that Bergdahl deserted his post and walked off into the Afghan mountains.

reported is the fact that Bob Bergdahl began his remarks in Arabic: “bisim allah alraham alraheem” which translated from the Arabic means, “in the name of Allah the most gracious and most merciful.” Bob Bergdahl appears to have spoken “off script.” Why did he quote the Qur’an by stating the words that appear in every chapter of the Qur’an except the Chapter of the sword (the 9th?) Why does the Official White House Transcript only note (speaks in Pashto?)6 The Bergdahls reside in Idaho. Where were they when the President called that morning? How did they get to Washington? How long had they been in Washington? Those facts are significant because they show how carefully staged the Rose Garden Ceremony was. Like the “rescue” in Eastern Afghanistan, the Rose Garden Ceremony was carefully planned and executed. Of course, there was no time to advise the Congress with the possible exception of Harry Reid the previous day. Really? The Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee sought and received responses from each member of the Joint Chief ’s of Staff.7 On July 10, 2014 Senator Carl Levin, (D. Mich.) indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unanimous in their support for the trade of five senior Taliban commanders for Bowe Bergdahl. However, as the Hill reported, their support appears to have been given after the fact. The Hill article explains: “Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey wrote that he “concluded the risk posed by the detainee’s future activity would be less grave than breaking faith with our forces in combat.” Army chief of staff Gen. Ray Odierno noted that while he “was not consulted in any way” about the swap he has since come to believe that no “viable rescue operation existed” to snatch Bergdahl from his Taliban kidnappers after five years of captivity. The other military

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leaders lodged similar complaints about not being briefed on the trade before it happened, but all said they supported the administration’s decision.” Secretary of Defense Hagel and National Security Advisor Susan Rice both appeared on Sunday News programs: Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and National Security Adviser Susan Rice made their comments roughly 24 hours after Americans learned that Bergdahl was recovered in exchange for the release of five Taliban detainees at the U.S. prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. “It was an extraordinary day for America,” Rice told CNN’s “State of the Union.” Rice and Hagel repeatedly disagreed with the argument that U.S. officials negotiated with terrorists to get back Bergdahl. “He wasn’t simply a hostage,” Rice said. “He was a prisoner of war. “Hagel told NBC’s “Meet the Press”: “We didn’t negotiate with terrorists. Sergeant Bergdahl is a prisoner of war. That’s a natural process.”8 Thus the optic presented to the nation is one of military and political unity even though Members of Bergdahl’s army unit in Afghanistan repeatedly stated that Bergdahl deserted his post and walked off into the Afghan mountains. How Bergdahl left his unit in Afghanistan remains to be determined by a military investigation. While how and why Bergdahl left is an issue for the U.S. Military it is not the operative fact about why neither the President nor his Administration failed to brief the Congress as clearly mandated by the NDAA. The “Why” Bergdahl left his post drove the media news cycle, however, little if any time was spent analyzing the critical legal and Constitutional issues. The media analysis went so far as to question whether Bowe Bergdahl would receive $375,000 in tax free, back pay or will he

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry meets with Qatari Amir Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani in Doha, Qatar, on June 23, 2013. Photo by: U.S. Department of State be Court Martialed. We will delve deeper into the same facts but with a focus on the legal and constitutional issues which the media underreported. The fact that— by a bipartisan vote—the House Armed Services Committee Condemned the Administration for the trade and for not complying with mandated Federal Law. As the individual members of the JCS wrote to Senator Levin they did not know about the trade. Foreign Policy Magazine exposed the fact that not only did the

two top commanders in Afghanistan not know about the finalized trade but that even Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel did not know that a final deal had been struck by the White House.9 As more and more facts emerge about the Bergdahl trade, more and more information indicates that the White House was the main driver of the prisoner swap. The intelligence community and top military commanders and even Secretary of Defense were not calling the shots

nor were they even “read in” on the status of negotiations. Congress was not alone kept in the dark. Why? That is the “Why” that merits close examination because the picture that is emerging is one of total White House control without consultation with the Congress, the intelligence community, the Secretary of Defense or even the top generals in command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 10 Now that the five senior Taliban Commanders are safely in the hands of

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The Emir of Qatar and reportedly under restrictions about their activities and prohibition on travel or fund raising the President has chosen to keep the documents between the U.S. and Qatar Classified.11 The President said “I shook hands on it (the transfer of five senior Taliban) with the Emir of Qatar.” The President met with the Emir of Qatar on April 23, 2013.12 13 The Bergdahl case presents the most troubling picture of the how this Administration acts that has emerged from Washington in decades. Where, as here, there was no consultation with the Congress who has sole legislative authority and mandated in Federal Law that Congress be advised 30 days prior to any transfer that constitutes a clear violation of Federal Law. Of equal concern is the fact that this Administration failed to consultation with the intelligence community about the five senior Taliban commanders who were released and the national security threats that they pose, nor did the President consult with his Secretary of Defense or his the top military commanders including the Joint Chiefs of Staff none of whom were “read in” on the status of negotiations which apparently were closely guarded inside of the White House. One may only conclude that the “Optics” presented to the nation were illusory. History records that when such conditions exist no true Democracy can continue. Bowe Bergdahl’s case may have inadvertently exposed how this Administration is conducting all policy, foreign and domestic. By any standard the President’s actions are unconstitutional and extra constitutional. Congress has determined that the Detention Center at Guantanamo cannot be closed. No Detainee can be released without first providing the Congress with

24 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014

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the legally mandated information. We can only conclude that Federal Law and the Constitutional Separation of Powers has and is being violated. Will President Obama close Guantanamo in violation of Federal Law and the U.S. Constitution? Bowe Bergdahl may have provided the nation with the answer.

•

about the author Mr. Brooten is the former Special Counsel and Chief Counsel, House Select Committee on Assassinations. He is Trial Counsel in the U.S. for Her Majesty’s Government of the United Kingdom. He has Professional and Graduate Degrees in International Law from the University of Florida, Gainesville, at Trinity College, Cambridge, U.K. and The Institute of Legal Sciences, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland.

http://www.foxnews.com/ politics/2014/06/02/hagel-rice-praisebergdahl-recover-mission-defendswiftness-not-telling/# 9 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ articles/2014/06/10/white_house_ military_bowe_bergdahl_pentagon_ chuck_hagel 10 Ibid. 11 http://www.washingtonpost. com/world/national-security/ sources-outline-conditions-on-taliban8

leaders-release-in-exchange-forbergdahl/2014/06/05/4ed9d8a0-eceb11e3-93d2-edd4be1f5d9e_story.html 12 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ policy-analysis/view/the-emir-of-qatarsoval-office-meeting 13 www.theaustralian.com.au/business/ wall-street-journal/taliban-prisonerswap-talks-kept-secret-for-three-years/ story-fnay3ubk-1226940632705?nk=c05 8b9574fe6c347370a8cdf781789cc#mmpremium

Endnotes The Counter Terrorist Vol. 2 No. 5, October, November 2009 2 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS112hr1540enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr1540enr. pdf SEE: PP 265-275 3 http://www.nbcnews.com/ watch/nightly-news/why-didntobama-tell-congress-about-prisonerswap-274505283536 4 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ articles/2014/06/10/white_house_ military_bowe_bergdahl_pentagon_ chuck_hagel 5 http://www.whitehouse.gov/photosand-video/video/2014/05/31/presidentobama-speaks-recovery-sgt-bowebergdahl 6 http://www.whitehouse.gov/photosand-video/video/2014/05/31/presidentobama-speaks-recovery-sgt-bowebergdahl#transcript 7 http://thehill.com/policy/ defense/211866-joint-chiefs-endorsebergdahl-swap 1

26 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014

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Why We Lost Iraq and Afghanistan andâ&#x20AC;Ś It may not be clear from the way popular news outlets cover these stories or from the way senior leaders celebrate themselves, but the United States has demonstrated some significant capability gaps that our enemies are exploiting.

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Photo by: Cpl. Joseph Scanlan

By Chris Graham

urrently, the U.S. government is withdrawing from 1 Afghanistan, leaving victory to the Taliban. Similarly, American forces were unilaterally withdrawn from Iraq,2 snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. Elsewhere, the U.S. government fired more than 100 cruise missiles into Libya3

against dictator Muammar Gaddafi’s soldiers, then seemed surprised when Gaddafi’s Islamist opponents consumed the country. American politicians also demanded the resignation of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak4 and championed a so-called “Arab Spring,” despite the fact that the Islamist “Muslim

Brotherhood” and other tyrannical radicals were the elements most likely to seize power. Finally, in another perplexing maneuver, the President of the United States threatened a “red line” in Syria,5 then asked for support for going to war against the Ba’athist Syrian dictator by promising not to act decisively.6

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Front row, from left, U.S. Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Secretary of State John Kerry; and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the Hart Senate Office Building in Washington, D.C., Sept. 3, 2013, during a hearing about potential U.S. military intervention in Syria. President Barack Obama was seeking congressional approval for a limited military strike in Syria in response to the Syrian government's alleged use of chemical weapons against its people. Photo by: Daniel Hinton

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States and its allies invaded Afghanistan, spearheading a renewed al-Qaeda hunt. Early unconventional CIA/U.S. Army Special Forces successes eventually gave way to “Big Army” operations of questionable value. Al-Qaeda was routed from Afghanistan, and the United States and her allies seemed to accept a new mission of creating a central Afghan government and defeating the Taliban. After years of vacillating efforts (including inconsistent rules of engagement and back-andforth policies on who to capture/kill, who to assist, prisoner releases, poppy production, etc.), newly appointed commander General Stanley McChrystal

reported to the President that he needed 40,000 additional troops to turn the tide and deliver success.7 Rather than authorizing the needed troops to support victory or deciding the cost of success was not worth paying and withdrawing, the President provided about 25% fewer troops than the stated requirement. Then, in 2011, the President announced withdrawal dates for American forces,8 making a win a near-impossibility and leaving the future of Afghanistan in the hands of a corrupt Islamic government and often feckless Afghan army. In 2003, the United States and Britain, with the symbolic participation of others, invaded Iraq after Ba’athist dictator Saddam Hussein repeatedly violated

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agreements from the conclusion of the 1991 Gulf War, plotted an assassination attempt against a former U.S. president,9 and gave numerous indications of attempting to build and stockpile a range of weapons of mass destruction.10 Allied forces quickly toppled the Hussein regime and held their ground. As months of U.S. government inaction rolled by, Ba’athist loyalists, regional jihadists, Iranian provocateurs, and disenchanted Iraqi citizens mounted a multifaceted insurgency against American forces and the new U.S.-backed government. After Gen. David Petraeus made a version of Marine Gen. James Mattis’ procedures the standard for all American forces in Iraq, operational success was achieved. In 2011, the President of the United States withdrew American forces, leaving an inept Iraqi military behind rather than obtaining a status of forces agreement (SOFA) and maintaining a small, competent residual force. Shiite members of the Iraqi government unsurprisingly fell under the silver-or-lead influence of their brothers in Tehran, and eventually the expected Sunni terrorist resurgence conquered northern Iraq.11 Also in 2011, not long after holding a dinner in Washington, DC, to honor Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the President of the United States told Mubarak to step down and withdrew American support from the unsavory leader who had—for decades—done the world’s dirty work by keeping Muslim Brotherhood Islamist militants on the run.12 Simultaneously, politicians and media figures expressed exuberance at what they called an “Arab Spring.” Frustrated citizens in a number of Arab countries protested and rioted. Muslim Brotherhood thugs and other Islamists— the most disciplined and unscrupulous

Spc. Adam Alvarez guides trucks full of wood and other materials off Forward Operating Base Walton, July 16, 2014. The FOB closed the next day, having served as a strategic joint operating base with Afghan National Security Forces during Operation Enduring Freedom. Photo by: Staff Sgt. Whitney Houston organizations in the region—predictably seized the opportunity to assert themselves and grow their power. The only place where regime change would have been clearly beneficial—Iran— received no real encouragement for their protesting opposition. In 2011—with little explanation that made sense—the President of the United States also ordered the U.S. Navy to fire more than 100 cruise missiles at Libyan soldiers and their equipment.13 This attack set the dangerous precedent

of bypassing Congress but instead coordinating with the United Nations for operations in support of a conflict that admittedly didn’t threaten America. Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi was responsible for the 1988 Lockerbie Pan-Am airliner bombing, but in recent decades had proven cooperative in the world’s struggle to resist Islamist terrorism. Later in 2011, Americanbacked “rebels” executed Gaddafi in the street. Islamist factions inherited power in Libyan neighborhoods, and

in 2012 a company-sized group armed with rifles, machine guns, mortars, and RPGs attacked a negligently underprotected U.S. ambassador in Benghazi.14 Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans were killed and an embassy annex was overrun, resulting in a bizarre call from the American President for a criminal investigation. In 2012, the President of the United States publicly threatened that Syrian Ba’athist dictator Bashar al-Assad faced a “red line” if he used chemical weapons

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We must unemotionally admit where we have fallen short, and we must study the clues left by the successes of the past.

in his fight against insurgents battling him for control of Syria.15 In 2013, it was reported that Assad had indeed used chemical weapons, and shortly thereafter, the President publicly tried to build support for going to war in Syria by promising not to act decisively and to attack Syrian forces with a limited campaign.16 His request fell flat, and the Islamist gangs and guerrillas fighting the brutal Assad regime received no overt American military assistance. These examples are merely the tip of the iceberg regarding global strife and are limited primarily to Afghanistan, the Middle East, and North Africa, although other theaters of operations are similarly challenged. Regardless of location, armed conflict presents two options: victory and defeat. If we are to limit present-day strategic defeats and reacquire the skills

and capabilities necessary to survive and deliver future victories, we must be our own harshest critics. We must unemotionally admit where we have fallen short, and we must study the clues left by the successes of the past. From 2003 to the present, I have spent weeks, months, and—cumulatively— years traveling Iraq, Afghanistan, and other relevant locations. I have made some observations on a number of topics that must be part of our analysis. This is not a comprehensive list of my observations, and unfortunately, it does not represent the perspective of the U.S. government or any particular agency/ organization. You may choose to consider this information merely anecdotal, but in honor of the brave young Americans, Britons, Australians, Germans, etc., who have given their lives and limbs to win these wars for you, please do give these observations some consideration.

Safe Havens

During Operation Champion Sword Paratroopers return from an air assault where they found a weapons cache and detained the cache owner in the Sabari District of Khost province July 31. Photo by: Spc. Christopher Nicholas

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Decades ago, studying literature from the JFK Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, I was informed that permitting an enemy to have “safe havens” during a counterinsurgency campaign was one of the primary roads to failure. Likewise, for guerrillas, having safe havens to make use of is a necessity for success. Safe havens are areas that are protected because of either policy inaction or physical protection, such as mountainous terrain or the defense of host nation forces. These areas are used for rest, recreation, rearmament, and training. Safe havens have long been a problem in Afghanistan, where large numbers of insurgents from each of the factions and their ISI (Pakistani intelligence) assistants have traveled freely to and from Pakistan

for more than a decade. Many take seasonal breaks in Pakistan, then return to outlast U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The Iranian border has been used similarly. Iraq had the same problems. Iraqi Ba’athist militants apparently received support from Syrian Ba’athists. Large numbers of Sunnis and Sunni terrorists crossed the Syrian border at will and do so to this day. Iranian intelligence personnel, special operations personnel, and surrogate terrorists have also had nearfreedom of movement in the Shiite areas of Iraq, and Shiite Iraqi insurgents have used Iran as a safe haven. Safe havens have also existed, at times, in under-patrolled areas of Afghanistan and Iraq. Lesson: Safe havens cannot be permitted to an opponent while still retaining a high likelihood of operational success. Safe havens can be anticipated in advance. If you are unwilling or unable to eliminate them, close them off or deny access to them, it is foolish to join the fight.

External Support A second pillar similar in importance to safe havens is external support. An insurgency needs support from the outside to grow beyond infancy. Relevant support includes armament, money, equipment, training, advice, medicine, and sophisticated intelligence, among other things. Financial assistance to insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq has come from individual contributions from the Muslim world (some witting, some not), organizational support, and national support from some of the providers of safe havens listed above and likely others. The insurgents of Afghanistan and Iraq also supplement their finances with robbery, kidnap for ransom, drug trafficking, and other black market

activity. Criminal activity to support these insurgencies is often sophisticated and calculated. Lesson: External support, especially national assistance and the support of international organizations, cannot be permitted to an enemy. Many sources of external support can be anticipated. If you are unwilling or unable to eliminate or interdict this support, there must be significant other factors to justify a belief that operational success is likely.

Cultural Assimilation An insurgency, and almost any likely modern war, is a population-based conflict. Key terrain is not the ultimate objective; rather, support from or control of a population is. Cultural assimilation was a critical factor in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and is likely to be the same in our next wars. A U.S. squad, platoon, or company bears the burden of patrolling and navigating the people and personalities that are the determiner of success in these conflicts. Using a platoon as an example, please allow me to raise a question: If 20 to 30 Americans are patrolling and interacting with hundreds of locals, how do they show respect, build relationships, and gather information from people they can’t speak to? Americans memorize a few greetings in the local dialect and contract interpreters. Unfortunately, these interpreters have often numbered less than a handful per battalion. Even in the relatively small numbers used, it has proven challenging to keep positions manned with competent, trustworthy individuals willing to walk in the field with Americans. Also, even when a “terp” is present on a patrol, he may be present for only one dialogue at a time. Every

Supplies designated for U.S. Army Soldiers fall from the sky after an air drop in Spera District, Khowst Province. Photo by Sgt. John Zumer

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American/local interaction out of his sight is conducted with the language/ culture barrier. Thus, easily more than 90% of interactions between American troops and locals have been conducted without linguistic understanding. Mao tse-Tung, one of the godfathers of communist revolutionary warfare, famously said, “A guerrilla must be able to move through the masses like a fish through water.” When Sunni terrorists travel through Sunni regions and Iranian terrorists travel through Shiite regions, they have the freedom to do so individually and unobtrusively. They can communicate, show respect, and rely upon Islamic hospitality. When they choose to move about armed or in numbers, they can read the population and elders with enough skill to understand how to manipulate or coerce their compliance. They easily leave informers in place in every community to report who provides less-than-zealous support to the insurgency or who displays cooperation with allied forces, then use this information for future torture, execution, or other punishment. Many locals see American forces as a generally honest broker that gives them less reason for fear than the insurgent gangs operating in the area, but the above trends are not in our favor. Further complicating matters is Islamic loyalty. Muslims in the community may find terrorist atrocities abhorrent, but that doesn’t mean that the perpetrator is not a fellow Muslim. The proposition for a Muslim to side with a non-Muslim against a fellow Muslim is not often favorable. Loyalties are widely mixed at best. Tribal influences are similar. Lesson: Cultural and linguistic skills (in relevant languages) must, at a minimum,

become required for infantrymen and special operators. Every infantryman and special operator should be required to begin a secondary career-long MOS of linguistics no later than immediately upon completion of his first deployment. Satisfactory progress should be a requirement for each re-enlistment.

Ideology Our enemies in the various al-Qaeda groups, the full range of Taliban factions, the existing Sunni terror groups in Iraq (and elsewhere), and the Iranian special operations units (e.g., IRGC Qods Force) and surrogate terrorist forces share one significant unifying thread: Islam. Many of these Islamist militants subscribe to the Muslim Brotherhood’s vision of global conquest. The zeal of belief held by these men permits individual jihadists to sustain themselves through periods of great hardship, long gaps in receiving pay, and intermittent-at-best logistical support. They generally have a strong belief that they are right and everyone else is wrong. Many of them proudly slay Christians, Jews, non-Muslims, and even Muslims of other sects when found unarmed, outnumbered, or vulnerable. Our adversaries have a very strong ideological glue. In contrast, their opponents in the Western armies—specifically the U.S. Army—do not have a similarly unifying ideology. When U.S. Marines went toeto-toe with bushido-trained Japanese forces and decisively defeated them in the Pacific and U.S. soldiers teamed with British and Soviet forces to defeat the Nazis in Europe, American forces had a unifying ideology. World War II was won by an American force composed of openly practicing Christian (and to

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a smaller, but not insignificant extent, Jewish) individuals. A comically underequipped, often undertrained adversary is permitted a significant psychological edge over Western forces. Worse still, our forces are fighting this population-centric conflict with only superficial, politically correct training about their adversaries’ dominant ideologies. The short pre-deployment lectures on “Islam” delivered to U.S. troops suggest that each of these Islamist terrorist groups are simply practicing Islam incorrectly. Young soldiers are left to ponder how it is that a non-Muslim bureaucrat in Washington, DC, is able to credibly assess that hundreds of thousands of men who identify themselves as Muslims, who have practiced Islam all their lives under Islamic instruction in different schools of Islamic thought in far-flung corners of the world, and who have demonstrated the conviction of their beliefs by traveling to war zones (often, but not always, acquitting themselves with valor) are practicing their own religion incorrectly. Lesson: The U.S. government’s new religion of global warming and LGBT studies is an inadequate counter-message to jihadism. Recent institutional harassment of Christian and Jewish chaplains and organizational harassment of practicing Christian and Jewish troops must be terminated.

Mission Creep CIA and military special operations men entered Afghanistan after the September 11, 2001, attacks with a clear mission. Senior CIA officer Cofer Black succinctly summarized the mission to annihilate al-Qaeda and kill Osama bin Laden when he passed on an order to

An Afghan leads U.S. Army soldiers from the Ground Combat Platoon, Echo company, 4-3 Aviation Battalion and Afghan National Army soldiers through the village of Akbar Kheyl, Pole-Elam district, Logar province, Afghanistan, March 18. The U.S. Army and A.N.A. are conducting a Key Leader Engagement with the village elders in order to check on conditions in the village. Photo by: Sgt. Russell Gilchrest bring back bin Laden’s head “in a box.” The U.S. invasion of Iraq was similarly undertaken with clear objectives. Scores of al-Qaeda militants were killed, the survivors dispersed, and after a few missed opportunities, bin Laden was eventually shot to death by American special operators years later in Pakistan.

In Iraq, a task force of U.S. and British Marines and soldiers and a small number of other allies, with U.S. Air Force support, defeated one of the world’s largest and most heavily equipped armies in about two weeks. In 2003, when U.S. Special Forces tracked down brutal dictator Saddam Hussein, the allies were

in a position to investigate all evidence of the weapons of mass destruction that the Hussein regime had previously used and refused to open to international inspectors as previously agreed. The President of the United States was photographed on the deck of an aircraft carrier in front of a navy banner stating

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“Mission Accomplished.” After successfully accomplishing these missions, U.S. forces did not depart. After witnessing dramatic special operations successes, large elements of conventional army forces were deployed to Afghanistan. A mission to build new central governments for these countries seems to have been quietly accepted. Over the years, everything from rules of engagement to our policy on poppy production vacillated. A concept of “draining the swamp,” or eliminating a geographic terrorist breeding ground, became popular. U.S. State Department efforts fell distantly short of what was needed. Though expenditures were impressive, the accomplishments of traditionally educated but operationally inexperienced employees often were not. The United States successfully rebuilt a productive and peaceful Germany and Japan after World War II. However, these efforts were dependent upon generally much more aggressive and uninhibited direct action operations, followed by selection of a capable military officer who was put in charge of the reconstruction, unification, and deterrence of spoilers.

This officer was given non-military authority similar to that of a king along with the freedom to succeed. As such, he could be held singularly responsible for his results. Lesson: “Draining the swamp” sounds good, but to work, all swamps would have to be drained. Terrorists walk through mountains and travel in cars and on airliners. They are mobile. No country or combination of countries has the wealth or consistent will to drain every swamp in the world. Many countries act as deliberate spoilers. Also, university academics does not sufficiently prepare key personnel for successful leadership, complex foreign policy, and counterinsurgency initiative. Previous planning, implementation, and (not or) pushing to completion of successful projects (commercial, military operations, etc.) is the experience that must be sought.

Morale Over the decade-plus long campaign formerly called the Global War on Terror, I have been happily encouraged by the generally high morale I have witnessed

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in U.S. forces deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite existing in a more micro-managed state than any force in U.S. history, troops have generally held their tongue in regard to complaining about questionable strategic decisions, and evidence of “discipline” generally appears uncompromised. Young men and women deployed to inhospitable regions have been sustained with—in most, but not all, cases—regular daily rest periods in air conditioned quarters– often for two. The majority of U.S. personnel live on forward operating bases that provide plentiful, adequate American food, daily ice cream, cable TV, and near-continuous internet. Infantrymen (and sometimes others) routinely spend extended periods in the field without these comforts. General order number one may be the first morale question to raise. General order number one prohibits U.S. troops deployed to these regions from drinking alcohol or having sex for the entire time deployed—generally seven months to a year. It is not lost on the troops that this order originated with senior personnel that are outside the warzone themselves or freely travel in and out of the zone.

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38 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014

WhaT If ISIS Were To CommUnICaTe anonymoUSly? One of the most essential instruments in counter terrorism is signals intelligence; infiltrating the adversary’s communication-flow to make qualified decisions, determine their strategy, and be aware of their next movement. If this stream of information is severed, if ISIS would start to communicate through anonymous communication channels, the advantage falls drastically in favor of the adversary. Contrary to popular belief it is still possible to use the TOR network to communicate anonymously. The most prominent example is the arrest of the alleged Silk Road founder Ross William Ulbricht, who has been able to acquire a fortune of Bitcoin worth several hundred million dollars over a

period of years, without being discovered. When reading the criminal complaint it becomes evident that his capture was only possible due to mistakes he made during the early stages of Silk Road, while a majority of sources still claim that providing anonymity for end-users on the internet remains a very challenging and difficult task. When used correctly, TOR offers tremendous possibilities to obscure communiqués in form of email, instant (mobile) messaging, and even voice messaging, while not only anonymizing the communiqué itself, but also the geophysical location of both sender and recipient.

reCrUITInG ProfeSSIonalS ISIS and previous extremistmovements are experienced in recruiting

followers for their cause online, so looking in other online-forums for IT security professionals is merely a minor change in procedure. Convincing hackers, who find pleasure in making use of things in ways that were unintended, is quite easy. Even ethical concerns tend to loosen with a budget of USD $2+ billion. Furthermore, a cyber-attack can be compartmentalized, so that subject matter experts might be hired to work on a particular piece of software that is - by itself - harmless. Only when put into greater context does it become harmful, without the people creating it being aware of the intended use. Adding to the simplicity is the fact that large quantities of the knowledge required to orchestrate a large-scale cyberattack are available in the public domain, and can be easily retrieved performing

The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014 39

searches for topics such as “penetration testing” or similar terms. Because they are people of the internet, most of the subject matter experts required for such a project will prefer Bitcoin over conventional cash for a variety of reasons. For one, the assets received in form of Bitcoin can be easily laundered and the source can be entirely obscured. If all fails, the claim is made that the large sum of money originated from early Bitcoin mining operations. Furthermore, it is easier to transport. Even large sums of Bitcoin fit onto a USB drive, and can therefore cross borders without a customs official even having a hint that a perpetrator is walking by them with the equivalent of several million US Dollars on their person.

an ImPreSSIve, BUT larGely USeleSS armory Their expansion in Iraq has granted ISIS access to several conventional arms, among which are tanks, armored vehicles, howitzers along with other towed artillery. An estimated 30 T-55 and T-72 battle tanks, SA-7 and FIM-92 shoulder mounted Stinger missiles, rocket launchers, etc. on the offensive, and instruments such as the ZU-23-2 antiaircraft guns, M79, HJ-8 and AT-4 antitank weapons on the defensive side are in their possession. Ongoing attempts to obtain chemical or biological agents, and their deployment in western countries is unlikely due to the high difficulty of shipping such agents undetected. In terms of nuclear capabilities, ISIS captured some 40kg of low-grade uranium compounds from a research facility in Mosul, but are far from weaponising it. While this presents an impressive arsenal, which is very useful in their current AO, deploying these weapons to strike the west is - again - nearly impossible.

neCeSSary TranSITIon The jihadist-movement has repeatedly been referred to as being very tech-savvy, so in spite of the post 9/11 scrutiny, and its dynamic strategy adjustments of the past, it is a conceivable opportunity that it will resort to acquiring the expertise necessary to conduct large-scale cyber attacks. One of an extreme number or possible threat scenarios resulting thereof is a prolonged internet outage.The western internet infrastructure currently has approximately 60 Tbps available bandwidth. A 2014 DDoS attack on Spamhaus, an organization specializing in spam prevention, reached 400Gbps. In a speech at the 2013 Defcon Conference in Las Vegas, Cloudflare CEO Matthew Prince not only stated that such large-scale attacks don’t require a lot of technical expertise, but that attacks of 12Tbps are realistic. Those orchestrating an earlier attack on Spamhaus in March 2013 would later attack the London Internet Exchange (LINX), the Amsterdam Internet Exchange (AMS-IX), the Frankfurt Internet Exchange (DE-CIX), and the Hong Kong Internet Exchange (HKIX), all of which are critical hubs in the internet infrastructure of the western world. Congesting 12Tbps of the available 60Tbps of the west’s available internet bandwidth would have significant impact on a society, in which almost any industry or part of personal lives rely heavily on network connected infrastructure. From our personal and business communication, over traffic lights, the trains we use to commute, up to the power- and water-treatment-plants we take for granted – nearly everything only works because it is connected to the internet. An organization like ISIS would seek

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to create large-scale interruption and/or damage upon the culture they despise, and favor this broadsword attempt to cause the highest possible damage, while cyber-attacks can also be exceptionally surgical and precise. The internet wasn’t designed with security in mind, because in its infancy it was a closed circuit system, never intended to go public. Therefore, all security measures becoming necessary for the commercial ways in which the web is being used/misused are built upon an exceptionally vulnerable infrastructure.

a ParTICUlar ThreaT To ISrael? In July 2014, reports surfaced about Chinese hackers having infiltrated the networks of three Israeli defense contractors, obtaining information not only on the Iron Dome System, but likely also on UAV technology, ballistic rockets, and detailed schematics on the Arrow III missile interceptor. It is black market intelligence like this, which is easily purchased through the right channels on the deep web, which can shift advantage in favor of the weaker adversary. The impressive arsenal ISIS has assembled over the past months is no match for the strong and well-trained Israeli Defense Force (IDF). Yet, a forward deployed, and targeted cyber attack to cripple large parts of Israel’s civilian infrastructure, thereby - for instance - also hindering rapid troop deployment, may present a viable option for ISIS to reduce the military advantage Israel holds. While it wouldn’t set the IDF and ISIS on par, a pre-invasion cyber-attack could reduce battle damage encountered by ISIS invading Israel, which, due to its close proximity to Syria and affiliation with the west - along with the ideological differences -, may be a likely target for an invasion.

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ConTrIBUTInG faCTorS To The GloBal CyBervUlneraBIlITy Along with the aforementioned fact, that the internet wasn’t design with security in mind, there are two main factors in western culture, which can be classified as the main contributors of increasing vulnerabilities in network connected infrastructure. Number 1 are the decreasing quality and commercialization/consumerization of software and operating systems, which essentially depict the interface between the employee and the machine. When consumer grade software is used to secure and control sensitive and critical infrastructure, vulnerabilities are inevitable. Number 2 is the exponentially increasing demand for convenience and cost reduction. Every employee needs a place to work; an office. Offices present a

large overhead for any corporation, as do the working instruments made available to employees. This fact has brought forth the trend of “Bring Your Own Device” (BOYD), in which employees are encouraged to use their own hard- and software as tools they would otherwise have to be equipped with by the employer. BOYD, however, puts the hard- and software used by employees out of the reach and control of employers and associated IT policies and procedures. Employees will be using their devices in private environments as well, therefore exposing them to significant risks in context to penetration of corporate intellectual property, in otherwise secured ICT environments. Furthermore, the fact that an ever increasing number of employees are left to work from the comfort of their home, mainly to save costs for office space. This, however, displays yet more vulnerabilities, because large distances have to be relayed for the employee to work, which can be

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intercepted, and the devices used to work are in unsecure environments.

CoUnTermeaSUreS In the years leading up to 9/11, the world was in denial over the fact that planes could be used as weapons. The consequences of this lack of imagination towards realistic cyberthreats could have even more dire consequences taking into consideration that all means of communication are network connected today. Even such basic things like telephony require a functioning, stable connection to the internet to function, if they’re not already switched over to IP-telephony already, and therefore require the internet as the base of operation. Applied countermeasures start with the necessity of awareness towards the vulnerabilities, more importantly though how catastrophic their exploitation would be in most western nations. The second step is to assess not only the vulnerabilities in

The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014 41

the domestic environment, but to also monitor the efforts of more advanced nations and enterprises, in order to prevent new vulnerabilities from arising and to check the domestic environment against vulnerabilities discovered by others, before they become a problem.

ConClUSIon The world is in danger, neglecting the consequences a cyber-attack could have. Whether it is the aforementioned â&#x20AC;&#x153;broadswordâ&#x20AC;? approach, or a more surgical strike, the consequences - both from a human casualty and monetary standpoint - would be dire for any western nation.

With ISIS, the world is introduced to the first actor with the financial capability to orchestrate such an attack with their ideology and hatred towards western culture presenting the motive. A variety of western nations deem themselves prepared for such an attack, while being far from it. The cyber-threats constantly change in an exceptionally dynamic fashion. Preparedness is the key, and constant analysis of domestic infrastructure, as well as inclusion of cyber-capabilities into warfare-theaters and civilian infrastructure is essential.

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aBoUT The aUThor Lars G. A. Hilse is a senior management consultant specializing in digital strategy with a lifelong passion for the internet. On the government side, he has privately funded over US $200,000 worth of research into cybercrime, cyber-terrorism, cyber-defense & -security, resulting in his Continuous Vulnerability Testing Methodology (CVT), which focuses on securing critical, domestic infrastructure, while at the same time including offensive cyber-warfare principles into military strategy to reduce casualties and battle damage. He has given numerous speeches around the globe, among others at the WCF in Davos and is the author of several books.

The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014 43

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This is an odd modern phenomenon that requires scrutiny. Throughout history and in the days when U.S. forces regularly won wars, “camp followers” (i.e., accompanying prostitutes) were common. Moreover, drinking prohibitions were never enforced en masse for an entire deployment. Even as recently as the Vietnam War, the late Col. David Hackworth, a man who was, for a time, the most decorated living U.S. soldier and one of the most competent field commanders, arranged for a supervised and medically screened brothel for his men. About a decade ago, I witnessed host-nation medically screened prostitutes made available to deployed Americans in the Philippines. In recent years, however, the U.S. government has taken the position that any act of prostitution is a serious “human trafficking” crime. Deployed soldiers and Marines generally find general order number one ridiculous, and it is frequently broken. There are, of course, more questions of hypocrisy relevant to morale. For example, at the same time that general order number one is enforced in an apparent act of “progressive puritanism,” American troops have been “entertained” with drag queen shows17 and subjected to daily Armed Forces Network commercials promising free (uncharged) leave to any military personnel willing to schedule a homosexual marriage.18 A young soldier may sit through a lecture explaining that women are identical combatants to men on the same day he hears the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff demand that physical standards be lowered so that women can be fully integrated into the infantry and special operations forces.19 Prior to the current integration of men and women in the field, one of

the concerns raised by opponents of the new policy was sexual harassment. They warned that no matter how disciplined a force is and how honorable young people might be, the stresses of combat, long and arduous deployments, austere conditions, and close confinement would lead to increases in sexual harassment and even in incidents of sexual assault. A spike in allegations of these offenses has, in fact, occurred. The same soldier that receives the lecture informing him that women are identical combatants to men often has this followed with a lecture on sexual harassment explaining that women are unable to protect themselves and must be protected by those around them. Lesson: Bureaucrats in a Washington, DC, ivory tower should not be permitted to foist “progressive puritanism” on troops in the field. Hypocrisy undermines credibility. Eunuchs do not win wars.

Technology Some believe that America has a great technological advantage that contributes magnificent results to all of our operations. I entirely disagree. For example, I have watched UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) be used to monitor raid forces en route to their objective so that seniors could micromanage unit leaders rather than watching the objective. I like UAVs and cherish any advantage over my enemy that somebody can buy for me, but this is just one example of a situation in which technological innovation and mass expenditure are more detrimental than helpful. Working dogs provided great value and would have been a great benefit in larger numbers and with wider ranges of the skill sets available. Similarly,

visual tracking skills are highly valuable for any war. During recent operations, the U.S. government contracted some short-tracking courses, but only for a limited number of troops. In addition, investigative skills and associated manportable technologies are more valuable than F-22s or submarines for populationcentric warfare. However, such skills were employed largely ad-hoc and on a limited basis for years. Al-Qaeda and other belligerents have openly stated their goal of provoking the United States into financial catastrophe. Terrorist elements and peaceful subversives serving the same causes do not have the ability to defeat a competent military force. Thus, a more important question to ask is: At the pennies-a-day cost of their operations and with their disregard for loss of human life, how long can these groups sustain themselves? Lesson: Our operations must either deliver blitzkrieg successes or be conducted much more efficiently. Operational skill and tactical competence is far more important than any technology purchase. Gadgets can be bought on short notice, but skills cannot be built on short notice. Visual tracking skills should be taught to all infantrymen and special operators. A path for careerlong refinement of these perishable skills should also be made available. In recent operations, valuable investigative capabilities were built in some places at some times. However, the best practices (and supporting equipment) must be institutionalized and made a permanent, widespread part of infantry and special operations organization and equipment. The value of these capabilities was not an anomaly. Despite popular attitudes, they will

The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014 45

be needed in the next war. It is widely believed that amateurs study tactics, while professionals study logistics—but this is only true after your tactics are sharp, and it assumes parity of will.

Conclusion I believe there is a chance that some of the information I have shared in this article might be overlooked. I leave it in your hands to determine whether you agree and how these lessons should be prioritized. We cannot afford selfdeception. Official reporting throughout the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns was tainted by “optimism.” When a report gets polished with optimism at every level through which it passes, the end product can be grossly inaccurate. I even witnessed an army task force commander require his subordinate commanders to conclude their update briefings with a “good news story of the day.” Any commander that accepts optimism-based reporting at any level is committing an act of incompetence that will contribute to losses and possibly defeat. Only allies that can pull their own weight should be permitted in theater. The contributions of NATO nation special operations forces were magnificent, and the world is in their debt. However, the contributions of these nations’ conventional forces were much more expensive and much less beneficial. In fact, the real contribution of some participating nations was nil. Entire forces arrived without permission to leave operating bases, providing no useful support and taxing American logistic and financial lines in exchange for nothing other than the ability to assert that unheard-of-nation-X participated. Political will is one of the greatest

determiners of success or failure in war. When the President sent Gen. McChrystal about 25% fewer troops than the general said he needed to deliver a win, I saw only one way to read that: The President was committed to participating in the war but uncommitted to winning the war. I believe immediate withdrawal (if the cost of victory is unwarranted) is a rational choice. Providing more than the minimum support required to win is also a rational choice. However, continuing the fight cut-off-at-the-knees with an announced withdrawal date guaranteed failure in Afghanistan. I am not aware of anyone that served in Afghanistan that failed to recognize this at the time (regarding the announced withdrawal.) Over the past few years, veterans of Afghanistan, Iraq, and other recent campaigns have watched an unfathomable combination of foreign and domestic policy choices in stunned silence. If we wish to reacquire the level of competence and productivity we demonstrated in second- and thirdgeneration warfare many decades ago, our defense apparatus will have to develop a significantly lighter, more efficient, initiative- and competence-based model. To get there, we will have to be far more judicious in selecting national leaders and much more discriminating in our choice of priorities. I hope you did not find the above observations surprising. If they were, I believe you have been insulated from the knowledge gained by thousands of American grunts. Sadly, most of the above trends were listed in the material I studied on the Vietnam War as a child and simply repeated today. Marines are taught that a patrol leader is responsible for everything his patrol

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The President was committed to participating in the war but uncommitted to winning the war.

accomplishes or fails to accomplish, and medical training often includes the precept “First do no harm.” It would appear that the President of the United States might have been benefitted by serving in the Marine Corps or working as a medical doctor. Whereas decades ago, the President had a sign on his desk that read “The buck stops here,” a more fitting sign for the President and his cohorts today might be, “Threaten endlessly, act randomly, accept responsibility for nothing.”

•

about the author

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ the-fix/wp/2014/06/19/president-obamatook-credit-in-2012-for-withdrawingall-troops-from-iraq-today-he-saidsomething-different/ 3 Associated Press, “Libya Hit With 112 Cruise Missiles” March 19, 2011, http://www.suntimes.com/news/ world/4405622-418/story.html#.U-iP9co7mI 4 CNN staff, “Obama Says Egypts Transistion Must Begin Now” Feb 2, 2011. http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/02/01/us.egypt.obama/ 5 Glenn Kessler, “President Obama and the Red Line” Sep 6, 2013, http://www. washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/ wp/2013/09/06/president-obama-andthe-red-line-on-syrias-chemical-weapons/ 6 Danielle Leigh, “Obama Considering

Mr. Graham is the former commander of a military anti-terrorism unit, the editor of The Counter Terrorist magazine and author of the highly acclaimed new novel Election: Dezinformatsiya and The Great Game (www.chrisgrahamauthor.com).

Endnotes Kevin Shieff, “Five Harsh Truths About the US Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” The Washington Post, May 29, 2014, http://www. washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/ wp/2014/05/29/5-harsh-truths-aboutthe-u-s-withdrawal-from-afghanistan/ 2 Scott Wilson, “President Obama Took Credit for Withdrawing All Troops From Iraq in 2012” June 19, 2014, 1

Limited Action Against Syria”, NECN, Feb 8, 2014, http://www.necn.com/news/ new-england/_NECN__Obama_Considering_Limited_Action_Against_Syria_ NECN-247884061.html. 7 Associated Press, “McChrystal Wanted 50,000 Troops”, CBS news, Oct 7, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/mcchrystal-wanted-50000-troops/, 8 Mark Landler, “Obama Will Speed Pullout From War in Afghanistan”, New York Times, Jun 22, 2011, http:// www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/world/ asia/23prexy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 9 David Drehle, “US Strikes Iraq for Plot to Kill Bush”, Washington Post, Jun 27, 1993, http://www.washingtonpost. com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/iraq/timeline/062793.htm. 10 “Iraq WMD Timeline”, NPR, Nov

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15, 2005, http://www.npr.org/templates/ story/story.php?storyId=4996218 11 Martin Chulov, “ISIS Captures More Iraqi Towns”, The Guardian, 22 Jun, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2014/jun/22/isis-take-bordercrossings-iraq-syria-jordan 12 “Profile: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood”, BBC News, 25 Dec, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-12313405. 13 Associated Press, “Libya Hit With 112 Cruise Missiles” March 19, 2011, http://www.suntimes.com/news/ world/4405622-418/story.html#.U-iP9co7mI. 14 Brandon Webb, “The Benghazi Cover Up,” The Counter Terrorist, Jun 2013/ Jul 2013. 15 Glenn Kessler, “President Obama and the Red-Line on Syria’s Chemical Weapons” The Washington Post, Sep 6, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ fact-checker/wp/2013/09/06/presidentobama-and-the-red-line-on-syrias-chemical-weapons/ 16 Danielle Leigh, “Obama Considering Limited Action Against Syria”, NECN, Feb 8, 2014, http://www.necn.com/news/ new-england/_NECN__Obama_Considering_Limited_Action_Against_Syria_ NECN-247884061.html 17 Travis Tritten, “Gay, Lesbian Troops Perform in Drag”, Stars and Stripes, Mar 2, 2014, http://www.stripes.com/news/ gay-lesbian-troops-perform-in-drag-atkadena-air-base-fundraiser-1.270747. 18 Author’s repeated observation on AFN in Afghanistan throughout 2013. 19 Douglas Ernst, “Gen. Dempsey Hints: Bar Likely Lowered for Female Combat Units”, Washington Times Jan 25, 2013, http://www.washingtontimes. com/news/2013/jan/25/gen-dempseyhints-bar-likely-lowered-female-combat/

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Terrorist ~ October/November 2014 49

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Book Review

The Prince By Niccolo Machiavelli

iccolo Machiavelli’s The Prince is a classic on leadership in warfare and statecraft that is widely studied to this day. Machiavelli (1469–1527), a midlevel government official from Italy, had a keen eye for seeing through pretense and observing reality. He chronicled his ideas in a volume intended to serve as a gift to curry favor with rulers of his time. In the book, Machiavelli states, “Let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding his state, the means will always be considered honest, and he will be praised by everybody; because the vulgar are always taken by what a thing seems to be.” In other words, Machiavelli observed that leaders can do what they want. As long as they are successful, the public will read events on face value. Machiavelli then gives an example from his own era: “One prince of the present time, who is not well to name, never preaches anything else but peace and good

Reviewed by: Chris Graham

faith, and to both he is most hostile…” Machiavelli thus observes that leaders who speak most loudly about peace may, behind the scenes, be the most conniving and truly lack such a commitment. He adds, “It is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities… But it is very

necessary to appear to have them.” Elsewhere in the book, Machiavelli notes, “Our experience has been that those princes who have done great things have a good faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have relied on their word.” He then references victories from those who mislead. The author also makes the interesting comment, “There is nothing that wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even as you exercise it, you lose the power to do so.” By liberality he is referring to freely spending. He continues to speak of the finite nature of public spending: “Either a prince spends that which is his own or his subjects or else that of others. In the first case he ought to be sparing, and the second he ought not to neglect any opportunity for liberality.” In making this comment, the author counsels rulers not to spend their own money when they can

The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014 51

be loved for spending others’ money. He then provides an example: “Caesar was one of those who wished to become preeminent in Rome; but if he had survived after becoming so, and had not moderated his expenses, he would have destroyed his government.” Also in The Prince, Machiavelli describes a skilled ruler as follows: “He exercises liberality towards all from whom he does not take, who are numberless, and meanness towards those to whom he does not give, who are few.” Here, Machiavelli articulates the timeless strategy of targeting a few from whom to take much, as well as how it is possible for a ruler to garner favor by redistributing those proceeds among a wide population. The author shares the insight, “[H]e who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his preservation.” He then adds, “[I]t appears to be more appropriate to follow up the real truth of the matter then the imagination of it…” Machiavelli offers advice necessary for a competent leader in any age: “To exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, and study there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have born themselves in a war, to examine

the causes of their victories and defeats, so as to avoid the latter and imitate the former.” He then contributes timeless insight relevant to both the micro and macro perspective: “There is nothing proportionate between the armed and the unarmed; it is not reasonable that he who is armed should yield obedience willingly to him that is unarmed, or that the unarmed man should be secure among armed servants.” Machiavelli also adds, “Among other evils which being unarmed brings you, it causes you to be despised.” In another passage, Machiavelli expresses something known to soldiers in every age: “A prince who does not understand the art of war… cannot be respected by his soldiers.” He also states a valuable truism: “[W]hen princes have thought more of ease than of arms, they have lost their states… [T]he first cause of your losing it is to neglect this art [war].” The author then shares knowledge known to the framers of the U.S. Constitution: “Rome and Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. The Switzers are completely armed and quite free.” The author encourages would-be rulers to create dependency among their subjects by saying, “Therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens

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will always and every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the state and of him, and then he will always find them faithful.” Machiavelli also states, “Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought to examine closely into all those injuries which is necessary for him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling then he will be able to reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits.” The Prince is a classic work that is widely studied around the world yet today. I hope you reject Machiavelli’s embrace of deceit for the sake of gaining personal power, but if you do not understand all of his insights you will live at the mercy of those who do. We cannot afford to overlook Machiavelli’s lessons. The author may be gone from this world, but his perspective certainly is not.

•

about the author Mr. Graham is the former commander of a military anti-terrorism unit, the editor of The Counter Terrorist magazine and author of the highly acclaimed new novel Election: Dezinformatsiya and The Great Game (www.chrisgrahamauthor.com).

ISIS: The Richest Terrorist Group?

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The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014 53

By Steve Young

In the past, nation state sponsors often footed most terrorist groups’ bills. A smaller percentage of a group’s funding came from wealthy private donors, and from zakat, or charitable giving in Islam similar to Christian tithing.

n some cases, charities have been involved in siphoning off zakat monies for various terrorist groups. Al-Haramain, for example, an Islamic charity formerly headquartered in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, was designated by the U.S. Department of State in 2008 as a “specially designated global terrorist” for providing material support to al-Qaeda. From 2002-2004, the U.S. designated 13 al-Haramain branch offices operating in Afghanistan, Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Comoros Islands, Ethiopia,

Indonesia, Kenya, Netherlands, Pakistan, Somalia, Tanzania, and the United States. As a result of the designation, alHaramain’s U.S.-based assets have been seized and frozen by the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).1 Over the years, aggressive action by OFAC has helped reduce the flow of monies to terrorist groups via various U.S. government sanctions and with the help of global financial partners. Individuals as well as groups and

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Islamic charities have been specially designated, with the primary result being a reduction in access to money from within the world’s normal banking system. Given that success, some groups have since allied themselves with criminal organizations and activities to supplement their incomes. Current Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, in Congressional testimony in 2012, identified a threatening criminal-terrorist nexus as one of five key threats to U.S. national security.

The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014 54

(AQI), the forerunner of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham or Syria (ISIS).3

ISIS Background

Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel walks with Matthew Spence, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East policy, in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, April 25, 2013. Hagel spoke with Spence after announcing to the press that the White House released a statement that they have evidence Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad has used chemical weapons on the Syrian rebels. Photo by: Erin A. Kirk-Cuomo

Clapper stated, “Terrorist and insurgents will increasingly turn to crime to generate funding and will acquire logistical support from criminals, in part because of successes by U.S. agencies and partner nations in attacking other sources of their funding. In some instances terrorists and insurgents prefer to conduct criminal activities themselves; when they cannot do so they turn to outside individuals and facilitators”.2 For example, the Taliban and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) are highly dependent upon the drug trade for their financial resources. According to a June 2013

Congressional Research Service report, criminal activities conducted for profit may range from local crimes of theft, burglary, and extortion to illicit trafficking of high-value commodities on a transnational scale. Terrorist groups may also “tax” other groups or charge a security or protection fee for permitting illicit trafficking activity to take place in a certain region under their control. Drug trafficking, cigarette smuggling, and kidnap for ransom are especially profitable for terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and al-Qaeda affiliates such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the former al-Qaeda in Iraq

Terrorist groups generally do not seek to control territory in the early stages of their operations. Today, ISIS has matured to control Mosul, Iraq’s second most populous city, and other towns in Iraq and Syria. In its advance across Iraq from Syria, ISIS cowered the local populace through intimidation, crucifixions, beheadings, executions, and various other atrocities as it declared a shariah-governed Islamic caliphate.4 This level of violence is actually inherent to the group’s origins. ISIS, then known as AQI, was founded in 2003 by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who fought against the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. He gained international notoriety with his brutality during attacks on fellow Muslims, which drew a letter of reproach in 2005 from then al-Qaeda second-incommand Ayman al-Zawahiri.5 He was also responsible for the beheading of U.S. businessman Nick Berg in May 2004. Abu Ayyub al-Masri changed the group’s name to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) from AQI after a U.S. airstrike in June 2006 killed Zarqawi.6 The group emerged in Syria in 2011 as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) at the start of the Syrian civil war, but was also known as ISIS before proclaiming the establishment of an Islamic caliphate on June 29, 2014, now led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The group is now simply called the Islamic State (IS). Its violence against anyone deemed irreverent to Islam has attracted many younger generation fighters who once may have fought for al-Qaeda affiliates in Syria. These new recruits are true believers that such violence is part of a broader war with the West advocated by Usama bin Laden, but is not generally a part of the current al-Qaeda playbook.7

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The old zone of Mosul city. Photo by: museebfoto

ISIS Funding There are reportedly approximately 1,000 diverse rebel groups fighting Bashar al-Assadâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Syrian regime.8 With so many groups vying for a seemingly finite level of resources, how is it that ISIS is now considered one of the richest if not the richest terrorist group in the region? Historically, Persian Gulf donors, primarily from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar supported ISIS and other groups fighting against the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. These same donors continue to send funds to Syria to the various Sunni extremist groups including ISIS, the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda called the alNusra Front, and other Islamic groups fighting on the ground in Syria, because the donors feel an obligation to protect Sunnis suffering under the atrocities of the Assad regime.9 Kuwait has emerged as the primary pipeline for all Gulf-origin financial donations to Syria. According to a

56 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014

Ruined buildings. Mosul. Photo by: was Riverwood124

Rubble and debris litter the site of the last safe house of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Hibhib, Iraq. The top insurgent target in Iraq, along with several of his associates, was killed during an air strike on the house June 7, 2006. Photo by: Sgt. Zach Mott

With so many groups vying for a seemingly finite level of resources, how is it that ISIS is now considered one of the richest if not the richest terrorist group in the region?

December 2013 Brookings Institution report, because of significant financial freedom, Kuwait financial institutions collect donations from all over the Gulf and use money transfers, exchange companies, hawala agents and direct cargo shipments to forward the funds to various Sunni radical groups in Syria, including ISIS.10 With the war going into its third year, funds to groups fighting in Syria now also pass through Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon. However, private donors and Gulf monies alone cannot sustain an extended military campaign such as that being conducted by ISIS

in Iraq. How then does ISIS keep its funding levels high? The simple answer is that ISIS is involved extensively in a variety of criminal enterprises. While in the process of taking over Syrian and Iraqi towns and intimidating the populations it conquered, ISIS supplemented its Gulforigin income with local origin monies. It began with petty street crimes and oil smuggling, tactics more commonly associated with organized crime. Recently though, ISIS has gained control of oil wells in Eastern Syria and ironically sells that oil to the government of Syrian

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iraq Syria

Areas controlled by the Islamic State Areas claimed by the Islamic State Rest of Iraq and Syria

President Bashar al-Assad, which ISIS is actively fighting.11 Other money comes from selling U.S. government surplus arms, material, and vehicles abandoned by the Iraqi Army’s mass desertion when ISIS came to town. Raiding banks from conquered towns has become commonplace. The best example of the latter is the raid on the Mosul bank on June 10, 2014. The group allegedly netted upwards of $400 million. However, some U.S. officials claim the amount was in the tens not hundreds of millions.12 Even before taking over Mosul, “the group extorted

taxes from businesses small and large, netting upwards of $8 million a month, according to some estimates.”13 U.S. government officials now estimate the ISIS treasury to be in the neighborhood of $2 billion.14 ISIS is also a leader in using new technologies and social media to raise awareness and reach individual donors. Appeals for donations (or investments) are tweeted while money is raised and sent via the Internet, then withdrawn in the form of bags of cash to be transported into the war zones. The ISIS publication Al-Naba (The News) has

58 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014

Mugshot of Abu Bakr alBaghdadi taken by US armed forces while in dentention at Camp Bucca in 2004. Photo by: US Armed Forces

…removed the crosses on the domes and brick walls of the 1,800-year old Mar Behnam monastery, and then evicted the priests and monks.

kept donors informed about the progress of specific operations, while Twitter feeds are updated with body counts and photos of the equipment and territory fighters now control.15 One of the more unique methods of acquiring funds by ISIS in this area of the world is through the sale of “conflict antiquities.” Conflict antiquities are artifacts that are looted, smuggled and sold to illicit dealers around the world, with the proceeds going to fund military or paramilitary activity. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) estimates that global trade in conflict antiquities could be worth more than $2.2 billion and growing as criminal groups recognize the value in very old things.16 The conflict area in Eastern Syria and Northwest Iraq, historically known as the fertile crescent of ancient Mesopotamia, contains antiquities up to 8,000 years old. As ISIS conquers

territory, it also systematically loots various archeological sites from the area. ISIS sanctions illicit excavation by locals, then levies a special Islamic tax, called khums, that takes 20 percent of all profits on treasure. Some local ISIS leaders charge 50 percent when Islamic, rather than pre-Islamic, artifacts are discovered, and the tax can climb even higher when relics contain gold.17 It is estimated that ISIS stole and sold $36 million worth of conflict antiquities from a lone site in Syria called al-Nabuk.18 Like their brutality and violence, the plundering of antiquities is not a new tactic for ISIS. The illegal antiquities trade became a revenue stream to regional terrorists, including AQI/ISIS, during the U.S. occupation of Iraq. According to Col. Matthew Bogdanos (USMC, Ret.), searches of caves, buildings, and other hiding places in 2005 would reveal boxes of rocket-propelled grenades alongside boxes containing ancient tablets and figurines. These antiquities were to be smuggled out of Iraq and sold to supplement terrorist funding sources.19 Over the past several years, smuggled Iraq antiquities have ended up in France and Switzerland, as well as countries in the Middle East.20 The FBI’s Wilmington Resident Agency and the FBI Art Crime Team in July 2010 seized a series of ancient Mesopotamian cuneiform tablets from an antique dealer in California.21 ISIS typically destroys large figures according to strict Islamic provisions against idolatry, as the Taliban did with the sandstone Buddha statues in Afghanistan’s Bamiyan Province in March 2001.22 Unfortunately, the Iraqis of Mosul are learning that what ISIS does not steal, it destroys. In July 2014, ISIS blew up the Mosque of the Prophet Younis, or Jonah, the prophet who in both the Bible and Quran was swallowed by a whale; the Mosque of Sheeth, or

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Seth, said to be the burial site of the third son of Adam and Eve; and the Mosque of the Prophet Jirjis. ISIS has also removed the crosses on the domes and brick walls of the 1,800-year old Mar Behnam monastery, and then evicted the priests and monks. If it were not for a local citizen protest, ISIS would have blown up the Crooked Minaret, a more than 840-year-old tower that leans like Italy’s Tower of Pisa.23

Policy Implications During the drug war against Colombia’s Cali Cartel, the U.S. Government (USG) learned that attacking the group’s financial resources was key to destroying the cartel itself. In 1995, the State Department levied financial sanctions against the group and its founders Miguel and Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela. The sanctions included freezing the assets of all the cartel’s business interests and those of any family members and all other identifiable cartel associates. Moreover, no U.S. business could have dealings with any business associated with the cartel. After the brothers’ arrest in 2006, they were sentenced to 30 years in prison and forfeited $2.1 billion in worldwide business assets. On June 19, 2014, the remaining sanctions were dropped from other family members and associates. USG officials said the sanctions could not have been effective without the assistance of multiple foreign governments, including Colombia, which aggressively worked to identify the cartel’s finances.24 Realizing that terrorist groups used many of the same funding mechanisms as drug cartels, USG counterterrorism officials believed the same tactic could be used against terrorist groups, individuals, and, as noted above, some Islamic charities. All these entities had received illicit funds and, at the same

time, had access to the world’s banking system. Most had funds either in U.S. banks or in banks with close U.S. ties. Thus, when these groups, individuals, or charities were “specially designated” by the U.S. State Department, OFAC could effectively freeze their assets. What is unique to ISIS in terms of counterterrorism financing is its ability to decrease its reliance on Gulf and private donors and acquire funds using tactics not dissimilar to criminal organizations: sales of conflict antiquities, bank robberies, oil smuggling, kidnapping, and old-fashioned extortion and protection rackets. This capability for self-funding poses an immense problem for the U.S. and other governments that have often relied on diplomatic sanctions to limit the flow of money to the terrorists as a counterterrorism tactic. In other words, as it acquires more territory, ISIS becomes more self-sufficient; consequently, there is no USG sanctioning mechanism available to inhibit its access to resources. Sanctioning Kuwait may help decrease the flow of funds from the Gulf, but this may be politically impractical. Moreover, with ISIS relying less on those funds, sanctions would have little to no effect. The obvious way to inhibit it acquiring new independent funds is to stop ISIS’ military advance and begin to take back towns currently in ISIS control. However, it seems a daunting task, given the past performance of the Iraqi army, even with U.S. intelligence assistance. For now, ISIS maintains sources of funding from private donors via social media, monies from wealthy Gulf donors via Kuwait, and an independent money flow from conquered territories. Unfortunately, unless these income sources are somehow cut off, ISIS will likely be able to consolidate its territorial gains and continue its offensive.

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•

Monastery of the Martyrs Saint Behnam and his Sister Sarah, is a Syriac Catholic monastery in northern Iraq close to the town of Beth Khdeda. Photo by: Aram33

Children exit a building after an alleged air strike by Syrian government forces on the northern Syrian city of Aleppo on February 3, 2014. Photo by: MOHAMMED ALKHATIEB/AFP/Getty Images

Some of the 12,000 Iraqi Yazidi refugees that have arrived at Newroz camp in Al-Hassakah province, north eastern Syria after fleeing Islamic State militants. The refugees had walked up to 60km in searing temperatures through the Sinjar mountains and many had suffered severe dehydration. The International Rescue Committee is providing medical care at the camp as well as distributing blankets, soap, underwear and solar powered lights and mobile phone chargers. Photo by: Rachel Unkovic/International Rescue Committee

about the author Dr. Young is a former CIA Operations Officer of the Clandestine Service with tours in the Middle East and South Asia. He is currently the Coordinator for the Masters of Science in Security Studies at Sam Houston State University, in Huntsville, Texas.

ENDNOTES “Treasury Designates Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation”. June 19, 2008. U.S. 1

Treasury Press Release. Available at: http:// www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/hp1043.aspx. Retrieved July 24, 2014. 2 Rollins, John and Liana Sun Wyler. “Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign Policy Issues for Congress”. June 11, 2013. Congressional Research Service R41004. Retrieved July 23, 2014. 3 Ibid. 4 Zahriyeh, Ehab. “How ISIL Became a Major force with only a few Thousand

Fighters”. June 19, 2014. Al Jazeera America. Available at: http://america. aljazeera.com/articles/2014/6/19/isilthousands-fighters.html. Retrieved July 7, 2014 5 “Letter from al-Zawahiri to alZarqawi”. July 9, 2005. Office of the Director of National Intelligence News Release dated October 11, 2005. 6 Laub, Zachary and Jonathan Masters. “Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria”. June 12, 2014. Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: http://www.cfr. org/iraq/islamic-state-iraq-greater-syria/ p14811. Retrieved July 7, 2014. 7 Maclean, William. “Young Islamic State Robs al-Qaeda of Militant Prestige”. July 23, 2014. Reuters News Service. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/ article/2014/07/23/us-iraq-securityqaeda-idUSKBN0FS0RB20140723?feedT ype=RSS. Retrieved July 25, 2014. 8 Dickinson, Elizabeth. “Playing with Fire: Why Private Gulf Financing for Syria’s Extremist Rebels Risks Igniting Sectarian Conflict at Home”. Brookings Institution Analysis Paper No. 16. December 2013. 9 Rogin, Josh. “America’s Allies Are Funding ISIS”. June 14, 2014. The Daily Beast. Available at: http://www. thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/14/ america-s-allies-are-funding-isis.html#. Retrieved July 8, 2014. 10 Dickinson, Elizabeth. “Playing with Fire: Why Private Gulf Financing for Syria’s Extremist Rebels Risks Igniting Sectarian Conflict at Home”. Brookings Institution Analysis Paper No. 16. December 2013. 11 Zahriyeh, Ehab. “How ISIL Became a Major force with only a few Thousand Fighters”. June 19, 2014. Al Jazeera America. Available at: http://america. aljazeera.com/articles/2014/6/19/isilthousands-fighters.html. Retrieved July 7, 2014.

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Circle 279Counter on ReaderTerrorist Service Card 62 The ~ October/November 2014

Dreazen, Yochi. “ISIS Uses Mafia Tactics to Fund its Own Operations without Help from Persian Gulf Donors”. June 16, 2014. Foreign Policy. Available at: http://complex. foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/06/16/ isis_uses_mafia_tactics_to_fund_its_ own_operations_without_help_from_ persian_gulf_donors. Retrieved July 9, 2014. 13 Laub, Zachary and Jonathan Masters. “Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria”. June 12, 2014. Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-stateiraq-greater-syria/p14811. Retrieved July 7, 2014. 14 Zahriyeh, Ehab. “How ISIL Became a Major force with only a few Thousand Fighters”. June 19, 2014. Al Jazeera America. Available at: http://america. aljazeera.com/articles/2014/6/19/isilthousands-fighters.html. Retrieved July 7, 2014. 15 Zarate, Juan C. and Thomas M. Sanderson. “How the Terrorists Got Rich: In Iraq and Syria, ISIS Militants Are Flush With Funds. June 28, 2014. New York Times. Available at: http:// www.nytimes.com/2014/06/29/ opinion/sunday/in-iraq-and-syria-isismilitants-are-flush-with-funds.html?_ r=1. Retrieved July 8, 2014. 16 Caulderwood, Kathleen. “How ISIS Pillages, Traffics and Sells Ancient Artifacts on Global Black Market”. June 18, 2014. International Business Times. Available at: http://www.ibtimes.com/ how-isis-pillages-traffics-sells-ancientartifacts-global-black-market-1605044. Retrieved July 11, 2014. 17 Freeman, Will. “How ISIS is making a Fortune on the Black Market for Ancient Artifacts”. July 10, 2014. Available at: http://thinkprogress.org/ world/2014/07/10/3458400/isis-blackmarket-artifacts-2/ . Retrieved July 11, 12

Circle 343 on Reader Service Card

2014. 18 Caulderwood, Kathleen. “How ISIS Pillages, Traffics and Sells Ancient Artifacts on Global Black Market”. June 18, 2014. International Business Times. Available at: http://www.ibtimes.com/ how-isis-pillages-traffics-sells-ancientartifacts-global-black-market-1605044. Retrieved July 11, 2014. 19 Bogdanos, Matthew. “Opinion: Illegal antiquities trade funds terrorism”. July 7, 2011. Interview with CNN. Available at: http://edition.cnn. com/2011/WORLD/meast/07/07/iraq. looting.bogdanos/. Retrieved July 11, 2014. 20 Caulderwood, Kathleen. “How ISIS Pillages, Traffics and Sells Ancient Artifacts on Global Black Market”. June 18, 2014. International Business Times. Available at: http://www.ibtimes.com/ how-isis-pillages-traffics-sells-ancientartifacts-global-black-market-1605044. Retrieved July 11, 2014. 21 “Iraqi Artifacts Seized”. July 2010. FBI Baltimore Division Press Release. Available at: http://www.fbi. gov/baltimore/press-releases/images/ ba102510a_02.jpg/view. Retrieved July 21, 2014. 22 Rathje, W. L. “Why the Taliban are destroying Buddhas”. March 22, 2001. USA Today. Available at: http:// usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/science/ archaeology/2001-03-22-afghan-buddhas. htm. Retrieved July 26, 2014. 23 Salama, Vivian. “In Iraq’s Mosul, Radicals Unleash their Vision”. July 28, 2014. AP News Service. Available at: http://news.yahoo.com/iraqs-mosulradicals-unleash-vision-173740162.html. Retrieved July 29, 2014. 24 Perez, Evan. “U.S. declares victory over Cali cartel”. June 19, 2014. CNN. Available at: http://www.cnn. com/2014/06/19/politics/us-cali-cartel/ index.html. Retrieved July 26, 2014.

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Lone-Wolf Terrorism and the Misuse of the Term 65 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014

The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014 65

by Dean T. Olson

The anonymity feature of solo terrorism is emphasized by al Qaeda–affiliated groups in Internet postings, including those in Inspire, the online magazine. An article in the Fall 2010 issue of Inspire included this quote: “No one else is involved. The idea doesn’t leave the mind of the mujahid.

his eliminates the chances of the Feds catching wind of what’s going to happen.”1 The article then exhorts Muslims in the West to launch lone-wolf attacks with firearms, describing these attacks as a more effective way for wouldbe martyrs to wage al-Qaeda’s war than

efforts to join militant groups abroad. The piece also stresses that specifically targeting a “crowded restaurant in Washington, DC at lunch” would likely kill U.S. government employees. One particular lone-wolf technique advocated in the Inspire article was

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Major Nidal Malik Hasan, USA, Fort Hood shooter. Photo by: U.S. Army

The Pit, where the Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar SUV attack occurred. Photo by: Ildar Sagdejev

described as “The Ultimate Mowing Machine,” which encourages would-be operatives to outfit a pick-up truck with waist-high metal blades and use it to “mow” down pedestrians. Although not mentioned in the article, the tactic bears similarity to the 2006 rampage of Omeed Aziz Popal, a self-described “terrorist” who deliberately ran down 18 pedestrians in California, as well as the 2006 attack of Mohammed Taheri-azar, who injured nine people with a sport utility vehicle on the campus of the University of North Carolina. In letters to the university’s student newspaper, Taheri-azar stated that his aim was to “avenge the deaths of Muslims worldwide.”

Concerns about lone-wolf terrorism are underscored by a February 2003 Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI) intelligence bulletin to state and local law enforcement agencies throughout the United States.2 It warned of lone terrorists who are not directed by organizations like al-Qaeda. “Lone extremists represent an ongoing terrorist threat in the United States,” the FBI wrote in the bulletin. “Lone extremists may operate independently or on the fringes of established extremist groups, either alone or with one or two accomplices.” Mislabeling of violent crimes as lonewolf events is common. For example, in April 2009, police in Pittsburgh,

Pennsylvania, were called when Richard Poplawski assaulted his mother during a domestic dispute. He then ambushed the arriving officers, killing three of them. Following a standoff and a shootout in which two more officers were wounded, Poplawski was injured during his capture. He was subsequently convicted of the murders and sentenced to death. Because Poplawski harbored white supremacist and anti-government views, watchdog groups like the Anti-Defamation League classified Poplawski as a lone-wolf terrorist. Also in 2009, U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan went on a shooting rampage at Fort Hood, Texas, killing 13 and wounding 29 while shouting, “Allahu Akhbar!” Similarly, in an incident near Tucson, Arizona, on January 8, 2011, Jared Loughner shot and severely injured U.S. Representative Gabrielle Giffords. After shooting Giffords, Loughner continued firing at bystanders, killing six people, including Chief U.S. District Court Judge John Roll and nine-yearold Christina-Taylor Green. Some observers classified Loughner as a lone-

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FBI photo of disassembled fireworks, which were recovered from a backpack inside a trash bag in a landfill near University of Massachusetts Dartmouth campus. In an affidavit the FBI alleges friends of the suspect found the backpack and attempted to dispose of it for him. The image has been rotated to landscape but is otherwise unaltered. Photo by: FBI

wolf terrorist. Those who knew him said that Loughner’s personality had changed markedly in the years prior to the shooting, a period when he was also abusing alcohol and drugs. He had been suspended from a community college because of his bizarre behavior and disruptions in classes and the library. After his arrest, Loughner was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic and deemed incompetent to stand trial.

Yet another example of a mislabeled lone-wolf attack occurred in 2011, when sanitation workers preparing for the Martin Luther King, Jr., parade in downtown Spokane, Washington, discovered a bomb hidden in a backpack placed along the parade route. The device was a radio-controlled pipe bomb filled with shrapnel laced with rat poison. DNA evidence and electronic component purchase records led investigators to

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arrest Kevin Harpham. Media reports and watchdog groups described Harpham as a lone-wolf terrorist and assert that he had been a member of the national socialist group “National Alliance” in 2004. The group denied that he was still a member. Among the most famous of these incidents was the Boston Marathon bombing of 2013. Shortly after two bombs were detonated near the race’s finish line, killing three people and

To differentiate lonewolf terrorism from other criminal acts such as hate crimes, domestic violence, or homicide, two elements must exist simultaneously.

wounding more than 260, investigators identified the perpetrators as brothers Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev. Tamerlan Tsarnaev was killed during a shootout with police days after the April 15 attacks; Dzhokhar Tsarnaev is currently awaiting trial. The Tsarnaev brothers built the two remotely detonated explosive devices using instructions similar to those posted on the Internet by various Islamist terror groups, including al-Qaeda. News agencies have referred to the bombings as a lone-wolf terrorist attack. Although the seven incidents listed above were widely described as lone-wolf terrorism by the news media, watchdog groups, and researchers, in reality, none may have been.3 Despite the fact that Richard Poplawski harbored white supremacist and anti-government views, his murder of police officers occurred during a domestic violence incident. For reasons unknown, the U.S. Army claims the Nidal Hasan attack was an incident of “workplace violence,” despite intercepted communications between Hasan and assassinated al-Qaeda figure Anwar alAwlaki. Jared Loughner’s shooting spree appears to be the result of his mental illness and lacks any nexus to terrorism.4 Kevin Harpham’s attempted parade bombing was prosecuted as a federal hate crime. And while the Boston bombings may have been perpetrated by two primary actors, thus fitting the broadest definitions of lone-wolf terrorism, subsequent investigation revealed that Tamerlan Tsarnaev had contact with an Islamist group during a six-month trip to the restive Russian province of Dagestan in 2012. Investigators continue to explore the possibility that he may have received training and other assistance from that group, including bomb-making instruction and possibly tasking to attack targets in the United States.

As these examples illustrate, lone-actor violence is often mislabeled as lone-wolf terrorism. There seems to be a rush to hang the terrorism label on what many people view as incomprehensible violence. In addition, it would appear that government officials often lack incentive to expeditiously correct inaccurate reports alleging lone-wolf terrorism over grouprelated terrorism. There is no universally accepted definition of lone-wolf terrorism. The FBI defines it as violent acts carried out by persons who operate individually or with one or two accomplices who may be motivated by the ideology of a movement without belonging to any organized groups and whose methods and targets are chosen without any direction or control by a terrorist group.5 This is, of course, an imperfect definition. One of the significant elements of lone-wolf terrorism is a lack of communications to intercept. So, if one terrorist communicates with another, is he still a “lone wolf ”? To differentiate lone-wolf terrorism from other criminal acts such as hate crimes, domestic violence, or homicide, two elements must exist simultaneously. First, the perpetrator must act alone or be assisted by one or two others without the direction or assistance of a larger group. Second, the motivation for the act must be the furtherance of a political, ideological, or religious goal. Indeed, the defining element of terrorism itself is criminal activity with political, ideological, or religious motivations. The attempted bombing of the Martin Luther King, Jr., parade described earlier highlights the difficulty in categorizing violent acts that occur in the gray area between terrorism and hate crimes. Many hate crimes may appear to involve ideological issues. However, as described by one federal official, a hate crime

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An FBI reproduction of a bomb created by the Unabomber. Taken at the Newseum in DC. Photo by: Queerbubbles

“generally involve[s] acts of personal malice directed at individuals” and is missing the broader motivations that drive acts of terrorism.6 Still, several terrorist incidents do exemplify the requisite coupling of the two elements necessary for an act of violence to be a true lone-wolf incident. For instance, between 1978 and 1995, Theodore Kaczynski—also known as the “Unabomber”—engaged in a mail bomb campaign that killed three people and wounded 23 others. Kaczynski sent a letter to the New York Times in April 1995 and promised to stop the bombings if either that paper or the Washington Post published his manifesto, titled Industrial Society and Its Future. In that document, Kaczynski espoused anarcho-primitivist

ideology, arguing that his bombings were extreme but necessary to attract attention to the erosion of human freedom caused by modern technologies. The ideology Kaczynski subscribed to is a critique of the origins and progress of civilization that its adherents believe has enslaved mankind to technology. Unchecked, they argue, technological progress could lead to the extinction of the human race.7 Anarcho-primitivists advocate a return to non-civilized ways of life through deindustrialization and the abandonment of large-scale organizations and civilization. Kaczynski is currently serving a life sentence in the federal Supermax prison in Florence, Colorado. Timothy McVeigh is often cited as another classic example of the lone wolf.

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Booking photo of Theodore Kaczynski. Photo by: Federal Bureau of Investigation

McVeigh was convicted and executed for the April 19, 1995, truck bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, which killed 168 people and injured hundreds more. McVeigh subscribed to white supremacist/antigovernment ideology, and he stated that the bombing was retribution for the federal raid on the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, in April 1993. During that raid a gun battle erupted, resulting in the deaths of four ATF agents and six Branch Davidians. A siege was then initiated by the FBI, leading to a 51-day standoff. Eventually the FBI launched an assault and initiated a tear-gas attack in an attempt to force the Branch Davidians out of their refuge. As the assault unfolded, a fire engulfed the compound, killing 76 men, women, and children, including cult leader David Koresh. McVeigh conceived of, planned, and carried out the Oklahoma City bombing with the assistance of one other person. Although McVeigh visited white supremacist/anti-government compounds in the years prior to the bombing, he was not a member of any group and apparently acted independently. Yet another example of a lone-wolf terrorist is Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, who in 2009 opened fire on a U.S. military recruiting office in Little Rock, Arkansas. In that attack, Muhammad killed Private William Long and wounded Private Quinton Ezeagwula. Since the shootings, Muhammad has proclaimed himself a member of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula who wanted to “carry out jihad in America.”8 Muhammad initially drove to the Nashville home of an Orthodox rabbi, where he threw a Molotov cocktail at the house. He then drove to an Army recruiting center in Florence, Kentucky, to carry out an attack but found it closed. Frustrated, he returned

to Little Rock, where he saw two men in uniform standing outside a recruiting station smoking. He then opened fire, killing Long and wounding Ezeagwula. Muhammad says he planned “to attack Jewish groups and U.S. Army recruiting centers to avenge what they’re doing in Palestine for years of killing Muslims.”9 He eventually pled guilty to charges of capital murder, attempted capital murder, and unlawful discharge of a weapon. Muhammad was sentenced to life in prison in July 2011. One major challenge to pulling off successful lone-wolf terrorist attacks is the combination of personal characteristics required. Attackers must have sufficient levels of discipline, will, adaptability, technical skill, and resourcefulness in order to bridge the gap from theory to practice.10 Failed lone-wolf operators are often plagued by the inability to realistically assess their capabilities and, more importantly, their limitations. A biological attack is likely one of the most dangerous possible lonewolf scenarios. One notable lone-wolf biological attack occurred shortly after the 9/11 attacks and was dubbed “Amerithrax” by the FBI. Findings regarding that attack are in dispute by multiple authorities.11 However, law enforcement groups agree that the Amerithrax case began in 2001, when letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to several news media offices and two U.S. senators, killing five people and infecting 17 others.12 A major focus in the early years of the investigation was a bioweapons expert who was eventually exonerated. Another suspect, Bruce Edwards Ivins, became a focus of investigation in 2005. Ivins was a scientist who worked at the biodefense labs at Fort Detrick, Maryland. In 2008, he committed suicide. After Ivins’s death, the Department

of Justice closed the Amerithrax case, reporting that Ivins engaged in actions and made statements that indicated a “consciousness of guilt.”13 For example, he took environmental samples in his laboratory without authorization and decontaminated areas in which he had worked without reporting his activities. He also threw away a book about secret codes which described methods similar to those used in the anthrax letters. In addition, Ivins threatened other scientists, made equivocal statements about his possible involvement in a conversation with an acquaintance, and put together outlandish theories in an effort to shift the blame for the anthrax mailings to people close to him.14 The lone-wolf terrorism phenomenon is not likely to disappear anytime soon. The anonymity of lone-wolf attackers allows them to carry out highly destructive attacks with limited preincident indicators that can be interdicted by counterterrorism activities. Lone-wolf terrorism has thus become a preferred method of operation for groups ranging from animal rights and environmental rights extremists to white supremacists, Islamists and anti-abortion extremists.

•

about the author Mr. Olson commanded the Criminal Investigation Bureau of a Midwest law enforcement agency, including participation in the regional Joint Terrorism Task Force. He earned a master of arts in security studies from the Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Homeland Defense and Security and is a graduate of the FBI National Academy. He is the security advisor for a division of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and author of Tactical Counterterrorism: The Law Enforcement Manual of Terrorism Prevention.

The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014 71

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Endnotes Al-Malahem Media, Inspire, Fall 2010, https://publicintelligence.net/completeinspire-al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-peninsulamagazine-issue-2-fall-2010/ 2 Reuters News Service, “FBI Bulletin Warns of ‘Lone Extremists,’” February 23, 2003, http://www.freerepublic.com/ focus/news/849967/ 3 Anti-Defamation League, “Richard Poplawski: The Making of a Lone Wolf,” April 2009, http://archive.adl.org/ learn/extremism_in_the_news/white_ supremacy/poplawski%20report.html 4 Mark S. Hamm, “Lone Wolf Terrorism in America: Forging a New Way of Looking at an Old Problem” 5 FBI Intelligence Bulletin, issued February 19, 2003, to state and local law enforcement agencies throughout the country, warning them to be on alert for 1

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lone terrorists who are not directed by organizations like al-Qaeda 6 Jerome P. Bjelopera, The Domestic Terrorist Threat: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, R42536, January 17, 2013, p. 41 7 John Zerzan, ed,, Against Civilization: Readings and Reflections, Feral House Publishing, May 10, 2005 8 “The Making of an American Jihadist: Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad,” IPT News, April 15, 2011, http:// www.investigativeproject.org/2772/ the-making-of-an-american-jihadistabdulhakim 9 “Arkansas Shooter Studied Under Yemeni Radicals,” IPT News, June 2, 2009, http://www.investigativeproject. org/1050/arkansas-shooter-studiedunder-yemeni-radicals 10 Scott Stewart, “Cutting Through

the Lone-Wolf Hype,” Security Weekly, September 22, 2011, http://www.stratfor. com/weekly/20110921-cutting-throughlone-wolf-hype#axzz37rzHOEZ2 11 “FBI to Request Scientific Review of Its Anthrax Investigation,” ScienceNOW, September 16, 2008; Kerry Sheridan, “Science Review Casts Doubt on 2001 Anthrax Case,” Google News/Agence France-Presse 12 “Amerithrax or Anthrax Investigation,” U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, http://www.fbi.gov/ about-us/history/famous-cases/anthraxamerithrax/amerithrax-investigation 13 “Amerithrax Investigative Summary,” United States Department of Justice, February 2010, http://www.justice. gov/archive/amerithrax/docs/amxinvestigative-summary.pdf, p. 9 14 Ibid., note 19

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Rajni Gamage

pon the military defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), an internationally proscribed terrorist organization, in May 2009, the Government of Sri Lanka embarked on a long-term post-conflict strategy that had two primary objectives: the rehabilitation and reintegration of former Tiger terrorists and the rebuilding of communities affected by the war. The rehabilitation program, in line with the Presidential Amnesty, sought to promote reconciliation by providing restorative justice for detained terrorists, in contrast to retributive justice which would penalize them for their crimes. In line with these efforts, as of January 2013, approximately 11,770 former LTTE members including child soldiers had been successfully rehabilitated as evident from a zero rate of recidivism and their independently assessed cognitive transformation. Kruglanski and Glefand (2011) identify two key ingredients which mark the success of Sri Lanka’s rehabilitation program: ‘dignity’, cultivated through mutual respect and engagement, and ‘adequacy’, achieved through assisting beneficiaries to engage in activities that help integrate them into society. The following three case studies reflect the emphasis on these two values by the Sri Lankan government, which was not only able to disengage and deradicalize former combatants, but former leaders of the LTTE.

Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, also known as (a.k.a.) Colonel Karuna Amman, was a former child combatant and top commander of the LTTE forces in the Eastern Province, and effective number two in the LTTE leadership hierarchy until March 2004, when he defected from the LTTE and formed the Tamileela Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP). Although initially seeking to gain recognition as another group on par with the LTTE, Karuna soon began to cooperate with the Sri Lankan government. This defection and subsequent cooperation is said to have been one of the major turning points that brought about the end of the

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protracted civil war. After the ending of the war, Karuna claimed to have renounced violence and the ‘Tamil Eelam’ secessionist ideology, and affirmed his commitment to bring development to the Eastern Province. In March 2009, Karuna was sworn in as the Minister of National Integration and in the following month appointed as the Vice President of the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (the largest party within the ruling coalition, the United People’s Freedom Alliance since 2004). The Sri Lankan government’s decision to negotiate with Karuna was not an isolated one. Velayutham Dayanidhi, more commonly known as Daya Master, was a leading member and media

spokesperson for the LTTE. Daya Master surrendered to the Sri Lankan Army in April 2009, days before the defeat of the LTTE. He was initially detained under the Prevention of Terrorism Act but with no charges and underwent a period of rehabilitation from May 2009 until he was released in September 2009. The former LTTE spokesman stated in an interview with Ali Naafiz from Haveeru Online on 1 May 2013: “I want to help the war-affected people and exLTTE cadres and develop the [Eastern] province. I believe it can be achieved through the government.” In another interview with Manjula Fernando from the Sunday Observer on 7 July 2013, he said: “We live in a country which is unitary. Hence we should strive to live in relation to one another and not against anyone or any culture.” In addition to this, he has made statements that the LTTE was violating the 2002 ceasefire agreement and using the ceasefire to rearm themselves, was forcibly recruiting women and children mainly during 2008-2009, and was shooting civilians that attempted to flee the fighting in the final stages of the war. In the aftermath of the war, he started to work for the Dish Asia Network, a pro-government broadcaster based in the north. During the latter interview, Daya Master announced his desire to contest in the upcoming Northern Provincial Council elections as a candidate for the UPFA as he felt that “the Provincial Council is an effective instrument to meet the needs and aspirations of the people,” although he did not succeed in making it to the party list of candidates. The third case is that of Shanmugam Kumaran Tharmalingam, better known as KP, who was the chief arms procurer of the LTTE, and later the head of the LTTE international network on grounds of seniority following the death of

Velupillai Prabhakaran and the LTTE’s senior commanders in 2009. However, KP was arrested shortly afterwards in Malaysia in August 2009 by the Malaysian authorities. Although punitive action was expected to be taken by the Sri Lankan authorities given his senior and unsurrendered status within the LTTE, in an unexpected turn of events, he was given the opportunity to cooperate with the government. Intelligence provided by KP has been deemed to be crucial in the uncovering of various LTTE networks (primarily overseas) and his involvement in humanitarian activities in conflictaffected areas indicate genuine attempts by a deradicalized former terrorist to turn over a new leaf. In July 2010, KP (while still in government custody) established the North-East Rehabilitation and Development Organization (NERDO), a non-governmental organization (NGO). NERDO’s primary activities are the release, rehabilitation and resettlement of former LTTE cadres and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The former terrorist chief stated in an interview with D.B.S. Jeyaraj on 6 August 2010 that “the armed struggle is a thing of the past…and…my goal now was to help my people recover from the war and lead normal lives.” He also called for the peaceful coexistence of all communities with equal rights and dignity in a united, pluralistic Sri Lanka. He then apologized for the violence perpetrated by the LTTE against the civilians of the country for which he feels partly responsible. The above three accounts indicate a consistent approach by the Sri Lankan government to engage with former terrorist leaders even after the end of the war in allowing them to return back to society (albeit to a controlled extent in the case of KP), rather than incapacitate them or enforce punitive action. What interests motivated the government to

adopt this approach, and in turn, for the former combatants to comply? In order to answer the first part of the question, the post-2009 context in which the Sri Lankan government operated in must be taken into account. Following the end of the war, the government continued to face strong international criticism regarding the lack of accountability for alleged war crimes and human rights violations during the final stages of the war as well as on the slow progress on certain aspects of post-conflict reconciliation. In such an environment, it is against the government’s interests to pass harsh punitive action on the bulk of former terrorists. Pardoning the rebels and helping them play a constructive role in society indicated genuine efforts by the government in its post-conflict rehabilitation efforts, thereby portraying it in a positive light in the international arena. Second, to enforce punitive action on the detained former LTTE leaders would serve to generate sympathy for them from the radicalized Tamil diaspora, which would in turn be used to serve the agenda of the overseas LTTE networks in their campaign to establish a ‘Tamil Eelam’ through militancy. Retributive justice may thereby prove to be a doubleedged sword, which while undoubtedly useful in defeating the LTTE, may now further radicalize the LTTE detainees and segments of the Tamil population, both local and overseas. In order to persuade the Tamil diaspora of the atrocities of the LTTE and on the finality of its defeat, persuasive narratives are required. It is this very function that is served by the narratives of the rehabilitated former terrorist leaders such as the three discussed above. The use of former terrorist leaders as a disengagement strategy is examined In Walking Away from Terrorism by John Horgan (2009)

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who states that “persuasive counternarratives that subvert the legitimacy of terrorist organizations can be conducted by former terrorists…the effectiveness of the counter-narrative will rely heavily on the credibility and relevant expertise of the communicator…and is thus able to change the entrenched beliefs of existing or budding terrorists.” This explains why these senior former terrorists are more effective in propagating such counter-narratives in comparison to an ordinary Tamil civilian or former LTTE combatant. Third, the Sri Lankan government sees the utility in these former terrorists in the rehabilitation of detainees, development of an alternative political leadership for

the Sri Lankan Tamils, as well as in the provision of crucial intelligence. The utility of rehabilitated former leaders in the rehabilitation of fellow members of the group is backed by the 2010 policy report entitled Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalization and Deradicalization in 15 Countries, which states that governments “can support the process of reform and dialogue for example by allowing reformed leaders to meet with their followers…” Therefore, the Sri Lankan authorities saw the role KP could play in speeding up the process of rehabilitation and resettlement of ex-Tiger cadres, especially as he was relatively more trusted (and in custody) by the government than an NGO or Tamil

12 The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014

political party, which have often misused their access in the past. This motive is also explicitly stated by KP during an interview – that the government faced a critical dilemma of international pressure to speed up the process of rehabilitation and resettlement of the former LTTE cadres on one hand, while at the same time having to be cautious of the security implications this may generate. Further, given the clear deficit of mainstream Tamil political leadership in the country (with the only viable option at present being the ethnocentric Tamil National Alliance, some of the leading members of which are aligned with overseas pro-LTTE groups), the Sri Lankan government also possibly sees the

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utility of grooming these former terrorists under the SLFP banner. In addition, these former LTTE senior members continue to be of great intelligence value to the Sri Lankan government in preventing the re-emergence of the LTTE threat, as they help the government to unravel the overseas LTTE network including crime and financial networks, which although weakened, remains largely intact. For instance, the Rajapaksa Government claims that KP has revealed the details of over 600 LTTE bank accounts. Next, what motivates these former LTTE members to continue to cooperate with the government upon completion of rehabilitation/deradicalization programs? First, these former terrorists claim to feel a sense of responsibility for the plight of the Tamil people in the aftermath of the war. KP states during an interview with D.B.S. Jeyaraj on 27 August 2010 that, as a former senior member of the LTTE, “I feel very guilty when I see the tragic plight of the Tamil people today…They were prosperous once but are now in abject poverty due to the war…” Second, they have come to realize that militancy was a futile strategy as it cost many lives of the Sri Lankan Tamils, thereby defeating the very purpose of the armed separatist movement. The three former LTTE leaders discussed, Karuna, KP, and Daya Master, seem to genuinely believe that the interests of the Tamils can henceforth be defended through cooperation with the Sri Lankan government. While KP believes he can achieve this through humanitarian assistance, other deradicalized leaders believe they can by entering the mainstream political process, as in the case of Karuna, Daya Master, Pillaiyan (real name Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan) - former deputy leader of the breakaway Karuna faction and

Thamilini (real name Subramaniam Sivakamy) - former head of the LTTE’s women’s political wing. Pillaiyan became the first Chief Minister of the Eastern Province in 2008, and Thamilini applied for UPFA nomination for the Northern Provincial Council elections held in September 2013. Third, the government may have applied a mix of carrots and sticks. That is, while on the one hand threatening harsh punitive action on the former terrorist leaders if they refused to cooperate, the government may have also promised positive incentives, such as amnesty, political appointments etc. in exchange for cooperation. For instance, Sashi Rekha, a former LTTE cadre and widow of S.P. Thamilselvan, the former leader of the LTTE political wing, accused the LTTE of holding her and her children under compulsion in LTTE-controlled areas following the death of her husband in November 2007 and dismissed accounts of LTTE leaders surrendering with white flags during the final stages of the war as false.

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Subsequently, she and her children were issued with a restricted release order after having being held in protective custody for two years since May 2009. The motives for her actions seem to run parallel to those of KP who stated during an interview with D.B.S. Jeyaraj on 6 August 2010 – “When the Sri Lankan intelligence began talking to me there were two choices for me. One was to confront them and the other was to cooperate. If I confronted I would have had to face a long prison term and not be of any use to anyone. But if I cooperated…I could [be] given an opportunity to be of some service to our people.” This indicates the rational choice made by a realist or pragmatist in the face of unavoidable circumstances. As a final point of consideration, the accusations from the pro-LTTE Tamil Diaspora that these former terrorists are traitors of the LTTE and have entered into a deal with the Sri Lankan government, or are being forced by the Sri Lankan government to speak against

Former Deputy Leader of LTTE, Karuna Amman, sworn in as the Minister of National Integration in 2009 by President Mahinda Rajapaksa Source: Asian Tribune, http://www.asiantribune.com/?q=node/15989

The Counter Terrorist ~October/November 2014 13

the LTTE, may affect the effectiveness of their intended post-conflict counternarratives to a certain extent. This is in line with Horgan’s (2009) reasoning that “the effectiveness of the communicator to persuade will be influenced of the communicator’s intention…people generally tend to be more trusting of the communicator if they do not perceive that the communicator has something to gain or has the explicit intention to persuade.” However, the rhetoric of these former combatants clearly represents the fatigue evident across the war-torn areas, as 30 years of militancy and extremism brought the northern and eastern Sri Lankan Tamil communities to the brink of disaster, and reflects the reality that the LTTE leadership compromised the interests of the community for its own personal or ideological agendas. Still, only time will show how genuine the deradicalization is of former LTTE leaders, as well as the strength of rehabilitation among former members of the LTTE.

President Mahinda Rajapaksa is received by former terrorist chief KP in Kilinochchi at the Sencholai children’s home – a NERDO project. Source: http://www.lankasrinews.com/view.php?22IOld0acz5YOd4e3SMC302cAmB3ddeZ BmS303eWAA2e4yY5naca3lOe42

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The Counter Terrorist ~ October/November 2014 81

The International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) is a specialist research centre within the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. ICPVTR conducts research and analysis, training and outreach programs aimed at reducing the threat of politically motivated violence and mitigating its effects on the international system. The Centre seeks to integrate academic theory with field research, which is essential for a complete and comprehensive understanding of threats from politically-motivated groups. The Centre is staffed by academic specialists, counterterrorism analysts and other research staff. The Centre is culturally and linguistically diverse, comprising of functional and regional analysts from Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and North America as well as Islamic religious scholars. Please visit www.rsis.edu.sg/research/icpvtr/ for more information.

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Training Review

The Atropian War By Greg Lapin

ver heard of Atropia—a small, unstable country with a large insurgent population that is destabilizing the entire region? No? I’m not surprised. That’s because Atropia doesn’t exist, except to two U.S. Army Special Forces ODAs, a couple of U.S. Marshal’s deputies, and a group of local SWAT officers. I was fortunate enough to take part in the role playing and assist in the training that was part of this scenario and exercise. For one week, sleepy southern Louisiana became an unstable country that the ODAs had to covertly infiltrate before linking up with sympathetic forces and local law enforcement officers, then running guerilla operations against “enemy” forces. For this week, we were all in it together. We started the week with a basic two-day range package, something we regularly run for our law enforcement and military clients. We conducted a bit of live-fire training to see where participants’ skills were and help them improve their technique, then we dove right into the important stuff: fighting with a carbine in an urban environment. Shooting fundamentals are universal, and quite a few good instructors around the country and in different agencies are producing skilled shooters. We made it through the first two days critiquing each other and passing along some slightly different techniques and methodologies, and I must say, the Special Forces (SF) soldiers we were working with were nothing but professional. We were fortunate enough

Photos courtesy of the author.

to have two guys that were fresh out of the CIF (Commander’s In-extremis Force), which is the SF’s direct action team. Think about all the missions that “Delta” might get but may not have availability for. Those often go to the CIF.

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There were a few younger SF team guys that were humbled by a group of “cops” that could outshoot them, but still, most of the guys were top notch. Next, we moved into the CQB (close quarters battle) and MOUT (military operations on urban terrain) phase of the week. This is where the Ford-vs.-Chevy-type arguments can be battled out. Everyone has a unique CQB tactical perspective, and they all have shortcomings. Some of the SF participants used L-shape (otherwise known as opposing corner) tactics for their room clearing. In comparison, the SWAT guys we were working with used a version of strong wall and all happened to have come through our Tactical Operator Proficiency Course (TOPC) a year prior. As is always the case with consummate professionals who have been doing a job in harm’s way using a certain tactic for some time, there were some disagreements. However, after two days, the SF had influenced the “cops” and the “cops” had influenced the SF. The SWAT guys had been using our preferred tactic since we instructed them on it over a year before, but we introduced the 18 Series guys to some techniques they weren’t currently using. The process began with some head butting and “friendly discussion,” but that is the beauty of working with professionals: If a certain method works and you can convince me that it’s better than what I am currently doing, I will use that method. I’m not saying we changed their tactics, or even that what they were doing was bad. What works for SF works for them, and it’s not necessarily the same thing that works for the SWAT guys. In the end, the two groups are performing different missions with drastically different rules of engagement and liability. In fact, sometimes a bad tactic is okay if it is being done well by an entire team. However, we did get the SF

members to start implementing the highready a little more. After demonstrating how to break the rifle down (breakdown position) around corners and door frames as you drive it out to dig your corner, this technique started to become the standard among our element. Still, after hearing the team guys out, I’m not as opposed to opposing corners (pun intended) as I used to be. I can see how certain rooms demand this technique, especially with a small assault force. The last two days of training were spent having some fun, running full mission profile exercises with OpFor (opposition forces). The operation was hinged around a unique method of insertion, which I won’t mention here. We began the exercise in street clothes and discrete carry. Our M4s were broken down into backpacks and the like. The SF guys made their insertion, and then we conducted a link-up. Moving through a sprawling city with M4s, NVGs, and other such kit can always be interesting, because the rest of the population and a lot of other law enforcement officers don’t know who you are or what you’re doing. Thus, it pays to be discrete and competent. After the link-up, the local guys moved the soldiers to a designated site where we picked up pre-staged caches of additional gear. We also had pre-arranged targets around the area that were manned with opfor (role players). Using surveillance assets brought in by the army, as well as our local knowledge and information from our S&R (surveillance and recon) teams, we then moved around the city conducting our primary missions. There were two other elements working in conjunction with ours that had targets of their own, some of which required simultaneous assaults. At the end of the day, we were able to kill and capture some of the leading command elements of the insurgent

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forces and restore order and stability to Atropia… um… I mean Louisiana. This was a long week with some challenging days. We all laughed and joked but took the training time very seriously. Through the training, all participants saw the effectiveness of an operational capability that I think was previously overlooked. It is safe to say that everyone had fun and made some new friends along the way. I believe that exercises like this should be carried out more frequently. People often complain about the “militarization” of police today. However, I am just as committed to defending the Constitution as you are, and I believe the fact of the matter is that the appearance of individual equipment and exposure to the tactical experience of others is not a measure of impropriety. Rather, how these things are employed is the measure of propriety. This week truly brought together international and domestic warriors, forged friendships, and increased capability and respect for both sides. The week concluded with lunch, copious amounts of beer at a restaurant with scantily clad women, and the trading of team coins, T-shirts, and the like. I’d like to give special thanks to Dre. If you read this, you are a true professional. Stay deadly, my friend.

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about the author Mr. Lapin is a former New Orleans Police Department Criminal Intelligence Bureau detective. He has deployed to numerous high-threat regions to conduct security operations on behalf of the US government and provides international anti-piracy services. He has trained personnel from federal, state and local agencies and is a principal of VATA group. www.vatatrainingcenter.com

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