The International Academic - I : CRISIS by The International Academic

iii

The International

ACADEMIC

The International

A word from the Editor in Chief Hello and welcome to the International Academic, a peer reviewed journal which aims to provide an academic platform for all students at the University of Aberdeen (and even those outside of the University) to share their opinions and views on various current political matters. The year of 2015/16 was very eventful and many different issues, especially political ones, arose questioning many of our values, understandings and opinions of the world. For this reasons the journal decided to go with the thought provoking headline “CRISIS” for its very first issue in order to incorporate as many different current events as possible. This issue contains articles concerning everything from U.S and Russian relations, the Environmental Crisis in China, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict written by both Students and scholars at our university. The International Academic began as an idea of the Politics and International Relations committee in order for more students to share their academic voice on our campus. Late October 2015 a whole external team of 16 individuals on a volunteering basis came together, devoting their time and effort, to create what is now an online based academic journal published under the remit of the University of Aberdeen Politics and International Relations society. The International Academic journal committee/team consisted of many different roles and responsibilities that range from production associate, section editors, digital director, chiefs of production, only to name a few, all the way to editor/s in chief and publisher. Through great cooperation and hard work we are today able to provide you with a great piece of work. The journal is set up in 3 different” tiers”. Tier one for non-honours students (year 1 and 2), tier 2 honours students (year 3 and 4) and tier 3 (teachers, scholars and individuals outside of the university) in order to really cater to the various levels of experience we have at our university. We encourage everyone, at all different levels of education and experience, to be a part of the journal and, if you are not a part of this issue, we look forward to seeing your contribution in coming issues. Please just see the guidelines for contribution or speak to any committee member. I would like to take this opportunity to thank everyone involved from contributor to creator to reader. It has truly been a team effort from many active people and without all of you this publication would not have been possible. Thank you to the International Academic committee for all of your hard work and for turning an idea into reality. Thank you to all contributors for all the material you provided. We hope we have made your work shine brighter and that this is something you are proud to be a part of. Last but not least, thank you to our readers. We, the Politics and International Relations society committee and the International Academic journal committee, hope that you will enjoy the journal and will, in the future, contribute to it. Thank you again to the International Academic Committee/Team. It has been a pleasure working with all of you!

Kind regards, ChristiAnne A . M Huntsman Editor in Chief/Publisher President of the Politics and International Relations society 2015/2016

Team Editor in Chief/Publisher ChristiAnne A.M. Huntsman

Deputy Editor in Chief Corey Cowan

Chiefs of Production Michela Siuni Emilia Saario

Sub Editors: Maria Elena Camarascu Satu Kuitunen

Editors: North American Affairs Alexandra Sundmark European and Russian Affairs Heidi Möttus North African and Middle-Eastern Affairs Julien Loury-Levrel Latin-American Affairs Katrin Wagner Asian-Pacific Affairs Felix Wiebrecht International Affairs

Marketing Director

Finn Sperber

Lea Henkel

Digital Director

Production Associates

Gabi Lipan

András Mellas

IT Associate

Joseph Méar

Dean Brooks

Contents The Deterioration in Western-Russian Relations

The Chinese Environmental Crisis

Earth, Wood, Water and Air

Costing the Chinese Economic Miracle

For a value-based interpretation of political crises

The Never-ending Scandal

Brazilian Corruption and Possible Policy Actions

The Civil War in Yugoslavia

and the Involvement of the International Community

The contemporary New Right:

Racist, Xenophobic, or Culturally Fundamentalist? Political crisis in Western Europe

My Land, Your Land?

Acknowledging Socio-Psychological Barriers in Search of Solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Weaponised history in international relations: Historical narratives as policy tools in the after math of Ukrainian crisis of 2014

Vladimir Putin and Barack Obama held a bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. September 2015 | Source: kremlin.ru

1 The Deterioration in Western-Russian Relations Tier1

BERGER NIKLAS European and Russian Affairs This article offers an overview on the recent deterioration in relations between the Western Community and the Russian Federation, as well on disputes in foreign policy key-points and strategic interests of both sides. The author adopts a post-structuralist position and argues that the disputes between the West and Russia are mainly caused by a distrustful feeling on both sides, expansionist policies and different strategic concerns. In conclusion, the author proposes as measures the increasing transparent cooperation between the West and Russia in order to accommodate the security concerns of both parties, along with adopting a flexible foreign policy on both sides in order to adapt to the realities of a volatile and changeable global environment.

his article analyses the roots of the

article takes a post-structuralist perspective, argu-

deterioration in Western-Russian re-

ing that even though sometimes policies would still

lations and suggests possible modifi-

fit the classic Cold War scheme of realism, Western

cations to the current Western ap-

-Russian relations in todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s globalised world con-

proach to Russia under Putin. It argues that the ag-

stantly remain subject to change and contain many

gravated climate is a result of Russian security con-

more dimensions than in the past. It suggests a du-

cerns, which are also associated with the feeling of

al-track approach in an attempt to provide solu-

being treated disrespectfully by the West and fears

tions for these problems. The first component is the

of a resurgent Russia. Also, it scrutinises the ambiv-

upholding of current sanctions and monitoring

alence in Western-Russian relations when it comes

compliance with international law. The second

to the Russian intervention in Syria under the ban-

track postulates the respectful treatment of Russia,

ner of combating the Islamic State. In general, the

awareness and accommodation of its security con-

The Deterioration in Western-Russian Relations

cerns and provision of stronger incentives for a se-

sidering power maximisation as a country’s ulti-

rious Russian contribution to finding a peaceful so-

mate goal and viewing international relations as a

lution for the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine.

zero-sum game has become obsolete, with the con-

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia found itself in a very difficult position, having to reform its complete economic, political and military system. At the same time, the United States became the only global superpower, constituting a

paradigm shift in international relations. NATO was not challenged by any other military alliance

cept of support for ‘enemy’s enemies’ becoming impracticable. Instead, a post-structuralist approach, taking into account the ambivalence and the perpetual change in international relations, is much more appropriate in analysing current realities, since the world is now much more globalised and it is much harder to distinguish ‘friend’ and ‘foe’.

like the Warsaw Pact anymore. ‘The task of “spread

The current Russian intervention in Syria is a case

[ing] the values of freedom and democracy that are

in point. Ending support for the Assad family, who

at the heart of our transatlantic partnership” be-

has been a long-term partner of the USSR and Rus-

came a key aspect of the post-Cold War role of

sia, would cause uncertainty about Russian military

NATO’ (Gheciu, 2005: 69). Despite cooperation on

bases in Syria. They are of great strategic signifi-

several levels, through programs like the Partner-

cance to Russia, since they constitute Russia’s only

ship for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership

access to the Mediterranean. In protecting its stra-

Council, some in Russia felt betrayed by the West

tegic interests, Russia was arguably emboldened by

following the demise of the USSR. Evidence for this

its successes in the dismantlement of Syrian WMD

can be found in the claims by Russian officials that

arsenal as well as by its role as a party to the Irani-

NATO expansion contravenes promises made by

an nuclear deal. The interest of maintaining Assad’s

US and German officials in 1990 not to expand into

grip on power is almost exclusive to Russia and

Central and Eastern Europe, which are however

Iran.

disputed by NATO (NATO, 2014). This sense of betrayal may be the key in understanding in Putin’s desire to regain respect for the Russian Federation as a global power with its own legitimate sphere of influence.

Conversely, the intervention’s declared goal of defeating the Islamic State is shared by many other states, including, for example, Saudi-Arabia, the

UAE and Qatar, who favour the removal of Assad from the levers of power. The West itself is divided

The debate on NATO expansion and its legitimacy

in its views, since its original aim had been the re-

would still fit the Cold War realist logic, since the

placement of Assad by moderate rebels, but some

United States arguably sought to maximise power

countries now accept Assad as a temporary partner

as the only superpower, while Russia seeks to reas-

in the fight against the IS. This creates a major am-

sert its old status through actions like the annexa-

bivalence in Western-Russian relations, further in-

tion of the Crimea in 2014. However, more broadly,

creased by the multitude of rebel groups and their

the domain of international relations has become

often unclear aims and ideologies as well as the re-

much more complex due to the lack of a clearly de-

sulting constant changes. On the one hand, Russia

fined ideological rivalry and due to the rise of asym-

appears like a possible partner for the West in

metric conflicts like the Afghan civil war following

fighting ISIS, but, on the other hand, there is con-

the completion of the Soviet withdrawal in 1989.

siderable Western mistrust, since it is feared that

Therefore, the traditional realist approach of con-

Russia wishes to pursue its own agenda rather than

“

The International Academic

4 anything else. In general, there is great suspicion

and shaping the system of international rela-

among both sides, meaning that a small change in

tions.

the situation could potentially have a significant impact on Western-Russian relations, making them highly volatile. Furthermore, there is considerable fear of an expansionist Russia across states that were formerly part of the Eastern Bloc, prompting many states

like Estonia, Poland and Georgia amongst others, to hold large-scale military exercises to increase readiness for a case of Russian aggression (Birnbaum, 2015). However, as critics acknowledged in May 2015 already, the increase in defensive measures may antagonise Putin (Birnbaum, 2015). Essentially, this is exactly what happened, since Vladimir Putin ‘told reporters that his government would be compelled to direct its military forces at any coun-

try engaged in a military buildup against Russia’ in reaction to ‘plans under consideration by the Obama administration to permanently position battle tanks and other heavy military equipment in Eastern Europe’ (Williamson, 2015). In contrast to Eastern European fears of expansionism, Russia arguably perceives its policies as a legitimate defence of its hard-power security interests. Evidence of the Russian perspective on their role in foreign policy may be found in a foreign policy concept approved by President Putin on February 12th, 2013 (Russian Foreign Ministry, 2013):

It may be argued that, despite successful cooperation with Russia in other areas, it remains necessary to uphold the current sanctions condemning Russian support for the insurgency in Eastern Ukraine, since anything apart from a clear condemnation with resulting consequences would create a dangerous precedent that could potentially be exploited by other major powers. Western states must continue to uphold international law, while also carefully monitoring their own adherence to the rules they defend. On the other hand, the West should still negotiate with Russia at eye-level, show more awareness of Russian security concerns and try to accommodate them through institutions like the NATO-Russia Council, while avoiding potentially provocative rhetoric of Russia as a ‘regional power’ to prevent any feelings of condescension. Also, this article suggests the introduction of stronger incentives for Russia to contribute to peaceful solutions of conflicts in Syria and Ukraine, for example offering possible increased economic cooperation in different fields. Furthermore, in a world which is as complex and dynamic as today, it

is imperative to remain flexible and adaptable to rapid changes in global affairs. To conclude, this article argues that the first main

“

reason for the recent deterioration in WesternRussian relations is Russian policy, guided by a

Rapid acceleration of global processes in the

feeling of betrayal, being denied its legitimate sta-

first decade of the 21st century and growing

tus and respect for its strategic concerns in interna-

new trends in global development require new

tional affairs and the fear that any vacuum left by a

approaches to key aspects of the rapidly changing situation in the world and a new vision of priorities in Russia’s foreign policy, taking into account Russia’s increased responsibility for setting the international agenda

less assertive foreign policy would be filled by its opponents. Secondly, former members of the Eastern Bloc are concerned about an expansionist Russia and therefore prompting own and NATO military measures to increase security, which has however caused Russia to threaten military counter-

The Deterioration in Western-Russian Relations

5 measures. Thirdly, conflicting positions of the West and Russia over Syria’s future create considerable ambivalence and volatility in mutual relations, resulting in suspicion and mistrust. In general, even

Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. NATO, (2015). Fact sheet: Russia’s accusations setting the record straight. [online] Available at:

though some aspects of Western-Russian relations

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/

would still fit the old realist theory, it can be argued

topics_109141.htm [Accessed 30 Oct. 2015].

that a post-structuralist perspective is more suitable to analyse the recent development of WesternRussian relations, since it takes the ambivalence and the constant change in today’s complex globalised world into account. In an attempt to efficiently tackle these problems, this author suggests a double

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (2013). Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs - The

foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation. [online] Available at: http://archive.mid.ru/ bdomp/

-track policy. Its first part consists of applying hard

nsos-

power and upholding the current sanctions in order

ndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/8

to prevent the creation of an unwanted precedent

69c9d2b87ad8014c32575d9002b1c38!

for the breach of national sovereignty. Its second

OpenDocument [Accessed 10 Nov. 2015].

track is, however, to always maintain channels for

White House, (2010). President Obama A nnounces

cooperation and negotiate at eye level with Russian

the New START Treaty. [online] Available at:

officials, while attempting to accommodate their

https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/03/26/

security concerns through institutions like the

president-obama-announces-new-start-treaty

NATO-Russia Council and avoiding provocative

[Accessed 30 Oct. 2015].

comments. Also, it is suggested to introduce stronger incentives for Russia to take a serious role in

Williamson, N. (2015). Russia Threatens Response

ending conflicts in Ukraine and Syria peacefully,

to US Military Buildup in Eastern Europe.

the potentially most useful incentive being in-

[online] Global Research - Centre for Research

creased economic cooperation. At the same time,

on Globalization. Available at: http://

flexibility and adaptability must be preserved in

www.globalresearch.ca/russia-threatens-response

order to be able to swiftly deal with eventual modi-

-to-us-military-buildup-in-eastern-

fications of today’s complex global environment.

Bibliography Birnbaum, M. (2015). Fearing Russian expansion, Baltic nations step up military exercises. W ashington Post. [online] Available at: https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/fearingrussian-expansion-baltic-nations-step-up-military -exercises/2015/05/15/b5ee51ee-f8c8-11e4-a47ce56f4db884ed_story.html [Accessed 30 Oct. 2015]. Gheciu, A. (2005). NA TO in the "new Europe".

europe/5456304 [Accessed 30 Oct. 2015].

The International Academic

Russian and U.S. representatives meet to discuss the situation in Syria on 29 September 2015 September 2015 | Source: kremlin.ru

Smog over Beijing's Forbidden City September 2005 | Author: Brian Jeffery Beggerly

2 The Chinese Environmental Crisis Tier2

NUGENT THOMAS Asian-Pacific Affairs The article assesses the severity of Chinese environmental crisis and shows how serious the dimension of the crisis is. In today’s China, pollution has a great influence on the living conditions and health of the people. The article concludes by tackling the problem, weighting the solutions and looking into the future of China’s environmental conditions.

s far as many of us are concerned, the

20th Century Origins

town, city or country in which we live

The origins of the country’s environmental crisis

resides under an environmental banner of continual inhabitancy. What if,

however, one day we woke to find that the billboard of ecological safety constantly hovering in peripheral sight was gone? And in its place was a harrowing haze of human wrongdoing, clouding our path to longevity? That is exactly what is happening in Chi-

na. China faces a daily battle with its self-imposed pollution levels and the detrimental effects upon her landscape caused by mass development that risk the lives of each and every citizen the second they leave their homes.

stem from reforms spearheaded by the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in 1978. Emanating from Deng’s era is the statistic that China now has “sixteen of the world's twenty most polluted cities” (Xu 2014, ‘China’s environmental crisis’, The Council on Foreign Relations). An effort to rectify the vast destruction, at the heart of environmental concerns is a constant reminder of the hindrance put in place by a past clouded in naivety. A Chinese delegation in the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm was made well aware of the dire state of the nation’s

The Chinese Environmental Crisis

9 looming catastrophe. Attempts were made to refine

mental revival is what China needs so desperately.

environmental institutions within the country but,

The hope is that authority from Beijing will prevail:

by the time any changes were made, Deng was making progress on the burden that hangs high over China today (Xu 2014, ‘China’s environmental crisis’, The Council on Foreign Relations)

“In the face of past challenges, the Communist Party has usually responded with sweeping edicts from Beijing. Some environmentalists say they hope the top leadership has now made pollution

Decentralisation took precedent. Township and vil-

control such a high priority that lower level offi-

lage enterprises (TVE’s) took hold. The philosophy

cials will have no choice but to go along, just as

allowed for rural sovereignty. However, despite

Deng Xiaoping once forced China’s sluggish bu-

success on a rudimentary level, the reforms consoli-

reaucracy to fixate on growth.” (Kahn & Yardley in

dated a mind-set within these rural establishments

The New York Times, 2007).

that would be proven difficult to change:

Beijing Beijing, the worst affected city, acts out its daily life

“

as if directed in a world created by Ridley Scott. The

In 1997, TVEs generated almost a third of the national GDP … local governments were difficult to

monitor and therefore seldom upheld environmen-

“

tal standards. Today, environmental policies remain difficult to enforce at a local level, where officials often retain economic incentives to ignore them.

atrocious spectacle screams out cut, as work is drastically needed in a city that is a soon-to-be poster for an uninhabitable dystopia. The capital needs to push through solutions, to lead by example, because, at this moment in time, “it’s as if the 21-million-strong population of the Chinese capital is engaged in a mass city-wide rehearsal for life on an inhospitable planet” (Wainwright 2014, ´Inside Beijing's airpocalypse – a city made 'almost unin-

(Xu in The Council on Foreign Relations,

habitable' by pollution’, The Guardian). Oliver

2014).

Wainwright describes how the locals have given up

Therefore, for China, a country whose rapid growth

hope of solving the crisis as a constant eyesore of

in the 21st Century has amounted to consistent eco-

pollution smokes out Beijing. To describe the poor

nomic success, a priority must be to alleviate brib-

air quality, locals use the word ‘wumai’, meaning

ery at a local level. Corruption is also rife at the

haze, rather than the alternative ‘wuran’, meaning

higher end of provincial autonomy. Despite at-

pollution. Despite ‘wumai’ being the description

tempts

problems,

heard in weather reports, Wainwright says that it is

corrup-

because, “one local [told him], ‘if we had to face up

tion” (Kahn & Yardley 2007, ‘As China Roars, Pol-

to how much we’re destroying the environment and

lution Reaches Deadly Extremes’, The New York

our bodies every day, it would just be too

Times). Regardless of Deng’s incessant drive to-

much’” (Wainwright 2014, ´Inside Beijing's airpoc-

wards rapid growth and his success with such a phi-

alypse – a city made 'almost uninhabitable' by pol-

losophy, the obsession has left China in desperate

lution’, The Guardian). The equation of rapid in-

need of environmental revival over 30 years on.

dustrialisation and mass pollution has resulted in

Progress should be pursued with energy similar to

failed public morale and a conscience rendered

Deng’s. However, albeit with emphasis on environ-

hapless. Rather than a combined determination to

“enforcement

tackle is

environmental

often

tinged

with

The International Academic

solve the problem, the response from Beijing is lim-

its environmental problems. The World Health Or-

ited; a solemn allegory of acceptance.

ganisation officially sentenced the western city of

Furthermore, dust, soot and aerosol particles form a toxin known as PM10. This term is used to describe the pollutant itself, providing that, when combined, each particle is “less than 10 microns in

Lanzhou as having “the worst air in China” (Wainwright 2014), which is an outrageous statistic when the facts and figures surfacing from Beijing are not enough to win the top prize.

diameter… The European Union [however] stipu-

Lanzhou is affected less by coal and carbon emis-

lates that any reading [in the air] above 40 mi-

sions, but more by local destruction upon the physi-

crograms is unsafe. The United States allows 50. In

cal environment. Large volumes of land are being

2006, Beijing’s average PM 10 level was 141, ac-

destroyed for the construction of further industry

cording to the Chinese National Bureau of Statis-

and, as in 2014, “more than 700 peaks [were] …

tics” (Khan & Yardley 2007). Over the course of

levelled to provide swathes of flat land for develop-

2015, the readings for the smaller particles, PM2.5,

ment” (Wainwright 2014). As industrialisation

have been as high as 161 in parts of Beijing (Air

takes precedent over conservation, China’s cities

Quality Index 2015). This means that the air quality

are becoming a mirrored reflection of one another.

falls into the unhealthy bracket, meaning that

The major short term problem in cities like Lan-

“everyone may begin to experience health ef-

zhou is the severe process of levelling. Unfortunate-

fects.” (Air Quality Index 2015). China’s vast indus-

ly, the landscape then morphs overtly into the face

trial core burns faster than any other counterpart in

of industrialisation and the main concern becomes

the modern era: “It has abundant supplies of coal

pollution in the form of coal, gas and motor vehicle

and already burns more of it than the United States,

emissions, a by-product of economic progression.

Europe and Japan combined”. (Khan & Yardley 2007). Thus, the extreme extent to which China has developed with rapid efficiency, has come back to bite its industrial derriere. The capital is a health official’s worst nightmare. Masks are worn daily in an attempt to shield each breath from the air’s contaminants. Unfortunately, measures to prevent health deterioration do not always prevail and “breaking the usual government silence on the issue, China’s former health minister, Chen Zhu, spoke out in January 2014 to reveal that between 350,000 and 500,000 people die prematurely each year here as a result of air pollution” (Wainwright, 2014).

Furthermore, the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) released a damning statistic stating that “about 40% of the water in the country's river systems has a quality index of 3 or worse, meaning that it is unfit for human consumption” (WWF,

2016). The aforementioned is a direct consequence of China’s rivers bearing sacrifice to decades of waste freely dumped across the country by naïve and careless factories. China may pride itself on the speed and efficiency of such factories in heightening the country’s GDP, but narcissism has woven its way into the mind-set of the owners in the form of profit. Eutrophication and algal blooming remain terms long banished from the pages of Geography

Beyond the capital’s walls

textbooks with rivers of historical clarity now bloat-

The pollution levels in Beijing write a damning nar-

ed by open sewage. Moreover, “China’s paper pro-

rative. There is no reading between the lines, they are cemented together and the message is clear. Beijing, and beyond, is in dire need of solutions to

duction consumes more than twice as much water as that in developed nations. Its irrigation relies on inefficient surface methods that waste water, cause

The Chinese Environmental Crisis

11 eutrophication and wash nutrients out of the soil

fied by it as “clean, clean.”” (Paramaguru in Time,

and sediment into the rivers” (Diamond & Liu

2013)

2005:3). All in all, what is consistent throughout each and every challenge facing the Chinese environment is inefficiency on a national scale. Therefore, how does the country proceed to tackle the problem?

Roosegaarde’s Dyson for the sky is an exciting prospect, “if you create a place that’s 75% cleaner than the rest of the city, you create a powerful incentive for people to clean the whole city.”(Roosegaarde in Wainwright 2014). If there is a niche for an inven-

Solutions

tion as such anywhere in the world, it is in China.

China chokes on its own growth as the air desper-

Mr Roosegaarde wishes to have instigated at least

ately needs to breathe and “it is estimated that by 2025 the nation will be the world’s leading producer of greenhouse gases” (WWF 2016). How then, does one go about counteracting a prediction that would surely, ten years from now, mean that all hope of reversing the damage is lost to the atmosphere? On the first step of the ladder is governmental intervention, in the form of fines and charges for

those who do not obey environmental law. The footing is loose. However, as Zhang Kai, lead cam-

one clean air park in Beijing within the next couple of years, hoping that success will bring with it further expansion, potentially nationwide. Although he “cannot permanently and completely solve one of the industrial world’s biggest problems […] his job as visionary is to play with the problem, propose solutions and make people think” (Schuetze 2014). China needs someone like Roosegaarde to

instil the hope that change is possible. As of now, the opinion is that we live here, it is a sad state of

paigner on air pollution at Greenpeace East Asia,

affairs, but we get on with it. What else can we do?

says “there is little to suggest any of their measures

The Future

factories, local officials are supposed to visit them in person … but there is just no capacity to do that, and no policy in place to punish the polluting factories effectively” (Kai in Wainwright 2014).

A saviour, however, may have floated down from the o-zone layer in the form of Dutch designer Daan Roosegaarde. The blue skies of China have been timid of late, cast into shyness by the ever-growing smog cloud originating from Beijing: “Titled Smog, [Roosegaarde’s] technology builds on existing designs to purify air. The design harnesses basic principles of physics: buried coils of copper wire, charged with a relatively low voltage … will magnetize and attract smog particles so that they drop down from the sky. He says it will only have to be switched on for an hour or two at night. Roosegaarde has already tested out the design in a small scale, describing the meter-long pillar of air puri-

In November 2014 citizens received a glimpse at what a clean-aired Beijing would look like as the sky was a miraculous blue, laid on for visiting world leaders present at the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) Summit. To ensure this:

“

The entire region was locked down. […] Production in all factories within a 125-mile radius of the city was suspended, half the cars were banned from the roads, schools were closed, and publicsector workers were given compulsory holidays. No weddings were registered, no passports issued,

“

are having an effect … to be able to monitor these

no taxes paid, no fresh products delivered, and no

banks open. Bodies went uncremated and burials were partly suspended. (Wainwright in The Guardian 2014).

The International Academic

12 Although the sky was given a chance to respire religiously before the apocalypse returned, it was a solemnly brief respite. Events like this highlight the fact that problems have to be solved before the only solution becomes a nationwide lockdown; a damning sentence for expansion, where temporary parole is given to natural beauty. Thus, China’s industrial roar may be heard but it

cannot be seen, cloaked by pollution and hidden by impending ruin. The communist leadership must alleviate its addiction to rapid growth. There is no such thing as an industrial patch to quell such a craving. It is ultimately up to common sense and willpower to prevail before Ridley Scott is asked to direct the nation’s downfall into an apocalyptic, desolate ruin.

Bibliography Air Quality Index 2015, Real Time A ir Quality Index. Available at: < http://aqicn.org/city/beijing/>. [22 November 2015] Diamond, J & Liu, J 2005, ‘China’s environment in a globalizing world’, Nature, vol. 435, pp. 11791186. Available at: http://www.researchgate.net/profile/ Jianguo_Liu2/ publication/7754553_China's_environment_in_a_globali zing_world/ links/09e41512e0ebc3ebe0000000.pdf. [21 November 2015] Khan, J & Yardley, J 2007, ‘As China Roars, Pollution Reaches Deadly Extremes’, The New York Times 26 August. Available at: <http:// www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/world/ asia/26china.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>. [23 November 2015] Paramaguru, K 2013, ‘How a Dutch Artist Will Suck the Smog Out of Beijing’s Polluted Air’, Time 28 October. Available at: < http://

science.time.com/2013/10/28/how-a-dutch-artistwill-suck-the-smog-out-of-beijings-polluted-air/ >. [23 November 2015] Schuetze, CF 2014, ‘Turning Dust to Diamonds’, The New York Times 16 March. Available at: < http:// www.nytimes.com/2014/03/17/fashion/TurningDust-to-Diamonds.html?_r=0>. [23 November 2015]

Wainwright, O 2014, ‘Inside Beijing's airpocalypse – a city made 'almost uninhabitable' by pollution’, The Guardian 16 December. Available at: < http://www.theguardian.com/ cities/2014/dec/16/beijing-airpocalypse-cityalmost-uninhabitable-pollution-china>. [23 November 2015] WWF 2016 Environmental problems in China. Available at: http://clone-gftn.panda.org/ who_we_are/wwf_offices/china/ environmental_problems_china/ [20 January 2016] Xu, B 2007, ‘China’s environmental crisis’, The Council on Foreign Relations 25 April. Available at: < http://www.cfr.org/china/chinasenvironmental-crisis/p12608>. [22 November 2015]

Thick haze blown off the Eastern coast of China, over Bo Hai Bay and Yellow Sea. The haze likely results from urban and industrial pollution. June 2009 | Source: NASA/GSFC

3 Earth, Wood, Water and Air: Costing the Chinese Economic Miracle DR. MARTIN A. MILLS University of Aberdeen DR. SAMANTHA MAY University of Aberdeen The Article examines the costs of the Chinese ‘economic miracle’ and, especially, the impact on anthropocentric issues that directly affect China’s population and productive capacities. The costs of rapid economic growth, such as horrible air quality and contaminated water, cause public dissatisfaction and devastation but the environmental protection practices are lagging. China is facing a huge challenge as the crisis deepens and faces the question whether the growth can be sustained. The article tackles the crisis from earth to air, showing in detail the price nature, and the people of China, pay. The article moves on to the solutions but also challenges and problems of technology and renewable energy.

n January 2015, the Environmental Protec-

lawmakers in reforming the region’s parlous envi-

tion Law (EPL) of the People’s Republic of

ronmental conditions are huge.

China (PRC), formulated in April 2014, was ratified. The first major change in China’s

environmental law since 1989, the new EPL gives the government sweeping powers based on a “polluter pays” principle. While China’s new laws have generally been lauded on the international stage, the political and technical challenges faced by

The new laws are primarily motivated by a growing recognition in Beijing of the political and economic costs of untrammelled growth. Public dissatisfaction with everyday air and water standards in urban areas now constitutes a groundswell threat to the Party’s legitimacy, while the reactive growth of the non-state environmental NGO sector has weakened

Earth, Wood, Water and Air: Costing the Chinese Economic Miracle

the government’s control over public discourse in

since. Indeed, China remains the largest recipient

the PRC. At a national level, environmental chal-

of grants and loans from the World Bank for envi-

lenges are affecting the PRC’s capacity to feed its

ronmental work (Chan, Lee & Chan, 2008: 306).

own population and, most pertinently for international investors, water distribution issues are undermining its capacity to maintain the state of its core economic industries. China, in other words, represents the core case

study in the debate over whether economic growth in the modern age can be sustained without a selfdefeating compromise of the environment. Given China’s wholesale engagement with new technologies, it speaks to the heart of the often made assertion that the human race will ultimately create technological solutions for its present environmental woes: that human ingenuity will triumph in the race against its apparently insatiable urge to pro-

duce and consume.

China’s Environmental Crisis

Deforestation Intensification of wood extraction has been a mainstay of the Chinese economy since the formation of the PRC in 1949. However, the introduction of privatisation in the early 1980s led to a spiralling of

unregulated demand that has had signal impacts on the region. While China is one of the largest exporters of processed wood products, its national timber consumption (excluding firewood) doubled between 1993 and 2003 (from 145 million squ. ms to 283 million squ. ms). Deforestation has substantial impacts on soil integrity in local areas, and water flow on a regional basis. Both foliage and root systems act as reservoirs for natural precipitation, generating biodiversity, increasing the consolidation of local soil against

Our purpose here is not to look at the impact of the

erosion and regulating water flow downstream. Be-

PRC’s massive economic growth on ‘nature’ per se,

tween 1980-1999 the massive deforestation of Chi-

but rather on anthropocentric issues that directly

na’s inland areas - (Figure 1: Deforestation areas

affect its population and productive capacities.

(brown) and flooding areas (green), 1980-1999) -

China’s huge industrial growth since 1980 has generally been understood and presented on the international stage in economic terms: that is, in terms

significantly disrupted the internal dynamics of regional water redistribution as well as denuding the established biodiversity of the area.

of economic growth and productivity. While such

The most substantial social and political impact

references are important, they often hide the prag-

here was the major floods around the Yellow and

matic realities that have been essential to support

Yangtse River basins throughout the 1990s, a result

China’s economic miracle. The practical conse-

of the loss of forest around their headwaters in the

quences for the region’s environment have come in

Tibetan Plateau. Massive flooding caused a sub-

four main forms: desertification, deforestation, wa-

stantial reversal in Beijing’s policy stance towards

ter challenges, and air pollution. Combined, these

state protection of inland forest resources in the

present significant dangers to food security, domes-

late 1990s and early 2000s. The Natural Forest

tic and regional stability, and economic growth.

Protection Program (NFPP) introduced a logging

These problems have been recognised for at least

ban on natural forests in 17 provinces along the

two decades: in 1997, the World Bank reported that

Yangtze and the Yellow river basins (Démurger et

economic losses caused by pollution in the PRC

al. 2007).

ranged from 3-8% of GDP (Cited Shao et.al. 2006:347), a situation that has only intensified

The International Academic

Figure 1: Deforestation areas (brown) and flooding

mous Region, Qinghai, Xinjiang and Inner Mongo-

areas (green), 1980-1999

lia). While estimates vary depending on the meth-

Earth Desertification – the gradual degradation of farming and populated areas into desert – is a major threat to both food security and population management. Direct anthropogenic desertification – that is, desertification directly caused by human activities – is usually found in areas surrounding population centres, while indirect anthropogenic effects can be caused by non-localised influences

such as human-induced climate change.

odology used, there is general agreement that des-

ertification in China is expanding and has been since the emergence of mass industrialisation in the 1950s, at a rate of between 2,000 and 10,000 squ. kms per annum. Areas presently at risk of progressive desertification within the PRC cover as much as 3.317 million squ. kms (that is, 34.6% of land area), impacting the lives and livelihoods of nearly 400 million people, and resulting in an estimated economic loss of 54 billion RMB(¥) per annum

(Shanghai.gov.cn, 2008; China Tibet Online 2009).

Established desert areas in the People’s Republic of

China’s desertification is primarily occurring in two

China make up 2.6 million squ. kms, 27% of its land

main areas: immediately adjacent to densely popu-

area, largely concentrated in the West and North-

lated areas and in grasslands areas that have been

West of the country (that is, the Tibetan Autono-

subject to the “grasslands contracting policy” since

Earth, Wood, Water and Air: Costing the Chinese Economic Miracle

the 1980s, where commonly held pastureland was

As we may note from Figure 2, the per capita water

parcelled out to individual households. Both of

shortages in the North-West compare with the rela-

these imply that much of China’s desertification

tive abundancy of per capita water supplies in its

issues are anthropogenic.

western desert regions, and with the water-rich but

Water Water, as with other areas of the world, is develop-

equally populated southern regions fed by the Yangtse River.

ing into the major infrastructural problem faced by the PRC. The United Nations defines water-scarcity

in terms of the amount of water available per unit of the population. An area is experiencing “water stress” when annual water supplies drop below 1,700 m3 per person; “water scarcity” when below 1,000 m3 per person; and “absolute scarcity” when below 500 cubic metres per annum (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2014). Beijing’s per capita annual water availability is now around 120 cubic metres (Lun, 2013).

Similarly, ten of China’s twenty-two provinces have been identified as short of water, eight of them in

Figure 2: Water Availability Per Capita in the PRC

northern China which has 40% of the population

(China's Annual Water Availability is republished

and 60% of its farmland. Approximately 360 mil-

with permission of Stratfor.)

lion farmers have no access to safe drinking water (Zabielskis, 2014), and of China’s 668 largest cities, at least 400 already suffer from water scarcity by UN standards.

The quantity of water reaching China’s industrial and population centres is not the only issue: so is its quality. 76 out of the PRC’s 118 large cities have serious levels of ground water pollution. In 2003,

Much of this issue is focused around the PRC’s

70% of all rivers and lakes were polluted to some

unique geographical West-East organization. In

degree according to China’s ministry of Water re-

this case, water must be moved by gravity from its

sources (Zabielskis, 2014).

central precipitation area on the low population Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau in the West, across the Chinese heartland provinces towards its highly populated coastal cities in the East. The two main rivers that feed these eastern cities are the Yellow to the north and the Yangtse to the south. The destabilization of the northern Yellow River in particular

has led to a ‘boom and bust’ cycle of floods and

The 2007 World Bank Report approximated that the cost of poor water quality in China was 60,000 premature deaths annually. Approximate economic costs of water pollution estimated at US$ 21 billion per year. Water quality issues remain the predominant cause of popular environmental protest in China.

droughts that has precipitated severe water availa-

Air

bility issues in China’s North-West, exacerbated by

Air pollution problems in China’s largest cities are

competition for scarce water resources by industry,

probably the country’s most widely-publicized envi-

agriculture and the region’s burgeoning population.

ronmental issue. The growing concentrations of

The International Academic

18 carbon monoxide (largely from car emissions) and

In response to these pressures, China has engaged

nitrogen and sulphur dioxide (from coal burning at

in numerous large scale projects, legal changes, and

both a regional and neighbourhood level) within

trading shifts to promote a vision of itself as a re-

the PRC are generating respiratory problems, hos-

sponsible member of the global community (Chan

pitalization and premature mortality on a wide

et. al., 2008). These initiatives have concentrated

scale, accounting for over 300,000 premature

largely around the issue of water control through

deaths per annum within East Asia according to the

huge central investment in hydro-electric and water

WHO (cited Fang and Kiong, 2006: 339-340). Sul-

transfer projects. These projects, however, come

phur dioxide also causes acid rain which is estimat-

with their own costs.

ed to cost China US$ 4 billion in crop damage and $1 billion in material damage annually according the World Bank statistics in 2007.

Engineering A Way Out? The Costs of Renewables China’s central government, have invested hun-

Based on 2012 Asian Development Reports less

dreds of billions of yuan in large scale engineering

than 1% of China’s 500 largest cities meet the

projects designed to “green” China’s economic

WHOs air quality standards (Xu, 2014). The in-

boom. Amongst these, China’s commitment to hy-

creasing frequency of “air-pocalypses” in major

dropower construction is certainly the most im-

Chinese cities are fuelling growing public anger and

pressive, exceeding in 2012 that of Brazil, the US

rendering public life nearly impossible on an epi-

and Canada combined (UN Global Status Report,

sodic basis. In October 2013, the norther city of

2012). Its national goal for 2020 is the production

Harbin effectively closed down as fine particulate

of 430 Gigawatts of energy from hydropower pro-

levels in the streets hit 1,000 micrograms per cubic,

duction, concentrated on the landfall of the eastern

forty times the WHO safe maximum (Duggan,

borderlands of the Tibetan Plateau (Figure 3).

2013).

China’s largest and most famous hydrodam project

Solving the Environmental Challenge?

remains the Three Gorges Dam on the Upper Yang-

Environmental issues have crept inexorably up Bei-

tse. The Dam cost $26bn to build, to a projected

jing’s political agenda over the last thirty years as

output of roughly a seventh of China’s entire do-

the economic costs of huge industrial expansion

mestic consumption of hydroelectricity. The dam

have become more urgent, and as popular discon-

also plays a major function in regulating the water

tent within China’s increasingly educated and em-

flow of the Yangtse River, which supplies water to

powered population begins to threaten Beijing’s

much of southern China.

claims to legitimacy.

The sheer magnitude of the dam, however, has

Not all of this pressure is domestic, however. With-

made it the centre of intense controversy. The fill-

in East Asia, both Korean and Japanese govern-

ing of the reservoir required the inundation or par-

ments have lodged diplomatic complaints against

tial inundation of 13 cities, 140 towns and 1350 vil-

China for export smog and acid rain (Zabielskis,

lages, and 60,500 acres of farmland and orchards,

2014). More globally, the UN, the World Bank and

and the relocation of between 1.3 and 1.9 million

the EU have brought diplomatic pressure to bear on

people.

China regarding its impact on global climate change

Despite the massive investment in hydropower, the

and carbon emissions, following its accession to the

sheer unreliability of China’s water resources, high-

Kyoto Protocols (Bosshard, 2011).

lighted above, present problems of their own. In

Earth, Wood, Water and Air: Costing the Chinese Economic Miracle

Spring 2011, central China experienced its worst

associated with a geological propensity called

drought for over 50 years, leading to more than one

“reservoir induced seismicity” (RIS): in effect, they

thousand hydropower stations suspending opera-

create their own earthquakes, by altering the tec-

tions (Bosshard & Yan, 2011:78), meaning that hy-

tonic structure underneath them. This problem has

dropower cannot be an real alternative to Chinese

been well understood since the 1930s, and has been

coal energy. Indeed, many of China’s southwest hy-

recorded in cases around the world. The 2008 Si-

dro-development zones are aligned to mining oper-

chuan earthquake, which killed 90,000 people and

ations which simultaneously encourages the devel-

rendered 10 million homeless, is widely attributed

opment of coal fired power plants primarily to se-

to RIS from the recently-filled Zipungpu Dam,

cure electricity supply in dry seasons (Liu,

which was 5.5 kms from the epicentre of the earth-

2011:83).

quake. Beyond the loss of life and livelihood, the

Figure 3: Hydrodam Building Projections for the PRC, 2003. Source: Hydrochina, English annotations by www.MeltdowninTibet.com

estimated rebuild cost after the Sichuan earthquake has been $170 billion (Kerr & Stone, 2009:322). .

The South-North Water Transfer Project Interlinking many of the hydrodam and reservoir

There are less publicised risks with the shift to hydropower. Large scale dams of over 100m depth are

installations set in place by China’s central government is the 3,000km South-North Water Transfer

The International Academic

20 Project (SNWTP; 南水北调工程). Costing $79bn by

Trading in Forestry

2014 (making it the most expensive engineering pro-

These kinds of projects have one signal advantage:

ject in human history), this includes the construc-

they are more ideologically manageable than the

tion of three canals diverting 44.8 billion cubic me-

alternative prospects of chaotic pollution or a radi-

ters of water from the Yangtze river to resupply the

cal curtailing of China’s economic “dream”. Colos-

Yellow River, and thereby the industrial and popu-

sal engineering feats such as the Water Transfer

lation centres, in the north.

Project or the Three Gorges Dam have the particular stamp of Socialist futurism to them – the kind of ideological aesthetic that Beijing feels comfortable asking its population to make massive sacrifices for. But if China’s technological and engineering solutions to its environmental problems have clear costs all of their own – transforming the consequences of economic growth into something that is more ideologically digestible - then its moves to reverse deforestation show this consequence shift more clearly and unambiguously.

Figure 4: South-North Water Transfer Routes (Han, 2014).

In 1992, new forestry regulations substantially reduced the PRC’s production of basic wood prod-

Like hydrodams, the costs of the North-South Wa-

ucts. At the same time, however, China’s demand

ter Transfer Project are not merely financial, in-

for wood continued to escalate. As a direct conse-

volving the division and inundation of huge areas of

quence, China’s began importing the wood it need-

land, and a massive relocation of population. The

ed for its economic growth, largely from local

long term goals of increasing the capacity of the al-

sources in East Asia: principally Eastern Siberia,

ready-established Danjiangkou Dam on the Middle

Myanmar and Papua New Guinea. Much of this log-

Route to a new depth of 170m has already involved

ging import now occurs illegally, to the extent that

moving 330,000 people and inundating 370 squ.

China is now the world’s largest importer of illegal

kms of land.

timber, much of it tropical rainforest timber (Chan et. Al. 2009:292). In effect, deforestation has simply been exported - its consequences and culpability hidden by distance and national borders.

CONCLUSION China’s response to its environmental catastrophe has been threefold: the introduction of new environmental laws,; massive central state funded engi-

neering projects designed to redistribute increasFigure 5: The South-North Water Transfer Canal,

ingly unreliable water supplies and supplement coal

http://www1.american.edu/ted/ICE/images5/bg-

-fired

south-north-water-transfer-project-china-2050-

organisation (rather than reduction) of trading re-

2052.jpg

lations over crucial commodities such as wood and

electricity

production;

and

the

re-

Earth, Wood, Water and Air: Costing the Chinese Economic Miracle

mineral products, effectively exporting most of

thorium. Their toxity from the lake has caused crop

their associated pollution and deforestation issues

failure, animal death, and locals complain of can-

beyond the national borders of the PRC.

cers, diabetes, osteoporosis and chest problems

In almost all of these cases, a consequence shift has occurred: environmental problems and their causes

( Ali, 2015). In Scotland, the wind turbines turn gracefully, an image of green technology.

are not directly addressed, but their consequences

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The International

4 For a value-based interpretation of political crises PAUL NICOLAS International Affairs The following article offers a new perspective on the concept of crisis through adopting a theoretical interpretation of tragedy in order to draw a general descriptive and functional background. The author chose to illustrate the certain common characteristics which mark the thin line between crisis and tragedy by using the example of the French Revolution and the contemporary clash of values represented by ISIS and the Western world. The essay ultimately concludes that a crisis is best explained as a clash between competing, equal and distinct values, and the victor can claim the final defeat or extinction of the losing party, and thus ends up in a tragic manner.

“

say that I did it and I do not deny it” said

It is trivial to state the everlasting relevance of the

Antigone to her great-uncle, Creon, king

Greek tragedians, but trivialities themselves some-

of Thebes. Henceforth, she sheds her

times need reminders. This essay will be one of

mortality to embody the voice of tragedy.

them. Through the study of the tragic emotion we

What did she do to deserve such an epithet? As

will propose a novel understanding of the concept

Sophocles’ play goes: Antigone, against Creon’s

of crisis, and argue for its applicability to our own

edict, decided to bury her recently deceased broth-

political contexts.

er, Polynices. In this act of rich symbolic significance, she disparages the laws of man in order to uphold the laws of the gods; she creates a confrontation between the divine and the mortal; she creates a crisis.

“Crisis”, as it appears, is one of those words we accept without a clear definition, the ones we hear being used all the time, and that we subsequently use through mimicry of their original contexts. It is to be classified along words like “objectification”,

For a value-based interpretation of political crises

“democracy”, or “terrorism”. Such a state of affairs

hold are of equal quality, and (4) one of the objects

would not per se be undesirable had it not permeat-

is destroyed in the process.

ed our performative language. Indeed, in much the same way as Aesop’s wolf, “crisis” is cried to monger fear—and advance political agendas. Hence the need for a tentative clarification of the concept. However, the task at hand is arduous, as it is a composite notion which webs itself with disparate evidence in such a way that valid interpretations are manifold. The one we are about to introduce neither is nor claims to be the proper one, and does not call for universal truth. It is, as stated above, tentative.

How does crisis fit into this picture? When Antigone confessed her crime to Creon, both were holding positive values (i.e., justice), which were both of equal quality, but were clashing nonetheless, as she personified the unwritten divine order, and he, the penned laws of man. But death had not taken its

toll yet, and, thusly, (1), (2), and (3) had been satisfied—but (4) remained pending. This creates a state of intense tension, the dissolution of which only being achievable through violence, and bloodshed; a state where stability is unthinkable; a state where

The tragic seems to be superficially similar to other

crisis awaits closure. Crises, we posit, are unre-

aesthetic values (i.e., beautiful, humorous, or sub-

solved tragedies.

lime), but they differ as to their inner workings. When an object is pretty it holds a certain set of in-

ternal characteristics, depending on its type. For instance, a pretty mug will surely be painted on fancily, will be made of quality porcelain, and will be all around charming. This form of descriptive enquiry falls short when applied to the tragic. Indeed, as Scheler states: “the tragic appears in objects only through the interplay of their inherent values”; it only exists through the tension created by the interaction of objects and their values—interaction which must culminate in the destruction of one of these objects (1954). Nevertheless, these values that objects hold must present a certain hierarchy: the surviving object must have a value of equal quality than the destroyed one. They also must be both positive, as most values (e.g., good, beautiful) have a negative counterpart (e.g., bad, ugly). A strong, righteous knight killing a weak, wicked foe is not tragic, but expected—and the contrary would be a painful disgrace. It is only when this knight battles a knight of equal strength, of equal righteousness that tragedy might appear—and thus, solely if one of them dies. To summarise briefly: the tragic appears if and only if (1) two objects clash, (2) the values they hold are both positive, (3) the values they

Now that we have set up a functional framework, we will focus on two case studies: the French Revo-

lution and ISIS. The first one is an instance of high applicability of the model and the second one, on the contrary, shows its limits. The year 1789, and the decades which orbited around it, saw the happening in France of one of the most important political overthrows of the modern era. The confrontation of two demographic bodies—the bourgeoisie and the nobility—plunged France into a state of political and social turmoil that lasted for nearly a

century (two empires, a few monarchies and republics) before the country once again found relative stability. This confrontation opposed different sets of values: the bourgeoisie was the herald of Enlightenment, and the nobility, of highness. The former set entails the consensual values bound to the end of the 18th century (i.e., freedom, equality at birth, and agency), whereas the latter entails values which are now alien to us (i.e., elitist erudition, grandeur,

and the famous esprit). There is a clash of positive values indeed, and one of the objects got destroyed in the process, but how is (3) satisfied? Values— metaphysics notwithstanding—seem to be sensitive to historical and social tendencies, and whilst we

The International Academic

26 could easily consider erudition to be of lower quali-

ence however lies in the scale, as the values are, on

tative importance nowadays, any enquiry into the

one side, shared by billions and millions on the oth-

thought of the time would reveal the contrary.

er. This example shows the limits of our interpreta-

Thus, the French Revolution is tragic. The gradual

tion, as it requires us to assume a mild form of val-

disappearance of the values of the

18th

century no-

ue relativism, which is not ideal. From the inside of

bility throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, and

the winning value-holding community, there is no

their complete foreignness nowadays, are definite

tragedy—they have won. Moreover, as it seems, the

proof of their destruction.

crisis-ness of political events are more readily and

The current opposition between ISIS and the western world is a challenge to the model, mainly due to

easily observed when time has passed, and history has put everything into order.

its temporal proximity. Moreover, the question is

In conclusion, this short and informal essay strove

not about whether it is a tragedy—as events are still

to present a novel interpretation of the concept of

unfolding—but whether it has the potential to be-

crisis. It is best read as a tentative exploratory anal-

come one, that is, if it satisfies (1), (2), and (3). Set-

ysis rather than a peremptory one. The two case

ting up the picture will require less contextualisa-

studies we focused on hopefully cast light on the

tion. Indeed, the values held by the western world,

possible applicability, in a political context, of such

which we will conveniently call “western values”,

an interpretation. However, one question need fi-

will be familiar to anyone reading this paper in its

nally be raised: does the model imply that crises

original language. On the other hand, the values

end up in tragedies? Yes, it does. To “solve” a crisis

held by ISIS is a trickier topic—which we will nim-

is only beneficial for the winning values—the loser,

bly dodge by calling them “Sharia values”— as they

on the other hand, is shattered. And by beneficial,

seem to hold, in a fashion oddly similar to Antigo-

we mean internally beneficial; beneficial for the val-

ne, a blind obedience to the divine laws which are,

ue-holding community. One has to take a step back,

unlike Antigone’s, written down. (1) is evidently

to think externally—as we did for the French Revo-

satisfied—even more so in regards to the recent

lution—to see the tragic-ness of it all. Crises are in-

events in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. In

curable plagues which die out with one of their

(2) and (3) lies the crux of the matter. We posit that

hosts. They may only be prevented. Two ways can

(2) is true: the forms of justice held by the western

achieve this: to tolerate different values, and avoid

world and ISIS are not polar opposites, but of a dif-

(1)—or to homogenise values, and avoid (2) and (3).

ferent kind; their respective holders both believe in

Whilst the former would be more desirable, the lat-

their righteousness. (3) is also true if we enquire

ter is the most readily applied ideology today.

into the psycho-social processes of the value hold-

Bibliography

ers: war has been declared on both sides; it is not one value-holder considering the other one as a sheer nuisance—both sides have been legitimised. Thus, it seems, this conflict is a crisis, a tragedy to

Scheler, M. (1954). On the tragic. Cross Currents, 4 (2), 178-191.

come. Notwithstanding the material and human

Sophocles. (1994). Antigone. H. Lloyd-Jones (Ed.).

destruction bound with the satisfaction of (4), we

Cambridge, U.S.A.: Harvard University Press.

will see the alienation of a whole population of value-holders, in the same way that nobles were alienated with the obliteration of their values. The differ-

Chamber of Deputies of Brazil May 2007 | Source: AgĂŞncia Brasil

5 The Never-ending Scandal: Brazilian Corruption and Possible Policy Actions VICTORIA DE ALMEIDA TELLECHEA-ROTTA Latin American Affairs This article offers an insight into the corrupt practices, loopholes and political scandals in Brazil that undermine the establishment of strong democratic principles and conduct. The author analyzes the political and electoral principles which can constitute levers for acts of corruption in Brazil and further suggests the importance of reforming the electoral system of alliances and improving governmental transparency, in order to solve these issues and strengthen the rule of the democratic principles and laws. .

egarding Brazilian politics, it is im-

qualities of democracies in 167 states around the

portant to note that the nation is a rel-

globe, placing Brazil in the category of “flawed de-

atively new democracy. As a matter of

mocracies” (EIU 2014).

fact, Brazilian democracy is a mere

thirty years old, enduring twenty-one years of a military dictatorship that, albeit not as bloody nor brutal as many of its Latin American counterparts,

undermined democratic values within Brazil and has left longstanding impediments in order to establish a strong democratic culture. The 2014 The Economists Intelligence Unit (EIU) Democracy Index ranked Brazil in 44th place in regards to the

At first glance, one may not understand why Brazil’s democracy is perceived as flawed not only by these indexes, but also by many of the people within the nation (the protests that have taken place in the nation for the past two years are evidently critical of the nation’s political impasses). It possesses a bicameral legislature, with two houses, the lower House of Deputies, Câmara dos Deputados, and the upper House of Senators, Senado

The Never-ending Scandal: Brazilian Corruption and Possible Policy Actions

(Vanden and Provost, 2002: 396), which have

presidency, he went on to execute an additional fif-

strong powers to the point where they can open

ty-nine political mandates.

Parliamentary Procedures of Inquiry (CPIs) as a manner of investigating any kind of governmental legal irregularity (Vanden and Provost, 2002: 397). The CPIs possess unmistakable capabilities, and were extremely useful when investigating the Mensalão scandal in 2013, where government officials, particularly of the PT, were accused and later indicted by the Supreme Court of participating in briberies (The Economist, 2014) in both chambers of the house in order to pass certain legislation. Additionally, Brazil has an independent Supreme Court with 11 judges nominated by the president and later confirmed by the Senado, (Vanden and Provost, 2002: 397), yet nonetheless, its weakness is a continuing problem in Brazil. The independence of the Court means little when the same party, Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) has dominated the executive branch for the past 12 years and, henceforth, nominated many of the judges that are now centrepieces in analyzing recent corruption standpoints.

The intensity with which corruption occurs in Brazil is undeniable, and thus, presents itself as an element that will neglect democratic principles and institutions if not tackled appropriately. As the world watches Brazilian corruption scandals erode from seeking personal wealth to the wealth and well

-being of their own political parties through public funds, with corruption perception by Transparency International ranking the nation on the “corrupt” end of the spectrum alongside many of its Latin American counterparts, adequate action must be taken in order to prevent and remedy corruption. Although corruption in Brazil is arguably part of a wider cultural problem, this paper will focus on how to avoid large-scale corruption scandals such

as the most recent one with the state-owned Petrobás oil company, which is still being processed. Therefore, this paper seeks to propose reforms within the political party system in Brazil, the promotion of transparency measures within the government, particularly in regards to govern-

It is, however, of no use to possess democratic insti-

ment spending. Through such reforms, it can be

tutions that are undermined by other negative po-

argued that not only would Brazilian corruption

litical factors. The intrinsic nature of corruption

face reduced rates, but one could also say that de-

within the branches of the Brazilian political system

mocracy would find a new environment to prosper

may as well be one of the most significant impedi-

and consolidate itself.

ments for Brazil to consolidate itself as a strong democratic power. Granted, the democratic establishment is relatively young, but the statistics for corruption are striking, and not, as some may believe, exclusive to the Lula and Rousseff mandates. A popular Brazilian magazine, Veja, has an entire section of their website dedicated to re-building a corruption “net” that has occurred within the nation (Infografico Veja, 2015). Instances of corruption date back to the first democratic election, in 1985, under the executive mandate of José Sarney, who was accused of nepotism and of redistributing funds to his home-state of Maranhão. After his

Proposal 1: Political Reform Multiparty democracies, as has been observed in many country-case studies, is a common trend in Latin America and has been argued by some scholars to be the source of stability, as well as an adequate manner in which the executive remains accountable and in check. Nonetheless, it is funda-

mental to understand that a system in which there is an excessive amount of political parties may as well lead to severe problems with corruption. Diverting from the opinion of the scholars Carlos Pereira and Marcus André Mello, one of the exact rea-

The International Academic

sons behind which they believe the success of mul-

suaded by the party of the executive, in their per-

tiparty presidentialism occurs is in part due to the

sonal attempts to seek power for both themselves

“trade-worthy coalition goods (cabinet posts, pork,

and the parties they are integrated in.

patronage and the like)” (Pereira and Mello, 2012: 158). Although both scholars argue that such coalition goods provide the executive with significant checks in their autonomy as well as facilitate negotiation with legislators, it is harmful when corruption plays a role in the game. As both scholars point out in their piece, there is a significant amount of clientelism that may arise given such capabilities under multiparty presidentialism (Pereira and Mello, 2012:162). Although the authors hedge around the idea that the Brazilian opposition parties are strong enough to avoid such things from occurring, that is far from true.

In order to avoid such a clientelistic approach, which may be the breeding grounds for corruption, it would be interesting to suggest a ban on coligações eleitorais, or electoral alliances. By doing so, the minority parties would actually be able to stand

firm on their grounds of what they believe in, both within the Senado and the Câmara. Additionally, this would provide an environment which would not be permissive to “exchanges of favors” of the clientelistic manner, particularly amongst large parties. In turn, this allows for less corrupt practices and corrupt politicians to gain space in the political arena. Coligações eleitorais exist only as a man-

One of the main problems with the opposition gov-

ner of keeping the interests of the larger parties in

ernment in Brazil currently, the PSDB, is that their

check, and if they can fundamentally work together

ability to form alliances across the board on munic-

and consolidate legislatures in unison, they should

ipal and state-levels yields in turn to the exact clien-

be able to function as a single party. Such removal

telistic approach to the multiparty system. A Brazil-

of the coligações would drastically shape a new par-

ian news source, EditoraGlobo, uncovered that in

ty system where there would be a significant reduc-

2004, PSDB and PT formed an alliance, which al-

tion from the current 35 parties to around 10 par-

lowed for there to be dominance of both parties in

ties, if taking the current alliances into account.

the state of Belo Horizonte, where over 100 mayors

Henceforth, with the reduction of the parties, there

were elected from either party. Curiously, one of the

would be fewer opportunities to engage in large-

major players in this alliance was presidential

scale corrupt actions, which become intertwined

hopeful Aécio Neves, who ran in an intense elec-

with exchanges of favours and “hush” policies in

toral campaign against Rouseff. Although this may

order to keep these coligações united.

seem irrelevant on a national level, it makes it incredibly difficult to control the accountability of the opposition in both the Senado and the Câmara dos Deputados when a significant amount of negotiations and alliances are occurring behind the scenes, including purchases of votes (a practice which both the PT and PSDB have been accused of ). By no means is this a suggestion that the opposition is weak enough to allow for corruption and corrupt practices to occur, rather, a suggestion that the opposition becomes corrupt and subject to clientelism due to the benefits these parties receive, while per-

Proposal 2: Transparency and Accountability Another significant problem within Brazilian politics is the lack of governmental transparency and the lack of accountability amongst politicians. These two areas of concern are intertwined with

each other, and often lead to situations where corrupt politicians are re-elected and can return to occupy important posts when they have been accused of corrupt practices. Although the Brazilian government has made some advancements regarding both

The Never-ending Scandal: Brazilian Corruption and Possible Policy Actions

these areas, with new laws that require the govern-

to the Portal in 2011, where all companies were

ment to make available all of its spending to the

linked to the government, lest they be by govern-

public, it is still an area that requires much im-

ment tenures, contracts or ownerships, the loop-

provement.

holes were immediately found. Claiming that such

In regards to transparency of expenses, Brazil currently has an entire transparency portal, Portal da Transparência, dedicated to both the public and all branches of government to access in order to verify

law would be harmful to the competitive market, these companies now possess the authority to determine what will or will not be divulged to the public (Bublitz, 2015).

and put in check spending on both the federal and

The transparency portal, henceforth, needs to oper-

municipal levels. Although this was an incredible

ate under stricter laws, possess a clearer interface

achievement towards placing an end to corruption

with less judicial jargon that makes it difficult for

and increasing accountability, the system is difficult

the average Brazilian to understand, and become a

to access. For starters, it is only available on-line,

more active part of Brazilian politics. Rather than

and according to a most recent census conducted by

using mandatory electoral television and radio time

the Brazilian government, less than 50% of the pop-

simply for promotion of parties, there should be an

ulation possesses access to internet, which makes

address whenever large contracts are signed

the system somewhat elitists, given that only those

amongst government owned companies and other

that can afford the internet access for consultation

private operators or newspaper releases, in order

can view government spending. Additionally, the

for such information to be more readily available to

data available in the portal is flawed: in an open

the Brazilian public and, in turn, make it harder for

source consultation, over ten states and municipali-

such large instances of corruption to remain cov-

ties in the past year alone have blamed the portal

ered for so long.

for inaccurately displaying data regarding public workers’salaries (an area in which politicians commonly devise corruption schemes from in Brazil, by creating “ghost” workers in order to launder and/or deviate public funds), including in Rio Grande do Sul, a Southern Brazilian state which is currently near bankruptcy after having its funds wiped out through

irresponsible

government

spending

(Bublitz, 2015). The Portal da Transparência also operates under significant loopholes when it involves government spending in regards to public-private partnerships and government tenures. Government tenures and

state-owned companies were the biggest issue regarding the Petrobrás scandal, as it became the home-base for many operations of money laundering for both personal and private gains. While Dilma Rousseff sanctioned a transparency act linked

Conclusion Corruption in Brazil is an ever-looming cloud that lingers amongst politics and threatens and undermines democratic values and institutions. Although

significant advances have been made in the areas of transparency, it is about time Brazilian policymakers engage in harsher laws that make loopholes harder to find, engage in the improvement of current laws and measures, and particularly, engage in political reform to end coligações

eleitorais.

Through such policy actions, Brazil would observe a more accountable, transparent operation of political institutions, which would make corrupt practic-

es increasingly difficult to engage in. Albeit Brazilian democratic institutions may seem conducive to democratic values on paper, it is of utmost importance to realize that, in order for these institutions to fulfil their objectives, they must not operate

The International Academic

32 under loopholes that undermine such values and breed corrupt practices.

prising Success of Multiparty Presidentialism." Journal of Democracy 23, no. 2 (2012): 156-70.

Bibliography

Vanden, Harry E., and Gary Prevost. Politics of Lat-

Alves, Cida. "Estatais Se Blindam Contra a Lei De AcessoàInformação." Veja. June 11, 2012. Accessed

October

12,

2015.

http://

veja.abril.com.br/noticia/brasil/estatais-se-

blindam-contra-a-lei-de-acesso-a-informacao/. Arais, Amauri. "Aliança PT-PSDB Ajudou a Eleger 149 PrefeitosEm 2004." G1 - Política. March 27, 2008. Accessed October 12, 2015. http:// g1.globo.com/Noticias/Politica/0,,MUL3650165601,00-ALIANCA

PTPSDB

AJUDOU

ELEGER PREFEITOS EM.html. Barrucho, LuísGuilherme. "IBGE: Metade Dos Bra-

sileirosEstãoConectadosàInternet;

NorteLid-

eraEmAcessoPorCelular - BBC Brasil." BBC Brasil. April 29, 2015. Accessed October 9, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/ noticias/2015/04/150429_divulgacao_pnad_ibge_ lgb Bublitz, Juliana. "Divulgação De Nomes E Salários Do Governo Do RS éFalha, DizEspecialista." Zero

Hora. June 10, 2015. Accessed October 10, 2015. http://zh.clicrbs.com.br/rs/noticias/ noticia/2015/06/divulgacao-de-nomes-esalarios-do-governo-do-rs-e-falha-dizespecialista-4778569.html. "Democracy Index 2014: Democracy and Its Discontents." The Economist. 2015. Accessed October

2015.

http://www.sudestada.com.uy/

Content/Articles/421a313a-d58f-462e-9b24-

2504a37f6b56/Democracy-index-2014.pdf. "InfográficoVeja: Rede De Escândalos." Rede De Escândalos: A Memória Viva Da Corrupção. 2015.

Accessed

Pereira, Carlos, and Marcos AndréMello. "The Sur-

October

2015.

http://

veja.abril.com.br/infograficos/rede-escandalos/.

in America: The Power Game. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

The Ministry of defence of Yugoslavia building in Belgrade, bombed during NATO airstrikes in 1999 2002 | Author: David Orlovic

6 The Civil War in Yugoslavia and the Involvement of the International Community Tier 1

NEJC SERETINEK European and Russian Affairs This article offers an outline of the events during Yugoslaviaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s civil war following the individual republicsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; declaration of independence. Accordingly, it analyses the response of the international community and its failure to prevent the escalation of the conflict and the bloody crisis which has sprang from it. The author argues that the powers which could have intervened to protect the population and stabilize the war responded in conformity with their internal political realities. Thus they adopted divided resolutions for addressing the dispute. These disputes succeeded in the further jeopardizing of the settlement of the conflict and the security and stability in the region and therefore deepened the crisis.

n the year 2015 we were commemorating the

brutal and tragic single event of the civil war in Yu-

70th anniversary of the end of the Second

goslavia. The aim of this article is not, however, to

World War. In the same year there was also

accuse one side or the other for atrocities done dur-

an anniversary of the event that shocked the

ing the Yugoslaviaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s civil war, but rather to examine

world 20 years ago. It was the 20th anniversary of

how the international community perceived the

the Srebrenica massacre that happened between

war, which steps did it take to prevent the blood-

the 11th and the 13th of July, 1995. More than 8000

shed and why it was ineffective.

Muslim men and boys were killed by the Bosnian Serb paramilitary units. It was, perhaps, the most

Yugoslavia was a federate state consisting of six republics and two autonomous regions. During the

The Civil War in Yugoslavia and the Involvement of the International Community

rule of Josip Broz Tito and his ideology of

the US army. In addition to that, during the time of

‘fraternity and unity’ Yugoslavia was considered as

tensions in Yugoslavia, US army was already

one nation and nationalism in individual republics

fighting Saddam Hussein’s troops in Kuwait. Ger-

was repressed. Soon after Tito’s death in 1980 there

many seemed to be the only state that supported

was a surge of nationalism, especially among the

the independence movement of Yugoslavia’s repub-

two biggest nations of Yugoslavia – Serbia and Cro-

lics. Its situation was quite the opposite of the

atia. It was obvious that Yugoslavia as a federation

USSR’s, as Germany was reunited and became

would not last: because individual republics de-

again a nation-state in November 1990. Self-

manded independence. The main problem was that

determination of nations played a key role in the

the republics of Yugoslavia were not ethnically ho-

unification, as both Germans in the DDR as well as

mogenous. Croatia had around 12% Serb minority

in the BDR were eager to live in the same state.

(Doyon and Slack, 2001: 148) living in Eastern Dal-

Therefore, Germany’s support to Yugoslavia’s re-

matia and Eastern Slavonia. The most ethnically

publics was not at all surprising. However, France

inhomogeneous republic was Bosnia and Herze-

and Britain, the two other major states in the Euro-

govina, where Bosnian Muslims represented 44%,

pean Community took the same position as the US,

Serbs 31% and Croats 17% of the entire population

probably because of a fear of instability in the re-

(Doyon and Slack, 2001: 146). These national

gion (Bowker, 1998: 1248). One can clearly see that

groups were spread throughout Bosnia and Herze-

the internal issues of the Great Powers dictated

govina.

their foreign policy. Hence, in the case of Yugosla-

Even before any declaration of independence, the international community was determined not to

via, each state took its own stance that was in accordance with their problems or politics at the time.

recognize individual republics as sovereign. The

That did not, however, stop Slovenia and Croatia

USSR was struggling with obtaining its own union

from declaring independence in 1991. Slovenia,

and support for secession in Yugoslavia was not an

which was ethnically homogenous, seceded from

option. The reason for the European Community to

Yugoslavia after a ten-day war in which the Yugo-

oppose the independence movements in Yugoslavia

slav National Army (controlled by Serb generals

was also much connected with the USSR. The lead-

and political leaders in Belgrade) did not use its full

ers of the European Community did not want to

military power. After Belgrade had realized that the

embarrass Gorbachev as he was trying to keep the

federation was going to fall apart, its main goal was

Soviet Union together while executing reforms that

not to try holding it together, but rather to ensure

would bring the Soviet Union closer to the Western

that the Serb people of Yugoslavia would live in one

world (Bowker, 1998: 1248). The United States also

state. This is why the war in Slovenia ended quickly,

stated that a united Yugoslavia was a necessity for

while in Croatia, lasted until 1995. Serb minorities

stability in the Balkans and that republics would

living in Eastern Slavonia and Dalmatia formed

not get US support in the case of a declaration of

paramilitary units and received military support

independence. US stance on Yugoslavia was justi-

from Belgrade. Belgrade justified its military sup-

fied, as an independence movement always increas-

port with the fact that Croatia was a fascist state

es instability in a region. However, the reason for

during the Second World War, where Ustaše (Croat

US policy may also have had another explanation.

fascists backed by Hitler) committed killings of

Ever since the Vietnam War, public opinion in the

Serbs in the concentration camps. In areas where

USA was much against any foreign intervention of

Serbs were in the majority, they created autono-

The International Academic

mous regions with a goal to annex those regions to

but that the international community also turned a

Serbia proper. At one point, they controlled about a

blind eye on Croatia, when it was covertly arming

third of the Croatian republic (Bowker, 1998: 1249).

its army to regain occupied territories in Dalmatia

Croats living there were forced to move or even

and Slavonia (Bowker, 1998: 1253). Clinton’s new

killed. In late 1991, Germany unilaterally recog-

campaign in Bosnia was a part of his election cam-

nized the independent states of Slovenia and Croa-

paign. Again national interests were a main guid-

tia, while Russia, the European Community and the

ance in states’ foreign policies. This is usually ac-

US did not. The move was condemned by the inter-

ceptable, but, in the case of crisis or war, where ci-

national community, especially the recognition of

vilian lives must be protected, states should take

Croatia, where the government in Zagreb did not

every step necessary to prevent bloodshed, even if

have an authority within the borders of the ex-

they are not fully compatible with the state’s na-

republic (Bowker, 1998: 1248). Germany was con-

tional interest at the time. The European Commu-

vinced that the recognition would stop conflicts in

nity blindly supported the campaign while Russia

the disputed areas, but in fact, it encouraged Croa-

was reluctant to do so. Russia also strongly opposed

tian Serbs to even peace up with the formation of

any air strikes against Serbia and was often criti-

ethnically clean territories in Croatia.

cized for ‘slowing down the solution in Yugosla-

In 1992 began the war in Bosnia, where the ethnici-

ty of the population was the least homogenous. Croats formed an alliance with the Muslims and fought Bosnian Serbs, who were supported by Belgrade. At that time, the international community’s stance on Yugoslavia changed significantly. Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia were recognized by other states (Slovenia became a member of the UN in May 1992) and the international community recognized Serbia as the aggressor. Even Russia, which has traditionally been seen as Serbia’s ally, supported

via’ (Bowker, 1998: 1251). In fact, Russia was eager to achieve a peaceful solution that all sides would be satisfied with. Because of that, relations between the West and Russia cooled, while, on the other side, Moscow regained influence on Belgrade and successfully convinced Serbia’s leader Slobodan Milošević to start negotiations and end his support to Bosnian Serbs (Bowker, 1998: 1253). The final peace deal for Bosnia was signed in Dayton in 1995, where leaders of Serbs, Croats and Muslims in Bosnia agreed to a federation.

Western sanctions on Serbia. This change can be

Atrocities committed during the Yugoslavia’s civil

explained by the fact that at the time, USSR no

war could have been prevented with a clear and

longer existed and Yeltsin, the leader of its succes-

unified response from the international communi-

sor – Russia – was offended by Serbian support to

ty. However, the response from the Great Powers

its opponents during the Moscow coup in August

was too much in accordance with their domestic

1991 (Bowker, 1998: 1248). The situation changed

politics at the time and indecisiveness of the inter-

again when Clinton was elected president of the US.

national community led to Serbian territorial gains

He was a strong opponent of Bush’s policy towards

at the beginning of the war. After that, the peace

Bosnia. He argued that Bosnia is an independent

was even harder to achieve. US and Russia each led

state and, as such, has a right to defend itself

their separate campaigns during the war in Bosnia,

(Bowker, 1998: 1250). By lifting an embargo on

but the European Community failed to execute any

Bosnia and with a clear support for a Muslim-Croat

kind of unified foreign policy, probably because it

alliance, the situation changed once again. This

was still struggling with the issue of its own integra-

meant not only an escalation of conflict in Bosnia,

tion and was unprepared to act as a unified political

The Civil War in Yugoslavia and the Involvement of the International Community

body at the time. It was in everyone’s interest to end the war as soon as possible, but that would have required a unified response from all major actors in the international community. In that case, the war in former Yugoslavia would have probably been shortened for a few years and many lives would have been spared. Even though a peace deal was achieved at the end, if we consider wars in Yugoslavia as a diplomatic test for the international community, it has failed miserably.

Bibliography Bowker, M. 1998. ‘The Wars in Yugoslavia: Russia and the International Community’, Europe-Asia Studies. 50 (7): 1245-1261 Doyon, R. R. and Slack, J. A. 2001. ‘Population Dynamics and Susceptibility for Ethnic Conflict: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Journal of Peace Research. 38 (2): 139-161

The International Academic

The International

A PEGIDA demonstration in Dresden January 2015 | Source: Kalispera Dell

7 The contemporary New Right: Racist, Xenophobic, or Culturally Fundamentalist? – Political crisis in Western Europe Tier 2 ANDERSSON EBBA European and Russian Affairs The article deals with the lot discussed contemporary extreme right in Western Europe, concentrating on the debated concepts of racism, xenophobia and cultural fundamentalism. It examines the contemporary extreme right parties’ relation to these concepts by looking into the parties’ agenda and rhetoric, especially concentrating on the ‘Islamophobia’ in the parties. Examples are taken from Western European extreme right parties who have become legitimate influencers of current politics. Are these parties actually racist, xenophobic and/or culturally fundamentalist and under which conditions?

uring the last decades there has been

parties of parliament, can be identified. Parties

an upsurge in research on the con-

such as Sweden democrats (Sweden), Northern

temporary extreme right mirroring

League (Italy), Danish People’s Party (Denmark),

the political success of these parties

Austrian Freedom Party (Austria), The Front Na-

in Europe (Mulinari and Neergard, 2014:1). Alt-

tional (France) and the BNP (Great Britain)

hough it may be difficult to pin down what these

(Widfeldt, 2010:13-19) serve as an example. Hence,

parties stand for (Davies and Lynch: 2002:162), a

the presence of policies promulgating this will not

common approach towards anti-immigration and

be contested. Instead, this essay will explore whom

anti-establishment, when compared with remaining

they are targeted against and why they are imple-

The contemporary New Right: Racist, Xenophobic, or Culturally Fundamentalist?

mented. In addition, it will assess the extent to

distinguished by their cultural heritage, will there-

which they are racist, instead of xenophobic, or cul-

fore be the definition allocated for racism for the

turally fundamentalist. After establishing the scope

purpose of this essay.

of ‘racism’, these questions will be addressed in reference to the growing relevance of ‘Islamophobia’. ‘Islamophobia’ is a result of the movement’s third wave (Beyme, 1988) and has impact on parties development from political pariahs to legitimate influencers of current Western European politics. However, assessing the extent to which the contemporary New Right is founded upon fascism goes beyond the purpose of this essay. An established relationship between them would not necessarily allude to the presence of racism within the extreme right.

As previously stated, the purpose is not to establish the presence of anti-immigration policies in the manifestos of the extreme right. Although, Herbert Kitscehlt (1995:35) claims that the winning formula of the extreme right comprises its economic policies

and there is a broad agreement that antiimmigration and establishment policies are more prominent. Hence, its presence is rather uncontested. In addition, the mere conclusion of its presence does not necessarily prove extreme-right parties racist. Rather, the conditions under which they are

The concept of racism, as an idea implying the ex-

implemented are of greater significance, two of

istence of hierarchy between certain groups, is a

which will be assessed in the next section of this

deeply contested notion and its interpretation var-

essay. Looking back the definition, it appears as if

ies (Zúquete, 2008:335). Classical racism asserts a

the identity of those targeted by anti-immigration

belief in permanent and hereditary differences be-

policies is very important. If policies were widely

tween groups, distinguished according to physical

applied and targeted anyone, the contemporary ex-

attributes, such as the color of skin, more generally

treme right would more appropriately be labeled

identified as ‘race’ (Miles: 1999:335). Due to this

xenophobic (fear of all strangers) (Fennema,

precise definition, academics such as Banton claim

1997:473-492). The focused criticism against Islam

racism to be an irrelevant concept for political and

(Zúquete: 2008:325), through means we will soon

sociological analysis. Since there exists no scientific

discover, however, suggests that policies are con-

evidence for biological differentiation between rac-

centrated on a specific group of people, based on

es, it can be proclaimed dead (Banton in Miles,

their cultural heritage. For example, many contem-

1989:48). Despite absence of the word ‘race’ in the

porary extreme right party leaders appear to make

19th century, discrimination is still present. This

a distinction between ‘immigrant’ and ‘Muslim’.

leads the analyst Montagu to argue that “whenever

This is highlighted in an opinion expressed by Jim-

racism fails in its attempts to prove that the source

mie Åkesson stating that “As a Sweden Democrat I

of group differences lies in the biological field, it

see Islam and Muslims in Sweden as our biggest

falls back on justifications concerning cultural dif-

foreign threat since World War II” (Åkesson in

ferences which would serve to mask its continued

Mulinari and Neergaard, 2014:9). He also states

racist beliefs” (Montagu 1972:159). In other words:

that “migrants in general, but Muslims in particular

“racism can no longer be identified exclusively as

are a burden to the Swedish nation” (Mulinari and

an ideology with a specific biological content or ref-

Neergaard, 2014:11). The targeting of a particular

erence” as the historical context in which it origi-

group goes beyond the scope of xenophobia. The

nated shaped its definition to have little meaning

proposition made by Guillaume Faye, one of

outside that particular context (Miles: 1972:49).

France’s New Right theorists, similarly suggests

The idea of an existent hierarchy between people,

this. He claims that ‘Muslims’ to have replaced

The International Academic

42 ‘Jews’ as the new transnational other in exclusion-

tion would not be a problem since children are gen-

ary discourses (Faye in Zúqete, 2008:9).

erally known to assimilate. Additionally, why is

The

reason

behind

the

targeting

anti-

immigration policies towards a culturally distinguished group will now be assessed in order to determine the extent to which the contemporary extreme right is racist as opposed to culturally fundamentalist. Cultural fundamentalism is the idea of

different cultures being incompatible and should

there

particular

focus

the

alleged

‘Islamification’ of Europe (Zúquete, 2008:326)? These issues lead to a question: to what extent ‘difference

culture’

justification

for

anti-

immigration policies merely acts as an ideological shield for hiding the original belief of hierarchy of cultural groups?

consequently not be mixed (Stolcke, 1999:30). In

Issues suggesting that the Western right is cultural-

other words, neither is superior; they are merely

ly racist, as opposed to fundamentalist, concern the

incommensurable. Much research on the contem-

way ‘Muslims’ or the ‘Islam’ culture is portrayed as

porary new right takes precaution in proclaiming

a ‘threat’ or ‘enemy’. A Northern League European

them culturally racist and most party leaders simi-

MP stating Islam to be a ‘dangerous virus’ during a

larly avoid this label (Mulinari and Neergaard,

street declared protest against the burqa (Zúquete,

2014:3). Instead, ‘Islamophobia’ is primarily con-

2008:325) and a BNP member announcing the real

sidered as nativist (Copsey, 2013:9) and ‘anti-

enemy of the British people to be the Crescent

muslim’ narratives as part of a broader anti-

Horde (Ibid) reassures this position. Similarly, dur-

immigration outlook of extreme right parties

ing the Austrian parliamentary election of October

(Lynch and Davies, 2002:162). For example, in

2006, the Freedom Party released a political adver-

2009 high abortion rates threatened prospects of a

tisement in which “the cross atop Stephen’s Cathe-

continued stable population in Sweden. All seven

dral in Vienna was replaced by an Islamic crescent.

parties in the Swedish parliament proposed that

The caption reads: This is the true hidden desire of

this could be solved by mass immigration from

Muslims” (Zúqete, 2008:327). The extreme right’s

countries with high birth rate, that is, the Middle

image of Islam being the new enemy (Camus:

East. Jan Björklund answered to this “As a Sweden

2005), the idea that Muslims threaten European

Democrat I realize that such a policy will lead to a

identity (Zúquete, 2008:329) and the increased

disastrous clash of cultures, which will eventually

perception of the Middle East as being an ominous

break down our Sweden” (Björklund in Mulinari

threat (Zúqete, 2008:324) become even more sig-

and Neergaard, 2014:8-9). Here, anti- immigration

nificant when looking at why many extreme right

policies were justified by a difference, as opposed to

party leaders think by these terms. In an Article

hierarchy, of culture and can therefore not be

published in 2005, the leader of the French Nation-

claimed racist (as defined for the purpose of this

al Front leader outlined the Islam culture to consist

essay). However, in 2002, Sten Andersson, the top

candidate for the Sweden Democrats party leader at

rape” (Griffin in Zúquete, 2008:330). Similarly

the time, justified his anti-immigration policy pro-

Mognes Camre, member of the European Parlia-

posal of not allowing children to be adopted into

ment with the Danish Party, explicitly states that

Sweden from the Middle East and Northern Africa

‘We think Muslim countries belong to the Middle

on the same ground (Edgar, 2002). This seems aw-

ages’ (Camres in Zúquete, 2008:331). Finally,

fully peculiar since culture is not hereditary. If it

Northern League literature reads that Islam culture

was purely a matter of anti-multiculturalism, adop-

is “incompatible with the mores of a superior West-

“ceaseless

oppression,

injustice,

and

The contemporary New Right: Racist, Xenophobic, or Culturally Fundamentalist?

ern civilization. The Western way of life is based on

nyheter/article10276132.ab

civilized democracy rooted in the DNA of each citi-

10.11.2014).

(accessed

zen, while Islam’s way of life is based on uncivilized

Fennema, M. (1997) ‘Some Conceptual Issues and

tradition” (Zúquete, 2008:333). Not only does the

Problems in the Comparison of Anti-Immigrant

contemporary new right portray Islam as a threat to

Parties in Western Europe’, Party Politics, 3 pp.

Europe, it does so on the basis that Muslim culture

473-492.

is ‘backward’ and ‘inferior’. The anti-immigration policies implemented by

Contemporary Right Parties are not in themselves racist. However, depending on whom they are targeted against, and why this is the case, they might become. This essay has established what constitutes racism and the conclusion of the essay depends entirely on how you define it. The discovery of ‘Islamophobia’, the distinction made between ‘Muslim’ and ‘Immigrant’ by relevant party leaders and the portrayal of ‘Muslim’ culture as a threat

towards European identity on the basis of it being characterized as ‘backward’ and ‘inferior’ has led this essay to conclude that, despite justifying their anti-immigration policies as xenophobic or culturally fundamentalist, the contemporary extreme right are in fact, to a large extent, racist.

Bibliography

Kitschelt, H. (1995) The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Miles, R. (1989) Racism. London: Routledge Press. Journal Articles Monde, January 23. Mulinari, D. and Neergaard, A. (2012) ‘Violence, Racism, and Political Arena: A Scandinavian Dilemma’, NORA-Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research, 20(1) pp. 12-18. Mulinari, D. and Neergaard, A. (2014) ‘We are Sweden Democrats because we care for others: Exploring racisms in the Swedish extreme right’, The European Journal of Women’s Studies, 21 (1) pp. 43-56. Newspaper Articles Camus, J. (2005) ‘Le nouvel enemie: le monde arabo-musleman ou l’Islam’, Le Stolcke, V. (1999) ‘New Rhetorics of Exclusion in Europe’, International Social Science Journal, 51

Beyme, K. (1988) Right-wing extremism in Western

Europe. London: Totowa Press, NJ.

(159) pp. 25-35.

Widfeldt, A. (2010) ‘A fourth phase of the extreme

Copsey, N. (2013) ‘Fascism...but with an open

right? Nordic immigration critical parties in a

mind.’ Reflections on Contemporary Far Right in

comparative context’ Nordeuropaforum, 20 pp. 7

(Western) Europe’, Journal of Comparative Fas-

-36.

cist Studies, 2 pp. 1-17. Davies, P and Lynch, D. (2002) The Routledge Companion to Fascism and the Far Right. London: Routledge Press. Eatwell, R., Mudde C., ed. (2004) ‘Introduction:

The New Extreme Right Challenge.’ Pp. 1-16 in Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge, London Routledge. Edgar, J. (2002) ‘De bör inte få adopteras till Sverige’. Available at: http://www.aftonbladet.se/

Zúquete, J. (2008) ‘The European extreme-right and Islam: New directions?’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 13:3 pp. 321-344.

The International Academic

The International

Demonstration against land confiscation held at Bil'in January 2011 | Source: Israel Defense Forces

8 My Land, Your Land? Acknowledging Socio-Psychological Barriers in Search of Solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Tier 2

LUKSCH, NIKLAS Middle East The article deals with the Israeli-Palestine conflict and examines the reasons behind the conflict and, especially, socio-psychological barriers to peace. As it can be concluded, the article takes a slightly different perspective to the crisis by raising themes such as identity, perceived victimhood and meta-narratives. The geopolitical conflict resolution strategies have failed to reach the peace and are not sufficient alone. The preliminary steps towards peace are re-humanizing the enemy, the ‘other’, mutual respect and understanding of other side’s narratives and victimhood. Thus the channel for negotiations and peace can be created.

ontested territory lies at the heart of

to address the underlying causes that keep the Is-

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and ne-

raeli-Palestinian conflict alive?

gotiations to reach a settlement have, for the most part, proposed a two-state

solution. The most recent development surrounding the Al-Aqsa mosque compound in Jerusalem are illustrative here. However, largely classified as a dispute over territory, why do attempts focusing on classic geopolitical conflict resolution strategies fail

This paper argues that an exclusively geopolitical approach is not sufficient for the conflict resolution because the bargaining over territorial interests should not be mistaken for the analytical phase of need-identification. Instead, before focusing peace efforts on the physical borders of the present, a more critical engagement with the conflicting par-

My Land, Your Land?

47 ties’ interpretations of the past is required. First, collective memories and narratives regarding perceived identity and victimhood are identified as major barriers to conflict resolution. While by no means dismissing the important contributions of territorial-geopolitical approaches to the ongoing peace process, it is the socio-psychological process related to the territory at stake that needs to be addressed prior to any negotiations involving concrete pieces of land. Specifically, the outright denial of the existence of the ‘Other’ and the perception of granting legitimacy as acute threat to one’s own col-

memory and thus the foundation of the internal and external legitimacy behind conflict parties’ demands (Auerbacher, 2010: 102). That Israelis and Palestinians

both

cultivate

their

own

meta-

narratives and do not tolerate any questioning of their validity only reinforces the tensions between them. They sustain the conflict by creating not only the memory of the self, but also what Zerubavel refers as the “counter memory” (1995: 10), directly

challenging the perspective of the ‘Other’. At this level, narratives about events surrounding the dispute become unalterable, historical truths.

lective identity are undermining efforts towards

The question of identity

conflict resolution. Supporting the analysis by pre-

The Palestinian meta-narrative provides a clear re-

sent-day events surrounding the direct aftermaths of the 2014 Gaza War, the article stresses the importance of identifying recurring behavioral patterns of all relevant stakeholders in order to be able

to develop meaningful solutions regarding the conflict’s latest crisis. The conclusion, building upon the socio-psychological barriers to conflict resolution identified in the analysis, outlines ideas that could serve as starting points for a more constructive dialogue between both sides.

sponse to the question of identity: Palestinians are the people who have been living in Palestine for generations, whereas the Jews are perceived as a religious group united through Zionism and expansive-colonialism in their goals. Lacking any national character, Palestinians deny the State of Israel the right to exist (Auerbach, 2010: 114). Simultaneously, largely stemming from physical dispersion, the fragmented nature of Palestinians’ own identity is compensated by narrative constructions that help

I. Collective Memories and Narratives as Barriers to Conflict Resolution

‘differentiating

oneself

from

what

one

Collective memories and the selective ways in

definition blended with the perception of Israelis as

which two people remember their past, play a cru-

an enemy or ‘Other’, results in the preservation and

cial role in identifying barriers to a peaceful solu-

even reinforcement of basic disagreements between

tion in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Abowd,

the two conflicting parties. By obstructing the pene-

2007: 245). Memory is not a passive thing, but a

tration of peaceful gestures initiated by such

“field of activity” (Said, 2000: 185) in which past

‘conflict-supporting beliefs’ (Halperin et al., 2010:

events are reconstructed, maintained, modified

29) make a conclusion in conflict quite difficult to

and, indeed, made ‘usable’ for contemporary politi-

achieve. In September 2015, Palestinian President

cal concerns. Memories are informed by the related

Abbas used the time leading up to the raising of the

concept of meta-narratives. Meta-narratives are

Palestinian flag at the UN headquarters as an op-

employed to unite members of the collective, estab-

portunity to openly accuse Israel of undermining a

lish people’s belief system and infuse these beliefs

two-state solution and its policies to “destroy what

with emotions which motivate certain actions in

is left of Palestine” (Abbas, 2015). This is reflective

conflict. They act as ‘super-stories’, building the

of cognitive-motivational processes as barriers to

framework that revives and creates collective

peace. Rather than seeking the dialogue with Israel,

not’ (Benhabib, 1996: 3). The struggle over self-

The International Academic

48 Abbas seems to have switched to diplomacy on the

Jewish struggle against those who wish to destroy

international level, generating domestic support

them (Pappé, 2014: 167). Educating the young gen-

while putting pressure on the Israeli government.

erations to be prepared to fight and sacrifice their

In addition to the negations of the existence of the

lives for the national ethos, these activist episodes

other, preferring “to act unilaterally against Isra-

establish an historic continuity between the events

el” (Abé and von Mittelstaedt, 2015, 'Interview with

of Masada, the Holocaust, the establishment of

Isaac Herzog: Israelis are Fed Up with Politics of

State of Israel and resistance against modern-day

Fear’, Spiegel Online International) sends out a dis-

Palestinian aggression. Any deviation from this

couraging signal in relation to possible future nego-

positive model of behavior and spirit of active hero-

tiation efforts, according to former Israeli prime

ism, in other words, conceding to peace that leaves

minister candidate Herzog. Deliberately pressuring

Israel worse off, is deemed unacceptable. Notably,

Israel into recognition, Palestinian leaders make

just like on the Palestinian side, the perception of

clear that they do not consider Israel a legitimate

identity of the ‘Other’ represents a considerable ob-

partner in peace but an antagonist to their own

stacle to conflict resolution. First, the Israeli narra-

goals. Associated with such zero-sum mentality,

tive of resistance coincides with the outright denial

peace loses its appeal to either party, since it cannot

of Palestinian historical presence and peoplehood.

be achieved through cooperation but only at the

Recognition of the negotiation partner, however,

expense of the other.

constitutes the basis for fruitful dialogue. Second,

In sharp contrast to this stands Israel’s consciousness of the singularity of its existence. The recurring themes throughout the Jewish meta-narrative, choice and covenant with God, were institutionalized in the State of Israel (Auerbach 2010, 120). Closely related to the notion of the State epitomizing political and societal progress, is the memory of two key events in Jewish history, namely Masada and the years of the Holocaust, which deeply stigmatize Israel’s self-perceived identity. Jewish resistance to Roman expulsion at the fortress of Masada around 73 AD, is, today, the narrative of heroic stoicism (Zerubavel, 1955: 69). Playing up the defenders’ readiness to die as the ultimate expression of their patriotic devotion, the Masada narrative easily translates into willingness and determinism to defend Israel to the bitter end rather than finding a compromise with the Palestinians. Compromise is viewed as tantamount to surrender parts of the state to the enemy. Similarly, while suppressing the traumatic aspects, the revolts in the various ghettos and camps during the years of the Holocaust serve as more recent reminder of the long

the uniqueness of the Palestinian situation combining

geographical

separation

and

inter-

organizational rivalry, particularly between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Hamas, significantly reduces confidence in durability of any agreement from the Israeli perspective (Tzoreff, 2010: 65). Hamas openly questions the PLO’s role as sole representative of the Palestinian people. This in turn, causes Israel to seriously

doubt Palestinian leaders’ ability to make credible commitments regarding a lasting peace agreement. In fact, once the 2013-2014 peace-talks failed and Abbas’ Fatah agreed to form a unity government with Hamas, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu openly declared that Abbas would need to choose whether he wants to have “reconciliation with Hamas or peace with Israel, because only one is attainable, not both” (Keinon, 2014, ‘Netanyahu: Abbas

must choose, peace with Israel or reconciliation with Hamas’, The Jerusalem Post). Clearly, Israel is presented as peacemaker while Hamas takes on the role of a ‘spoiler’ to peace. In doing so, Netanyahu is subject to actively excluding parts of the Palestin-

My Land, Your Land?

49 ian people from the peace process by refusing to

is the existence of a Jewish State of Israel in the

negotiate a deal with Hamas, apparently taking into

middle of the Arab-Muslim world. It represents a

account the long-held Israeli memory of Hamas’s

constant reminder of the weakness and deep crisis

radical and ideologically-charged demands. Recent

of the Palestinian people. Tellingly, the terminology

events, like the assault on UN premises in Gaza

that Palestinians themselves employ to describe

during a pre-announced demonstration and just a

this condition reflects the culture of the poor and

day after the UN had been forced to suspend cash

oppressed: Nakba is the ‘catastrophe’ marking the

payments to refugee families due to a lack of donor

end of the 1948 war, while Naksa labels the

support, seem only to reinforce Israel’s view that

‘setback’ of 1967. Certainly, this acute sense of hu-

Hamas and its deficient political mechanisms can-

miliation experienced twice in 20 years and its

not be trusted. As early as January 2015, calling for

presence in daily discourse through language cre-

a “[Palestinian] government … that is able to take

ates a powerful barrier to resolution of the conflict

responsibility”(Lewis, 2015, ‘Palestinian political

with Israel, which for Palestinians bestowed upon

stalemate is stalling Gaza rebuilding- UN envoy’,

them their greatest and most humiliating calami-

Thomson Reuters Foundation), UN Special Coordi-

ties. At the same time, the psychological wounds of

nator for the Middle East Process Robert Serry had

perceiving itself as a victim of aggression within its

warned that the conflict might enter unchartered

own territory today are reinforced by a fundamen-

territory as tensions between the two sides escalate.

tal sense of insecurity. As could be observed during

The conflict is precisely such a downward spiral of

the debates leading up to the parliamentary elec-

actions and counter-actions and an ever-widening

tions in March of 2015, Israeli leaders promoted a

trust that sparked and seems to sustain the most

tougher stance on security and openly favored in-

recent clashes surrounding the al-Aqsa mosque

creased military operations in Gaza. Instances in-

compound. Accelerated by mutually deep-rooted

clude Foreign Minister Lieberman blatantly calling

memory of the enemy ‘Other’, thus it would appear

that the conflict over identity is caught in a vicious

“inevitable” (quoted by Somfalvi, 2015, ‘Lieberman:

circle with meta-narratives on both sides, framing

Third Lebanon War is inevitable’, Ynetnews), while

contradictory belief-systems that then are unloaded

in other occasions criticizing Prime Minister Netan-

in bursts of violence directly undermining any

yahu for his soft handling of Hamas during

peace efforts.

‘Operation Protective Edge’ (Curiel, 2015). Help-

The question of victimhood For Palestinians, the overall asymmetry in the balance of power with Israel intensifies the need for narratives to compensate for its weakness, especially in military and economic terms. Public Palestinian discourse is heavily influenced by a sense of de-

featism. The context of this is to be found in both more than a century of perceived failure and harsh socio-economic realities (Agha and Khalidi, 2014: 94). The main problem for Palestinians to resolve, and hence part of any possible peace negotiations,

fourth

operation

the

Gaza

Strip

lessly finding themselves under constant threat and yet once again in a position of weakness, Palestinians perceive any negotiation not as bargaining between equals, but as prescribed solution by the Israeli side. Likely to be exploited by dictating an ‘Israeli peace’, the defeatism complex continues to generate great suspicion to any peace initiative. For Israelis, the Holocaust has not at all lost its symbolic meaning as a collective trauma. Regarding the conflict with the Palestinians, Zuckermann argues that Jewish collective memory never underwent any real ‘Trauerarbeit’, the process of grieving

The International Academic

50 (2010: 80). Instead, the Jewish community inter-

tween the conflicting parties, by comparing the ICC

nalizes the tragic event to such an extent that it los-

to Jim Crow courts in America’s old South, Ma-

es its universal significance as a warning sign

cEoin also deliberately discredits international

against the suffering of any human being and takes

mechanisms of conflict resolution in the eyes of

on a sense of victimization that applies exclusively

many Israelis.

to them. Embracing the image of the ‘eternal victim’ (Zuckermann, 2010: 79) bears two implications for the peace process.

Second, the sense of victimization simultaneously sustains Israel’s positive self-image as virtuous and moral military power. Perceiving any Palestinian

First, from a psychological perspective, incapable of

resistance to Israel’s presence tantamount to ter-

remembering the Holocaust without invoking ter-

rorism, Israel has no choice but to defend itself by

minology of guilt, the expression of hatred becomes

the use of force. Painting the picture of moral forces

a necessity. Because the original object of hate, the

only fighting moral wars produced the Israeli oxy-

collectivity of Germans, had been slowly lost during

moron of ‘the purity of arms’ (Pappé, 2014: 56). Ac-

a process of normalization of the relationship be-

cording to this narrative, wars are fought reluctant-

tween the two nations, Israel is forced to produce a

ly against the worst of enemies and won while the

new guilty party. Through a process of ‘guilt shift-

army adhered to the highest principles of moral

ing’ (Zuckermann, 2010: 79), fear and hatred are

conduct. In this vein, only days after prosecutors at

then projected onto the contemporary enemies of

the ICC opened a preliminary examination of possi-

the State of Israel. Every time there is a security

ble war crimes committed in the Palestinian territo-

crisis in form of violent confrontation with the Pal-

ries during the 2014 War, Israeli President Rivlin

estinians, this nurtures the hatred towards the

urged UN-Secretary Ban to take a stand against the

‘Other’. Occupied by strong emotions of animosity,

“more than cynical” attempt by Palestinian “terror

it is now the Israeli society that runs the risk of

organizations” to bring Israeli soldiers in front of

shutting out honest ideas for peace initiatives, all

the ICC, declaring the IDF “the most ethical army

while further delegitimizing the Palestinian stake-

in the world” (quoted by Benhorin, 2015, ‘Rivlin

holders as partners of peace. International criticism

urges Ban to take a stand against Palestinian ICC

of Israel is often perceived as an expression of anti-

bid’, Ynetnews). Believing to be in morally superior

Semitism, this shows once again that memory is not

position to its contender complicates Israeli’s readi-

necessarily authentic. Instead, through careful ma-

ness to accept its share of responsibility for contin-

nipulation and “dynamics of organized remember-

uance of the conflict, to look beyond the incident

ing and forgetting” (Campos, 2007: 58) memory

and finally identify solutions both disputants can

seems to be made rather useful politically. Palestin-

support.

ians gaining membership of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in early January 2015, can be considered to be a key step towards being able to pursue Israel for alleged war crimes committed during the Gaza offensive. Denis MacEoin, distinguished Senior Fellow of Gatestone Institute, suggests that anti-Semitism constitutes the main motivation behind these accusations (MacEoin, 2015). Besides fueling emotional barriers of fear and hatred be-

In the absence of an objective or agreed-upon criteria for evaluating and defining the historic injustice, treating the other as victim and itself as victimizer

does not constitute an option. At this point, selfascribed victimhood turns into a “protected value” (Baron and Spranca, 1997). It is perceived so essential in defining society’s identity that is granted protected status against any negotiation or trade

My Land, Your Land?

51 -off. In sharp contrast to their deep psychological

1997: 696). This notion does not entail equality be-

fears indeed linked to, but as demonstrated, not

tween the two conflicting parties in terms of mili-

caused by, territorial vulnerability. For Palestini-

tary-economic power, but rather a certain degree of

ans, recognizing the victimhood of Israeli Jews

mutual respect. Helping to bridge notions of guilt

would entail accepting them as community of suf-

and injustice by recognizing the other as victim

fering. However, whereas anti-Semitism to them

thus becomes part of the own healing process. After

seems remote and irrelevant, the powerful, very

successful normalization of the ‘Other’, the next

present memory of harsh socio-economic realities

step is that the incorporation of each other’s narra-

since 1948, including dispossession, displacement,

tives could be employed as means to conflict resolu-

dispersal, occupation, perpetual siege in Gaza and

tion (Bar-Tal and Halperin, 2013: 2). Here, the

daily subjugation in West Bank, cannot be compro-

recognition of legitimacy entails both: granting the

mised. Simultaneously, for Israelis to accept the

other side the right to tell one’s own stories about

trauma the Palestinians suffered and to lose their

heroism and suffering from a different point of view

status as modern history’s ultimate victims would

as well as showing the appropriate respect and

be shaking the fundamental narrative of Israeli

carefully listen to what the other side has to say. In

statehood (Pappé, 168: 2010). Thus, preserving

this sense, recognition acts as ‘audience-widening’

one’s own victimhood serves as the most important

by making deep-rooted psychological fears more

criterion for judging the quality of a negotiation

accessible to people from the other side. Peace and

process and a possible agreement on both sides.

ultimately reconciliation mean acceptance of the

Ultimately, these attitudes make mutual sympathy

other’s narrative of conflict. For instance, discus-

and forgiveness as key elements of peace very hard

sion forums or educational material, could be used

to achieve.

to critically engage with and demystify concrete

II. Approaches to Conflict Resolution Analyzing the ways in which collective memories and narratives continue to penetrate the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, multiple socio-psychological

barriers to conflict resolution can be identified. Importantly, it is those very same obstacles that seem to sustain the most recent waves of violence. Only after they have been removed can the conflict resolution strategies of compromising, dividing, exchanging or sharing the physical be applied at all.

events structured around the long history of the conflict. At the political level, this new input for critical self-examination combined with a better understanding of the other’s complex identity could make negotiations between Palestinians and Israe-

lis more meaningful. Especially in light of the most recent crisis and recurring fears of a Third Intifada, enabling both parties to better discern and finally accommodate the other side’s needs, will be crucial to achieve a more stable peace.

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A Palestinian boy and Israeli soldier in front of the Israeli West Bank Barrier August 2004 | Author: Justin McIntosh

A line of riot police in Kiev on 12 February 2014 February 2014 | Author: Аимаина хикари

9 Weaponised history in international relations: Historical narratives as policy tools in the after math of Ukrainian crisis of 2014 Tier 3 BALCYTIS, DAINIUS TOMAS European and Russian Affairs Article offers an overview of how history is used as a tool to formulate and justify policies pursued in Ukrainian crisis today. Attention is drawn to the different conceptions of the shared, and not shared, history of Ukraine and Russia. History can be manipulated to serve the purpose and in the current crisis both, Ukraine and Russia, seek historical evidence to justify their actions. Territorial disagreements have throughout their history been hotly contested issue and form a rupture in their relations. This serves as one example of different historical narratives as Russia has often seen Ukraine as an offspring of Russia while many Ukrainians have experienced Russian influence as an oppression.

istory has traditionally been viewed

torical past. In some cases, especially where the

as an important indicator of how

throne was usurped or taken by a person without

society perceives itself and its ori-

an ancient claim or a good reason, history had to be

gins. Since the Middle Ages, when-

invented and “adjusted” to manufacture a façade of

ever a new monarch took the throne or obtain a

legitimacy. Despite the centuries of progress and

new domain, his legitimacy and right to rule was

decline of monarchy, not much has changed in this

most often evaluated within the context of the his-

regard. Whenever there is a radical political shift

Weaponised history in international relations

within a country or when a new polity emerges, we

lematic in itself as both Russia and modern Ukraine

can observe instant change in the way public histo-

believe that they have historical claims based on the

ry is being interpreted. The most recent case would

legacy of Kievan Rus and territories north of the

be the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 which created at

Black Sea. In addition, many Ukrainians perceive

least two such precedents: the annexation of Cri-

their history to be that of oppression by Russia and

mea and the appearance of a separatist polity of

reject the patronising name of “Little Russians”,

Novorossiya (“New Russia”). Both of these events

while Russians themselves tend to see Ukraine as

have been accompanied by a surge in rhetoric

an offspring of Russia (Kappeler, 2014: 107-109).

which relies on radically different interpretations of history. This article will briefly overview the complicated crossover Ukrainian-Russian historical identity and then assess how history is being used by policymakers today to justify violence, manufacture legitimacy and mobilise the population.

In this context, it was no surprise when questions related to historical justice arose soon after the proRussian government was overthrown. One of the most controversial decisions was an attempt to repeal the Language Law of 2012, which was implemented by the deposed President Viktor Yanu-

To properly analyse questions related to Ukrainian

kovych and granted the Russian language regional

history, we must first have a brief overview of

status in some regions of Ukraine. While this law

shared Ukrainian and Russian history. Both states

was not repealed, just an attempt to do so stirred

claim that they can trace back their origins to the

public imagination and very soon sporadic violence

medieval polity of Kievan Rus and their foundation-

erupted across Ukraine. Pro-Russian historians and

al myths are formed accordingly (Riabchuk, 2012:

politicians decried this attempt to reduce the Rus-

439). The modern Ukrainian state still uses one of

sian language to a minority status as an attack on

the Rurik dynastic seals as its coat of arms, both

Russians which was motivated by neo-Nazi and fas-

Russia and Ukraine are using the Cyrillic alphabet

cist sentiments (Motyl, 2015). One of the ways aca-

and adhere to Orthodox Christian faith as a direct

demic history was used to support this idea was to

consequence of Byzantine missionaries who con-

draw a comparison between the followers of Stepan

verted Kievan Rus. However, most of Slavic princi-

Bandera

palities, including Kiev, were utterly destroyed dur-

Yanukovych activists and protesters. Bandera was a

ing the Mongol invasions in the 13th century. Only

controversial figure who, for some time, collaborat-

around the 15th century did the Grand Duchy of

ed with the Nazi regime after they occupied

Moscow accumulate enough power and influence to

Ukraine during their invasion of USSR, but later

rally Slavic polities under one banner and create a

declared an independent Ukrainian state. For this,

country known today as Russia. The original centre

he was sent by the Nazis to a concentration camp

of power in Kiev was in decline as it changed hands

where he remained until 1944 and, after that, he led

between Mongols, Lithuanians and Poles (Snyder,

the anti-Soviet resistance in the hopes of restoring

1998: 3-4). Only in the 17th century did Russia gain

an independent Ukrainian state. He was eventually

control over Kiev and mainland Ukraine. Finally,

assassinated by the KGB in 1959. Both sides used

Crimea was captured from the Ottoman Empire in

this figure to rally support either by hailing him as a

the 18th century. During the first half of the 20th

hero who did all he could to restore a Ukrainian

century there were attempts to create a Ukrainian

state, or by condemning him as a Nazi war criminal

nation state, but all of them were suppressed by

(Liebich & Myshlovska, 2014: 752). Because of this,

Russia. As we can see, such a setup is quite prob-

Pro-Russian

during

WWII

media

and

adopted

modern

anti-

term

The International Academic

58 “banderovtsy” (“those following Bandera”) to refer

and Eastern parts of the country (about two-thirds

to all pro-Maidan activists and protesters. Such

of modern Ukrainian territory) were given to

strong accusations triggered a strong response from

Ukraine by the Bolsheviks after the October Revo-

the population, as public history of the “Great Patri-

lution and that those territories are historically

otic War” and Nazi-Soviet atrocities has been a con-

Russian. This is a great example of historic revi-

tested topic in Ukraine even before the current cri-

sionism which can be used to justify breaking trea-

sis (Katchanovski, 2014: 210-212). Thus, both sides

ties (Budapest Memorandum, a document where

were able to manipulate public history to distance

Russia recognised Ukrainian borders and sover-

themselves from the other group and create an im-

eignty in 1994) even in the 21st century (Orlov,

age of their opponents as the social “Other” which

2014: 133-137).

made it a lot easier to start hostilities and justify violence within a society that lived peacefully for generations (Janmaat, 2007: 307).

In the following months after Putin’s speech, his words about Eastern and Southern Ukraine being historically Russian bore fruit and an open sepa-

After the eruption of riots across the eastern part of

ratist rebellion began in the Easternmost Donbas

Ukraine, Russian forces infiltrated the Crimean

region of Ukraine. While most countries and inter-

peninsula. A referendum was organised and within

national organisations have agreed that Russia is

a week Crimea became part of the Russian Federa-

supporting separatists, Russia continues to deny

tion. The speech given by Russian President Vladi-

this as of November 2015 (Allison, 2014: 1255). It is

mir Putin during the “reunification” ceremony, in

clear that, at least to some extent, Putin’s appeal

March 2014, is probably one of the best examples of

had a mobilising effect on the population and polls

how historical discourse can shape both public and

reflect it very well (Associated Press, 2014). Inter-

foreign policy (Biersack & O’Lear, 2014: 260-261).

estingly, Russian media soon started referring to

In the opening line of his speech, Putin states that

the new separatist polity as Novorossiya (“New

the Crimean issue is of “historic significance”. He

Russia”), a loaded archaic term used for these terri-

proceeds to mention history eighteen times in his

tories by the Russian Imperial administration after

speech, dedicating about one third of the whole

they were conquered in the 18th century. Within a

speech (which is more than half an hour long) to

month, separatists adopted a flag, the USSR consti-

discuss historical origins of Russian claims to

tution, as a temporary measure, and started talking

Ukraine (count done by the author based on the

about a possibility of restoring a tsarist-style mon-

transcript of speech which was made available by

archy. Naturally, this strange mixture of historical

Pervy Kanal, First Channel, 2015). Putin’s historical

ideas had a strong mobilising effect on various

argument for the “reunification” of Crimea with

groups and significant numbers of troops fighting

Russia is threefold. Firstly, he argues that Crimea

on behalf of the separatists have come there from

became part of Ukraine only because of a decision

Russia or elsewhere in Europe (ITAR-TASS, 2014).

made in 1954 by Nikita Khrushchev. Secondly, he

Some of the volunteers are fighting there for money

argues that Crimea was always primarily Russian

or adventure, but plenty of them are motivated by

and that even Ukrainians and Tatars living in Cri-

historical reasons and questions of identity. For ex-

mea are Russian speaking and culturally leaning

ample, at the moment, there is a pagan 700-strong

towards Russia since the times of Russian Empire.

“Svarog” battalion fighting for the separatist cause

Finally, he raises doubts about the legitimacy of the

because they pray to the old Slavic gods and believe

Ukrainian state itself. He argues that the Southern

the Donbas region to be ancient Slavic land that will

Weaponised history in international relations

59 be corrupted by a pro-European Kiev government

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The International Academic is a peer-reviewed journal made primarily for students by students and it was founded by the Politics and International Relations Society at the University of Aberdeen. Copyright ÂŠ 2016 PiR Society. All rights reserved.