Burke's Submarine-Based Finite Deterrent: Alternative to the Nuclear Triad
John Near Scholar
Ramsay Westgate, Mentor
April 9, 2012
Arleigh Max IsenbergHow Did the Nuclear Submarine Emerge?
With the end of major conflict and the beginning of the atomic age, the US Navy “felt particularly vulnerable to the charge that the bomb and airpower had made ships and seapower obsolete,” as it became difficult to justify maintaining so many hundreds of ships during peacetime.1 The threat of a nuclear-capable Soviet Union and the onset of the Cold War breathed new life into the Navy, with the conflict in Korea demanding a reactivation of the American war machine. By 1953, the Navy had recommissioned hundreds of ships, increasing the Navy's active fleet to 1,129 ships, nearly double what it had been at the Korean War's beginning.2 The conflict demonstrated the importance of sea control and logistical support during the primarily landbased conflict. It became clear, however, that the Navy, submarines included, required an overhaul.
Existing submarine technology from the Second World War was not technically adequate for the new demands of the Cold War. Before, submarines were powered by noisy diesel turbines that scientists at Oak Ridge concluded shortly after the end of World War Two that "we cannot expect surface and near-surface detection to long remain in their present states of development. When the snorkeling submarine becomes readily detectable, nothing short of a deep-running true submarine will be acceptable.”3 Each side had become more adept at finding and tracking the other's diesel powered ships, whose main weakness lay in their frequent trips to the ocean surface to take on fresh air. The forced surfacing of the USS Gudgeon by Soviet ships in August 1957 highlighted the pressing need for nuclear submarines. Spotted off the coast of Vladivostok, the Gudgeon, unable to surface for air and recharged batteries, was chased for two days, giving the USSR an opportunity to learn about American tactics and espionage missions.4 This started a submarine game of cat and mouse, with each side trying to outrun and outlast the other.
The question of leadership at the Bureau of Ships, the innovative arm of the Navy that emerged during the second World War, was answered by the appointment of Hyman Rickover. An Annapolis graduate and naval officer, Rickover was above all an engineer. Though he had served during the war commanding a mine sweeper in the Pacific, he drew praise and attention through his skill in the electrical section in the Navy Bureau of Ships.5 Here, his rigorous and practical style of leadership demanded technical perfection which he personally oversaw. Rickover vastly improved the inadequate and obsolete electrical equipment currently used in the Fleet, and after six years in the Bureau, Rickover had created “the most creative, productive, and technically competent section in the Bureau of Ships.”6 By 1953, “the father of the nuclear navy” had spent seven years developing a propulsion system that would soon be installed into a submarine.
In 1955, that system powered the USS Nautilus, the flagship of the Rickover's Nuclear Navy, during attack drills against conventional warships. According to those witnessing the war games, the Nautilus seemed “almost invulnerable,” evading detection, avoiding the threat of air attack by remaining submerged for long periods of time, and “making 16-18 knots,” easily outracing the surface fleet.7 While the first submarines served in essentially the same role they had since their earliest usage, Admiral Arleigh Burke was the visionary whose unique view of finite deterrence motivated the creation of the missile submarine fleet as the strongest and most flexible leg of the nuclear triad. Additionally, his theory of finite deterrence, though initially scorned, provided an alternate perspective that has become gradually adopted in the nuclear strategy.
How did submarines become missile launchers?
The clear advantages of nuclear submarines soon overlapped with the developments in
ballistic missile projects, ushering in a new role for the Navy. In 1955, the Special Projects Office (SPO) within the Navy was formed to adapt the Army's Jupiter missile program to a seabased platform.8 Research on the possibility of a Soviet solid-fueled ballistic submarine conducted by the National Academy of Sciences reported to Admiral Burke with findings that suggested that “If the Soviets can build this system, then the United States can do it also.”9 This report, along with research on the potential dangers of a liquid-fueled rocket convinced the SPO to branch off from the Jupiter project and begin their own solid-fuel version capable of being launched from a submerged submarine.10 By the end of 1956, the Navy began work on the Polaris missile, “28 feet in height, 60 inches in diameter, 15 tons in weight, and with a planned range of 1,500 nautical miles.”11 With a missile now in the works, the submarine force had to design a ship specifically for launching one. The August 1957 announcement of the first successful launch of a Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) motivated the Navy to raise the Polaris project to “BrickBat01” status, making the project of the highest possible priority, cutting in half the time allocated to development and deployment of a ballistic missilefiring submarine.12 To meet the demands for an operational missile sub by 1960, one of the boats in the Skipjack class (one of the attack submarine successors to the Nautilus) was reconfigured to include the necessary launching tubes and maintenance equipment. This boat, rechristened the USS George Washington, successfully fired two Polaris missiles in July 1960.13 The next logical question became how to incorporate this new launch platform into the existing hierarchy of the bomber-based Strategic Air Command and land-based ICBMs just now being developed.
Arleigh Burke's VisionThe germ of the submarine based deterrent lay with Admiral Burke, and with it came a radical new view for the so-called “finite deterrence.” Previously, the Eisenhower administration
had prepared for an all-out war strategy. Rejecting the idea that any nuclear war could be localized, this policy of “massive retaliation” made no distinction between civilian or military targets; a first strike would be answered with an indiscriminate counterstrike.14 One of many iterations of American nuclear policy, Eisenhower's plan would set a precedent of deterrence. The fundamental paradox with deterrence was its requirement that each side advance together to more and more devastating technologies. In briefings John Craven, the chief scientist of the Special Projects Office, gave to inductees of the Polaris Ad Hoc Group for Long-Range Deterrence, the group in charge of developing Polaris, he explained that
. . . the Soviets feared that the United States might strike first, or that the United States might even contemplate striking first, deterrence might fail. Therefore, if the United States elects to design and deploy a credible deterrent using nuclear weapons, then it must allow, nay, encourage, the Soviets to design and deploy their own deterrent having characteristics identical to our own.15
In order to prevent war with the Soviets, the balance of terror had to remain even at all times. Winston Churchill, at first a proponent of a preemptive strike while the US held the atomic monopoly, soon conceded that “the new terror brings a certain element of equality in annihilation. Strange as that may seem, it is to the universality of potential destruction that I think we may look with hope and even confidence.”16 This policy, for better or worse, remained the keystone of US nuclear policy through and beyond the Cold War.
Burke's finite deterrence stood in distinct contrast with previous nuclear strategies in that it favored an indestructible platform armed with a relatively small number of warheads that could guarantee retaliation without being vulnerable to a first strike. Like others before him, Burke accepted the paradoxical strategy of deterrence as the way to prevent nuclear warfare; however,
unlike previous strategies the admiral prioritized efficiency (both of cost and deterring ability), limiting the size of the nuclear arsenal as much as possible while still maintaining a credible threat. With a fleet of forty-five submarines, two-thirds of them on active duty at any one time, Burke envisioned a deterrent capable of destroying the Soviet Union with little threat of a counter-force strike, or an attack that targeted military installations like nuclear silos before they could be used.17 Before the USS George Washington had even test launched its first Polaris missiles, Burke was a firm believer in deterrence as an alternative to strict counterforce, which he saw as a doctrine that would “force us into a spiraling arms race” to try to keep up with the Soviet weapons we were trying to eliminate.18 He envisioned a minimal deterrence as a way of avoiding the ensuing arms build-up that came with a policy of massive retaliation. Such a strategy would only require the knocking out government control organizations and industrial complexes. Since these targets did not require absolute annihilation to cause considerable disruption, fewer weapons would be required to achieve the necessary effect of threatening an incredibly destructive counterattack to deter a preemptive strike.19
The key to efficient deterrence for Burke was invulnerability. Bombers and ballistic missiles suffered from the fact that a first strike, though not completely effective, would still significantly harm the retaliatory capability of the nation. If the US stuck with land-based launch systems, the only way to maintain the deterrence would either have been to invest in an incredibly expensive anti-ballistic missile system or continue arsenal growth to keep up with the expected capability of the Soviets to preliminarily eliminate the nukes.20 He also contended that an invulnerable nuclear launch system would allow for a nuclear attack beyond an all-out retaliatory blast. While land based systems had to be launched as soon as possible because of the threat of counterforce, submarines could be used in an extended conflict because they would not
be immediately destroyed in retaliation.
The Evolving American Nuclear Policy
Any nuclear deterrent depended on two key details: how the payload would be delivered and what installations would be targeted. With the success of the Polaris program, the last branch of the Nuclear Triad had been set. Combining the lurking missile submarines with the constant patrols of B-52s and the hardened silos that dotted the United States and its allies, the Nuclear Triad compensated for each leg's weaknesses to form a nearly insurmountable and counter-proof strategy.21 On this point, Burke did not disagree; though he favored nuclear submarines as the central form of deterrence, he recognized the value of having multiple systems to “insure that an enemy breakthrough against one system does not checkmate our total retaliatory capability.”22 The significant initial debate between theories of deterrence revolved around what targets should be prioritized.
Under Eisenhower, the “massive retaliation” strategy set forth a single plan of attack that even frightened some of his own advisers.23 By ensuring any nuclear exchange would end catastrophically, the option of a limited nuclear war was removed, which detractors saw as allowing for the possibility of an unwinnable conventional war.24 More disturbing for finitedeterrence proponents such as Burke, “massive retaliation” opened the door for a tremendous increase in the number of weapons in the US stockpile, an eighteen-fold expansion within five years. 25
The Kennedy administration re-evaluated the policy and Robert McNamara was soon charged with proposing a new strategy that raised the threshold for nuclear assault, instead emphasizing a conventional arms buildup with nuclear weapons relegated to a “late and limited” role that also did not attack civilian populations.26 Nuclear weapons would be exclusively used
on military targets, promoting a counterforce priority in deciding targets. While other programs such as the B-70 bomber and Skybolt aircraft-launched missiles were cut because of their costliness and incompatibility with McNamara's plan, the Polaris program and ICBMs such as Minuteman were pushed ahead.27 The de-emphasis of bombers in favor of long-ranged launching platforms was due to perceptions of bombers’ obsolescence and their inability to deliver powerful and targeted attacks that a counterforce required. McNamara's original vision became known as SIOP (Single Integrated Operating Plan)-62, which he famously outlined in his commencement address to the University of Michigan in 1962.28
This vision, however, was severely criticized internationally and domestically. V.D. Sokolovskii, the Marshal and highest military commander of the Soviet Union, denounced the plan as planning for a preemptive war.29 The idea of counterforce was also severely criticized. Admiral Burke noted that . . . many of these missile bases are right close to our cities[...]so an attack on our major bases would necessarily destroy a great many cities and a great many of our people. When those missiles start coming over you do not know whether the intent of the enemy was to hit or not to hit a city if he hits it. The same is true with the Russian military installations.30
By the Johnson administration, however, a new Single Integrated Operation Plan also created by McNamara backtracked on the initial counterforce focus of SIOP-62 and established a “flexible response.” This strategy demanded a build-up in nuclear weapons capabilities to ensure nuclear war would trigger mutually assured destruction, motivating both sides to avoid starting a war at all costs.31 Because of their mobility and ability to hide, nuclear submarines could guarantee swift retaliation that could not be effectively countered by a preemptive strike. Vice
Admiral Nils R. Thunman stated that there was “factual and authoritative assurance that there [was] no foreseeable technological capability by which the Soviets could significantly diminish the strategic effectiveness of the US submarine missile force.”32 In addition, submarines at the time had relatively poor accuracy, which made them an excellent platform to launch the widespread retaliatory counter-value attacks.33 In all these ways, nuclear submarines worked well within the new plan, supporting the Air Force's Strategic Air Command and the Army's ICBMs in the deterrence of nuclear war. However, with the ingraining of the nuclear triad into the core of American deterrence, the hope of Burke's finite deterrence and the avoidance of an escalating arms race diminished greatly. By making the Triad nuclear canon, backtracking to a single form of deterrence would face significant military and political opposition, even if submarines were capable of deterring with a much smaller nuclear arsenal.
The Submarine Superiority
Compared to the significant flaws and dangerous possibilities opened up by both a bomber-based and land-based deterrent, missile submarines threatened the most effective and least vulnerable retaliation of the three components of the Nuclear Triad, and thus made it a feasible option as a finite deterrent. The role of bombers within the Triad greatly diminished as anti-aircraft technologies flourished. To compensate for their increasing vulnerability to a counterforce strike by the Soviets, General LeMay of the Strategic Air Command dramatically increased the available nuclear arsenal and number of targets, with every weapon being assigned a target; there was no effort to try to minimize the number of weapons used.34 Critics, especially those in the Navy, railed against this strategy of “overkill.” According to Strategic Air Command's plans incorporated into One SIOP-62, a target the size of Hiroshima, which was leveled by a thirteen kiloton bomb, was now targeted by multiple bombs with an explosive
power thirty or forty times more than was used in 1945.35 Such inefficient, redundant targeting would also cause unmanageable levels of radioactive fallout. With the ever-increasing sizes of both the United States and Soviet Union nuclear arsenals, any exchange involving even a small percentage of their nuclear might could result in a devastating environmental disaster or possibly even a civilization-ending nuclear winter.36
Eventually, the increased reliance on ICBMs supplanted the role of bombers; however, its imprint on nuclear strategy had stuck; erring on the side of overkill became standard policy. The Strategic Air Command ended its round the clock watches of nuclear-armed bombers unglamorously after an emergency crash at the Thule Air Base in Greenland in January 1968, where a B-52 bomber, laden with four hydrogen bombs, exploded along with its payload.37 The same year, a collision between planes off the Coast of Spain also resulted in the loss of four nuclear bombs that had to be recovered by the Navy.38 Though in times of emergency rearmament of bombers could occur, this branch of the Triad quickly lost its importance.
The land-based ICBMs that took on the central role in American deterrence suffered from many of the same problems that plagued bombers. Admiral Burke noted that the coming missile age would essentially become an artillery conflict, with the key difference being the tremendous increase in the range of the weapons.39 He further argued that with the increased accuracy and range of ICBMs on both sides, counterforce became a more viable option and thus by basing our primary means of deterrence on home soil, the United States would be inviting a strike targeted on those structures and hence ourselves.40 Missiles also suffer from a significant vulnerability to a counterforce strike, but one that also creates a significant hazard for an accidental launch.
General Curtis LeMay, the noted commander of the Strategic Air Command, testified before the House Armed Services Committee that although missiles had their purposes, “with manned
bombers you can maneuver and change bases,” allowing for flexibility.41 Additionally, bombers, unlike ICBMs, could be recalled up until the last minute, and would clearly be used only as a second strike.42 ICBMs, however, would be inoperable if initially taken out, and their retaliatory capability will be eliminated. Thus, to prevent their loss completely, ICBMs may be launched within fifteen minutes of the first hint of an incoming attack, even if the warning turned out to be a false alarm.43
Missile silos' vulnerability to the so-called “use it or lose it” situation represented a grave threat as “a launch [could] be triggered by pixels on a screen rather than unmistakable real missiles.”44 The incident of Colonel Stanislav Petrov in September 1983 illustrated exactly this possibility. During his watch at an early-warning station in the USSR that communicated with satellites to detect missile launches, a warning siren sounded, saying that several launches from American silos had been detected, and that a response had to be ordered within minutes.45 Petrov correctly recognized the alerts as false alarms; however, had he not, orders for the launch of the Soviet nuclear might would have followed within minutes, threatening a devastating and entirely unintended nuclear exchange, a lapse impossible with the redundant safety features in place on missile submarines.46
The clear disadvantages of the other two legs of the nuclear triad were more than made up for by the submarine fleet's effectiveness. Fervent work in the Special Projects Office and elsewhere strove to make the submarine deterrent fail-safe, which ultimately succeeded in establishing Polaris and its successors as the nearly invulnerable threat Admiral Burke envisioned.47 Unlike the accident-prone bombers, no missile submarine was ever lost during the Cold War. Also unlike the very visible silos and aircraft bases, submarines were kept on rotation in large holding areas thousands of miles from their targets, following a path not even the
president knew precisely.48 The potential of a leaked mission plan was entirely contained, with only the captain himself sure of the exact course for his submarine and its payload. Submarines' arsenals did not suffer from a hair-trigger response either. In a speech by President John F. Kennedy following the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, he noted that “the United States could wait quite long” before firing submarine missiles, and that “the Polaris alone permits us to wait to make sure that we are going to have sufficient [force] in hand that he [presumably Khrushchev] knows that we could destroy the Soviet Union. Actually that is the purpose of the deterrent.”49
Even the supposed disadvantages of the missile fleet could be turned into assets. The relative inaccuracy of submarine launched ballistic missiles ensured their role as a counter-value deterrent that could not be misinterpreted as a weapon for a decapitating first strike. Submarines also suffer from a “use it or lose it” situation, though one that is more strategically disadvantageous than accident-prone.50 Though each individual submarine carries dozens of warheads, once any of them are launched, the missile submarine has exposed itself and is at risk for retaliation. Hence, missile submarines are not very flexible in a limited nuclear conflict, as submarines may be forced to launch all of their missiles rather than risk losing the ability to use the unfired missiles later once their position is exposed.51 From a strict standpoint of deterrence, however, this compulsion reinforced the certainty of retaliation without risking a hair-trigger response that ICBMs could demand or increasing the arsenal to spur an arms race.
Anti-Submarine Warfare and Invulnerability
Admiral Burke's argument for finite deterrence ultimately rested upon the invulnerability of the fleet; during the Cold War, US superiority under the seas so effectively safeguarded American missile submarines that indeed they were invulnerable, and thus could have been implemented as an alternative to the nuclear Triad. Several factors contributed to the certainty
placed in our missile fleet, all of which ultimately centered upon the superiority of the American missile submarines over Soviet anti-submarine warfare. One of the most crucial tools for early detection of submarine activity was the Sound Surveillance System, or SOSUS. This expansive network of hydrophones capitalized on recent advancements in acoustics technology during the Second World War and became the omnipresent ear on the ocean floor. One test of a precursor system known as SOFAR in 1943 worked so well that explosions of small depth charges could still be registered 900 miles away.52 The first prototype of a SOSUS array was completed in 1952, and by 1954 the systems had been deployed all along the American coastline and beyond, ensuring that every movement of the Soviet navy could be heard without putting ships and their crews in danger. Its effectiveness emerged during the Cuban Missile Crisis as it confirmed the Soviets' deployment of submarines during the tense standoff.53 The Soviets never developed a listening network as advanced, precise, or pervasive as SOSUS, as demonstrated by the US Navy, which scrambled dozens of submarines headed towards Soviet shores without eliciting any response. 54 Thus, American submarines could patrol unhindered without the risk of a counterforce strike aimed to destroy the missiles before they could be launched.
Soviet submarines were also significantly noisier and poorly equipped for detection. As the range of their ICBMs increased, Soviet missile submarines were kept closer to their bases in the Barents Sea. Even in these relatively hostile waters, American boats frequently trailed their Soviet counterparts with a fair amount of success. In September 1969, “Whitey” Mack managed to remain undetected for forty-seven days behind an advanced Yankee class missile submarine, and ultimately provided invaluable information about the enemy's nuclear capabilities and submarine tactics, greatly embarrassing the Soviets.55 Even the best Soviet captains could not manage much more than eighteen hours.56 On the same chase, while Mack's USS Lapon could
locate surface ships twenty thousand yards away, the submarine he tailed only seemed to react to the same ship at half that distance, highlighting the vast inferiority of sonar and other detection methods on Soviet boats.57 Over the course of more than two thousand American missile patrols from 1960 onwards, not a single one had been successfully tracked completely by the Soviet Union.58 Even if the Soviets had the technology to circumvent the SOSUS nets and hunter-killer submarines that attempted to trail them, finding the missile submarines themselves remained nearly impossible, especially in the open ocean. Despite their best efforts, the Soviet Union remained at a significant disadvantage under the sea, and changed their own strategy to try to establish their own invulnerable missile fleet.
Unable to effectively evade the sonar nets and attuned detection systems of American submarines in the Atlantic Ocean, the Soviets began setting up bastions near the Arctic icecaps. The Arctic was “the one area of the world where the prey ha[d] the distinct advantage over the predator, where it would be huge difficult for US forces” to track and eliminate their targets.59 In the marginal ice zone, along the shallower fringes of the polar ice cap, the noise of breaking ice floes and poor sonar acoustics make tracking difficult. Additionally, the submarine headquarters at Murmansk lay less than three hundred nautical miles from the marginal ice in April, meaning that submarines could power through the intervening open sea and within a day shelter themselves in the marginal ice zones, despite American surveillance.60 By the late eighties, the submarine fleet had completely shifted its focus northward. Sixty percent of the Soviet missile subs and half of their total submarine strength had been reassigned to the Red Banner Northern Fleet.61 Ultimately, however, the strategy did not nullify the existing American deterrent, but instead somewhat leveled the playing field by eliminating some of the vulnerability of the Soviet submarine deterrent. The Soviet Union tried to emulate, rather than counter, the invulnerability
of the United States' missile submarines, a telling sign of how Burke's deterrent had become accepted by both sides as secure.
Finite Deterrence and the Test of Time
The recognition of the missile submarine's capability to provide an effective yet relatively cost effective deterrent has spanned time and a wide variety of nuclear strategists and military men, Arleigh Burke being just one of the first to see the potential of finite deterrence. Robert McNamara originally rejected the finite deterrent in SIOP.62 He criticized the extreme of minimum deterrence for its inability to counter Soviet military targets should deterrence ultimately fail.62 Pressured by the Air Force who demanded the purchase of twenty four hundred to ten thousand ICBMs and President John F. Kennedy to fulfill the promise of closing the supposed “missile gap” with the USSR, McNamara accepted into his plan one thousand Minuteman missiles, the first major ICBM to be placed in silos across the United States.63
Admiral Burke, though open to the missiles as a replacement for Strategic Air Command's bombers, recommended a much smaller order of around four hundred missiles.64 The existing vulnerabilities and unproven effectiveness of ICBMs made him wary of investing so heavily in the technology, especially in light of the relative safety of the Polaris missile.
McNamara, however, underwent an about face on his thoughts on finite deterrence. His initial criticisms assumed that the threat of heavy civilian destruction would not be enough to prevent the Soviet leadership from still launching a first strike against the United States. As Richard Rhodes, an author who studied the origins of the nuclear arms race, asserts, The Navy's 'finite deterrence' alone would have deterred the Soviet Union, unless one believes that the Soviet leadership would have been willing to accept, in return for gambling a first strike against the United States, the complete
destruction of all its major cities and the violent death of most of its population.65
Indeed, had the Soviets been willing to risk massive civilian casualties, it is doubtful any deterrent could have worked against such an ideologically driven government. McNamara himself admitted the fallacy of his argument, stating in an interview during the 1980s that “they [the Soviet Union] are aggressive; they are ideological, they need to be restrained and contained by the existence of our defensive forces. But they are not mad[...]”66 McNamara's complete reversal of opinion came in his book on nuclear strategy, where he explicitly supports Burke's finite deterrence, which he had denounced twenty-five years previous, as a viable alternate tack against Soviet aggression.67
Even during the seventies and eighties, which reemphasized massive arms buildup for counterforce and a controversial anti-ballistic missile defense system as central components of the American nuclear strategy, the idea of finite deterrence had its place. Tensions between the Cold War powers spiked with the Strategic Defense Initiative, which the Soviets believed could only serve the purpose of counterforce, proof of the United States' intent on launching a preemptive first strike.68 During a meeting of the National Security Council in November 1982, in the midst of the debate over the basing of new ICBMs, General George Vessey of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed the importance of shifting over time to a sea-based nuclear force.69 The long-term goal, no matter the short term policy, often reflected what Admiral Burke had proposed from the beginning.
With the end of the Cold War and the diminishing threat of nuclear conflict, the path towards a reduced nuclear arsenal pointed towards finite deterrence. In his memoir, Colin Powell recalled the dramatic cuts demanded by both sides following the collapse of the Soviet Union, which included the elimination of short-range nuclear weapons, Strategic Air Command, and the
Notes
widespread Minuteman missile silos, leaving Trident submarines as the primary platform for deterrence.70 The current naval nuclear capability comprises twelve Ohio class ships on active duty at a time, each one carrying an array of twenty-four Trident D5 missiles, “an explosive force greater than all the weapons used in all the wars of history.”71 These submarines can hit targets four thousand miles away with a precision approaching that of land-based ICBMs.72 This undetectable and mobile force guarantees that even in a Post Cold War world retaliation will be sure and swift, but it still functions in an existing triad that includes aging B-52 bombers and ICBMs.
The adaptation to a new nuclear dynamic motivates the need for a new approach to deterrence. In House hearings in 2011, Dr. Keith B. Payne, Commissioner of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, noted the precedent that “no Republican or Democratic administration has accepted that kind of minimum deterrence standard for U.S. forces.”73 Such a deterrent would be based on perceived percentages of how much damage must be inflicted. However, finite deterrence, which may be confused with a minimum deterrence, bases its size on the amount of warheads needed to destroy what the enemy values, exactly what Dr. Payne states deterrence should be based upon.74 Finite deterrence continues to offer, as it did in the 1950s, a cheaper, safer alternative to the nuclear Triad. As Craven stated, the key to deterrence lies in each side being balanced, as imbalance causes instability where one side may try to circumvent the other's arsenal through a preemptive strike. With the Soviet Union shifting focus onto its submarine fleet, the United States can create a credible and balanced deterrent by following suit.75 Though fifty years in the making, finite deterrence may actually now be implemented as the policy of the United States against future nuclear threats.
Notes
1 . Richard G Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Nuclear Navy: 1946-1962 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 23-24.
2 Ibid., 201- 204.
3 Ibid., 41.
4 Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew, Blind Man's Bluff (New York: Harper Publishers, 1998), 42-55.
5 Hewlett and Duncan, Nuclear Navy: 1946-1962, 32.
6 Ibid., 33-4.
7 Ibid., 222.
8 John Craven, The Silent War: The Cold War Battle Beneath the Sea (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 35-6.
9 Ibid., 37.
10 Henry D. Sokolski, ed. Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004), 125, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ pubs/display.cfm?pubid=585.
11 Hewlett and Duncan, Nuclear Navy: 1946-1962, 308-9.
12 Craven, The Silent War, 40.
13 Tom Clancy, Submarine: A Guided Tour Inside a Nuclear Warship (New York: Berkeley, 1993), 17.
14 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin, 2005), 67.
15 Craven, The Silent War, 52-53.
16 Gaddis, The Cold War, 65.
17 Peter Pringle and William Arkin, SIOP: The Secret US Plan for Nuclear War (New York: Norton, 1983), 119-20.
18 Arleigh Burke to All Flag Officers, March 4, 1959, in How Much Is Enough?: The U.S. Navy and "Finite Deterrence" (Washington DC: National Security Archive at George
Washington University, 2009), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb275/07.pdf. 8.
19 Ibid., 9-10.
20 Ibid., 10.
21
Stephen M. Younger, The Bomb: A New History (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 54-5.
22 Burke to All Flag Officers, March 4, 1959, 10-1.
23 Gaddis, The Cold War, 66.
24 Ibid., 66-7.
25 Pringle and Arkin, SIOP, 107.
26
Robert S. McNamara, Blundering into Disaster: Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age (New York: Pantheon, 1986), 23-4.
27 Gerard H. Clarfield and William M. Wiecek, Nuclear America: Military and Civilian Nuclear Power in the United States, 1940-1980 (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), 252.
28 Pringle and Arkin, SIOP, 122.
29 Gerard H. Clarfield and William M. Wiecek, Nuclear America: Military and Civilian Nuclear Power in the United States, 1940-1980 (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), 253.
30 Ibid., 253-4.
31 Younger, The Bomb, 54-7.
32 Robert S. McNamara, Blundering into Disaster: Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age (New York: Pantheon, 1986), 50.
33 Stephen M. Younger, The Bomb: A New History (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 55.
34 Pringle and Arkin, SIOP, 116.
35 David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," International Security 7, no. 4 (Spring 1983): 7, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2626731.
36 Carl Sagan et al., interview by Fred Graham, Face the Nation, CBS, December
16, 1984.
37 L. Douglas Keeney, 15 Minutes: General Curtis LeMay and the Countdown to Nuclear Annihilation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2011), 317-8.
38 Pringle and Arkin, SIOP, 162.
39 Arleigh Burke to Joints Chiefs of Staff, December 22, 1959, in How Much Is Enough?: The U.S. Navy and "Finite Deterrence" (Washington DC: National Security Archive at George Washington University, 2009), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb275/09.pdf.
40 Arleigh Burke to Flag and General Officers, December 23, 1960, in How Much Is Enough?: The U.S. Navy and "Finite Deterrence" (Washington DC: National Security Archive at George Washington University, 2009), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb275/15.PDF.
41 Keeney, 15 Minutes, 294.
42 John Newhouse, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988), 163.
43 Ron Rosenbaum, How the End Begins: The Road to a Nuclear World War III (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 54.
44 Ibid., 54.
45 David E. Hoffman, The Dead Hand (New York: Doubleday, 2009), 7-10.
46 Ibid., 10-11.
47 Craven, The Silent War, 91-101.
48 Richard Compton-Hall, Sub Vs. Sub: The Tactics and Technology of Underwater Warfare (New York: Orion Books, 1988), 80.
49 Craven, The Silent War, 92.
50
Philip Bobbitt, Democracy and Deterrence: The History and Future of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1987), 188.
51 Ibid., 187-8.
52 Edward C. Whitman, "SOSUS: The 'Secret Weapon' of Undersea Surveillance," Undersea Warfare, Winter 2005), 1, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/usw/issue_25/sosus.htm
53 Ibid., 2.
54 Sontag and Drew, Blind Man's Bluff , 348.
55 Ibid., 172-96.
56 Ibid., 216.
57 Ibid., 191.
58 Pringle and Arkin, SIOP, 160.
59 Sontag and Drew, Blind Man's Bluff, 328-331.
60 Compton-Hall, Sub Vs. Sub, 79.
61 Ibid., 80.
62 Robert S. McNamara to John F. Kennedy, September 23, 1961, in How Much Is Enough?: The U.S. Navy and "Finite Deterrence" (Washington DC: National Security Archive at George Washington University, 2009), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb275/19.pdf.
63 Newhouse, War and Peace, 164-5.
64 Burke to Flag and General Officers, December 23, 1960.
65 Richard Rhodes, Arsenals of Folly: The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 92.
66 Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels : Reagan, Bush, and Nuclear War (New York: Random House, 1982), 221.
67 McNamara, Blundering into Disaster, 123.
68 Ibid., 98-100.
69 Minutes, Of NSC Meeting on MX Missile Basing Decisions, Nuclear Weapons, November 18th, 1982, folder NSC00066, Box 91285, Executive Secretariat NSC, NSC Meeting Files, Ronald Reagan Library.
70 Rhodes, Arsenals of Folly, 293.
71 Younger, The Bomb, 86.
72 Nigel Calder, Nuclear Nightmares (New York: Viking Press, 1980), 133-4.
73 The Status of United States Strategic Forces, 112th Cong. (2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg65112/html/CHRG-112hhrg65112.htm.
74 Ibid.
75 Rosenbaum, How the End Begins, 256-7.
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Acknowledgments:
I would like to thank first of all my family and mentors who supported me throughout the writing of this paper, providing direction and opening up opportunities for further research and growth. In particular I thank Mr. Westgate for mentoring me from the beginning and helping me guide my research, Ms. Gilbert for overseeing the editing and publication of this paper, and Ms. Smith for helping me find primary sources and restructure my paper. I also would like to thank the Reagan Presidential Library and Ms. Shelley Nayak for her assistance in the Archives Room at the Library. Finally, I wish to thank the John Near Family and the Harker School for affording me the opportunity to study this fascinating topic.