Nationalism by The Paris Globalist

VOLUME 10 | ISSUE 2 | SPRING 2016

WHOSE NATIONALISM? THE POLITICS OF HONG KONG’S IDENTITY EGYPTIAN WOMEN’S REVOLUTION: INTERRUPTED THE MIDDLE EAST’S OTHER CIVIL WAR DEBOUT LES DAMNÉS DE LA TERRE

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THE PARIS

GLOBALIST Contents CONTENTS from the cover WHOSE NATIONALISM?

THE POLITICS OF HONG KONG’S

IDENTITY

EGYPTIAN WOMEN’S

REVOLUTION: INTERRUPTED

THE MIDDLE EAST’S

OTHER CIVIL WAR

DEBOUT LES

DAMNÉS DE LA TERRE

NATIONALISM VOLUME 10 | ISSUE 2

Spring 2016 8 THE SOLDIER IN YOU

11 VOUCHER PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA: A NATIONALISTIC AND CAPITALISTIC POLICY 14 UNSETTLED, UNDEFINED, UNCENSORED 20 REBELLIOUS LATIN AMERICA 23 NATIONALISM AND TERRITORY 28 UNE LECTURE FONCIÈRE DE LA CRISE EN CÔTE D’IVOIRE 34 UNDERSTANDING DONALD TRUMP: A LOOK AT AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM

ORIGINAL COVER PICTURE TO BE FOUND AT HTTP://BANKSY.CO.UK/

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PHOTO CREDIT: SALMA TALAAT

Editorial

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF ELIZABETH WALSH

In January of 2016, graffiti artist Banksy painted a mural opposite the French Embassy in London, a photo of which is the feature of this issue’s cover. It is of Cosette, from Les Miserables, with tears running down her face, and a can of CS gas beneath. The QR code, when scanned, brought viewers to a YouTube video of the tear gas and rubber bullets that French police used against refugees in the Calais camp several days before. The work was later removed, but not before Google added it to its digital archives on StreetView.

MANAGING TEAM DAISY ALPHONSO DAVID SEILER PAUL MOINEREAU ELÍN MARGRÉT BÖÐVARSDÓTTIR

PRESIDENT SARAH VALLÉE

There is a competition within many of our countries to define nationalism. It is, as Amartya Sen writes, the “non-chosen virtue, if virtue it is.” But is nationalism a virtue if we define it in terms that exclude others who share our borders and political representation? In a democracy, nationalism is distinct from religion, ethnicity, race, and sometimes language. Yet current politicians and political hopefuls ascertain otherwise. Can the values of a democracy endure if we define our nations’ identities on these terms? The refugee crisis calls this into question. Refugees are, literally and metaphorically, on the borders of nationalism. For some, “national security” is a veil used to justify exclusion on the basis of religious and racial difference. For others, this flies in the face of national values that are supposed to protect tolerance, liberty, and justice. Both arguments pivot on what is best for the nation. Is a nation the state, or the people? Who gets to decide? Where is the line between national security and oppression of the majority? Where is the line between protecting national values and preserving homogeneity and the status quo at the expense of justice? When does nationalism become xenophobia? For a hint, we ought to carefully consider who is doing the nation-defining, and who is not. For another, we ought to look closely at what our leaders say when outsiders seek to adopt our non-chosen virtue. Our issue this spring examines the effects of nationalism, ranging from political and economic policies, to war, personal struggle, and the denial of women’s participation in defining national identity. Does nationalism require territory? Does it depend on the exploitation of resources and workers around the world? What happens when its laws are imposed on a territory with a different culture and history? Our contributors grapple with these and many other questions, often based on their personal experiences. To return to our cover, I pose to you a question from one of our contributors: Does the “baptism of nationalism grant a pardon” for state violence? Let us not forget the histories which have often proved that the tears which the “other” wept were later shown to be our own.

ELIZABETH WALSH April 2016

EDITORS LIKHITA BANERJI JILL TIPTON HENRY O’CONNELL ANITHASREE ATHIYAMAN MARTIN DE BOURMONT PAUL JEFFRIES LUCY LEVINSON JIA LIU GUEST WRITERS SHAWN CARRIÉ JOURNALIST RIVA KASTORYANO RESEARCHER CONTRIBUTORS AMAL ABDULLA MARTIN DE BOURMONT MARTA CIOCI STÉPHANE COLIN JEREMY HA MARÍA NOEL IRABEDRA GUILLAUME LEVRIER SALMA TALAAT MAIJA WALLACE COVER LAYOUT ARTIST ISABEL ARGOTI (UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, USA)

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The Paris Globalist et InFocus rassemblent leurs forces pour vous apporter un seul magazine! Nous tenons à remercier toute l’équipe de PSIA Student Council pour leur aide, et sommes très heureux d’accueillir David Seiler et Paul Moinereau, ainsi que leur éditeurs au sein de notre équipe. Daisy Alphonso reprend le magazine l’année prochaine en tant que directrice de rédaction et présidente. Elizabeth Walsh et Paul Moinereau se partageront le rôle d’éditeur-en-chef. Nous recrutons un vice-président, des éditeurs, un responsable événementiel, un webmaster et responsable réseaux sociaux pour la rentrée. N’hésitez pas à nous envoyer votre candidature à parisglobalist@gmail.com! Sarah Vallée, future-ex-présidente

The Paris Globalist and InFocus are joining forces to bring you one magazine! We would like to thank PSIA Student Council for their help, and are very happy to welcome David Seiler and Paul Moinereau to our editorial team. Next year, Daisy Alphonso will take over as President of the association. Elizabeth Walsh and Paul Moinereau will be Co Editors-in-Chief. We are recruiting a vice president, editors, an event manager, a webmaster and social media officer for September. Apply at parisglobalist@gmail.com! Sarah Vallée, future-ex-president

THE SOLDIER IN YOU MARTIN DE BOURMONT William was about my age when he died for the first time. “I think it was the first time I saw a bombing raid in Vietnam,” he tells me over a glass of tea in a Korean karaoke bar. “We were pinned down by sniper fire from the top of this hill,” he begins, brushing a wisp of steam away with the fingers of his left hand.

at least it seems that way now. Anyway, as I’m watching these two scenes I start to think to myself: ‘What a perfect system!’ You know! Like doesn’t it work so well, that you take this kid playing war in army surplus, not really knowing what he’s doing, and get him to volunteer for a war he doesn’t really even believe in?”

“We couldn’t move. It was like we were trying to sink into the ground. Someone called for air support and eventually the planes came. I’d never seen anything like it. Suddenly there are these black arrows flying over your head, and you look up at them and it’s like they’re dropping eggs. The belly opens up and you see this black egg begin to fall towards the ground. When it hits it’s the loudest noise you’ll ever hear. The ground shakes. You find yourself suspended in the air. It’s terrifying. The ground is reassuring. It’s real, you know, concrete, something you can really hold onto.”

William stops to clear his throat. “That’s about when I woke up or came to or whatever you call it. I just went from this fantastic moment of peace and clarity to being back in my body, stumbling over bushes and branches. After that I wasn’t as afraid of death anymore. It was so peaceful. It was such an amazing experience and I’m really glad I had it. Not glad for the war, just that I was able to experience that moment.”

“Anyway, the explosions stop and we’re just lying there. But at some point we have to start moving. So I lifted my head and started looking around. I don’t think I’ve ever been more terrified in my life. Despite my terror, I get up and start walking up the hill. And that’s when I left my body.”

“Well, I was just afraid of being a coward. I thought it would make me a man and all that bullshit. I was also afraid of being wrong.”

William pauses to take a sip of his tea. I don’t say anything. “I actually left my body,” he continues. “All of a sudden I’m watching myself walk up this hill. And it’s like I’ve got the whole universe at my back and I’m just watching over this figure, this man — me — walk up a hill in Vietnam. I really felt completely at peace. Like nothing could touch me, because I was somewhere else, removed from all this.”

“Yeah, wrong,” he repeated. “One day I ran into a guy I’d been in a fraternity with in college. We’d dropped out around the same time and he ended up in Vietnam. The next time I saw him was at the University of Oregon. He was all dressed up in uniform and looked pretty serious. One night we went for a drink and he started asking me what I thought about the war. So I told him, you know, I thought we had no business being there. And he just looked at me and said: ‘you’d see it differently if you were there.’ That really stuck with me. There was nothing I could say. I didn’t want to be wrong. I wanted to have an answer. I thought I had to do my duty, that I needed to go see for myself. In the end it turned out to be such a waste.”

“As I’m watching myself go up this hill, I begin asking myself how I got there. You know, how did this guy — who was probably more interested in getting to know the North Vietnamese at the top of this hill — end up here, trying to kill these people? When I was growing up, all the kids in my town had military paraphernalia. Their fathers came home from World War II with army belts, helmets, fatigue jackets, all that kind of army surplus stuff. So we used to go play war outside like this, running and pretending to fight the Japanese and the Germans or whoever it was. I’m watching myself from above, and this image comes to me of myself as a kid, running through the woods with all my friends in their army helmets and belts, pretending to shoot at some enemy. It’s like I was watching myself on two screens, or 8

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“Why did you enlist if you didn’t believe in the war?” I ask William.

“Wrong?” I asked.

It occurs to me that this statement, with its emphasis on individual moral choice, departs from the insight afforded to William by his first brush with death. In that moment of serenity, William had come to terms with the existence of a system that propelled him across the globe to murder other young men in the name of interests and convictions not his own. In his epic World War II novel, The Kindly Ones, Jonathan

THE NATIONAL LIBRARY OF SCOTLAND

Littell, speaking through the satanic mind of the former SS officer Max Aue, identifies the war’s forgotten human rights violation: the violation of one’s right not to kill. “No one asks you for your opinion,” he writes: “…. genocide in its modern form is a process inflicted on the masses, by the masses, for the masses. It is also, in the case in question, a process segmented according to the demands of industrial method. Just as, according to Marx, the worker is alienated from the product of his labor, in genocide or total war in its modern form the perpetrator is alienated from the product of his actions. This holds true even for the man who places a gun to the head of another man and pulls the trigger. For the victim was led there by other men, his death was decided on by yet others, and the shooter knows that he is only the last link in a very long chain, and that he doesn’t have to ask himself any more questions than does a member of a firing squad who in civilian life executes a man duly sentenced under the law.” Genocides committed by industrial societies are not the only forms of barbarism alienated from their perpetrators. All societies are built on violence. We erect our temples and monuments on the ashes of civilizations swept away by war, disease, and

corruption; we nurture our greatest endeavors and build our most fantastic technologies with treasure plundered from distant shores. The bargain-priced clothes I wear as I write this are likely the product of Asian sweatshop labor. My phone contains minerals extracted from the heart of Africa with the aid of militias for whom rape and murder are competitive business strategies. In America, the country that is now my home, I have ever-more security by forces granted near-impunity to beat, murder and jail minority and working class populations in the name of a law and order that is surprisingly forgiving to the besuited thieves and warcriminals lecturing at our best universities and dining at our cities’ finest addresses. Meanwhile, the maintenance of the prosperity I cherish depends on the continuous, increasingly rapacious pillaging of the planet’s ecosystems. I, like Officer Aue, did not choose any of this. We are each pushed into new crimes and massacres by history, through the context into which we are born. Yet I am still responsible. Alienation is no excuse. Civilizations are made up of individuals, and as individuals we are all implicated in the horrors carried out in our name. Responsibility is not voided by lack of choice or by an The Paris Globalist | Vol. 10 Issue 2

inability to enact change when the structures that regiment our lives are too complex to topple. William could have chosen not to go to war. But as he discovered in the moment he spent between life and death, he belonged to a system. His great failure, as he conceives it, was to find himself at the forefront of what is most despicable in all civilizations. Staying at home would not have absolved him of responsibility. He would have funded the war with his taxes. He would have contributed to the pollution of the environment, just as we all do, every single day. There is no escape from the violence inherent in human civilization. Our desire for community is often just as much a source of violence as our greed and fear of the unknown. We learn to accept constant violence because to do otherwise would mean to threaten our bonds with society. Even in developed nations governed by the rule of law, to expose or denounce violence often leads to social ostracism, or — in the case of Chelsea Manning, for instance — subjecting oneself to the aggression of the state. Nothing of what we build will survive. We will die and our civilizations will collapse. Our planet will also someday expire. Our violence, just like our moments of kindness and moral clarity, will do nothing to save us. Still, despite the collective horror in which we find ourselves and the certainty of our demise, almost all people harbor untapped reserves of sympathy and compassion. If there is any goodness to be found in this life, it can only be in gratuitous acts of kindness, in moments in which we defy the intrinsic violence of the systems that nurture us. These acts are fleeting and ultimately useless. They may achieve very little in the present and will likely change nothing in the long-term. Nevertheless, they are nothing short of miraculous. Like enemy soldiers sharing cigarettes between trenches, we reveal our capacity for decency when there is nothing to gain and nothing to save. But let’s not fool ourselves. The battle rages on at our backs.

MARTIN DE BOURMONT IS A MASTER’S STUDENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN ACTION AT SCIENCES PO’S PSIA. HE IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN EAST ASIAN PROBLEMATICS AS WELL AS GLOBAL RISKS.

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VOUCHER PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA:

A NATIONALISTIC AND CAPITALISTIC POLICY? MARTA CIOCI

In the aftermath of the collapse of the USSR, a series of reforms were carried out to privatize state-owned assets. The large-scale privatization program, which envisaged the transfer of state assets and shares in the industrial, energy and financial sectors issued to Russian citizens via a voucher scheme, was part of the transition from a planned economy to a market economy. In other Former Soviet Union countries such as the Czech Republic and Lithuania, the marketing and selling of vouchers was outlawed by the government specifically to avoid the concentration of wealth in the hands of the previous communist elite.1 On the contrary, in Russia, the government legally permitted the marketing of shares. The encouragement of privatization among citizens initially achieved widespread consensus and dispersal of wealth, but soon revealed its darker side as a nationalistic means to promote the concentration of ownership and national wealth into the hands of a few wealthy individuals in the medium-run. As it resulted in an increase of the wealth gap, it earned the name katastroika, often described as one of the most “cataclysmic peacetime economic 1Sachs, J. D., Privatization in Russia: Some Lessons from Eastern Europe. Columbia University, 2015

collapses of an industrial country”2 throughout history. Due to lack of time and access to information pertaining to real market value, workers and peasants sold their vouchers to the industrial managerial class at a market price well below the real or nominal market value of the share. These well-informed investors (who would then go on to be called the “new Russians,” alias oligarchs) were eager to exploit such an opportunity. After many Communist years of protectionism and nationalization, the door had finally opened for them to invest in capital and stocks. In such a scenario, businessmen and workers appealed to the same justifications to motivate their preference for voucher privatization, namely, that the selling of vouchers would strengthen the social safety net and protect the population.3 If it is true that vouchers represented state assets, it is also true that they could be retrieved for cash, thus providing short-term needs at a time of a shortage of basic essentials. The Russian economy was on its knees in the early 1990s: 2 Milne, S., Catastroika Has Not Only Been a Disaster for Russia. The Guardian, 2001 3Guriev, S. & Megginson, W., Privatization: What Have We Learnt? World Bank, 2015

VOUCHER 1992, OBVERSE. PUBLIC DOMAIN, AUTHOR: ГОЗНАК (GOZNAK)

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its size was estimated to be half of its US counterpart, and its processes and had no influence on their ownership. Workers performance was lagging in all major fields, from consumer lacked information on their rights, and often had no means by demand to computerization, innovation and social welfare. It which to access judicial remedies to challenge their employers might then seem acceptable to excuse voucher privatization on the legally.6 Moreover, as a legacy of the Communist ideology, trade basis of ignorance of its potential unions were still incorporated under the he consequences. Nonetheless, these FNPR (Federation of Independent Trade arguments fall short in that what Unions), which embedded in its structure encouragement of was at stake (the state’s property the very industrial managerial classes and management) seems too that had long wielded power over the privatization soon valuable to merely cede to these workers. Intuitively, there was no division revealed its darker explanations. Rather, it seems of interests between the ruling class and reasonable to complement these side as a nationalistic the workers. arguments with the explanation means to promote that businessmen were driven by All industries in Russia had to the desire to concentrate corporate liberalize the marketing of their shares. the concentration governance in their hands, and Only a few industrial complexes with workers lacked the knowledge to governmental connections (including of ownership and understand what was at stake. The Gazprom) were exempted from this national wealth into rule so that the movement of shares ignorance of not understanding the meaning of vouchers was a could be restricted and monitored. For the hands of a few legacy of 70 years of communist an initial period following the inception rule, during which ownership was of the voucher privatization program, wealthy individuals nationalized and the most urgent the preference of the managerial thought of many Russians was the and industrial class was indeed for a procurement of bread to satisfy basic needs for the following day. restriction of voucher sales, leaving them in the hands of the workers. In this way, Russian national wealth could be protected The political elite behind the voucher privatization program— from outside buyers or foreign investors. The managerial class Chairman of the State Property Committee Chubais—realized thought of controlling the individual shareholders who owned that the transfer of shares to employees would have been too the shares so as to control the shares themselves. Their initial costly, both politically and economically. Nonetheless, they position changed when Chubais managed to persuade the observed that this move could serve their medium and long-term industrial elite of the desirability of the full transferability of interests; the transfer of property rights to rank-and-file workers shares.7 would not have necessarily meant the transfer of structurally embedded share ownership or corporate management to Chubais certainly knew how to play its cards and insisted workers. Moreover, a similar move would have hardly been on the full transferability of shares from Russian workers to any opposed by the Communist party, and, in enjoying widespread buyer, because he knew that for outside buyers it would have cross-party political support, would have thus been easily and been difficult to enter the Russian share market; as a result of the quickly approved.4 Chubais and his liberal team advanced the strong control that the Russian managerial class was exerting over requirement that it should remain at the discretion of the worker its workers, the managerial class itself would still have been the (deprived of the intermediation of trade unions) to sell or market final recipient of vouchers sold. In this scenario, managers often the vouchers at his or her will. Once again, the emphasis was cheated and persuaded workers to sell them their vouchers, on leaving open all possibilities for the transfer of vouchers from warning that should they act otherwise, the enterprise would be workers to the ruling economic elite.5 taken over by foreign firms or, even worse, go bankrupt. Either due to coercion or workers’ free will, managerial ownership As predicted, the transfer of vouchers and employees’ shares increased from 8% to 20% from the initial distribution of vouchers to the managerial class did not translate into de facto decision- in the first months of the privatization program.8 making control, transfer of governance, or access to the executive One way to subtly induce the selling of the voucher from board, and was not accompanied by the transfer of ownership 6 CEIC, The Progress of Privatization in Russia, 2015 rights. A rift was created between distribution of ownership and 7 Appel, H., Voucher Privatization in Russia: Structural Consequences and Mass actual structural control of ownership. Paradoxically, despite their Response in the Second Period of Reform, Europe-Asia Studies 49(8), pp. 1438-1444, 1997 new position as owners, workers could not access decision-making 8 Appel, H., Voucher Privatization in Russia: Structural Consequences and Mass

“T

.”

4 Guriev, S. & Megginson, W., Privatization: What Have We Learnt? World Bank, 2015 5 Boycho, M., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W., Privatizing Russia. Harvard Edu, 2015

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Response in the Second Period of Reform, Europe-Asia Studies 49(8), p. 1437, 1997

the worker to the manager was to set up a pooling resource office in the factory where workers could pool their shares.9 This way, the worker remained the legal owner of the voucher-share, but could not exercise control over it; technically, the voucher no longer represented a share of the factory, but rather a share of the factoryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s fund; hence, there was no way to redeem it. Similarly, another strategy to induce workers to sell their vouchers to the industrial elite was to suspend wage payments, so that workers, desperate to earn any amount of money, would sell their shares directly to the managers rather than to outside buyers.10 It was hard for workers to resist managers at a time when jobs were scarce, and the factory in which one worked was the only viable option for employment, because it often constituted the only industrial complex in a vast area, or because it provided housing. As a result of these considerations, the prospect of losing their job was daunting. The Russian government also contributed to the reduction in public morale during the years of privatization. In the Czech Republic, privatization was championed by private companies rather than the government. The Czech government, which was worried about the accumulation of wealth in few hands, phrased public communications in such a way so as to minimize the attractiveness of shares. In such a process, the actual value of shares was diminished via rhetorical means, and private acquisitions were dissuaded. On the contrary, in Russia, the government rhetorically inflated the value of shares and adopted a populist approach, thus leading the public to become disillusioned when it was discovered that the proclaimed value of the shares was unrealistically inflated.11 In property rights theory, it is well known that if a property right is protected and restricted in some way, then the value of that property is going to increase; conversely, if the share is fully and tradeable without restriction, then this implies less protection. Regardless of who is to blame for the role that privatization played in fostering wealth concentration, what is interesting to note is that paradoxically, the eventual preference of the managerial class for fully tradeable voucher privatization reveals a nationalistic mood aimed at restricting competition among bidders. Instead of raising privatization revenues by allowing foreign investments into the domestic market, a ban was imposed on competitive ownership at the expense of the public, which resulted in lower privatization prices and decreased efficiency. Especially when dealing with mass privatization programs in post-communist countries, the national wealth within the country is insufficient to assure a high price for the share.

9 Kuzes, I. Y., & Nelson, L. D., An Assessment of the Russian Voucher Privatization Program, 1994 10 Kuzes, I. Y., & Nelson, L. D., An Assessment of the Russian Voucher Privatization Program, 1994 11 Sachs, J. D., Privatization in Russia: Some Lessons from Eastern Europe. Columbia University, 2015

MARTA CIOCI IS ITALIAN AND CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN THE MA EUROPEAN AFFAIRS AT SCIENCES PO, PARIS. SHE GRADUATED FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF WESTMINSTER, LONDON, AND WROTE HER DISSERTATION ON THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS. SHE IS INTERESTED IN EU-RUSSIA RELATIONS WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO UKRAINE, AND IS PASSIONATE ABOUT THE CONCEPTS OF STATE AND NATION, NOTIONS OF MASS OBEDIENCE AND RATIONALITY.

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UNTITLED, UNDEFINED, UNCENSORED AMAL ABDULLA

I write this with the courage of a person who comes from a place where having an opinion is dangerous, where speaking your mind makes you a threat and where standing up for what you believe is seditious. I write this knowing that if it is read, someone somewhere may consider me a national threat. Having said this, while reading this piece, do not expect anything revolutionary. You will realize that the words I’ve written are not intended to have the same mobilizing effect that a certain vegetable merchant had on the masses as he set himself on fire. The only purpose behind my disclaimer is to put things into perspective, for you to understand that in some places a mere thought can have grave consequences. I have only recently become very open about voicing my opinions; it’s been a long but a gradually liberating process.

the “good us” that fit under the definition of a loyal national or was I foreign enough to be the “traitorous them”? These distinctions led me to reconnect with my heritage and trace my lineage in an attempt to reason with the absurdity of the situation. My reasoning eventually led me to diagnose myself with a chronic “out-of-place disorder”: one that was caused by the accent I carried in my Arabic and by the family name I didn’t carry officially but the one by which people knew me. It’s the way my thick black eyebrows are drawn on my face, amongst other facial features, that allowed people to systematically identify where I was from, and eventually led them to approach me in a language other than that of my mother tongue. The year it all started, I had an interview for a scholarship; one that was precisely designed to distinguish between students who belonged to either the Us or the Them. Towards the end, my interviewer asked me if one of the reasons why I made mistakes in Arabic was my Persian background. I remember leaving the room not knowing whether to feel proud that I hold such a strong element of identity, or to feel disgraced for not having perfect enough Arabic to be addressed as an Arab.

Have I ever talked to you about my pivot point theory? I have always believed that life revolves around split-second “ahamoments,” and that in the middle of an extraordinary experience you reach a point that influences the course of your life in unexpected ways. My pivot point was in 2011, and how cliché is it for me to consider the year of the Arab Spring as such? Personally, I experienced a sort of awakening; I allowed a revolution to run in me and fuel every thought I had kept hidden for so long. You may You see, I was born Arab, I grew up being taught that I was a have seen people rise against dictators on the streets, chanting Bahraini girl and I was unable to recognize beyond that. However, catchy slogans as countries crumbled down into chaos. However, I also grew up hearing my elder aunts and uncles speaking in what didn’t appear on your television sets was a profound wound a language that was foreign to my little ears. I grew up hearing that scarred my society and divided it into two. What you didn’t my grandpapa talk about his sisters living in “Fars” in his broken see was me struggling in a battle to reconcile between my family Arabic. I even remember the day we went to pick him up from the and my friends, who all of a sudden belonged to two separate port after school because he had gone on a visit to “Fars” by boat. divisions of society. Your CNN, BBC and “Where is Fars? Have you ever been to realized that no Fars, Baba?,” I asked my father. My parents France24 news anchors didn’t tell you that we no longer spoke of ourselves as would then be put on the spot trying to matter how much citizens of a country but in the language explain why a part of our family was on the will other side of the Persian/Arab Gulf. Voilà, of archenemies, and that we were having contain myself the infamous conversation of “us” versus I came to realize that a body of water also always remain under shares my identity crisis. As I grew, so too “them.” the imposed criteria did my curiosity . “Mama, can you please I felt the need to define my place in teach me the language?” I would ask my of a second class mother on Friday afternoons as I would try the midst of the turmoil of feeling torn between two parts I belonged to, but that to decrypt the language my aunts used to citizen no longer belonged to each other. Was I gossip in around a cup of tea. The answer

“I

.”

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was always negative. “Habebti, it will only affect your Arabic. Do you want to have broken Arabic like your aunts?” she would ask. Little did Mama know that years later, despite not teaching me the language, a stranger over an interview would be able to detect my identity through my linguistic imperfections.

know the answer to this question. So, if you ask me today as to who I am, the most honest answer I can give you is my name because I am unsure of the rest.

You may wonder why speaking about my personal identity struggle is dangerous. Or even why my parents faced the difficulty in explaining who we were while instructing me on who I should be. You see, being of a Persian background links me to the notso-friendly neighbour, Iran. Admitting this background therefore leads my national allegiance to be questioned. Did I mention how when Iran was brought up in front of Grandpapa, as a part of very common political discussions, he would ask us all to stop talking because he was afraid of being sent back to Iran? Why would we be sent there? Are we not Bahraini and Arab as my parents taught me we were? Why would we be sent out of our country to a country that I still haven’t clearly understood our connection to? Why, despite the tremendous effort my parents put into proving that we were nationals of this country, would we be exiled to a foreign land because of a mere thought? Mama always explained it as exaggerated fear and for a long time I accepted this justification. However, as I grew older I realized that if you felt secure in your national identity, then the idea of exile wouldn’t haunt you, would it? Understanding this led me to question the idea of a homogenous society that is being imposed through power. You know, the homogenous national identity that included the citizens who belonged to the “Us” but excluded the “them,” which is in some ways “foreign.” I have found that the basis of creating such an identity of a unique culture, history and language is a method to keep societies under control. It is this very construction of national identities in a way that isolates aliens, the “them,” who don’t carry the exact same values, that led my parents to emphasise their belongingness within the accepted sphere. We were told to filter our ethnic and cultural identity in order to not be in conflict with the “interests and the security of the nation.” But can we all not be a part of a nation regardless of the distinctions that make us who we are? How much of me should I eliminate in order to fit within the parameters of a national? Very recently, I realized that no matter how much I contain myself, I will always remain under the imposed criteria of a second-class citizen. Two years ago, I interned at the most prestigious public institution in my country, where I was frankly told that though they would love to employ me, there was only a certain level that I’d be able to attain in my career because, amongst other reasons, I wasn’t from an Arab family. I never blamed my parents for raising me in a certain way; they had my future and best interests in mind. “Do you prefer living in Iran where our relatives live in poor conditions as a forgotten [religious] minority?,” they would argue today as my curious childhood questions develop into adult frustration. I wonder sometimes, if they had known that their efforts to make us fit in with the “Us” would ultimately not be enough, would they have taught me the language of my grandparents? I’ll probably never

AMAL ABDULLA IS IN HER FIRST YEAR AT PSIA STUDYING IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN ACTION PROGRAM WITH A CONCENTRATION IN MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES. SHE HAS A BACKGROUND IN HISTORY. CURRENTLY LEARNING HER SIXTH LANGUAGE, SHE IS DETERMINED TO LEARN FARSI IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO VISIT AND COMMUNICATE WITH HER FAMILY IN IRAN.

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WHOSE NATIONALISM? THE POLITICS OF HONG KONG’S IDENTITY JEREMY HA Do people from Hong Kong feel proud to be Chinese? Hong Kong’s Lunar New Year celebrations in February 2016 were marred by violence following the Hong Kong government’s prohibition of unlicensed food vendors from selling fish balls. More than 60 people were arrested and many were injured. The incident escalated quickly on social media, along with the hashtag #fishballrevolution. The incident was related to the mistrust of the Hong Kong police forces, as well as to the recent disappearance of booksellers in the city. Tensions between the people of mainland China and Hong Kong have worsened, as many believe that China is encroaching upon the city’s freedom and judicial independence. This begets the question: is Hong Kong just another Chinese 16

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territory? Can there be different nationalistic sentiments in the same country? Can a non-sovereign nation feel nationalistic? The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region After the transfer of sovereignty in 1997, China has retaken control of Hong Kong, a former British colony, under the visionary internationally-recognised constitutional principle “one country, two systems,” as outlined by the Sino-British Joint Declaration. Hong Kong and Macau (a former Portuguese colony), two Special Administrative Regions of China, were able to retain their own capitalist economic and political system, whilst the rest of

THE FAMOUS SKYLINE OF HONG KONG. PHOTO CREDIT: PIXABAY/CC/SKEEZE

mainland China uses the Communist system. The three regions continue to have their own legal, political and socioeconomic affairs. They may also maintain external relations with foreign countries and are externally represented; they continue to participate in International Competitions and events under the name “Macau, China” and “Hong Kong, China.” Hong Kong is allowed to have its own Constitutional identity under the material constitution, the Basic Law, which outlines a horizontal separation of power, judicial autonomy and the protection of basic human rights. This high degree of autonomy allows Hong Kong to thrive as the third largest international financial centre in the world (after New York and London). Moreover, the people of Hong Kong enjoy a very high standard of living with a very high GDP per capita, life expectancy and human development index. Do the Hongkongers feel Chinese? Strolling down the streets of Hollywood Road in Hong Kong, you might see a popular T-shirt design with the words, “Hong Kong since 1997”, indicating that after 1997, Hong Kong was considered an independent territorial entity. Despite being autonomous under

Chinese rule, Hongkongers have long resisted being known as “Chinese.” Many recent polls and surveys have indicated that most Hongkongers do not identify as Chinese. When travelling abroad, Hongkongers generally will say that they are from “Hong Kong” but not “China, Hong Kong” or “Hong Kong, China.” When interacting with people from mainland China, most Hongkongers will avoid a possible quarrel by conversing in Mandarin Chinese instead of Cantonese. Administratively, when Hongkongers visit China, at the Shenzhen border control, they will comfortably line up in the “Hong Kong and Macau residents” channel, while mainland Chinese visitors will pass through “mainland residents.” The sentiment of patriotism or nationalism towards China is not popular among Hongkongers. Tensions between mainland China and Hong Kong The policies advocated by Hong Kong and the central government encourage visits to Hong Kong by mainland residents and economic cooperation between the two regions. Increasingly, these policies have given rise to Hongkongese hostility towards the mainlanders. The Hongkongers begrudge what they perceive as a The Paris Globalist | Vol. 10 Issue 2

trend towards assimilation. At the same time, mainland Chinese have also shown resentment towards Hong Kong’s different political system, socio-economic values and language. Hong Kong has retained many traditional Chinese cultural values, many of which were destroyed during the Cultural Revolution when Chairman Mao tried to revolutionise China and destroy the “four olds” (old customs, culture, habits and ideas). For example, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and many other southeast Asian countries still use traditional Chinese characters and celebrate the Hungry Ghost festival. Furthermore, they have very different ways of celebrating the same festival. For example, during Lunar New Year, the mainland Chinese traditionally eat freshly made dumplings and will usually watch nationally broadcasted television programmes that celebrate the New Year; these shows unite and bring the Chinese people together. However, this is not very common in Hong Kong. The different culture and rituals detach Hong Kong from the mainland and discourage Chinese nationalism in Hong Kong. Often, nationalism in Hong Kong is thus generated either by a sense of superiority or a sense of intense hatred towards the mainland Chinese. In 2012, a Beijing University professor publicly referred to Hongkongers as dogs. The condemnation sparked a resurgence of nationalism in Hong Kong. The professor’s strong language prompted protests in Hong Kong and the Hongkongers vigorously began to demonstrate their support of their own cultural and civic identity. But this is only the tip of the iceberg. Multiple recent events have marked the deterioration of the relationship between Hong Kong and mainland China. Recently, Hong Kong residents have vehemently denounced mainland visitors for urinating or defecating in public. (Similar events happened in the MRT of Singapore as well.) On the other hand, to escape the single child policy, many pregnant mainland women seek to give birth in Hong Kong, specifically to benefit from the right of abode. This has sparked a heated public debate, as spaces in Hong Kong’s public hospitals are insufficient to cater to the surge in demand. Hong Kong’s media has called the mainlanders “locusts,” referring to how they take Hong Kong’s resources away from locals.

Hong Kong government’s response to the protesters was seen as a betrayal, as the police attempted to disperse them with teargas and pepper spray. During the protest, on the streets of Causeway Bay, there were graffiti designs saying, “build a Hong Kong state” and “Hong Kong must be independent.” Signs of nationalism began to spark and prevail. When Beijing rejected the proposals, many Hongkongers, especially young students, began to distinguish themselves from mainland China by producing big posters with messages such as “Hong Kong is not part of China.” The central government’s rejection of a proposed extended electoral college has in effect sparked the first sentiments of genuine Hong Kong nationalism. Recently, during the World Cup game between Hong Kong and China, the Chinese national anthem was played, while it was Hong Kong that won the game. Fans from Hong Kong booed at the anthem immediately and waved slogans such as “support your own people,” “We are Hong Kong” and “Hong Kong is not China.” Advocates for political independence in Hong Kong have since then increased sharply with the rise of different political parties and groups. An example is the Hong Kong Independence Party, founded in 2015, which strives for the independence of Hong Kong and for allowing Hong Kong to join the Commonwealth of Nations. Many even hoped to create a democratic “Republic of Hong Kong.” Patriotic feelings were also generated during another recent event, concerning the use of Chinese characters, which made the Chinese language become a very political issue. The discovery of a document for public consultation regarding Chinese teachings at schools in Hong Kong has prompted indignation on social media and induced anger amongst educators as well, because it stated that pupils should be taught simplified Chinese characters to acquire a wider reading range. In trying to defend its local history and culture from the influence of Mainland China, the society of Hong Kong is now very sensitive to issues of “mainlandisation.” For instance, during the recent global environmental event Earth Hour, all of Hong Kong’s skyscrapers dimmed their lights except a notable exception: the building of China’s People’s Liberation Army. The event was mocked by the mass media of Hong Kong and people were showing disdain f hina is towards the Communist Party and its perceived Nationalism in action inability to adapt to internationally recognised the parent standards of human and environmental Since Hong Kong has never rights. In Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, only been a sovereign entity, historically, ong ong is traditional Chinese characters are taught. All nationalism is not particularly signage is in traditional Chinese and pupils prominent in the city. During colonial its child raised learn traditional Chinese to read or write, and rule, Hongkongers generally did not it is generally very difficult to switch between express nationalistic sentiments the two — traditional and simplified. The by a white towards Britain or China; in fact, outburst on social media criticising the Hong they generally do not feel patriotic Kong education bureau’s suggestion showcases family towards any country. However, Hongkongers’ strong desire to protect their own after the handover, there have been traditions, which is also an act of a newfound multiple attempts that showcase nationalism. Hongkongese nationalism, namely, Hong Kong’s outcry for democracy during the 2014 Umbrella Revolution. In September As a Hongkonger, I would say that my identity is conflicted. 2014, thousands of pro-democracy protesters gathered in the While my grandparents would often say, “we are Chinese,” I find the city centre waiting for their voices to be heard and pleading with word “Chinese” very vague because it has a different connotation Beijing to fulfill its promise of universal suffrage in 2017. But the in mainland China. Even during celebrations, we will eat “Chinese

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UMBRELLA REVOLUTION, THE 2TH TEAR GAS FIRED, 28 SEPTEMBER 2014. PHOTO CREDIT: FLICKR/CC/PASU AU YEUNG

food,” but mainlanders do not eat the same food as us. Also, many of my Canadian and American friends tend to confuse Cantonese with Mandarin. This is because during the handover, many Hongkongers immigrated to North America. Particularly in places such as California and Vancouver, Cantonese is the prominent language within the Asian community. Hongkongese immigrants have set up “Chinese restaurants” that serve Cantonese cuisine, and they converse in Cantonese. Foreigners who do not speak the language will assume that they are speaking Mandarin. The notion of being Chinese is therefore more complicated than it seems. Furthermore, studying in a different education system, I have realised that my exposure and values are very different from that of the mainland Chinese. In general, many Hongkongers are still emotionally attached to the practices and traditions left behind by the UK. For example, there is still a large number of Hong Kong parents who will abandon the competitive and new education system in Hong Kong (The Hong Kong Diploma of Secondary Education was created 4 years ago to replace the A-level system) and choose to send their children to study in Britain. Someone once told me an analogy to describe the relationship between China and Hong Kong: if China is the parent, Hong Kong is its child, raised by a white family. So, can a child be the same after being brought up in another household? The answer to the question remains to seen. However, above all, I personally do hope that one day our governments will allow our voices to be heard and let the people freely decide their own leadership.

that stands in stark contrast to mainland China. Whilst much of the population wants to preserve Hong Kong’s distinct identity and enhance its autonomy from the mainland, many have said that nationalism has lighted the fuse and that the differences between Hong Kong and mainland China are snowballing—a drastic showdown is on the horizon. Ultimately, although Hong Kong’s nascent nationalism remains on the fringe and is merely partially recognised by the international community, Hong Kong’s distinct history and culture deserves to be respected.

JEREMY HA WAS BORN AND RAISED IN HONG KONG. HE IS CURRENTLY STUDIES AT SCIENCES PO PARIS CAMPUS DU HAVRE, MAJORING IN SOCIO-POLITICAL SCIENCES AND LAW. HE IS AN AVID READER, A CLASSICAL MUSIC FAN, A PASSIONATE FOODIE AND A KEEN TRAVELLER.

All in all, Britain has arguably preserved the city’s unique heritage, creating a colonial, political, and socio-economic system

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VENEZUELAN ELECTIONS 2013. IN CARACAS POPULATION SHOWS SUPPORT TO NICOLAS MADURO, SUCCESSOR TO HUGO CHAVEZ. PHOTO CREDIT: FLICKR/CC/JOKA MADRUGA /TERRALIVREPRESS.COM

RE BE L L I O U S LATIN AMERICA MARÍA NOEL IRABEDRA

Latin America is a continent full of surprises; so much so that its dynamism and rareness sometimes challenges the traditional notions that we use to define political, social and cultural circumstances. This continent has witnessed a significant number of political spins and turns, from guerrilla warfare and revolutions to severe military dictatorships, and it has also been the birthplace of curious expressions of political power. In past decades, we have seen how Venezuela has been governed by a hybrid regime in the hands of the late President Hugo Chavez, and afterwards Nicolás Maduro; we have seen Néstor and Cristina Kirchner guide Argentina based on questionable manners for more than ten years; and Brazil has been driven by Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva, and his party colleague Dilma Rousseff, whose current hold on power is being seriously questioned. And these are just three examples of an era that seems to be approaching its end in Latin America; an era defined by the rebirth of populism and leftist ideological dominance. This new epoch that seems to be appearing may be a reversion to the region’s origins, or maybe it will open new doors. God alone knows! A new leftist, and maybe “neo-populist” wave spread across Latin America after a predominant center-right flood that took part in the second half of the twentieth century. This new wave was the result of several circumstances among which we can identify the growing presence of a predominant middle class with new demands, the people’s need to break from traditional regimes that no longer fulfilled their expectations, and the need to look for alternative ways of managing the region’s countries in the aftermath of a bumpy ride that encompassed social movements, rampant inequality, transitional periods of social agitation, guerrilla warfare and military dictatorships, sometimes with significant foreign interference. This political shift seemed to work relatively well for a while -until the vices and flaws of the regimes started to emerge. Most of these countries had suffered severe military coups, and had been damaged to such a degree that they placed great hopes in these new regimes that promised more than what they could ultimately deliver to their people.

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This doesn’t mean that they didn’t make any real effort to improve their countries — which they did by creating great social welfare programs, for example — or that their policies have not been successful (for example, in terms of fighting inequality), but that they used demagogy as one of their major political weapons, corroding the path towards democratization.

Silva won the presidential election after a term marked by unemployment and enormous debt. He established a political campaign focused on the eradication of poverty and the fight against inequality, which he conducted relatively well, but it was not enough. In 2010, after Lula’s second term, Dilma Rousseff was chosen to be his successor and won reelection in 2014. The biggest problems they had to face were the economic crisis related to crude oil prices and the many alleOne of the gations of corruption that emerged alongside their mandates. While Lula was previously biggest treasures detained and facing charges that could lead of democracy is to his imprisonment, he has now been the possibility to appointed as a minister in the government of Dilma Rousseff. Dilma is herself now facing change leaders an impeachment process due to severe corfrequently, which ruption accusations. endows democracy

In Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, under the flag of Simón Bolívar, won the democratic elections for the first time in 1998 and remained in power until his death in 2013. Anybody would be able to notice the peculiarity of this situation. One of the biggest treasures of democracy is the possibility to change leaders frequently, which endows democracy with good health. Yet it is not necessary for a with good health. Yet democracy to exist in its theoretical defiKeeping with tradition, Latin America nition, which can thus lead regimes to be is changing again. Nicolás Maduro is stumit is not necessary considered “democratic” even without bling, embracing a provocative and defiant for a democracy to a change in leadership. In the case of attitude towards the rest of the Venezuelan exist in its theoretical Venezuela, we can see how the extended institutions, especially the legislative branch mandate of Hugo Chavez slowly transwhere the opposition recently achieved a definition, which can formed a regime, which might have majority; Dilma Rousseff’s mandate is in serithus lead regimes seemed harmless at the beginning, into ous danger of ending sooner than expected to be considered a truly questionable one, through the as a consequence of her deviant behavior; “democratic” even unhurried metamorphosis of the regime Cristina Fernández de Kirchner recently lost from being an alternative to liberalism the election to Mauricio Macri, a centre-right without a change in and a potential positive change, to an politician. In other countries, changes are installed hybrid regime that restricted moving along more smoothly, as in Chile, leadership. civil rights, failed to guarantee free and Uruguay and Bolivia, where Evo Morales lost open elections and could not provide its people with the most basic a referendum in which he intended to extend his mandate one resources. All this illuminated the great nepotism and poor admin- more time. Things are changing again. Is the left coming to an end istration that Chavism brought to Venezuela in recent decades. in Latin America? We will have to wait, but one more time, Latin Americans are asking for a change. Argentina transitioned through a different path. In 2003, after a huge economic crisis and the constant failure to establish long-standing governance, a new political orientation inspired by Peronist Populism made its appearance with Néstor Kirchner. With him came a series of policies oriented to the redistribution of wealth, a strong nationalist rhetoric and other measures that made his popularity surge. In 2007, Néstor Kirchner’s wife, Cristina Fernández, won the presidential election, mimicking the evolution of Evita and Juan Domingo Perón, the figureheads of late Peronism, but straightaway Kirchnerism gently started its downfall. As with MARÍA NOEL IRABEDRA WAS BORN AND most good things come to a sudden end, and, in the case of KirchRAISED IN MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY, WHERE SHE nerism, the policies that were adopted ultimately inflicted a general CURRENTLY STUDIES INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. economic downfall that was precipitated by a healthy combination SHE IS ON EXCHANGE AT SCIENCES PO, PURSUof manipulating economic indices, encouraging clientelism and ING HER MASTER’S DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL graft, adopting a narrow and isolationist perspective on internaSECURITY. HER INTERESTS VARY FROM PHILOSOtional relations, and harassing the opposition and the media. PHY TO HISTORY, MUSIC AND PHOTOGRAPHY.

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Brazil is one of the largest countries in the world as well as one of the anticipated major economies of the near future (BRICs), but it has also proven difficult to manage. In 2002, Luiz Inacio Lula Da 22

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NATIONALISM AND TERRITORY RIVA KASTORYANO SCIENCES PO – CERI - CNRS

In spite of their variety, theories of nationalism are based on membership in a historical cultural community institutionalized by the state on a given territory. Views differ as to how this membership is expressed and how it relates to the creation of nation-states in 19th-century Europe. Its conceptualization, however, remains vague and is applied to a variety of phenomenona. Some authors, such as A.D. Smith, emphasize a “primordialist” approach when they highlight the ethnic origins of nationalism.1 W. Connor, in his concept of “ethnonationalism,” also sees an ethnic basis in the definition of a nation, but he is referring to minority nationalisms, particularly regional ones, expressed in reaction to an attempt to achieve a culturally homogenous blend in various nation-states.2 Other theories of nationalism pertain to the political agenda for self-determination of a people sharing the same myths of origin, the same language and the same ideology. From this standpoint, the state and its territory are the only sources of legitimacy.3 E. Kedourie, for instance, does not reject the idea of a primordial attachment that he expresses in terms of “need,” but he strives to define the legitimate criteria by which a people can create a state.4 According to Gellner, the phenomenon is part of the modernization process, with the passage from an agrarian society to an urban society and the emergence of an elite mobilizes to create a nation. On the whole, the institutionalization of nationalism is the result of social movements of resistance that seek autonomy, selfdetermination, freedom or decolonization, or even territorial expansion, movements that all boil down to a struggle for territory.5 Such definitions of nationalism consider all nations as being 1 A.D. Smith, Ethnic Origins of Nations, London, Blackwell, 1986. 2 Ethnonationalism. The Quest for Understanding, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994, pp.67-89. 3 See in particular John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1982. 4 Nationalism, 4th ed., New York, Oxford University Press, 1993. 5 Thomas W. Pogge,”The Bounds of Nationalism,” in J. Couture, K. Nielsen, M. Seymous (eds), Rethinking Nationalism, Calgary, University of Calgary Press, 1999.

linked to a state established on a territory. The emergence of communities as a result of the politicization of identities within nation-states and the multiple loyalties of their members, a source of dissociation between state and nation, has led to different interpretations of nationalism.6 A “portable” nationality, to use B. Anderson’s expression,7 as reference to the mobility of individuals and to their action, increasingly de-territorialized. The resulting transnationality is behind a new imagined community that goes against the unified community brought together around the same territorialized political project. This new community is imagined on the basis of a religion or an ethnicity that encompasses linguistic and national differences and breaks away from the territorialized nationalist project to assert itself beyond national borders, without geographical limits, as a deterritorialized nation in search of an inclusive (and exclusive) center, around an identity or an experience constructed out of immigration, dispersion and a minority situation that aims to achieve legitimacy and recognition not only from states, but also from supranational or international institutions. This quest generates “a permanent tension been the idea of the state as a source of absolute power and the reality of the state as something limited both from beyond.”8 These tensions crystallize around the issue of minority nationalisms, be they national, territorial, ethnic or religious. A form of nationalism arises when they mobilize beyond national borders, and this phenomenon reinforces the interdependency between internal political developments and the involvement of transnational actors in the international political system. The question of territory and territoriality The question of territory has always been at the heart of nationalist movements. Through territorialization a community 6 R.Ware, “Nations and Social Complexity,” ibid., p.133. 7 B.Anderson, “Mapping the Nation,” in Gopal Balakrishnan (ed.), Mapping the Nation, London, Verso, 1998. 8 See John Breuilly, op.cit. p.52

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becomes a geopolitical reality, an independent nation whose territorial borders coincide with political and cultural boundaries.9 Territory is even what makes a nation; its right to self-determination, a combination of cultural and territorial autonomy, is what is at stake in conflicts, even wars, between states as well as between states and nations that have risen up against those who have the monopoly of legitimate violence on their territory. How can a nation, then, be conceived of without territory? How can nationalism as a historic concept be delinked from its territorial attribute? The example is often given of the Roma, who define themselves as a group that has developed its entire national conscience precisely on the lack of territory and today claims a right to non-territorial self-determination and recognition of it as such in the international system.10 Dispersed throughout the entire European continent and beyond, never having had any territorial reference or country recognized as their country of origin, the Roma are increasingly being listened to in international bodies. They are represented at the World Bank, the United Nations and the European Union.11 They claim to be a stateless nation which therefore has no territory. Their demands echo those of immigrants or political refugees, making reference to human rights, the fight against racism and discrimination, and demands for integration, particularly through education in their host country. At no time do they raise the issue of territoriality. The question of non-territoriality arose in the early 20th century in the Austro-Hungarian Empire when Karl Renner and Otto Bauer advocated social democracy and sought an alternative to minority and diaspora nationalism. Karl Renner suggested personal autonomy in reaction to projects to territorialize the nation. For Otto Bauer, national autonomy based on the principle of territoriality was unquestionably the way to circumscribe national spheres of power and quash national power struggles. The nation, a “community of faith,” was to seek unity in the proletariat which would surpass ethnic and religious differences specific to the empire, but nevertheless aspired to cultural autonomy – starting in particular with language as a tool for nonterritorial communication.12

B. Anderson noticed that the development of capitalism generated a new type of nationalism that he terms “long-distance nationalism.”13 The development of emigration, the evolution of means of communication, the new industrial civilization and the ensuing social and geographical mobility has raised consciousnesses and led to an identity-based withdrawal fueling nationalist claims to the effect that repressed ethnic identities should take the form of ethnicity-based nation-states.14 In their own definition of a similar concept, N. Glick-Schiller and G. Eugen Fouron suggest that long distance nationalism is reconfiguring the way many people understand the relationship between populations and the states that claim to represent them. According to these authors, the political agenda associated with this type of nationalism relates to “the vision of the nation as extending beyond the territorial boundaries of the state frequently springs from the life experiences of migrants of different classes, whose lives stretch across borders to connect homeland and new land.”15 This is reminiscent of the projects of reconstruction of nation-states elaborated in exile that B. Anderson also mentions.

Today non-territoriality is an extension of the debates surrounding multiculturalism. Cultural, ethnic and religious communities recognized as such by states that increasingly rely on transnational solidarities have sparked new upsurges of nationalism. This translates as the nationalization of community sentiment (whatever its content may be) or the communitarization of networks of transnational solidarity accompanied by new forms

The “distance” to which this type of nationalism refers is thus none other than distance with respect to territory — the reference territory, that of the country of origin or the one that must be conquered or reconquered to build a state, the “homeland.” In the early 20th-century, the same phenomenon gave rise to the concept of “diaspora nationalism” that Gellner qualifies as “ historical fact” and considers a subspecies of nationalism. According to him, this concerns a group in a minority situation due to its religion or its language and that is consequently excluded from the state’s version of nationalism: the group of urban, educated “foreigners” who have no political power, but who have economic clout that they use, moreover, to serve nationalist purposes. Gellner sees diaspora nationalism as the result of a social transformation, a cultural renaissance and a desire of this minority to acquire a territory.16 Nationalist movements founded and developed in

9 See Y. Lacoste, “Les territoires de la nation,” Hérodote, 62-63, 3rd quarter 1991, pp.1-21. 10 C. Fayes, “Towards a new paradigm of the nation. The case of the Roma,” Journal of Public and International Affairs, 1997. 11 The European Union supports the Roma populations in central and eastern Europe where they make up 5% of the population, by setting up mechanisms and programs to improve their welfare. 12 O. Bauer, La question des nationalités et la social-démocratie, T. 2, Montréal, Guérin Littérature; Paris, Arcantère, 1987, p.338.

13 B.Anderson, “Long-distance Nationalism,” pp. 58-74 in Spectres of Comparisons. Nationalism in Southeastern Asia and the World, London, Verso, 1998. 14 In reference to B.Anderson’s article, “Long-distance Nationalism,” pp. 58-74 in Spectres of Comparisons. Nationalism in Southeastern Asia and the World, London, Verso, 1998. 15 N. Glick-Schiller, G. Eugen Fouron, George Woke Up Laughing. Long-distance Nationalism and the Search for Home, Durham NC, Duke University Press, 2001 (especially Chapter 2). 16 E. Gellner, op.cit., pp.88-110.

Transnational nationalism

of subjectivity. The territorial boundaries of these communities are not disputed —on the contrary their non-territorial boundaries follow formal and/or informal network connections that transcend the territorial limits of states and nations, thus creating a new form of territorialization — invisible and unbounded — and consequently a form of political community within which individual actions become the basis for a form of non-territorial nationalism that seeks to strengthen itself through speech, symbols, images and objects. These communities are guided by a deterritorialized “imagined geography” that gives rise to a form of transnational nationalism, or a type of nationalism without territory that should be conceived as a new historical stage in nationalism.

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exile, as is the case of diaspora nationalisms, are projects that are territory-based with regards to self-determination or the redefinition of the nationalist foundation for the building of the state. For transnational nationalism, self-determination does not imply cultural autonomy on a territorial basis, but recognition within the framework of state structures, an “institutional assimilation” serving as the basis of equality for the differences that arise in the public space of Western democracies. From that standpoint, demands for recognition take on a racial or ethnic, even a religious, character, depending on the interactions with the community’s states of residence and are based on forces outside the state territory. Thus transnationalism challenges multiculturalism. But in what way is this entity a “transnational nation”? Is a rhetoric that seeks to create an entity enough to generate transnational nationalism? Obviously this entity is not built upon common “ancestors,” nor on a quest for national selfdetermination. It is also difficult to talk about collective organized action with a view to building a nation-state, thus of nationalism.17 Membership is determined neither by blood nor by soil; it is not based on the civic principles that unite individuals claiming membership in this nation on the same territory. What’s more, the references are first of all the product of the nation-states of origin, and linguistic, national and ethnic attachments take precedence over this solely religious identification, even if the latter is not excluded from the first three. Likewise, allegiances seemed to be fleeting, temporary and opportunistic.

that are expressed beyond state borders. Such transformations replace territory with space. The transnational nation fits within the global space which does not reflect but produces an identity and generates a mode of participation beyond borders, as can be seen in the involvement of actors in strengthening transnational solidarities. Accusing states of their deficiencies in human rights or citizenship rights as the basis of democratic equality, the actors seek to channel the loyalty of individuals in a territorialized political community toward a non-territorialized political community, thus redefining theM. terms BY COLETTE TALBOT of membership and allegiance to a global nation maintained by the rhetoric of unity diffused thanks to modern technology which produces a single idiom, that of images, even a single language, English, as the language of participation on websites and social media.

So what makes this entity a nation and its expression a nationalism? According to Gellner, nationalism is the product of major transformations. He refers in particular to the Emancipation that dissolved the old isolated communities and united them around a political community. Today the transformation is taking place not through “grouping,” but on the contrary by the dissociation of communities from the political community, by the delinking of citizenship (territorialized rights) and nationalities 17 See M. Hechter, Containing Nationalism, New York, Oxford University Press, pp.18-19.

RIVA KASTORYANO IS A SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW AT CNRS (CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE) AND HAS BEEN TEACHING AT SCIENCES PO SINCE 1988. HER RESEARCH IN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY FOCUSES ON EUROPE, NATIONALISM, IDENTITIES AND COMMUNITIES.

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REFUGEES IN MYTILINI, LESVOS, GREECE PHOTO CREDIT : SHAWN CARRIÉ

CONSTRUCTION NATIONALE ET TENTATIONS ETHNO-NATIONALISTES, UNE LECTURE FONCIÈRE DE LA CRISE EN CÔTE D’IVOIRE STÉPHANE COLIN

Depuis la fin du régime d’Houphouët-Boigny en 1993, la République de Côte d’Ivoire (RCI) est entrée dans une période instable. Alternant coups d’Etat et tentatives de coup d’Etat, tensions et guerre civile, sur fond de discours identitaires, nationalistes ou « ethniques », le pays a finalement vu, en 2011, la victoire des « gens du Nord » sur « ceux du Sud » — sans pour autant que la situation sécuritaire ne soit pleinement rétablie. Cette crise politico-militaire, qui a frappé la RCI de 2002 à 2011, ne peut se comprendre qu’à partir de l’étude de l’organisation de la vie économique ivoirienne, construite autour de la dichotomie autochtone - « étranger ». Autochtonie et allochtonie dans la construction nationale L’économie et l’Etat ivoiriens ont été fondés sur des pactes sociaux et politiques qui doivent être explicités pour comprendre la crise des années 2000. Dans la longue histoire de co-construction d’une économie fondamentalement agricole et de l’Etat, la clé majeure tient dans une relation particulière entre autochtonie et allochtonie. L’expansion remarquable de l’économie de plantation caféière et cacaoyère, héritée de la période coloniale, a reposé sur un front de colonisation interne de la zone forestière, correspondant au sud du pays, et sur le binôme autochtone - « étranger » — l’étranger désignant, dans le français local, tant le migrant originaire de Côte d’Ivoire, qualifié d’allochtone, que le migrant non national, qualifié d’allogène, le plus souvent voltaïque (puis burkinabé) ou malien.

The Paris Globalist | Vol. 10 Issue 2

Selon le compromis « houphouétien » fondamental, les migrants étaient autorisés à s’installer comme planteurs sur les terres (pour l’essentiel, des réserves forestières), sur lesquelles les autochtones exerçaient un contrôle coutumier ; en retour, ceux-ci profitaient des redistributions de la manne financière assurée par les exportations de cacao et de café, via la Caisse de stabilisation alimentée par les taxes, à travers la réalisation d’infrastructures, et surtout du développement de la scolarité, qui assurerait à leurs enfants un avenir prometteur. De fait, certains groupes autochtones (les Bété en particulier) ont développé une stratégie marquée d’ascension sociale à travers la scolarisation. Afin de faciliter les transferts fonciers vers les migrants, Félix Houphouët-Boigny lance au début des années 60 son fameux mot d’ordre (sans valeur légale) « la terre est à celui qui la cultive », qui « orchestra sans ambiguïté le principe de l’allochtonie triomphante ».1 Il gagnait ainsi l’électorat étranger, selon le principe implicite « venez et votez (bien) », ces derniers disposant alors du droit de vote. Au niveau local, un autre type de compromis intervint entre autochtones et migrants, qui reposait sur un accès à la terre accordé après un certain temps passé dans la communauté — parfois avec un statut de manœuvre, ou en échange d’une compensation financière, et d’un « devoir de reconnaissance » du migrant envers le cédant et la communauté autochtone. Ce devoir de reconnaissance prenait la forme de civilités dans la vie quotidienne, et d’une aide dans les épreuves 1 Dozon J.-P., 1997. L’étranger et l’allochtone en Côte-d’Ivoire. In B. Contamin, H. Memel-Fotê (ed.) Le modèle ivoirien en questions : crises, ajustements, recompositions, Paris : Karthala, Orstom, pp. 779-798.

que pouvaient rencontrer le cédant ou ses parents. Cette intégration des « étrangers » dans les sociétés locales, à travers une relation de patronage, a été qualifiée de « tutorat ». Le transfert foncier portait sur un droit d’usage et non sur un droit de propriété complet ; il correspondait donc à un droit d’exploiter la terre pour une durée indéterminée. Avec le développement de cultures marchandes et pérennes comme le caféier et le cacaoyer, avec une demande accrue de la part de migrants, toujours plus nombreux, et par conséquent, une raréfaction de la ressource foncière, les cadeaux symboliques initiaux eurent tendance à se multiplier et le « devoir de reconnaissance » des « étrangers » à se monétariser. Les transferts ressemblèrent de plus en plus à des ventes, mais ces « ventes » informelles restaient fortement enchâssées socialement, le paiement d’une somme d’argent ne faisant pas disparaître (du moins dans l’esprit des cédants) le devoir de reconnaissance des « étrangers » acquéreurs. Ces transferts fonciers se sont transformés en facteurs de tensions, les autochtones pouvant considérer que le devoir de reconnaissance n’était pas suffisamment exprimé, et l’incomplétude des contrats engendrant des perceptions contradictoires. Ainsi les acquéreurs (ou leurs héritiers) considéraient qu’ils avaient acheté la terre, tandis que les cédants (ou leurs héritiers) considéraient que la cession portait sur le seul droit d’exploitation, pour la durée de vie de la plantation de caféier ou de cacaoyer (deux à trois décennies). Du fait de la dichotomie acquéreurs-« étrangers » / cédants-autochtones, les tensions foncières portaient en germe des conflits inter-ethniques. Crise du compromis « houphouétien » et Ivoirité

rural est, lui, fortement questionné par la diminution des terres disponibles en zone forestière et par la disparition de perspective d’emploi urbain pour les jeunes autochtones scolarisés (pression démographique, manque de politiques publiques). S’amorce le « retour au village » de ces jeunes déscolarisés et chômeurs, frustrés par l’échec de leur projet de vie, mais aussi par le constat que leurs aînés ont largement « bradé » les terres familiales aux « étrangers ». Ces nouvelles générations remettent alors en cause les transferts fonciers passés, souhaitant pour la plupart bénéficier de la rente foncière en récupérant des parcelles en vue de les rétrocéder à des conditions plus avantageuses, plutôt que de les exploiter directement. Les contestations des droits des étrangers (burkinabés en particulier) sont d’autant plus virulentes que ces derniers résistent mieux à la crise qui frappe le monde rural : leur grande capacité à mobiliser le travail familial réduit leurs besoins financiers, ils peuvent également pleinement jouer du capital social apporté par une relation privilégiée avec certains de leurs compatriotes ayant rencontré le succès (sources de crédits informels), et deviennent fréquemment les créditeurs de leurs « tuteurs ». Les autochtones — mais aussi les allochtones ivoiriens — acceptent mal ce retournement radical qui transforme d’anciens manœuvres en petits entrepreneurs… l’ordre « naturel », tel qu’ils le perçoivent, s’en trouve bouleversé, ce qui crée un ressentiment très fort. Le 7 décembre 1993, le « père fondateur » de la RCI s’éteint. Quatre acteurs principaux se partagent la scène politique les années qui suivent : Laurent Gbagbo (Front Populaire Ivoirien, FPI), Henri Konan Bédié, Alassane Ouattara et le général Robert Gueï (auteur du coup d’état de 1999, assassiné lors de la

Le système « houphouétien » était fragile parce qu’il supposait une redistribution des ressources financières tirées de l’économie de plantation. Il était condamné à se gripper si les ressources venaient à manquer. Au tournant de la décennie 1980, le retournement des marchés internationaux et la hausse des taux d’intérêt prend l’économie ivoirienne en tenailles. Simultanément, la mise en œuvre d’une politique d’ajustement structurel met fin ou réduit fortement les régulations étatiques et remet radicalement en cause un compromis construit sur la redistribution des recettes liées aux prélèvements fiscaux sur les exportations agricoles. Cette rupture se traduit par une contestation forte du régime, avec la manifestation directe de revendications régionales, catégorielles et générationnelles qui ne peuvent plus être satisfaites. Entre 1989 et 1991, le gouvernement tente de surmonter cette crise politique par une série de concessions majeures : restauration du multipartisme, liberté de la presse et syndicale, avec en particulier une montée en puissance de la Fédération Estudiantine Scolaire de Côte d’Ivoire (FESCI).2 Le compromis entre les autochtones et les migrants en milieu 2 Vue comme un instrument du pouvoir sous le régime Gbagbo ; Guillaume Soro, leader politique de la rébellion nordiste, et Charles Blé Goudé, leader des Jeunes Patriotes, pro-Gbagbo, en ont été les secrétaires généraux.

PAGE DU CAHIER DU TRIBUNAL COUTUMIER DE ZRO, 16 JUILLET 2008 CRÉDIT PHOTO : JEAN-PHILIPPE COLIN

The Paris Globalist | Vol. 10 Issue 2

MALI

GUINÉE

Lo bi

Di ou la

Sé no uf o

Di ou la

BURKINA FASO (Haute Volta)

Ya co ub a

ndam

a C

m oé

Ab ro n

ière est

Ba ou lé

Yamoussoukro

for

Agnibilékrou

G ba n

and

B ak w é

Tiassalé

Divo

Agboville

G od ié

Di da

LIBERIA

GHANA (Gold Coast)

Soubré

Bé té

Gagnoa

Abengourou

Dimbokro

Ag ni

Daloa

Bouaké

G ou ro

W é

W ob é

Abidjan

Kr ou

Sassandra San Pedro

lfe Go

Guinée

Tabou

Bouaké

Principales villes

Premiers foyers de culture du cacao (1890-1910) Diffusion de la cacaoculture à partir de 1920

Principaux groupes ethniques Espace de référence

Diffusion de la cacaoculture à partir de 1930 Diffusion de la cacaoculture à partir de 1950 Diffusion de la cacaoculture à partir de 1970 Derniers fronts pionniers, à partir de 1985

SOURCE : E. LÉONARD (INSTITUT DE RECHERCHE POUR LE DÉVELOPEMENT)

tentative de coup d’état de 2002). Konan Bédié, figure du Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI, parti présidentiel), est président de l’Assemblée nationale et dauphin constitutionnel d’Houphouët-Boigny ; c’est un Baoulé comme ce dernier. Ouattara est un « nordiste » malinké (Dioula) musulman, membre du PDCI. Il est premier ministre sous Houphouët-Boigny et est considéré comme successeur potentiel du « vieux ». C’est finalement l’ordre constitutionnel qui est respecté ; Ouattara et ses soutiens quittent le PDCI et créent le RDR (Rassemblement des Républicains) en 1994. Afin de consolider son électorat et discréditer son principal adversaire Ouattara aux élections présidentielles prévues pour 1995, Konan Bédié va mobiliser la notion d’Ivoirité, sensée

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permettre d’identifier un « vrai Ivoirien ». En décembre 1994, il fait modifier le code électoral par l’Assemblée nationale, ce qui lui permet d’exclure Ouattara de la course, en jouant, entre autres, sur la nationalité du père de ce dernier, né en Haute-Volta. Tout un débat va naître autour de cette notion ethno-nationaliste et restrictive de la citoyenneté, dans un contexte de recensement tendantieux, et alors que la part d’étrangers a explosé (17 % en 1965, 25 % en 1993). Un discours xénophobe remet en cause la participation à la vie citoyenne des étrangers (notamment burkinabés et maliens), mais aussi des Ivoiriens dont la nationalité est jugée suspecte (à patronymes « nordistes »). L’Ivoirité signe la fin de « l’allochtonie triomphante » et fait

sauter les verrous des dynamiques ethno-nationalistes. Face à une pression foncière croissante, les jeunes autochtones de retour dans les villages s’emparent très rapidement de l’Ivoirité pour contester la présence des étrangers ainsi que l’autorité des parents. Mêlant affirmation générationnelle et revendication de la tradition dont ils se proclament les gardiens, ils vont commencer à reprendre « leurs » terres. Cela va générer des violences récurrentes, surtout dans l’ouest du pays, où l’on voit apparaître les premiers mouvements d’autodéfense de jeunes autochtones, avec de jeunes « barragistes » que l’on retrouvera plus tard au cœur des conflits dans les milices. En 1999, les conflits entre autochtones bétés et allochtones burkinabés et maliens vont conduire à l’évacuation d’environ 10 000 burkinabés de la zone forestière. La question de l’Ivoirité se retrouve dans la loi foncière votée quasiment à l’unanimité en 1998. Jusqu’à cette loi, l’essentiel des terres rurales relevait de régulations néo-coutumières, seule une infime proportion des parcelles étant titrée. Le nouveau cadre légal exclut les étrangers de la propriété foncière. Même si les troubles militaro-politiques des années 1999-2011 ont bloqué de fait la mise en œuvre de cette loi, son adoption a souvent été présentée comme l’une des causes du conflit armé engagé en 2002. Le retournement de situation à l’issue de la résolution de la crise en 2011 La crise politico-militaire, initiée en 2002 par la tentative ratée de coup d’État contre Gbagbo, s’achève en 2011 à l’issue de la crise post-électorale. Alassane Ouattara et ses Forces Nouvelles, rebaptisées Forces Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), appuyées par des supplétifs et de nombreux chasseurs traditionnels Dozos (principalement originaires du monde Mandingue, du « Nord »),

chassent Gbagbo du pouvoir, marquant la victoire des « gens du Nord » sur ceux du « Sud ». Ce dénouement correspond à une inversion radicale des rapports de force, avec la concentration des postes stratégiques entre les mains des anciens commandants des Forces Nouvelles et la marginalisation de la police et de la gendarmerie considérées pro-Gbagbo. Cette inversion est particulièrement criante dans la zone forestière, avec la perception bienveillante du pouvoir à l’égard de l’emprise croissante des Dozos, assumant localement certaines fonctions régaliennes, notamment dans l’Ouest, ainsi que l’arrivée incontrôlée de nouveaux immigrants burkinabés dans cette même région. Enfin, l’on observe l’impossibilité pour certaines populations autochtones du grand Ouest, qui avaient fui, de rentrer et de récupérer leurs plantations, occupées par des éléments pro-Ouattara — immigrés installés dans la région, Dozos, éléments des FRCI eux-mêmes (parfois après une « vente » par de jeunes autochtones). Le « retour de balancier » est particulièrement marqué dans l’extrême Ouest, où la situation des allochtones et allogènes avait été la plus fragilisée à l’époque du gouvernement Gbagbo, avec leur stigmatisation virulente, et où aujourd’hui ce sont les autochtones yacouba, guéré, kroumen, qui voient leurs droits les plus élémentaires niés. La période actuelle, généralement qualifiée de « post-conflit » par les ONG et les institutions internationales, est en fait une période de grande incertitude, malgré une réélection assez calme en 2015 de Ouattara. Le potentiel conflictuel demeure, dans une société où s’exerce la « justice des vainqueurs » et où 400 000 jeunes arrivent chaque année sur le marché du travail, avec peu de perspectives. Cet article est rédigé à partir des publications de R. Banegas, J-P Chauveau, J-P Colin, J-P Dozon, K. Kouassi et B. Losch, ainsi que de leurs contributions orales. L’auteur tient à remercier également E. Léonard.

STÉPHANE COLIN EST EN M2 SÉCURITÉ INTERNATIONALE À SCIENCES PO (PSIA). IL REJOINT L’ARMÉE DE TERRE APRÈS UNE FORMATION D’INGÉNIEUR. UN ACCIDENT LE RENVOIE SUR LES BANCS DE L’ÉCOLE, OÙ IL PARFAIT SA FORMATION SUR LES QUESTIONS DE SÉCURITÉ, PLUS PARTICULIÈREMENT AFRICAINE.

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PHOTO CREDIT : SHAWN CARRIÉ

UNDERSTANDING DONALD TRUMP: A LOOK AT AMERICAN I NDI V I D UA LI SM MAIJA WALLACE As an American in France, I’ve often been asked how it is that a candidate like Donald Trump has been able to gain so much support. The United States is often referred to as a country founded by immigrants. Yet, somehow, Trump has gained support with policies that talk about banning Muslims from entry and building a wall across the border with Mexico. Of course, one good explanation is fear. Trump’s website cites a press release stating that nearly 25% of American Muslims believe that violence is a legitimate response to offenders of Islam. Questionable methodology aside, (and there are many reasons why one would have reservations about Trump’s data), Trump has been using events such as the San Bernadino shooting and other recent global attacks claimed by the Islamic State to capitalize on fear. If you want to get really afraid, just check out Dabiq — the Islamic State’s propaganda magazine — whose most recent issue praises the San Bernadino shooters for having fought for Allah and “succeeded in killing” 14 disbelievers. Fear cannot be underestimated in our understanding of the current political situation, but there is also another force at play. That force is American Individualism. If we talk about social brownie points in the United States, nobody gets more than the American who came from a poor family and worked their way through college, juggling two jobs and a young family, only to eventually get an amazing job and become well-known or wealthy. This is what we often refer to as “pulling yourself up by your bootstraps,” and it embodies American individualism and the American dream: not relying on anyone else to go from rags to riches. Respect for American individualism is deep-rooted, and probably traces all the way back to when Americans literally pulled themselves up by their bootstraps to explore the Wild West and build communities across the vast territory of the New World. Many would argue that it’s this very quality that has contributed to the United States producing so many talented entrepreneurs and innovators. Indeed, conservative political scientist Samuel Huntington, author of The Clash of Civilizations, even considers it to be one of 34

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America’s three core values, along with egalitarianism and liberty. After all, a society that values self-reliance and hard work yields innumerable benefits. Individualism also affects how Americans view national policy. Conservative Ayn Rand argues that today’s most basic issue in the world is the struggle between individualism and collectivism. She also gives some decent definitions for these two principles. Rand writes that with individualism, “each man exists by his own right and for his own sake, not for the sake of the group.” In contrast, she writes that collectivism suggests “each man exists only by the permission of the group and for the sake of the group.” This struggle between whether we exist for ourselves or for the group also permeates our understanding of the role of government. Should the government prioritize individual rights or group rights? In an article for the Wall Street Journal, political scientist and libertarian Charles Murray explains that up until the 1960s, political candidates embraced individualism in their campaigns before what he describes as a “large-scale ideological defection.” Murray points to policies such as affirmative action that led to treating citizens as groups. He further explains that the fading of individualism has led working-class white men to feel they are “looked down upon by the elites and get little validation in their own communities for being good providers, fathers and spouses.” This then fuels Trumpism — not through fear, but through anger and a desire for the government to focus more on individuals and less on groups. Notice that this view of individualism holds a specific type of individual at its core: a white, American male. When asking whether the government should prioritize individual rights or group rights, it is important to specify whose individual rights or which group’s rights we are talking about. After all, if affirmative action had favored poor white men, Murray’s argument would no longer stand. The issue is not one of fading individualism in general, but rather fading individualism for Trump supporters, which a Washington Post analysis showed tend to be white, male and low-income. How do Trump policies promise to restore individualism to these supporters? One way is through protecting second amendment rights — that is, the right to bear arms. Trump’s plan regarding guns has

PHOTO CREDIT: CC/MICHAEL VADON

three main parts: enforcing existing laws, fixing the mental health system and defending the rights of law-abiding gun owners. In order to achieve this, Trump points to groups — drug dealers, violent criminals, gang members and the mentally ill — that he says need to get off the streets via treatment programs and harsher sentences for those who use guns to commit crimes. He says this will “put the law back on the side of the law-abiding,” who are “the ones who anti-gun politicians and the media blame when criminals misuse guns.” Therefore, with Trump, gun owners will be treated more as individuals and not as groups. Furthermore, Trump opposes expanding background checks for gun purchases because they are inefficient and a hassle for the law-abiding individual. As far as health care goes, Trump plans to completely repeal Obamacare, which is seen as promoting group access to health care at the expense of individual access to an efficient system. Again, the idea here is to reduce the hassle for the individual even if that might mean sacrificing benefits for the group as a whole. These are not radical policy positions; they generally garner consensus from Republicans across the nation. Prioritizing an individual’s right to carry comes in part from a view of individualism with law-abiding gun carriers at its center. Repealing heath care is about prioritizing the individual who doesn’t want to deal with the inefficiencies of access, cost and quality that come with a universal system. However, Trump differs from the Republican mainstream in his focus on a particular group of individuals he calls the “silent majority.” On his website, Trump states that his immigration reform approach prioritizes the needs of working people, and he lays out three core principles for his plan: building borders, enforcing laws and improving the economic situation of Americans. In order to defend the home country from immigrants illegally crossing the Southern border, he hopes to increase visa fees for Mexicans and seize remittances in order to pay for his infamous wall. Of course, seizing remittances immediately jumps out as a policy that doesn’t put working people first at all — at least not Mexican working people. That’s why it’s important to understand who the individual at the root of Trump’s policies is. Building a wall is a policy that holds US-born citizens at its core — specifically those who have economic or racial fears associated with immigration. The same can be said about policies to restrict Syrian refugees from entering the country, temporarily banning Muslims and legally requiring Americans businesses to hire U.S. citizens before others. Historian Rick Perlstein explained on NPR that the phrase “silent majority” comes from President Nixon. In the 1960s, the noisy minority represented black civil rights militants, bra-burning feminists, and drug-smoking students. In contrast, the silent majority included “the ordinary middle-class folks [...] who play by the rules and pay their taxes and don’t protest.” Perlstein also explains that the phrase is racially coded because: “To say majority is to say 36

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minority, and everyone knows who minorities are. They are people in America who are not white.” Indeed, as racism has recently come to the headlines with the Black Lives Matter movement, Trump responds to concerns for a population that is over 77% white. Trump supporters shift the focus away from black lives saying that all lives matter and that “no one’s looking out for the white guy anymore.” They are a silent majority with a feeling of dispossession. An article from The Guardian points to statistics showing that white Americans have had a tendency to ignore the existence of racism, making the shocking thing about Trump not his opinions, but rather his blatancy. Indeed, many Trump supporters say that they like his politically incorrect rhetoric. By speaking bluntly in a way that other politicians do not dare, he is the voice that a silent majority has been, until now, too hesitant to raise. So, how could Trump’s policies possibly gain so much support in the United States? A combination of fear and an extension of individualism that holds a so-called silent majority of white Americans at its core. While primary elections generate a lot of noise, it’s important to keep in mind that primary elections are just the first step to choosing a new US president. Moreover, there is historically no correlation between primary and general election voter turnouts. In fact, a surge in turnout of Republican voters this primary season might indicate that the possibility of any Republican making it to the White House is in doubt. As of March 2016, 62.3% of Americans have an unfavorable opinion of Trump. Even if he wins the presidential primary, polls predict that he would lose in the general election to either Hillary Clinton or Bernie Sanders by an average of 6.3% or 10% of votes, respectively. Although not a Trump supporter myself, I think the support he has gathered is a good wake-up call. The United States needs to find a way to make all its citizens, including working-class white males, feel individually appreciated for their contributions to society. Strengthening the economy and expanding the middle class are, in my opinion, key. However, I believe we can — and indeed must — find a way to achieve that without resorting to racist or discriminatory agendas.

MAIJA WALLACE GREW UP IN ARKANSAS (USA). SHE IS NOW FINISHING UP AN M.A. IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AT SCIENCES PO. SHE ENJOYS COOKING, FILMMAKING, GEOCACHING AND WORKING ON HER BLOG AT TRAVELINGLANG.US

PHOTO CREDIT: SALMA TALAAT

EGYPTIAN WOMEN’S REVOLUTION:

INTERRUPTED SALMA TALAAT “The current situation of women in Arab political life shows that their status has deteriorated: this is reflected in their role and in their participation in public life. Political participation by women involves two main dimensions: the legal constitutional framework, on the one hand, and the political climate and social and cultural aspects, on the other.”1 Political participation comes in many forms; it is not limited to voting or joining a political group/movement. Reading newspapers, discussing politics, signing petitions, watching the news, participating in rallies/protests, volunteering for political

activity, civic participation and social engagement are all part of political participation. While the above examples fall into traditional examples of political participation, there are also other unconventional forms of political participation, such as civil disobedience, breaking laws for political beliefs, boycotts and political violence (which could be interpreted as terrorism by some). Political participation is the offspring of political culture’s process of “political socialization”2; without culture and thought, there would be no participation. Hence, “all political activities of citizens as well as the attitudes and orientations [are] relevant for these activities.”3

1 Mustafa, Hala, Abd al-Ghaffar Shukor and Amre Hashem Rabi’. (2005) Building Democracy in Egypt Report. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and the Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND): 10

2 Newton, Ken, and Jan W van Deth. (2005) Political Attitudes and Behaviour. In Foundations of Comparative Politics: 135-58. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 138 3 Ibid. : 146

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Egypt has always, in my opinion, had a participatory culture. Looking back at its history — of monarchy, British occupation, revolutions and uprisings (1919, 1952, 2012, 2014) — I can see that Egyptian citizens are both knowledgeable about politics and consider it highly important, and so, they participate to endorse a change of some sort. However, political participation does not always allow for positive results for everyone involved. After almost five years since the 25th January uprising, the rights and aspirations of Egyptian women, who have been side by side with Egyptian men in the struggle for bread, freedom and social justice, are still put on hold and even ignored. Egyptian women’s participation — in the form of active presence on the frontlines during clashes with Hosni Mubarak’s regime, standing at polling stations all day to vote, and their role in the field hospitals of Tahrir Square — did not seem enough of a plea on women’s behalf to be part of the new regime governing Egypt. In fact, what women witnessed was a drastic retrogression in their status. According to Dina Samir:4 “The Egyptian women’s status report for 2012 by ECWR also reveals the factual deterioration of women’s position. Egypt ranked first among countries witnessing a decline in the political status of women, ranking 126 on women’s rights… according to the Global Gender Gap Report. Regarding women holding ministerial positions, Egypt ranked the lowest, with zero female governors. Egypt also ranked first in the list of countries that recorded a decline in economic opportunities for women.” The report draws attention to the debilitating circumstances of Egyptian women on all levels — socially, politically and economically. As a woman, and former participant in the uprising of Tahrir Square, I find it ironic that women’s rights have dramatically regressed after the uprising. While many men were the “spectators” in and outside of Tahrir, a large number of women were the “gladiators” — “the leaders and activists who [ran the political organization and protests of the 2011 uprising],” thus exhibiting high levels of political participation.5 The Muslim Brotherhood’s ultra conservative regime, which governed Egypt for almost a year, adopted a discriminatory and misogynist discourse that was projected in the performance and suggestions of its male members in the parliament. The Brotherhood with its authoritarian attitudes “concluded debates on gender with a swift finality. Their teachings maintained that the patriarchal system is the ideal system for the [country] where gender differences are clearly delineated, and men have authority over women.”6 What was really awful and shocking was that four women representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood Party — Freedom and Justice Party — were also extremely fierce, not in 4 Samir, Dina. (2013) “Egyptian Women Still Struggling for Rights Two Years After Revolution.” Ahram Online. 5 Newton, Ken, and Jan W van Deth. (2005) Political Attitudes and Behaviour. In Foundations of Comparative Politics: 135-58. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 147 6 Hafez, Sherine. (2003) The Terms of Empowerment: Islamic Women Activists in Egypt. Cairo, Egypt: The American University in Cairo Press: 26

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presenting women’s claims, but in attempting to deprive them of the few rights they have managed to extract from the lion’s teeth in previous years. Azza Al-garf, a member of the Freedom and Justice Party and former parliament member, represented a flagrant example of someone who parrots her party’s views for the sake of personal gain. Shamelessly, she called for the revocation of the law that banned and criminalised the circumcision of young girls. Not only that, she demanded that laws allowing women to have custody of children be revoked; and also called for tightening Egypt’s already stringent divorce laws. Brotherhood-backing women in parliament believed that women were unsuited for political participation despite the fact that these women were political participators themselves. The majority of women were relegated to “marginal” status or “political marginality” and have been pushed to the fringes of politics, and therefore have little influence — a fact that still persists.7 While some may say that after the June 30th uprising women were acknowledged in the political sphere, I disagree. Right now, the new Egyptian cabinet only has three female ministers out of thirty-three. The attempt to confine Egyptian women within the domestic sphere is a longtime strategy to reinforce their supposed inadequacy and incompetence in participating effectively in the political leadership of the country. Sadly, Egyptian women’s political alienation and poor representation began long before the Brotherhood rose to power, despite the fact that Egypt has the most advanced constitution among Arab countries. While the 1956 constitution granted women the right to vote and to run for office, the actual representation is extremely limited. According to Mustafa, Shukor and Rabi’,8 “women held two seats in the legislature (0.57 per cent of the total number of seats) in 1957 and 11 (2.49 per cent) — seven elected and four appointed by the president — in 2000. This poor representation extends to women’s presence in political parties… [with] the highest proportion of women members in a political party [being] 2 per cent.” Egyptian women didn’t expect to be flagrantly marginalized after their heroic role in the uprising. They want their “material interests” — money, promotion and security — and “ideal interests” — freedom, justice, political values and religious beliefs — acknowledged and met.9 Mervat Tallawy, the head of the National Council for Women, stated at the Women Deliver MENA region panel: “We are not desperate. In Egypt, the fall of the existing system will be because of women. They don’t sit still at all. Their voice is raised at demonstrations, signing petitions — they are everywhere. We will not accept the situation. We will fight it until the end. Either they will put us in jail or they will change their 7 Newton, Ken, and Jan W van Deth. (2005) Political Attitudes and Behaviour. In Foundations of Comparative Politics: 135-58. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 150 8 Mustafa, Hala, Abd al-Ghaffar Shukor and Amre Hashem Rabi’. (2005) Building Democracy in Egypt Report. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and the Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND): 10 9 Ibid. : 136

attitudes.”10

To reiterate, political participation is not only limited to political activities, but also civic engagement. So, in contrast to their situation in the political arena, women play a major role in the civil sector and voluntary work. Internationally, women’s rights have come to be inseparable from human rights, so the Egyptian state felt pressure to increase the role of women. Hence, in the year 2000, the National Council for Women was established to support women in voicing their opinions and urging them to enter public and political life. If only the level of education of girls and women were to grow, Egypt would have an increase in the level of politically aware, confident women willing to enact change and progress in the political sphere. Such an achievement is an indivisible part of the plan to modernize state and society.11 As part of cognitive mobilization, “education and wealth bring greater awareness of politics and better skills to participate.”12 With every new regime, Egyptian women seem destined to start anew their struggle for equality and just treatment. Women’s active participation seems to be recalled only in moments of crisis or drastic upheavals, but once the change takes place, they are shoved aside and men emerge victoriously at the forefront as the main actors in the revolutionary process. The exclusion and circumvention of Egyptian women from active political participation in the political scene after their momentous role in recent events, is, in fact, reminiscent of what took place after the 1919 Revolution. After participating in protests against British rule side by side with men and the success of the Revolution to bring partial independence in 1922, women’s active roles were deplorably overlooked, and they remained deprived of their rights to vote, work and equal education until 1956. The new generation of female activists, who emerged after the January and June uprisings, recognize that the claims for their inclusion and participation in decision-making, in matters of the state, will require the restructuring of gender relations to rectify the prevalent inequities between men and women. As Heba Afify maintains:13 “Egyptians regard women as unfit for political leadership because of these domestic roles and their need to take maternity leave after giving birth, according to [Nehad Aboul] Komsan: “As if Egyptian women were different from women all over the world who are presidents.” The remarkable revolutionary role played by women in the 10 Montasir, Jenny. (2013) “VOICES: Women’s Rights in Egypt – Re-examining a Revolution.” Middle East Voices. 11 Mustafa, Hala, Abd al-Ghaffar Shukor and Amre Hashem Rabi’. (2005) Building Democracy in Egypt Report. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and the Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND): 19 12 Newton, Ken, and Jan W van Deth. (2005) Political Attitudes and Behaviour. In Foundations of Comparative Politics: 135-58. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 142 13 Afify, Heba. (2011) “Egyptian Women Still Struggle for a Spot in Politics.” Egypt Independent.

two uprisings provides concrete proof that they are eligible beyond doubt to take their well deserved place in the leadership of the new Egyptian state. The notion that oppression breeds resistance is echoed in the words of prominent political activist Doctor Karima El-Hefnawy who says, “when society keeps telling women they cannot be Judges or presidents, they try to prove the opposite and this gives them more motivation to excel… As a female you have to snatch your rights, one after the other, you have to defy traditions and be in the frontlines.” El-Hefnawy, together with other female activists, insists on resistance against all forms of subjugation, and that women assert their determination to exercise their full rights as equals to men. The politicization of the Egyptian people in general, and women in particular, can be attributed to undergoing two major uprisings within three years. Political culture is “passed on from one generation to the next so it persists over time”; it changes slowly and provides stability for many. This explains why many cling to the current gendered status quo. Nevertheless, Egyptian women have become more conscious of their rights and also more aware of the need to reproduce new structures of power relations that maintain an equal representation of women in all institutions of society. Hopefully, Egyptian women will start to witness tangible progress in their social, economic and political status and promote the agency and parity among individuals regardless of gender. Their participation in the reconstruction of the Egyptian political agenda can never be undermined or ignored. Women’s active participation in the political dialogue constitutes a major step in the initiation of a cultural revolution that should fuel the political transformations going on in society.

SALMA TALAAT IS AN EGYPTIAN STUDYING POLITICAL SCIENCE AND LAW AT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO. SHE IS CURRENTLY AN EXCHANGE STUDENT AT SCIENCES PO WHERE SHE IS FOCUSING ON DEVELOPMENT STUDIES.

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PHOTO CREDIT: SALMA TALAAT

THE MIDDLE EAST’S OTHER CIVIL WAR SHAWN CARRIÉ

Don’t be fooled by the ads — Turkey is at war. Behind the slick airline commercials showcasing the country’s shining Mediterranean beaches, sweeping green fields bristling with eager agricultural entrepreneurs and tourist destinations, tension has set in on the streets of its cosmopolitan cities. Recent suicide bombings in Istanbul and Ankara linked to militant groups operating on both sides of the less-than-impermeable southern border with Syria have made fighting terrorism a priority for Turkey. Courting a nervous European Union at one side, while hosting most of the Syrians expatriated by the conflict continuing at the other, the bloodiest piece of its geopolitical puzzle originates within Turkey’s own borders. On the morning of 10 October 2015, the day I arrived on my second visit to Turkey, a suicide bomber had just struck a rally of Kurdish activists in Ankara. As reports trickled in and the number of dead swelled past 100, government officials were placing blame on the blacklisted Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). By that night, a 40

communiqué on behalf of the so-called Islamic State, or Daesh, had claimed responsibility. Meanwhile, mourners gathered in Istanbul’s Taksim Square. After a moment of silence, the stillness was punctuated with a song that had been illegal to sing for decades: the “Çerxa Şoreşê,” the anthem of the PKK. Today, Turkey’s fight against terrorism has led to the deployment of its soldiers not to Syria, but on the streets of its own cities and villages under the auspices of fighting a separatist insurgency in its majority-Kurdish southeast. The PKK – listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the E.U. and U.S. — had fought a guerilla war aimed at establishing an independent Kurdistan in the 1980s and 1990s, and its cause still has considerable sympathy among the Kurdish population. In recent months, Turkish security forces have begun to implement a sweeping crackdown, bombarding villages and urban neighborhoods where strongholds of separatists have taken up arms to resist the military presence on their streets, which they view as an occupying force.

The Paris Globalist | Vol. 10 Issue 2 Flickr/CC/U.S. Missile Defense Agency

This fighting is not so much a spillover, but a reverberation of the violence just over the border in northern Syria. Once underdogs taking a primarily defensive stance through the shift from uprising to civil war, the Kurdish militias, called the People’s Protection Units (YPG/YPJ), have emerged as a formidable force in the conflict. Seizing an opening created by the war’s chaos, they have effectively established autonomous self-rule in enclaves they have given the traditional name Rojava, Kurdish for “the west.” In Bakur — or “the north,” referring to their lands within the borders of Turkey – the Kurdish movement has taken it as their signal to reignite the generations-old dream of a free and independent Kurdistan. Turkey’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has viewed the unfolding events with alarm – ending peace negotiations with the PKK and leading the charge to eliminate the domestic separatist movement by force. In his government’s view, the prospect of Kurdish independence – within Turkey’s borders or Syria’s — threatens the very identity of a Turkish citizen. The resulting conflict draws on deep-seated animosities in a battle for the soul of both countries. Plural Nationalisms Without Plurinationalism Turkish nationalism and Kurdish nationalism have always been at odds with one another – a dissonance enshrined in the Turkish Constitution. Article 66 states: “Everyone bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk.” Turkish citizens who are not only Turks but Kurds have lived through generations of legalized discrimination. Though Armenians, Jews and Greeks are recognized by law as minority groups and granted special protections, Kurds — who comprise about 20 per cent of the Turkish population — are not. Discriminatory laws target not the ethnic identity explicitly, but the expression of it. Until 1993, laws existed on paper that criminalized speaking the Kurdish language in public or giving children Kurdish names. Cihad Ilbaş, a historian and lecturer at The Kurdish Institute in Istanbul, explains that such measures have existed

for decades in various forms, reinforcing a homogenous Turkish national identity and seeking to eradicate pride in a distinct Kurdish identity. “From the Turkish state’s point of view, we all have to be one nationality — Turks. All it takes is for someone to say ‘I am a Kurd,’ and that’s a threat to the nation,” Ilbaş says. The drumbeat of Turkish nationalism is not so unlike the familiar debate that perennially unfolds during election seasons in Western nations. The high notes every politician makes sure to hit include total national unity, zealous veneration for the “Father of the Nation,” Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, finished with attestations of religious values. They stumble over one another to offer the most Kemalist response to the bread and butter topic of mainstream debate, which is a distinctly Anatolian variation of a timeless refrain: “Which unites us all as Turks more: the flag or the Qur’an?” The notion of a diversity of ethnic groups sharing a common demonym remains far more troubled in Turkey than in other diverse multi-ethnic societies like Brazil, South Africa and the United States. For Kurds to demand recognition, much less independence, not only challenges what it means to be Turkish, but reopens old wounds bandaged for nearly a century. Forged in the republican-nationalist ideology of Kemalism, the Turkish Republic set out from its establishment to unite a nation out of the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. Part of this inglorious history includes the thousands of Armenians and Kurds who were systematically murdered in the early years of the Turkish Republic. Generations of Kurds have since pushed for rights and recognition in Turkey, at times through diplomacy, occasionally through insurrections; both have been suppressed. After the PKK was founded in 1978, the conflict manifested in blood-for-blood attacks during a vengeful campaign of guerrilla warfare lasting until the 1990s. Two decades of relative calm have seen the PKK abandon a separate state as a feasible goal, instead seeking greater rights and autonomy under the Turkish government as both sides curtailed military operations and entered into peace negotiations. But those

PHOTO CREDIT: SALMA TALAAT

talks broke down at a critical moment. In January 2015, the YPG/ YPJ succeeded to hold the city of Kobanî through months of siege by Daesh. But even as they were encroaching on its border, Turkey turned its back, shutting its border to fleeing civilians, offering no military support and urging the United States to stop backing the Kurds in Syria. Cracking Down At Home Kobanî was a watershed moment which for many Kurds proved that the Turkish government had no real intention of ever granting Kurdish autonomy in either Syria or Turkey. “Before Kobanî, if you took a poll of Kurds in Turkey, most would say that they would want to live together with the Turks under a democratic system with equal rights – but now, people are fed up – it was that the uprisings began,” says Brüsk Çekvar, the nowunemployed manager of a café destroyed by the bombardments in Diyarbakır’s Sûr district, a walled-off neighborhood of winding, tight streets and thousand year old stone buildings. This ancient city, named Amed in Kurdish, is an especially venerated place for the roughly 40 million ethnic Kurds scattered throughout Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey. If Kurdistan were a sovereign nation, this would be its capital. Here, explosions can be heard all throughout the city as it continues its bustling daily activity while the military continues the crackdown. “They call everyone they kill ‘terrorists’,” Brüsk tells me with stoic inflection. “People may say this all started because some of them dug ditches and took up guns. But I can tell you that before there were any ditches, before there were any incidents at all, the police were raiding people’s homes, dragging them out into the street, beating them and arresting them.” Like most social movement scenarios, the point of rupture was the coinciding of lingering resentments provoked by an incident of injustice. On the 8th of October, Brüsk’s 15-year-old nephew Aliş Çekvar was shot by a police officer after an incident at school where he had been questioned about affiliations with

a terrorist group. There were no witnesses to the shooting itself, but the locals became furious when the police simply left him in the street to die and refused to allow an ambulance to come and collect his body after he did. The usual street protests followed. But when demonstrators defied the 24-hour curfew declared on 10 October, the crackdown came – swift and deadly. “I had always seen the police use tear gas and water cannons at demonstrations – but on that day, I saw the police cut down the crowd with bullets,” Brüsk told me. “It was only after those incidents that people started digging ditches. They did it to protect themselves, to protect their homes.” The Syrian Connection The uncompromising crackdown on the country’s own population in Kurdish cities has earned Turkey’s president comparisons to Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. Images of neighborhoods reduced to grey rubble frame a bleak picture of what the Turkish government has wrought – yet Erdoğan has only become more popular. In February, when surreal stories covered national headlines telling of 60 people burned to death in the basement of a building surrounded for weeks by the Turkish soldiers in the far southeast town of Cizre, the president unapologetically defended the military’s siege of the building, calling it a hideout for PKK terrorists. President Erdoğan has insisted that the Syrian Democratic Union Party (PYD) – whom the United States has backed as a key front line against Daesh – are a group of terrorists no different from the so-called Islamic State, against whom they are fighting. His view, at odds with the U.S. position in the Syrian war, is that a self-ruling Kurdish region adjacent to Turkey will threaten its territorial sovereignty since the Syrian Kurds, Erdoğan argues, are merely an extension of the PKK under a different name. While equating the two ires supporters of the Kurdish cause, it isn’t entirely inaccurate. Kurds in Syria have faced marginalizations under Assad similar to their cousins in Turkey. In March 2016, the PHOTO CREDIT: SALMA TALAAT

PYD took its boldest step yet, declaring the establishment of an autonomous government over “Rojava.” Just short of declaring their own state, they have begun transforming every aspect of society into “democratic confederalism” – the model pursued by the PKK and developed by its leader Abdullah Öcalan, currently imprisoned by Turkey. Advances by the YPG/YPJ in Syria have undoubtedly emboldened Kurdish rebels declaring autonomy in Turkey’s cities, calling themselves the YPS, or Civil Protection Units. Government officials state that since military operations began last July, over 1 200 militants have been “neutralized” – a euphemism for killed. The Turkish Human Rights Foundation (TIHV) contends that as many as half of those killed were nonmilitant civilians. The uncomfortable truth may lie somewhere in the grey area, as numbers still leave an incomplete picture of the pain that compels civilians to turn against the government. Running on an empty stomach When I met Ekrem Şen, a taxi driver who, until recently, had been living in Sûr, he struck me as a thoroughly average man, yet one who appears to have just realized he left his keys at home with the stove on. Massaging a pressure point on his hands, he speaks with frank cadence, syncopated with frenetic tangents of rhetorical questions. “What’s a twenty-four hour curfew, anyway? When it started, the stores were open and people were walking around, and now there is only death on those streets,” Ekrem says casually, before a long pause. “My whole psyche is broken. How is the state capable of such cruelty?” he then demands, almost suspecting there is an answer. “Why, Allah? Why?” On the day the curfew took effect, the entrances to Sûr were sealed off while Ekrem was out driving a customer. Cut off from his family, he stayed with a friend to keep up his work, phoning home hourly. On the fourth morning of curfew, his daughter Helin called to say she was going out to buy bread. Fifteen minutes later, a cousin called with news that she was dead. An army commander questioned the distraught father at the morgue where Helin’s body was brought. He asked why the girl was out on the street alone, why the family hadn’t left Sûr, and suggested she might have been killed by militants looking to turn blame and rancor against the security forces. Ekrem may never know exactly what happened – but his demeanor conveys a clear conviction. As he shows me two photos and an autopsy report, I understand the source of his disturbed temperament: the indelible images of a nine year old girl’s distorted head, ripped apart by two .6 caliber bullets – heavy ammunition that could only have been fired by an artillery gun. The autopsy noted: “the stomach of the deceased was observed to be empty.”

“Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.” Original Sin The mere mention of the Turkish president’s name invokes controversy. It’s tempting to explain the Byzantine complexity of the conflict in Syria in black and white terms. While President Erdoğan insists he is defending the nation from barbarous terrorists, many of the people to whom I spoke counter that that it is civilians who are being slaughtered; they revere the Kurdish resistance as freedom fighters. The polarized discourse of Turkish politics is steeped in tribe-affirming polemics that provide little insight into the nuances of a complex conflict. An opposition party whitepaper held both sides blameworthy, stating: “the local community is torn between PKK terrorism and the unlawful and anti-democratic practices of the government, and feels resentment towards both.” But moderates are becoming the minority, drowned out by much louder voices. Kurds in Turkey look to Rojava’s revolution as an inspiration for what they hope to achieve, but it hasn’t all been clean. Not only are the YPG/YPJ seen by other rebel factions as traitors to the Syrian revolution – which set the stage for their gains – they accuse the Kurds of acquiescing to the regime of Bashar al-Assad, pointing out that they have almost completely evaded the bombing campaigns that have decimated most of the country’s urban centers. They have also been accused of expelling Arab Syrians from their homes in an attempt to cleanse the region of non-Kurds. YPG/YPJ spokesman Rêdûr Xelîl has admitted that some Arabs have indeed been displaced from areas where fighting took place, but denies that they were forced by Kurdish forces. Intransigent animosities continue to problematize the conflict spilling over from the Kurdish front of Syria’s war into Turkey. Any project of state-building will inevitably be a bloody one – and the baptism of nationalism grants a pardon for its crimes. Kurds have fought for years using both diplomatic means and armed struggle to advance their cause. As the Kurds’ emerging efforts towards autonomy – won by the bullet, not the ballot – it remains to be seen how their future will fit in with the rest of Syria, and whether the same crimes that have been committed against them in their history will be repeated.

SHAWN CARRIÉ IS AN INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALIST BASED IN ISTANBUL, TURKEY. HIS WORK HAS APPEARED IN THE GUARDIAN, VICE, AND SYRIA DEEPLY.

“Isn’t it a pity that our children have to die? What was their sin? Being a Kurd? Soldiers – they are mother’s sons – die also. Isn’t it a pity? And whose doing is all this?” Ekrem laments, before continuing: The Paris Globalist | Vol. 10 Issue 2

MELANCHOLIA, TAKEN IN TRIER, GERMANY, ON 9 OCTOBER 2011. PHOTO CREDIT: FLICKR/CC/55LANEY69

DEBOUT, LES DAMNÉS DE LA TERRE ANTHROPOCÈNE ET NATION N’ONT QU’UNE COMPATIBILITÉ RESTREINTE GUILLAUME LEVRIER 8 millions de déplacés, dont la moitié qui choisissent de traverser les frontières.1 La guerre en Syrie est la cause du plus grand mouvement de population depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale. De nombreux enfants, femmes et hommes tentent de fuir une violence dans l’espoir d’en trouver une plus douce ailleurs, ou au moins une qui ne serait pas fatale. Arrivés, comme tant d’autres, en Europe, ils découvrent dans leur chair la vérité du Monde d’Hier2 qui s’est transmise jusqu’à nous : « Autrefois, l’homme n’avait qu’un corps et une âme. Aujourd’hui, il lui faut en plus un passeport, sinon il n’est pas traité comme un homme. » Construire une nation n’a jamais été une possibilité. Les nations émergent d’une vocation populaire et transversale, de la volonté de promouvoir une idée, un message. Pour autant, les conditions de cette émergence sont de plus en plus remises en question : au contraire, les circonstances actuelles favorisent leur effondrement. 1 UNHCR, “Worldwide displacement hits all-time high as war and persecution increase”, 18 June 2015 2 Stefan Zweig, Le Monde d’hier. Souvenirs d’un Européen. (Autobiographie 1944)

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L’Anthropocène, ère géologique dont l’Homme est le principal acteur (ou la principale agence responsable), n’est pas qu’une affaire de stratigraphie. L’impact budgétaire, économique et géopolitique de l’utilisation des ressources est de plus en plus massif. La chute massive des prix du pétrole a mis en difficulté la capacité des puissances publiques à maintenir le monopole de la violence dans certaines régions. Si l’Iran sort renforcé de l’accord international sur son programme nucléaire, il ne produit plus que 2,8 millions de barils par jour, contre 5,8 en 1978.3 Le poids de sa dette et du financement de son effort militaire face à son conflit périphérique avec l’Arabie Saoudite va encore s’alourdir. Pour les pays d’Afrique Équatoriale, les risques sont encore plus importants. Le Nigéria doit lui aussi faire face à une baisse dramatique de sa rente pétrolière, tout en combattant Boko Haram avec un succès relatif. La situation vénézuélienne fait de plus en plus contraste avec celle de Cuba, alors qu’elle s’enfonce dans une inflation qui pourrait mettre un terme au régime actuel. 3 The Economist

Dans le même temps, l’amplitude des variations climatiques pose de forts enjeux à certaines populations vulnérables. Après la perte d’une partie importante de la récolte de céréales en Corée du Nord à l’été 2015, l’Éthiopie tente à son tour de contenir une famine massive. Si des pays comme le Rwanda ont triplé leur production agricole entre 2000 et aujourd’hui, leurs rendements restent encore largement inférieurs aux pays d’Amérique du Sud ou du Sud-est de l’Asie. Les défis posés au concept même de nation n’en épargnent aucune. Les “idoles carnivores”, décrites par Antoine de SaintExupéry4 pour qualifier le nationalisme allemand, se réveillent à travers le monde occidental, par le biais d’une démocratie

“Autrefois, l’homme n’avait qu’un corps et une âme.

Aujourd’hui, il lui faut en plus un passeport, sinon il n’est pas traité comme un homme. ”

plaide pour une dissolution du concept. Il n’y a plus de surface ni de relief, de limites ni de frontières, mais des populations et des vecteurs qui traversent un milieu. Politiser la Biosphère7 pose un problème vis-à-vis de la représentation des agences qui se situent en dehors du langage. De plus, changer de point de vue en extrayant l’homme du centre des préoccupations politiques pour lui substituer une perspective planétaire demande une maturité des systèmes de gouvernement qui est difficile à atteindre. Au niveau administratif, gérer l’intérêt de l’écosystème d’une forêt ou d’un réserve marine relève de dispositifs efficaces qui ont déjà été éprouvés par l’expérience. Mais l’objet “abeille” comme tel, à l’échelle de la Biosphère, reste inatteignable par la gouvernance mondiale pour l’instant. L’échec actuel du système national à faire face à ces défis trouve sa solution dans l’éducation. Les manuels scolaires ne placent l’humain dans le contexte du vivant que sous un biais scientifique. Cette approche ne devrait que compléter l’étude philosophique, historique et social de la place de l’humain dans son environnement terrestre, voire plus large encore. Pourquoi n’enseignons-nous pas à tous ces enfants qui veulent devenir astronautes pour aller voir les planètes qui brillent dans le ciel qu’ils vivent déjà sur l’une d’elles ?

qu’aucun idéal ne vient diriger. La catastrophe environnementale ne fait plus débat, et l’impuissance publique à y faire face vient paradoxalement alimenter la montée des extrêmes. Il est difficile d’expliquer à six millions d’américains que leur armée est omnipotente, mais que l’eau qu’ils ont bu pendant quatre ans était contaminée au plomb.5 S’ensuit une fuite en avant vers les candidats les plus radicaux, dans l’espoir de retrouver le contrôle de la situation, de recouvrer des marges de manœuvre. Augmenter l’intensité d’un outil inefficace est contre-intuitif, mais traduit avant tout l’absence d’alternative. Contrairement à la réduction des inégalités, la préservation de notre support terrestre devrait s’inclure naturellement dans les schémas nationaux. Mais à l’inverse, « cette plaie des plaies, le nationalisme, qui a empoisonné la fleur de notre culture européenne »,6 fragmente un combat qui est soit trop local, soit trop global. Le principe selon lequel « la Nation proclame la solidarité et l’égalité de tous les Français devant les charges qui résultent des calamités nationales » est à géographie variable. Il s’attache à des groupes sociaux disposant d’impact politique. Les thons auront toujours beaucoup de mal à bloquer les axes autoroutiers, ce qui les rend particulièrement vulnérables.

GUILLAUME LEVRIER EST UN ANCIEN DIRECTEUR DE LA RÉDACTION DU PARIS GLOBALIST, ET TRAVAILLE ACTUELLEMENT À LA BANQUE EUROPÉENNE D’INVESTISSEMENT.

Comment résoudre cette ambivalence face au territoire ? L’idée selon laquelle la traçabilité remplacera à terme l’identité 2016

4 Terre des hommes, 1939 5 Le Monde, “L’eau de six millions d’Américains contaminée au plomb”, 18 mars 6 Stefan Zweig, Le Monde d’hier. Souvenirs d’un Européen. ( Autobiographie 1944)

7 Vladimir Vernadski, (1863 – 1945) chimiste et minéraliste russe ayant conceptualisé la Biosphère (bien que n’étant pas l’inventeur du terme) comme « la région unique de l’écorce terrestre occupée par la vie ».

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THE PARIS GLOBALIST – ASSOCIATION LOI 1901 SCIENCES PO PARIS 27 RUE SAINT-GUILLAUME 75007 PARIS Responsables : Sarah Vallée, Elizabeth Walsh, Daisy Alphonso, Paul Moinereau, David Seiler Directrice de rédaction : Sarah Vallée Rédactrice en chef : Elizabeth Walsh Date de parution : Avril 2016 Dépôt Légal : à parution N° ISSN : 1969-1297 VALEUR : distribué gratuitement, en 700 exemplaires. HTTP://WWW.PARISGLOBALIST.ORG/ Nous souhaiterions remercier Book Services pour l’intérêt qu’ils portent à notre travail, ainsi que pour leur soutien. https://www.bookservices.eu/ Nous remercions également Sciences Po pour leur soutien.

REFUGEES IN MYTILINI, LESVOS, GREECE. PHOTO CREDIT: SHAWN CARRIÉ

Crédit photo : United Nations ; Licence Creative Commons

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L’AFNU propose à ses membres différents colloques réunissant des intervenants spécialistes des relations internationales ainsi qu’une liste actualisée de postes à pourvoir dans les organisations internationales, qu’elles soient gouvernementales ou non gouvernementales

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L’AFNU Aix-en-Provence édite depuis 16 ans l’Observateur des Nations Unies. Cette revue semestrielle accueille les contributions de doctorants et d'auteurs confirmés de tous horizons. Retrouvez dès mars prochain son dernier volume sur « Le formalisme juridique dans le droit international du XXIème siècle ».

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