2012-13
JOHN NEAR GRANT Recipient
An Interview at Weehawken: An Extensive Analysis of the Causes and Overall Political Ramifications of the Infamous Duel
Nina Sabharwal, Class of 2013
An Interview at Weehawken:
An Extensive Analysis of the Causes and Overall Political Ramifications of the Infamous Duel
Nina Sabharwal
Near Scholar Paper
Mr. Fowler, Mentor April 12, 2013
Once Federalist Alexander Hamilton had been shot by Democratic-Republican Aaron Burr, Van Ness and Pendleton—the two eyewitnesses to the occurrence—anticipated the frenzy of false accounts and released their own “Joint Statement” in July of 1804.1 The two intermediaries agreed on minor facts about the proceedings at Weehawken with the exception of two key particulars: both Hamilton and Burr had taken a single shot each, and there was a gap of “a few seconds” between the two shots.2 Apart from these two facts, Van Ness and Pendleton’s accounts differed significantly. Pendleton, Hamilton’s second, soon claimed that Hamilton had involuntarily and subconsciously fired after Burr as a response to Burr’s shot. On the contrary, Van Ness, Burr’s second, claimed that Hamilton fired and missed Burr followed by a brief pause and then Burr’s shot at Hamilton.3 The latter disagreement was one of many in the aftermath of the duel. Moreover, stories fabricated by pro-Burr and pro-Hamilton advocates filled newspapers and pamphlets of the day, adding to the gaping uncertainty about the duel’s events.
In order to understand the “war of words” and the ambiguity in the aftermath of Burr and Hamilton’s duel, a more pressing uncertainty must be addressed.4 What were Burr and Hamilton doing at Weehawken in the first place? The men had fought for opposing parties for fifteen years and often clashed on principles but had never resorted to a duel.5 Even despite the intermeshed history between the two politicians, how had two prominent men of the law agreed to an unlawful practice? And moreover, had Burr allowed his desperation to drive him to decide to kill Hamilton during those decisive “few seconds?”
Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr’s participation in the infamous duel at Weehawken was not a clear-cut case of partisan politics. The antagonism between the two men was spurred by partisan politics and conflicting ambition, but the duel—the climax of their heated relationship—resulted from the men’s shared desire to maintain their reputations. Rather than
being part of Burr’s larger conspiracy, the duel’s tragic outcome was simply an example of the extent to which Burr and Hamilton would go to salvage their reputations and by association, their careers. An understanding about the roles of party politics and public opinion in shaping early American political relationships results from a study of this notorious duel and the men involved.
The Origins of the Dueling Practice
Perhaps to gain some perspective on the prevalence of the dueling practice, it is important to understand its history in the United States. The practice began in the middle ages in Europe, originally called “judicial combat,” and it was built upon the belief that the winner of each duel was chosen by God. In 1777, the Code Duello was put forth by a set of Irish delegates of Tipperary, Galway, Sligo, Mayo, and Roscommon that specified twenty-six regulations when partaking in a duel.6 The code covered all facets of a duel, including the protocol for the correspondence prior to a duel, time the duel was held, and more particularly the number of shots and wounds required to determine the winner. In Europe in the 18th century, the reason to resort to a duel was nearly always to defend or obtain a title of nobility.7
Amid other violent national movements—the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions in particular—the early years of the newly independent America followed a more nonviolent pattern.8 Moreover, the infant nation in the late eighteenth century wanted to differentiate its new republican government from European forms, eliminating titles of nobility in the hopes of an equal and fair society.9 Nonetheless, the dueling practice had still carried over into the American society and mindset. It remained the one exception to the dominantly peaceful American society. Americans also followed the tenets of the Irishmen’s Code Duello.10 A singularly notable difference between American duels and their European counterparts, however, was that European nobles fought to maintain their titles of nobility while American men fought to defend
their reputations.11 The code of honor put forth by the Code Duello was basic information known and abided by all American gentlemen and provided a basic code of conduct for maintaining one’s reputation. Though from the modern perspective there is high shock value in American men participating in such an antiquated practice, it had become commonplace. Men still felt as though their reputation depended heavily on the defense of their honor and dueling was the most popular choice of defense. 12
A Fluid National Government
Late eighteenth through early nineteenth century saw the formation of the first party system in the United States. On one side was Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist Party; on the other was James Madison and Thomas Jefferson’s Democratic-Republican Party, founded in response to and against Hamilton’s Federalist ideals.13 Though all American politicians at this time championed democracy and freedom, the atmosphere in Washington was tense. Not only was there political tension between the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans, but also each man wanted to individually leave his mark on the young nation. As Historian Joanne Freeman accurately states in "Dueling as Politics: Reinterpreting the Burr-Hamilton Duel,” in the volatile period of the late 18th and early 19th century “political interaction revolved around the identities and aspirations of individual politicians.”14 The U.S. government was still fluid and susceptible to change at this point, and these founding fathers saw the great possibility of leaving their own legacy on the government they helped to create.15 Furthermore, as political parties had not fully become institutionalized, politicians could not rely on their party to take the blame for their own actions, as has come to pass in recent times.16 Consequently, American politicians often entered into dueling negotiations to defend or clear their names. Freeman determined sixteen such affairs of honor amongst political figures between 1795 and 1807 alone.17 Politicians recognized that
how they were perceived by the American public would largely determine their personal honor and public careers.
It is important to note that politicians mostly used duels as a form of conflict resolution. Generally, the first step of a duel was not the duel itself, but rather extensive negotiations by the intermediaries involved in the duel.18 In Burr and Hamilton’s case, however, the negotiations were unmerited because each man wanted to come across as the victim of the other’s wrongdoing.19 Each wanted to preserve his reputation with the American people. An analysis of the fifteen-year rivalry between Burr and Hamilton and their fifteen-year rivalry reveals how their relationship degenerated into duel. While they began as rivals in parties on opposing sides, they came to be more personal threats to each other’s reputations and consequently each other’s careers.
Understanding the Two Men
Though Burr and Hamilton came from vastly different backgrounds, they both had their own personal demons. Burr had to escape the long-standing reputation and rigidity of his family and make his own path in the world. Hamilton was challenged by his illegitimacy and had to make an entire life for himself in a new country.20 Both men had ambition and both were selfmade, causing every threat to their respective careers to be intensely personal.
Aaron Burr came from a family distinguished by wealth, and a legacy of achievement.
Jonathan Edwards, his grandfather, helped shape the ideologies of the Great Awakening in New England. Moreover, though Burr’s father passed away when he was two, his credibility as a founder of the College of New Jersey and its second president added to the Burr family’s prominence. For the majority of Burr’s childhood, he was raised by his strict uncle and a private tutor. Under such rigid control, he resisted authority at every opportunity and at only thirteen he
enrolled in the College of New Jersey. After graduating within three years, Burr decided to join the Continental Army at the start of the American Revolution in 1775. He notably served on Washington’s staff alongside Alexander Hamilton, one of the two men’s first encounters. Washington questioned and insulted Burr’s character on multiple occasions, especially in 1779 when Burr resigned from the army due to illness. The two men parted ways on negative terms, and they never mended any of their disputes. As a consequence of his boss Washington’s lack of respect for Burr, Hamilton’s first impression of Burr was poor. 21
In 1782, Burr had been admitted to the New York state bar. He hoped to use his political career in the state as the first step towards a national position.22 Though Burr’s political career looked promising as he served as Thomas Jefferson’s Vice President, the Jefferson administration did not consult with Burr on many decisions largely because they did not trust his motives after the election of 1800. The tie in electoral votes between Jefferson and Burr delegated the House of Representatives to elect one of the two Democratic-Republican candidates. The Federalists in the House had to decide between the lesser of two evils—the majority favoring Burr’s more unassuming political principles to Jefferson’s idealized ones.23 Though Burr never actually encouraged the Federalists to vote for him and Jefferson did ultimately win the election, Jefferson never trusted Burr again, believing him to be morally gray. Burr became increasingly ostracized in the Jefferson administration. He even said to his son-inlaw, “I…now and then meet the [cabinet] ministers in the street,” indicating his estrangement from the administration.24
As a politician Burr’s natural inclination was also to play both sides. Even in his private life, Burr was both a “notorious womanizer and a devoted family man.” 25 His morals both personally and publicly were always questionable—at times he acted honestly and at others he
did not. Though his character swayed between two extremes, he always acted and spoke based on his own personal interests and desires.26 He shrewdly considered nearly every decision he made, placing power above what he thought was best for his country. As Historian Ron Chernow keenly notes, “Burr tended to cultivate a wary silence, a studied ambiguity, in his comments about political figures.”27 He was a wily politician who was never outspoken in denunciations of politicians so as to preserve his reputation.
Alexander Hamilton was a self-made man. Born in 1757 from an adulterous relationship to a bankrupt father and mother, Hamilton faced obstacles from early on.28 He was raised by his mother Rachel Lavien after his father abandoned them in 1765. However, only three years later, his mother passed away and Hamilton was left entirely alone.29 Fortunately enough, Hamilton found his own advocates in Nicholas Cruger, his employer, and in Hugh Knox, his teacher and clergyman. These two men helped Hamilton financially with his desire to move to America.30
After completing his education at King’s College in 1776, Hamilton decided to join the American Revolution. In 1777, he became a member of Washington’s staff in the war, working alongside Aaron Burr and eventually becoming Washington’s main advisor.31 Notably, Hamilton did not enjoy his “desk job.” He still wanted the glory that could only come from fighting in the war. 32 Though Hamilton persistently asked Washington to grant him a command, Washington held off until late in 1781, when Hamilton was appointed to an “infantry regiment attached to the Marquis de Lafayette's force.”33 From his military efforts, Hamilton received glory and recognition. Furthermore, having recently married Elizabeth Schuyler, the daughter of one of New York’s most powerful men, Hamilton’s social and financial standings were no longer in question. Due to his recent experiences in the war and under the influence of his politician father-in-law, Hamilton took up an interest in American politics. He spoke about the weak nature
of the national government when he attended the Congress of the Confederation in November 1782. Furthermore, while he began work as a lawyer, he continued to comment and criticize the actions of the government, particularly the Articles of Confederation. Hamilton helped launch the Constitutional Convention and along with contemporaries James Madison and Benjamin Franklin, he advocated a strong central government, culminating in his writing of The Federalist Papers. Because of his close support of George Washington in his run for the presidency, Hamilton was appointed to secretary of the treasury. In this position, he notably created the National Bank, assumed all state debts, and began levying excise taxes. While these acts helped build the American economy Hamilton created several enemies for himself including Thomas Jefferson, who denounced Hamilton’s policies claiming that they were reminiscent of British aristocratic methods.34
Despite his heavy involvement in the first years of American democracy, by the early 1800s, Hamilton had become disillusioned with American politics. Hamilton’s more extreme beliefs regarding the preservation of the Union were rejected by the majority of the evolving Federalist Party. With Jefferson’s popularity, Hamilton feared his own achievements would be scorned or soon forgotten. He believed that Jefferson’s popularity was mostly circumstantial because he had inherited a government that was majority Democratic-Republican and whose economy flourished due to Washington and Hamilton’s policies. Hamilton built a country house away from Manhattan to spend time with his family now that his career was on the decline. As Hamilton himself put it, “A disappointed politician is very apt to take refuge in a garden.”35
Determined to better himself at his new hobby of gardening, he also wrote to agricultural expert Richard Peters, “In this new situation, for which I am as little fitted as Jefferson [is] to guide the helm of the United States, I come to you as an adept in rural science for instruction.”36 Evidently,
Hamilton still had many personal opinions about American politics and what was best for the country he helped to build. He made his estrangement and disappointment with the current state of politics known to close friends such as Governor Morris. In a letter addressed to the governor in 1802, Hamilton expressed his belief that virtue was never rewarded nor vice punished, indicating his fear of his work being overshadowed by the Jefferson administration.37
As he spent more time away from politics, Hamilton also returned to his Christian beliefs that he had lost during the American Revolution. Largely because of his dislike of Jefferson and his predilection for deism, Hamilton rejected the godlessness of the French Revolution and Jefferson’s support of this revolution. He believed that religion formed the basis of all law and morality, and he thought the world would be a “hellish place” without it.38 This restoration of his religion also caused him to believe in abiding by the gentlemanly code of honor, and he grew very critical of dueling as he returned to the religious fervor of his youth. When Hamilton’s son Philip entangled himself in a duel, Hamilton believed a good compromise would be for Philip to throw away his first shot, a maneuver Frenchmen termed delope. Philip’s former classmate, Henry Dawson, confirmed Hamilton’s advice, claiming that “On Monday before the time appointed for the meeting…General Hamilton heard of it and commanded his son when on the ground to reserve his fire till after Mr. Eacker had shot and then to discharge his pistol in the air.” 39 Hamilton’s return to religion and his dueling advice to his son Philip indicate that he had become much more reserved and cautious after his estrangement from American politics. He was no longer the man who so bluntly and without censor spoke of his issues with politicians and policies. He seemed to have had lost the fire and desire for glory that he once had. While previously, Hamilton had spoken publically about his dislike of men like Thomas Jefferson and his bitterest opponent in the Federalist Party, John Adams, he had begun to question the intensity
of his past political disagreements. In his “Thesis on Discretion” that he imparted to his eldest son, Hamilton advised that discretion is “if not a splendid…at least a very useful virtue.”40 Moreover, he warned “the greatest abilities are sometimes thrown into the shade by this defect or are prevented from obtaining success to which they are entitled. The person on whom it is chargeable [is] also apt to make and have numerous enemies and is occasionally involved…in the most difficulties and dangers.” 41 Hamilton had evident regret over his loss of influence in American politics. As he spent more time away from Washington, he wondered what good his outspokenness against other politicians had done for him and his reputation.
Both Burr and Hamilton worked for their respective political achievements. They had ambitious agendas and were not satisfied until their influence reached the national level. Nonetheless, while Burr acted strategically and consistently with his reputation in mind, Hamilton acted more instinctually and rashly. Hamilton did not think twice about speaking out against people he disagreed with such as Jefferson, Adams, and ultimately Burr. Nevertheless, during Jefferson’s term, Hamilton began to question his outspokenness because he feared he had hurt his reputation and consequently his career. Hamilton may have suspected that his alienation from politics during Jefferson’s presidency was due to his failure to maintain his reputation with his colleagues and the public. Hamilton’s new outlook is evident in his “Thesis on Discretion” and indicates that he had begun to regard maintaining his reputation as crucial if he was to continue his political career.42
Partisan Politics Shaped Their Mistrust
While American politics seemed united on the surface, in reality there was a clear divide between the two parties. Even Jefferson who had become the face of the Glorious Revolution of 1800—a symbol of the peaceful transition from a Federalist President to a Democratic-
Republican President—was in fact highly critical of the Federalist Party. Though he publically delivered the famous lines, “We have called by different names brethren of the same principle. We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists,” he also stated privately in a letter that he would “sink Federalism into an abyss from which there shall be no resurrection.”43 These men were devoted to their parties, and tensions between them ran deep.
The partisan politics of the times shaped the way Burr and Hamilton mistrusted each other. The men began as political enemies in 1789. Betraying his loyalties to the candidate he and Hamilton had been campaigning for in the New York gubernatorial election, Burr accepted the opponent and winner George Clinton’s offer of attorney general. Hamilton was shocked at Burr’s blatant shift in allegiance, and his duplicity produced the first of Hamilton’s anti-Burr comments.44 Two years later, Burr not only defeated Hamilton’s father-in-law Philip Schuyler for a position in the senate, but also he used his new position to oppose Hamilton’s Federalist fiscal program. Furthermore, he most likely rigged New York’s 1791 gubernatorial election by aiding the Democratic-Republican opponent of Hamilton’s candidate. 45
During the 1800 election, Democratic-Republicans spread a lot of anti-Federalist propaganda. Since the election had been a tie between Jefferson and Burr, the power moved to the Federalist dominated House of Representatives to decide.46 Democratic-Republican scenarios ranged from Federalists preventing both Democratic-Republicans from winning office, to Hamilton “descending upon the capital with an army that would seize control of the government during the deadlock.” 47 Notably, Burr added to these hypotheses, prescribing “a resort to the sword” if the Federalists challenged the Democratic-Republican Party’s victory. Burr’s strong advocacy of the Democratic-Republican Party during the 1800 election certainly did not sit well with Hamilton.48
Hamilton was not passive in his clash with Burr. He responded by making a plea to the Federalists in the House of Representatives in the elections of 1800 in favor of Jefferson’s candidacy over Burr’s. He claimed that Jefferson was “by far not so dangerous a man” as Burr because at least Jefferson had “solid pretensions to character.” 49 He notably remarked that “As to Burr there is nothing in his favour…His private character is not defended by his most partial friends. He is bankrupt beyond redemption except by the plunder of his country. His public principles have no other spring or aim than his own aggrandizement…If he can he will certainly disturb out institutions to secure himself permanent power and with it wealth. He is truly the Cataline of America.” 50 Politicians took such strong remarks against Burr very seriously. Hamilton argued that Burr’s only motive was power and money. Comparing Burr to Cataline was serious accusation. Essentially Hamilton categorized Burr as an equal to the treacherous, duplicitous man whose scheming nearly ruined the Roman Republic.
Hamilton and the undecided Federalists in the House did not completely endorse Jefferson without concessions, however. Certain Federalist representatives from small states who had significant power over the election negotiated with Jefferson in exchange for their votes.
James A. Bayard of Delaware, loyal to Hamilton, significantly conversed with two of Jefferson’s friends, John Nicholas of Virginia and Samuel Smith of Maryland, and argued that Jefferson maintain Hamilton’s financial system along with several other Federalist-oriented requirements. This “Federalist deal” concluded with Jefferson’s election by a difference of ten votes.51 It is important to note that Hamilton—one of the only outspoken Federalist advocates of Jefferson for president—supported Jefferson in exchange for the guarantee of the preservation of Federalist principles in a Democratic-Republican administration. The underlying motive for Hamilton’s support of Jefferson and opposition to Burr was political partisanship.
Personal Ambition Caused Intensely Personal Clashes
While Burr being a Democratic-Republican and Hamilton being a Federalist certainly contributed to the men’s political opposition, their personal opposition stemmed from their ambitious agendas in the face of their declining influence in politics. To Hamilton, Jefferson was more an enemy of partisanship than Burr for he was the visionary of the Democratic-Republican Party whereas Burr was less idealistic or firm in his beliefs.52 In fact, it was typical for Burr to ingratiate himself to both parties so that he could side with whichever was in power. As such, Burr was more of a threat to Hamilton within the Federalist Party than against the Federalist Party.53
It was easy for men with questionable characters to take advantage of the changeable nature of the republic. Hamilton recognized Burr’s proclivity for mischief and his unsound moral fiber. He came to see Burr as a man with tremendous political skills but a threat to his standing in the Federalist Party. Equally, Burr saw Hamilton as a great obstacle to his political agenda.54
During Jefferson’s first term, Burr knew that Jefferson and his party would drop him from the ballot in the next election. Consequently, he began talks with the Federalists. To show his support for the Federalist Party, on February 22, 1802, Burr attended a Federalist gathering at Stelle’s Hotel to honor Washington’s Birthday. Though he was still vice president under a Democratic-Republican administration, Burr remained favorable to the Federalists to allow him options once his term was over.55
The 1804 campaign for governor of New York produced the worst anti-Burr remarks made by Hamilton. Having been alienated from Washington and the Democratic-Republican Party, after his term as vice president was over Burr needed a next step. Consequently, he began talks with the Federalists, suggesting he would change party and run as the Federalist candidate
in the New York gubernatorial election.56 Hamilton feared his own marginalization within the Party he had fathered.57 With Burr’s new footing amongst the Federalists, the Party began plans for a Northern secessionist movement. Hamilton was among the minority who strongly advised against this plan. He had built the foundations of the Union and he would not stand to see it dismembered. Nonetheless, an alliance with Burr would be a key strategy in the Federalists’ ploy. They needed his position as New York’s governor to capture New York and join it with the remaining northern states to form a Federalist confederacy. While Burr did not entirely accept the Federalist offer, Hamilton did everything he could to ensure Burr’s loss and therefore hinder the secessionist plans. He spread disparaging and career-damaging criticisms of Burr that were publicized in newspapers. Moreover, he sent letters to numerous Federalist leaders of the secessionist movement to cease their talks.58 Over a dinner conversation with John Trumbull, Hamilton requested that Trumbull deliver a message to the Federalist Party. To Trumbull he said, “You are going to Boston. You will see the principal men there. Tell them from ME, at MY request, for God’s sake, to cease these conversations and threats about a separation of the Union. It must hang together as long as it can be made to.” 59 Hamilton never wavered in his belief in the Union, and in the conservation of the Constitution that he had played a vital role in constructing.
Meanwhile, Burr made one last attempt to save face with the Democratic-Republican Party. He met with Jefferson on January 26, 1804 to request a “mark of favor” that Burr could release publically. Essentially, this document would state that Burr was leaving office on good terms with the President. Burr complained that Hamilton had helped the Livingstons and the Clintons—heads of major New York publications—launch campaigns against him and he needed
Jefferson to save his name. With Jefferson’s refusal to help, Burr decided to join the Federalist plot, causing Burr and Hamilton to be direct obstacles for one another.60
Preserving Reputation: Direct Motive to Duel
The role of partisan politics and personal ambition shaped the hostile relationship between Burr and Hamilton. Nevertheless, these men spent fifteen years loathing each other without ever resorting to a duel. While their history of party differences and ambitious agendas rationalized their decision to partake in a duel, what remains is a direct motive for dueling. An analysis of their correspondence immediately prior to the duel and the press’s role in fueling the men indicates Hamilton and Burr’s use of the duel as a political tool to preserve their reputations. Reputation, more than their history of opposition, was the immediate motivator to duel for both men.
The back and forth between Hamilton and Burr leading up to the duel demonstrate the two men’s concern over how they were perceived by their colleagues and the public. Beginning with the biting criticisms Hamilton spread about Burr during Burr’s campaign for New York governor, the two men’s negotiations were their way of casting the other man as the wrongdoer.
In March of 1804, four months before the fatal duel, Hamilton dined in Albany at Judge John Taylor’s home with men including Dr. Charles D. Cooper, James Kent, and Judge Taylor himself. Cooper, contemptuous of Burr, wrote a letter regarding the dinner to his friend Andrew Brown, claiming that Hamilton had said Burr was “a dangerous man and one who ought not to be trusted.”61 In little time, parts of the letter appeared in the New-York Evening Post. Schuyler, Hamilton’s father in law, wrote a letter that was also run in the post, which repeated Hamilton’s pledge to remain neutral in the governor race between Burr and Lewis. Only trying to help his son-in-law, Schuyler claimed Hamilton could have never said such things and implied that
Cooper’s story was fabricated. Cooper felt affronted by Schuyler’s statement and on April 23 he wrote a second letter, this time to Schuyler, substantiating his claim and going further in saying that that he had even been “unusually cautious” in recounting the dinner conversation and that he “could detail to [Schuyler] a still more despicable opinion which general Hamilton has expressed of Mr. Burr.” With this noteworthy statement, which later appeared in The Albany Register on April 24, 1804, Cooper indicated that there was more slander and more “despicable” remarks made by Hamilton of Burr.62
While Burr was projected to lose in any case, the publicity of Hamilton’s anti-Burr remarks had been instantly defaming, and Burr lost the race for governor.63 The fact that newspapers such as The New-York Evening Post and The Albany Register published stories about Hamilton’s anti-Burr remarks contributed to Burr’s increasing frustration with Hamilton. Burr was aware that public opinion meant his whole career. That a noteworthy politician such as Hamilton had said “despicable” statements about Burr’s character, especially around the time of Burr’s gubernatorial campaign, caused Burr to see a direct relation between Hamilton’s attacks at his reputation and his declining political career. Burr saw Hamilton as his ultimate threat and a way to rationalize his unsuccessful career.
On June 18, after his election defeat, Burr received a copy of the paper with Cooper’s letter, with an unknown sender. Burr confronted Hamilton stating, “You might perceive, Sir, the necessity of a prompt and unqualified acknowledgement or denial of the use of any expressions which could warrant the assertions of Dr. Cooper.” 64 This statement began the extensive written correspondence between the two men that eventually erupted in their fatal duel. To Burr’s request of disavowal of his statements, Hamilton admitted that he had “no personal knowledge” of the remarks that Cooper suggested. While Burr had swallowed Hamilton’s accusations of his
bankruptcy, profligacy, and unprincipled nature during the 1800 election, this time he was not invulnerable to Hamilton’s statements. Burr knew that his political career had no future after losing the gubernatorial election, and he needed to redeem himself in the public eye. In a conversation with a friend, Burr expressed that: It is too well known that Genl. Hamilton had long indulged himself in illiberal freedoms with my character…On two different occasions, however, having reason to apprehend that he had gone so far as to afford me a fair occasion for calling on him, he anticipated me by coming forward voluntarily and making apologies and concessions. From delicacy to him and from a sincere desire for peace, I have never mentioned these circumstances, always hoping the generosity of my conduct would have some influence on his.65 Burr explained himself as a victim of Hamilton’s conduct. He claimed that there were two other instances when he could have challenged Hamilton to a duel but he was generous enough to accept Hamilton’s apology and make peace.
It is significant to note that Burr’s confrontation of Hamilton lacked substance. Cooper’s statement about Hamilton’s slander only suggested that he had said something “despicable.” What exactly Hamilton had said of Burr remained undisclosed.66 Since Hamilton’s actual comments had not been revealed, an immediate way to resolve the media controversy would have been for Hamilton to refute that he had said any comments that matched Cooper’s description and apologize for the press implying that he had criticized Burr. Nonetheless, Hamilton also resisted settling issues with Burr, fearing his colleagues and the American public would see him as a coward. Moreover, having been alienated by the Federalist Party, Hamilton was furious with Burr’s conspiring with the Federalists for secession, fearful of his loss of influence over politics, and as a result too stubborn and proud to apologize. Hamilton played to
the ambiguity of the entire situation, noticing that “without manifest impropriety” he was given no reason to defend himself. 67 He tried to portray himself as the rational one, expressing his confidence that soon Burr “[would] see the matter in the same light as [him].” 68 Otherwise, Hamilton ominously said that he would “only regret the circumstances, and must abide the consequences.” 69 Hamilton’s response was as firm as Burr’s allegations of Hamilton’s slander. By the latter statement, he made clear he would not apologize for anything, no matter the cost. The men’s back and forth continued and only increased in scale—with even greater insults. Burr remarked that Hamilton was “a duplicitous character” who was devoid of “the Spirit to Maintain or the Magnanimity to retract” his words.70 Moreover, with the feud becoming more heated, Burr demanded an even larger apology from Hamilton: “a General disavowal of any intention on the part of Genl Hamilton in his various conversations to convey impressions derogatory to the honor of M. Burr.” 71 What Van Ness relayed was that Burr now wanted an apology applying to every insult Hamilton had ever said of Burr. Under Pendleton’s counsel as his intermediary, Hamilton tried to change the subject of the negotiations from an affair of honor to an affair of political principle. He claimed that he had only criticized “the political principles and view of Col. Burr…without reference to any instance of past conduct, or to private character.” 72 Since duels were based on solely personal charges, the negotiations for a duel should have ceased with this situation. Nonetheless Hamilton’s stubbornness to admit this earlier had allowed Burr’s anger and frustration to grow. Now Burr would have nothing less than an apology from Hamilton for all comments made against both his personal and private character. As Van Ness explained, “No denial or declaration will be satisfactory…unless it be general, so as to wholly exclude the idea that rumors derogatory to Col. Burr’s honor have originate with Genl Hamilton or have been fairly inferred from anything he has said.” 73 While Pendleton and Van Ness continued to
negotiate after this settlement for Hamilton to exit honorably, Burr’s patience had run low and on June 27, 1804, Burr formally invited Hamilton to the “interview at Weehawken” for he saw that “a satisfactory redress…[could not] be obtained.” 74
Hamilton requested time to restore order to his personal life and finish tasks at his law practice. In this time he also wrote various documents to explain himself and his decisions regarding the duel preemptively so as to protect his reputation. In his “Statement on the Impending Duel,” he justified that his participation in the duel was socially, morally, religiously, and politically acceptable. He would participate in the duel, maintaining his honor amongst his colleagues and the American public. But he would reserve his first shot, complying with his devotion to Christianity.75 On all accounts, Hamilton assured that his reputation would not be tarnished or his career ruined. Hamilton reveals his desperation to maintain his place in politics and his image among the American people. He addressed “those, who with me abhorring the practice of Dueling may think that I ought on no account to have added to the number of bad examples” and notably said:
All the considerations that constitute what men of the world denominate honor, impressed on me (as I thought) a peculiar necessity not to decline the call. The ability to be in future useful, whether in resisting mischief or effecting good, in those crises of our public affairs, which seem likely to happen, would probably be inseparable from a conformity with public prejudice in this particular.76
Hamilton admitted that he felt his career and his “ability to be in future useful…in those crises of our public affairs” were at stake if he refused a duel. Partisan politics and character aside, Hamilton ultimately agreed to the duel not because he despised Burr, but because his reputation and by consequence his career was at stake. Similarly, Burr ended negotiations and formally
requested the duel because he was threatened by “secret whispers traducing his fame and impeaching his honor.” 77 Hamilton had played a large role in harming Burr’s career and with little vision of a next step, Burr wanted to salvage his reputation and career by winning in a duel against the man that had cost him many losses. The media is a testament to the importance of public appearance and reputation; the press heavily influenced the actions taken by both Burr and Hamilton during their negotiations. James Cheetham, editor of the newspaper American Citizen, was particularly vocal in his articles about Hamilton and Burr’s relationship—antagonizing both men. He wrote that Burr “put into operation a most extensive, complicated, and wicked scheme of intrigue to place himself in the presidential chair.”78 Damaging statements such as these compelled Burr to become defensive. Burr believed Cheetham and other propagandists were running a conspiracy to destroy him and his career. Reporter Robert Troup noted of all the anti-Burr press that “Burr is a gone man and…all his cunning, enterprise, and industry will not save him.”79 Burr needed some way to reclaim his reputation and demonstrating his courage in a duel with the famous Alexander Hamilton could have been his way of doing so. Regarding Hamilton, Cheetham wrote that Hamilton had returned to his aristocratic ways and said he “was a native of that part of the civilized world where tyranny and slavery prevail in a manner even unknown to the despots of Europe. It was utterly impossible that the habits and prejudices he contracted in infancy could even have been eradicated.”80 Cheetham played on Hamilton’s feelings of being alienated from American politics. Throughout his life Hamilton felt like an outsider and especially in his final years, Hamilton felt his legacy slipping from him.81 Accusations made by Cheetham only provoked Hamilton’s newfound determination to defend his honor as he detailed in his “Thesis on Discretion.” Hamilton would not stand for his revolutionary work in American politics to be
destroyed or forgotten. Refusing to duel with Aaron Burr would have portrayed Hamilton as a coward and would have allowed men such as Cheetham to ruin the public opinion of Hamilton.
The Duel
Some scholars argue Burr fired at Hamilton with the intention of killing him on the morning of July 11, 1804, and the duel was part of Burr’s larger conspiracy to remove Hamilton as a threat.82 Nonetheless, it is more probable that the two men resorted to the duel due to their long-standing opposition over the course of fifteen years and their respective desires to protect their reputations. While it is impossible to know beyond a reasonable doubt whether Aaron Burr intentionally fired a mortal shot at Hamilton, there is reason to believe his aim was merely to injure Hamilton. Firstly, Burr had nothing to gain by killing Hamilton, for such an action would have terminated his already vulnerable career.83 For a man who cared desperately about his reputation and who was careful with every word he spoke, surely Burr would have considered the harm killing an esteemed man such as Hamilton would do to his career.
Moreover, on the morning of the two men’s encounter during the pre-duel negotiations, Burr agreed that only one doctor would be needed and “even that unnecessary” for he believed no one would be seriously injured.84 Most duelists intending to injure but not kill their opponents aimed for the hips and legs.85 The fact that Burr’s bullet missed Hamilton’s hip by only two or three inches could suggest Hamilton’s mortal wound had been intended by Burr to be merely superficial. Finally, upon shooting Hamilton, Burr’s immediate, natural reaction was to run over to Hamilton. He stumbled over to Hamilton to speak with him but Van Ness pulled Burr away from the scene and took him to his boat back to New York.86 The fact that both Van Ness and Pendleton agree that Burr’s expression upon Hamilton’s fall was of shock and horror implies certainty that Burr was shaken by the sequence of events and clearly had not expected any fatal
injuries that morning. His shock also suggests the duel was intended as a symbol of the two men’s fight for honor.
Immediate and Broader Ramifications
Aware of public interest and anxious to protect their principals’ reputations, Pendleton and Van Ness began to draft an account of the duel almost immediately after Hamilton’s death. By July 16, 1804, they had sketched out their “Joint Statement” detailing the events on the dueling ground, though they did not fully agree on key facts.87 In spite of their disagreements, Pendleton was eager to publish the statement immediately. He knew he could take advantage of the public intrigue and laud Hamilton at Burr’s expense. Nonetheless, Van Ness recognized the benefits of delaying publishing for Burr’s reputation.88 While nothing could completely eradicate the fact that Burr killed Hamilton, postponing their “Joint Statement” would allow the public frenzy to lessen and do less harm to the public opinion of Burr.89 The duel did not end with Burr’s shot at Hamilton. As the duel was ultimately a political tool used by the two men to improve their public images, it would only be resolved once the general opinion about the duel was settled. Pendleton published his statement without Van Ness’s approval in the New York Evening Post on July 16th. Van Ness reciprocated, publishing a more Burr-friendly account in the Morning Chronicle on July 17th.90 Both the American Citizen and New York Evening Post joined in high praise of Hamilton and condemned Burr as a murderer.91 Burr was outraged that “thousands of absurd falsehoods [were] circulated with industry.”92 Burr was forced to flee New York but his supporters continued to defend his reputation. Rather than justifying Burr’s actions, they attacked Hamilton supporters for their hypocritical and self-interested newspaper campaigns against Burr.93 Ultimately, there was more public support for Hamilton as he came to be portrayed as a hero and a victim of Burr’s political scheme.94
Burr spent the rest of his life trying to set the historical record straight. He hoped with the memoirs he would leave as his legacy; “at last, his countrymen should know him as he was.” 95 Moreover, even Jefferson who had been outspoken in his dislike for Hamilton and his ideals struggled for the rest of his life, trying to portray his relationship with Hamilton in a better light. Jefferson hoped to end his political career and leave a legacy as a moral, liberal politician rather than a “petty and vindictive” one. He even went so far as to put Hamilton’s bust in the entrance to Monticello in order to convey a sense of amnesty between him and the tragic Hamilton.96
Duels, particularly the publicized Burr-Hamilton duel, brought to light the strong role reputation played in a man’s career. Even if a politician was simply associated with an immoral politician, the former politician would see his career collapse. As Matthew Davis—a secondary intermediary during the negotiations between Burr and Hamilton—wrote to William P. Van Ness, “On the subject…of attachment to men, both of us, I think, have learned sufficient to know the folly of connecting our political destiny with that of any Individual; and more especially when the views and conduct of that Individual is not in unison with the wishes and expectations of the party.” 97 Both men acknowledged the demise of their political careers due to Burr’s downfall. Because they were associated with a man whose reputation had been destroyed by the duel, their own reputations had consequently been tarnished. Moreover, Davis provides a keen analysis of the politics of the times. Men acted of their own volition and were held accountable by the public if their actions had poor consequences. Reputation was both the motivation and the punishment. Reputation governed men through fear and guided their actions through the desire to win public favor.
In the formative stages of American politics, reputation was a politician’s highest stratagem. More significantly, politicians typically acted individually. Though they generally
worked alongside men who shared similar views, each man was responsible for the political action he took. Politicians including Hamilton and Burr in the late 18th and early 19th centuries were working with a government that was still fluid. Stakes were high and there were no precedents or models that these men could follow. It was vital for every politician working in Washington to maintain his honor and for others to believe him to be virtuous; a reputation as a corrupt official could ruin a career. Burr and Hamilton clashed due to their party differences and their ambitious agendas for fifteen years before their opposition resulted in a duel. Leading up to their duel, the men faced declining political influence and saw the duel as a tool to preserve their reputations. Neither man would entertain the pre-duel negotiations, fearing coming across as a coward. Provoked by the press, Burr and Hamilton could not risk a reputation as the weaker man. The relationship between Burr and Hamilton suggested the dire consequences of party politics and public opinion on political rivals in the formative stages of the nation. What is ironic then is that while both men decided to duel to revive their respective careers, the duel had an adverse effect. Though in different ways, the duel ended any chance at a political revival for Burr and Hamilton.
Notes
1 David Colbert, ed., Eyewitness to America: 500 years of America in the words of those who saw it happen (New York: Pantheon Books, 1997), 109.
2 William P. Van Ness and Nathaniel Pendleton, "Joint Statement by William P. Van Ness and Nathaniel Pendleton on the Duel between Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr," The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=ARHN-print01-26-02-0001-0275
3 Joseph John Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 27.
4 Ibid.
5 Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary, 39.
6 "Dueling," in U.S. History in Context, ed. Ronald Gottesman and Richard Maxwell Brown (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1999), last modified 1999, accessed March 27, 2013.
7 LaVaque-Manty and LaVaque-Manty, "Dueling for Equality: Masculine," 718.
8 Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary, 39.
9 "The Constitution of the United States," Article 1, Section 9, Clause 8.
10 "Dueling," in U.S. History in Context.
11 Ibid.
12 Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary, 40-41.
13 August Greeley, Pistols and Politics: Alexander Hamilton's Great Duel (New York: Rosen Pub. Group, 2004).
14 Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National, 308.
15 Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary, 40.
16 Joanne B. Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic (New Haven: Yale Nota Bene, 2002), 227.
17 Joanne B. Freeman, "Dueling as Politics: Reinterpreting the Burr-Hamilton Duel," The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 53, no. 2 (April 1996): 295, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2947402.
18 Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary, 43
19 Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary, 46
20 Greeley, Pistols and Politics: Alexander Hamilton's Great Duel
21 "Aaron Burr," in ABC-CLIO, http://puffin.harker.org:2308/Search/Display/195797?terms=hamilton+and+duel
22 "Aaron Burr," in ABC-CLIO, http://puffin.harker.org:2308/Search/Display/195797?terms=hamilton+and+duel.
23 Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary, 42.
24 Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton (New York, NY: Penguin Group, 2004), 633.
25 "Aaron Burr," in ABC-CLIO, http://puffin.harker.org:2308/Search/Display/195797?terms=hamilton+and+duel.
26 Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary, 41-42
27 Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, 682.
28 Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, 23.
29 Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, 24.
30 "Alexander Hamilton," in American History, accessed March 27, 2013, http://puffin.harker.org:2311/
31 Ibid.
32 Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, 112.
33 "Alexander Hamilton," in American History
34 Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, 634.
35 Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, 642.
36 Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, 643.
37 Ibid.
38 Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, 645.
39 Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, 653.
40 Alexander Hamilton, "Thesis on Discretion," The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, accessed March 27, 2013, http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=FGEA-chron1800-1804-06-00-5#ARHN-01-26-02-0001-0242-0002-fn-0002
41 Hamilton, "Thesis on Discretion.”
42 Ibid.
43 Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, 635.
44 Greeley, Pistols and Politics: Alexander Hamilton's Great Duel
45 Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary, 41-46.
46 William Joseph Rorabaugh, "The Political Duel in the Early Republic: Burr v. Hamilton," Journal of the Early Republic 15, no. 1 (1995): accessed December 8, 2012, http://puffin.harker.org:2076/stable/3124381?seq=2.
47 Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, 635.
48 Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, 633-637.
49 Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary, 41-46.
50 Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, 633.
51 Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, 634.
52 Ibid.
53 Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary, 41-46.
54 Ibid.
55 Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, 678.
56 Rorabaugh, "The Political Duel in the Early Republic: Burr v. Hamilton.”
57 Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary, 41-46.
58 Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, 679.
59 Ibid.
60 Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, 678.
61 Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, 685.
62 Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, 682.
63 Nancy Isenberg, Fallen Founder: The Life of Aaron Burr (New York, N.Y.: Viking, 2007), 110.
64 Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary, 32.
65 Qtd. in Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary, 34.
66 Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary, 32.
67 Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary, 33.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary, 34.
71 Ibid.
72 Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary, 35.
73 Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary, 37.
74 Ibid.
75 Alexander Hamilton, "Statement on Impending Duel with Aaron Burr," The Alexander Hamilton Papers, 279, accessed March 27, 2013, http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=ARHN-search-12&expandNote=on#match
76 Hamilton, "Statement on Impending Duel.”
77 Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary, 37.
78 Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary, 35.
79 Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, 678.
80 Ibid.
81 Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, 642.
82 Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary, 21.
83 Isenberg, Fallen Founder: The Life, 115.
84 Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary, 46.
85 Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National, 281.
86 Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary, 30-31.
87 Colbert, Eyewitness to America: 500 years, 109.
88 Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National, 281.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National, 303.
92 Aaron Burr, Mary-Jo Kline, and Joanne Wood Ryan, Political Correspondence and Public Papers of Aaron Burr (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), 887.
93 Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National, 303.
94 Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary, 21.
95 Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National, 281.
96 Ibid.
97 Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National, 227.
Bibliography
"Aaron Burr." In ABC-CLIO. Accessed December 8, 2012. http://puffin.harker.org:2308/Search/Display/195797?terms=hamilton+and+duel.
More good information on Aaron Burr and his relationship with Hamilton. A lot about the men's history of hostility with one another.
"Aaron Burr." In Compton's Encyclopedia. Accessed December 8, 2012. http://school.eb.com/comptons/article-9273412.
Good historical information about Burr and information about Burr and Hamilton's relationship. Provides some facts that point to earlier tensions building between the combatants before the duel.
"Alexander Hamilton." In American History. Accessed March 27, 2013. http://puffin.harker.org:2311/.
Detailed background on Hamilton's life before becoming a politician. Describes his selfmade career.
Burr, Aaron, Mary-Jo Kline, and Joanne Wood Ryan. Political Correspondence and Public Papers of Aaron Burr. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983.
Collection of primary source documents written by Aaron Burr. Includes informative letters he wrote to trusted friends, confiding in them about his forthcoming duel with Alexander Hamilton.
Chernow, Ron. Alexander Hamilton. New York, NY: Penguin Group, 2004.
Detailed look at Alexander Hamilton. Provides his entire history and much about his life apart from the political arena. Helps to understand why he always acted defensively and fought for his ideals.
Colbert, David, ed. Eyewitness to America: 500 years of America in the words of those who saw it happen. New York: Pantheon Books, 1997.
Great recount of the compromises the intermediaries, Van Ness and Pendleton, made immediately following the duel's result.
"Dueling." In U.S. History in Context, edited by Ronald Gottesman and Richard Maxwell Brown. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1999. Last modified 1999. Accessed March 27, 2013.
Understanding dueling's place in America. Makes it clear that dueling was not uncommon and was not as romantic and extreme as it may seem from the modern perspective.
Ellis, Joseph John. Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000.
The best book to understand the two men separately and their political feud. It helped me realize that political partisanship was just one of the catalysts for their duel. There was so much more at stake for Burr and Hamilton apart from defending their parties. They were defending their role in shaping this new nation.
Freeman, Joanne B. Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic. New Haven: Yale Nota Bene, 2002.
Freeman offers great insight into the use of dueling as a political weapon. Moreover, she analyzes the importance of honor in determining a politician's career.
———. "Dueling as Politics: Reinterpreting the Burr-Hamilton Duel." The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 53, no. 2 (April 1996): 289-318. Accessed March 27, 2013. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2947402.
Great article that discusses the dueling practice as a means of problem solving. With reference to the Burr-Hamilton duel, Freeman examines the correspondence between Burr and Hamilton leading up to their duel and relates the numerous instances they could have prevented a duel.
Greeley, August. Pistols and Politics: Alexander Hamilton's Great Duel. New York: Rosen Pub. Group, 2004.
Greeley provides a detailed telling of the interwoven lives of Burr and Hamilton. Useful in understanding the significant amount of times they opposed each other in the political arena.
Hamilton, Alexander. Federalist No. 70. N.p., 1788. Accessed March 27, 2013. http://billofrightsinstitute.org/founding-documents/primary-source-documents/thefederalist-papers/federalist-papers-no-70/.
Work written by Hamilton that provides his view that multiple people as the executive power would not function best for the nation. He saw the need for each politician to be held accountable for his own actions, instead of shifting the blame.
———. "Statement on Impending Duel with Aaron Burr." The Alexander Hamilton Papers, 279. Accessed March 27, 2013. http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=ARHN-search-12&expandNote=on#match.
Hamilton's justification of the duel with Aaron Burr. He explains that he is justified in every sense: morally, religiously, politically, and socially.
———. "Thesis on Discretion." The Papers of Alexander Hamilton. Accessed March 27, 2013. http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=FGEA-chron-1800-180406-00-5#ARHN-01-26-02-0001-0242-0002-fn-0002.
Imparts advice from Hamilton to his son. Hamilton advises his son to act with discretion, for creating enemies as Hamilton did, was not wise. The papers shows Hamilton's remorse in the final years of his life about his outspokenness against other politicians.
Hamilton, Alexander, Harold Coffin Syrett, and Jacob Ernest Cooke. The Papers of Alexander Hamilton. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961.
Primary resource that provides a collection of letters and essays written by Hamilton himself.
Isenberg, Nancy. Fallen Founder: The Life of Aaron Burr. New York, N.Y.: Viking, 2007.
An interesting take on Burr's history. Isenberg offers a unique biography in favor of Burr. While most historians portray Burr as the villain of the early republic, Isenberg claims he acted no less morally than the other politicians of his time.
LaVaque-Manty, Mika, and Mika Le LaVaque-Manty. "Dueling for Equality: Masculine Honor and the Modern Politics of Dignity." Political Theory 34, no. 6 (December 2006): 71540. Accessed March 27, 2013. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20452507.
Great for understanding history of dueling in the Western World. Discusses its origins as as aristocratic practice and its connection to a defense of honor.
Rorabaugh, William Joseph. "The Political Duel in the Early Republic: Burr v. Hamilton." Journal of the Early Republic 15, no. 1 (1995): 1-23. Accessed December 8, 2012. http://puffin.harker.org:2076/stable/3124381?seq=2.
Rorabaugh provides a lengthy description of the duel. He has keen insight into the role of reputation as a deciding factor for the two men to duel.
Van Ness, William P., and Nathaniel Pendleton. "Joint Statement by William P. Van Ness and Nathaniel Pendleton on the Duel between Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr." The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 333. Accessed March 27, 2013. http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=ARHN-print-01-26-020001-0275.
Van Ness and Pendleton disagreed on many aspects of the duel between Burr and Hamilton but they agreed on two significant details that they published in this Joint Statement.