The International Academic - III: Global Tensions

The International

A

Letter from the Team The International Academic is proud to present its 3rd issue. This edition focuses on various interpretations of ‘Global Tensions’, providing a platform to discuss controversial topics ranging from terrorism and elections to structural inequalities including food security, the myth of race and ethnic and class tensions. The articles we received were also refreshingly cross-disciplinary, including not only contributions from economics and politics but also commentary from within different sociology and anthropology streams. We are very pleased to see this engaging dynamic as this is inherently what university is about: challenging our ourselves and each other to find new perspectives and new lenses through which to address current, and recurring, issues and affairs.

The International Academic team has been beavering away with the journal for several months now, with new energy and lessons learned from the past years. This journal was founded on the idea to provide students a platform to be published and to help them improve their academic writings skills.

We are extremely thrilled with the level of engagement and that every year more students are getting involved.

Since 2015, the committee has been constantly changes as old members graduate and new ones join.

Every year brings with it new challenges and learning experiences and it is truly remarkable to see how each new committee responds to them. We would like to thank every single committee member for dedicating hours of their time to putting this piece together. We hope it has been as rewarding for you as it has been for us. We would also like to thank the writers who contributed to making this issue versatile and an insightful reading experience. Without your contributions our journal would be immaterial. So thank you to everyone who has been involved and we hope you will considering publishing again.

The team is already brain storming ideas for next year. It is our goal to keep striving forward and we welcome what 2018-2019 has in store for the journal. We encourage anyone who is interested in getting involved, whether that being writing for us or applying to be on the committee.

Satu Kuitunen and Katrin Wagener Editor in Chief Deputy Editor in Chief

Team Editor in Chief Satu Kuitunen Deputy Editor in Chief Katrin Wagener Chief of Communications Delaine Lorio Digital Director Hans Nasman Sub Editors Graham Davidson

Lisa-Marie Esselmann Editors Tomoki Otani Ella Kivisaari James Cree-Hay Kristyna Greplova

Contents Class Tensions in the West - Brexit, Trump, and Le Pen and

Pg. 1

Bourdieu — Graham Davidson Ethnic Thensions in the UK: Evaluating the main arguments for

Pg. 7

and against multiculturalism — Laura Farley The complex nature of ‘religious’ terrorism in modern societies

Pg. 14

— Sofia Galli Race as a Dangerous Myth

Pg. 18

— Mie Astrup Jensen Intractable State Conflicts and Identity Wars

Pg. 24

— Ella Kivisaari Neoliberalism: A Tool for Global Instability & Conflict

Pg. 29

— Delaine Lorio Will Mexico Go Down the Populist Route in 2018?

Pg. 36

— Lisdey Espinoza Pedraza The Powder Keg in the Balkans: Can it happen again?

Pg. 40

— Nejc Seretinek The UN and Solving Intra-State Conflict

Pg. 47

— Katerina Videva Rising Food Insecurity and Malnutrition: The Role Governments Play in Preventing Undernutrition and Obesity

— Katrin Wagener

Pg. 52

1

1

Class Tensions in the West - Brexit, Trump, Le Pen and Bourdieu GRAHAM DAVIDSON

In markedly the most consistently controversial year for modern western politics, there is really one question remaining that we all ask ourselves and everyone else: How was this all possible? A cutting of ties to the EU from the UK that helps no one and creates hundreds of other problems, a president in the US who, definitely without trying, trivializes the problems and needs of the many with bellicose and uninformed rhetoric, and Marine Le Pen in France, her father’s legacy being the Head of the FN, an anti-European Unions party, and hers being reviving that party and bringing it to the fore of politics in France. This article tackles the complexities of growing class struggles, the resurgence of traditional values, and political division within leftist parties in the wake of these shocking developments in contemporary politics.

T

he twin seismic shocks of the Brexit vote

working-class revolt. Concentrating on Britain and

and the election of Donald Trump in

the US (but also looking at France and other

2016 have been interpreted variously as

European states to establish patterns in voting and

a crisis for the left, an explosion of

attitudes), this short paper will argue along

xenophobia and rollback of liberal values, and a

Bourdieusian lines that the class-based negative

2

Class Tensions in the West - Brexit, Trump, Le Pen and Bourdieu

consequences of globalisation and neoliberalism,

and the Norwegian left lost elections in 2017, as did

combined with the dominance of ‘legitimate’

the SPD in Germany (Manwaring & Kennedy,

cultural values in the political and social discourse,

2017). Furthermore, concerns regarding racism and

has led to increased class tensions across the West.

the rise of the far-right have some validity. Hate

The knock-on effects of these internal tensions may

crimes spiked alarmingly in the months following

also have further consequences in terms of

the Brexit vote, with a 41% spike in reported

international relations, with immigration and trade

incidents by late 2016 when compared to 12 months

policy affected as a result. Bourdieu’s take on

previously (Public Policy Exchange, 2016). This,

globalisation will also be used to suggest solutions

however, may have been due to a “welcome rise” in

to class tensions, assuage the threat of extremism

incidents being reported (Met Police, 2016). A

and the rise of openly racist political parties, and to

recent US poll revealed 68% of white working-class

re-engage a large section of western electorates in

voters agreed that the American way of life needs to

the political process and social discourse.

be protected from ‘foreign influence’, with nearly

It is simplistic to assert that the working-classes voted Trump and Leave, while the middle-classes chose Clinton and Remain. There, however, were multiple communities and sub-divisions voting in both Britain and the US – so that there is a certain

half agreeing with the statement, “things have changed so much that I often feel like a stranger in my own country” (Green, 2017). The Front National, while slightly detoxified from its extreme past, remains a party of the far-right.

degree of truth in this statement. In the UK, 57% of

Whilst the examples of Brexit, Trump, and France

AB1 social class voters chose Remain, dropping to a

refer to national elections, there have been

mere 36% among C2DEs (Moore, 2016). Florida

undoubted international consequences. Britain

(2016), meanwhile, unequivocally states that in the

outside of the EU will be able to pursue a more

US, social class was a “basic dividing line in this

restrictive immigration policy, while Trump’s

election. Clinton states are richer…while Trump

proposed policies of trade tariffs on countries with

states are poorer”. Similar patterns have been

which the US runs a deficit – principally China, but

established in France. In the 2017 Presidential

also Germany, Japan and Mexico – may have knock

election, the Front National polled 34%, with many

-on effects for international relations in the near

defectors

parties

future (Ghemawat, 2016). It is tempting to

(Goodhart, 2017: 73). French political analyst

interpret the decline of the centre-left and the rise

Bruno Cautres

of populism as a spike in intolerance, with potential

coming

from

mainstream

states simply that the Front

National “has become the party of the working class (Chassany, 2016).

knock-on negative effects across borders.

However, it is instructive to introduce Bourdieu’s

A clear pattern of working-class and lower-middle

take

class disaffection can be seen across the West,

(2001:161) cites Bourdieu’s anger at the “retreat of

mirroring

national governments from adequately funding

the

decline

of

centre-left

parties

on

globalisation

medical

at

care,

this

point.

throughout Europe in the 21st century, which

welfare,

traditionally drew much of their support from this

transportation,

demographic. This is demonstrated by the election

addition, Bourdieu believed that neoliberalism and

of Trump and the surge in support for the Front

globalisation have produced “a new mode of

National; contrarily the PvDA in the Netherlands

discipline and domination founded upon the

education,

housing,

Leitch

and

public

culture”.

In

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The International Academic

institution of insecurity” (Bourdieu, 1996 in Leitch,

have seen their salary fall in real terms by 9%

2001:100). For many among the working-classes

(Coder & Green, 2016). While only 33% of

throughout the West, globalisation and neo-

Americans described themselves as working-class

liberalism have resulted in a fall in living standards

as recently as 2000, this figure had risen to 48% by

and employment security, as well as creating a deep

2015 (Newport, 2015). Social class has increased in

mistrust of political elites and the status quo.

prominence in recent times in the US, and the

It is this new ‘precariat’ that is rejecting traditional political allegiances and neo-liberal hegemony.

Commenting on the failure of the Remain

campaign,

Mitchell

(2016) argues that “Remain tried to offer the status quo to millions of people for whom the status quo hasn’t been working for decades.”

McKenzie (2016), writes that the EU

referendum

conducted

on

immigration

was

the

not

basis

policy,

but

of was

about “precarity and fear”. Mason (2016:261),

meanwhile,

comments that the dramatic late surge

in

favour

of

“

itself

-Frank,

(2016) describes Hilary Clinton as

Vote and the elec-

screaming for an outsider” - than

tion of Donald

Trump in 2016 have been

as a ringing endorsement of Trump

himself.

Indeed,

with

many Trump voters professing a

interpreted variously as a

preference for the equally anti-

crisis for the left, an explo-

establishment Bernie Sanders –

sion of xenophobia and a

Budowsky (2017), writes that “it is Sanders, not Trump, who is the

roll back of liberal values

real working-class hero - it can be

and working class revolts”

seen that the desire for a new kind of politics, free from neo-

Scottish

solidly for Yes in the major cities) were seen to be rejecting the status quo, with economic as opposed to ethnic grievances at the fore. working-class

class’

“an insider when the country was

nationalism. Again, the working-class (who voted

US,

‘political

shocks of the Brexit

plebeian movement”, as opposed to blood-and-soil

the

against globalisation, free trade agreements and the

The twin seismic

independence in 2014 was driven by a “left-inclined

In

election of Trump is perhaps better viewed as a vote

Americans

report

negatively on the prospect of securing a decent level of employment through educational attainment.

Jones (2017) states: “The enduring narrative of the American dream is that if you study and get a college education and work hard, you can get ahead…white working-class Americans…no longer see that path available to them”. Statistics from the US also highlight a growing class divide, with the income of college graduates increasing by 22% in the past two decades, while those without a degree

liberal establishment elites, has been the driving force behind populist votes through Europe and the US, with inevitable international

consequences

as

a

result.

Furthermore, deindustrialisation has exacerbated t he situation between the haves and have nots with regard to economic capital. Goodhart (2017:149) speaks of the ‘disappearing middle’, in terms of the effect wrought upon previous median-income jobs such as high-level clerical work and skilled machine operators due to automation and globalisation.

Rowthorn (2016 in Goodhart, 2017:152) notes the emergence of a ‘dual economy’, with the majority of people working in either well-paid sectors such as finance, media and the professions, and lowincome, mainly service jobs. With social mobility declining for those born in the 1970s and later (Rogers, 2012), Bourdieu’s ‘cultural capital’, where

Graham Davidson

4

Class Tensions in the West - Brexit, Trump, Le Pen and Bourdieu

the ‘correct’ dispositions, accent and cultural tastes

pastime”. It nevertheless appears that traditional

are often required for high-stays employment

party affiliation is in decline, with Swales (2016)

(Bourdieu, 1986), is apt here. Class tensions

commenting

regarding the economic divide may be growing.

signaled a move away from traditional left-right

Indeed, it can be argued that the abandonment of centre-left parties by their traditionally workingclass core electorate, is a direct result of the decline in living standards for the ‘precariat’. Furthermore, there is a perception that those in charge of the centre-left parties, appear not to care.

Williams

(2016) asserts that the cultural divide between the higher echelons of centre-left parties and their traditional core vote is key here. Stressing that economic policy was at the heart of Democratic

that

“the

[Brexit]

Referendum

politics and towards voting according to underlying political attitudes” (NatCen, 2016). Williams (2016) notes the re-emergence of College students’ negative attitude towards the police (a traditionally working-class career), writing that “for elites to write them off as racists is a telling example of how, although race- and sex-based insults are no longer acceptable in polite society, class-based insults still are”. As has been evidenced, class tensions across the West undoubtedly exist.

Party policy from 1930-70 (when blue-collar

However, possible solutions have been suggested,

workers voted Democrat en masse, as did the

not least regarding the reversal of the negative

British working-classes for the Labour Party),

effects of neo-liberalism. Bourdieu cites a two-fold

Williams states that the party is currently “obsessed

European Union, the “Europe of workers" and "the

with cultural issues,” adding that “progressives’

Europe of bankers”", of which the former forms the

obsession with prioritising cultural issues infuriates

new precariat. Improved technical and vocational

many

training at community and further education

Americans

whose

chief

concerns

are

economic”.

colleges in the US and Europe, along with greater

Similar complaints can be found in the UK, with McKenzie (2016) arguing that in recent decades both Westminster and the political media have embarked on a “sustained attack on working-class people, their identities, their work and their culture.”.

Goodheart

(2017)

also

notes

the

“disappearance of a distinct working-class culture and the marginalisation of their views in the public conversation”. Former Labour government advisor John McTernan indicates the disconnect between the mobile middle-classes and the ‘communitarian’ working-classes in Britain, stating that “New Labour rhetoric was on the side of change and mobility but it was off-putting to many people”.

While many on the liberal left decry the antiimmigration McKenzie

rhetoric (2016)

of

the

stresses

populist that

right,

“shouting

“backward” and “racist” has become a middle-class

job security and stronger trade unions could go a long way to easing tensions between the haves and the have nots. In addition, a move away from the ‘professional’ middle-class ubiquity of the political parties, who are increasingly drawn across the West from the higher echelons of society, may be required. In particular, a recognition that attitudes to immigration are more the result of precarity than intolerance - the 2014 British Social Attitudes Survey found a mere 11% of respondents to be ‘authoritarian (BSA, 2014 in Goodhart, 2017) must be acknowledged. A recognition that the negative effects of neo-liberalism may not only have consequences

on

national

elections,

but

on

international relations and trade, too, is needed. As Williams concludes, “If we don’t take steps to bridge the class culture gap…the consequences could turn dangerous.” At the very least, without a marked improvement in circumstances for the

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precariat, and indeed greater recognition of

Ghemawat, P. (2016) ‘Trump, Globalization, and

precarity, class tensions will remain a factor in the

Trade’s Uncertain Future’, Harvard Business

West.

Review,

at:

https://

trades-uncertain-future [Accessed 15.11.2017].

Budowsky, B. (2017) ‘Sanders, not Trump, is the hero’,

Available

hbr.org/2016/11/trump-globalization-and-

Bibliography real working-class

[Online]

TheHill,

[Online]

Available at: http://thehill.com/blogs/punditsblog/national-party-news/320679-sanders-nottrump-is-the-real-working-class-hero

Goodhart, D. (2017) The > Road to Somewhere.

London: Hurst Publishers.

Leitch, V. (2001) ‘Bourdieu Against the Evils of Globalization’, symploke, 9(1), pp.161-164.

Manwaring, R. and Kennedy, P. (2017)’Why the left

[Accessed 15.11.2017].

loses: Explaining the decline of centre-left

Chassany, A. (2016) ‘How France’s National Front

parties’, EUROPP, [Online] Available at: http://

is winning working-class voters’, Financial

blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/11/08/why-the

Time.,

-left-loses-explaining-the-decline-of-centre-left-

[Online]

Available

at:

https://

www.ft.com/content/ad9502f4-8099-11e6-bc520c7211ef3198 [Accessed 15.11.2017].

Mason, P. (2016) Postcapitalism, London: Penguin.

Coder, J. and Green, G. (2016) Comparing Earnings of White Males by Education for Selected Age Cohorts. [Ebook] Available at: http://ww.sentierresearch.com/.../ Sentier_Income_Trends_WorkingClassWages_1 996to20... [Accessed 15.11.2017].

Florida,

R.

(2016)

’America's

Class-Divided

https://www.citylab.com/equity/2016/10/ trump-clinton-and-the-creative-class/504827/ [Accessed 15.11.2017].

White House, and liberals put him there | Available

at:

The

Guardian,

[Online]

https://www.theguardian.com/

commentisfree/2016/nov/09/donald-trumpwhite-house-hillary-clinton-liberals [Accessed 15.11.2017].

Information

Police

(2016).

Request

‘Freedom

Reference

of No:’,

met.police.uk [Online] Available at: https:// www.met.police.uk/globalassets/foi-media/ disclosure_2016/november_2016/information-of-hate-crimes-committed-from-before-andafter-the-brexit-vote [Accessed 15.11.2017].

Moore, P. (2017) ‘YouGov | How Britain Voted’, YouGov: What the world thinks, Available

Frank, T. (2016) ‘Donald Trump is moving to the Frank’,

Metropolitan

rights-unit---statistics-in-regards-to-the-number

Electorate’, CityLab, [Online] Available at:

Thomas

parties/ [Accessed 15.11.2017].

at:

[Online]

https://yougov.co.uk/

news/2016/06/27/how-britain-voted/ [Accessed 15.11.2017].

Mitchell, D. (2016) ‘Angry remain voter? Now you know how working-class people feel | Dreda Say Mitchell’, The Guardian, [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2016/jul/07/angry-remain-voter -working-class-division-britain [Accessed 15.11.2017].

Graham Davidson

6

Class Tensions in the West - Brexit, Trump, Le Pen and Bourdieu

Newport, F. (2015)’Fewer Americans Identify as Middle Class in Recent Years’, Gallup.com, [Online] Available at: http://news.gallup.com/ poll/182918/fewer-americans-identify-middleclass-recent-years.aspx [Accessed 15.11.2017].

Public Policy Exchange (2016), [Online] Available at:

https://www.publicpolicyexchange.co.uk/

events/HF27-PPE [Accessed 15.11.2017].

Rogers, S. (2012) ‘Social mobility: the charts that shame Britain’, [Online] The Guardian, [Online] Available

at:

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news/datablog/2012/may/22/social-mobilitydata-charts [Accessed 15 Nov. 2017].

Williams, J. (2016) ‘What So Many People Don’t Get About the U.S. Working Class’, Harvard Business Review, [Online] Available at: https:// hbr.org/2016/11/what-so-many-people-dont-get -about-the-u-s-working-class [Accessed 15 Nov. 2017].

7

2 Ethnic Tensions in the UK: Evaluating the main arguments for and against multiculturalism LAURA FARLEY

With a greater focus on ethnic tensions developing across Europe, this article takes aim at the efforts towards multiculturalism in the United Kingdom. Reconciling competing arguments on matters of nationality, social cohesion, and diversity, this article highlights the delicate balance required for us all to thrive in a multicultural country.

E

ver since the Brexit referendum, the UK

spikes can be seen following several terrorist at-

has seen an unprecedented spike in

tacks (ibid). Global tensions between people of dif-

hate crime (Dearden, 2017). The Home

ferent ethnicities are strongly perceived in the UK,

office has confirmed that the offences

raising the pressing question of how diverse cul-

were racially or religiously aggravated and that

tures can simulatenously exist within one society.

8

Ethnic Tensions in the UK

Britain is multicultural. According to the 2011 Census, the United Kingdom has a multicultural population of about 8 million (National Records of Scotland, 2013). Most cities and towns have a multicultural population and while many have operated peacefully, some have experienced riots. Ever since the 2001 riots in Burnley, Bradford and Oldham, many issues concerning social cohesion and diversity have been a topic of discussion.

The question of “what it takes to combat racism and live with difference and cultural exchange in a multiethnic society” (Amin, 2002:966), is prevalent.

Some scholars talk about a “multiculturalism backlash” that occurred at the start of the 21st century, describing how people have become more sceptical towards cultural diversity. This is evident not only in the rise in hate crime but also in the resurgence of extreme right populist groups such as the English Defence League. There is a widespread perception that multiculturalism represents the enemy from within. Werbner says that multiculturalism “probably

has

more

critics

than

defend-

ers” (2003:52). Nonetheless, multiculturalism remains a widespread aspect of societal life. There are no

feasible

alternatives

to

multiculturalism

(Kymlicka, 2010:47) and thus society has to negotiate how the intersection of cultures can work.

In this article, I will be looking at the main fields of discussion when it comes to multiculturalism, namely nationality, social cohesion, diversity and fairness. Critiques of multiculturalism argue that it increases segregation and brings conflict in values and allegiance due to differing nationalities. Contrarily, proponents of multiculturalism argue that the diversity multiculturalism brings makes the country a better place and creates fairness because each culture is recognized and accommodated. I will be assessing the main arguments of both and from them draw the conclusion that due to its complexity, multiculturalism needs to be managed very

well in our society in order to make it work.

Nationality “Social identity denotes definitions in terms of category

memberships”

(Hewstone

and

Brown

1986:14). Nationality is one of these category memberships. The fear concerning multiculturalism is that as people of different nationalities come together, category memberships will conflict in what is supposed to be a common society of a nationstate. Different cultures bring conflicting values that could weaken allegiance to the state. This view is held in particular towards Muslim immigrants, especially after 9/11 and 7/7 (Grillo, 2007:992) and has resurged after the terrorist attacks in France.

Muslims are seen “as both disloyal and illiberal” (Kymlicka, 2010:45). One of these conflicting values is “Islam’s failure to separate religious and secular authority” (Grillo, 2007:992) which threatens liberal pluralism. This is manifest in, for example, Muslim sharia courts that are operating on British ground against the laws of the state (Corbin, 2013) and the fact that British citizens have volunteered to fight alongside Muslim extremist groups in Syria (Wintour and Watt, 2014).

What is not considered, however, is that while all these incidences have occurred and may be seen as a threat to the state and its citizens, many people of different nationalities seek to integrate. Ralph Grillo (2007:982) talks about a certain Mr S who questioned a panel of experts on Multiculturalism on how he could show society that he, as a Muslim, had integrated himself within British society . The perceived conflict in values British Muslim led people around him to believe that he had not integrated. However, people like him want to let British society know that they want to be part of this social body and that they are loyal to the state they live in.

Kymlicka (2010:39) claims that “multiculturalism is equally transformative of identities and practices

9

The International Academic

of minority groups”. This is evident, for example, in

that as Asian immigrants started to move into inner

the fact that many young Muslim women desire a

-urban areas, whites fled to outer estates in order to

better education and to be able to choose marriage

escape Asian ‘contamination’ and in order to pre-

partners, “perhaps within a frame of commitment

serve white Englishness. Poor Asians had little

to Islam and kinship ties” (Amin, 2002:964).

choice but to settle in those abandoned areas. The

Transformation does happen and there is a strong

government has sought to solve this problem by

argument that immigrants develop “strong affilia-

arranging mixed residential areas. Although there

tions based on kinship and religious ties” partly be-

is now a intersection of cultures in a common

cause of “racial and ethnic labelling and the rejec-

space, this does not mean there is intercultural en-

tion that comes with deprivation” (ibid).

gagement.

Immigrants and members of cultural minorities

Furthermore, Hewstone and Brown (1986) are very

want to belong. Nationality does not have to be a

clear in that for real social cohesion to be produced,

threat. Multiculturalism brings people of diverse

it is necessary to have more than mere contact.

nationalities and identities together, even though it

They found that interaction within ethnic groups

is important to note that some values may conflict.

was still more frequent than inter-ethnic engage-

Still, many immigrants want to be ableto live in

ment. As studies show, even when there was paren-

harmony with the rest of the society they live in. As

tal support for mixed schools, schoolchildren would

the different cultures intersect, a hybrid of identi-

often resegregate into their ethnic groups in recess

ties comes to show.

(ibid p.9). In many mixed housing estates, racism,

Social cohesion “Convention suggests that multicultural areas tend to exhibit high levels of residential and educational segregation, high degrees of poverty and deprivation and low rates of contact between culturally distinct individuals and groups” (Kesten et al., 2011:133). Some people, such as Trevor Philipps, talk about multicultural societies “sleepwalking to segregation” and finding themselves in a system where people of different cultures lead parallel lives (Grillo, 2007). This claim is justified by data such as a UK survey that found that “half of Muslim families wanted their children to go to a Muslim school” (ibid p.986). The Cantle Report of 2001 documented that most British towns are vastly polarized in many spheres of daily life (ibid). Still, the background of ethnic segregation in schooling and housing is more complicated than the perception that people of a particular ethnicity want to live in cultural closure. Ash Amin (2002:962) illustrates

prejudices, and interethnic tensions are perpetuated. As Ash Amin argues (2002:967), these areas contain ‘parallel lives’ and produce resentment by whites. The author, however, also notes that resentment is “fuelled by socioeconomic deprivation and a sense of desperation” (ibid p.962). Although there is not much empirical research on the interethnic relations in ‘ordinary’ or relatively prosperous cities, a study of the New Town of Milton Keynes focuses on social cohesion (Kesten et al., 2011:135).

Milton Keynes is a city which is characterized by overall growth and has a large multicultural population but does not show much residential or educational segregation (ibid p.136). The research showed that the city was experienced in similar ways regardless of which ethnic community people belonged to (ibid p.139). Segregation in friendship groups and inter-ethnic tensions were still prevalent but conviviality is made possible (ibid p140).

Kesten et al argue that “conviviality should not be seen as some unproblematic process of coming to-

Laura Farley

10

Ethnic Tensions in the UK

gether or homogenisation - a space within which

culture realizes a limited range of them and ne-

difference can be negotiated and argued over, ra-

glects, marginalizes and suppresses others. Howev-

ther than one in which it disappears or becomes

er rich it might be, no culture embodies all that is

settled” (ibid p.142). They contend that the people

valuable in human life and develops the full range

of Milton Keynes “are not living parallel lives - on

of human possibilities. Different cultures thus cor-

the contrary they are actively negotiating differ-

rect and complement each other, expand each oth-

ence” (ibid p.147). The argument of segregation and

er’s horizon of thought and alert each other to new

the leading of parallel lives has validity as many

forms of human fulfilment. The value of other cul-

people experience it this way, however, we need to

tures is independent of whether or not they are op-

ask ourselves to which extent this segregation is

tions for us. (…) Its unassimilable otherness chal-

problematic when conviviality is made possible.

lenges us intellectually and morally, stretches our imagination, and compels is to recognize the limits

Diversity According to a BBC poll, 62 per cent of the population believe that multiculturalism makes the country a better place (Grillo, 2007:984). A lot of literature encourages the ‘celebration of diversity’, by which the music, customs, traditions and cuisine of other cultures is embraced (Kymlicka, 2010:34). It is also called the “3S” model: saris, samosas, and steel drums (ibid). Parekh (2000:165), one of the most prominent defenders of multiculturalism, lists a number of arguments for diversity that have arisen in the academic debate of multiculturalism. Some of these

are

“cultural

that

diversity

increases the availa-

“

turalism, there is not much data that supports that this is actually how we experience it. The ‘celebration of diversity’ also has some criticisms.

Kymlicka claims that ‘celebrated diversity’ trivialises “the real challenges that differences in cultural values and religious doctrine can raise”; it also turns a blind eye towards economic and political inequalities and the real problems of unemploy-

correct and complement each other”

and expands freedom of choice” (ibid p.166), it “creates a rich, varied aesthetically

While these are all possible outcomes of multicul-

Different cultures thus

ble range of options

and

of our categories of thought” (ibid p.167).

pleasing

and

stimulating

world” (ibid), it encourages a “healthy competition between different systems of ideas and ways of life, and both prevents the dominance of any one of them and facilitates the emergence of new truths” (ibid). Parekh himself has the opinion that different cultures add something to each other and cause a process of self-reflexivity: “Since human capacities and values conflict, every

ment, poor education, English

inadequate language

skills, and political marginalization (2010:34). Furthermore, by the experience of celebrating

distinctive customs, frames are put into place of how a particular culture looks like. It ignores the adaptation of cultures and does not show cultural commonalities that may emerge. The perception of the minority or immigrant group will always be one of the “other” (ibid). This imprisons people in ‘cultural scripts’ which reinforce power inequalities (ibid). Multiculturalism, in the diversity that it brings, surely adds to our society. However, in the process of encouraging diversity, society needs to be careful not to treat cultures as static, nor to ig-

11

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nore the real problems of social inequalities.

lines (ibid p.144). This calls into question to what

Fairness Policies of multiculturalism have aimed to create a

“

more fair society, giving every group certain rights and

allowing

them

political

representation.

Multiculturalism has granted immigrants citizen-

peared very fragmented as it splintered along clan extent fairness is created as it depends on the organisation of fixed communities.

Celebrating diversity has its downsides as it ignores the real problems of inequality”

ship and has sought to include them into society.

Multiculturalism overcomes legacies of former hierarchies and helps to build more inclusive and egalitarian democratic societies. Kymlicka therefore defines multiculturalism as being “first and foremost about developing new models of democratic citizenship, grounded in human rights ideals, to replace earlier uncivil and undemocratic relations of hierar-

One way of economic redistribution has been the process of affirmative action. Such a policy wants to ensure

equality

and aid social mobility. However, as Hewstone and Brown contend, affirmative action may cause members of minority groups, who have achieved high status might be downgraded because of their positive discrimination (1986:27). They may also be regarded as an exception within their wider community, which does not help to improve how group

chy and exclusion” (ibid). The mechanism of fair-

members are evaluated in general (ibid p.28).

ness within multiculturalism manifests in three

Finally, political participation is made possible

forms, namely, “cultural recognition, economic re-

through the formation of associations. Due to the

distribution, and political participation” (ibid p.39).

diversity within the multicultural populations,

These processes, however, also have their down-

these associations can be very vast in number. Leis-

sides. I will turn to each process individually.

ter had over 400 minority associations in the mid-

Official cultural recognition entails some sort of

1900s. This institutional structure made “local au-

formal organisation and establishment. It means that communities have to define themselves in some coherent way in order to generate some political weight (Kesten et al., 2011:144). In order to make communities governable, bureaucrats look for fixidity in a very fluid, uncertain and dynamic population group (ibid p. 147). In the study of Milton Keynes, a council officer affirmed that “the population changes here quite rapidly so you don’t really have a mass of people who have established themselves and organised themselves that you need to respond to, you don’t have that here’’ (ibid p.145). The study also showed that some communities establish themselves much more easily than others. The Somali community, for example, ap-

thority consultation with the associations “an essential

element

in

the

management

of

change”” (cited in Amin, 2002:973). In 1996, academic Steven Vertovec supported such a system which involved “a variety of modes of incorporation'' (ibid). About a decade later he questions how many smaller, less organized groups, such structures can support (2007:1047). He writes that as it takes years to develop effective community organizations and new immigrants are kept out of local representative structures, “there are good reasons why minorities may wish to remain invisible to outsiders and resist forming themselves into explicit organisational structures” (ibid p.1048). Every effort to establish a fairer society encounters difficul-

Laura Farley

12

Ethnic Tensions in the UK

ties of implementation and this questions the validity of the claim that multiculturalism creates a more equitable and more democratic society.

[Accessed 1st Jan. 2018].

Dearden, L. (2017) ‘Hate-crime reports rise by almost a third in year as Home Office figures illus-

Conclusion

trate EU-referendum spike’, The Independent,

In conclusion, the main arguments for and against

[Online]

multiculturalism have been evaluated in the following ways. Nationality is a form of identity that is fluid and many ethnic minorities, especially immigrants, exhibit hybrids of a certain cultural identity.

Even though some cultural values might conflict,

Available

at:

http://

www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/hatecrimes-eu-referendum-spike-brexit-terrorattacks-police-home-office-europeansxenophobia-a8004716.html [Accessed 1st Jan. 2018].

many immigrants want to be seen as an equal

Grillo, R. (2007) ‘An excess of alterity? Debating

members of society, belonging to the nation state

difference in a multicultural society’, Ethnic and

they live in. Segregation, however, is a threat to so-

Racial Studies, 30(6), pp.979-998.

cial cohesion but only to the extent to which conviviality is endangered. While diversity can benefit society in multiple ways, there is hardly any evidence to back this up or to prove that this is our primary experience of multiculturalism. Celebrating diversity has its downsides as it ignores the real problems of inequality and treats cultures as fixed and un-

Hewstone, M. and Brown, R. (1986) ‘Contact is not enough: An Intergroup Perspective on the ‘Contact Hypothesis’. In Hewstone, M. and Brown, R. ed.’, Contact and Conflict in Intergroup Encounters. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, pp.1-44.

changeable. Lastly, the aim to create fairness faces

Kesten, J. Cochrane, A. Mohan, G. and Neal, S.

many hurdles, especially when it comes to accom-

(2011) ‘Multiculture and Community in New City

modating immigrants. The bureaucracy of organiz-

Spaces’, Journal of Intercultural Studies, 32(2),

ing distinct communities that can be recognized

pp.133-150.

politically is problematic. When looking at multi-

Kymlicka, W. (2010) ‘The rise and fall of multicul-

culturalism as a whole, one can say that it is a very

turalism?: new debates on inclusion and accom-

complex phenomenon that needs to be managed

modation in diverse societies´, In Vertovec, S.

delicately. Politics and society need to find a bal-

and Wessendorf, S. ed.’, The Multiculturalism

ance between community recognition and inclusion

Backlash: European discourses, policies and

in order to foster respect, tolerance and unity.

practices, Oxon: Routledge, pp.32-49.

National Records of Scotland. (2013) ‘Table

Bibliography Amin, A. (2002) ‘Ethnicity and the multicultural city: living with diversity’, Environment and Planning, 34, pp.959-980.

Telegraph,

[Online]

Available

at:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/lawand-order/9975937/Inside-Britains-Shariacourts.html

Census,

[Online]

Available

at:

http://

www.scotlandscensus.gov.uk/documents/ censusresults/release2a/scotland/KS201SC.pdf

Corbin, J. (2013) ‘Inside Britains Sharia Courts’, The

KS201SC – Ethnic group: All people’ Scotland

[Accessed 1.1.2018].

Parekh, B. (2000) Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, 2nd ed.

London: MacMillan Press LTD. pp.1-432.

13

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Vertovec, S. (1996) ‘Multiculturalism, culturalism and public incorporation', Ethnic and Racial Studies, 19(1), pp.49-69.

Vertovec, S. (2007) ‘Super-diversity and its implications’ Ethnic and Racial Studies, 30(6), pp.10241054.

Werbner, P. (2003) ‘The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe’, In Saunders, B. and Haljan, D. ed.’, Whither Multiculturalism? A Politics of Dissensus, Leuven: Leuven University Press.

Wintour, P. and Watt, N. (2014) ‘Up to 400 British citizens may be fighting in Syria, says William Hague’, The Guardian, [Online] Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/ jun/16/400-uk-citizens-fighting-syria-isis-iraqwilliam-hague [Accessed 1.1.2018]

Laura Farley

14

3 The Complex Nature of ‘Religious’ Terrorism in Modern Societies SOFIA GALLI

This article wrestles with the role of religion in terrorism. The article builds on a strong base of historical concepts and incorporates engaging, contemporary cases. Critically discussing Mark Juergensmeyer’s work and whether religion is justification for terrorism, this article builds on historical literature to shines new light on one of the oldest debates in terrorism studies.

T

he word terrorism originally derives

ry, during the French Revolution, when Robes-

from Latin terrĕo: ‘to frighten, put in

pierre imposed the Reign of Terror aiming at

fear

Short,

fighting the risk of popular violence. It was only

1962:1860) – and it has been a recur-

from 1980 onwards, however, that the exponential

rent element in innumerable settings throughout

growth of ‘religious’ terrorism occurred, and the

human history. Ancient Romans named the panic

phenomenon quickly established itself as the most

provoked by the arrival of warriors belonging to the

crucial as well as lethal issue in modern societies

Cimbri tribe terror cimbricus and the expression

(Hoffman, 1997:3). Scholar Mark Juergensmeyer

became even more renowned in the late 18th centu-

focused his studies precisely on the relationship

or

dread’

(Lewis

&

15

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between terrorism and religion, arguing that the

ton argues that the world is gradually becoming a

latter represents the motivation for violent act to be

smaller place and interactions between civilizations

perpetuated. In regard of the structure of this arti-

are therefore on the rise; this creates greater con-

cle, the first paragraph will highlight Juergensmey-

sciousness of differences and commonalities with

er’s thesis, the second one will deal with the percep-

other civil agglomerates (1993:25). In this way, reli-

“

tion of religion as a potential cause for violence, taking into account the ambiguity

fostered

by

Scriptures,

whilst

the

third will explore in more detail the connection between politics and religion. The main intention is to demonstrate that religion is not the cause

gion becomes a watershed that intensifies commit-

Religion becomes a watershed that intensifies commitment”

ment by transcending national

boundaries

(1993:26). For instance, on 11th September 2001, Mohammed Atta and fellow members of Al Qaeda boarded

the

airplanes

that crashed into and destroyed the Twin Towers

of terrorism but it can be instrumentally used, un-

of the World Trade Center. The tragedy, which now

der certain socio-economic circumstances, to both

represents the most iconic terrorist act of the mod-

justify and rationalise terrorism.

ern age, was orchestrated on a large scale through

In Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, Mark Juergensmeyer (2013) construes religion not as the cause but as the justification for violence. The core concept is that instrumentalization of faith allows extremists to deem their actions as part of a spiritual scenario. This does not imply that religion inevitably creates violence, albeit it provides the symbols of fundamentalism to root in and prompt terrorism. Juergensmeyer (2013:191) places emphasis on the context of

connections with supporting factions in Europe, United States, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and uncountable

cohorts

elsewhere

in

the

world

(Juergensmeyer, 2013:11-12). It is indeed to be specified that it takes a wide organizational network to support terrorism. Understandably, the attack generated the need to explain why more than three thousand lives went lost and this led to the formulation of theories on the intricate relationship between religiosity and violence.

global politics and social dynamics, stating that ter-

Having said that religion is not the leading cause

rorist attacks aim to empower those communities

for violence, we need to acknowledge that certain

that embrace the culture of violence. Thus, groups

religions do leave the scope for ethical entangle-

of terrorists are able to strengthen their authority

ment. Political expert Giovanni Sartori (2015:62)

through the demonization of their enemies by

asserts that secularism is typical of the Western

means of religion. In this context, political ideolo-

World, where emphasis is placed on the will of the

gies and governmental goals are unswervingly in-

people and the role of religion is regulated, whereas

terconnected with the decision of using strength

theocratic societies are based on the principle of

(2013:10). Likewise, Bergen (2006) frames 9/11 as

submission to the will of God, which cannot be

‘collateral damage in a civil war within the world of

questioned. Particularly, Islamic societies have not

political Islam’ and this can surely be juxtaposed

followed the same historical process of democrati-

with Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations. Hunting-

zation and secularization of the Western societies,

Sofia Galli

16

The Complex Nature of ‘Religious’ Terrorism in Modern Societies

and this encouraged the transfer of power to reli-

are violated. Therefore, Muslims can enforce their

gion (2015:63). Here, Bin Laden would have stated

understanding of the Quran over geopolitical set-

that his war deals with the safeguard of Islam and

tings and their interpretation can supply the means

he has often called forth the “sword” verses of the

to endure a Jihad (Venkatraman, 2007:235).

Quran (Bergen, 2006). At this point, let us highlight that Islam is not the sole religion that fails in being thoroughly pacific, nor this paper intends to suggest that being Muslims equals being terrorists.

This is absolutely not the case. Religious-based slaughters have been carried out on behalf of the most diverse faiths – among the innumerable cases we may recall the Crusades, the European Wars of Religion between 1524 and 1648 and the ferocious assaults of the Ku Klux Klan. Nevertheless, as we specified in the introduction, this essay focuses on ‘religious’ terrorism, which only took its shape in 1980 (Hoffman, 1997:3). Hence, Islam is to be perceived as the religion that is in the viewfinder of most of the contemporary religious-based conflicts and therefore the most cited in our analysis. That said, the Quran does coin ambiguity. The following two quotes: ‘There shall be no compulsion in religion’ (Surah 2:256) and ‘O Prophet, exhort the believers to fight’ (Quran 8:65) cater an example of the dual nature of Islam. In Infidel, Somali-born and Muslim-raised Ayaan Hirsi Ali (2007:310) identified the nub of the problem in Islam itself: according to the Quran, Prophet Muhammed consummated his marriage with his wife when she was only nine years old, and this is simply the edge of the never-ending controversies that the Quran legitimates, if not mystifies. The concern here is that such distortions are too often considered as holy, and when challenged, many fundamentalists would feel insulted and violated. Hirsi Ali’s (2007:314) acute avowal is that Quran is not the act of God, but the act of men who interpreted the words of God. Such an issue becomes very treacherous if we think that the Shariat, which consists of outlined commandments that Muslims are expected to follow, allows the Jihad to take place when Quranic laws

Then again, religiously-motivated violence is not an end in itself. A very popular view among scholars is that Muslim societies are prone to ferocity precisely because they have not yet learned to separate religion and politics (Cavanaugh, 2009:194). Thus, it is not unlikely for political leaders to ally with religious parties to obtain their support. For example, in the 1980s the Pakistani dictator General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq subsidised the madrasahs, the educational institutions where violent versions of Islam are likely to be professed, to recruit troops for the

anti-Soviet

war

in

Afghanistan

(Stern,

2000:118). Similarly, the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), which implemented suicide bombings as the display of nationalism in Turkey, financed itself through blackmail and sale of heroin, whilst the Kurdish Diaspora in the Western World became a source to provide constituencies to lobby European governments and create profit (Bloom, 2005:102104). In such instable situations, the most dramatic violence can arise due to religious groups combatting in a framework of nationalist struggle, shaped by deprivation and repression. In fact, it is a common belief to perceive terrorism as the manifestation of non-religious factors such as ethnic fractionalization, governmental subjugation and territorial occupation (Henne, 2012:39). In this way, religion becomes a shared feature, an emblem of commonality so that religious groups often seek to both dwell and spread their belief, picturing it as the universal

truth.

Notwithstanding,

Smilansky

(2004:796) points out that there is an abundant potential for Islamic self-expression with over one billion followers and twenty-two nations in the Arab League. Yet, targets of terroristic attacks are seldom directly political; the vast majority of victims are intentionally unarmed innocent civilians. Here

17

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the literal nature of terrorism is again particularly

Bloom, M. (2005) ‘Halting Suicide Terror from

evident: the aim is to frighten and paralyze, and the

Within: the PKK in Turkey’, 101-119, Dying to

most effective way to do so is undoubtedly to attack

Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror, New York:

those who do not foresee it.

Columbia University Press

In the light of the latter reflections, we may be se-

Cavanaugh, W. (2009) ‘The Uses of the Myth’, The

duced by the idea that terrorism is the result of a

Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology

romantic idealization of religious violence. Howev-

and the Roots of Modern Conflict. Oxford: Ox-

er, this would be far too simplistic to explain a much more complex phenomenon. This paper focused on the explanation of Juergensmeyer’s assessment of religion as a justification to violence, and on providing an understanding of the causes of terrorism as the combination of political, cultural, social and religious factors that need to be consid-

ford University Press Henne, P. (2012) ‘The Ancient Fire: Religion and Suicide Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 24(1), 38-60 Hirsi Ali, A. 2007. ‘Politics’, Infidel, New York: Free Press

ered as complex and intertwined units. In spite of

Hoffman, B. (1997) ‘The Confluence of Internation-

the acknowledgement that religion does create a

al and Domestic Trends in Terrorism’, Terrorism

strain within societies, we might call it unreasonable to blindly embrace seventh-century agonising practises without being free to interpret and shape the words of Scriptures according to modern political and sociological circumstances. We may perhaps suggest that even if religions makes equivocalness arise as a result of different, possible interpretations, the believers themselves have the duty to structure their beliefs according to morality and

and Political Violence, 9(2): 1-15 Huntington, S. (1993) ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign Affair, 72(3): 22-49 Juergensmeyer, M. (2003) ‘Seeing Inside Cultures of Violence’, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. Berkeley: University of California Press Juergensmeyer, M. (2003) ‘Warriors’ Power’, 190-

societal values. Thus, for those who have faith, it is

218, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise

necessary to hold principles that make them serv-

of Religious Violence. Berkeley: University of

ants, and not slaves, of God. In other words, those

California Press

who worship God shall reassess insidious interpretations of the original precepts of one’s faith, in order to assist and be assisted by God and not to be-

Lewis, C. & Short, C. (1962) ‘terrĕo’, A Latin Dictionary, London: Oxford University Press Sartori, G. (2015) ‘Cristianesimo e Islam, laicismo e

come the slave of religious authorities.

religione’, 59-70, La Corsa Verso il Nulla. Mila-

Bibliography

no: Mondadori

Bergen, P. (2006) ‘What Were the Causes of 9/11?’, Prospect,

Via:

http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/ whatwerethecausesof911 [accessed 21/02/2017]

Smilansky, S. (2004) ‘Terrorism, Justification, and Illusion’, Ethics, 114(4), 790-805 Stern, J. (2000) ‘Pakistan's Jihad Culture’, Foreign Affair, 79(6), 115-26

Sofia Galli

18

4 Race as a Dangerous Myth MIE ASTRUP JENSEN

In the past decade, aspects of identity have become questioned as to their relevance and ability to identify people in our quickly changing society. One such common identifier is race. Darwin used race to categorise different species of animal, but also used it to differentiate between groups of human beings. As the theory of evolution became more and more central to the life sciences, so did the language Darwin used. Thus, the idea of different races of human became more common, and the word and its meaning increasingly colloqusalised. Conversely, however, there is also the question of race as a myth. Mie Astrup Jensen examines the use of race throughout history, and the subsequent consequences of various interpretations, while exploring its place in the present and future

I

t is difficult to find something with more

is a myth. Alternatives, involving substitutions and

symbolic and imaginary connotations than

ethnicity theories, have been suggested. This essay

the concept of race. In 1942, Montagu ar-

will give a historical account of the development of

gued that race is a trigger word and people

Race Theory and demonstrate its dangerous conse-

ought to stop using it (Montagu, 1962:926) as race

quences in Nazi Germany. Next, it will demonstrate

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how there is a need to create alternatives, then pro-

lions’ given the emerging racial social construct,

ceeding to investigate the application of ethnicity

where ‘the superior races will substitute themselves

theory in contemporary Israel-Palestine. It will con-

by force… and the last sentimentalists will witness

clude race is a ‘dangerous myth’, nonetheless the

the copious extermination of entire peoples’ (cited

strong afterlife affects the alternatives too.

in Hecht, 2000:287). Therefore, the idea of race

First, one must define ‘a myth’. A myth is more than an epistemological mistake, as it contains powerful elements that are inherited through lineage, meaning it is constantly reinterpreted, which gives it such a powerful effect and an important role in the ‘unfolding history of thought’ (Mitchell, 2012:22). Essentially, the race myth is fused into the public mind, affecting our notion of cultural and biological behaviour, even though, it does not accurately depict human capabilities and behaviour (American Anthropological Association 1998:713).

was to categorise more than physical differences, it was to construct a social categorisation. Consequently, some groups were permitted privileges, power and prosperity – based on colonial imperialism. During the late 19th century, Europeans started categorising traits; the superior with Europeans and the negatives with Orientals, which was used to justify domestic political, economic, and social inequalities, which thereby became a strategy for controlling and ranking people (American Anthropological Association, 1998:712-13)

Lacan argues that race emerges as a construction of

Scientifically, race is ‘the process of genetic change

Symbolic and Imaginary elements that are con-

within a definite ecological area’ and it is therefore

stantly affected by impressions, experiences, pro-

dynamic; scholars classify race in a specific time

jections,

and

and

hallucinatory

effects

(Mitchell,

situation in their

own terms’(Montagu,

2012:16). Race is a matter of the represented

1942:372). There are several layers to the develop-

‘reality’, where ‘we see and recognize racial identi-

ment of scientific race theory. First, the original

ties’ (Ibid:20-21), whereas the ‘real’ is the unrepre-

population was generally genetically homogenous.

sented that forms racism. Race is not the issue, but

Second, through migration the tribes dispersed, to

rather racism is, since that is what harms people.

then become more isolated, which in effect led to

This Lacanian schema is a fragile frame to manage

evolutionary changes, based on the geographical

the ‘real’, which sometimes leads to acts of hatred

circumstances, and that led to physical differences

(Ibid:17-18). It is this Real that becomes the dan-

between the population groups. Therefore, ‘race’

gerous myth.

seems superficial given it is based on external fac-

Race is a trigger word due to the underlying emotional responses (Montagu, 1962:926), which is partially due to history and, despite the changing society, the purpose is still to divide people (Ibid:920). In 1795, Blumenbach asserted: ‘no variety of mankind exists, whether of colour, countenance, or stature… they are all related, or only dif-

tors (Ibid:371-74) that are a part evolutionary processes. It is noteworthy that the original subspecies have evolved too, which in effect creates new physical appearances (Montagu, 1962:921).

Further, it can be argued that there is nothing in the world doing what ‘we ask race to do for us’ (Mitchell, 2012:14).

fer from each other in degree’ (cited in Montagu,

Dunn and Dobzhansky (1952) defined races as

1942:369). In 1887, Lapouge predicted that ‘in the

‘populations which differ in the frequencies of some

next century people will be slaughtered by the mil-

gene or genes’ (in Montagu, 1962:922). Given the

Mie Astrup Jensen

20

Race as a Dangerous Myth

genetic focus, Montagu suggests the use of the term ‘genogroup’, or a reference to the gene changes, as they clearly show what is referred to, and further because the term ‘race’ is very powerful. Simpson states that these redefinitions of words are of the same sort of Gesham’s Law, as they will eventually indicate our preferred meanings (in Ibid:923-25).

nature’ (Hirsch 2009:595).

Anti-Semitism was activated by political events and the rise of ‘racial science’ (Hecht 2000:304), which Hitler systematically used, through propaganda, to undermine the Jews (Reich 1945:295). This led to social reforms, largely founded by the middle class, that led to eugenics (Hirsch 2009:596). Here, La-

Nonetheless, Barzun suggests that Montagu focuses

pouge played a key role. Even though much of what

too much on queries of human relations and inter-

he said about morality, nation-states, human

actions considering what is necessary when ques-

breeding, atheism and Jews was rejected by the Na-

tioning the validity of a myth and deconstructing a

zi leadership (Hecht 2000:303), he had significant

fallacy. Furthermore, Montagu rejects ‘race’ before

influence on Günther, his ideas and academic ca-

looking at the concept’s history. Additionally,

reer – which is evident in his publications. Despite

Kluckhohn argues that anthropologists ought not to

his supra-nationalist theory, Lapouge did not ex-

eliminate biological race categories because some

plicitly see Jews as less evolved (Ibid:293-95). Yet,

people face alienation (Barzun, in Hazard Jr.

the Nazis found it appealing because it classified

2016:295-97). Nevertheless, to Montagu (1942),

some people as ‘too scientific and clinical to be po-

considering race determines important traits of our

litical’ (Ibid:286). This anthro-sociological work

body and soul it is the ‘tragic myth of our tragic

was further developed by Günther and it became

era’ (in Ibid:297). Thus, he urges to abandon the

Hitler’s primary influence. In 1933, ‘racial science’

word because the continuous use of it permits peo-

became mandatory in German schools (Ibid:299),

ple the agency to decide the meaning of the term (Montagu, Montagu

1962:926). therefore

en-

courages the reader to investigate the similari-

“

Race is not the issue, it is rather racism, since that is what harms people”

which

increased

the

spread of anti-Semitism along with the legal practices where the Jews within six years faced more than 400 decrees that re-

ties and differences between various population

stricted their lives (United States Holocaust Memo-

groups, so they can form an opinion (Ibid:920).

rial Museum, 2016). Historians suggest that this

Nevertheless, Darwinism formed an idea that some lives were more important than others, which contributed to the Nazi genocide (Jackson and Weidman 2005:79). Anti-Semitism arose as a manifestation by the dominant population against the nonconformists (Reich 1945:298). This occurred during the late 19th century, when the Jews were presented as an ‘Oriental Race’, with different physical and mental qualities. These misconceptions

happened through the ‘selectionist’ and ‘organicist’ metaphors. The division between the population in Nazi Germany based on race, demonstrates that racial characteristics led to the genocide of Jews and it is therefore a dangerous myth. After the war, scientists dedicated themselves to deny racial differences (Jackson and Weidman, 2005:78-79), however, anti-Semitism still exists and it is difficult to eliminate (Reich, 1945:301-2).

negatively redefined Jewish identity in the eyes of

Multiple scholars argued for categorising people on

others, which was justified by the concept of ‘racial

more than physical characteristics. Carter argues

21

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that ‘race’, ‘variety’, and ‘form’ are too vague and

the ethnic majority of the community (Dalsheim

should not be used. Moreover, Hanhart denies the

2008:539). This is especially evident in Israel-

term since ‘there are no “true races”’ (Montagu,

Palestine.

1962:922). Montagu claimed that ‘ethnic group’ was different than ‘race’ and it would make it clear that there are implications involved in classifying people. He urged people to abandon ‘race’ given ethnic group is broader and offers possibilities of discussing the terminology (Ibid:926-27). During the decolonisation in Africa and Asia, the term ‘ethnicity’ became widely used in the social sciences, as ‘new nation states were created’ (Guibernau and Rex 2003:1).

Intra- and inter-ethnic disputes, especially those regarding religion, have characterised Israel since it became a state in 1948. The ethnocracy in Israel places the Ashkenazi at the top, then the Mizrahim with a lower status who are somewhat segregated from the Ashkenazi and at the bottom of the geographic-socio-economic power structure are the Palestinians (Ibid:539). The International Declaration of Human Rights was agreed upon, while the Zionist terrorists executed operations against the

To elaborate, ‘ethnic-group’ is a human population

Palestinian citizens, the cities, and the socio-

‘with shared ancestry, myths, histories and cul-

economic infrastructure. Nakba is continuous,

tures, having an association with a specific territory

which makes the massacre one of the severest polit-

and a sense of solidarity’ (Smith 2003:27). It com-

ical issues in modern time as the segregation has

bines physical and cultural elements, that are

affected the civilians for almost 70 years (Frish,

linked to culturally bounded socio-geographical

2002:172-76).

barriers (Montagu, 1942a:375). These collective feelings are especially found in language and religion that make up the fundamental principle of group formations, which creates in-groups (Weber, 2003:20). Banton recognises that ‘race’ mainly refers to out-groups whereas ‘ethnicity’ refers to ingroups (Eriksen 2003:35). Moreover, Weber argues collectiveness survive in time and space, which is why migrants maintain a collective consciousness

Qurai writes that: ‘The dreams of our Palestinian people continue to draw strength and legitimacy from its basic right to its land and country, its legitimate right of return, self-determination, the establishment of its independent state on its national soil… and its human right to life’ (cited in Frish 2002:175).

that moves past the dominant political institution

The ethnicity and class play huge roles in this con-

(Guibernau and Rex 2003:2-4). Therefore, Weber

flict, because these groups pose ideologically differ-

(1968) sees the ethnic minorities as human groups

ent moral grounds. This set of binary distinctions

with ‘a subjective belief in their common descent’

makes it impossible to reach an agreement

given either physical and/or customary similarities,

(Dalsheim 2008:545). ‘Umar Ghazzawi (1998)

or recollections of migration or colonisation (in

writes about Israel-Palestine: ‘let it be a state for all

Ibid:2). Accordingly, Cohen (1994) claims that peo-

its citizens through the proclamation of the consti-

ple represent themselves ‘symbolically as the bear-

tution’ indicating that Israel should recognise the

ers of a certain cultural identity’. However, ‘ethnic

rights of the Palestinians and abolish the Jewish-

identity’ is both psychological and sociological

ness of the state. Further, he declares, the ethnic

(Ibid:4), which complicates the understanding of

hegemony emphasises that the Jewish have greater

the term. Further, ‘ethnocracy’ is used to describe

legitimacy to occupy the land than the Arab, which

Mie Astrup Jensen

22

Race as a Dangerous Myth

is a foundation to the ethnic disputes (in Frish,

tween the Jewish ethnicities – if this happens, there

2002:180).

is an opportunity to create a stable and cohesive

Jewish radicalisation emerged in the late 19th century, when race scientists made distinctions between the Ashkenazi and

Sephardi (Hirsch,

2009:601). However, the Zionists recognised a Jewish race, where their beliefs would unite the otherwise divided people, which would ‘prove’ the

society (Gordon, 1974:270). Finally, it can be argued that if the Jews did not identify themselves as a race, but rather as an ethnic group, they have, through systematic practices, made themselves into one, which in effect has caused many Arabs to become anti-Semitic (Mitchell, 2012:80).

ethno-nationalist descent a myth (Ibid:592). This

The predictions following the rise of scientific rac-

Eurocentric-Zionist ideology has systematically re-

ism developed into horrific historical moments,

moved the Arab-Jews from Israel, which again has

such as the genocide in Nazi Germany. The myth

created ethnic disputes (Dalsheim, 2008:538). Es-

created a ’real’ that led to racism, which is the seri-

sentially, the Zionists presented ‘the Palestinians as

ous danger of race. Inevitably, Montagu argued for

a disease that had to be cured’ and they were often

abolishing the word and suggested genetic substitu-

referred to as ‘a cancer in the heart of the nation’.

tions. However, theorists have argued that the myth

The Second Aliyah portrayed the Arab customs and

had a too strong afterlife. Thus, ethnicity theories

lifestyles as evil (Pappe, 2015:31-33). Instead of

were developed, which combined cultural and

controlling them through slavery, the Israelis car-

physical traits. However, as evident in Israel-

ried out an ethnic cleansing for ‘security’ reasons

Palestine, intra- and inter-ethnic disputes play key

(Mitchell 2012:85). Moreover, the racial manifesta-

roles in the conflict. Thus, race is, as Montagu stat-

tions are primarily territorially expressed (Ibid:80).

ed, a dangerous myth. However the alternatives

The segregation laws, targeting 1/5 of the popula-

pose critical issues too, and they must therefore be

tion, the Palestinians, involve torture, lack of free-

investigated further.

dom of speech, poor access to water and education

Bibliography

and unequal justice, where the separation wall marks the segregation of the people (Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign, n.d.). Ethnicity is therefore equally as dangerous as ‘race’. Around the 1990s, anthropologists started investigating the

American Anthropological Association (1998) 'AAA Statement on Race', American Anthropologist, 100 (3), pp. 712-713.

ethnocracy of Jews with different cultural back-

Barzun, J. (1943) ‘Book review: Man's most danger-

grounds in Israel where they found a strong Ashke-

ous myth: The fallacy of race’, Political Science

nazi identity of the Jewish occupied territories

Quarterly, 58 (3), pp. 450-51.

(Dalsheim, 2008:536-38).

Dalsheim, J. (2008) ‘Twice removed: Mizrahi set-

The main reason for the disputes between the Ar-

tlers in Gush Katif’, Social Identities, pp. 14 (5),

abs and Jews, and the Jewish intragroups, are the

535-551.

differences in ideology and the pragmatic accommodation. While it is generally believed that power lies with the ethnic majority, the Ashkenazic constitutes a minority. To establish peace between the Arabs and Jews, it is essential to create peace be-

Eriksen, T. (2003) ‘Ethnicity, race and nation’, In: M. Guibernau and J. Rex, ed., The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration, pp. 33-42, 1st ed. Cambridge: Polity,

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Frisch, H. (2002) ‘Ethnicity or Nationalism? Com-

Seattle

Mideast

Awareness

Campaign,

paring the Nakba Narrative amongst Israeli Ar-

(2016) ‘Israel’s apartheid policies against Pales-

abs and Palestinians in the West Bank and

tinians’, Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign,

Gaza’, Israel Affairs, 9(1-2), pp. 165-184.

[Online] Available at: http://www.seamac.org/

Gordon, L. (1974) ‘Reflections on Inter- and Intragroup Relations in Israeli Society’, Jewish Social Studies, 36 (3), pp. 262-270.

equalrights.htm [Accessed 27 Feb. 2018].

Smith, A. (2003) ‘Structure and persistence of ethnie’, In: G. Montserrat and J. Rex, ed., The Eth-

Guibernau, M. Rex, J. (2003) The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism Multiculturalism and Migration, Cambridge: Polity.

Hazard, A. (2016) ‘Ashley Montagu, the “Most Dangerous Myth,” and the “Negro Question” during World War II’, Journal of Anthropological Research, 72(3),pp. 289-310.

Hecht, J. (2000) ‘Vacher de Lapouge and the Rise of Nazi Science’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 61 (2), pp. 285-304.

Hirsch, D. (2009) ‘Zionist eugenics, mixed marriage, and the creation of a 'new Jewish type'’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological In-

nicity Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Migration, 1st ed. Cambridge: Polity, pp. 2733 United

States

Holocaust

Memorial

Museum,

(2018) ‘Anti-Jewish Legislation in Prewar Germany’, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum,

[Online]

Available

at:

https://

www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?

ModuleId=10005681 [Accessed 27 Feb. 2018].

Weber, M. (2003) ‘What is an ethnic group?’, In: M. Guibernau and J. Rex, ed., The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Migration, 1st ed. Cambridge: Polity, 15-26.

stitute, 15, pp. 592-609.

Jackson, J. Weidman, M. (2005) ‘The Origins of Scientific Racism’, The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, (50), pp. 66-79.

Mitchell,

W.

(2012)

Seeing

through

Race, Cambridge: Harvard Univeristy Press.

Montagu, A. (1942) Man's most dangerous myth: The fallacy of race, New York: Columbia University Press.

Montagu,

A.

(1962)

‘The

Concept

of

Race’, American Anthropologist, 64 (5), pp. 919928.

Pappe, I. (2015) The Idea of Israel: A History of Power and Knowledge, London: Verso.

Reich, N. (1945) ‘Anti-Semitism’ The Journal of Educational Sociology, 18 (5), pp. 294-302.

Mie Astrup Jensen

24

5 Intractable State Conflicts and Identity Wars ELLA KIVISAARI

There have been a number of changes in the duration and nature of war in recent years, resulting in a considerable impact on the process of conflict analysis and resolution. In addition, ethnicity, identity, religion and culture are all to some extent associated with nationalist tendencies. Ella Kivisaari asks whether this is dangerous, while focusing on economic (under)development, and the effects of globalisation on conflict.

T

he nature of war has changed signifi-

that the number of interstate conflicts that are

cantly during the post-Cold War era, as

fought between sovereign states is declining. At

95% of military conflicts since the mid-

first glance, the decline of interstate wars and mili-

1980s have occurred within states

tary conflicts between states appears to be a posi-

(Heywood, 2014:254). This, in other words, means

tive development. However, once we take a closer

25

The International Academic

look at the consequences of the increased number

(2014:254) argues, when a country has not been

of intrastate conflicts, multiple problems emerge.

able to maintain domestic order and civil security,

Firstly, according to Bennett and Stam (cited in Collier et al, 2004), the average duration of war has increased. This is due to the fact that on average, interstate wars last for 11 months, whereas the duration of intrastate wars is seven years. Put simply, a civil war is likely to last nearly eight times as long as a conflict between two or more sovereign states.

The most recent long-duration wars between sover-

the level of civil strife is usually high, which can often trigger violence and insurgency against the state’s relatively weak grip on power. Examples of this can be seen for instance in Somalia, where the outbreak of civil war in 1991 saw violence escalate between rival clan warlords and weak central authority. More recently in Syria, revolts against President Assad ushered in civil war (BBC, 2017).

eign states are considered to be the two World

Modern conflicts can often be characterised as

Wars, although the Cold War, through its proxy

identity wars. An identity war is defined as a war in

wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan, also falls into

which the cause of conflict is a certain ethnic

this category. Secondly, the shift in the numbers of

group’s quest for cultural recognition, and the de-

different

wars

has

turned the nature of modern

conflict

to-

wards what is known as ‘New Wars’. These conflicts often have an asymmetrical

nature,

where one group is notably stronger than the other. Modern wars often share the charac-

“

The issue of different

mand that the group’s collective identity is al-

groups maintaining

so both publicly and

disparate identities is at

(Heywood, 2014:254).

the core of many

need

for

political and social

and

recognition

issues and conflicts.”

most important moti-

politically

recognised

Azar emphasizes the acceptance of

one’s identity as the vating factor in ethnic

teristics of civil wars, as well as featuring a strong

conflicts. Thus, any form of governance that seeks

element of identity politics as a root cause of the

to suppress those human needs or to trade these

outbreak of hostilities.

needs for, for example, economic progress is not

Intrastate conflicts are often triggered by multiple

sustainable (Azar, cited in Davies et al., 2002:15).

issues, such as race, ethnicity and identity. Civil

Sen (2006:12) points out that the issue of different

wars and intrastate conflicts often occur in states

groups maintaining disparate identities is at the

that suffer economic underdevelopment, and where

core of many political and social issues and con-

the state’s central power is weak. This can easily

flicts. This is because the concept of identity has a

lead to the state becoming a ‘quasi’, or collapsed

very strong influence on each person’s actions and

state. Economic underdevelopment and artificial

thoughts. A war that is fought over how people see

national borders are both notable problems in Sub-

themselves is usually conducted with special pas-

Saharan Africa, where the states and their current

sion and ferocity (Heywood, 2014:255). Sen (cited

status in terms of national borders are partly deter-

in Heywood, 2014:255) posits that the notion of

mined

monocultural identity triggers hate, as the person

by their colonial past. As

Heywood

Ella Kivisaari

26

Intractable State Conflicts and Identity Wars

identifying with a certain group is allowed to identi-

“global tribes” (Heywood, 2013:166). As the Nation-

fy with that group only. For example, a person born

al Security Strategy of the United States of America

into a Russian family in the UK would likely consid-

(2002:11) highlights, the spread of local civil wars

er him- or herself both Russian and British, where-

over state borders in the form of transnational eth-

as the society around him might regard him as only

nic conflict can often result in civil wars escalating

Russian. It can be argued that uncompromising cul-

into conflicts that encompasses the wider region.

tural separation deepens the social fragmentation between different groups within a society.

Smith (cited in Tennant, 2007:113) argues that war has become a “war amongst the people”. This is es-

Sen also argues that outsiders often build our iden-

pecially the case when the distinction between mili-

tity, which can lead to an increased risk of having a

tary and civilian personnel becomes blurred, and

dividing effect on people and narrow down the

when the actions of war shift from the battlefields

qualities a group can obtain (Sen, 2006:7). When

to the civil societies where ordinary people live. The

people identify themselves in a monoculture, they

increasing use of suicide bombers, car bombs and

easily fail to recognise the integrity of members of

attacks on public transport are just a few of the

other groups. This contributes to the build-up of

tools of this principle. Smith also posits that the in-

ethnic divisions within a society by creating a mind-

dustrial character of war will be replaced by multi-

set of ‘us’ and ‘them’. When social tensions escalate

ple events, which may better serve the desired polit-

into armed conflict, these often-artificial qualities

ical outcome. Events like this are described as

and man-made ethnic categories can easily be used

‘guerrilla war’. Guerrilla war consists of small at-

to justify and incite hatred, and even genocide.

tacks by irregular troops using tactics that are suit-

With regards to the nationalist movements currently on the rise within many European Union states, it could be argued that building a common European identity for everyone to identify with - in tandem with their national identity - would be a useful tool both for uniting the political union and avoiding conflict. Anderson (1983), meanwhile, points out that the groups with which we identify are in fact often imagined, and discusses them further in his publication “Imagined Communities” (Anderson 1983). This is the case when discussing groups that are too big for anyone to know personally, such as national or ethnic groups. An imagined ethnic group thus consists of shared ideas and values, which connect the group members to one another.

One intractable factor in cases of intrastate conflict is the transnational nature of the opposing politicocultural groups. The cultural identity and political allegiances of transnational communities cross state borders, and thus are often thought of as

ed to the terrain. As many or most guerrilla insurgents are commonly local to the specific arena of engagement, this gives them a clear advantage in knowing the environment in which they operate (Heywood, 2014:248). Indeed, it can be argued that guerrilla warfare (or other forms of warfare of a similar nature) is one of the most prevalent factors in prolonging intrastate conflicts. In contrast, in interstate conflicts fought between national armies, opponents are easily recognisable, and the distinction between civilians and military personnel is clear. When guerrilla tactics are used in intrastate conflicts, the irregular troops disguise themselves as members of the general public, and relocate the arena of war from the battlefield to a more domestic environment. The key distinguishing factor between guerrilla warfare and terrorism is the target of their operations. Even though the intended end result may be the same for both, guerrilla fighters concentrate on military targets, while terrorists direct their attacks on civilians (Ganor, 2002:287).

27

The International Academic

The majority of intrastate conflicts stem from is-

stant decrease since the Second World War. How-

sues relating to identity politics and ethnic tensions

ever, the current level is still not historically low.

within the society concerned’. Indeed, Maslow’s

(Roser, n.d.) To conclude based on evidence intra-

“Hierarchy of Needs” places love and belonging

state conflicts last on average longer than interstate

right after safety (Maslow, cited in Poston, 2009).

wars and the amount of civil strife is at a risk of ris-

This indicates the importance of ethnic and cultural

ing.

belonging, and thus helps to explain why brutal vio-

Bibliography

lence is so common in ethnic conflicts. When people feel that not only is their personal existence at stake, but also that of their entire community and identity (including their cultural heritage), the use of brutal violence is seen as more justified. It could

Anderson, B. (1983) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism

also be argued that interstate wars affect people in

BBC News (2018) ’Somalia profile’, BBC, [Online]

the same way. However, the main difference be-

Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-

tween intra- and interstate wars is that during an

africa-14094503

interstate conflict, the nation is usually bound to-

[Accessed 31 Jan. 2018].

gether to fight a common enemy, thus domestic politics is set aside. A good example of this was the Winter War fought between Finland and the Soviet Union in the winter of 1939-1940. At the time, the nation was still deeply socially and politically divided by the 1918 Finnish Civil War, but the threat of violence from an external aggressor compelled both

Collier, P. Hoeffler A. and Söderbom M. (2004) ‘On the Duration of Civil War’, Journal of Peace Research 41 (3):253-273 Davies, J. and Kaufman, E. (2002) Second track/ citizens' diplomacy., Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, pp.15-30.

sides of the civil conflict to unite. By contrast, civil

Ganor, B. (2002) ’Defining terrorism: is one man’s

wars and intrastate conflicts do not help to create a

terrorist an other man’s freedom fighter?’, Police

common,

Practice and Research, 2002: Vol. 3, No. 4, pp.

unifying

sense

of

nationhood.

287–304 Economic underdevelopment, weak state govern-

Heywood, A. (2014) ‘War and Peace’, in Heywood,

ance, the increase in the use of guerrilla tactics and

A., Ed., Global Politics, pp.246-269 London:

the colonial heritage of artificial state borders are

Palgrave Macmillan

among the most influential factors prolonging a civil strife or ethnic conflict. Many aspects, including economic interdependence, and accelerated globalisation for example, help to reduce the amount of conflicts fought between two or more sovereign states. As these results can undoubtedly be regarded as a positive phenomenon, it is fair to question whether or not the absolute quantity of violence has been reduced. Indeed, the number of both military

Heywood, A. 2013. ‘Politics, Society and Identity’, in Heywood, A., Ed., Politics. pp. 151-170, London: Palgrave Macmillan Poston, B. (2009) An Exercise in Personal Exploration: Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, [Ebook] Association of Surgical Technologists, Available at: http://www.ast.org/pdf/308.pdf [Accessed 31 Jan. 2018].

and civilian casualties in conflicts has seen a con-

Ella Kivisaari

28

Intractable State Conflicts and Identity Wars

Roser, M. (n.d) ‘War and Peace - Our World in Data’, Our World in Data, [Online] Available at: https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace [Accessed 31 Jan. 2018].

Smith, R. cited in Tennant, S.V. (2007) ‘MR Book Reviews: The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World’, Military Review, pp. 113120 Sen, A. (2006), Identity and violence, London: Penguin, pp.1-17.

(2002) ‘The Security Statement of the United States of America’, Washington D.C.: The White House,

[Online]

Available

www.state.gov/documents/ organization/63562.pdf [Accessed 31 Jan. 2018].

at:

https://

29

6 Neoliberalism: A Tool for Global Instability & Conflict DELAINE LORIO

According to many, neoliberalism is seen as a positive tool creating economic interdependence that makes modern wars too costly to be fought. However, as the power of multinational corporations increases, the true nature of neoliberalism can be questioned, and whether the ending result serves the global community by creating stability and equality - or the small elites that get to do the cherry picking.

A

ccording to economic liberalism,

al lines of which economic interdependence

economic interdependence is a

has been structured has actually made the

positive manifestation because it

world less stable as demonstrated by the 2007-

‘leads states to define their inter-

09 global financial crisis. Additionally, many

ests in a way that makes war less important to

scholars, such as David Harvey (2007) and

them’ (Nye, Jr. and Welch, 2011:58) or, in

Amy Chua (2003), blame neoliberalism for the

short, is a viable form of conflict prevention.

marked rise of inequality and social fragmenta-

However, under closer inspection, the neoliber-

tion in society, especially in developing coun-

30

Neoliberalism: A Tool for Global Instability & Conflict

tries. The contentious nature of neoliberalism

an equilibrium that advances everyone. This

and the global tension and social injustice it

also implies that outside intervention and coer-

can generate bring many to doubt its identity

cion, such as by the state, should be minimised

as a liberal institution. More importantly, it

(Butler, 2015:32). Notably, this rationale was

raises questions as to where the priorities of

applied to the markets by Smith where he ar-

neoliberal policies lie: are they concerned with

gued that a free market economy would find a

serving the interest of the public, or the interest

similar natural equilibrium where supply and

of elite groups?

demand will balance each other. Moreover, as

For the interest of this article, classical liberal-

stated by Heywood (2013:130), by maintaining

ism (and not liberalism as a whole) will be discussed, as this is the basis of which it ties its

this balance, it becomes a ‘positive-sum game, in that greater efficiency produces economic

identity to the overarching liberal ideology. Al-

growth […] which benefits everyone.’

so, it is a comprehensive term. Therefore, it will

Inspired by this ‘positive-sum game’ of eco-

be confined by the definition given by Butler

nomic exchange, neoliberalism is an economic

(2015:xx) as simply ‘a belief in freedom and an

strategy employed to maximise economic

aversion to the coercion of one individual by

growth. The practices it argues for are those

another.’

that actively minimise the role of the state in

Neoliberalism does not present itself as a new

both economic and social life and impart finan-

liberal ideology, but rather as a modern revitalisation of nineteenth century classical liberal economic tradition, led by twentieth-century political economists such as Milton Friedman and Fredrich von Hayek. More specifically though, it focuses on the ideology of thinkers like Adam Smith and David Hume who champion the benefits of individual freedom to the general welfare. With the assumption that humans are rational and self-interested, they argue that if individuals have the freedom to pur-

cial benefits to businesses responsible for productive input. Their policies include deregulation of private industries and privatisation of government-owned enterprises, while making cuts in spending to social welfare programs.

Additionally, they work to establish freemarket and open international trade and monetary systems by minimising obstacles to trade and foreign investment. This is achieved

through lowering tariffs and giving income tax cuts to large corporations (Duncan et al.,

sue their self-interest without interference,

2009:413; Kotz, 2015:13).

they will be in the best position to make the

Overall, the basic assumptions of these policies

best choices for themselves. As a result, with

are that by promoting policies that benefit big

more autonomy comes greater personal wel-

business, it will help to expedite growth and

fare, which in turn benefits the entire commu-

lead to better standards of living for everyone

nity. This concept is described by Smith

in the long-term. However, there is evidence

(1776:540) as the ‘invisible hand’, where com-

that these assumptions of neoliberalism does

peting forces of individuals will naturally find

not manifest themselves evenly in practice.

31

The International Academic

Firstly, Multi National Corporations (MNCs)

ico effectively terminated Article 27 of its con-

are intricately linked to the rise of neoliberal-

stitution because it was viewed as a restriction

ism because it has enabled them to operate

to foreign investment. This is significant be-

with minimal regulation and restriction, there-

cause Article 27 served as a legal mechanism

by putting them in an ideal position for market

which protected Mexico’s indigenous farmers

expansion and profit maximisation (Nye, Jr.

and their lands from sale or privatisation. The

and Welch, 2011:239). Furthermore, this accu-

loss of protection consequently caused many of

mulation of economic power was reinforced by

them to worry about the possibility of losing

the policy change of the 1944 Bretton Woods

both their lands and their way of life, due to

system, the neoliberal policy package that

increased trade with the US. This fear eventual-

would become known as the ‘Washington Con-

ly led to the rise of socialist militant group the

sensus’ - a term first used in 1989 (Heywood,

Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN)

2013:145). This change shifted their strategy

against the Mexican government. In their eyes,

and established a new global economic system

NAFTA was a ‘death sentence’ and a sign that

based upon open trade and investment around

the state no longer served the wishes of its peo-

the world (Kotz, 2015:13).

ple, particularly the indigenous communities

Empowered by this ‘rise of neoliberal globalisa-

(OURGRATIONS, 2006). Similarly, NAFTA

tion’ (Heywood, 2013:144), international corporations have become a powerful force in the international system. According to Greer and Singh (2000), for example, MNCs lobbied for the policy structure of Europe’s Single Market agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to be shaped in favour of open international trade. This speaks to the powerful and coercive effect companies now have over even the most powerful states. Daly

and Goodland state that as boundaries between states disappear, ‘the policy-making strength of

faced opposition in the US from both trade un-

ions and environmental groups who saw the move as detrimental to America’s domestic interests. These two examples reveal how neoliberalism and its policies can cause social and political friction not only on the international level, but on the national level as well. It also illustrates

Robert

Cox’s

concept

of

the

‘internationalisation of the state’, where a ‘democratic deficit’ is created when the policies

of states are determined by the global economy, and not by their citizens (cited in Hey-

the nation is…weakened, and the relative pow-

wood, 2013: 145).

er of [MNCs] is increased’ (Daly and Goodland

In addition, international corporations have

in Greer and Singh, 2000). Also, due to MNCs’

been shown to take drastic measures beyond

growing influence on international politics,

exercising economic power in order to safe-

conflicts have arisen between some states and

guard their own interests. Strategies to impel

their citizens (Greer and Singh, 2000). For in-

states to advance their agenda have included

stance, by signing the NAFTA agreement, Mex-

bribing government leaders, giving large finanDelaine Lorio

32

Neoliberalism: A Tool for Global Instability & Conflict

cial aid to political candidates, and even pres-

The aggressive intervention by MNCs in inter-

suring more industrialised states to infringe on

national and national affairs and the conflicts

the sovereignty of weaker countries, no matter

that arise exposes how neoliberal policy is a

the consequences (Greer and Singh, 2000).

means to gain power and maintain control over

This is best illustrated by the International Tel-

a state. As has been shown, neoliberalism

ephone and Telegraph (ITT) involvement in the

helped enable their rise to power through the

fall of President Allende and the rise of August

promotion of policies that provided dispropor-

Pinochet in Chile in the early 1970s. During the

tionate advantages to themselves, with the jus-

1970 presidential election, the ITT tried (and

tification that it would eventually benefit every-

failed) to bribe the US Central Intelligence

one. However, as one can see, this is often not

“

Agency to fund rival campaigns against Salva-

the case. Furthermore, the outcomes that do

dor Allende, and even after his inauguration,

result are in complete contradiction to classical

they continued to lobby the US government

liberalism. International corporations curtail

and other MNCs to take more harsh measures

the freedom of individual states by prioritising

against Allende. Their actions culminated in a

their interests via neoliberal policies, even if it

coup d'ĂŠtat which deposed the democratically-

is at the expense of general welfare (Greer and

elected government and established Pinochet’s

Singh, 2000; Seville, 2016:452).

military regime (Greer and Singh, 2000). Soon

One may argue that the option of restraining

The aggressive intervention by multinational corporations in international and national affairs and the conflicts that arise exposes how neoliberal policy is a means to gain power and maintain control over a state.

after assuming power, the regime instituted neoliberal reforms with the removal of trade

barriers, freezing of wages, and privatisation of government-owned enterprises. With these reforms came political and social instability which left eighty-five percent of people in poverty (Chossudovsky, 2017). This example best shows how the unregulated power of MNCs can coerce states to enforce their interests at the expense of the public welfare, and exposes the fact that empowering the wealthy does not always bring benefits to all - contrary to the assumptions of neoliberalism.

MNCs to prevent this abuse of power and prevent conflict is also a contradiction to classical

liberal beliefs. By intervening, one would, in turn, be infringing on the economic freedom of entrepreneurs, and disrupt the spontaneous order of the market that classical liberalism heralds (Butler, 2015:9). Consequently, it will upset economic growth and reduce the benefits that come from the free-market and MNCs. These benefits they laud include the transfer of new jobs and professional skills to less devel-

oped countries. Additionally, they argue that

33

The International Academic

increased competition between domestic and

weaker states, contrary to Friedman’s vision.

foreign industry is advantageous because the

Because there is no mechanism to bolster the

introduction of international competition will

bargaining

drive domestic industries to become more effi-

industrialised countries against foreign inter-

cient, such as in the case of US carmakers in

est, they must keep wages low and restrict

the 1980s and 1990s, with the market expan-

health and environmental restrictions or run

sion of the Japanese auto industry. Moreover,

the risk of losing foreign investment (Duncan

as Friedman (1962:21) claims, intervention

et al., 2009:397). As a result, poverty becomes

would give rise to discrimination. People, un-

entrenched, and workers are exposed to health,

like the market, can be biased, and their per-

safety and ecological risks that can culminate

spectives on ‘views or colour’ can impact their

in crises (Greer and Singh, 2000). An example

choices. This suggests that besides offering so-

that best illustrates this case is the 1984 Bhopal

cial benefits, the free-market also serves as a

gas disaster in India, where due to improper

buffer against any form of discrimination.

safety and operating procedures, forty-five tons

The above points are acknowledged to be possi-

of toxic gas methyl isocyanate leaked from an

ble benefits. However, it can also be argued that neoliberals disregard the underpinning moral philosophy behind classical liberals’ intentions of economic freedom. As indicated by Butler (2015: 32), classical liberals did ‘not rely solely on the principle of love thy neighbour’.

This implies that they were aware that selfinterest can be damaging to others, and therefore there are times when some coercion is necessary - either through statutes, the justice system, or ethics - to maintain the peace (Butler, 2015:32). In the case of powerful corporations,

there is clear evidence that unregulated MNCs are willing to go so far as to facilitate military action (e.g., ITT involvement in Chile) if it

power

of

leaders

of

less-

American-owned insecticide plant. Because of the company’s negligence, about 15,00020,000 people died and half a million suffered

from respiratory problems, visual impairment, and other injuries due to the exposure (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2017). Moreover, with income inequalities, comes further social fragmentation and the deterioration of social cohesion. Thus, it augments the risk of intrastate conflict and instability (World Bank, n.d.). Considering the social injustices that have arisen from deregulated global trade and

investment, it can be deduced that intervention, in this case, is still in line with classical liberal doctrine as it is in the defence of ‘life,

serves their interests. This reveals that big

liberty, and property’ (Sloman, 2007:213).

business works to serve the general welfare on-

In conclusion, after examining the actions tak-

ly as long as it serves them, and discards it

en by the entities that neoliberalism puts in

when it does not. Furthermore, not only does

power - multinational corporations - and the

neoliberalism enable MNCs to influence states,

negative consequences of said actions, it must

it also enables them to discriminate against

be concluded that this ideology is not in line Delaine Lorio

34

Neoliberalism: A Tool for Global Instability & Conflict

with classical liberal tradition, because it propagates tension between both states and its citizens, as well as curtailing individual freedoms through coercion. This article does not seek to

Evans, G. Newnham, J. (1998). Dictionary of International Relations. London: Penguin Group.

Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and Freedom.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

discredit the benefits of economic freedom. Ra-

Goodwin, N. Ackerman, F. Nelson, J. Weisskopf, T.

ther, it tries to bring forward questions regard-

(2005). Macroeconomics in Context. Boston:

ing the dangers of unregulated self-interest

Houghton Mifflin Company.

that do not serve the general welfare, but instead incites internal and external conflict within the international system.

Greer, J. Singh, K. (2000). ‘A Brief History of Transnational Corporations’ [online] Global Policy

Forum.

Available

history-of-transnational-

Butler, E. (2015). Classical Liberalism- A Primer.

London: The Institute of Economic Affairs.

Chossudovsky, M. (2017). ‘Chile, September 11, 1973: The Inauguration of Neoliberalism, “Shock Treatment” and the Instruments of Economic Repression: The Junta’s Deadly “Economic Medicine” ’ [online] Globalresearch.ca, Available at: https://www.globalresearch.ca/chile-september11-1973-the-inauguration-of-neoliberalism-

corporations.html#bk2_ft16 [Accessed 18.10. 2017].

Harvey, D. (2007). ‘Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction’ The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 610 (1), 2144.

Heywood, A. (2013). Politics. 4th edn. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Investopedia, (2017) Trickle-Down Theory [online]

shock-treatment-and-the-instruments-of-

Available

economic-repression-the-juntas-deadly-

terms/t/trickledowntheory.asp

economic-medicine/5545802

[Accessed 18.10. 2017].

[Accessed 19.10. 2017].

at:

http://www.investopedia.com/

Kotz, D. (2015). The rise and fall of neoliberal capi-

Chua, A. (2003). World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breed Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability. New York: Doubleday.

W.

https://

www.globalpolicy.org/empire/47068-a-brief-

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Seville, A. (2016). ‘From ‘one right way’ to ‘one ruinous way’? Discursive shifts in ‘There is no alternative’ ’ European Political Science Review, 9 (3), 449-470.

Sloman, J. (2007). Essentials of Economics. 4th ed.

Essex: Pearson Education.

Smith, A. (1904). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Edwin Cannan, ed., 5th ed. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd. [online] Available at: http://www.econlib.org/ library/Smith/smWN.html [Accessed 9 Jan. 2018].

World Bank, (n.d.). CHAPTER 6: SOCIAL FRAGMENTATION [online] Available at: http:// siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPOVERTY/ Resources/335642-1124115102975/15551991124115187705/ch6.pdf [Accessed 18.10.2017].

Delaine Lorio

36

7 Will Mexico Go Down the Populist Route in 2018?

LISDEY ESPINOZA PEDRAZA

This year the world has been taken aback by elections in the UK, the US and France. One by one, nations are electing what seem to be, to the rest of the world, the wrong choices. Now, Mexico may be the next nation to watch as its 2018 elections are coming up, and in fashion with the trend of controversy from this past year.

Under Peña Nieto, controversy and civil strife were not unheard of, it has been a turbulent time for Mexican politics as well as its people. However, there is a nominee in particular who still casts a shadow of doubt within the political community. In this article, a focus is put on leftist Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador and his possible connections with corruption in the political arena and the implications of his personal political philosophy on Mexico’s future. The question of who and what Lopez Obrador truly represents, and what interests he will appease is posed.

I

n less than a year’s time Mexico will have its

ning Mexico’s presidency on his third attempt since

presidential election and the country may

2000 is a prospect that thrills many Mexicans and

well elect leftist Andrés Manuel López Obra-

terrifies others. Mexico may now be ready for more

dor as its new president. - The nominee fac-

drastic politics since the majority of the population

es a weakened ruling party and a deeply divided

has stopped believing that either of the two political

National Action Party (PAN). López Obrador win-

parties that have ruled Mexico, PAN and the Insti-

37

The International Academic

tutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), will do anything

reached the Chamber of Deputies and it was decid-

to change the current situation (Wood and Valen-

ed that a process of impeachment would start

zuela, 2015). The PRI’s nominee, whoever it will be,

against López Obrador. This caused discontent

will be tainted by association with the current ad-

among the majority of the population of Mexico

ministration and the flawed record of the PRI re-

City who were fervent supporters of López Obrador

gime; the likeliest candidate of the PAN, Margarita

and saw the process of impeachment as a way to

Zavala, is the wife of a former president blamed for

prevent him from winning the presidency. Finally,

the upsurge of violence triggered by his poorly co-

following the resignation of the General Attorney

ordinated crackdown on drugs. - López Obrador

Rafael Macedo de la Concha, the government

has ranted against privilege, corruption and what

ceased any legal actions against López Obrador.

he calls the ‘political establishment’, made up of every single political actor bar his newly created party,

the

National

Regeneration

Movement

(MORENA). Sweep away all that, and, according to him, Mexico will immediately improve. Many others associate with these ideas the latent message of a charismatic populist who would only weaken institutions and roll back reforms (Solis-Delgado, 2012).

It is his lack of respect for institutions and the ease with which he is willing to discredit rules that are not in his favour that could prevent him from being an effective corruption-fighter. Even though López Obrador has not held any position of popular election since 2006, he has toured the country convening public assemblies and disseminating his opposition speech to the governments of the PAN and the PRI, and most recently of the PRD, his former par-

López Obrador has capitalised the fact that people

ty. Last year he took his presidential campaign

are fed up with corruption and he has presented

abroad by visiting London, New York and Canta-

himself an honest politician committed to cure

bria. Controversies have arisen as to where he gets

Mexico of the cancer of corruption. His political

the funding for what has been a permanent cam-

career and performance tell a different story

paign since 2006. He claims the funds have come

though. He has shown a common contempt for

from his supporters but has also been involved in

norms, the separation of power and the rule of law.

several acts of corruption. René Bejarano, now a

After the wafer-thin victory of Felipe Calderón over

close supporter of - López Obrador again, was

López Obrador, Avenida de la Reforma blocked one

taped several years ago when he was the personal

of the main roads in Mexico City for 45 days due to

assistant of - López Obrador receiving enormous

alleged electoral fraud and the tampering of votes.

amounts of money (Silva, 2004). He backed -López

Just a year before, in 2005, when he was still the

Obrador in both presidential elections, in 2000 and

major of the capital of the country, he was engulfed

2006, and has now declared publicly that he is

in an impeachment scandal due to the violation of a

ready to work closely with him again. The finance

judiciary order. López Obrador had ordered the ex-

minister of - López Obrador when he was the major

propriation of a piece of land called “El Encino” to

of Mexico City, Gustavo Ponce, was also shown bet-

go ahead with his long-planned proposal of opening

ting huge amounts of public money in a casino in

a super highway in the west of the city. The owners

Las Vegas. Carlos Imaz, husband of Claudia Shein-

of the land won a trial to avoid expropriation. This

baum, the most likely candidate of - López Obrador

resolution, however, was not accepted by López Ob-

for the governorship of Mexico City, was also taped

rador who went ahead with his plans. The case

being bribed by the businessman Carlos Ahumada.-

Lisdey Espinoza Pedraza

38

Will Mexico Go Down the Populist Route in 2018?

López Obrador also received the continuous sup-

most unappealing aspects of his persona for a long

port of the Abarca family of Guerrero who were lat-

time; his personalism; and the structural limita-

er involved in the Iguala incident where 48 stu-

tions of his strategy (Bolivar-Meza, 2014). Follow-

dents went missing and presumably killed. Ricardo

ing the loss of his candidate, Obrador blamed the

Monreal, a prominent figure in Obrador’s newly

defeat, just like he did in 2006 and 2012, on elec-

created party, was also known for conceding mil-

toral fraud. For him democracy is only democracy

lionaire contracts to the friends of his daughter, a

as long as he himself or a member of his party are

total of 16 contracts for 27 million pesos to supply

elected. This electoral defeat can only be blamed

his administration of stationery material. In 2012, a

on himself and his inability to negotiate deals and

conversation of Luis Acosta Bonino, a campaign

put his personalism aside. One natural place for -

strategist of - López Obrador, was leaked in which

López Obrador to look for allies would be his for-

he said 6 million dollars would be more than

mer home, the PRD. Teaming up in the State of

enough to make sure López Obrador won the elections; and the most recent case was the local deputy and ex -candidate of MORE-

“

Ultimately, candidates

Mexico

would

have

delivered a 49% victo-

matter more than

ry over the PRI candi-

elections in Mexico”

cannot blame anyone

date who got 34%. He for his lack of vision in

NA for municipal president in Veracruz, Eva Ca-

that election, and this could also well be a forecast

dena Sandoval, who was caught taking a bribe of

for the 2018 presidential election (Bolivar-Meza,

half

2014b). Coming up 3% points short in the State of

a million pesos for

- López

Obrador

(Domínguez, 2006).

Mexico left - López Obrador and his party with

López Obrador created MORENA in 2014, and its launch came at the expense of his membership of the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD). MORENA is a one-man party, and - López Obrador is not willing to let anyone else dictate what they want or what needs to be done. Martí Batres, Enrique Semo, Ricardo Monreal, Héctor Díaz-Polanco, Clara

Brugada,

Pablo

Moctezuma,

Claudia

Sheibaum, Bertha Luján, Mario Delgado, Vidal Lleneras, Alejandro Encinas, Pablo Amílcar Sando-

none of the 31 governorships of the country and no access to potential funding. If he is to win the presidency next year under such conditions, tapping into voter outrage at graft, crime, and Donald Trump will not be enough. He will need to broaden his range of appeal and curtail his threats against an establishment that he sees as the mafia of power and that, ironically, -López Obrador was part of for nearly 40 years, first in the PRI and then in the PRD (Toledo and Vela, 2016).

val and Virgilio Caballero are only a few of the

In a one-round election, - López Obrador would

names that were part of the PRD government López

win with as little as 30% of the vote; if that hap-

Obrador formed from 2000 to 2005 as a major of

pens, Mexico will embark upon a perilous political

Mexico City and that are now members of his newly

experiment. What would a presidency of - López

created party looking for new posts. The creation of

Obrador look like? Just like with Trump and Brexit,

his own party will also enable him to run for presi-

the world will have to wait and see. For -López Ob-

dent for as long as he likes. The past July elections

rador opponents in Mexico, there are 2 worst-case

in the state of Mexico have again put his worst

scenarios. One would be a northern version of Hu-

qualities at the forefront: his inability to hide the

go Chávez who upon gaining power set to radically

39

The International Academic

change institutions and concentrate power around

Mexico’s next president, will have little chance of

himself. The other would be a left-wing version of

changing the facts on the ground, particularly the

Donald Trump, who would go at politics like a soli-

unspeakable violence of the drug cartels and the

tary gunslinger without regard for counsel or conse-

endemic corruption of the Mexican political system

quences (Modonesi, 2017). The fear of - López Ob-

despite empty, vague populist promises.

rador has triggered coalition talks by other parties,

Bibliography

namely the PAN and the PRD, who have already teamed up at the state level and have had a proven track of victories. If - López Obrador wants to win the presidency rather than go down as a selfproclaimed martyr of a so-called fraudulent system, he has to be able to convince the voters that he will be less like Hugo Chávez and Donald Trump and more like Brazilian Lula Da Silva. He also needs to rely on the entire left. His defeat at the State of Mexico election shows that a divided left will only continue losing (Modonesi, 2017). The electoral successes PRD has had by uniting with PAN also reduces - López Obrador’s ability to bully his former party leaders into supporting him. He would then have to act with more negotiation and less personalism. - López Obrador needs to somehow reconcile with the PRD and unite the left to have a real chance for victory.

López Obrador is at heart a populist authoritarian

Bolívar Meza, (2014) ‘R. Liderazgo político: el caso de Andrés Manuel López Obrador en el Movimiento

de

Regeneración

Nacional

(MORENA)’, Estudios Políticos, No. 42 Bolívar Meza, R. (2014b) ‘Morena: el partido del lopezobradorismo’, Polis, 10(2), pp. 71-103.

Domínguez, M. D. S. R. (2006) ‘Diferencias programáticas, ideológicas y propositivas entre Andrés Manuel López Obrador y Hugo Chávez: la imposibilidad de un proceso de reforma en México al estilo de Venezuela’, Editorial Grijalbo, México.

Modonesi, M. (2017) ‘Lecturas de las izquierdas mexicanas’, Nueva Sociedad, (268), 100.

Silva, A. A. (2004) ‘¿Hábitos del corazón? Corrupción política y escándalo en México’, Nueva Sociedad, 191, 16-24.

and if he continues with his incendiary speech and

Solis-Delgado, J. J. (2012) ‘Andrés Manuel López

non-democratic, authoritarian practices within his

Obrador: el segundo intento’, Editorial ITESO,

own party along with corruption and tainted alli-

Universidad Iberoamericana, México.

ances, he could easily lead voters to settle for unappealing but safer choices. Ultimately, candidates matter more than elections in Mexico, a PRI candidate who can show enough distance from the present administration and a solid career may yet be able to overcome the negative image bound to this administration. PAN, with or without the PRD, need to deal first with its internal divisions just like the PRD, and for the perpetual candidate - López Obrador, his liabilities remain overwhelming and

Toledo, R. E., & Vela, J. P. N. (2016) ‘MORENA en la reconfiguración del sistema de partidos en México’, Estudios Políticos, 37, pp. 81-109.

Wood D. & Valenzuela Pedro (2015) ‘Corruption, A Central Issue in the Campaigns’, The Wilson Center, Mexico Institute, 20th April, 2015, [Online]

Available

at

http://

www.wilsoncenter.org/article/corruptioncentral-issue-the-campaigns

too serious to claim an easy victory in 2018. At the same time, it is also clear that whoever becomes

Lisdey Espinoza Pedraza

40

8 The Powder Keg in the Balkans: Can it happen again?

NEJC SERETINEK

As the global community has turned its attention towards the EU’s inner problems, the crisis in Syria and the instability created by North Korea, it is at risk of neglecting the changing tides of the Balkans. As the region’s former scars are still aching, the powder keg in Europe’s very own southeast is at risk of heating up again.

D

espite the attempts of many peace

the globe; Venezuela, Central Africa, Syria, Kashmir

movements and international bodies

and North Korea, to name but a few. While the fo-

to promote peace and stability, we

cus of global superpowers is mainly concentrated

probably live in the most politically

on just two or three of the above, there is perhaps

unstable world since the Cold War. Conflict

another prospective conflict area mainly left unno-

hotspots are numerous and scattered throughout

ticed by the international community – the Bal-

41

The International Academic

kans. While the European Union was busy with in-

gion from triggering a global conflict again, as it

tegration and the promotion of peace and coopera-

had done eighty years before. Nowadays, however,

tion, quite the opposite of what it was standing for

we very much live in a multipolar world. With the

was happening right on its doorstep. EU values did

strategical interests towards the region still present,

not reach the Balkans until the 2000s. The

and the conflicts scarred in the memories of the

‘forgotten child of Europe’ has been a source of ma-

region’s people and politicians, the Balkans are pos-

jor conflicts in the past and, neglected when all the

sibly more unstable than ever.

signs of conflict were there. Still today tensions in the region are high, while the eyes of the international community are turned away towards Syria or North Korea. With history repeating itself, can we prevent a major escalation of conflicts at The Door of Europe, or will the Balkans become another bloody stain in Europe’s war statistics?

Europe’s door to Asia - a bridge between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, between the West and the East - has historically been an important trading route. Because of its geostrategic importance, this region has always attracted substantial interest from global superpowers such as the United States, Germany, Turkey and Russia. The significance of the region was demonstrated in the run-up to the First World War. Austria-Hungary, the German Empire, the Ottoman Empire and Russia all had conflicting interests in the early 1910s, and the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne was the spark that lit the powder keg, and started the biggest military conflict in modern history at the time. Similarly, 30 years later, the Balkans was the front line in stopping the Nazi advance further south; a fact barely acknowledged in the popular history of World War II (Britannica, 2018). Lastly, in the 1990s, the region was the source of the greatest military conflict in Europe since the Second World War.

Russia, NATO, and the Balkans The two great global military blocks, NATO and Russia, both have substantial interests in the region. The balance of powers changed significantly after 2009 when Croatia and Albania joined the North Atlantic military alliance. Furthermore, Serbia’s former political partner and close ally Montenegro has also joined the organisation, acceding to the block in 2017; a move not welcomed by Serbia, and even less so by Russia. The two Slavic countries have historically had strong ties, and have supported each other on issues such as Kosovo and Crimea.

The cause of this close cooperation is, however, more than sentimental. Serbia remains Russia’s only ally in the region, and with more Balkan states joining NATO, it is not hard to understand the reasoning behind Russia’s anxiety. Consequently, Moscow has been tightening its economic ties with Serbia more and more recently. More than 80% of Serbia’s natural gas comes from Russia (Statfor, 2015).

In addition, Russia lent its Balkan ally $300 million in 2012 and $700 million in 2013 (The Economist, 2012) after the IMF suspended its loan deals with Serbia (MacDowall, 2015). Furthermore, a RussianSerbian humanitarian centre was opened in the southern Serbian town of Nis in 2012, boasting substantial mine-clearing and firefighting resources, as well as playing host to Russian (non-military) air-

Indeed, it is more than likely that only the fall of the

craft. In addition, Serbia has pledged to be Russia’s

Soviet Union, which resulted in Russia’s inability to

long-term partner in the region, with Belgrade

focus on global issues, and the consequent Ameri-

clearly stating that it will not pursue NATO mem-

can hegemony in world politics, prevented the re-

bership (The EIU, 2012).

Nejc Seretinek

42

The Powder Keg in the Balkans: Can it happen again?

Opinion in Serbia on NATO membership is, howev-

of a S300 Surface-to-air missile system in 2016, as

er, divided. While the majority still tends to favour

a response to Croatia’s ambition to acquire long

relying heavily on Russia, there are some who be-

range missiles that could strike Serbian territory

lieve that Serbian membership in NATO is not that

(Stojanovic, 2016). A year later, the story is hardly

far-fetched. As NATO is by far the most powerful

any different; while Croatia is modifying its army

military block in the world, Janusz Bugajski, a sen-

by purchasing new fighter jets and patrol vessels to

“

Indeed, it is more than likely that only the fall of the Soviet Union, which resulted in Russia’s inability to

focus on global issues, and the consequent American hegemony in world politics, prevented the region from triggering a global conflict again, as it had done eighty years before.

ior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analy-

meet NATO’s requirements, Serbia is negotiating

sis, believes that there is no rational reason for Ser-

with Belarus (likely under Russian supervision)

bian military officers wanting to be more closely

about buying MIG-29 fighters and BUK surface-to-

aligned with the Russian army, as opposed to the

air missiles (Adamowski, 2017). Instead of peace

North Atlantic block. “You want to be part of the

and increased stability as a consequence of NATO’s

best, not second best’’ as he put it in an interview

presence, the region’s two major powers are instead

with a Serbian media portal (Tanjug, 2017). It does

engaging in an arms race.

seem at first, perhaps, that with Serbia being surrounded

either

by

NATO-aligned

countries

(Croatia, Montenegro, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Hungary) or by NATO military bases (in Bosnia and in Kosovo), that Belgrade cannot pursue the politics of military neutrality for much longer. It would be best, seemingly, for the region’s stability if Serbia joined NATO. However, referring back to Janusz Bugajski’s comment, he seems to miss the fact that Russia would not allow such a move, and with Serbia being dependent on Russia’s gas and financial help, Belgrade would have no choice but to oblige.

It is evident that tensions in the Balkans are high, and that any shift in the balance of power in an already very imbalanced system may end in catastrophe. All that the powder keg of the Balkans needs is a spark, and that spark could be caused by many scenarios. Currently, none of the NATO members from the region (with the exception of Greece) meet the alliance’s requirement to spend 2% of GDP on defence. (Szoldra, 2017). Therefore, should any Balkan member state decide to increase military spending, they would doubtless get the blessing of the United States. However, such a move would severely affect the balance of power in the Balkans,

Russia has already threatened retaliation, in re-

and would most likely result in Serbia feeling com-

sponse to NATO inviting Montenegro to join the

pelled to seek a formal alliance with Russia, and the

block in 2015, and vocally opposed the accession of

establishment of Russian military bases in Serbia.

Serbia’s former political partner to the alliance two

In the event of armed conflict, a proxy war between

years later. Russia helped Serbia with the purchase

the major global powers may result.

43

The International Academic

A similar outcome would result in the not-so-

villages of Bosnia (Galdiini, 2015). Radical Islam is

unlikely event of Bosnia joining NATO. The country

often a breeding ground for terrorism, and cases of

already boasts a large Serbian population, which

terrorist attacks in Bosnia have been reported. For

has been a reason for Belgrade’s military involve-

example, a radical Islamist fired shots on the Amer-

ment in Bosnia before. The worst case scenario,

ican embassy in Sarajevo in 2011 (Mackey and

however, would be if Kosovo was to seek member-

Gladstone, 2011), a bomb attack was carried out on

ship of NATO. The self-declared independent and

a police station in Bugojno in 2010 (Aljazeera Bal-

largely

country

kans, 2015) and a shooting on soldiers took place in

(although not by Russia and Serbia) already coop-

Sarajevo in 2015 (BBC b, 2015). However, the topic

erates with the alliance (Phillips, 2017). Both Serbia

did not receive much attention until the rise of ISIS,

and Albania claim historical ties to Kosovo and are

and it now presents a serious challenge to the sta-

ready to go to war over the region. With NATO’s

bility of both the country and the region as a whole.

and possibly Russia’s presence, the conflict would

Bosnia consists of three main ethnic groups: Serbs,

quickly escalate from a local into a global one. Just

Croats and Bosniaks, who are Muslims. In the

over 100 years after the assassination of the heir to

1990s, all three groups fought over territories in

the Austrian throne in Sarajevo, the Balkans could

Bosnia and indeed all three ended up more or less

again be the powder keg that would cause a global

dissatisfied with the Dayton Agreement peace ac-

conflict.

cord of 1995. The agreement put an end to the

internationally

recognised

Radical Islamism in Bosnia Given the dramatic rise of ISIS, there is another element that could severely compromise stability in the Balkans – that of radical Islamisation. Islamic radicalisation is not exclusive to, but still very much concentrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina only.

There have been allegations of areas in Bosnia being used by ISIS – mostly remote areas where a radical version of Islam, Wahhabism, is practiced (Hill and Wight, 2015). Religion was an important factor in the Balkan wars in the 1990s, and many elements of radicalisation are a consequence of that conflict. Firstly, many (around 750,000) illegallyheld weapons remained in the country after the war (Rose, 2017). Some of those weapons are now in the hands of terrorist training camps in the country.

Secondly, during the war in the 1990s, Bosnian forces received financial support and trainings from other Islamic countries, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. Radical versions of Islam arrived simultaneously, and are still practiced in the more remote

bloody war, and split the country into administrative regions with separate assemblies and a rotary system of governance. As the new system has proved ineffective, with all three groups still harbouring territorial grievances, it would not be too bold an assumption to suggest that any major destabilisation of the country (such as terrorism) could cause another break down of Bosnia, and another armed power struggle between the three ethnic groups. In 2009, for example, political deadlock concerning Republika Srpska, a political entity in Bosnia, reached such levels that political analysists, such as Srečko Latal, openly speculated that a fresh Bosnian conflict could occur. (Latal, 2009). While the situation was resolved, there is no guarantee of a similarly peaceful resolution in the event of further sectarian tensions.

It has been reported that Bosnia has provided the highest number of ISIS fighters in Syria per capita, with around reported 300 travelling to the conflict (Shenhav, 2016). The reports were of great concern not only to Bosnia, but also to the rest of the region

Nejc Seretinek

44

The Powder Keg in the Balkans: Can it happen again?

and the EU, as the returnees would potentially be

Any military intervention in Bosnia would inevita-

able to train other radical Muslims in handling

bly decrease the stability of the region as a whole,

weapons. Having received the necessary training,

with different parties such us NATO, Croatia, Ser-

there would be little to stop Islamist radicals travel-

bia and Russia with competing interests, resulting

ling to neighbouring countries, or even further

in Bosnia falling apart for the second time in under

north to the EU to execute terrorist attacks. Objec-

30 years. Since the interests of the possible actors

tively, however, Islamic radicalisation in Bosnia

involved are conflicting, again the outcome may be

occurs to a far lesser extent than the mainstream

a local military dispute evolving into a global con-

media wishes us to believe. A common reference is

flict. Once again, only a spark would be necessary to

made to the rural village of Gornja Maoča, where

ignite the Balkan powder keg, and that spark could

Wahhabism (also known as Salafism) is practised.

be Islamic radicalisation.

While, there have been numerous reports of ISIS presence and of terrorist training camps being organised in Gornja Maoča, no conclusive proof has been presented (Galdiini, 2016). Nevertheless, starting a war seldom has a rationally justifiable reason, and Islamic radicalisation in Bosnia – the extent of which is disputed – could indeed be a cause. Furthermore, war in Bosnia would inevitably attract the support of regional and global powers, ranging from Croatia (NATO) and Serbia (Russia), to Saudi Arabia and Iran, with both of the latter two states having economic interests in what is one of only two Muslim countries in Europe.

ISIS drew attention to the Balkans earlier this year when it published an article entitled “The Balkans Blood for Enemies, and Honey for Friends” in the Bosnian version of the group’s magazine Rumiyah.

The article threatens to kill Croats and Serbs in the country as revenge for their involvement in the war in Bosnia in the 1990s. Should there be any truth in the threat promised to the region by ISIS, we could soon witness not only a Croatian and Serbian military presence in Bosnia, but also the presence of NATO and Russia. ISIS has been the main reason for the military involvement of NATO and Russia in the Middle East, and should ISIS gain a stronghold in Bosnia, at the very door to Europe and the EU, we can be certain it would cause a military intervention.

Conclusion Despite the EU and NATO’s efforts towards promoting stability in the region, the Balkans are today just as unstable as they have been for the past 100 years. Probably even more so, precisely because of the conflicting interests of the same superpowers that advocate for harmony in this war-driven region. Unlike some other areas of conflict that could trigger a global crisis, such as North Korea or Syria, the Balkans receives significantly less attention in the media, as well enjoying far less significance with international policy-makers. To neglect the situation in the region, however, would be dangerous, and without appropriate responses to the aforementioned dangers, the Balkans could once again become the spark that triggers a global conflict. The conflicting interests of NATO and Russia in the region could severely challenge the balance of powers, and disrupt the region’s stability. Further, NATO expansion or moves towards rearmament among its members in the region could trigger a Russian-backed military response from Serbia. Due to the strategic geographic location of the Balkan region, it would not take long for regional fighting to escalate into a global military conflict. Furthermore, Islamic radicalisation in Bosnia could lead to a military response from one of its neighbours, which would push the country into another vile war. Again, it would be because of the strategic, ge-

45

The International Academic

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47

9 The UN and Solving Intra-State Conflict KATERINA VIDEVA

Looking through a realist and liberalist lens, Katerina Videva discusses the much-questioned effectiveness of the United Nations in its designed role as a protector of civilians, during and after periods of conflict. Within the context of the changing nature of global conflict - from inter state to intra state - the UN response has time and again been criticised for its ineffectiveness. Ms Videva highlights the global body’s rigidity and structure as a possible cause of this, calling for internal structural reform, in order to prevent paralyses in the decision-making process.

A

ccording to its mission statement, the

twentieth century, the main purpose the UN was

United Nations is associated with the

designed to fulfil was the avoidance of a Third

maintenance and promotion of inter-

World War (Weiss et al., 1994: 89). This implies

national peace and security (White et

that the organisation’s mechanisms were primarily

al., 1990: 3). Established closely after the conclu-

designed to resolve inter-state wars. However, the

sion of the second greatest global conflict of the

changing nature of conflict allowed it to find an al-

48

The UN and Solving Intra-State Conflict

ternative way to manifest itself through the so-

peded the intervention of the United Nations in in-

called ‘new wars’. One of the hallmarks of these

ternal conflicts is that its actions are highly depend-

more modern conflicts is that they tend to occur

ent on its permanent members, or the so-called P5

within states, where they are often fuelled by funda-

– the US, UK, France, China and Russia (White et

mental differences in terms of ethnicity or religion

al., 1990: 9). The core problem that engenders this

(Heywood, 2014: 451-453). As a result, intra-state

issue of intervention is that the United Nations

conflicts have replaced inter-state ones as the domi-

does not maintain an independent military force

nant threat to international security (Weiss et al.,

and has no source of funding other than the afore-

1994: 88).

mentioned nations. (Browne, 2009: 2-3). For these

The safety of numerous citizens is endangered during civil wars, which raises the question as to whether humanitarian intervention from a supranational institution should be the next logical demarche. Nevertheless, it has always been difficult to respond to such events because of the contradiction between respecting countries’ views on sovereignty and the moral impetus to save human life from deadly military conflict (Aksu, 2003: 21-23). In some cases the UN, specifically the Security Council, has successfully coped with such situations exemplified by the cases of Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Nonetheless, the UN’s efforts to intervene have ranged from tentative to non-existent (as exemplified by limited protection and intervention in Rwanda and South Sudan), due to fluctuating levels of motivation.

Therefore, it is generally agreed that the UN has not always been effective in resolving internal conflicts.

reasons, it is reliant on the military and financial support of the affluent member states. A failure of the UN which strongly suggests that its actions are chiefly dependent on the interests of its members was illustrated by the lack of humanitarian values apparent in response to the 1994 Rwandan genocide (Guardian, 2014). The unwillingness of the Security Council to use military or financial resources to protect the region at the time could be due to the fact that Rwanda was a marginalised, underdeveloped country, that did not represent an economic interest for any of the global powers. This example can be explained by the neorealist suggestion that international organisations chiefly represent the interests of the powerful, hegemonic states, and are not always driven by humanitarian values (Waltz, 1979: 112). This, therefore, reaffirms that the organisation is subordinate to the active pursuit of the goals of the world powers.

This article will consider two reasons for its ineffec-

Furthermore, the UN’S actions are largely de-

tiveness. Firstly, it will consider the financial and

pendent on its permanent members due to their

logistical resources of its more affluent members -

veto powers (White et al, 1990: 9). The exercise of

many of whom have the power to veto as perma-

veto in the Security Council - the body charged with

nent members of the Security Council – which

the extremely important task of peace enforcement

leaves the UN overly reliant upon them. Secondly,

- has been paralysing the organisation ever since

the author will explore the implications of entrust-

the Cold War (Nicholas, 1967: 70-74). Thus, the

ing an overly enhanced role to regional organisa-

passiveness of the United Nations could be ex-

tions for the resolution of intra-state conflicts.

plained by the frequent occurrence of disagree-

Power Distributions UN Security Council

within

the

First and foremost, a crucial factor that has im-

ments between the P5, due to the constant struggle for power. For instance, in 2016 the Russian ambassador to the UN, Vitaly Churckin, vetoed a resolution aiming to end the bombing of the Syrian city

49

The International Academic

Aleppo. This created considerable political tension

the regional clan system (Weiss et al., 1994: 79-81).

within the Security Council (Guardian, 2016). From

This case provides a good example of why the tactic

this, it follows that it would be possible for any P5

of co-operating with regional actors, who have

country to use its veto to impede intervention with-

acquired knowledge of the areas in question

in its own country from the other member states in

throughout

the case that it ever commits gross atrocities and

Furthermore, cooperating with regional actors,

rights violations. This corresponds very well with

such as the African Union, helps to avoid the

the neorealist view that nations will always priori-

further centralisation of power by giving more

tise their national interest, making the internation-

authority

over

al system extremely competitive (Waltz, 1979: 109).

structures

(Montesquieu,

As a result, this exacerbates the already problemat-

addition, it could also be regarded as liberal

ic process of co-operation (Waltz, 1979: 107), mak-

because it can interpreted as a reluctance to

ing the task of peacekeeping even more challenging.

disrespect the sovereignty of foreign territories.

The Role of Regional Structures A further explanation for the ineffectiveness of the UN in coping with such scenarios is the superfluous reinforcement of the role that regional structures have to play in intra-state conflicts (Duffey and Jones, 1996: 3). While this policy is not without merit, the weaknesses of this particular demarche outweigh their advantages. On the positive side, it could be argued that by pursuing this policy, the United Nations is attempting to alleviate the underrepresentation of marginalised regions such as Africa (Kolb, 2009: 87-88). In

“

addition, the diplomatic skills of UN officials on the

the

years,

can

be

decision-making 1777:

very

to

useful.

regional

221-228).

In

However, this policy has numerous limitations as regional actors often experience shortages of financial, logistical and technical resources while attempting to intra-state conflicts (Duffey and Jones, 1996: 5). Probable historical links with neighbouring regions give rises to the threat of partiality, which endangers the success of the endeavour as well. Nevertheless, since regional organisations are more likely to be aware of an arising conflict in proximity to them and are more likely to respond to it promptly, the UN has relied on them regularly (Smithers, 1979: 12-18). Chapter VIII of the UN Charter illustrates how this practice is encouraged

The UN’s policy of empowering regional structures in times of civil war could be regarded as highly calculating, as it gives the organisation a means of escaping its responsibilities by transferring them to other political actors and organisations.�

ground can be lacking in certain regions, where UN staff possess insufficient local knowledge. An appropriate example of this problem would be Somalia, where neither the United Nations nor the American forces were adequately acquainted with

through its enshrinement in international law (Weiss et al., 1994: 34). It has been stated explicitly that it is preferred for intra-state conflicts to be resolved by regional actors, and that the assistance of the UN should be demanded solely in extreme cases (Weiss et al., 1994: 33). Nonetheless, this decision

Katerina Videva

50

The UN and Solving Intra-State Conflict

could also be perceived through the prism of the

self-interest, they have more incentive to intervene,

Classic Realism of Morgenthau, which highlights

provided that the area in question represents an

the unimportance of domestic matters among the

economic interest for them. Additionally, the over-

international community (Griffiths, 1992: 78-80).

reliance on regional actors and organisations also

This theory implies that since states are chiefly con-

highlights the UN’s unwillingness to intervene in

cerned with their national self-interest, they have

such situations. Indeed, as the UN has been shown

limited interest in the internal affairs of other coun-

to have had difficulties in overcoming many other

tries which will not have a significant impact on

situations of international conflict, due in no small

their own well-being (Griffiths, 1992: 81-84). Thus,

part to the reasons mentioned, many of the body’s

the UN’s policy of empowering regional structures

officials have suggested that it is in need of struc-

in times of civil war or other intra-state conflicts

tural reform.

could be regarded as highly calculated, as it gives

Bibliography

the UN a means of escaping its responsibilities by transferring them to other political actors and organisations. The Sri Lankan civil war, which began in 1983 when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam launched an intermittent insurgency against the government, is a case in point (Clarance, 2007: 25).

Asku, E. (2003) The United Nations, Intra-state peacekeeping and Normative Change, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Borger, J. (2016) ‘Russia vetoes UN resolution to

While a regional organisation was used in an at-

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(Guardian, 2009). The UN was harshly criticised, as at no time in these final months did it attempt to intervene on behalf of the civilian population (BBC News, 2012). It has been suggested that the UN’s decision was strongly influenced by the lack of oil in the region, and by Sri Lanka’s geographic remoteness from the powerful states (BBC News, 2012).

Conclusion In conclusion, the unsatisfactory fulfilment of the UN’s responsibility to protect civilians in times of intra-state conflicts is chiefly caused by the varying level of motivation of its members. Since the prosperous member countries consistently pursue their

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Duffey, T., Jones, R. (1996) ‘Searching for alternatives: The UN and Regional Organisations’, Journal of International Peacekeeping, 3(1), pp:1-3.

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New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

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McGreal, C. (2014) ‘Rwandan genocide 20 years on’, The Guardian, [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/ apr/03/rwanda-genocide-20-years-on [Accessed on 10/02/2016] Montesquieu, C. (1777), The Spirit of the Laws, Vol. 1. London: J. Nourse.

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Katerina Videva

52

10 Rising Food Insecurity and Malnutrition: The Role Governments Play in Preventing Undernutrition and Obesity KATRIN WAGENER

Despite the continuous efforts to end malnutrition on a global scale, the battle goes on as over 815 million people still experience extreme hunger in the world. The reasons for this are numerous, as food security can be threatened by multiple different factors, including globalisation and conflict situations. This forces both national governments and international organisations to search for new ways to end the suffering.

I

n 1996, the World Food Summit (WFS) set a

tions, 1996). This target became a concrete goal of

target of “eradicating hunger in all coun-

the Millennium Development Goals, which sought

tries, with an immediate view to reducing

to halve the proportion of people who suffer from

the number of undernourished people to

hunger between 1990 and 2015. As a result of an

half their present level no later than 2015� (Food

increase in world food prices in 2007-2008, the

and Agriculture Organization of the United Na-

concerns regarding food security gained even great-

53

The International Academic

er international attention, becoming one of the

rity: Conceptualizing the linkages, 2003). Current-

foremost targeted objectives of the 2030 Sustaina-

ly, the most widely recognised definition of food

ble Development Goals. Nonetheless, despite the

security states: “Food security exists when all peo-

tremendous progress that has been made in recent

ple, at all times, have physical and economic access

years, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Or-

to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets

ganization (UNFAO) reports that even though there

their dietary needs and food preferences for an ac-

is enough food produced in the world to feed the

tive and healthy life� (World Food Summit, 1996).

global population, over 815 million people still face extreme hunger and malnutrition, an increase from 777 million in 2015 (FAO.org, 2017). In addition to rising undernutrition in the developing world, a global health paradox has arisen linking obesity to food insecurity in countries where food availability seems abundant (Franklin et al., 2011:253-259). It is becoming evident that food security, in its different forms, is visibly worsening across the globe.

Given these alarming statistics and concerns, it surely follows that governments must prioritise food and nutrition policies, and allocate substantial funding for targeted programs aimed at minimising food insecurity.

Food insecurity poses a tremendous strain on nations, as it is directly associated with malnutrition, as well as health concerns such as stunted growth and weakened immune systems, preventing active engagement in society. The FAO statistics database reveals that stunting affects nearly one in four children worldwide under the age of five (FAO.org; 2017). Stunting poses a major social concern as it results in weakened performance in school caused by impaired cognitive ability, and an increased chance of becoming sick and dying from infections.

Insufficient calorie intake directly causes a series of health concerns that prevent individuals from maximising their productive capabilities, and so there

The concept of food security was arguably first ad-

exists a pervasive triad of poverty, food insecurity

dressed at the World Food Conference in 1974, and

and malnutrition. Hence, it is vital to provide un-

has since then evolved from assuring the availabil-

dernourished persons with access to food resources

ity and price stability of basic foods at the interna-

as well as the means to earn adequate income. It is

tional and national levels, to explicitly addressing

through the implementation of targeted govern-

the multidimensional nature of food security

ment policies that problems of availability, access

(UNFAO, 2006). Whereas early definitions of food

and utilisation can be confronted.

security primarily focused on supply side factors of food availability and distribution, the conventionally adopted definition distinguishes between international and local household levels and the temporal dynamics of food security. The 1989 World Bank report on Poverty and Hunger specifically sought to differentiate between problems of structural poverty and low incomes associated with chronic food insecurity, as is the prevailing case in many developing countries, and transitory food insecurity caused by natural disasters, economic instability or conflict (Trade Reforms and Food Secu-

A major concern within the Dominican Republic, for example, is micronutrient deficiencies, particularly those of iron and vitamin A. According to a study conducted by El Centro Nacional de Investigaciones en Salud Materno Infantil (CENISMI), 34 percent of school-age children were iodine deficient in 2003 (Kim, 2008:4). To address the various micronutrient deficiencies, national level actors made the decision to implement a nationwide fortification program of wheat flour and sugar to improve the micronutrient status of its population (Kim,

Katrin Wagner

54

Rising Food Insecurity and Malnutrition

2008:5-12). The Dominican Republic, under their

appears on its website) (2015; 3-6) notes however

National Food and Nutrition Plan, has outlined fur-

that households beleaguered by low incomes and

ther policy programs aimed at achieving nutritional

food insecurity are more likely to become vulnera-

and sanitary wellbeing. Brazil presents another case

ble to obesity because of the lifestyle challenges

of relatively successful policy implementation, not-

they face, including but not limited to cycles of de-

ing a fall in occurrences of stunting from 20% to 7%

pressive and emotional eating, sedentary lifestyles,

between 1989 and 2007 (Mantovani et al., 2016;

limited resources, lack of access to affordable,

”

healthy foods and limited access to health care. A

2263). This is largely accredited to programs such

In addition to rising undernutrition in the developing world, a global health paradox has arisen linking obesity to food insecurity in countries where food availability seems abundant”

as the Bolsa Familia, which gives cash transfers to

study published in the Journal of the Academy of

over 11 million impoverished families, subject to the

Nutrition and Diabetics found that in a study of

conditions that they comply with basic health mon-

66,553 adults across 12 US States, individuals who

itoring, and that their children attend primary edu-

were food insecure had 32 percent greater odds of

cation (The World Bank, 2013). The Food and Nu-

being obese compared with those who were food

trition Security Policy is an additional strategy

secure (Food Research and Action Center, 2015:2).

which focuses on strengthening family agriculture, encouraging local initiatives for food banks and providing resources and information to improve school meals and nutritional awareness. This policy is monitored by Brazil’s National Council on Food and Nutrition security.

As a result of growing obesity among food insecure households, the United States government implemented a series of strategic policy action programmes aimed at improving the nutritional dietary quality of low income households by increasing the resources available to purchase food. One of

In addition to fighting undernutrition caused by

these policy programs is the Supplemental Nutri-

food insecurity, policy initiatives have also been en-

tion Assistance Program (SNAP). The SNAP pro-

acted by governments seeking to minimise rising

vides roughly 46 million Americans with benefits

obesity levels and associated health risks. Linking

through an electronic benefit transfer card that can

obesity to food insecurity at first seems counterin-

be used at authorised food retailers to purchase

tuitive, and indeed rather contradictory, as rising

food; excluded from the purchases are alcohol and

obesity would seem to imply that there is an abun-

hot or prepared foods (Blumenthal et al., 2013;

dance of food supply. The Food Research and Ac-

2825). In 2012, data revealed that the average

tion Center (again, as this is the name of an official

monthly benefit roughly accumulated to $133.41

body, I’m going with the US spelling of ‘center’ as it

per person. Congressional legislation has also, in

55

The International Academic

recent years, revised existing nutrition programs

$28,879,526 was donated by Political Action Com-

such as the Special Supplemental Nutrition Pro-

mittees and $31,070,655 by soft or “outside” mon-

gram for Women, Infants and Children to provide

ey; roughly 73% of total contributions to the elec-

food packages that reflect the federal government’s

tion cycle were donated to Republicans.

nutrition policy. The third major governance approach to reducing food insecurity comes in the form of the National School Lunch program, which provides federal subsidies to over 100,000 schools to help them provide nutritious lunches to more than 30.4 million children daily. A study conducted by the United States Agriculture Department in 2015 reveals the effectiveness of such policy programs, noting that food insecurity decreased from 14.9% of American households in 2011 to 14% in 2014.

However, the success of programs such as these depends largely on the continual multi-sector collaboration between levels of national and local government, the private sector and global donors or international cooperations (Lang and Barling, 2012; 317-321). Failure of communication and coordination mechanisms between these entities weakens the success of these policies. Furthermore, the feasibility of food and nutrition programs also depends on their cost-effectiveness, as well as the availability of financial resources. Without consistent financial support, these policies lose their efficacy in providing long-term development assistance. To exemplify the political shortcomings of policy initiatives, Marion Nestle – in

her work

“Food Policy: How the Food Industry Influences Nutrition and Health” – discusses how dominant food companies exert calculating influence on government nutrition policy through lobbying practices. The Center for Responsive Politics (2017) (this a US-based group, so I’m going with the US spelling again) estimates that the lobbying expenditures for Agribusiness is $130,892,759 for the year of 2017.

The Center for Responsive Politics (2018) also reports

that

during

the

2016

election

cycle

Despite criticisms regarding existing food and nutrition programs, there are multiple global initiatives and organisations offering financial, scientific and practical assistance in drafting and implementing appropriate policies and programs, such as the Scaling Up Nutrition Movement, Zero Hunger, and the ‘Voluntary Guidelines to support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security’ presented by the UNFAO in 2004.

In recent years, more specifically after the food crisis of 2007-2008, governments recognised the need for food security to be addressed at local, national and international levels. It became evident that specific trends driving food insecurity, including globalisation, consumerism, the power of transnational corporations, and cases of conflict, were not limited to one level of governance specifically (Ericksen et. al, 2009; 374-375). The UNFAO notes that food (in) security can be attributed to a number of factors, including crises and national disasters, as well as fundamentally poor governance and lack of institutional support for those living in impoverished conditions (Fao.org, 2017). As such, solutions to resolving food insecurity must be approached through assisted government programs on both micro and macro levels. Crucially, these government policies need to realistically evaluate case by case areas, and individualistically target the underlying factors that perpetuate the multidimensional marginalisation of these population groups. Nations beleaguered by food insecurity increasingly notice the spillover effect of poverty, hunger and malnutrition in areas of active

communal

engagement

and

economic

productivity. Vulnerable populations place prevent-

Katrin Wagner

56

Rising Food Insecurity and Malnutrition

able strains on the public sector, and it is therefore

Kim, S. (2008) Developing a National Food Forti-

of paramount importance that governments place

fication Program in the Dominican Republic,

greater focus on targeting policy to alleviate condi-

New York: Cornell University pp. 2-11

tions that lead to increased food insecurity.

Lang, T. and Barling, D. (2012). ‘Food security and

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United

States

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Agriculture

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Katrin Wagner

58

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