2014-15
JOHN NEAR GRANT Recipient
The United Fruition: A Historical Analysis of the Motives for the 1954 U.S.-Backed Guatemalan Coup
Karnika Pombra, Class of 2015
THE UNITED FRUITION:
A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MOTIVES FOR THE 1954 U.S.-BACKED
GUATEMALAN COUP
Karnika Pombra 2015 Near Scholar
Mentors: Mr. Ray Fowler, Ms. Meredith Cranston
April 13, 2015
The 1950s were entangled in the chaos of the Cold War, and marked by a medley of global fallouts, misunderstandings, and repercussions. In 1949, the North American Treaty Organization marked the first peacetime alliance in the United States’ history.1 This provided a new basis for the War, and showed the dire state of Cold War antagonism. The Soviet Union’s countermove with the Warsaw Pact in 1955 intensified the mutual hostility.2 At this point in the conflict, the arms race between the American and Soviet Union superpowers continued to accelerate.3 Meanwhile, tensions between the United States, China, and North Korea worsened as the Soviet Union provided these countries with the means to practice Communism.4 Back in the United States, the Red Scare was on the rise.5 Senator Joseph McCarthy had just begun conducting hearings on supposedly communist elements in the American government, instigating the era of McCarthyism.6
While Cold War tensions between the United States, Soviet Union, and East Asia seemed to take center stage in the 1950s, many other countries were also critically affected by the Cold War events. The United States was intertwined with several Central American conflicts. Since the United States had an economic stake in these regions, it found it difficult to balance their ideals of democracy with those of economics and social status. Often times, American officials had to decide whether agricultural profit overpowered governmental principles.
Guatemala is a prime example of this conflict. After Jacobo Arbenz Gúzman helped overthrow dictator Jorge Ubico Castañeda’s pro-United States regime and ascended to the presidency, the United States looked askance at Guatemala’s seemingly socialist and potentially communist ideals.7 Joining the United States in their suspicion towards the Guatemalan government was the United Fruit Company. The United Fruit Company was established in Central America in 1899; its influence was so widespread that it sported its own Central
American nickname, La Frutera 8 The company held several agricultural stakes in Guatemala, ranging from railroads to farmland. The company worried that Arbenz might deny them the economic leniency and rewards the prior Guatemalan government had provided. In 1954, Colonel Armas overthrew Arbenz’s government with help from the American Central Intelligence Agency’s Operation PBSUCCESS.9 Although the United States' desire to hinder the spread of Communism in Guatemala was the publicized reason for the overthrow of President Arbenz, the true rationale for the coup was more covert; preserving the United Fruit Company and United States governmental officials’ economic interests in Guatemala and maintaining the elite status of the Guatemalan army were the private grounds for the ousting.
Ubico’s Government and Arbenz’s Ascendency to President
The state of Guatemala before the 1954 coup was tumultuous, and the country was led by a series of very different governments. At the beginning of the Cold War era, Guatemala was ruled authoritatively by Ubico.10 Ubico was a dictator who had governed Guatemala since 1930.11 Ubico’s leadership included little to no social reform. At the time, the lower class suffered terrible working and living conditions, as well as turbulent race relations.12 However, the upper class enjoyed a much more favorable situation and status. Most of the upper class took influential roles in the government and military aristocracy.13
Ubico’s relations with the United States government were positive, making Guatemala and the United States tranquil companions. While the two countries were not necessarily major allies, little to no violence took place between them. Ubico’s Guatemala also enjoyed very friendly relations with the United Fruit Company because he saw connections with the United States economy as advantageous. In fact, the United Fruit Company had regularly received large concessions of land from Guatemala since the 1930s.14 The United Fruit Company also benefited
from monopolization of railroad and port facilities, low shipping costs, low taxes, and excellent profits.15 Overall, the Guatemalan government’s supervision over United States’ companies in the country was very low, strengthening the United Fruit Company while adversely affecting Guatemala’s own agricultural economy. This matter caused agrarian workers strife, while leaving the upper class citizens relatively unharmed.
This apparent tranquility dissolved, however, in 1944.16 In July of that year, Ubico was overthrown; in October of the same year, his successor, Federico Ponce Vaides, was also removed from power.17 Arbenz and Juan José Arévalo Bermejo instigated and played a critical role in the overthrows.18 Following a democratic election, Arévalo remained Guatemala’s president until 1951.19 Meanwhile, Arbenz held the position of minister of defense.20 Arévalo’s presidency involved major social reform for the ailing lower class.21 However, Arévalo did not touch on land reform, making him suspicious, but not an immediate threat, to American agriculture-based companies in Guatemala.
Arbenz’s Presidency
In 1951, Arbenz finally became Guatemala’s president following a democratic election.22 Arbenz was known for enacting major social reform. He did so because of his own background and his wife’s influence. Arbenz came from a turbulent family background and worked hard to ascend the ranks to political control.23 His wife, María Cristina Villanova Castro, was an El Salvadorian noblewoman who was horrified by lower-class working conditions.24 Politically, Arbenz is best labeled as a “moderate leftist.”25 While he was unassociated with the Communist Party, Arbenz did not actively discourage the communist presence within Guatemala’s borders. Arbenz also never looked at the United States as an immediate threat or potential enemy, which was in stark contrast to how the American government looked at him.
But perhaps Arbenz’s most impactful action was his decision to introduce land reform. On June 17, 1952, Arbenz began a new agrarian reform scheme to address Guatemala’s unjust form of land distribution.26 He hoped to draw tracts of land away from the upper-class citizens, and portion the terrain out to disadvantaged farmers. If the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Armas had not infiltrated, it may have provided major relief to agricultural workers and the ailing Guatemalan economy.
In February 1953, Arbenz’s government passed Decree 900, which was part of the Agrarian Reform Law by the National Agrarian Council.27 With this decree, Arbenz parceled out 234,000 acres of the United Fruit Company’s uncultivated land to peasants.28 He also attempted to offer the United Fruit Company compensation for the land in the form of 25-year bonds and 3% interest, as the United Fruit Company had claimed for taxing purposes.29 However, the United Fruit Company rejected the payment. While Arbenz may have seen Decree 900 as a small component of his Social Reform Movement, the United Fruit Company and United States government saw it as a defining basis for future conflict and uprising.
A Synopsis of the 1954 Guatemalan Coup
The 1954 Guatemalan coup was an amalgam of complicated politics, intertwined with wily militaristic practices. Outwardly, the coup was led by Carlos Castillo Armas.30 Inwardly, the United States’ CIA provided significant support for the overthrow. Carlos Castillo Armas was a former Guatemalan army officer who had actually supported the pro-democratic deposition of Ubico, as well as Arévalo and Arbenz’s form of government.31 In 1949 Armas was arrested because he was rumored to be involved in a coup attempt that resulted in the death of Francisco Javier Arana, a high–ranking political official32 He was released in 1950, and imprisoned again in 1951.33 Exasperated with the governmental chaos of the time, he had no
choice but to escape. The CIA already knew of Armas because he had received some formal military training at Fort Leavenworth in Kansas.34 Since then, Arbenz had become increasingly displeased with the Guatemalan government. When Armas was released in 1950 and 1951, the CIA contacted him and fortified his revolutionary plan.35
The CIA began by instigating Operation PBFORTUNE in September of 1952, which aimed to provide aid to anti-Arbenz revolutionaries but ultimately failed.36 Then, Eisenhower allowed the CIA to launch Operation PBSUCCESS to aid Armas.37 The Bureau of the Budget gave approximately three million dollars to revolutionary forces.38 As of February 1953, the CIA was under director Allen Dulles, who had been appointed by Eisenhower.39 Allen Dulles was a former lawyer, and current intelligence and foreign-service officer.40 His brother, John Foster Dulles, served as Secretary of State at the time and gave the CIA unprecedented power.41 He had a long history with government, including several furtive operations during World War I and World War II.42 Dulles’ role in the world wars left him infatuated with the more covert side of politics, and he championed such endeavors in locations such as Iran and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.43 Thus, Allen Dulles took much pride in organizing Operation
PBSUCCESS. Operation PBSUCCESS involved the following five-step plan:
The first step involved staffing the revolutionary army from sources in Guatemala, Honduras, Caracas, and Panama.44 The second step was meant to be the “preliminary conditioning of the target.”45 It involved internationally and nationally discrediting Arbenz.46 It also involved sowing dissension in Guatemala.47 This procedure also caused mistrust of Arbenz in surrounding countries, including Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador.48 Simultaneously, the United States shipped 15 tons of arms to Armas.49 The third step was to take place 75 days before Guatemala’s “D-Day.”50 It simply encompassed further conditioning and softening of the
target.51 The CIA’s “conditioning” of the target usually included fabricating propaganda filled with political rumors. This propaganda comprised pamphlets, posters, and radio messaged that nationally tarnished Arbenz’s reputation. The fourth step was to occur roughly 25 days before “D-Day.”52 It called for maximizing economic pressure, inciting rumor campaigns, sharpening divisions, engaging in passive sabotage, and strengthening the CIA-backed paramilitary.53
The fifth and final step was arguably the most impactful. After meticulous planning with the CIA’s encouragement, Armas secretly prepared a rebel army in Costa Rica.54 On June 18, 1954, Armas crossed the Guatemalan border with his army.55 Meanwhile, CIA-backed forces masqueraded as Armas’ rebel tactical military network.56 Then, this coalition broadcasted how rapidly Armas’ invasion forces were proceeding towards the capital.57 When the radio reported that these invasion forces were nearing the capital, Arbenz’s government resigned and evacuated out of sheer fright and disloyalty.58 Ironically enough, Armas’ army was actually quite some distance away and had to be flown into Guatemala’s capital, Guatemala City, for the victory celebration.59 Conclusively, a mix of tactics and paranoia led to the downfall of Arbenz’s government during the 1954 coup d’état.
Publicized Political Reasoning Behind the Coup
The 1954 Guatemalan coup clearly had several causes, spanning from politics and economics to social class. However, the internationally publicized reasoning behind the coup was often limited to political grounds. This promoted reason makes sense, considering the political climate of the time. During the thick of the Cold War, an insurrection related to governmental fallout was not uncommon. American journalists and politicians, who did not know of the covert mechanisms involved in the coup, often pinpointed the Guatemalan government as the leading cause of the incident. A myriad of American publications and
recordings recounting the event labeled Guatemala’s “communist” government as the cause for the United States and Armas’ call to action. The following are a few examples of publicized articles and broadcasts that labeled Guatemala’s communist politics as the coup’s primary motivation:
Primarily, events in Guatemala were broadcasted even before the coup had occurred. Most of these public announcements declared Guatemala’s increasingly “communist” government as a potential circumstance for American involvement. A notable example is that of John Peurifoy, the U.S. Embassy Ambassador to Guatemala.60 In January 1954, well before the overthrow had occurred, he told a New York Times reporter that “public opinion” in the U.S. might “force” actions to “prevent Guatemala from falling into the lap of international Communism.”61 Peurifoy never mentioned any other reasons for the involvement, indicating that hindering Guatemala’s “communist” momentum were the leading and potentially the sole factor for the seizure of power.
During the coup, the United States broadcasted Arbenz actions in a manner that aligned his motives with Communism. If any of Arbenz’s doings were remotely related to the Leftist Movement, the United States would pinpoint and publicize them. One notable example was when Arbenz suspiciously “banned anti-Communist demonstrations in the capital.”62 However, Arbenz only carried this out because of the multitude of disruptive riots “sparked by right-wing democrats.”63 Arbenz also purchased 2,000 tons of arms from the Skoda works of Czechoslovakia due to his concern over the political tensions during the coup.64 The United States government condemned this undertaking. Arbenz, who began to worry about the United States’ growing qualms, was trying to prepare his army for potential conflicts within the country.
Unknown to Arbenz was that each action he took, no matter how small, fed into the United State’s negative mindset towards Guatemala.
Political reasoning was even publicized after the coup. The most circulated case comes from Allen Dulles, who was the CIA director behind Operation PBSUCCESS.65 He recounts the motives behind the coup in his book, The Craft of Intelligence, which was first published on November 30, 1962:
In Guatemala, Arbenz had come to power through the usual processes of government and not by any Communist coup as in Czechoslovakia. Neither man at that time disclosed the intention of creating a Communist state. When this purpose became clear, support from outside was given to loyal anti-Communist elements in the respective countries...in the other, to a group of Guatemalan patriots. In each case the danger was successfully met.66
Additionally, John Dulles gave a 15-minute nationwide radio-television broadcast supporting a similar viewpoint. He remarked that the Guatemalan coup was a “new and glorious victory over Red encroachments.”67 He also fabricated ties between Guatemala’s government and the Soviet Union. His broadcast was reported on by the Los Angeles Times, and included the following remarks: Dulles laid the blame for the leftist bent of the overthrown Guatemalan government directly on the Kremlin. He said Communists seized on the Guatemalan revolution ten years ago and in the last few years and “openly connived” with Guatemalan officials. He said the Foreign Ministers of Guatemala and the Soviet Union were in ‘open correspondence and ill-concealed privity (intimate association)’ in attempting to “disrupt the inter-American system.”68
In the same broadcast, John Dulles aligned Guatemalan citizens as victims of Guatemala’s Communist government. He equated Armas and the United States with saviors of the Guatemalan residents, when he said:
The people of Guatemala have now been heard from. Despite the armaments piled up by the Arbenz government, it was unable to enlist the spiritual cooperation of the people.
Led by Col. Castillo Armas patriots arose in Guatemala to challenge the Communist leadership—and change it. Thus the situation is being cured by the Guatemalans themselves.69
Allen Dulles also supplied the New York Times with the same information on the coup, but barely mentioned the CIA’s covert involvement or the United Fruit Company’s economic rationale.70 His brother, John Dulles, also supplied The Saturday Evening Post with similar information on the coup that disregarded his covert involvement.71
Years later, John Dulles stated that “Peurifoy won widespread attention for his role in Guatemala's 1954 civil war, in which the Red-supported Government of President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman was ousted."72 When Peurifoy died in 1955, The Baltimore Sun memorialized him in the article “Peurifoy, Trouble Shooter against Reds, Dies in Crash.”73 The article quoted John Dulles’ aforementioned remarks.74 The depictions of Peurifoy show how the 1954 Guatemalan coup was attributed to Communist threats even years after the mishap occurred.
Underlying Economic Reasoning Behind the Coup
While political, anticommunist strife was the publicized rationale for the coup, the overthrow’s impetus truly relied on covert economic reasoning. The United Fruit Company’s complaint to the United States government was a catalyst for the CIA’s support of the coup. Arbenz’s land reform policies gravely concerned the United Fruit Company. The United Fruit
Company was Guatemala’s largest landholder. The company owned 550,000 acres of Guatemalan land, as well as held a controlling share of the country’s only railroad, International Railways of Central America and Puertos Barrios.75 Arbenz’s Decree 900, which was part of the Agrarian Reform Law in February 1953 by the National Agrarian Council, parceled out 234,000 acres of the United Fruit Company’s uncultivated land to peasants.76 Clearly, this was a concern to the United Fruit Company because the parceled lots were equivalent to almost half their land.
Arbenz did offer compensation in the form of 25-year bonds and 3% interest, as the United Fruit Company had claimed for tax purposes.77 The United Fruit Company, which was used to having limitless control over this land, rejected the offer and retaliated. The company argued that the land was not “uncultivated”, as claimed by the agrarian law, but was actually needed to grow bananas when a soil fungus banana disease struck their other land.78
Panicked, the United Fruit Company sought home government relief from the United States. The company consulted President Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Dulles, and CIA director Allen Dulles in 1953.79 Eisenhower agreed to bolster the coup d’état that would remove Arbenz from power but labeled the reasoning as anticommunism. Interestingly enough, the United Fruit Company was never publicly involved with the coup itself because they would be internationally discredited if it failed. The company did, however, fully support and agree with the CIA and rebel Armas’ actions. However, with Secretary of State John Dulles on their side, the company was not forced to take an active role. John Dulles, a fervent anticommunist and ardent supporter of the United Fruit Company, was essential in convincing Eisenhower to take action against Guatemala. While the coup may have taken place later on without the United Fruit Company’s plea, the United Fruit Company’s complaint was definitely the catalyst for
conducting the coup as early as 1954. Yet, the company’s decision to remain behind-the-scenes makes the economic rationale more covert than publicized.
There were also several governmental figures who had connections to the United Fruit Company’s economics. These connections prove that the coup had more than just a political, anti-Communist basis. Primarily, the Dulles brothers had extensive ties with the United Fruit Company. Allen Dulles, the C.I.A director at the time of the coup, was on the board of directors at the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell.80 It was no coincidence that Sullivan and Cromwell was the law firm retained by United Fruit Company.81 John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State at the time of the coup, was a senior international partner at Sullivan and Cromwell.82 Both the Dulles brothers had represented the United Fruit Company with Sullivan and Cromwell in the 1930s.83 The Dulles brothers had helped negotiate land giveaways to the United Fruit Company with government officials in Guatemala and Honduras.84 It was no surprise that the Dulles brothers were adamant in trying to convince Eisenhower of Guatemala’s communist leanings. In fact, John Foster Dulles was the main proponent for the coup. His position as Secretary of State allowed him to convince Eisenhower that the Guatemalan coup was a necessity.
Just having the Dulles brothers on the United Fruit Company’s side may have been enough to set the coup in motion. But the list goes on, adding even more governmental officials to the controversy. Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, was a United Fruit Company stockholder.85 John Moors Cabot, the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, was also a United Fruit Company stockholder.86 Ed Whitman, the public relations man for the United Fruit Company at the time of the coup, was married to Ann Whitman.87 Ann Whitman happened to be Eisenhower’s secretary at the time of the coup.88 The
complex web of personal and economic connections to the United Fruit Company explains why the United States government was so quick to support the 1954 coup.
Private Social Reasoning Behind the Coup
Guatemala’s 1954 coup also had its fair share of social reasoning. Ubico, Arbenz’s predecessor, maintained a system of government that favored the upper class and militia. Ubico had come from an affluent and political background, and had maintained connections with much of the aristocracy. A high-ranking army officer himself, Ubico had ensured that many of the governmental positions were held by the military elite. While the lower classes suffered in squalid conditions, the upper class enjoyed a fair share of influence and privilege.
Yet Ubico’s governmental policies were not instigated without reason. Ubico came into power during one of Guatemala’s major depressions, and had to take swift action.89 He promoted a campaign of effectiveness and quickly seized dictatorial power, promising that Guatemala’s poor economy would “march toward civilization.”90 He intended on running a dictatorial government from the very start, and his “election” into “presidency” was questionable considering he was the only one running.91 Therefore, he hoped to initiate rapid economic development. He took on a pro-United States standpoint because he thought it would aid the Guatemalan economy, although the United States looked at Guatemala with detachment.92 His stance explains the generous land concessions and arbitrary privileges given to the United Statesaffiliated United Fruit Company. Yet by letting the United Fruit Company run the agricultural economy, Ubico allowed the working class farmers to suffer. Plus, his political plans and attentions only focused on the upper class and army officers.
In stark contrast, Arbenz’s government sought to improve the lives of peasants and the lower working class. His focus on the lower class is evident in his widespread social reform, and
especially the agrarian reform laws that attempted to distribute land to the lower class. However, the upper class was not particularly fond of Arbenz’s government. Many of the upper class figures who had governmental roles during Ubico’s reign disfavored Arbenz. Arbenz’s army and officers were not loyal to him because they missed status they enjoyed under Ubico. Many of the military elite tried to hinder peasants and lower class military’s access to arms, making for a weaker and less unified army.93 When Armas demanded the distribution of weapons to workers, the army blatantly disobeyed. Armas and the CIA’s psychological warfare techniques, including the clandestine radio messages, worked easily on Arbenz and his disloyal government and army.94 Thus, social conflict did play a major role in Arbenz’s downfall.
If anything, the social reasoning behind the coup may point to the hypocrisy of the United States. The United States avidly promoted democracies during the Cold War, yet clearly did quite the opposite in Guatemala. United States’ role in supporting the “democratic” coup led by Armas was ironic. Armas government was more akin to Ubico’s administration, as it ruled the regime with a dictatorship. Furthermore, Ubico and Armas’ favoritism for the aristocracy evidently did not follow democratic ideals. Yet, the United States government championed Armas wholeheartedly. In the case of the coup, the United States favored an unjust social class system over any form of leftist government.
Aftermath and Consequences of the 1954 Guatemalan Coup
After Arbenz’s downfall in the summer of 1954, Armas became the President of Guatemala. The label “President” is misleading because Armas displayed oppressive, dictatorship-style rule. He did, however, maintain good relations with the United States and Guatemala’s upper class military elite. On the economic side, Armas immediately annulled Decree 900 in July 1954, forcing peasants off the land.95 The United Fruit Company was now
allowed to reclaim their land, confirming that their appeal to the United States government was a success. While their exact reaction to Armas’ actions remains undocumented, the company was most likely ecstatic to have their old economic rights returned to them. To make political amends, Armas also formed the National Committee of Defense against Communism and published the Preventative Penal Law against Communism.96 This anticommunist display effectively satisfied the United States government.
Meanwhile, Arbenz left his presidential position and was forced to embark on a dreadful exile.97 He traveled through many Latin American countries. Arbenz went on to publicly denounce the United States and United Fruit Company. On June 27, he criticized these two institutions from the Mexican Embassy, which was home to many exiles at the time.98 From 1954 to 1960, the CIA organized a defamation campaign for Arbenz and his family to ensure his expulsion’s permanency.99 Clearly, the United States hoped to bolster the legitimacy of the coup well after it actually occurred. Arbez’s growing infamy made Armas and the United States’ actions seem more and more justified. Arbenz moved and was subsequently rejected in many locations around the globe, including Mexico, Canada, Switzerland, France, Prague, Russia and Uruguay.100 Finally, Fidel Castro invited him to Cuba, but used him as an anti-revolution example.101 He reached his demise in Mexico on January 27th 1971, when he was fifty-seven years old.102 The true cause of his death remains a mystery.
Back in the United States, the United Fruit Company’s success was short-lived. On the financial side, their stocks declined after the coup.103 In 1958, the Eisenhower administration, the same management that had supported the United Fruit Company’s plea against Arbenz, filed an antitrust lawsuit against the company.104 In the case Banana Distributors v. United Fruit
Company, held in the United States District Court in New York, the United Fruit Company was said to have monopolized the banana trade.105 The official court case stated:
This is an action for treble damages under the antitrust laws… Plaintiff claims that defendants, United Fruit and Fruit Dispatch, have monopolized and have conspired to monopolize and to restrain trade with respect to the importation and distribution of quality green bananas in the United States, and more particularly, in the Eastern Division of Fruit Dispatch and the State of Connecticut. Plaintiff alleges that United Fruit and Fruit Dispatch had monopoly control over the supply of bananas and have abused their monopoly power in various unlawful ways, described hereinafter, thereby causing damage to plaintiff.106
The company was thus hindering other banana vendors in the United States. Because of this case, the United Fruit Company had no choice but to split.107 As the Guatemalan anticommunist paranoia subsided in the late 1950’s, the United States government started seeing the disadvantageous effects the United Fruit Company had on the American economy. As the Cold War became less and less severe, the United Fruit Company became an abusive monopoly and shameful remnant that was leftover from an earlier time of corporate colonialism.
At the time of the antitrust lawsuit, Secretary of State John Dulles admitted that “many of the Central American countries were convinced that the sole objective of the United States foreign policy was to protect the fruit company.”108 Clearly, this objection is hypocritical considering that the United Fruit Company’s complaint helped instigate the coup. However, when the government filed the lawsuit against the United Fruit Company, John Dulles had no choice but to concur. As the panic of the Cold War subsided, as it did during the thaw in the 1960’s and 1970’s, the United States government had to renounce its less respectable
motivations. In the late 1950s, the United Fruit Company sold off many of its overseas assets.109 These included International Railways Central America and the Latin American Companía Agrícola.110 By 1972, the United Fruit Company sold its final holdings in Guatemala.111
In the end, the coup and its aftermath portray the fickle nature of economics, especially when mixed with politics and social structure. On one hand, there are sizable businesses, such as the United Fruit Company. These types of corporations often had enough influence to overpower foreign governments, as shown by the events in Guatemala. On the other hand, individuals with notable influence over their own government might pursue political objectives in foreign countries for personal economic gains. The Dulles brothers, along with the many allies of the United Fruit Company that held positions in the United States government, clearly encouraged the coup due to private economic motivations. When overshadowed by political mayhem, these off-the-record incentives may go unseen for years. Thus, the coup also displays the drastic measures and mentality the United States took on at moments of panic during the Cold War. Minor threats often seemed magnified when looked at through the lens of the Cold War.
Notes
1 David L. Snead, "Cold War," in Dictionary of American History, ed. Stanley I. Kutler, 3rd ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2003), 2:266, accessed December 1, 2014.
2 Ibid, 268.
3 Ibid, 268.
4 Ibid,270.
5 Joseph Patterson Hyder, "McCarthyism," in Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence and Security, ed. K. Lee Lerner and Brenda Wilmoth Lerner (Detroit: Gale, 2004), 2:251, accessed December 1, 2014.
6 Ibid, 252.
7 "Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán," in Encyclopedia of World Biography (Detroit, MI: Gale, 1998), accessed July 30, 2014.
8 "United Fruit Company," in American History, accessed July 16, 2014.
9 Stansfield Turner, "Chapter Three: Dwight D. Eisenhower and Allen Dulles: The CIA Is Thrust into Action," in Burn Before Reading: Presidents, CIA Directors, and Secret Intelligence (New York, NY: Hyperion, 2005), 71.
10 Max Gordon, "A Case History of U. S. Subversion: Guatemala, 1954," Science & Society 35, no. 2 (Summer 1971): 131, accessed October 4, 2014.
11 Ibid, 132.
12 Ibid.
13 Jason M. Colby, United States in the World : Business of Empire : United Fruit, Race, and U.S. Expansion in Central America (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).
14 Gordon, "A Case History of U. S. Subversion," 133.
15 Ibid, 134.
16 "Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán," in Encyclopedia of World Biography
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Gordon, "A Case History of U. S. Subversion," 135.
20 "Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán," in Encyclopedia of World Biography.
21 Gordon, "A Case History of U. S. Subversion," 135.
22 "Guatemala, U.S.-Sponsored Invasion of (1954)," in The Age of Globalization (1900 to the Present), ed. Thomas M. Leonard, vol. 4, Encyclopedia of Latin America, 148, accessed June 17, 2014.
23 "Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán," in Encyclopedia of World Biography.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Prados, "Chapter 6: Bitter Fruits," in Safe for Democracy: The Secret, 100.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Turner, "Chapter Three: Dwight D. Eisenhower," in Burn Before Reading: Presidents, 78.
31 Ibid, 80.
32 Ibid, 82.
33 Ibid, 84.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 "Allen Welsh Dulles," in Dictionary of American Biography.
38 Prados, "Chapter 6: Bitter Fruits," in Safe for Democracy: The Secret, 110.
39 "Allen Welsh Dulles," in Dictionary of American Biography.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Turner, "Chapter Three: Dwight D. Eisenhower," in Burn Before Reading: Presidents, 69-88.
55 Ibid.
56 Prados, "Chapter 6: Bitter Fruits," in Safe for Democracy: The Secret, 115.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Prados, "Chapter 6: Bitter Fruits," in Safe for Democracy: The Secret, 118.
61 Ibid.
62 Turner, "Chapter Three: Dwight D. Eisenhower," in Burn Before Reading: Presidents, 80.
63 Ibid.
64 Prados, "Chapter 6: Bitter Fruits," in Safe for Democracy: The Secret, 118.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 "GUATEMALA COUP HAILED BY DULLES".
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Turner, "Chapter Three: Dwight D. Eisenhower," in Burn Before Reading: Presidents, 82.
71 Ibid.
72 "Peurifoy, Trouble Shooter Against".
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Prados, "Chapter 6: Bitter Fruits," in Safe for Democracy: The Secret, 119.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 "GUATEMALA DISTRIBUTING 215,000 ACRES".
79 Prados, "Chapter 6: Bitter Fruits," in Safe for Democracy: The Secret, 101.
80 "United Fruit Company," in American History
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 "Jorge Ubico y Castañeda, General," in Encyclopedia of World Biography (Detroit: Gale, 1998), accessed April 1, 2015.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 David M. Barrett, "Sterilizing a 'Red Infection' Congress, the CIA, and Guatemala, 1954," Central Intelligence Agency, last modified May 8, 2007, accessed August 4, 2014.
94 Turner, "Chapter Three: Dwight D. Eisenhower," in Burn Before Reading: Presidents, 84.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 "Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán," in Encyclopedia of World Biography
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 "United Fruit Company," in American History.
104 Ibid.
105 Banana Distributors v. United Fruit Company, 162 U.S. 32, 32 (United States District Court S. D. New York. 1958).
106 Ibid.
107 "United Fruit Company," in American History..
108 Turner, "Chapter Three: Dwight D. Eisenhower," in Burn Before Reading: Presidents, 69-88.
109 "United Fruit Company," in American History.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
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