Singapore's Development and Use of Military Power

Singapore’s Development and Use of Military Power Diplomacy, Deterrence, Compellence and Counter-coercion Toh Boon Kwan

Author’s Note: This opinion piece traces its origin to a term paper written in the 2003-2004 academic year at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University for Professor Muthiah Alagappa’s M.Sc. (Strategic Studies) module on Force in Asian Politics. A revised version was submitted to the 9th Chief of Army Essay Competition organised by the Singapore Armed Forces in 2007 and was placed in the top tier prize category – Outstanding. The opinion piece was subsequently revised and updated to June 2009 based upon the constructive criticism provided by the anonymous reviewers of Asian Security and Asian Journal of Political Science and offers a historical snapshot of Singapore’s national security strategy. The author, however, retains sole responsibility for the views expressed in this opinion piece and for any errors made.

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Singapore’s Development and Use of Military Power: Diplomacy, Deterrence, Compellence and Counter-coercion Toh Boon Kwan

Abstract As a small, vulnerable country surrounded by larger neighbours in a volatile region, Singapore has rapidly developed military power to defend its sovereignty following its attainment of independence in 1965. Despite publicly professing a reliance on diplomacy and the deterrent value of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) to safeguard its sovereignty, this article argues that Singapore has acquired the capability to exercise counter-coercion and has not hesitated to use compellence to protect its national interest. The inclusion of counter-coercion in Singapore’s national security strategy reflects the maturing force capabilities of the SAF as well as the growing sophistication in Singapore’s national security strategy. This article concludes that the expansion of the SAF’s military capability beyond deterrence to encompass counter-coercion and compellence has enhanced the credibility of its military deterrence and contributed to Singapore’s national security, allowing a closer nexus between the use of military power and the achievement of national security objectives. This has ensured that Singapore would continue to maintain and safeguard its sovereignty against any threat, real or perceived.

Key Words: Singapore Armed Forces; Diplomacy; Deterrence; Coercion; Countercoercion; Compellence

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Introduction Singapore is a small, ethnically diverse island nation of slightly over three million citizens located in the heart of maritime Southeast Asia. Singaporeans of Chinese descent constitute the largest ethnic group on the island, forming 77 per cent of the population. Malays and Indians comprise 14 per cent and 8 per cent of the population respectively. Ethnicity and religion are intertwined in Singapore with the majority of Chinese being Taoist and Buddhist, the Malays being Muslim, and the Indians being Hindu. Two larger neighbours, Malaysia and Indonesia, surround it.

Malay and Javanese elites, who systematically marginalise their Chinese minorities, rule both countries. These discriminatory attitudes pervade their dealings with Singapore, whom they expect to be as compliant as their own Chinese minorities (Lee, 2006).

The clichés touted by Malay ultra-nationalists from time to time depicting Singapore either as a Chinese island in a Malay sea, the Singapore nut in a Malay nutcracker, or a little red dot indicate the ideational context in which Malay ultranationalism hold Singapore in their worldview: An anomaly that could be easily extinguished and a desire to intimidate Singapore into subordinating its interests to that of its larger neighbours. Singapore’s willingness to face down such condescension and threats instead of taking its place at the bottom of the regional pecking order because of its minuscule size, have been a source of historical and current tensions with its neighbours. Paradoxically, over time, Singapore’s neighbours have learned to treat it with greater respect granted Singapore’s propensity to stand up for its national interest.

Another source of bilateral tension has been the disparity in the level of economic development and national prosperity. Singapore’s neighbours, though

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better endowed with natural resources, have lagged behind Singapore in terms of economic development and wealth (see Table 1).

Table 1: Comparison of key national indicators between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia Country

Singapore

Malaysia

Indonesia

GDP per capitaa

US$52,000

US$15,300

US$3,900

Foreign Exchange Reservesa

US$168.8 billion

US$104.4 billion

US$51.54 billion

Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)b

4c

47

126

Sources: a CIA – The World Factbook, 2008. b Transparency International, 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index. c The figure refers to the country ranking in the CPI. Singapore is rated the fourth least corrupted country in the world.

Singapore’s corruption free society, industrious population, efficient and open economy, built on a foundation of meritocracy that is ethnicity blind, offers a stark contrast with its neighbours’ ethnically based, patronage driven, corrupt political systems that distort the economy. The resulting politics of material envy have bedevilled bilateral relations. Singapore’s sense of self-righteousness based on its outstanding national achievement and the air of superiority it flaunts towards its larger but less successful neighbours have created perceptions that it is insensitive and arrogant, a country that is overly materialistic and ‘getting too big for their rather small-size boots’ (Ashton and Louis, 2004: 390-391).

Singapore has traditionally relied on diplomacy and deterrence to manage its troubled relations with its larger neighbours. These troubled bilateral relationships

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include the territorial dispute with Malaysia over the jurisdiction of the small island of Pedra Branca; the price of Malaysia’s supply of water to Singapore; the dispute over the Malayan Railway land in Singapore; the withdrawal of Central Provident Fund monies held by West Malaysians working in Singapore; Indonesia’s failure to ratify the painstakingly negotiated Extradition Treaty and Defence Cooperation Agreement with Singapore in 2007; and the occasional personal animosity displayed by Malaysian and Indonesian leaders towards the island state (Tan, 2000a: 8-25; Ganesan, 2005: 56-100; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, 2007). These disputes and differences are a constant source of anxiety to Singapore, raising its sense of vulnerability. This has led Singapore to view the development and use of military power as an important instrument of statecraft to maintain its sovereignty and ensure non-interference in its domestic affairs by other states.

Despite publicly professing a reliance on diplomacy and the deterrent value of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) to safeguard its sovereignty (Ministry of Defence, Singapore, 2000: 12-13), this article argues that Singapore has acquired the capability to exercise counter-coercion and has not hesitated to use compellence to protect its national interest.1 The existing scholarship on Singapore’s defence policy has focused on the island state’s development and maintenance of a credible deterrence capability. This assumed that Singapore adopts a passive posture, which is inherent in a deterrent strategy that draws a line in the sand and ceding the initiative to the opponent who has to decide whether to act and cross the line.

Scholars have either ignored or overlooked the SAF’s current capability to exercise compellence, a coercive strategy which is active as distinct from deterrence’s passivity. Compellence involves the issue of threats to coerce the opponent to change his behaviour and do something he would otherwise not do. This may either

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result in the opponent doing something new or cease doing what he has begun (Morgan, 2003: 2-3; Bobbitt, 2002: 13). The inclusion of counter-coercion and compellence in Singapore’s national security strategy reflects the maturing force capabilities of the SAF as well as the growing sophistication in Singapore’s national security strategy. This article concludes that the expansion of the SAF role beyond deterrence has enhanced its operational readiness and contributed to Singapore’s national security, allowing a closer nexus between the use of military power and the achievement of national security objectives.

Singapore’s National Security Strategy Singapore’s official national security strategy is conceptualised along the three themes of security, survival and success. As a small, vulnerable state located in a volatile geo-political region, maintaining its survival as an independent entity is a constant challenge. Thus, the preoccupation with security is necessary to preserve its sovereignty. The pursuit of diplomacy and deterrence underpins security. This involves building bilateral defence relations with other armed forces and participating in multilateral security arrangements such as the Five Power Defence Arrangements.

Singapore also adopts a comprehensive concept of security, termed Total Defence. This consists of five elements – Psychological Defence, Social Defence, Economic Defence, Civil Defence and Military Defence. The five elements blend ‘military deterrence, economic strength, and internal cohesion and stability as the foundations of its security’ and mobilise, in principle, all segments and sectors of society to defend Singapore against both military and non-military threats (Tan, 2001: 13; Yong, 1988: 288-289).

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It is not enough merely to survive, but also necessary to go beyond it. Hence, Singapore constantly strives for success, mainly defined in economic terms (National Education Office, Singapore, 1998: 2). This is reflected in the official rhetoric of developing ‘a First World Economy and a World-Class Home’ (Ministry of Defence, Singapore, 2000: 5). The means to achieve economic success is through promotion of a global free trade regime abroad and establishing a conducive commercial environment at home to encourage investment in the country. A strong SAF helps to maintain security, providing a foundation for political stability and inspire investor confidence (Tan, 2003b; Alagappa, 1988: 33).

The official rhetoric emphasises the benign posture of the SAF, emphasising that Military Defence runs in parallel with Psychological Defence and Social Defence, which encompass the softer aspects of Total Defence. The hard military power of the SAF is played down deliberately to disguise the latent military capabilities of the SAF. The blending of soft and hard power in the Total Defence concept is indicative of a broader conception of national security that is not based solely on military considerations.

Beyond Balance of Power Analysts have conceptualised Singapore’s foreign policy as coping with vulnerability.

Leifer has argued that Singapore’s foreign policy is driven by balance of power considerations as it seeks to involve extra-regional states in the regional locale to act as countervailing power to influence local geopolitics in favour of Singapore (Leifer, 2000: 26-27). This explains why Singapore sought to retain British and American military presence in the region. While Leifer’s balance of power analysis has merit, it does not adequately explain why Singapore has chosen to bandwagon with the

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British and American hegemonic power at different phases of its post-independence period instead of balancing against Anglo-American power. Therefore, it is more useful to go beyond the balance of power concept and consider the applicability of balance of threat theory to explain Singapore’s national security policy.

Balance of Threat Walt reformulated and replaced the balance of power theory with the balance of threat theory. He argues that states choose to balance with or bandwagon against threat, not power. Aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power and aggressive intentions influence perceptions of and responses to threats (Walt, 1987: 17-33).

Balance of threat theory offers a good explanation of Singapore’s acute sense of vulnerability following its unexpected attainment of independence in August 1965.

Malaysia maintained a security interest in the island despite Singapore’s constitutional secession from Malaysia. Malaysia did not hesitate to practice coercive diplomacy when it deemed Singapore’s actions to be inimical to its national interests.

These included veiled threats to cut Singapore’s water supplies from the mainland (Lee, 1998: 663). Malaysia insisted on stationing an infantry regiment in Singapore following independence and in a demonstration of force, compelled the Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew to accept Malaysian Army outriders to ‘escort’ him to the first post-independence Parliament sitting (Lee, 2000: 26, 32-33; Leifer, 2000: 53; Easter, 1998: 360). When Singapore unilaterally decided to resume the lucrative barter trade with then erstwhile enemy Indonesia, Malaysia threatened to use the Royal Malaysian Navy to blockade an offshore island that Singapore intended to use as a barter trade zone with Indonesia, forcing Singapore to abandon the initiative

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(Lee, 2000: 260-261; Leifer, 2000: 57; Easter, 1998: 327-328, 334-335; Dee, 2005a: 514-547; Dee, 2005b: 35-36).

Indonesia, the dominant power in the region, did not abandon its Konfrontasi policy of conducting sub-conventional warfare against Singapore despite talks of a cessation of hostilities in the wake of Singapore’s independence. Its Soviet-supplied bombers, jet fighters, warships and amphibious assault forces continued to pose a threat that was only deterred by the presence of massive British military forces (Subritzky, 2000; Jones, 2002). Konfrontasi only ended in 1966 after General Suharto’s Indonesian army-backed, conservative right-wing forces successful wrestled power from the pro-left-wing Sukarno regime. When Singapore hanged two Indonesian saboteurs for terrorist activities during Konfrontasi in 1968, Indonesia responded with military threats (Lee, 2000: 37-38). In view of perceived aggressive intentions by its neighbours, Singapore’s leaders resolved to develop a credible military force to nullify their neighbours’ future attempts at compellence and defend its national interests.

Development of military power The development of indigenous military power was made more urgent by geopolitical strategic shifts. Britain had maintained forces East of Suez to bolster its claim to Great Power status. High defence expenditure coupled with weak economic performance led to a Sterling financial crisis. Britain was forced to pull out the bulk of its military forces from the region by 1971 to avert an economic collapse at home (Murfett et al., 1999: 316-326; Hack, 2001: 272-298). In adherence to the Domino Theory, the United States (US) had in the 1960s militarily intervened in South Vietnam to avert a communist victory by the North Vietnamese supported guerrilla

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insurgency. Mounting domestic opposition to rising troop casualties led to new policy directions. The US effectively disengaged militarily from mainland Southeast Asia under the Guam doctrine by 1973 and the last US troops left Vietnam in 1975. The truncation of military responsibilities by Singapore’s traditional military patron and ally transferred the defence burden onto local shoulders. It also convinced local leaders that self-help remained a timeless principle in the face of abandonment by its allies (Huxley, 2000: 55-56).

Initial requests for military assistance from the non-aligned nations of India and Egypt in starting the SAF were politely rebuffed. In its hour of need, Singapore readily took up an Israeli offer of military training. To avoid incurring a large military expenditure, to develop patriotism, to re-organise the armed forces to reflect Singapore’s Chinese majority ethnic composition and to socially engineer cohesion within a multi-ethnic society, a conscription army built around a small professional core model was adopted. Conscripts, after serving two and a half years of military training, are passed into the reserves where refresher training is regularly conducted and liable for call-up for a further thirteen years.2 In this manner, a large pool of trained military personnel was quickly accumulated and which could be mobilised at short notice (Lee, 2000: 30-31, 33-37; Chan, 1985: 140-141).

Lee Kuan Yew placed a premium on acquiring tanks and armoured vehicles.

This aimed to deter Malaysia from attempting to intervene across the Causeway connecting the two territories in the event of communal disturbances between Singapore’s Malay minority and Chinese majority. The first public display of tanks and armoured vehicles during the 1969 National Day Parade had a salutary deterrent effect on the Malaysians, who did not have any armour assets save some poorly armed armoured cars (Lee, 2000: 40-41). Coming on the heels of the May

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1969 racial riots in Malaysia, it marked the turning point when Singapore passed from military impotence to acquiring a minimum military capability to defend itself.

The British withdrawal would have left Singapore bereft of air and naval protection. A squadron of British fighters was quickly procured and local pilots trained in Britain to form a fledging air force. New naval patrol vessels were purchased to provide coastal defence to guard the Singapore Straits and port limits.

By 1971, Singapore had rudimentary and balanced armed forces to fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of British military forces (Huxley, 2000: 11-14, 18-21; Lee, 2000: 29-31, 35, 40-42).

Unfortunately, the urgency to develop a conventional defence capability limited the resources that could be allocated to nurture counter-terrorism expertise.

Counter-terrorism wasn’t seen as a major issue at the time. The primary challenge was overwhelmingly conventional in nature. This gap was glaringly exposed during the 1974 Japanese Red Army attack on offshore oil refineries. The terrorists escaped by hijacking a ferry, Laju, taking hostage its passengers to be traded subsequently for a safe passage out of Singapore. Negotiation was preferred over force in this instance since the counter-terrorism capability was lacking (Anonymous, 2000a: 6).

But by the 1980s, a well-trained special operations force was in place. It showed its mettle by swiftly ending the skyjacking of a Singapore Airlines shuttle flight flying from Kuala Lumpur to Singapore on 26 March 1991. All four poorly armed hijackers were killed without a single loss to the assault team and hostages. In a skyjacking scenario, a shoot-to-kill policy is the best guarantee of safety for both the hostages and the assault team. Hijackers are worth more dead than alive to governments. Incarcerated hijackers may prompt comrades who remain at large to

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conduct further hostage taking to compel governments to free their prisoners. The successful use of force in this instance served as a deterrent against future skyjackers and showcased the operational readiness of Singapore’s armed forces (Bilveer, 1991: 68; Anonymous, 2000b: 11-14; Ministry of Defence, Singapore, 2000: 9; Huxley, 2000: 126).

As it currently stands, the SAF possesses relatively impressive military forces of four army divisions with heavy armour and artillery components, five squadrons of modern fighter and strike aircraft, and two squadrons of missile armed warships and a squadron of submarines. These assets are underpinned by comprehensive training regimes and backed up by extensive logistic support infrastructure.3

Military Doctrine Posen has identified three types of military doctrine adopted by military organisations. An offensive doctrine aims to disarm an adversary by destroying his armed forces. A defensive doctrine aims to deny an adversary the objective he seeks. Finally, a deterrent doctrine aims to punish an aggressor by raising his costs relative to any benefits that could be attained (Posen, 1984: 14).

Singapore’s official military doctrine is deterrence. Should deterrence fail, the SAF aims to secure a swift and decisive battlefield victory (Ministry of Defence, Singapore, 2000: 27). Implicit is the threat of a resort to force using an offensive doctrine should the non-use of force inherent in deterrence fails. Snyder distinguishes between two types of deterrence. Deterrence by denial is accomplished by having military forces which can block the enemy’s military forces from making territorial gains. Deterrence by punishment concedes territory but deters

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by posing the prospect of war costs greater than the value of the gain (Snyder, 1960: 163).

In Singapore’s case, the type of deterrence adopted is a function of military power. During the initial phase of military build-up, the limitations of the SAF led it to deter by punishment using a deterrent doctrine. The ‘poisonous shrimp’ analogy was widely used. An aggressor may be able to conquer Singapore, but the high cost of conquest would turn success into a Pyrrhic victory (Huxley, 2000: 56-57). The gradual expansion of military capabilities, however, has allowed the SAF to transit to deterrence by denial. More significantly, the SAF’s growing capabilities have endowed it with the ability to adopt a fungible concept of force, allowing it the options of either choosing not to use force through deterrence by denial or the use of force in an offensive role.

The evolution of military doctrine towards an offensive capability is reflected in the force structure of the SAF. The Army comprises three combined arms divisions comprising infantry, tanks and artillery organised into combat units combining mobility and firepower. Two divisions are deployed in the frontline with one kept in reserve. A fourth division focuses on homeland security. The availability of power projection assets – Chinook heavy lift helicopters and Endurance class amphibious assault ships – provides the flexibility of landing troops behind enemy lines by sea and air to trap the enemy armed forces in a massive encirclement and destroy it in a single decisive battle. The Air Force will provide a permissive environment for land operations by first gaining air superiority and destroying strategic targets, subsequently providing close air support for rapidly advancing armoured battle groups (Ministry of Defence, Singapore, 2000: 27-28, 33; Ministry of Defence, Singapore, 2009a).

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The aim is to fight a short, decisive war of manoeuvre based on precision fires, rather than engage in a long war of attrition which resource poor Singapore is unable to indulge in. In line with manoeuvre warfare concepts, soldiers have been trained to exercise initiative in decentralised settings to fulfil the intent of commanders rather than rely on traditional centralised command systems that emphasised rigid obedience of orders from the higher chain of command (Kuek, 1999: 30; Seet, 2000: 23; Tan, 2000: 29-40).

Deterrence: Success or Failure?

Singapore’s official military doctrine is deterrence by denial. If deterrence fails, it will resort to the use of force in an offensive role to secure a swift and decisive victory.

Under what circumstances would Singapore’s military power be used? What is the impact of military doctrine on deterrence success or failure in Singapore? It is, therefore, useful to import Mearsheimer’s concept of conventional deterrence as an analytical tool.

According to Mearsheimer, conventional deterrence ‘is a function of the capability of denying an aggressor his battlefield objectives with conventional forces’ (Mearsheimer, 1983: 15). Written in the context of the Cold War in Europe, Mearsheimer argued that traditional theories of conventional deterrence emphasising balance of forces or the type of weapons possessed by each side were flawed (Mearsheimer, 1983: 25-28). Deterrence success or failure depended on the type of military strategy being employed by decision makers. Mearsheimer identified three types of military strategy: attrition, blitzkrieg and limited aims. From the decision maker’s perspective, deterrence will prevail in an attrition strategy, fail in a blitzkrieg strategy and create an ambiguous outcome in a limited aims strategy in which the

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aggressor does not intend to destroy his opponent but instead, opt for the limited aim of seizing a small portion of the opponent’s territory. Ambiguity prevails because the limited victory may translate into a war of attrition and impose more costs than benefits. In such situations, deterrence prevails. But if limited victory is won through a blitzkrieg strategy and a fait accompli ensues, the benefits will outstrip the costs of military action. Hence, deterrence will likely fail in this situation (Mearsheimer, 1983: 28-66).

Posen has written that an offensive doctrine predisposes a military organisation that adopts a blitzkrieg strategy to launch a pre-emptive strike to maximise success. When applied to the SAF, this is problematic. While the validity of a blitzkrieg strategy as part of a limited aims strategy has not been questioned by the SAF Officer Corps, considerable debate remains amongst SAF officers as to the relative merits of pre-emption. Seet has argued that negative conceptions of preemption on legal, moral and ethical grounds as well as difficulties in clarifying an enemy’s intent early enough to mount a response rules out pre-emption as a valid policy option for Singapore (Seet, 2000: 22). Lim, however, argues that Singapore’s vulnerability and need to make quick decisive decisions during a crisis will predispose the SAF not to take chances. The SAF will therefore avail itself of a rapidly closing window of opportunity (Lim, 2002: 73-75). The difference in views, especially among serving military officers, indicates that the validity of pre-emption remains contested. But Singapore’s growing civil defence capability to protect its key infrastructure and population, its hardening of military facilities such as air bases, has widened Singapore’s strategic options since the ability to absorb a first strike generates policy options beyond pre-emption (Huxley, 2000: 249). What is certain, however, is that the SAF’s military capabilities allow Singapore’s political leaders to

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choose pre-emption if necessary. The exercise of this choice will determine whether deterrence succeeds or fails.

Is War an Option?

Huxley has argued that the SAF’s superior military capabilities are never meant to be used and act as a ‘regional doomsday device’ to deter potential enemies. Any conflict with Malaysia would shake the confidence of local and foreign investors in Singapore’s economy and create unrest among Singapore’s Malay minority (Huxley, 2000: 62-63). In view of Singapore’s emphasis on the provision of security to promote economic success, fighting a war would undermine its pursuit of economic development goals, which require a peaceful and stable environment to attract foreign investment. At the regional level, no Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) member has engaged a fellow member in inter-state war since its inception, leading some analysts to argue that there exists a foundation to create a security community in Southeast Asia (Acharya, 2001: 204). Thus, Huxley’s view holds considerable merit, given the rational outlook of Singapore’s political leaders who set great store by cost-benefit analysis. But would the desire to avoid war undermine the credibility of the SAF’s deterrent function?

The Rising Utility of Force While war may not be a viable option because its costs exceed any potential benefits that may be attained, this does not mean that force may not be used. Force may be employed in a coercive function in ‘an attempt to impose one’s will upon another through the threat of force or the use of force’ (Schaub, 1998: 330). This may take the form of compellence, which may be defined as

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(1) the use of threats by one actor (2) to induce a change in the behaviour of another actor (3) by persuading the target that the probable costs of continuing its current behaviour will exceed the probable costs of altering it in the direction desired by the actor issuing the compellent threat (4) because that actor is willing to undertake actions that will increase the cost of maintaining the status quo (Schaub, 1998: 43-44).

Related to the concept of compellence is coercive diplomacy, which aims to persuade an opponent to actually do something it would otherwise not do by using threats and the exemplary use of force (Freedman, 1998b: 17). Force is used to convey resolve and exercised through gradual escalation to allow an opponent the opportunity to back down (Craig and George, 1995: 196). In Morgan’s analysis, coercive diplomacy represents the defensive dimension of compellence (Morgan, 2003, 3-4). Compellence theory recognises that threats to use force may be more effective if left implicit rather than explicit. Given the fungibility of force, force may be kept in reserve to achieve political ends (Art, 1996: 10-11).

Strategic Coercion The SAF’s current military superiority relative to its regional counterparts has widened Singapore’s coercive options in the event of any attempt to upset the status quo by its neighbours. The authoritative Jane’s World Air Forces described Singapore’s air force as ‘the most powerful and capable air arm in Southeast Asia’ (Peacock and Keymer, 2009a) while the Malaysian air force ‘will remain inferior to Singapore’s sophisticated and substantial air arm’ (Peacock and Keymer, 2009b).

Singapore’s Revolution in Military Affairs lead over its neighbours ensures that it will

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prevail in any limited regional conventional conflict (Huxley, 2004: 202). Unlike in the past, Singapore is now capable of standing up to compellence attempts by its adversaries. The island state has developed the ability to engage in counter-coercion by issuing its own credible compellent threats.4 Confidence in its military capabilities has led Singapore to use counter-coercion on occasion when Singapore’s troubled bilateral relations with Malaysia flares up periodically.

One issue in dispute concerns the sovereignty over the offshore island of Pedra Branca which controls vital shipping lanes. Singapore has administered the island since the 1840s. Malaysia laid claim to the island in 1979. Following an International Court of Justice’s ruling in Malaysia’s favour over Indonesia regarding the disputed islands of Sipadan and Ligitan, Malaysia began fresh agitation on the Pedra Branca issue (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, c. 2003). Beginning from December 2002, Malaysian leaders started to raise the possible spectre of war if Singapore refused to compromise over the issue in the Malaysian media. This further encouraged the Malaysian media to play up Singapore’s offensive military doctrine and link it to Singapore’s ‘arrogance’ in the conduct of its bilateral relations with Malaysia. Malaysian leaders were quick in publicising the Malaysian Armed Forces’ capability in defending Malaysia from external threats. The Malaysian press also created a furore over Huxley’s book. ‘Walking the talk’, Malaysia challenged Singapore’s sovereignty by intruding into the waters surrounding Pedra Branca, leading to tense standoffs involving vessels of both navies. The aim, apparently, was to whip up Malay nationalist fervour (Jayakumar, 2003a: para.76-78).

This dramatic escalation of tensions led to the discussion of bilateral relations in Singapore’s Parliament on 25 January, 2003. Singapore’s Foreign Minister, S Jayakumar, noted that ‘[l]oose talk of war is irresponsible and dangerous. It whips up

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emotions that could become difficult to control … it heightens the temperature which makes bilateral relations very, very tense and spiky … such talk is senseless and dangerous’ (Jayakumar, 2003a: para.79; Jayakumar, 2003b). The Foreign Minister also warned the Malaysian Government that repeated intrusions of Singapore’s territorial waters would lead to serious consequences (Jayakumar, 2003a).

The next day, a Sunday, the SAF conducted an open mobilisation exercise to signal its operational readiness (Yeo, 2003a). While it is not uncommon for the SAF to conduct an open mobilisation exercise, this exercise stood out for the mass media coverage of soldiers on parade, kitted in full battle order, faces covered in war paint amidst tanks, armoured fighting vehicles and artillery. It is rare for soldiers reporting for a mobilisation exercise to be fully equipped with small arms and heavy weapons and made ready for immediate deployment as the norm merely involved marking attendance. The exercise was held on the last weekend before the Lunar New Year, both a peak season for many businesses which were hard pressed to release employees and a busy period for the vast majority of Singaporeans to prepare for festivities. This inconvenient timing required army reservists to sacrifice their precious time for the sake of national interest, in pursuit of the aim of sending a strong signal to the Malaysians.

This was further reinforced the following day when Members of Parliament and senior community leaders witnessed a demonstration of force by the SAF’s armoured battle group, ostensibly a routine visit planned to acquaint local leaders with the SAF’s capabilities which was covered by the mass media as well. But its signalling effect targeted at the Malaysians was unmistakable (Yeo, 2003b).

In the weeks following the issue of the two implicit threats of force, public statements by Malaysian leaders were subdued and avoided any loose talk of war.

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Singapore’s counter-coercion strategy merged deterrence and compellence to deter the Malaysians from continuing their vitriolic public discourse and maritime intrusions into Singapore waters. Successful counter-coercion compelled the Malaysians to respect the taboo on using war-like language and channelling Malaysian efforts towards a diplomatic solution while toning down attempts to stir up public feelings against Singapore (Jayakumar, 2003c).

In this respect, if the outcome of the episode is deemed a success, then counter-coercion may be used more frequently in future, especially since the broad capabilities of the SAF allows it to demonstrate military power in all three dimensions of land, air and sea. The air force, with its ability to deliver precision-guided munitions accurately over long distances, may become the preferred medium of coercion. This is in line with current theories on the use of airpower as a coercive tool to achieve political objectives. This development has not gone unnoticed by air force officers who have advocated similar use of airpower for coercive purposes in the local context (Ng, 2002: 98-115).

The Singapore navy’s acquisition of submarines poses a latent threat to Malaysian maritime communications. A submarine on patrol constitutes an implicit threat that Malaysian maritime interests could be easily threatened by a stealthy submarine laying in wait under the sea, outside the major Malaysian ports.

Submarines may also be used in tit-for-tat violations of Malaysian territorial waters in response to further Malaysian intrusions into the waters surrounding Pedra Branca (Channel NewsAsia, 2003). As submarines travel under water, it is more difficult to stop submarine incursions, especially when Malaysia still lacks an effective underwater defence capability. This represents a relatively low-cost, low-risk medium to coerce Malaysia without worry of effective counter-measures being implemented.

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The SAF’s successful development of credible counter-coercion capability heralds a more peaceful environment in which decision makers across both sides of the Causeway are channelled towards diplomatic options since coercion wielded by one side may be effectively countered by the other party. The successful reference of the Pedra Branca dispute to the International Court of Justice shortly after Singapore’s counter-coercion and compellence efforts bears this out. In 2008, the Court awarded Pedra Branca to Singapore while Malaysian gained sovereignty over a nearby maritime feature, Middle Rocks. The Court ruled that a second maritime feature, South Ledge, which is visible only at low tide and does not generate its own territorial waters, belongs to whoever owns the territorial waters it sits in. This begs the question of how Singapore and Malaysia will delimit the territorial waters in the Pedra Branca and Middle Rocks area (Lim, 2008; Jayakumar and Koh, 2009). This may become yet another contentious issue to bedevil bilateral ties. What is certain is that the SAF can be expected to play a more active compellence role when the need arises instead of sitting passively in a deterrent posture. Compellence, though, is not the only way the SAF has used military power.

Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Relief Operations The SAF have been engaging in humanitarian relief operations abroad since the provision of a military medical mission to East Pakistan in 1970, following a devastating cyclone that ravaged the country (Singapore Armed Forces Medical Services, 1992: 56, 123-125). Aside from the humanitarian aims of such missions, it also serves to win the hearts and minds among foreign populations and show the flag, highlighting Singapore’s contribution to international order as a responsible global citizen. Furthermore, it assists in establishing friendly relations with countries

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in their hour of need. A recent example was the SAF humanitarian relief operations in Sumatra and Thailand after the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster in December 2004 which earned the gratitude of the affected Indonesian and Thai communities (Boey, 2005). To highlight its role as a responsible global citizen, Singapore also deployed a medical mission to the Persian Gulf in 1991 to express solidarity with the international coalition assembled under the United Nations (UN) auspices to end Iraq’s illegal occupation of Kuwait (Singapore Armed Forces Medical Services, 1992: 130-131; Tan, 1999: 27-33). Such missions provide a realistic environment to test the operational readiness of the SAF. The increasing involvement of the SAF in Operations Other Than War (OOTW) have led to recognition among serving officers of the need to prepare for OOTW, in addition to the SAF’s main function of conventional deterrence (Lim, 2000: 41-54; Lim, 2001: 49-59).

Singapore has gradually increased its involvement in UN peacekeeping operations as part of a strategy of maintaining a higher international profile.

Participation showcases its commitment to the UN’s efforts to safeguard international law and order through its peacekeeping efforts, which resonates with a small country like Singapore (Ministry of Defence, Singapore, 2000: 23). The SAF has participated in UN peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Guatemala and Namibia among others, which indicates the worldwide deployment of SAF personnel and assets (Anonymous, 1999: 2).

In its immediate locale, Singapore had contributed substantial men and material to two UN operations, namely UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia in 1993 and the International Force for East Timor in October 1999, subsequently transformed into the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) (Ministry of Defence, Singapore, 2000: 24; Koh, 2001: 5-6). These UN operations

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served to stabilise the political situation in two neighbouring countries and contributed to regional order and stability. As the deployment of forces was under UN auspices and had the consent of the host governments, the risk of hostilities was limited but not absent. Singapore’s participation, along that of fellow ASEAN countries, indicated a more pro-active stance in contributing to regional stability.

Humanitarian Intervention Humanitarian intervention violates state sovereignty and involves interference into the domestic affairs of states on humanitarian grounds, which contradicts the ASEAN norm of non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states.

Significant ethnic minorities are present in all the ASEAN states, transcending ASEAN borders in the case of Malay Muslims in predominantly Buddhist southern Thailand and large Muslim populations on Mindanao in predominantly Catholic Philippines. The presence of secession movements in Thailand, Myanmar and the Philippines complicates on-going nation-building efforts and has the potential to raise bilateral tensions among ASEAN members (Tan, 2000a; Tan, 2000b). This has led to continuing sensitivity to humanitarian intervention and makes Singapore and fellow ASEAN members cautious in the use of military power for humanitarian purposes in the region. When it involves Indonesia, the major power of the region, the issue of humanitarian intervention is treated gingerly.

Thus far, Singapore has only used military power for humanitarian intervention if two conditions are met. First, the operation should be under UN auspices or meets international legal norms, which lends legitimacy to the deployment of forces. Second, the operation should have the consent of the host

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government. Deployment of combat forces under such conditions has taken place on two occasions.

The first was the evacuation of Singapore citizens from Phnom Penh in July 1997, following the outbreak of fighting between rival Cambodian government factions. Armed special operations troops accompanied the military transport aircraft deployed to Phnom Penh airport to ensure the safe evacuation of civilians which was completed successfully (Ministry of Defence, Singapore, 2000: 38; Anonymous, 2000a: 9).

The second occasion was the deployment of an infantry company for peacekeeping operations in East Timor. Singapore had hitherto declined to commit ground combat troops but limited itself to contributions of medical, logistics and air support to UN peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. It reversed its position in order to participate more fully in UN peacekeeping operations. The government prepared public opinion at home for possible casualties among its peacekeepers prior to their deployment, justifying the over-riding need to contribute to international peace and stability as a responsible member of the UN (Tan, 2003a).

Deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan The gradual and expanding SAF involvement in UN operations abroad has effectively lowered the threshold for the commitment of combat support troops to hostile regions, and domestic public opinion has been conditioned to accept overseas troop commitments as necessary for national security. In the wake of the 11 September 2001 Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks against the US, Singapore chose to ‘bandwagon’ with the US in combating global terrorism and its efforts to curb proliferation and development of weapons of mass destruction. The presence of Al-

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Qaeda offshoots in the Southeast Asian region and on the island itself spurred Singapore to actively endorse and participate in US-led counter-terrorism initiatives.

The close alignment of security interests and the seriousness of the terror threat led Singapore to openly side with the US in endorsing and supporting the US war against Iraq in 2003. Answering the US call for troop contributions from allies, Singapore responded by dispatching warships, aerial refuelling and transport aircraft to Iraq to operate as part of US-led post-hostility stabilisation efforts (Quek, 2009). In addition, Singapore also contributed medical and combat engineering teams to NATO-led humanitarian and reconstruction assistance efforts in Afghanistan (Teo, 2008; Ministry of Defence, Singapore, 2008). Singapore’s military contributions have been decidedly token since its minuscule size limits the extent of assistance it could render.

The contribution of combat support troops abroad has enhanced Singapore’s economic security. In return for Singapore’s support for US operations in Iraq, the US had rewarded Singapore with a much coveted Free Trade Agreement; allowed a local government-linked firm to buy over the bankrupt American telecommunications giant Global Crossing despite initial security concerns expressed by the Department of Defence; and allowed Singapore companies to bid for lucrative commercial contracts in US-administered Iraq (Toh, 2002: 126; Lee, 2003; Koh, 2003). The Singapore government has downplayed suggestions that these separate events constitute rewards by a grateful Bush administration. Instead, it has chosen to highlight the beneficial effects of these events on creating job and business opportunities in an economy suffering from recession.

The inauguration of the new Obama administration has necessitated a reorientation away from Iraq towards Afghanistan in accordance with the latter’s higher

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priority in the new administration. Singapore has ceased its deployment of forces to Iraq and diverted its troops and military equipment to Afghanistan and the Gulf of Aden to combat rampant piracy on the high seas. Taking its cue from the Obama administration, Singapore is increasing its military commitment to Afghanistan, making preparations to deploy an aerial refuelling tanker, an unmanned aerial vehicle task group and a weapon locating radar team (Teo, 2009; Ministry of Defence, Singapore, 2009b). The deployment of token combat support forces to Iraq during the Bush administration and rapid re-orientation of Singapore’s military effort away from Iraq towards Afghanistan following the election of President Barack Obama who campaigned for a US military withdrawal from Iraq, illustrates the growing nexus between the use of military power and the attainment of national security objectives – namely bandwagoning with the unipolar power to ensure physical and economic security – which further safeguards Singapore’s national sovereignty.

Conclusion Singapore’s lack of strategic depth and location within a volatile region has sensitised its leaders to the acquisition of military power to ensure its security, survival and success. A history of strained bilateral relations with neighbours led to the development of the SAF to deter attempts at compellence and provide a credible conventional deterrent.

The expansion of military capabilities allows the SAF to adopt a military doctrine that could serve either deterrent or offensive functions depending on how it defines its security interests. Increasingly, the SAF has moved beyond its traditional deterrent function and has been used as a coercive instrument to further Singapore’s

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national interests. The SAF has diversified into new areas such as peacekeeping operations, humanitarian relief operations and humanitarian intervention. It has started contributing combat support troops abroad to assist its allies engaging in combat operations.

These diverse uses of military power signal the growing maturity of the SAF. Thus, despite ASEAN norms against resort to war to settle bilateral issues and the growing recognition that war does not serve Singapore’s national interests, this has not diminished the credibility of the SAF in performing its main deterrent function.

The growing fungibility of military power and the SAF’s increasing capability to use military power in myriad ways have instead enhanced its deterrent credibility and allowed a closer nexus between the use of military power and the achievement of Singapore’s national security. This has ensured that Singapore would continue to maintain and safeguard its sovereignty against any threat, real or perceived.

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Endnotes The Noble Prize winning economist and military strategist Thomas C. Schelling conceptualised ‘compellence’ theory during the 1960s.

2 The National Service period currently stands at two years with a further ten years in the military reserves.

3 See Singapore Ministry of Defence website, www.mindef.gov.sg 4 The concept of counter-coercion is explained in Freedman, 1998a: 13; Freedman, 1998b: 30, 36; Schaub, 1998: 45-46.

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