Saloni Shah - 2021 Near Scholar by The Harker School

2020-21 JOHN NEAR GRANT Recipient The Proliferation of Peace: The Impact of Referendum Strategy on the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign Saloni Shah

The Proliferation of Peace: The Impact of Referendum Strategy on the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign

Saloni Shah 2021 Near Scholar Mentors: Ms. Katy Rees, Mrs. Meredith Cranston Special Acknowledgment: Dr. Eric Nelson, Masako Toki April 14, 2021

Shah 2 The Nuclear Bombings and the Arms Race On August 6, 1945, the world witnessed the enormous, appalling power of the atomic bomb as “Little Boy” obliterated Hiroshima. Over 80,000 people were killed and another 35,000 were injured. Characterizations of the bomb as a merciless destroyer were well captured by journalist John Hersey, published in the August 1946New Yorker magazine. Hersey’s work, based on extensive interviews with survivors, etched gruesome and tragic images in the public imagination that would forever be associated with nuclear weapons: “Dazed survivors with skin hanging from their face and hands, slipping off in huge, glove like pieces. Victims vomiting, unable to do anything but wait for death. A group of soldiers, all in exactly the same nightmarish state: their faces wholly burned, their eye sockets were hollow, the fluid from their melted eyes had run down their cheeks.” 1 The antagonistic relationship between the United States and Soviet Union and the distrust between the leaders of the two nations—especially after World War II—was the main driver in fueling the arms race. The use of atomic bombs by the United States in Japan demonstrated its nuclear arms capabilities to the Soviet Union and raised the level of suspicion between the two powers. The Soviet Union developed a similar bomb; so began the race, the threats, and the retaliations from both sides, eventually giving way to mutually assured destruction. As the world reeled from the arms race, scientists including Albert Einstein and Robert Oppenheimer, the physicist in charge of developing the atomic bomb, lamented that the weapon should have never been created and stepped into a role unfamiliar to them: that of the political activist. The traditional role of a scientist is to remain isolated from social and political protest

Paul Rubinson, Rethinking the American Antinuclear Movement, American Social and Political Movements of the Twentieth Century (New York, NY: Routledge, 2018), 23.

Shah 3 movements; however, the atomic bomb changed that. 2 Believing that the atomic bomb forever altered the relationship of science’s beneficial impact upon society, Einstein, Oppenheimer, and other scientists and physicists crafted a warning for the American government and the public in hopes that the public would recognize the danger and act on it. Concerned with their part in creating a more dangerous world, these scientists assumed the burden of guiding civilization toward safer, more peaceful paths. Their efforts formed the Atomic Scientists’ Movement, which was more than a congregation of famous Nobel Prize winners like Einstein. Younger scientists at advanced national labs in Chicago, Los Alamos, and Oak Ridge formed a group to discuss the dilemmas of the atomic age and their role in it. 3 This movement was “the first large confrontation of scientists and politicians in American history, and perhaps the only sustained organized political activity by science as such in world history.” 4 Due to the increased popularity and recognition of its goals, they formed a national organization, the Federation of Atomic Scientists—soon changed to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS)—in November 1945. As the arms race continued, the radiation produced in testing the bombs and ensuing damage led to a significant public outcry. Along with the scientific community petitioning the United Nations (UN), intellectuals and other peace activists wrote, organized, and marched against nuclear weapons. Grassroots antinuclear protest saw a dramatic increase in the United States. The citizens called for an end to all nuclear tests and formed a Ban-the-Bomb movement in the 1960s. Some belonged to pacifist groups while others formed new peace groups, the most significant of which was the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) that consisted of several hundreds of local chapters. Their passionate members petitioned feverishly

Frances B. McCrea and Gerald E. Markle, Minutes to Midnight: Nuclear Weapons Protest in America, Violence, Cooperation, Peace (Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications, 1989), 44. 3 Rubinson, Rethinking the American, 28. 4 McCrea and Markle, Minutes to Midnight, 44. 2

Shah 4 to reduce or ban nuclear testing. Its leaders used public media very effectively as they announced the organization in a newspaper ad that emphasized the obsolete nature of Cold War bipolarity: “The slogans and arguments that belong to the world of competitive national sovereignties … no longer fit the world of today or tomorrow.” 5 Within a year, more than 24,000 people had joined the cause. As the United States, Soviet Union, and Britain developed and tested new atomic weapons with increasing frequency, not only did fears of nuclear war arise, but growing concern and protest at the health risks and environmental damage caused by these atmospheric tests increased globally. With the impact of nuclear disaster in Hiroshima and Nagasaki witnessed by millions of people worldwide, these fears became acute, and the world was gripped by a very real and imminent terror of nuclear conflict. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) was founded in 1957 in the wake of widespread fear of nuclear conflict and the effects of nuclear tests. CND was launched with a massive public meeting in London in February 1958; and became the world’s largest group for unilateral disarmament. Shortly afterwards, the Aldermaston marches were organized in London to demonstrate against nuclear weapons. Over 80,000 protesters gathered at Trafalgar Square, making it the largest demonstration in London as demonstrators, including many religious groups, came from all over the world — including Pakistan, Sweden, India, Cyprus, Iraq, Malta, South Africa, France, Ghana and Nigeria. The CND grew to well over 100 local chapters as it arranged speeches, fundraising events, and protests. All these efforts eventually led to the 1963 Partial Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT), which was executed by Russia and the United States agreeing to ban testing in the atmosphere, underwater, or in outer space. 6

Rubinson, Paul. “The American Antinuclear Movement.” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of American History. 5 Apr. 2016; Accessed 5 Mar. 2021. 6 Judith Bentley, The Nuclear Freeze Movement (New York, NY: Franklin Watts, 1984), 16-17.

Shah 5 Yet, much of this antinuclear activism often prioritized distributing petitions, lobbying, organizing, and writing articles and books over direct action campaigns or a confrontational uprising. 7 Activitists’ success at any time depended largely on the layers of mainstream public support that formed around its ideological core. If the layers were not there, the movement fizzled. After the signing of PTBT, the antinuclear sentiment, which was strong throughout the 1960s lost its momentum and the public outcry died down. The antinuclear movement evolved to encompass opposition to nuclear power and diffused into other ideologies including antiwar protest, environmentalism, feminism, and human rights among others. By the mid-1960s, many former antinuclear activists and scientists found themselves absorbed in debates and protesting the Vietnam War. 8 That war was seeing significant casualties on both sides as a result of chemical defoliants and massacres, which convinced people that perhaps nuclear weapons were no longer the greatest threat to peace in the world. SANE, the most visible United States antinuclear group of the 1950s and early 1960s, dropped the word nuclear from its name. Cold War and Détente As the arms race accelerated, the United States and the Soviet Union soon realized that, with their nuclear arms ability, they would both possess the capability to destroy the other and an uneasy truce came into being. Détente, a policy of easing the hostilities, replaced the Cold War from the late 1960s to late 1970s. This gave rise to Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) I and SALT II in 1972 and 1979, respectively, limiting the number of weapons, delivery vehicles, and launchers each country would maintain. 9 Even though President Jimmy Carter’s election campaign in 1976 advocated for controlling and reducing nuclear weapons, the increasing Soviet

Rubinson, Rethinking the American, 40. Rubinson, 89. 9 Bentley, The Nuclear, 13. 8

Shah 6 Union nuclear threat forced him to change his stance. It came to light that the Soviet Union was continuing to spend significantly on defense relative to the United States leading Carter to raise the country’s defense budget every year he was in the office. While following détente in their respective countries, both the Soviet Union and the United States contradicted the policy on the world stage. The Soviets intervened in the Angolan civil war followed by invasion of Afghanistan while the United States was involved in a war with North Vietnam. 10 As the use of nuclear power continued to grow in the 1970s and 1980s with potential peaceful uses of atomic power, countries gathered the technology and expertise to build nuclear power plants while buying the capability to produce plutonium and build bombs. Along with this came renewed protests at the growing use of nuclear power and concerns among the broader world population. Antinuclear movements focused on either nuclear power or nuclear weapons. Due to concerns of interfering with national defense and foreign policy, nuclear activists chose to keep the issue of nuclear power and nuclear weapons separate. Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) and Mobilization for Survival (Mobe) were two groups that attempted to bring together the environmentalists and peace groups. By this time, the arms race and the terms like “mutually assured destruction” were all but forgotten. In 1979, the Three Mile Island accident (TMI) at a nuclear reactor plant in Pennsylvania brought UCS and Mobe together. Although the small radioactive releases had no detectable health effects on plant workers or the local residents, TMI led to the increase in the public fears about the fallout from such nuclear accidents. 11 Activists became convinced that the issues of nuclear power and nuclear weapons could not be kept separate and, together, was the more pressing problem. 12 The diversity and growth of the

Bentley, 14. Joseph Mangano. “Three Mile Island: Health Study Meltdown.” Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists 60, no. 5 (September 2004), 33. 12 McCrea and Markle, Minutes to Midnight, 95. 10

Shah 7 antinuclear movement was distinctly visible along with increased discussion across the United States on ways to control and reduce nuclear arsenals among the superpowers. This was exacerbated by The China Syndrome, a film released only two weeks after TMI, depicting an eerily similar chain of events. The rise in nuclear fear led to an increase in activity among peace groups. The Rise of the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign As people became more aware of the threat of nuclear war, in addition to national and international organizations, antinuclear groups started forming in local communities. However, as these different groups worked independently, this did not form a mass movement or win widespread support from the general public. After the TMI accident and the 1980 leak at the Indian Point nuclear power plant, north of Manhattan, environmentalists and peace activists saw the need to work together toward the same goals. A successful rally for disarmament at the UN’s First Special Session on Disarmament in May 1978 showed activists’ continued interest in disarmament. Another rally took place in New York City on Wall Street in 1979. The anniversary of the 1929 Stock Market Crash was marked by a demonstration that blamed corporations for funding the arms race. It was organized by a group called “The Manhattan Project.” TMI, Indian Point, the protests of 1978 and 1979, combined with a rightward shift in national politics, fueled a resurgence of nuclear-focused peace activism. While there was active antinuclear sentiment, the American public feared the Soviet Union was surpassing them in defense spending and proliferating nuclear weapons. In November 1980, Ronald Reagan, who promised to increase military spending, was elected president. Reagan took advantage of the perception that the United States was falling behind the Soviet Union in the arms race, and he

Shah 8 pursued a strategy of military strength and returned to Cold War ideas while completely discarding détente. With renewed tensions between the superpowers, the arms race did not show any signs of slowing down. According to historian George Herring, during this time, “the Cold War escalated to a level of tension not equaled since the Cuban missile crisis.” 13 This renewed strain led to a collective sense of grievance among the public and fear of nuclear war was at its peak. Even though the public wanted a strong defense, they also feared that the arms race was spiraling out of control, and they did not want a nuclear war. A Gallup poll confirmed that by the end of 1981, 47 percent of Americans believed that nuclear war was possible; by 1983 close to half of all Americans still believed that they might die in a nuclear war. 14 While there had been previous antinuclear movements, most of them had revolved around disarmament efforts that were either too extreme, such as the total abolition of nuclear weapons, or were too insignificant to have any impact. However, history changed in 1980 when Randall Forsberg, a defense analyst and founder of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies in Brookline, Massachusetts wrote a four-page document entitled a “Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race” which became the founding document of the nuclear freeze movement. The Bilateral Nuclear Freeze proposal, Forsberg’s brainchild, was a simple and moderate approach to mobilize the middle class and involve them actively in the arms race discussion. In fact, Forsberg stated that “we can democratize and therefore eventually abolish the ancient, pernicious, elite institutions of warfare and exploitative foreign policy.” 15 Although its pluralistic power failed to achieve legislative adoption of a freeze resolution, the Nuclear Weapons Freeze

William M. Knoblauch, Nuclear Freeze in a Cold War: The Reagan Administration, Cultural Activism, and the End of the Arms Race, Culture and Politics in the Cold War and Beyond (Amherst, MA: U of Massachusetts P, 2017), 5. 14 Knoblauch, 5. 15 David S. Meyer, A Winter of Discontent: The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics (New York, NY: Praeger, 1990), 162.

Shah 9 Campaign was successful in reversing the rhetoric of President Reagan’s arms policy and influencing foreign policy during the late twentieth century. The Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign (NWFC) reached its pinnacle at a political demonstration in New York’s Central Park on June 12, 1982. Forsberg’s simple vision of a nuclear freeze energized the most powerful grassroots peace movement of the twentieth century and transformed the antinuclear weapons movement. The citizen activism was unlike any other in American history until that date. One million participants gathered for an anti-nuclear demonstration around the theme “End the Arms Race and Fund the Human Needs.” 16 Historians proclaimed it the largest political protest in United States history to date and was the result of the mobilization of the NWFC. Forsberg stated: “We’ve done it. The nuclear freeze campaign has mobilized the biggest peacetime movement in the United States history.” 17 The New York Times further emphasized this sentiment in an editorial that same day: “In 17 days American and Soviet officials will at long last sit down in Geneva to renew negotiations … It’s a stirring accomplishment and Americans at the grassroots deserve the credit.” 18 The nuclear freeze proposal, considered a comprehensive freeze, distinguished itself from other proposals in two aspects: it put an end to further modernization of nuclear weapons, and it included a ban on production of warheads. 19 The popular protests during the test ban treaty campaign and the movement against the Vietnam War left behind a network ready to be revitalized for the new cause of arms race. The NWFC was able to attract a wide variety of

Lawrence S. Wittner, “The Nuclear Freeze and its Impact,” Arms Control Today 40, no. 10 (December 2010). JSTOR. 17 McCrea and Markle, Minutes to Midnight, 112. 18 Daryl G. Kimball, “In Memoriam: Randall Caroline Forsberg,” Arms Control Today, December 2007, Gale General OneFile. 19 McCrea and Markle, Minutes to Midnight, 114.

Shah 10 groups and the freeze enjoyed a synergistic bandwagon effect. 20 According to the strategic plan laid out by Forsberg and peace activist George Sommaripa, the NWFC would plan to first bring together a coalition of different peace organizations under one umbrella and garner support of major interest groups. They hoped to leverage the potential of the grassroots movement to spread education and gain middle class support, and finally introduce it into electoral politics. 21 The popularity of the NWFC can be attributed to many factors: President Reagan’s rhetoric in office, positive public opinion, support from different professional, religious and business groups, policy makers, and referenda strategy. President Reagan’s Rhetoric and Defense Policy After being elected, President Reagan promised to “rearm America” and “attain nuclear superiority” over the Soviets. 22 As the priority of the administration shifted to arms buildup over arms control talks, President Reagan’s declaratory policy led to an increase in fear of a possibility of a nuclear war among the public. The administration claimed that the United States was vulnerable since the SALT I in 1970 had given the Soviets an advantage in land-based missiles. In order to reach par with the Soviets, President Reagan increased defense spending; in fact, spending increased by 40 percent between 1980 and 1985. 23 Additionally, Reagan appointed more than 50 members who were strong opponents of the SALT II treaty to his defense team. The rhetoric of the administration consistently conveyed the necessity for more time for arms buildup, the need to be able to fight and win a nuclear war, and ability to limit the nuclear casualties between 10 million and 30 million people. In 1981, Secretary of State

20 Thomas R. Rochon and David S. Meyer, Coalitions and Political Movements: The Lessons of the Nuclear Freeze (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997), 248. 21 Wittner, “The Nuclear,” 53. 22 McCrea and Markle, Minutes to Midnight, 97. 23 Rochon and Meyer, Coalitions and Political, 5.

Shah 11 Alexander Haig spoke about the possibility of firing a nuclear warning shot inside Europe. 24 Thus, Reagan’s military buildup along with a new nuclear space program created an environment of increased anxiety about nuclear threat. President Reagan broke the unspoken trust that a president would not use nuclear weapons when he and his team began talking about winning a nuclear war. As observed by Assistant Secretary of Energy for International Affairs David Waller, “What Ronald Reagan did that no other President had ever done was to rip off the psychic bandage that covers public fears and anxieties over nuclear weapons. Americans, simply put, do not like to dwell on the subject of nuclear war, and they become skittish when their leaders talk about it.” 25 Driven by fear, supporters rallied behind the NWFC, and when Reagan claimed the movement was communistled, the public reignited its support. Ironically, it was President Reagan’s rhetoric that was the fuel that launched NWFC’s rise to political prominence. Positive Public Opinion According to Markle, “the majority of participants [of the Nuclear Freeze Movement] represented a cross-section of citizens.” 26 The NWFC was supported by a variety of citizens from different backgrounds. These included “homemakers and businessmen, clerks and doctors, clergymen, teachers, scientists, and even military.” 27 With this broad-based support from common people expanded exponentially due to the large NWFC marches, rallies, and events, Forsberg was able to create a movement that was the largest of its time. In October 1983, Patrick

Rochon and Meyer, 6. McCrea and Markle, Minutes to Midnight, 105. 26 McCrea and Markle, 109. 27 McCrea and Markle, 109. 25

Shah 12 Caddell, one of the nation’s leading political pollsters, called the NWFC “the most significant citizens’ movement of the last century.” 28 Retired Admiral Gene R. LaRocque acknowledged that since national security information was not shared with citizens, the Pentagon fostered the notion that military men had a special knowledge about how to defend the nation. Yet, on the topic of participating in a war, the he conceded citizens “have as much to say as the highest ranking general or admiral.” 29 Many scientists supported the freeze from early stages, including Philip Morrison, George Rathjens, Jeremy Stone, Hans Bethe, Harrison Brown, Karl Menniger, George Wald, and Bernard Feld, among others. 30 The support of these scientists added legitimacy to the movement and drew media attention. The scientists organized teach-ins at various college campuses and directed research projects on nuclear wars. Their scientific expertise was critical to educating the citizens and expanding the discourse on nuclear threat. Many former members of the White House administration team were also early supporters of the freeze including Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, and State Department officials George Ball and Warren Christopher. Many officials and experts did not endorse the freeze but publicly attacked Reagan’s nuclear policies thus aiding the NWFC. 31 For example, the team of four distinguished statesmen— George Kennan, Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and Gerard Smith—were vocal critics of the president's nuclear policies and strongly advocated for a “no first use” policy. 32 These criticisms of Reagan’s policies fueled the NWFC.

Wittner, “The Nuclear,” 54. Bentley, The Nuclear, 107. 30 Meyer, A Winter, 98. 31 Meyer, 100. 32 Meyer, 100. 29

Shah 13 Physicians joined in giving their support to the NWFC. In particular, Physicians for Social Responsibility, led by pediatrician Dr. Helen Caldicott, took a very active role in communicating the unmanageable medical consequences of the nuclear war. 33 Not only did physicians voice their concerns about nuclear policy publicly, lawyers did as well. Many lawyers supported the antinuclear movement by challenging the government on technical issues, raising questions about government policies and defending civil disobedience. 34 Motivated by the active involvement in the medical and physician community, teachers formed Educators for Social Responsibility, built curricula about nuclear issues, and encouraged students to write letters to the president. 35 Thus, many individuals used their professional identities, skills, expertise, and status to voice their political opposition on nuclear weapons. Church leaders who were not previously involved in defense issues endorsed the movement since the NWFC redefined nuclear war as a moral issue. As a true grassroots movement, NWFC activists first sought support of their local churches for the freeze proposal. The churches facilitated meetings, created mailing lists, distributed proposals and literature, and were able to reach more people through newsletters, services, and sermons. During the 1970s, many churches made nuclear arms discussion an integral part of their moral and spiritual teachings. In fact, in May 1983, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops wrote a pastoral letter titled “The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response,” to address nuclear weaponry. 36 More than half the Roman Catholic Bishops had endorsed the freeze by mid-1982. The involvement of the religious leaders attracted media stories and gave public attention to NWFC. Endorsed by high-ranking officials in many religions—Baptists, Lutherans, 33

Meyer, 102. Meyer, 103. 35 Meyer, 103. 36 McCrea and Markle, Minutes to Midnight, 110. 34

Shah 14 Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Methodists, Unitarians, and more—the NWFC gained popularity and was able to expand. 37 President Reagan’s conservative policies were a cause of concern to many liberal politicians. As Reagan’s rhetoric became more pronounced and public opinion shifted towards nuclear freeze, former policymakers like CIA director William Colby criticized Reagan’s strategy and endorsed the freeze. For many politicians, the growing public momentum towards the freeze was a fruitful avenue to associate themselves with. They shared concerns about Reagan’s aggressive arms policy and were keen on shifting the United States policy to the center towards a more restrictive arms policy. This gave Democrats an opportunity to take a stance against Reagan and other Republicans in the elections. The pressure from the general public at the polls reinforced by the elite in the Congress led to a coalition between the popular activists and the political elites. Members of the Congress decided to work with the advocacy groups to use the legislative process to drive change in the legislative policy. In March 1982, Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy and Republican Senator Mark Hatfield introduced a bill calling for nuclear freeze. At the same time, it was introduced in the House by Democrat Edward Markey, Democrat Jonathan Bingham, and Republican Silvio Conte. 38 Many business leaders such as entrepreneurs Alan Kay and Harold Willens supported the NWFC driven by their own personal motives or ideology. Several foundations like the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the MacArthur Foundation even sponsored research and public education on arms control issues. 39 Some used the NWFC to protect their interest in government investment, need for trade with Soviet Union, and concerns about the

Wittner, “The Nuclear,” 55. Meyer, A Winter, 224-25. 39 Meyer, 109. 38

Shah 15 increasing deficit with military spending. Actors, celebrities and other prominent people also used their popularity to support the freeze by making appearances at fundraisers, participating in demonstrations, and performing at events. Their support on nuclear issues also helped breakthrough and attract more followers for the NWFC. For example, Betty Bumpers, Paul Newman, Meryl Streep, Yo-Yo-Ma, and Stevie Wonder supported the freeze movement. 40 As a grassroots movement, NWFC masterfully employed the involvement of citizens and community leaders as its central strategy. NWFC’s third annual strategy paper written in 1983, brags “getting the political and civic leadership of our communities … publicly on record … is the work that most local Freeze Campaigns have thus far done best … and is the bedrock of all further efforts.” 41 As the grassroots campaign organized its efforts, there were a series of city and state referendums. Working in loose but functional coordination, thousands of local organizations achieved historic success at the ballot box. The freeze was successfully endorsed by 370 city councils, 71 county councils, and 446 town meetings. 42 By June 1982, after hosting town meetings, the freeze had the support of 169 United States representatives and 25 senators. 43 These foreign policy issues discussed at local town meetings was a successful referendum strategy and gained national media attention. Twenty-three state legislatures passed freeze resolutions, and in the fall of 1982, more than 30 percent of American voters voted on the freeze in ten state referenda, Washington D.C., and thirty-eight cities and counties. Sixty percent of those votes affirmed the freeze and this astounding success at the polls shook the Reagan administration. 44 Consistently, the polls showed overwhelming support for the freeze which

Meyer, 102. McCrea and Markle, Minutes to Midnight, 126. 42 McCrea and Markle, 126. 43 Meyer, A Winter, 183. 44 McCrea and Markle, Minutes to Midnight, 126. 41

Shah 16 remained unchanged from 72 percent in favor of the freeze in six polls taken in 1982 to five 1983 polls. 45 Growth from a Grassroots Movement to a National Campaign Frustrated with the academic and peace communities’ inability to debate about the causes of war and nuclear weapons and peace, Forsberg was convinced that in order to achieve disarmament, a simple and achievable goal was key: If you looked for a common denominator, a near-term future position would be profound enough so that the pacifists would work on it, and moderate enough to interest the people concerned with institutional change … If all these groups worked on one proposal, they would have enormous disseminating power. 46 With persuasive arguments, Forsberg was able to bring leaders and activists from different organizations to rally behind the “Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race.” Various organizations had diverging objectives that were either too broad or radical and unilateral, so unifying the peace community under one umbrella with a moderate objective was a huge task. Forsberg spoke at rallies, teach-ins, and arms control symposia around the country to present her proposal for a mutual and bilateral arms freeze. The proposal called for a halt to production, as well as testing and deployment, of all new nuclear weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union. 47 From the start, Forsberg was adamant about keeping the NWFC a single-issue, moderate, populist, middle-class effort. The grassroots campaign developed a public outreach program focusing on the dangers of a nuclear war, the economic consequences of an arms race and military spending, and the advantages of a bilateral freeze. Avoiding technical jargon and

Wittner, “The Nuclear,” 54. McCrea and Markle, Minutes to Midnight, 98. 47 McCrea and Markle, 100. 46

Shah 17 scientific terminology, NWFC could appeal to the average citizen with its simple proposal, regardless of whether they held centrist, liberal, or radical viewpoints. The NWFC was able to bring in a new class of people who had never before been a part of any peace movement and fundraising efforts raised $20 million by December 1982. 48 As NWFC sought to expand at a national level while still keeping its grassroots origin, the leaders decided to establish its headquarters in St. Louis in January 1982 and hired Randy Kehler as a national coordinator. Stationing the headquarters in St. Louis was critical in the NWFC’s efforts to distinguish itself from other lobbying groups in Washington, D.C. and gain local support. Some critics argued that the popular support of the freeze was “wide but shallow,” yet, poll findings proved the critics wrong. The results of a Gallup Report conducted in 1982 shared that 45 percent favored a unilateral nuclear freeze, regardless of whether the Soviet Union agreed to reciprocate. Further, a Harris survey found that 56 percent of the voters supported pronuclear freeze candidates in the 1982 Congressional elections. 49 The grassroots organizer of the NWFC successfully received a great deal of local newspaper coverage of its conferences, educational events, petition campaigns, and demonstrations. Early on, the NWFC’s organizers were decentralized without any established offices, popular leaders, or public relations strategies. Hence, initially, the NWFC received more attention from the local media than the national media since the local news were eager to cover a topic on a national issue free from national media coverage. When large demonstrations against nuclear weapons in Western Europe became the breaking story in November 1981, the national media was forced to highlight the rising antinuclear sentiment and the freeze movement. The NWFC again caught national media’s attention in March 1982 when New England town 48 49

McCrea and Markle, 100. Meyer, A Winter, 88.

Shah 18 meetings started endorsing the freeze resolution, followed by the introduction of the freeze resolution in the Congress. These advancements led to a frenzy of media coverage of Reagan’s military program and the NWFC, which reached its peak during the spring and summer of 1982. Between March and April of 1982, CBS ran a total of 28 stories on anti-weapons protests in the United States. 50 This increased fascination with the NWFC was accurately described by Christopher Paine, an early activist, as an example of the “hula hoop syndrome.” Paine expressed that “the intense coverage we got in the period from February 1982 to April of 1983 was just way out of proportion to our actual strength at that time.” 51 Time magazine featured a ghastly image on its March 29, 1982 cover, which had a billowing mushroom cloud with a sinister face and the headline story titled, “Thinking about the Unthinkable,” reflecting the increasing levels of nuclear fear in America (See Figure 1). 52 As the message received a wider audience, it led to increased support from the public, politicians, and more fundraising. Freeze organizers were unprepared for the fast-paced events brought about by the media onslaught and had little say in the public image defined by the media through its coverage of different perspectives and new angles to report on the story. In March 1982, Randy Kehler, the national coordinator of NWFC, said that “I feel like I am on a comet, but I don't know whether I’m leading it or on its tail.” 53

Meyer, 127. Meyer, 127. 52 Knoblauch, Nuclear Freeze, 1. 53 Meyer, A Winter, 128. 51

Shah 19

Figure 1: Christian Piper, Nuclear War: Thinking the Unthinkable. March 29, 1982. Cover Art Time. Accessed April 19, 2021. http://content.time.com/time/magazine/0,9263,7601820329,00.html. Along with the newspaper coverage, there were also “antinuclear cultural activists” including authors, publishers, directors, musicians, and celebrities who used their skills to revive cultural awareness of the nuclear threat. Jonathan Schell’s The Fate of the Earth was a huge sensation and was placed on a New York Times best-seller list. 54 ABC and Nicholas Meyer’s atomic film The Day After attracted approximately one hundred million viewers and generated controversy at national level and redefined “nuclear freeze” to mean dangers of nuclear war.

Meyer, 131.

Shah 20 The Success of NWFC A majority of the NWFC’s success came from shaping public opinion. Forsberg and her team offered citizens a new cultural understanding of arms issues and encouraged the rapid spread of education to develop a new outlook on arms and security. They defined nuclear weapons as the largest problem of the 1980s. Forsberg focused her concentration on the middleclass, a tactic that proved efficient in aiding the movement’s rapid expansion. She utilized petitions, town meetings, endorsements, rallies, peace walks, and peace marches in order to spread the word and educate others about this global security threat. The extent of NWFC’s grassroots support was undeniable and alteration of the moral and social values was powerful. The sheer volume of the populist, middle class support it drew sets it apart from other peace movements. The NWFC elicited local and congressional support and encouraged antinuclear discourse on the streets. Only the NWFC gathered all different peace organizations under one umbrella for a unified purpose, garnered the pluralist power of this magnitude, created nonpartisan support, and successfully educated the mainstream Americans about the nuclear threat. Having garnered broad and visible public support, the freeze became a politically viable movement and leaders decided to focus its efforts on gaining the support of policy makers and adopting the freeze as a national policy. The national campaign resulted in a more favorable Congress in the 1982 Congressional elections. Congress and the NWFC The NWFC became involved in electoral and legislative politics, gaining newfound power in the United States Congress and even having a significant impact on the 1982 Congressional elections. NWFC supporters were successful in securing new 20-30 pro-freeze seats. Further, freeze organizations worked on elections in 43 states, passed eight statewide and

Shah 21 innumerable local referenda supporting the measure, and won in 38 of 47 congressional seats. Meyer stated that “on every talk show, in every forum in which the candidates sought to get their message across, they [found they] have to have a position on the nuclear weapons freeze.” 55 Despite the NWFC’s great success in achieving populist support, Forsberg soon lost control of the movement when it was coopted by members of Congress — in particular, senators Kennedy and Hatfield. While this did allow the movement to gain an even larger national spotlight, Forsberg and her team lost the centrist image and the nuclear freeze was quickly viewed as a partisan political issue which splintered the movement and marked the beginning of internal conflicts. As the nuclear freeze proposal went through many iterations in the House, it deviated significantly from the original document. Popular members of the government twisted the proposal to fit their own needs: “Members of the Congress … [said] they had to vote for it or get creamed on the Main Street.” 56 However, the biggest issue remained that the “it” for which the congressmen voted was not the “it” for which the NWFC was campaigning. The movement quickly changed hands and direction, straying away from its original purpose of freezing nuclear weapons. As popular support for the freeze grew, it became imperative and imminent for congressmen to support the cause. The congressmen wanted only to influence the general direction of arms policy rather than impose a specific collation on the arms control agenda. Thus, they watered it down to a version that was merely symbolic and would result in no lasting change. Senator Hatfield reflected that “the geo-politics of United StatesSoviet relations called for some kind of a pause, a breather [in the arms race] … We needed to cool the environment … and let the diplomats come up with a plan.” 57

Rochon and Meyer, Coalitions and Political, 145. Meyer, 244. 57 Douglas C. Waller, Congress and the Nuclear Freeze: An Inside Look at the Politics of a Mass Movement (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1987), 60. 56

Shah 22 The freeze displayed its strength in the House of Representatives where the grassroots appeal reached members who are accountable to its constituency. After a long, drawn-out debate, on May 4, 1983, the resolution passed the House with 26 amendments and a 287-149 vote. 58 This wide two-to-one victory was historic since the House had never before taken an active role in national security policy. The resolution had many achievements—it retained its ground in the final passage and clearly called for a freeze, followed by reductions and a complete freeze covering all weapons. Even though the resolution had been bombarded with amendments, in the end it had successfully weakened all the amendments. The Levitas amendment was the only one with vague interpretations and the freeze resolution had achieved all its goals. More than a legislative document, the freeze was a political document that was judged for its accomplishments. The fact that the original resolution had been only 202 words long but the resolution passed by the House was 1,251 words long signaled that the final version was, ironically, a watered down resolution with innumerable caveats. 59 Instead of a quick victory, the defenders of the resolution were subjected to defining and defending their legislation which left the impression that the original freeze was not clear, nor simple, and it began to lose its appeal. The media reported the resolution as “substantially modified” in the New York Times, “seriously watered-down” in the Washington Post, and “substantially amended” in the Los Angeles Times. The wording of the Levitas amendment left the resolution open for vague interpretations as to what would happen to the resolution if reduction of arms did not occur. The administration seized their victory on Levitas and distorted the message claiming that the resolution was fundamentally flawed. Senator Markey stated, “they knew they couldn’t win us on the final

58 59

Waller, 285. Waller, 289.

Shah 23 passage, so, they decided to take the one amendment (Levitas) that didn’t mean anything and make it a symbolic victory they could take home with them.” 60 Ironically, as part of the resolution, a congressman could vote affirmatively for the freeze resolution yet continue to support President Reagan’s weapons program. In fact, within 20 days of passing the freeze resolution, the House passed the funding for the MX missile. 61 Les AuCoin criticized that “the President gets an MX missile, and the country gets a statement of sincerity about arms control.” 62 The actions of the Congress proved that nothing had changed, and they would take no steps to halt the arms race. Even though the resolution did not promise change, the NWFC had made it into Congress and the threat of nuclear weapons was taking the center stage. In October 1983, the resolution was introduced in the Senate as a rider to a Senate bill, which had no chance of passing in the Republican-led body. The proposal lost 40-58 along partisan lines. Despite strong public disapproval, on November 23, 1983, nine Pershing missiles were deployed by the United States in Europe—bringing a total halt to arms control talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. 63 Realizing that the freeze was not a priority on the president’s agenda, the NWFC decided to change its strategy and introduce a quick freeze resolution for Congress. Whereas the original freeze had called for a mutual halt on testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, the quick freeze was restricted to the testing of nuclear warheads and the testing and deployment of ballistic missiles but not production. It also did not include Pershing and cruise missiles. 64 A quick freeze would give Congress the power to halt funding on selected weapon systems if the Soviet Union

Waller, 287. Waller, 290. 62 McCrea and Markle, Minutes to Midnight, 137. 63 Waller, Congress and the Nuclear, 291. 64 McCrea and Markle, Minutes to Midnight, 128. 61

Shah 24 reciprocated. However, this was interpreted as a unilateral approach and inconsistent with the original appeal of mutual, bilateral, and verifiable freeze. With these inconsistencies, the quick freeze did not garner support and momentum either in the House or the Senate since a formal legislation would interfere with the president’s sphere of influence on arms control. 65 The backing of the Senate was critical since the Senate has the constitutional advice and consent role to the Executive branch. Yet, in a Republican-controlled Senate, this feat proved impossible. Reagan’s Shift in Policy and Re-Election Recognizing that the earlier rhetoric of the administration had led to public discontentment and the freeze issue was making the president vulnerable in the upcoming elections, the administration left no stones unturned to change the tone and packaging of its statements. Beginning in the spring of 1982, at every opportunity, the administration expressed anti-nuclear views. From earlier claims that the United States could plan to win a nuclear conflict, President Reagan now tried to calm the public by making statements like “a nuclear war cannot be won, and never must be fought.” 66 Additionally, the pressure from the NWFC led to restarting the discussions on Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) negotiations. Many senior administrative officials in Reagan’s team interviewed by Thomas Rochon and David Meyer, authors of Coalitions and Political Movements: The Lessons of the Nuclear Freeze, agreed that the NWFC influenced the shift in the timing and nature of the renewed talks with the Soviet Union. David Gergen, director of communications for the White House, affirmed, “the peace movement accelerated the move towards an agreement, [and] prodded the administration to act more swiftly.… I know all of us felt we had to move [on arms control].” 67

Waller, Congress and the Nuclear, 293. Rochon and Meyer, Coalitions and Political, 149. 67 Rochon and Meyer, 148. 66

Shah 25 President Reagan went one step further than merely changing the rhetoric; the administration now emphasized and communicated the need for nuclear disarmament. With this approach, the president did not have to support the freeze and claimed, “we can do better than a freeze.” 68 In order to maintain the public image of anti-arms buildup, the administration focused on the pro-peace message. Contrary to its previously cavalier attitude towards nuclear weapons and arms control, on January 22, 1983, the Reagan administration declared that “we have no higher priority than arms control.” 69 As a part of its rebranding efforts, the Reagan administration began developing a set of negotiating principles focused on disarmament including peacekeeper missiles, zero-options, and others. This new tact was revolutionary because the NWFC was able to alter a president’s foreign policy mindset and change his rhetoric regarding nuclear war. Electoral pressure and coalition dynamics forced the Reagan administration to move forward more quickly in arms control and change its messaging to the public by effectively using the media to publicize their new foreign policy initiatives. 70 In fact, Waller stated that “all Mr. Reagan had to do was embrace the proposal, welcome with open arms the millions of people who worried about nuclear war, smother their concerns with platitudes and generalities, co-opt the freeze with vague language and public relations.” 71 The Reagan administration masterfully marketed its general policy in such a way that it convinced the people that Reagan was serious about arms control. In the 1984 State of the Union address, Reagan extended his peace talk to the Soviets by proclaiming that “Americans are people of peace. If your government wants peace,

Rochon and Meyer, 150. Rochon and Meyer, 151. 70 Knoblauch, Nuclear Freeze, 8. 71 Adam M. Garfinkle, The Politics of the Nuclear Freeze (Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1984), 119. 69

Shah 26 there will be peace. We can come together in faith and friendship to build a safer and better world for our children.” 72 In September 1984, poll results showed that 60 percent of the public believed that President Reagan would make a real effort on arms control negotiations with the Soviets—the majority now had confidence in Reagan’s policies and therefore, the NWFC agenda no longer seemed imperative. 73 Ironically, Reagan created the NWFC with his pro-nuclear rhetoric, then brought down the nuclear freeze movement by coopting its rhetoric. Mass Media Distortion The Reagan administration recognized the threat and power of these activists to influence the American people and they pivoted their efforts to contain the antinuclear propaganda. Schell was criticized by the White House staff for lack of political analysis in his book The Fate of the Earth. Gergen led the effort to contain the popularity of the nuclear freeze in 1982 and minimize the backlash from the airing of The Day After in 1983. 74 In fact, nine days before the release of the film, President Reagan remarked at the World War II Commemoration in Japan that “a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought.” 75 Using this as the center point of their strategy, White House officials talked about how to prevent war and how “only a strong defense will deter nuclear war.” 76 Immediately following Day After, the show Viewpoint aired featuring Secretary of State George Shultz, and leaders including Henry Kissinger, Robert McNamara, Carl Sagan, and Elie Wiesel who gave assurances to the public that the Reagan administration was doing everything to avert the nuclear war but the panel failed to include any representation

Ronald Reagan, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union - January 1984,” National Archives, last modified January 25, 1984, accessed April 1, 2021, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-joint-session-congress-state-union-january-1984. 73 Rochon and Meyer, Coalitions and Political, 151. 74 Knoblauch, Nuclear Freeze, 9. 75 Knoblauch, 67. 76 Knoblauch, 69.

Shah 27 or expertise from the NWFC. 77 After the discussion, news reports shared the views of political leaders who acknowledged concerns about nuclear war and weapons but who did not understand or support the nuclear freeze proposal. The administration had masterfully spun the to its advantage and the media trivialized the NWFC by focusing on humanitarian goals. Although newspaper coverage was extensive during this span of time, the message was distorted and only 15 percent of the reportage focused on the main political message of the NWFC. The New York Times, Washington Post, and CBS all failed to focus on the proposal of the freeze. Sensationalizing the movement, the news media showcased apolitical, human interest, or personality stories rather than the message of the proposal. Dr. Caldicott was proclaimed the voice of the NWFC and attention was placed on her quote, “We are focusing on our babies… A baby is a baby is a baby,” without conveying any of the analysis of the NWFC’s goals. 78 The media portrayed NWFC first as a spontaneous impulse from the American public and later as an interest group led by the veterans of the Vietnam War. CBS reporter Bruce Morton, who declared the rally a huge success, raised Reagan's lack of support to the freeze and questioned the following: “Will the freeze, which has grown quickly, be able to move from the rallies to the tough politics necessary to change his mind?” 79 As the NWFC was not given a chance to defend and explain the merits of its proposals, the public opinion was influenced by these divided messages. Perspective bias was reflected in the news stories and Forsberg or Kehler were rarely interviewed in the media to explain the freeze proposal, yet opinions of privileged groups or individuals outside the NWFC’s organizations were reflected. 80 The power and the energy of the

Meyer, A Winter, 132. Meyer, 129. 79 Andrew Rojecki, Silencing the Opposition: Antinuclear Movements and the Media in the Cold War (Urbana, CI: University of Illinois Press, 1999),140. 80 Meyer, A Winter, 131. 78

Shah 28 one million people gathered at the Central Park rally was lost in the portrayal of well-behaved, white middle class participants rather than the content of the speeches and slogans. Limitations of the NWFC Reaching an impasse for policy change when the success at the electoral polls failed to have an impact, the NWFC decided to focus all its energy on the 1984 elections, which took focus, time, and resources. So far, the NWFC strove hard and succeeded in maintaining a bipartisan image, but entering the national elections reinforced a partisan image. The Democrats made the freeze a part of the party’s campaign platform in 1984 and the Democratic presidential candidate, Walter Mondale, was committed to a nuclear freeze. The Political Action Committee Freeze Voter ’84 was founded to support pro-freeze candidates during national elections. Even though the 1984 election created discourse and debate on arms control issues, President Reagan’s sweeping victory took the steam out of the NWFC. The grassroots activists felt helpless and frustrated that a mass movement like NWFC with their dedication and support was unable to swing the pendulum at electoral politics. Kehler, disappointed that the voters were more focused on the economy and personalities observed that “the important message is that the American people are in favor of a freeze, but they don't feel the freeze is an urgent necessity.” 81 After Reagan’s reelection, different priorities of various peace groups within the movement emerged and amid rising tensions, the movement started fragmenting. Peace organizations no longer supported the narrow appeal and the electoral focus of the freeze and the coalition fizzled out. Mobe chose to return to its mission of total abolition of nuclear weapons. History has shown—through abolition of slavery, the suffrage movement, the civil rights movement and protests against war in Vietnam—that direct action is necessary to make change.

Rochon and Meyer, Coalitions and Political, 26.

Shah 29 Yet, Forsberg’s opposition to nonviolent direct action and civil disobedience in fear of radicalization resulted in many activists leaving the movement and continuing efforts on their own. The inability of the NWFC to broaden its goals to include other causes such as biological warfare, the establishment of nuclear free zones, United States military intervention in Central America, and other international peace movements in Western and Eastern Europe was a lost opportunity. 82 Moreover, NWFC made no efforts to gain non-white support and participation in the movement; it was mostly middle-class white America, who were more drawn by the “no nuclear war” appeal than the appeal of the freeze proposal itself. As the movement spent its energy and time on legislative action, the NWFC failed to tap into the power of the mass movement. Instead of mobilizing efforts for mass support, the NWFC shifted its strategy to mobilize for political legislation and funding strategies. Moreover, many of the local activists struggled with a lack of clear direction on how to contribute to the cause. Pam Solo, a dissident tactician within the freeze movement believed that “keeping education separate from strategy was like giving the movement a lobotomy.” 83 It also failed to bring about cultural change to educate the public about minimal deterrence for long-term goals. If they had taken advantage of the new awareness and interest in national security, the NWFC might have been able to educate the public not only on halting the arms race but also on the distinction between the proposals to reduce the buildup of nuclear arsenals and the limitations of proposals to reduce the buildup of nuclear weapons while modernizing the weapons at the same time. 84 The freeze resolution that passed in the House of Representatives in 1983 proved to be a symbolic gesture with no direct impact on policy at a specific level as the freeze proposal was

Meyer, A Winter, 188. Meyer, 170. 84 Waller, Congress and the Nuclear, 247. 83

Shah 30 not adopted and a bilateral freeze with Soviet Union was never negotiated. Rochon proposes that the goal of the NWFC should have been to influence change in arms control policy as arms control is too vital a project to be exclusively in the hands of the executive branch. According to Rochon, an arms control policy developed with cooperation between the executive branch and the Senate would be a new policy process over which the grassroot movements could have more influence in the future. 85 Since the support for the NWFC’s platform of avoiding nuclear war was on firmer ground than the freeze proposal, Rochon claims that this would have been a more achievable goal. The NWFC’s prominence as a political and social movement lasted from 1979-1984. It underwent fragmentation as some leaders left the organization, and the organization faced rapid collapse after 1984. Once the resolution dissolved in Congress and the prospects of achieving the unifying goal was improbable, the coalition of different peace organizations came to an end. Contrary to its original grassroots strategy, NWFC became a membership organization and moved its headquarters to Washington, D.C. in 1985. A year later, the staff was reduced from 20 to six, and the NWFC merged with SANE in 1987. 86 The Legacy of the NWFC The NWFC defined the nuclear arms race as the most significant and dangerous social problem of its day. Primarily considered an academic topic for strategists and defense officials in Washington, D.C., the NWFC raised America’s awareness and made the topic of nuclear weapons and nuclear annihilation a household conversation through a simple proposal and emotional appeal. Instead of technical and military strategies, people addressed moral and political solutions. The extent of the grassroots support was remarkable and its greatest strength. 85 86

Rochon and Meyer, Coalitions and Political, 152. McCrea and Markle, Minutes to Midnight, 90.

Shah 31 The change in the social and cultural values and increased participatory democracy is the true measure of success of the NWFC. The NWFC created a new network of peace activists who continued to engage in nuclear weapons and security discourse. New peace studies programs were initiated in high schools and colleges in the 1980s and there was a heightened awareness and renewed debate on nuclear strategy in the academic circles. 87 Needless to say, The NWFC’s freeze movement had a long term effect on shaping the viewpoint on nuclear weapons and arms control. The NWFC was successful in applying legislative and electoral pressure on the president to propose a comprehensive bilateral nuclear weapons freeze and it also applied citizen pressure on the Congress for a quick freeze while cutting off funds for some nuclear weapons. 88 The impact of the NWFC was striking: from a president who mocked arms treaties as “fatally flawed” and calling the Soviet Union “an evil empire,” Reagan referred to Americans and Soviets as having “common interests … to avoid war and reduce the level of arms.” 89 It was the success of the NWFC that changed the thinking of the president and his administration, causing them to reverse their rhetoric and soften the arms control policies. Though the freeze policy failed to alter the policy at a specific level, it had a significant indirect impact in reviving the arms control process and putting pressure on the administration to alter its policy and reduce the possibility of a nuclear war. From two countries at the brink of a nuclear war, the NWFC opened the door for negotiations with Mikhail Gorbachev that eventually led to the fall of the Iron

Rochon and Meyer, Coalitions and Political, 168. Christopher Paine, “The Freeze and its Critics,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 39, no. 4 (April 1983), Gale General OneFile. 89 Steven R. Weisman, “Reagan Calls Nuclear Freeze Dangerous,” New York Times, last modified April 1, 1983, accessed April 1, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/04/01/world/reagan-calls-nuclear-freeze-dangerous.html. 88

Shah 32 Curtain and the end of the Cold War. This dramatic reversal in President Reagan’s foreign policy is a testament to the success of the NWFC. While the freeze resolution was not adopted, it opened doors for arms-control advocates in the administration to make nuclear weapons a priority, vocalize their support, and act. Congress took steps to intervene in the president’s security policies after the NWFC. Waller concluded that “no modern president [has ever] faced so much legislative advice or so many restrictions on nuclear weapons as Mr. Reagan did after 1982.” 90 Congress finally capped the deployment of the MX missile at half of what the president wanted and temporarily halted the production of nerve gas and the testing of antisatellite weapons. Rochon and Meyer stated that the freeze resolution called on the President not to undercut the SALT treaty and … to resume negotiations toward a comprehensive ban on testing of nuclear warheads … it put restrictions on United States military involvement in Central America [and] cut sizable chunks out of the President’s star wars budget. 91 The NWFC left behind a network of organizations and alliances. Its merger with SANE led to Peace Action, the largest grassroots peace and disarmaments organization that continues to mobilize public support for nuclear disarmament. 92 Understanding and assessing the brief and volatile history of NWFC has shed light on how a powerful grassroots movement and cultural activism can influence foreign policy. NWFC reversed the rhetoric and thinking of the Reagan administration and demonstrated the ability of a movement to drive change and win elections. In the United States, the use of nuclear weapons

Waller, Congress and the Nuclear, 303. Rochon and Meyer, Coalitions and Political, 173. 92 Wittner, “The Nuclear,” 54. 91

Shah 33 does not require approval of the Congress, and any one leader can “press the red button” and place the entire world at risk. By elevating the issue and forcing a change in what was politicallyacceptable rhetoric, the NWFC greatly reduced the likelihood of any leader using this option. Nuclear warfare continues to be one of the major threats to humanity in the twenty-first century due to the shifting balance of geopolitical order, escalating tensions, failed diplomacy and noncommunication, lack of mutual trust, effective leadership, and restraint. Today, a grassroots strategy could create a concrete, common-sense, simple proposal for the ratification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The NWFC paved the way and established the foundation for movements ranging from the Parkland school’s marches against gun violence to Greta Thunberg’s climate change initiative to the Black Lives Matter protests. These grassroots campaigns have successfully influenced the decision-making abilities of policy-making adults and inspired millions to join their cause. The aforementioned movements attest that grassroots movements can make a difference. With the power of social media, activists can go viral and a movement can grow from grassroots to a national movement. The nuclear arms race is interconnected with all social problems—whether it is climate change or poverty—and a broadening of goals to achieve common objectives would be a huge step towards the betterment of humanity. The lessons from the NWFC can be helpful in confronting the ongoing challenges for a peaceful and better tomorrow.

Shah 34 Bibliography Bentley, Judith. The Nuclear Freeze Movement. New York, NY: Franklin Watts, 1984. Forsberg, Randall. "A Bilateral Nuclear-Weapon Freeze." Scientific American 247, no. 5 (1982): 52-61. JSTOR. Garfinkle, Adam M. The Politics of the Nuclear Freeze. Philadelphia, PA: Philadelphia Policy papers, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1984. Knoblauch, William M. Nuclear Freeze in a Cold War: The Reagan Administration, Cultural Activism, and the End of the Arms Race. Culture and Politics in the Cold War and Beyond. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2017. Mangano, Joseph. “Three Mile Island: Health Study Meltdown.” Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists 60, no. 5 (September 2004), 33. McCrea, Frances B., and Gerald E. Markle. Minutes to Midnight: Nuclear Weapons Protest in America. Violence, Cooperation, Peace. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications, 1989. Meyer, David S., A Winter of Discontent: The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics. New York, NY: Praeger, 1990. Paine, Christopher. "The Freeze and its Critics." The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 39, no. 4 (April 1983): 5-8. Gale General OneFile. Piper, Christian. Nuclear War: Thinking the Unthinkable. March 29, 1982. Cover Art Time. Accessed April 19, 2021. http://content.time.com/time/magazine/0,9263,7601820329,00.html. Reagan, Ronald. "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union - January 1984." National Archives. Last modified January 25, 1984. Accessed April 1, 2021. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/ address-joint-session-congress-state-union-january-1984. Rochon, Thomas R., and David S. Meyer. Coalitions and Political Movements: The Lessons of the Nuclear Freeze. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997. Rojecki, Andrew. Silencing the Opposition: Antinuclear Movements and the Media in the Cold War. Urbana, CI: University of Illinois Press, 1999. Rubinson, Paul. Rethinking the American Antinuclear Movement. American Social and Political movements of the Twentieth Century. New York, NY: Routledge, 2018. ———. "The American Antinuclear Movement." Oxford Research Encyclopedia of American History. 5 Apr. 2016; Accessed 5 Mar. 2021.

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"Setting a New Agenda for Global Arms Control: An Interview with Randall Forsberg." Technology Review 93, no. 8 (November/December 1990). Gale General OneFile. Solo, Pam. From Protest to Policy: Beyond the Freeze to Common Security. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1988. Waller, Douglas C. Congress and the Nuclear Freeze: An Inside Look at the Politics of a Mass Movement. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1987. Weisman, Steven R. "Reagan Calls Nuclear Freeze Dangerous." New York Times. Last modified April 1, 1983. Accessed April 1, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/ 1983/04/01/world/reagan-calls-nuclear-freeze-dangerous.html. Wittner, Lawrence S. "The Nuclear Freeze and its Impact." Arms Control Today 40, no. 10 (December 2010): 53-56. JSTOR.

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