Madison Huynh - 2020 Near Scholar by The Harker School

2019-20 JOHN NEAR GRANT Recipient Door Half-Open: Postwar American Legislationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Failure to Support Vietnamese Assimilation Madison Huynh

Door Half-Open: The Struggles of Federal Legislation Concerning Vietnamese Refugee Assimilation

Madison Huynh 2020 John Near Excellence in History Endowment Mentors: Ms. Julie Wheeler, Ms. Amy Pelman April 15, 2020

Huynh 2 The Vietnam War represented one of the most destructive and disruptive conflicts in modern history, creating aftershocks that rippled through the world. As a proxy of the Cold War, the conflict in Vietnam was officially fought between the Communist forces of North Vietnam and 1

anti-Communist South Vietnam, backed by the United States and its allies. The war lasted from 1955 to 1975, and the American military, under five presidents, supported the South Vietnamese 2

army in its fight to stop Communist encroachment. While initially the United States’ involvement was limited to military aid via training and weapons system assistance, the role of American forces grew as the war continued. After the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964, President Johnson was able to employ the direct action of the United States military 3

against Communist Vietnam during the war. The American strategy was largely successful at deterring the Viet Cong; airstrikes and bombings were used in conjunction with ground troops 4

until 1968, initially devastating the North Vietnamese militia until defenses were devised. Agent Orange, a chemical defoliant, was used in conjunction with this dual strategy as an effective aerosol weapon against the North Vietnamese, both directly against the soldiers and by attacking crop areas to cut off their resources.

However, due to the momentum of anti-war protests, the political consequences of the conflict, and the inability to execute a decisive win against North Vietnam, the government reversed its stance to one of “Vietnamization,” in which the United States gradually reduced its

Spencer C. Tucker, “Vietnam War,” in World History: The Modern Era (ABC-CLIO, 2020).

Tucker.

Spencer C. Tucker, “Agent Orange,” in World History: The Modern Era (ABC-CLIO, 2020).

Huynh 3 6

involvement in the conflict. After the American withdrawal, South Vietnamese forces began to fall, and the ratification of the Paris Peace Accords in 1973 signaled that America’s position in 7

the Vietnam War was merely one of spectatorship. In 1975, the North Vietnamese army captured the South Vietnamese capital of Saigon, renaming it Ho Chi Minh City and cementing the new Communist governing authority.8 After the United States retreated from the Vietnam War as part of the Vietnamization strategy, the destruction and pain of the war on the country were palpable; the transition to a North Vietnamese Communist government created emotional distress, substantial portions of established housing and infrastructure systems were destroyed, and over one million Vietnamese people were displaced by the conflict. 9 The air raids and bombings on land created cycles of poverty for generations to follow, and immediately left many Vietnamese people, both North and South, without the means to survive. Power plants, oil storage, and bridges were destroyed, 10

disrupting transportation and cutting off energy for much of the country. Many were left without homes due to physical destruction; the fear of American-placed landmines and the remnants of Agent Orange in food and water supplies left many devastated; and many places of 11

schooling and work were destroyed. The displaced Vietnamese people were forced to flee their

Tucker.

Edward Miguel and Gérard Roland, “The Long-Run Impact of Bombing Vietnam,” Journal of Development Economics 96, no. 1 (September 2011): 2. 10

Miguel and Roland, 2.

Huynh 4 homes, revealing the need for a process of relocation and resettlement for these refugees of the Vietnam War. After the immediate relocation process by the United Nations and neighboring countries from 1975 to 1986, six hundred thousand Vietnamese refugees elected to move to the United States and restart their lives, creating a mass exodus of migrants from Southeast Asia to 12

America. After the Vietnam War, the United States federal government’s passage of humanitarian legislation and politicians’ fears of social nativism created a rushed resettlement process that facilitated the long-term failure of Vietnamese refugees’ cultural assimilation, as evidenced by the predominance of low-wage work, secondary migrations, and a lack of social intermixing. Jurisdiction Over Immigration Reform Following the conclusion of the Vietnam War, large numbers of Vietnamese refugees were ushered to different countries, creating an immediate need for legislation specific to refugee immigration. The first, second, and third waves of Vietnamese refugees composed the overwhelming majority of these postwar migrants who arrived in the United States, representing 13

those immediately displaced by the Vietnam War and in need of protection. Of the dictums passed by the federal government, the most significant was the Refugee Act of 1980, the de facto 14

determinant of refugee status following the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. Passed during the Carter Administration by the 96th United States Congress, this act was developed in

Nghia M. Vo, The Vietnamese Boat People, 1954 and 1975-1992, (Jefferson, McFarland, 2006), 183.

Vo, 85.

Paul James Rutledge, The Vietnamese Experience in America, Minorities in Modern America, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), 84. 14

Huynh 5 response to the exodus from Indochina and the growing number of refugees from Afghanistan, Poland, and Central America, officially declaring the process for refugee entrance and resettlement. This provided the first official national definition of “refugee,” and it described who may be admitted under refugee status; this closely paralleled the definition employed by the 15

United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees. In addition to the newly declared refugee title, many Vietnamese immigrants were admitted under parole programs, which tripled 16

by 1980, almost 250 times more than when the program was established.

The Refugee Act of 1980 created the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), a new federal agency offering support for refugees upon their arrival to the United States and carrying 17

out all assimilation assistance efforts. While all previous immigration affairs were controlled by the Department of State, specifically the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Congress sought to emphasize the ORR’s focus on the humanitarian and personal aspects of immigration, and thus created it under the Department of Health and Human Services. 18

Although the USCIS offered important input in refugee legislation, the ORR wielded the most

influence concerning the social and cultural assimilation of Vietnamese immigrants, directing state and municipal efforts by determining which programs were necessary, how much financial assistance to provide, and, overall, how the government could best help refugees transition into American life.

Rutledge, 84.

Rutledge, 37.

Rutledge, 38.

Huynh 6

International Pressure to Respond Following the conclusion of the Vietnam War, the United Nations High Commission on Refugees established an Orderly Departure Program (ODP) to minimize illegal escapees and 19

facilitate the departure of those who accurately qualified as refugees from Vietnam. The ODP successfully resettled many Vietnamese people starting with closer Southeast Asian countries, 20

but this failed due to the rise of compassion fatigue. As the war drew to a close and many Vietnamese people were displaced by the war itself or spillover local violence, hundreds of thousands fled Vietnam for the nearest countries they could find. While initially they were welcomed, the large influx of refugees after the war created a severe backlog in refugee camps in 21

Southeast Asia, with small countries such as Thailand and Taiwan severely overloaded. This led to the rise of compassion fatigue in Southeast Asian countries, where both the governments and the people were averse to the acceptance of more refugees. Feeling that they had done enough and growing weary of the seemingly infinite, continuous flow of refugee arrivals, these 22

countries reduced their assistance with postwar resettlement. This response was magnified by European countries’ refusal to accept large numbers of refugees: many Asian countries felt that if the European West did not have a significant response, they too were not obligated to accept 23

even more refugees. Singapore was the first of many to refuse boats packed with Vietnamese

Vo, The Vietnamese, 163.

Vo, 167.

Vo, 163.

Huynh 7 refugees at their country’s door. However, despite the fact that they would not accept refugees, they followed United Nations’ policy in that they allowed boats to replenish their supplies on the 24

coastline; this became known as the “‘shut, but slightly open’ door policy.”

The United States faced pressure both from international agencies and foreign governments to respond to the growing refugee crisis. These governments, especially those in Southeast Asia neighboring the regions of the war, believed that the United States was most at fault, and therefore had the largest responsibility in relocating and resettling the displaced Vietnamese people. With incidents like the My Lai Massacre in mind, the leaders of Southeast Asia said the United States was culpable for destroying Vietnamese infrastructure, and thus the 25

onus was on American efforts for refugee resettlement. Nghia Vo explains that “[T]hey blamed the refugee problem on the inhumane treatment of people by the Vietnamese Communist regime and the U.S. war policies of 1968-1975,” proving their intense disinclination towards further 26

aiding the situation after the Vietnam War.

Xenophobic Sentiment and Relieving Domestic Pressure The United States government felt an intense pressure from the international community to open its doors to refugees, but at the same time was forced to deal with the domestic consequences of its war obligations. A 1975 New York Times article describes President Ford’s pleas to American politicians and the public to accept refugees, to reverse their overwhelmingly 27

negative opinions. Despite the power and popularity of anti-intervention protests during the

Vo, 164.

Vo, 163.

David Binder, "Ford Asks Nation to Open Its Doors to the Refugees," The New York Times ( New York,

Huynh 8 Vietnam War, the public’s aversion to refugee assistance showed people’s failure to acknowledge the American government’s culpability in creating the immigration crisis. President Ford faced the difficulties of maintaining Congressional backing for refugee funding and aid policies. Hoping that left-leaning organized labor groups would help galvanize popularity for refugee resettlement, he appealed to unions, but they disapproved of further immigration, 28

wanting to protect native-born workers. Even traditionally liberal Democrats, such as Senator Joe Biden of Delaware and Senator Dick Clark of Iowa, formed agreements with opposing party members like Henry Kissinger in opposition to refugee resettlement, claiming that immigrants were a public charge on the community, especially in such unknown numbers.

After meeting

behind closed doors with multiple Senate leaders, President Ford acknowledged that Congressmembers feared the backlash from their constituents, who were upset by the possibility 30

of large refugee influxes to America.

Moreover, in a committee speech that was later released to the public, President Ford attempted to appease those against resettlement. The president’s careful wording shows how cautiously he approaches the subject of Vietnamese refugee assistance; rather than one of personal importance, President Ford deflects blame and criticism away from the government by establishing the crisis as an international duty that the United States was forced to fulfill by the United Nations and the global humanitarian community. By acknowledging the American

NY), May 7, 1975, https://www.nytimes.com/1975/05/07/archives/ford-asks-nation-to-open-its-doors-to-the-refugees-president-in-tv.ht ml. 28

Binder.

Huynh 9 public’s difficulty in dealing with resettlement, the logistical trouble it caused, and the social problems due to the Vietnamese-American culture gap, the government showed its reluctance to 31

truly provide assistance for refugees. In the speech, President Ford ingratiated himself to the American public, calling refugees friends but also “new burdens on our society” and thanking the audience for their “extreme generosity” in assisting new immigrants in their assimilation 32

process.

The carefully constructed interactions between the government and the public, as well as the struggles with passing refugee legislation by Congress, show the overall reluctance of the government in its resettlement efforts. While there was a show of good faith by the Ford Administration to encourage further generosity for refugee relief from the American public, the overwhelming fear of social backlash provides a pretext for understanding the subsequent legislation passed by the federal government in the resettlement process. Underlying Legislative Logic Working with several American private religious and humanitarian organizations in 1975, the United States began to airlift Vietnamese refugees and resettle them within the country. 33

The U.S. Catholic Conference, Church World Service, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee

Service, and Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society played large roles in the sponsorship process, in 34

which they helped pair immigrant families with American families in their local communities.

Gerald R. Ford, "Remarks at Meeting of Advisory Committee on Refugees," speech presented at Meeting of Advisory Committee on Refugees, December 17, 1975, Ford Library Museum, https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/Library/document/0122/1252622.pdf. 31

Binder.

Vo, The Vietnamese, 173.

Vo, 173.

Huynh 10 However, in conjunction with the rushed nature of federal resettlement, the support of these 35

private immigration groups failed to support refugees in a meaningful way. Much of the process of resettlement happened hurriedly, because the government sought to reduce the public view of relocation measures to relieve political pressure from constituents, oftentimes resorting to untested, covert means of forcing refugee independence. For example, “[t]he State Department paid them 500 dollars for each case placed”; it would pay refugees as a quick-fix measure rather than establishing long-term organizations or structures that would ease the pressures of assimilation.

The United States initiated a project following the war named the “Humanitarian Operation,” a style of policy proposal and plan typically passed as a response to an order, whether implied or direct, by the United Nations to resettle refugees. In response to the pressure the United States government felt from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the Humanitarian Operation was established as America’s proof of plan for 37

Vietnamese refugee relocation to the international community. However, the language of the Humanitarian Operation project makes it clear that the United States felt a large obligation to the war effort, and was not necessarily acting out of its humanitarian good.

Under this Humanitarian Operation framework, the federal government established numerous policies aimed at reducing the influence of Vietnamese refugees on the social fabric of

Vo, 173.

Vo, 178.

Huynh 11 the United States. The Refugee Dispersion Policy of the Ford Administration was the most obvious of these attempts to prevent the aggregation of Vietnamese people into ghettos or communities deemed socially unacceptable by white American society. Hien Duc Do explains in his book The Vietnamese Americans: To minimize the social impact of the large influx of Vietnamese refugees on an American public that did not favor the Vietnam War, the U.S. federal government, under the leadership of President Gerald Ford, adapted the Refugee Dispersion Policy. . . . The Refugee Dispersion Policy served four purposes: to relocate the Vietnamese refugees as quickly as possible so that they could achieve financial independence; to ease the impact of a large group of refugees on a given community to avoid an increase in competition for jobs; to make it logistically easier to find sponsors; and to prevent the development of an ethnic ghetto.

After considering the social and political conditions for resettlement, the motivations for policies such as the Refugee Dispersion Policy are understandable. The logic of refugee legislation was entirely social; to avoid backlash from the white Americans who were averse to immigrants, especially refugees, in their traditionally unintegrated communities, these policies attempted to resettle refugees in a supposedly “less impactful” manner, without acknowledging the results or conducting social or economic impact assessments.

However, conflicting

motivations outlined in the second and final reasons present an unsuccessful irony. The desire for

Hien Duc Do, The Vietnamese Americans, The New Americans (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 33-34. 39

Do, 34.

Huynh 12 ultimate efficiency in “large group” undermined the government’s obsession with avoiding 41

ethnic ghettos, leaving them unable to fulfill either of those goals.

In their attempt to maximize the efficiency of resettlement while minimizing the social impact of these processes, United States officials looked to immigrant gateways as a means of 42

federal relocation that relied on third-party integration. Following the logic of “out of sight, out of mind,” these new immigrant gateways were destinations to which the government sent new arrivals to start their new lives. In the past, refugees were sent to “traditional gateway states, such 43

as New York, Massachusetts, Florida, Illinois, Texas, and California.”

Using these gateways, resettlement agencies clustered new immigrants from Vietnam into certain areas, placing many of them in the same areas or places close enough that they could 44

eventually move together or congregate. This policy was viewed as an economic good for refugees, since Vietnamese people were relocated to places where they had to establish financial stability and independence. They could not rely solely on past immigration services, welfare, or benefits, since the places they were sent had never before seen so many new immigrant arrivals. 45

However, this was eventually damaging for refugee integration, because it discouraged

intermixing with other cultures, since the Vietnamese tended to group together when they had the option.

Do, 35.

Do, 32.

Mary C. Waters and Tomás R. Jiménez, “Assessing Immigrant Assimilation: New Empirical and Theoretical Challenges,” Annual Review of Sociology 31 (2005): 115, JSTOR. 44

Waters and Jiménez, 115.

Huynh 13 The Ideal of Economic (In)dependence The government believed that the ideal means of encouraging refugee independence from federal and local support was to immediately encourage refugees to acquire jobs, which would 46

reduce the public view of Vietnamese immigrants as a “public charge.” The Refugee Act of 1980 included the Limited Assistance Clause, which directly mirrored the government’s aims of reducing financial dependence of new Vietnamese immigrants. While the government provided some aid for refugees, this direct cash assistance was limited to an eighteen- to thirty-six-month period of allowed government assistance, during which refugees were expected to become 47

acquainted with the Unites States, its customs, English language, and economic system. This clause directed that federal support for refugees would be restricted after six months, in order to 48

drive the Vietnamese to become financially stable even without federal support.

While some historians have argued that the existence of some economically prosperous Vietnamese refugees supports the idea that the United States’ assistance was successful, this theory conflates this correlation as proof of success, ignoring refugees’ own motivations in their 49

assimilation process. Claims that some refugees thrived in the United States are moot, as this success was unlikely to stem from government support. The first refugees were motivated to acquire jobs and become financially successful by a sense of duty to their families and a drive to fulfill the American Dream, in which they could thrive despite their background as poor

Rutledge, The Vietnamese, 84.

Rutledge, 84.

Rutledge, 78.

Huynh 14 50

immigrants from Vietnam. Small numbers of Vietnamese refugees were able to improve their own positions in the workplace because of their cultural values, since they themselves sought 51

better jobs than the low-skill work that the government ushered them into. The Vietnamese refugees who were successful established their financial motivation due to personal beliefs; Rutledge writes that they preferred to work in groups, work in ethnic businesses if possible, seek white-collar employment where available, upgrade their educational level ... counter to the government programs. The characteristics of Vietnamese employment mirror the philosophical foundations of their indigenous culture and as they adapt to the American 52

economy they are finding ways to blend the two perspectives together.

In latter groups, this self-motivation was less present; as the very first refugees became disillusioned with the ideals of the American Dream, their motivation to find employment was only a product of government pressures and the immediate need for money with which to 53

maintain their well-being.

Resulting Pressure and the Rise of Low-Wage Work The Refugee Resettlement Act, a piece of legislation following the Refugee Act of 1980, proves that the government’s pressure on refugees to join the workplace was clear and effective, 54

as many of them immediately set out looking for employment. Particularly since refugees were

Rutledge, 78.

Rutledge, 86.

Rutledge, 87.

Rutledge, 84.

Craig Centrie, Identity Formation of Vietnamese Immigrant Youth in an American High School (El Paso, TX: LFB Scholarly Publishing, 2004), 58, ProQuest Ebook Central. 54

Huynh 15 arriving in a new country and were still acclimating to American daily life, they were likely more susceptible to the influence of the government, especially wanting to prove to the Office of 55

Refugee Resettlement that they would work hard to be “good immigrants.”

The Limited Assistance Clause worsened these pressures by creating deadlines that refugees were forced to abide by. For example, the Refugee Medical Assistance (RMA) program was only promised for a year, then would be cut off immediately with no exceptions. Fears of unexpected medical disaster, coupled with the propensity of illness in many previously malnourished refugees, motivated many refugees to seek work as soon as possible so that their 56

families could enjoy benefits, such as health care and other forms of insurance.

Many American sponsors assisted refugees in finding employment, but these jobs were largely limited to low-skill work in entry-level positions. Starting as early as 1975, Vietnamese arrivals were encouraged, under the direction of government suggestion to sponsors, to begin the 57

search for jobs of this type. Some refugees with strong educational backgrounds were able to work as mechanics or technicians for slightly higher pay, but many were relegated to jobs in 58

factories or processing plants. Refugees also turned to their relatives, as well as other Vietnamese people who were in the United States prior or already had jobs, taking advantage of others’ pre-existing networks in the country and using those employment connections to find 59

work.

Centrie, 58.

Rutledge, The Vietnamese, 85.

Rutledge, 80.

Huynh 16 The American government's focus on immediate workforce entry for refugees precluded possibilities for them to be successful in the economy over the long-term. The government’s only focus was on reducing immigrants’ financial overreliance on the government, and these policies claimed to help them “get on their feet” while acclimating to their new country. However, they merely served as a palliative measure that did not realistically help newly arrived refugees acquire high- or even moderate-paying jobs. The policies also ended up pushing refugees away from higher education and instead into low-wage jobs where they were unable to establish 60

upward mobility, trapping them in cycles of economic hardship. In addition, while Vietnamese refugee parents placed a high focus on education as a familial and cultural ideal, their children often were unable to complete degrees in higher education, because of government pressure for 61

workforce participation.

The government’s push for refugees to become part of the labor force undermined the long-term success of its assimilation efforts due to the abuse of Vietnamese immigrants in the workplace. Many Vietnamese people thought that finding jobs would be their path toward autonomy and separation from both their old homes and the government, especially regarding the 62

pressures from the ORR and the Limited Assistance Clause. While the ORR and its sub-agencies attempted to help refugees find jobs, the refugees ended up being exploited by American employers. Furthermore, because refugee workers could not fluently speak English or understand the legal nuances of the American system, they could not negotiate contracts or

Rutledge, 86.

Rutledge, 72.

Centrie, Identity Formation, 51.

Huynh 17 conditions or understand the expectations of their work environment and were easily taken 63

advantage of by corporations and factories. The workplace conditions were so atrocious that many volunteered to repatriate, returning to Vietnam by personal choice. The high levels of repatriation represent significant contempt for the American system, as many refugees detested the Communist government and the process of refoulement was extremely difficult under the 64

1967 Refugee Protocol.

Social Interactions in the Workplace In conjunction with the difficulties of low-wage work and the financial hardships that it entailed for Vietnamese refugees, workplace conditions left refugees unable to interact with those of other races or establish connections with other Americans. In their case study, Waters and Jiménez perform an impact assessment and analysis of meat-packing plants and the 65

conditions of poor employment that undermined the social integration of Vietnamese refugees.

While this study focused on the communicative conditions of a specific factory in the Midwest, similar conditions persisted for many other Vietnamese people, especially since the low-wage jobs refugees held, such as in car manufacturing and other factories, were likely to have loud 66

noise. The high levels of background noise, strict shift supervisors who prevented talking between workers, and the harsh conditions that limited breaks and meals established barriers

Centrie, 52.

Waters and Jiménez, “Assessing Immigrant,” 116.

Waters and Jiménez, 116.

Huynh 18 between many Vietnamese people who worked for large corporations and their American coworkers who may have assisted their social assimilation. Furthermore, the transient nature of low-wage, factory-style work meant that refugees were unable to develop significant personal connections with other workers, most notably white 67

Americans. These jobs were often seasonal, or high-risk, which limited refugees’ long-term economic and social success and furthered their inability to maintain connections with other workers. Ethnic Ghettos, Secondary Migrations, and Community Building In addition to the lack of social interaction in the workplace, the grouping of Vietnamese people into informal ghettos, especially due to integrated communities and housing, limited community building between Vietnamese refugees and their American neighbors. Rutledge describes the ORR’s establishment and use of Mutual Assistance Associations, which created Vietnamese enclaves where refugees bonded with those of a similar background. However, this forced grouping had a largely negative impact: Mutual Assistance Associations served as a hindrance to refugees truly assimilating, since the premise of these organizations relies on new arrivals mixing with other Vietnamese people who already had been in the United States for 68

some time. While the “network” Rutledge claims was established could have helped refugees feel like their new country was more familiar, it ultimately made new arrivals too comfortable by surrounding them with other Vietnamese people, making them unwilling to step outside of their 69

ethnic enclaves or communities.

Waters and Jiménez, 116.

Rutledge, The Vietnamese, 57.

Rutledge, 58.

Huynh 19 Many refugees moved from their original assigned neighborhoods through the process of secondary migration. These secondary migrations were largely a product of dissatisfaction in their current locations; they, therefore, sought to find improved jobs, welfare, or community elsewhere. After the “grieving phase” associated with the arrival to the United States, during which refugees reestablished personal, economic, and emotional stability, many felt isolated due to their new homes and jobs. Although time spent in refugee camps was short, they now lacked the connection and camaraderie of living with other Vietnamese people, and the aforementioned 70

lack of social interaction in the workplace contributed to these feelings of loneliness. Many refugees started to move to states with family, or more generally, regions with higher Vietnamese populations, seeking a broader sense of community.

States with the largest initial refugee populations experienced large influxes of refugees via secondary migrations, which exacerbated the presence of ethnic enclaves. Census data in 1990 found that California’s population of Vietnamese refugees nearly doubled from its original numbers in 1975 when refugees were relocated. The number of Vietnamese refugees in Texas, 72

Washington, Minnesota, and New York also increased significantly.

Refugee secondary migration to traditionally low-density Vietnamese areas, such as the Midwest and South declined, showing that these groups of refugees were moving toward areas 73

that were highly populated with other Vietnamese Americans. There was a sense of established

Vo, The Vietnamese, 81.

Vo, 81-82.

Centrie, Identity Formation, 55.

Centrie, 55.

Huynh 20 “social comfort” for refugees in associating with non-native American people, proving that they valued ethnic loyalties and their desire to associate with Vietnamese people overcame any 74

discomfort they felt with American culture and the assimilation process.

As a product of secondary migrations, many Vietnamese people established intra-refugee support groups irrespective of government aid. These groups provided financial support and established networks of support from refugees who had been in the United States longer. These groups for business assistance and Vietnamese-exclusive housing prove that refugees, especially those who came in the earlier waves, created their own “alliances” in many cities to assist each 75

other. Even though the government resettled refugees in different places, they eventually 76

moved together and formed communities in regions with higher Asian American populations.

The assimilation of Vietnamese people in this sense was not one of intermingling, but adaptation to their circumstances by intra-Vietnamese connections rather than connections with native-born Americans. Orange County, California, saw the largest increase of migrated Vietnamese people over 77

time, and it was dubbed “Little Saigon” as a nod to its extreme numbers of former refugees.

Rather than seeking to Americanize many traditional Vietnamese experiences, the Vietnamese people established their traditional customs just as they had practiced them in their former country. In Little Saigon, street markets and food stalls were set up with little regard for the

Centrie, 55.

Rutledge, The Vietnamese, 98.

Rutledge, 98.

Vo, The Vietnamese, 82.

Huynh 21 78

authority of American public health or commerce regulations. The existence of such innately Vietnamese cultural habits in ethnic enclaves represents the refusal of refugees to accept American cultural norms or assimilate, instead choosing to form their own communities. Day-to-Day Interactions with non-Vietnamese Americans Irrespective of the formation of ethnic enclaves, the character of interactions with white Americans after refugees’ relocation depended largely on the nature of the area, such as if there were large Vietnamese populations in the community. Many Vietnamese people moved toward intermingling with white neighborhoods and developed strong relationships with white 79

Americans, without any racist or xenophobic backlash. However, this was only true of some communities. Craig Centrie’s study explores the example of Vietnamese-non-Vietnamese interactions in an undisclosed suburban district of Wisconsin, an area without a large Vietnamese demographic. When these immigrants moved into Wisconsin communities, it was individually via secondary migration or scattered government resettlement, not en masse by an immigrant gateway. Upon their arrival in this traditionally white community, Vietnamese refugees were able to integrate more successfully because they were not perceived by white Americans as one monolithic, intruding ethnic group. However, this success story was not the case for the majority of Vietnamese Americans; because so many were relocated in large groups and to cities with many immigrants, they formed 80

large Vietnamese communities. Those who were not satisfied in their isolated, non-Asian

Stanley Karnow and Gerry Gropp, "In Orange County's Little Saigon, Vietnamese Try to Bridge Two Worlds," Smithsonian 23, no. 5 (August 1, 1992): 29, Gale in Context: Biography. 79

Centrie, Identity Formation, 65.

Rutledge, The Vietnamese, 99.

Huynh 22 communities founded enclaves through the aforementioned process of personal secondary 81

migrations. In places where many Vietnamese people were settled, their secondary migrations were all to similar areas, because they felt they could be part of an established community.

Linguistic and Cultural Adaptation Studies performed by linguistic and developmental experts Huer, Saenz, and Doan provide insight into the language adaptation of Vietnamese refugees several years after arrival in the United States. The high numerical indices in the study demonstrate the propensity of Vietnamese youth, particularly those in the 1.5 generation, who arrived as second wave refugees, to speak Vietnamese at home is as expected. However, the fact that they also spoke Vietnamese 83

so regularly with friends indicates that they were mostly acquainted with other refugees. This is a large part of the social issues young Vietnamese people faced in schools; they did not mix with other ethnic groups and thus school did not help significantly with their acculturation. Vietnamese refugees, especially youth, regularly celebrated Vietnamese traditional customs over American holidays and noted that they overwhelmingly preferred Vietnamese media, such as television and radio, showing their disregard for much for American mainstream 84

culture. The rejection of such American pastimes provides insight into Vietnamese refugees’ lack of adaptation to their new environments.

Rutledge, 99.

Mary Blake Huer, Terry Irvine Saenz, and Julie Huong Diem Doan, “Understanding the Vietnamese American Community: Implications for Training Educational Personnel Providing Services to Children with Disabilities,” Communication Disorders Quarterly 34, no. 1 (September 22, 2001)], Gale Academic OneFile Select. 84

Huer, Saenz, and Doan.

Huynh 23 Overall, the United States governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s policies undermined the long-term success of refugee assimilation in that they undermined economic success for Vietnamese immigrants, which then spilled over to social and cultural divides with Americans. The push for jobs left refugees without financial mobility, forcing them into difficult, low-skill jobs that limited their interactions with white Americans and encouraged them to only develop ties with other Vietnamese people. Furthermore, the lack of support from local communities due to the fear of public backlash left Vietnamese refugees with no desire to intermingle with Americans, forcing the development of ethnic enclaves in housing and the rejection of American culture in schooling and thought. The intentions of the federal government in its aims of resettling Vietnamese refugees were based on traditionally humanitarian norms of aid and assistance, showing the neutral intent of the government in its relocation efforts. Combined with the pressure from international organizations, the United States fulfilled its responsibilities in assisting hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese refugees left transient after the destruction of the war. However, the prioritization of the social culture of white America transformed the process of resettlement from an obligatory international agreement into a palliative measure, creating a rushed process of resettlement where the fears of backlash overwhelmed the intentions of truly helping refugees. The resulting assimilatory failure for Vietnamese immigrants created divisions between refugees and native-born Americans and entrenched mistrust and even xenophobia. While the success of these refugees today cannot be fully measured, the policies of Vietnamese refugee resettlement and the immediate consequences can be viewed as a framework through which to view current migration crises as a result of American intervention.

Huynh 24 Bibliography Binder, David. "Ford Asks Nation to Open Its Doors to the Refugees." The New York Times (New York, NY), May 7, 1975. https://www.nytimes.com/1975/05/07/archives/ford-asks-nation-to-open-its-doors-to-therefugees-president-in-tv.html. This primary source provides a firsthand account of the perspectives of multiple government officials upon the start of Vietnamese refugee migrations. David Binder was a journalist at the New York Times focusing on foreign reporting, famously writing as a special correspondent on the Cold War; he also wrote a book and numerous journal articles on the state of Europe after Soviet decline. By including direct transcriptions of Ford's speeches and the responses of his Congressional colleagues, Binder's article provides insight into the decision-making of policymakers during refugee resettlement. Centrie, Craig. Identity Formation of Vietnamese Immigrant Youth in an American High School. El Paso, TX: LFB Scholarly Publishing, 2004. ProQuest Ebook Central. This book explores the West Side High School of an undisclosed city as a microcosm of the community of refugee youth upon arrival in the United States, focusing on lived experience and analysis of individual students' interviews. Craig Centrie, professor at Medaille College and the University of Buffalo and specialist in ethnographic data collection and research on development of the American identity explores how race and ethnicity have affected the lives of young people of color in America. Centrie uses the frame of students' past lives in Vietnam to analyze the accounts of their struggles adapting to life in the United States, offering a unique perspective on their identity formation to describe how they adapted to their new roles at home, school, and the workplace. Do, Hien Duc. The Vietnamese Americans. The New Americans. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999. In The Vietnamese Americans, Hien Duc Do details the history of Second Wave Vietnamese refugees upon their arrival to the United States. Do is the author of several books and journal articles on Vietnamese American history, documentary producer, and a professor of sociology at San Jose State University. Do's comprehensive descriptions of the United States government's various legislation on refugees of the Vietnam War allows for an intricate understanding of the policies that shaped assimilation. Ford, Gerald R. "Remarks at Meeting of Advisory Committee on Refugees." Speech presented at Meeting of Advisory Committee on Refugees, December 17, 1975. Ford Library Museum. https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/Library/document/0122/1252622.pdf. This primary source is a transcription of Ford's speech to the Advisory Committee on Refugees about Vietnamese refugee resettlement. By providing a direct account of Ford's language and how he addressed the public in speaking about Vietnamese immigration, this source allows for an analysis of the political motives for refugee policy.

Huynh 25 Huer, Mary Blake, Terry Irvine Saenz, and Julie Huong Diem Doan. "Understanding the Vietnamese American Community: Implications for Training Educational Personnel Providing Services to Children with Disabilities." Communication Disorders Quarterly 34, no. 1 (September 22, 2001). Gale Academic OneFile Select. In this article from Communication Disorders Quarterly, Mary Blake Huer et al. analyze the language barriers of young Vietnamese refugees when integrating into American society. Huer, as a former linguistic psychology professor, specializes in cross-cultural communications; Terry Irvine Saenz is a communications professor focusing on translation and interpretation of languages; Julie Huong Diem Doan contributes the perspective of a English-second-language Vietnamese-American and expert on speech disability training. This study uses a focus group of Vietnamese Americans to correlate their loyalty to Vietnamese traditions with their English abilities, offering an analytical perspective on language adaptation. Karnow, Stanley, and Gerry Gropp. "In Orange County's Little Saigon, Vietnamese Try to Bridge Two Worlds." Smithsonian 23, no. 5 (August 1, 1992): 28. Gale in Context: Biography. This article describes the lives of Vietnamese Americans in the Orange County of California, one of the largest Vietnamese ethnic ghettoes in the United States. Stanley Karnow is an American writer and historian famous for his writings on the Vietnam War and its aftermath; Gerry Gropp is the photographer of this article from 1992. Karnow provides a secondhand source from the time period of resettlement that describes how Vietnamese people in Orange County merge their lives as Americans with their traditional culture. Miguel, Edward, and Gérard Roland. "The Long-Run Impact of Bombing Vietnam." Journal of Development Economics 96, no. 1 (September 2011): 1-15. This article provides a quantitative analysis of the effects of American bombings on Vietnam during the Vietnam War, analyzing the long-term trends of United States military strategy during the conflict. Edward Miguel is the Oxfam Professor of Environmental and Resource Economics in the UC Berkeley Department of Economics, and Gérard Roland is an author and professor in Political Science and Economics at UC Berkeley. By evaluating the effects of the war numerically, Miguel and Roland provide a direct, quantitative perspective to measure American influence in Vietnam. Refugee Act of 1980, S. 643, 96th Cong. (Mar. 17, 1980). Accessed August 22, 2019. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-94/pdf/STATUTE-94-Pg102.pdf. Refugee Assistance Act of 1980, H.R. 7859, 96th Cong. (Oct. 10, 1980). Accessed August 22, 2019. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-94/pdf/STATUTE-94-Pg1799.pdf. Rutledge, Paul James. The Vietnamese Experience in America. Minorities in Modern America. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992. This book provides an exhaustive account of the lives of Vietnamese refugees upon arrival in America, focusing on how resettlement policies and government assistance

Huynh 26 programs shaped housing patterns, formation of local communities, and social stratification. Paul James Rutledge, a fellow at the Center for International Studies and Associate Professor of Anthropology at the University of Missouri, St. Louis, has written multiple books detailing Vietnamese communities in the United States following the Vietnam War. Rutledge provides insight on how government policies impacted newly-arrived refugees by coupling firsthand anecdotal accounts of Vietnamese people's lives in America with data concerning the scope and effectiveness of the federal government's policies. Tucker, Spencer C. "Agent Orange." In World History: The Modern Era. ABC-CLIO, 2020. ———. "Vietnam War." In World History: The Modern Era. ABC-CLIO, 2020. Vo, Nghia M. The Vietnamese Boat People, 1954 and 1975-1992. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2006. Nghia M. Vo's The Vietnamese Boat People reflects on the two mass exoduses of Vietnamese people to the United States as a result of Communist reform and eventual takeover. Vo, previously the founder of the Saigon Arts, Culture and Education Institute, wrote The Bamboo Gulag: Political Imprisonment in Communist Vietnam, as well as detailed the history of 20th century Vietnam in numerous research journals. This work emphasizes the distinctions of the 1975-1992 Second Wave of Vietnamese refugees compared to the prior migrations, using numerical data combined with individual refugee narratives to explain the results of newer resettlement policies. Waters, Mary C., and Tomás R. Jiménez. "Assessing Immigrant Assimilation: New Empirical and Theoretical Challenges." Annual Review of Sociology 31 (2005): 105-25. JSTOR. This article provides a comparative study of how Vietnamese immigrants assimilate in different ways compared to other groups of migrants, especially refugees from other countries. Mary C. Waters is a historian and professor of sociology at Harvard University who has written numerous books on immigration and ethnicity studies; Tomás R. Jimenez is a professor of sociology and comparative race and ethnicity at Stanford who frequently writes about social characteristics of immigrants in the United States. Waters and Jimenez's detailed analysis of Vietnamese refugees’ versus other immigrants' success creates a baseline for how the policies of the Vietnam War differed from other migrations.

The Harker School | 500 Saratoga Ave., San Jose CA 95129 OofC: 3/25/20 (RM)