The Lighthouse, Trinity 2018

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FRONT COVER

A Note From the Editors This issue looks to engage with and challenge the prevailing narratives surrounding the many ‘directions’ of international affairs in the twenty-first century. We are proud to present these articles that grapple with an impressive range of issues, from Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indian Ocean, to Macron’s reforms, through to the institutional challenge of artificial intelligence. We hope that our readers will enjoy reading them as much as we have.

We would like to start this edition, however, with showing our deep gratitude to all those who have helped us put this issue together.

We are particularly indebted to our editor-in-chief Tom who kept a watchful eye on our finances and guided us throughout the process.

Our team of sub-editors, Cara, Julia, Michelle and Thania, have supported the writers to ensure that each article is succinct, precise, and elegant. Many thanks go out to Robert Harrison, who once again has outdone himself as our Graphic Designer. Also to Kean Murphy, IRSoc’s President, for helping to promote the Journal at Text events, as well as Neil Misra, the IRSoc Director of Communications.

Thanks also go to TJ Fitzgerald, IRSoc’s Treasurer for his assistance with finances. Without the collaboration of all these people, this term’s Lighthouse would have been much the poorer and possibly even non-existent. Thanks are also due to Wadham SU for its generous donation to help fund printing costs.

Above all we want to thank the writers for their excellent work.

We encourage our readers to follow our blog, where we will be uploading even more exciting articles.

Hugh Thomas and Owen Brooks

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INSIDE LEAF

DIRECTIONS IN GEOPOLITICS Turbulent Waters: Rivalry in the Indian Ocean Shantanu Roy-Chaudhury

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The Bear, the Dragon, and America’s National Defense Strategy Julia Routledge

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Migrations, Fundamentalism, and the other Silk Road to Syria Archie Philipps

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Lighting Up a Continent: Energy, Security and Geopolitics in Africa Lucy Clay

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A Polar Silk Road: China’s Warming Arctic Interests Ee Hsiun Chong

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DIRECTIONS IN NEGOTIATION Trump, Israel, and the Iran Deal: The New Diplomacy Nicholas Linfoot

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Macron’s Reforms, an International France, and the Future of the EU Carl du Jeu

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Weinstein to Wahhabism: Global Directions in Gender Equality Cara Exall

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China and the Direction of Korean Nuclear Talks Nicholas Chin

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DIRECTIONS IN IDENTITY Myanmar: A Fragile Transition Michelle Huang

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Eastern Europe’s Right-Wing Swing Verity Bligh

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Britain’s History of Deportations Magda Rodríguez Dehli

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Colombia: Narcos or Nirvana?

Kyra Leyland

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Kazakhstan: Where is it Wandering Now? Max Randall & Nicholas Ching

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POSTSCRIPT: A WARNING Artificial Intelligence and the Future of our Institutions Nathania Silalahi

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TURBULENT WATERS:

RIVALRY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN Shantanu Roy-Chaudhury The world is increasingly understanding the strategic aspect of maritime power in the present day. The Indian Ocean is a region with growing competition and rivalry. The two main contenders in the ocean, India and China, both have enormous stakes in the region. Since India views the Indian ocean as a part of its neighbourhood, increasing Chinese presence in its ‘backyard’ has recently caused alarm. This has led to the emergence of a maritime great game between these two Asian powers.

immense value for the national security and strategy of both countries. From China’s end, the government adopted a “string of pearls” strategy to encircle India. This comprises of establishing a series of ports in countries surrounding India as Beijing had done in Gwadar in Pakistan and Hambantota in Sri Lanka.

The so-called string of pearls forms a part of the wider Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Announced by Xi Jinping in 2013, the Belt refers to a series of overland roads, pipelines, railways, and other infrastructural initiatives through Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East to Europe. The Road refers to a series of ports and maritime trade routes through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean to the Middle East, the east coast of Africa, and onward to Europe. This expansive project, seeking to connect China with the world to increase connectivity and

As the maritime great game unfolds between India and China in the Indian Ocean, this region is becoming the focus of global geostrategic agendas for many countries. The Indian Ocean is an extremely important region for India and China due to the amount of trade and energy resources that pass through it. As a result, the region has an

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trade, is not seen favourably from the perspective of the Indian government. A part of the BRI, known as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), passes through territory contested by India and Pakistan. The development of this corridor, which runs extremely close to the Indian border, is a source of strategic worry as it would ease Chinese military entry into the region. India is looking to extend its influence in the region and avoid Chinese encirclement, while China is continuously furthering its influence in the region and simultaneously trying to constrain and encircle India.

Both countries are investing heavily to increase their naval capabilities and out-manoeuvre each other strategically.

Therefore, as Robert Kaplan stated in his article on power plays in the Indian Ocean, “India fears being encircled by China unless it expands its own sphere of influence. The two countries' overlapping commercial and political interests are fostering competition, and even more so in the naval realm than on land”.

government, the situation has the possibility to change. However, for the time being, the Chinese have the upper hand in Sri Lanka, and India must prioritise furthering its own footprint in Sri Lanka and the wider Indian Ocean as a whole.

As the maritime great game unfolds between India and China in the Indian Ocean, this region is becoming the focus of global geostrategic agendas for many countries.

Similarly, the Maldives is another island state which has historically been under the Indian sphere of influence but has recently seen a growing Chinese footprint slowly eroding India’s primacy.

The China-Pakistan axis and their ‘all-weather friendship’ is also a factor that India should view with caution.

China is building a port in Gwadar, Pakistan, which will directly play a role in encircling India. In 2017, China also inaugurated its first overseas military base in Djibouti which lies on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on the northwest end of the Indian Ocean, an important global shipping lane that leads to the Suez Canal. What is more, China is also developing ports in Myanmar and Bangladesh. The government in India is aware of these developments and is not taking them lightly. Although China justifies these development projects purely on the grounds of trade, they want to convert these trade outposts into military outposts. This was seen with

One of the main facets of the direct rivalry between India and China is the endeavour for influence in the island and littoral states of the Indian ocean.

Sri Lanka is central to this competition; its geographical location at the crossroads of important sea lanes makes it a priority for both India and China. Both countries have initiated many projects in Sri Lanka. Most worrying for India are China’s Hambantota port and the Colombo Port City projects, which in the past have seen Chinese submarines dock at the former. Although India has discussed joint ventures like the Trincomalee Harbour and the Mattala airport in Hambantota, they are yet to be implemented. With the more assertive Indian

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the alarming emergence of a Chinese submarine in Sri Lanka and warships docking in Maldives,. To push back, India is currently developing a port in Chabahar, Iran, which is less than 200 kilometres from Gwadar in Pakistan.

This is an effort by the Indian government to avoid being constrained and to open a new route to Central Asia. India is also seeking to further ties with the Seychelles as it is currently negotiating a military base in the country.

Southeast Asian nations through its “Look-East” policy. India is also drawing closer to the United States and Japan, both looking to India to be a counterweight to China in the region. With the inclusion of Australia, there are talks on the resurgence of the quadrilateral security dialogue (the Quad) as a counter to China’s BRI. India has options but has to be cautious not to bandwagon off the United States and must carry out a proactive foreign policy in the Indian Ocean.

The island states of the Indian Ocean have always been wary of India’s hegemonic tendencies. With the emergence of China in the region, many of them are looking to balance India by drawing closer to China. Although India cannot compete financially with China to develop projects overseas, China’s hegemony in the region is not completely certain since being the regional power, India still has a large role in the Indian Ocean. Chinese investments in various countries have also left the host countries in serious debt.

The Chinese have used this to their advantage to increase influence. States slowly realise the dangers of falling into this debt trap and might be wary of China. The increasing Chinese presence in countries like Sri Lanka has also triggered negative local reactions, with some feeling as though their country is on sale. The Chinese business model, although prosperous for China, may backfire and ultimately hinder their development projects.

Evidently, the rivalry in the Indian Ocean will continue and intensify in the coming years. An assertive China is directly challenging India in its neighbourhood, and it will be interesting to see the direction this maritime great game takes.

The Indian Ocean, although vast, does have choke points. China has no other alternative but to go through the extremely narrow strait of Malacca to enter the Indian Ocean. Checking the strait of Malacca could play in India’s favour as it is drawing closer to the

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THE BEAR, THE DRAGON, AND AMERICA’S NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY AMERICA'S NATIONAL DEFENCE STRATEGY Julia Routledge

In January of this year, the US Secretary of Defense, Jim Mattis, took to the stage in a room full of hushed scholars at John Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. A man whose iron composure has been forged during a naval career stretching back over decades, Mattis is not given to hyperbole. Instead, he spoke with frankness of the grave challenges confronting the country in today’s geopolitical landscape.

mented, could shape the course of American foreign and defence policy for years to come.

The tectonic plates of international security are shifting, and America, having been mired in the longest continuous stretch of conflict in its history, is realising that it must tackle other emergent threats to the international rules-based order. The full NDS is classified, so we can assume that the more specific strategic elements are confined within it. Nevertheless, the condensed version, which accompanies President Trump’s earlier National Security Strategy of December 2017, remains a fascinating read, for it argues that America must redirect its policies to focus on preparation for tomorrow’s conflicts, whether they are contested in conventional arenas of war, or in the ominously-named “grey zone.”

America’s “competitive edge has eroded in every domain of warfare… and it is continuing to erode,” he observed, and he cautioned against complacency: “History is clear that America has no pre-ordained right to victory on the battlefield.” This event marked the launch of the first National Defense Strategy (NDS) in a decade, a document whose objectives, if properly imple-

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At the heart of the NDS are two key actors, China and Russia, whose “revisionist regimes” imperil the established international rules-based order. The former’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, coupled with the menacing shadow it casts over smaller neighbours such as Taiwan and the Philippines, has set alarm bells ringing in many quarters. America would be unlikely to countenance an Asia and Indo-Pacific increasingly dominated by an authoritarian, one-party state, and the recommendations of the NDS are designed to equip the US military to prevent such an outcome, whether through deterrence or more extreme measures. Long-term strategic competition has also resurged with a vengeance within Russo-American relations. Putin has scant concern for international norms and the territorial, diplomatic and economic security of Russia’s neighbours, and his regime’s alignment with Assad and Iran in Syria has further established Russia as a serious threat to the international order.

sionist regimes,” striking an alarmist tone when it contends that “China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model.” In reality, the challenges they present are most dissimilar. The Russian bear, truculent, belligerent, and bent on undermining the West and its interests, has had no qualms about its actions in countries such as Georgia, Ukraine and Syria. The Chinese dragon, on the other hand, has not shown such flagrant disregard for international norms, and endangers America and the international system far less, for now at least.

China is hardly a steadfast ally of the US, but Xi Jinping seems more intent on consolidating his party’s domestic power than bolstering the country’s position on the world stage at the expense of international peace. An examination of the patterns of education amongst the upper echelons of Chinese society, for instance, reveals that over 300,000 Chinese students currently study in America (indeed, Jinping sent his own daughter to Harvard) and this model of Sino-American integration hardly smacks of a virulently anti-Western stance. China is the largest trading partner of 130 countries and regions, including America and many of its neighbouring countries towards which it allegedly deploys “predatory economics.” It is little wonder that China greeted this iteration of the NDS with strong censure: Ren Guoqiang, spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, deemed it to be “full of unreal assertions of ‘zero-sum’ games and confrontations,” whilst his counterpart in the foreign ministry, Hua Chunying, exhorted America to “discard the Cold War mentality.” America’s wariness about China’s future intentions is not entirely misplaced, but by paying

If America does not act with a degree of caution, the magma of discontent will bubble up through the fissures in its argument.

Yet there are flaws to the NDS, and if America does not act with a degree of caution, the magma of discontent will bubble up through the fissures in its argument. Perhaps most crucially, the NDS unduly conflates the two “revi-

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closer attention to the individual trajectories of the two “revisionist regimes,” America might be able to shape more effectively the direction of its own defence strategy without unduly alienating China in the process.

the world. Unless America reinforces its web of dependable and sympathetic allies, the bark of the NDS might prove to be worse than its bite.

Whether the public will throw its support behind this redirection of defence policy is debatable. The NDS offers up a substantial bill to the taxpayer at a time when many Americans are disillusioned with an international order from which they do not seem to derive any personal benefit.

This is only exacerbated by a profound civil-military divide in the country, with most Americans lacking almost any exposure to military personnel. A disconnect between the military and the people it seeks to protect does not bode well for stability of investment, and Congress will need to work hard to convince American citizens that modernising the military is in the best long-term interests of their country.

Nonetheless, the NDS’s emphasis on regaining a military edge in a rapidly changing security environment is wellfounded. No longer can the US rely upon the global hegemony it traditionally enjoyed in the 20th century. Wearied by years of maintaining its presence in the Middle East, the US military is in danger of becoming sclerotic, yet it now faces intense peer-to-peer competition.

Whilst Islamic terrorism should still not be underestimated, there are more acute threats emerging: both from China and Russia (according to the NDS at least) as well as from “rogue regimes” such as Iran and North Korea. Although relations between America and North Korea have started to defrost in recent weeks, Trump’s forthright rejection of the Iran deal can be seen as taking a hammer to a Swiss watch without bothering to reset it first. The NDS has made it clear that these threats should be tackled with the help of a “robust constellation of allies and partners”, a network of which America is most proud. Yet some of these relationships are becoming increasingly fragile, as Trump’s often bullish and foolhardy diplomacy drives old partners away and fails to attract new ones. From his blood-soaked decision to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel to his jeopardising of the multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran, despite the pleas of various heads of state, and his failure to establish a real foothold amongst southeast Asian nations, Trump is doing a woeful job of endearing America to its partners across

The NDS is a bold and uncompromising statement of intent from an administration which has recognised that America must act assertively and swiftly to maintain its military prowess. America must exercise caution, however, when choosing how to approach the threats it has identified – for failure to do so, coupled with Trump’s penchant for unilateral and frequently disruptive diplomacy, could serve only to inflame tensions and aggravate the global situation.

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MIGRATIONS, FUNDAMENTALISM, AND THE OTHER SILK ROAD TO SYRIA Archie Philipps

Among the mass migrations of the past few years, a new and bloody Silk Road is being trod; a multistage, increasingly multidirectional journey, with echoes and consequences across the globe.

and, more worryingly, radicalisation and a burgeoning insurgency. This is especially true in Uzbekistan, with its most notable incarnation of revolt being the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Against this backdrop of political repression, low living standards, and increasing desire for change, hundreds of thousands of young men travel on overcrowded trains every year to look for work. Once in Russia, these workers, many without permits, are met with experiences common to many migrants worldwide: discrimination, racism, and the struggle to peacefully and publicly express their beliefs. These difficulties provide fertile ground for radicalisation; a trend that can also be seen across Europe. The increasing nationalism and prominence of the Russian Orthodox Church under Putin have left much of the Muslim population isolated and abused. The Islamic population is not

Labour flow from the former Soviet republics in Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan) to Russia has made Moscow the second largest Muslim-population city in Europe, after Istanbul.

These workers come from countries in flux, and even after the breakup of the USSR, the Tajik Civil war of the 1990s, and the Kyrgyz Revolutions of 2005 (‘the Tulip Revolution’) and 2010, many of these ancient lands remain poor, authoritarian, and corrupt. As a result, and also in large part as a consequence of proximity to Afghanistan and Pakistan, several republics have seen increasing religiosity supplanting cultural Islam,

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well provided for: there are only four mosques in Moscow to cater for some 2 million Muslims, leading many to gather in apartments for prayers and meetings. This makes it easier for potentially extremist preachers, many trained in hard-line schools in the Middle East due to the suppression of Islam in both the Soviet Union and later in the Russian Federation, to spread their message with less risk of detection. Such covert and close-knit interactions can also sow the seeds for the formation of terrorist cells: this was notoriously seen in Hamburg in the 1990s where four young Arab men shared an apartment: three of them later became suicide pilots on 9/11.

which they can channel their frustration, search for meaning, and allow the many lonely and isolated migrants to be part of what they view as a historic, global project. The last widely-recognised Caliphate was the Ottoman Empire, which was abolished in 1924. The resurrection of the term ‘Caliphate,’ an Islamic government led by a successor of the Prophet, is very emotionally charged, harking back to the dawn of Islam, and the establishment of an Islamic state for the entire Muslim ‘umma’ (community) has been the dream of many jihadists for generations. Over 7,000 Russian speakers have travelled to Syria to heed Al-Baghdadi’s call, mostly from the Central Asian republics and the North Caucasus, making Russian ISIS’ second biggest language. Veteran jihadists from the North Caucasus often occupy senior positions in the Islamic State hierarchy: Tarkhan Batirashvili, nom de guerre Abu Omar Al-Shishani, an ethnic Georgian convert, and veteran of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, served as the group’s commander in Syria until he was killed in 2016. Although Central Asian recruits are for now mostly foot soldiers, it seems perfectly plausible that they will achieve more strategic prominence in time. The grudge against the Russian state and its perceived injustices towards Muslims is not abandoned in Syria: the fact that Russia is one of the main backers of the Alawite Assad, while most Central Asian Muslims are Sunnis, exacerbates their anger, and these jihadists’ involvement in the conflict allows them to fight Russia and simultaneously defend their Islamic state.

Just days earlier, in a propaganda photo, ISIS had threatened to “burn” Russia.

The migration route from Central Asia to Russia is not new; nor is the Islamist threat. For almost two decades, Islamist groups in the North Caucasus region have committed many attacks both in the region (such as the 2004 Beslan school massacre) and in the heart of the Federation, such as when militants attacked a Moscow theatre in 2002.

The aims of the militants in both these atrocities were largely religious nationalist: to achieve Chechnya’s secession from Russia against the backdrop of the Second Chechen War. In the case of Central Asia, the republics have already been sovereign states since 1991.

With the proclamation of the ‘Caliphate’ in parts of Iraq and Syria in 2014, these disaffected workers have found a new, concrete direction towards

At the beginning of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, Russia initially took a ‘push and shut the door’ approach, encouraging

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potential terrorists to travel to Syria, and die there, rather than committing attacks on Russian soil. This has not worked in the long term. As the territorial caliphate crumbles, in no small part due to Russian airstrikes, the phenomenon is taking on a new, global dimension. Jihadis are now travelling back to commit attacks in many directions across the world: according to a CSIS report, some 900 have already returned to Russia, and according to Russia’s First Deputy Prosecutor-General Alexandr Buksman, “terrorist crimes” rose by 73% in the first half of 2016. In the more recent attacks in Sweden, Istanbul, and New York, all the perpetrators were Uzbeks, while the perpetrator of the 2017 St. Petersburg metro bombing was a Kyrgyz-born ethnic Uzbek, who arrived as a migrant worker in Russia in 2011 and had Russian citizenship. Just days earlier, in a propaganda photo, ISIS had threatened to “burn” Russia.

Far from being a short-term problem, the danger looks set to continue, if not intensify, as a new, second, generation of Central Asians in Russia grows up.

As has been seen in European countries such as France, this group, if unable to see better life prospects than their Gastarbeiter parents, will likely feel increasingly antagonistic towards, and lash out against, Russia. With the lack of a physical caliphate to focus Islamist aims, the jihadist threat seeks to become more deep-rooted and insidious rather than exported. This is an urgent threat to Russia and to the international community. The eyes of the world will be on Russia this June for the World Cup. Thousands will travel and cram into stadia. For those seeking revenge, notoriety, and paradise, the target could not be more ideal.

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LIGHTING UP A CONTINENT: ENERGY, SECURITY AND GEOPOLITICS IN AFRICA Lucy Clay

In the Western world our lives are governed by electricity: it powers our homes, charges our phones and cooks our food. Our way of life is reliant upon its aid, and, even if we are not using it directly, most of the products which we purchase have been made and transported with its help. For something that was developed under 150 years ago, electricity has permeated into almost every facet of our lives, yet the geopolitics of our energy needs to be explored further before we place our faith in one particular system.

electricity. This makes it the worst region of the world in terms of electricity access, and such access is highly uneven.

Reports show that there is a direct correlation between economic growth and electricity supply, for countries with over 20 percent of their population lacking access to electricity suffer from a reduced GDP per capita. The logic behind this is simple: increased energy access leads to huge improvements in healthcare, education, life expectancy and economic opportunities. For instance, light allows schools, hospitals and businesses to stay open for longer, leading to increased national productivity, a precursor to economic development.

It is almost unimaginable to conceive of a world without electricity. However, there are still many areas which are starved of this vital resource, such as sub-Saharan Africa: it is home to 13 percent of the world’s population, but accounts for 48 percent of the global population of people without access to

Not only are many people unconnected, but those who are experience an underwhelming service, with an average of 54 days of power shortage a year. The commercial sector has been forced to

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use expensive generators to compensate for the deficit in the energy supply, but, although effective, generator power costs over four times the price of grid power. It is an unfortunate reality that many enterprises which succeed in other parts of the world have failed in sub-Saharan Africa due to the crippling energy expenses. A rising population, combined with large increases in urbanisation and economic productivity, means that more power could dramatically improve the quality of life in the region.

Some countries, including France, have committed to investing in Africa’s renewable sector, but investment often causes controversy as it may be used by countries for their own political gain: striking when many people are in need can generate a politically beneficial foothold in the continent. For instance, China’s continued investment in Africa has sparked debate, as this is the optimal place for it to extend its geopolitical influence. Having opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti last year, as well as investing in African energy, China is gaining considerable political influence in the continent and this will benefit it in years to come.

Yet the directions of Africa’s energy use are changing, and it is estimated that sub-Saharan Africa will consume nearly 1,600 terawatt hours by 2040, four times what was used in 2010. It is imperative that supply can keep up with such high demand. Luckily, Africa has a huge energy potential and only a small portion of this is currently being used: the continent has the potential to source an additional 10 terawatts of solar energy, 1,300 gigawatts of wind power, and 1 gigawatt of geothermal potential. In an era when climate change looms as an omnipresent spectre and countries dash to find cleaner forms of electricity, the vast potential for renewable energy in Africa could be the continent’s saving grace.

Africa has a huge energy potential and only a small portion of this is currently being used.

In the Western world the cross-border renewable energy trade has already caused tensions, including solar trade disputes between the European Union and China. Wind and solar could spark further international problems due to their intermittent and unreliable nature: they often produce inconsistent energy supplies, whilst changing weather conditions can lead to an inability to generate the required energy. Potential solutions have included creating super grids where excess electricity can be transmitted from one area which is experiencing an abundance to another that is in decline, but in a politically unstable continent such as Africa, the ability to withhold energy from other countries has the potential to cause devastating conflict.

This is a fantastic opportunity for the region but the cost is immense.

Estimates show that Africa will require over $490 billion to generate the new capacity, and another $300 billion for building associated infrastructure by 2040. This would constitute a huge investment in any region, and financing this could cause a number of geopolitical challenges, including spiraling debt and exposing vulnerabilities to large donor countries.

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Moving towards renewable energy may be necessary, but it should not be undertaken lightly.

of its links, the GreenWish Partners, is developing on-and-off-grid renewable energy projects to help new local businesses to establish a foothold in rural areas. This focus is highly beneficial as it allows communities to create their own energy, brings money into the area and stops other countries from staking their claims in Africa for political gain.

Renewables provide an infinite resource which could play an essential role in powering many homes in sub-Saharan Africa, but private investments often tend towards larger projects and wealthier customers, leaving many communities behind. In 2017, groups such as ActionAid and Oxfam raised concerns that European countries were pushing through energy schemes which were taking the control from local people. Many Africans have argued that they want the direction of their future in their own hands, opposing the large-scale infrastructure which is often imposed by the West such as the large Jasper Power Project in South Africa, which was heavily financed by Google.

European powers have been accused of focusing on large projects and favouring undesirable solutions to Africa’s energy problems, yet it seems clear that the answer lies in small-scale community-based solutions which avoid instability, high costs and geopolitical issues. If the international community is to help sub-Saharan Africa in its pursuit of this new direction, the answer lies in aiding small communities. Akon Lighting Africa, for example, has installed over 100,000 street lamps in villages, over 1,000 clean solar micro-generators and over 200,000 household solar electric systems. Such a positive focus on local aid will help Africa to develop its renewable sector whilst avoiding the international conflicts that can often be sparked by large-scale renewable energy.

For most small communities, the best option is off-the-grid solar and wind power. Large-scale renewable energy can be expensive and could doom over a billion people to higher energy costs than they can afford. However, off-grid renewables could be the cheapest option for more than one-fifth of sub-Saharan Africans. These projects can provide cheaper power, keeping communities from the instability of large-scale geopolitical tensions over energy, and out of the clutches of large corporations who aim to exploit them.

NGOs are taking these issues into account, implementing schemes which empower local communities and moving Africa’s renewable energy sector towards a more positive future.

For example, the Seed Capital Assistance Facility (SCAF) has joined forces with different funds to take energy in Africa in a more desirable direction. One

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A POLAR SILK ROAD:

CHINA'S ARTIC INTERESTS Ee Hsiun Chong

On 26 January 2018, the State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China published a white paper titled ‘China’s Arctic Policy.’ The paper laid out China’s policy goals and principles concerning the Arctic, and detailed its interests in the region; it is remarkable in signalling China’s active engagement with Arctic issues despite its lack of Arctic territory. The paper specifically discusses China’s ambitions for building a ‘Polar Silk Road,’ conveying the importance of the Arctic to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Arctic, with notions of cooperation and mutuality being recurring themes in the paper. This policy direction is natural given that China has no territory in the Arctic and must therefore cooperate with the Arctic nations under a rulesbased order to maximise access to opportunities there. The Arctic white paper thus sends a signal that China is preparing to play a stronger contributory role in promoting a rules-based international order.

The Arctic region comprises the area north of the Arctic Circle. This area, including both land and sea, is around 21 million square kilometres. Nations claiming territory in the Arctic are Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States. Under international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), these nations have special use and control

Naturally, some commentators worry that the involvement of another great power in the Arctic, alongside the United States and Russia, will increase competition and heighten tensions. However, such concerns may prove unfounded, as the policy direction and goals in the white paper evince a strong desire to promote rules-based governance of the

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the world makes the Arctic shipping routes of prime interest for China as it continues its efforts at promoting connectivity and cooperation via the Belt and Road Initiative.

rights over areas in the Arctic that are classified as internal waters, territorial waters, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones and continental shelf.

The Arctic is an area of geopolitical interest. Higher global temperatures have caused Arctic sea ice to melt sufficiently such that commercial shipping through the region appears increasingly viable. Three routes are of key importance: the Northeast Passage, Northwest Passage and Central Passage.

These routes can shave between 2000 and 3000 nautical miles off a journey between Shanghai and Europe or America, depending on whether one bypasses the Panama or Suez Canals.

The problem for China is that parts of the Arctic sea routes cross the territorial waters or the exclusive economic zones of the Arctic nations, allowing these nations to enact restrictions on passage. Under Article 234 of UNCLOS, Arctic nations have unique powers to impose regulations on vessels in “ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone”. Russian legislation coming into force in early 2019 will prohibit non-Russian-flagged and non-Russian-built ships from carrying oil, natural gas and coal along the Northern Sea Route. Russia is not the only nation that may interfere with Arctic shipping routes. Canada and the United States are also engaged in territorial disputes over the Northwest Passage. Canada claims some of the waters along the route as its internal waters. The USA, in contrast, claims that these waters are international waters.

As of today, this dispute remains unresolved. The conflicting claims over the Arctic sea passages threaten China’s shipping interests because an Arctic nation asserting a territorial claim to portions of the sea routes may one day restrict access in an assertion of sovereignty.

This policy direction is natural given that China has no territory in the Arctic.

Given the Arctic’s strategic importance in terms of resource wealth and transport linkages, it is little wonder that China is engaged and interested in this region. China’s Arctic white paper reveals both China’s immediate interests in the Arctic region, and its broader self-conception of its geopolitical status and role on the world stage.

The white paper states that the “development of Arctic shipping routes” is one of China’s key Arctic interests. China is invested in ensuring that shipping routes through the Arctic remain open to its ships. A route through the Northeast Passage could cut 20 days from the current journey time of 48 days from China to Rotterdam via the Suez Canal. This prospect of expediting and increasing trade between China and

China’s shipping interests can therefore only be adequately protected through dialogue and cooperation with the Arctic nations, within a rule-bound international order. In the Arctic white paper, China notes that “states from outside the Arctic region … have rights in respect of scientific research, navigation, overflight, fishing, laying of

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submarine cables and pipelines in the high seas and other relevant sea areas in the Arctic Ocean, and rights to resource exploration and exploitation in the Area, pursuant to treaties such as UNCLOS and general international law”. China further expresses its desire for management of the Arctic shipping routes to be “conducted in accordance with treaties including the UNCLOS and general international law” and that “freedom of navigation… in accordance with the law” should be protected. China further maintains that disputes should be settled “in accordance with international law”. China has a clear interest in promoting a rules-based international order which safeguards the interests of nations with a non-direct interest in the Arctic.

icant that China makes explicit reference to UNCLOS in its Arctic white paper.

This should be viewed optimistically because UNCLOS provides the pre-eminent international legal framework defining the rights and responsibilities of nations concerning the world's oceans and marine natural resources. It also provides a dispute resolution mechanism in the form of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. China’s support for dispute resolution to be conducted in accordance with international law suggests that it may grow more willing to participate in international dispute resolution tribunals and abide by their rulings.

Given China’s significant geopolitical clout, this development is likely to have a major impact in advancing the rule of law on the international arena.

China’s policy position concerning the Arctic hence differs from that in the South China Sea. In the South China Sea dispute, China displays a preference for the biteral resolution of disputes through diplomatic negotiations. China’s geographical distance from, and lack of territory in, the Arctic means that it must rely on provisions of international law designed to safeguard the rights of all nations.

Taken as a whole, the Arctic white paper paints a clear picture of an emerging power, cognisant of its importance in the world order, engaged and eager to gain influence across a broad spectrum of domains. At the same time, we see a power that desires a leadership role in the world order – this is evident in repeated claims of China ‘building’ and ‘contribut[ing]’ to the establishment of governance frameworks and norms in the Arctic. China’s leadership model appears rooted in a spirit of amity and cooperation with other nations, along with the promotion of a rules-based international order. In this regard, it is certainly reassuring to see China expressing support for existing institutions and frameworks of international governance such as the Arctic Council and UNCLOS. With the USA looking increasingly inward under its new administration, China’s Arctic policy may provide a glimpse of how China may fill the gaps left behind by a retreating America.

The Arctic white paper paints a clear picture of an emerging power.

This is a positive development for the rule of law. The white paper signals an increased willingness by China to respect the norms of international law. After all, an effective international legal system requires reciprocity. It is especially signif-

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TRUMP, ISRAEL AND THE IRAN DEAL: THE NEW DIPLOMACY Nicholas Linfoot

In 2015, bombs falling on Israel would have seemed an alien prospect to many in the Western establishment. The Iran deal had been signed and, guaranteed by executive fiat, was set to ensure a new partnership with the despotic regime in Tehran and to secure a future free from the menace of a nuclearised hostile power. The process of creating it was controversial enough, with loud cries of anguish emanating from America’s Middle East allies and many politicians, including 25 House Democrats, rejecting it.

crumble. A new direction is appearing in the way in which foreign policy in the age of Trump is being conducted.

New media, partisan division and the changing importance of US power are all driving diplomacy towards a more divided and fractured set of narratives.

In the age of Trump, social media and soundbites, it is no longer tenable to have week-long summits, to do the backroom deals or simply to provide the dominant narrative. The days of Obama’s National Security team gloating that “The average reporter we talk to is 27 years old, and their only reporting experience consists of being around political campaigns… They literally know nothing,” are over. Now the development of differing sources of diplomatic narrative, information and even meaningful negotiation has both amplified and diversified that echo chamber, with both sides peddling

Now that the deal is in tatters, the backlash against it reveals much about the state of diplomacy in a world of social media, unstable characters and violent disagreement. The pillars of American leadership – a strong national security establishment, respect for the office and a controlled expression of foreign policy – are all beginning to

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narratives to their own sympathetic press arms. These press arms in turn function as the gateways to power and making change, to impressing ideas on leaders and the polity at large. Even on the eve of the withdrawal from the deal, this new diplomacy was working away.

Boris Johnson’s sudden appearance on Fox and Friends to implore the President to keep the deal is symptomatic of the changing direction of international affairs. The traditional press briefings, media bubbles and control are moving into competing media narratives to capture the attention of leaders. Even when world leaders like Macron, Merkel and May all made the trek to Washington to plead the case for the Iran deal, backed by much of the world’s media, they appear to have had less effect than the appearance of an anti-deal activist like John Bolton on Fox and Friends.

This, quite plausibly, is the most stark reminder of the new direction of international relations: away from traditional state-to-state discussions and instead towards a nexus of loud and competing voices in the ether.

not just the attention of America, but also the other allies of Israel across the world. As the leader of one of the most prominent of the anti-Iran deal nations – which include Saudi Arabia and the UAE – Netanyahu has pioneered the most eye-catching stunts to showcase his opposition to Obama-era foreign policy.

In the days of the muted Obama administration, this provided Netanyahu with a platform unrivalled by America’s other allies, earning him an address to the US Congress. Yet with Trump in the White House, paying close attention to the TV screens around him, Netanyahu has upped the stakes, hauling out huge new props for widely televised exposes of Iranian malfeasance. As leaders become louder and louder in a crowded media whirlpool, however, the rhetoric begins to become a danger in itself. As President Trump has demonstrated, part of his strategy is supposedly to ‘out crazy’ his opponents, with the rhetoric becoming the diplomacy. As such, to moderate the presentation is to moderate the policy itself, risking a dangerous escalation with leaders like Trump and Netanyahu not wishing to disappoint their hard-line bases. Perhaps this shift towards escalating and competing narratives is at risk of becoming increasingly out of hand.

A new direction is appearing in the way in which foreign policy in the age of Trump is being conducted.

The new direction of vocal, multi-origin narratives is occurring on both sides of the debate on US-Israel-Iran relations. For those who support the Iran deal, this is developing through the creation of rival diplomatic efforts. John Kerry’s negotiations with the Iranian and French governments to save the deal have already stirred the President from his Twitter slumber as an example of a “deep state” conspiracy, plotting to undermine his foreign policy objectives. When coupled with the roster of

Leading and pushing this new direction is the bombastic Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. From his infamous bomb cartoon in 2012 to his PowerPoint ‘Iran Lied’ presentation in May, Netanyahu has mastered winning the court of public opinion. He has captured

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high-level Obama alumni affiliated with the pro-Iran deal group, ‘Diplomacy Works,’ such as Joe Biden’s National Security Advisor and John Kerry’s Chief of Staff, there is real evidence of the direction of an expanding alternative diplomacy. Bypassing the traditional systems of power and not respecting what is perceived to be an illegitimate and dangerous administration, a parallel diplomatic effort exists, providing key talking points and narratives in much the same way as authorised diplomatic efforts. On the international stage this is incredibly important, for competing centres of diplomatic power in turn undermine the United States’ authority, confuse allies and embolden others to do the same. The sight of Ayatollah Khomeini posing on Twitter with a copy of Fire and Fury is perhaps the latest development in these new directions: international relations conducted through social media, stunts and appealing to partisan groups for domestic support for international policies.

Donald Trump has shaken up so much of the status quo, and now that the traditional norms of diplomacy have been shattered, a new, multi-faceted diplomatic web has emerged. International relations appear to be taking the road that so many other sectors have taken, increasingly less in the hands of single state actors and instead buffeted by social media and competing narratives. As many of us know, on social media, TV or in any public forum it is they who shout loudest who wins, who appeal to our base partisan prejudices and provide the set piece image. In international relations, from Netanyahu to Trump and Khomeini, this is increasingly dangerous. Whether it be announcing foreign relations on Twitter or digging up dirt on diplomats for morning talk shows, bringing props to the UN or photos with specific literature, international relations dominated by competing levels of bombast and showmanship is here to stay.

But if a move towards rival centres of international legitimacy exists, there is also a more sinister side of international relations conducted through social media. Recent reports state that allies of the President hired the shadowy Black Cube firm – made famous by their employment in the service of Harvey Weinstein – to dig up dirt on Obama foreign policy aides. The threat that these aides posed to the hegemonic narrative of the White House clearly necessitated an attempt to dig up dirt and delegitimise them. If the future of waging international diplomacy is to be fought out increasingly in the public sphere, then these kind of actions will perhaps become more common.

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MACRON’S REFORMS, AN INTERNATIONAL FRANCE, AND THE FUTURE OF THE EU Carl du Jeu

“La France est de retour,” Emmanuel Macron announced boldly at the last Davos World Economic Forum. After years of insignificance, represented best by the warbling and calamitous figure of President François Hollande, France is set on a new course. The liberal media have wasted no ink on this fact, depicting Macron as a leader who will save the globalised world from populist pressures. The man dubbed ‘the start-up President’ has been all too happy to entertain this image.

President has one clear aim: to ‘make France great again’.

Distressingly, Macron, much like Trump, is bent on cementing his new direction, whatever the cost. Blinded by his devilish charm and marketability, journalists seem to be overlooking this willingness to pass reform at any price.

In reality, streaks of authoritarianism, anti-parliamentarianism and manipulation lie behind the PR smoke screen.

Domestic policy is perhaps the clearest demonstration of how Macron conducts politics. Ruthlessly efficient, the ‘neither left nor right’ leader has launched a blitzkrieg of reforms to make France more suited to his methods. One passed last August saw the country’s labour laws overhauled, in a bill that made it radically easier for employers to hire and fire workers – key to the President’s plans to steal investors from abroad.

With catchy sound-bites and firm handshakes, he has become a poster boy for journalists desperate to avoid contemplating Donald Trump’s presidency for too long. And yet Macron has an aim which is not so distinct from his American counterpart’s. Using domestic reforms, international relations and the European Union as his tools, the French

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Notably, the reform was passed with uncharacteristic French efficiency, and with little opposition from France’s strong unions. Two of the largest syndicates refused to take part in protests, citing their satisfaction with the government’s role in carrying out ‘a real consultation’ on that matter. This is a characteristic of Macron that one can observe time and time again over the past year, be it at home or on the international stage: the charm-offensive.

Whether it is solving tense stand-offs in December between Lebanese and Saudi Arabian leaders, or presiding over such domestic reforms, the former investment banker is adept at defusing situations, gaining the trust of key players and thereby isolating remaining actors to the point of impotence. Media outlets around the world have lauded this technique, swooning over the Frenchman’s charm. Alas, blinded by his smile, these very outlets miss the much darker manifestations which can come from this.

darker results. Feeding off a wave of anti-parliamentarianism, the French leader has pledged to reduce time spent debating issues by reducing the number of representatives – all in the name of efficiency. The leader of La Republique en Marche (LREM) believes that “a reduced parliament, with greater resources, is a parliament with greater fluidity in its work.” Equally, it is also a parliament with less democratic representation and debate, and thereby less opposition. The self-titled ‘Jupiterian President’ believes his political programme will ‘make France great again’, and has no time for interventions. Happy to rule by ‘ordonnances’, the French equivalent to executive orders, Macron has used his tactics to enable reforms which, at best, are anti-parliamentarian, and at worst, are outright authoritarian.

Journalists seem to be overlooking this willingness to pass reform at any price.

From the Élysée palace in central Paris, the French President has prepped another reform: that of the French legislative branch. The French president has set out to reform this and adapt it to his trident of values: efficiency, representation, and responsibility. In a three-pronged proposal, he sought the following: to reduce the number of elected representatives by a third, to limit the maximum length of their time in office to 18 years, and to instil a ‘dose’ of proportional representation into their election. Again, Macron uses the same technique: having charmed the electorate by attacking an outdated political elite and system throughout his election campaign, he has been able to pick away at parliamentarians. Identical methods,

Matthew Goodwin, the Professor of International Relations at Kent University, made the following observation at a recent conference: “Mr Macron seems to be very good at smelling weakness, and then acting accordingly.” He has wasted no time on the domestic front, and has been equally ruthless abroad.

Despite much of the media’s belief, his relationship with Donald Trump is quite clearly not the result of a mutual admiration between two men who usurped the establishment. The pair could not be more opposed, and Macron made a point of reminding the world of this during his speech to Congress. Sensing an unstable Angela Merkel, whose

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impetus has been drained by a fourth term in office, and an ineffectual Theresa May, plagued by Brexit problems, Macron has leaped at the opportunity to place France on the map as America’s foremost ally. For a man who chooses his words carefully, his description of the ‘special relationship’ between France and the United States could not have been more pointed. It was a sly, self-indulgent dig at the United Kingdom, a subtle reminder of the role-reversal that had just occurred.

Europe.’ While it is true that Macron has spoken of his desire to reform the EU, it would be foolish to think this would not be in France’s own interest. This is perhaps best illustrated by his ideas for European defence. The French president views this as a matter of defence policy; his German counterpart regards it much more as a matter of integration. The EU will not be supported by Macron for nothing: he will only support an EU which works for the French, and where they are firmly at the controls. His reform of the EU legislation of posted workers showed exactly that, and was called “a move to defend French labour from this source of unfair intra-European competition” by the Brookings Institute. Caricatures depict Mr Macron as Napoleon; they are not wrong to do so. If the French President continues at this rate, the EU could become his very own empire.

It is not the first time Macron has done this. Even Boris Johnson rose to the bait when the French leader told Prime Minister Modi of his desire to become India’s “first strategic partner in Europe.” The Foreign Minister’s seething reaction did not dissuade Macron in the slightest; instead, he went back for more. With Canberra in his sights, the ‘hyper-active’ President sought again to steal a traditionally British ally. Indeed, his political manoeuvring seems even starker when considering his approach towards Australia. Undoubtedly keen to play his part in the developing tensions in the South China Sea, Macron used the trip to announce a new ‘Indo-Pacific axis’ through the French Island territories in the area. The French President makes no attempt to hide his unbridled desire to expand French interests, happily confessing of his desire to maintain the French “linguistic space of unequalled power” and “the second biggest army in the world.”

And yet the liberal media still paint Macron as the saviour of the European Union. Wooed by his charm, they consistently misinterpret his true motives. When the French President visited India, his message was clear: ‘Choose France’, as opposed to, ‘Choose

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WEINSTEIN TO WAHHABISM:

GLOBAL DIRECTIONS IN GENDER EQUALITY Cara Exall

September 2017. Saudi activist Manal al-Sharif, weeps with joy as the Kingdom issues a decree allowing women to drive. Just seven years previous, she and her fellow female activists faced jail time and harassment for breaking the ban on driving as a protest. Driving in Saudi Arabia has become more than just a means of transportation, it symbolises the denial of freedom and autonomy to women.

Could the key to changing the direction of women’s rights in Saudi Arabia be as simple as car-keys?

for women’s rights are being met with a conservative backlash. Achieving women’s rights is not a given – there are revolutions still to be won.

The concepts of struggle and revolution are as important as ever to achieving gender equality. In Russia, recent regressive laws, introduced in 2017, have decriminalised domestic violence. Battery of one’s wife, as a first offence without hospitalising them, only results in an insignificant fine between six pence and three-hundred and seventy pounds. The country already faces a staggering problem with domestic violence, with Human Rights Watch estimating that at least twelve thousand women are killed by their abusers each year. This new legislation only serves to normalise such violence, implicitly encouraged by conservative politicians and the Orthodox Church.

To add insult to injury, these laws often

The tremendous achievements in women’s rights over the past year demonstrate gathering momentum in the global march towards gender equality. Such progress makes it easy to be complacent that gender equality is inevitable. Yet, as patriarchal structures become increasingly threatened globally, feminism and movements

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mean the Saudi monarchy is moving away from its traditional dependence on the powerful clerical establishment that promotes such strict beliefs on gender segregation. But, as long as Wahhabism remains such a large part of Saudi life and culture, the reforms MBS introduces will struggle to achieve significant change for women, unless there is a complete overhaul of the guardianship system.

penalise the women themselves through fining the family bank account. Reversals like these make it apparent why the UN has called violence against women “the world’s most pervasive human rights issue”.

Similarly, Saudi advances mask the long road ahead. For one, an archaic guardianship system remains, meaning a man’s permission is necessary to travel, marry or exit prison. Threats to female autonomy permeate much of Saudi society, with the Kingdom applying its clerics’ interpretation of Sharia to its laws and constitution. The Wahhabi religious establishment preaches a radical conservative and restrictive branch of Islam, largely opposed to female empowerment. For now, Saudi women have found an ally in Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, known informally as MBS, whose Vision 2030 aims to bring Saudi Arabia into the modern era, but there is still a long way to go to achieve gender equality.

In a narrow legislative reading, it appears many countries have made significant progress towards gender equality and ensuring protections for women. Yet, legislation too often acts as a quick-fix solution to more deeprooted socio-cultural problems of violence against women and threats to female autonomy. In many countries, for example, laws against Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) are toothless, with the practice remaining widespread. The World Health Organisation estimates that more than two-hundred million girls and women alive today have been cut, especially in Africa and the Middle East – an unambiguous violation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

A clear divide remains between nominal ‘progress’ and day-to-day realities.

Many continue to defend FGM in terms of ‘tradition’, even in countries where it is illegal. Such hijacking of cultural relativism to protect torturing a child and this extreme form of discrimination against women is indefensible. Not only does FGM violate the victim’s right to be free from torture, but their rights to health, security, physical integrity and in some cases their right to life as well. In the communities in which the practice remains prevalent, opponents of FGM face a daily struggle to educate and protect, especially given that laws

Only 15% of female victims of the most serious sexual offences report it to the police in the UK. Under MBS’ leadership, it is clear, the Kingdom has come a long way from the Mecca School Fire tragedy of 2002, in which the Kingdom’s ‘mutaween’, religious police, tried to prevent eight hundred school girls escaping their school as it burnt to the ground – simply because they were not wearing the Kingdom’s mandatory dress code of headscarves and abayas. Fifteen died as a result. Many critics argue MBS’ reforms

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against FGM go largely unenforced. A revolution in local mindsets, brought about by grass-roots activism, is needed to achieve long-term cultural change and protect future generations of girls.

In the US, nearly half of working women have experienced sexual harassment in the workplace. Clearly, complacency is dangerous even once legal rights and protections have been achieved. Gender equality is constantly contested in our everyday experiences, and feminism is needed in the twenty-first century as much as ever.

Certain progress in the West is also paper thin. Women have legal equality with men, and protections against violence and discrimination. However, often such equal protection under the law is inadequate, given a culture that enables sexual assault, harassment and victim blaming. In this way, the justice system arranges itself to affirm what the powerful want to see, or more limits the platforming of what they refuse to accept. This was demonstrated most recently in the exposure of the decades of sexual assault and harassment, perpetrated by million-dollar movie producer – Harvey Weinstein.

This scandal turned Hollywood on its head, with the subsequent #metoo campaign promoting reform in both the film industry and beyond. Since, the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, which awards the Oscars, has introduced a new code of conduct, and many celebrities have joined the Time’s Up movement, which has created a legal defence fund to enable women in less privileged professions to prosecute their harassers.

All over the world, the struggles and revolutions of brave, outspoken activists have heralded an era where achieving gender equality is more tangible than ever. More women are being given a voice in society: successfully running for office, going to school and climbing the corporate ladder. Even in Saudi Arabia, the state is inching towards female autonomy. However, gender equality is not a given. The global template for power remains resolutely male. To shatter this, a continued international struggle is needed.

However, substantive, wide-spread change is by no means a given, even with the #metoo campaign ensuring the right conversations are starting to happen.

Indeed, whilst Hollywood is often the pinpoint of interest for gender equality in the West, it is important to remember that everyday acts of sexism and violence against women often go unreported. Only fifteen percent of female victims of the most serious sexual offences report it to the police in the UK.

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CHINA AND THE DIRECTION OF KOREAN NUCLEAR TALKS Nicholas Chin

In April, as Kim Jong-Un and South Korean President Moon Jae-In sat down for a historic dinner together, the message of their dessert - a mango mousse topped with a map of a unified Korea - could not have been any clearer.

The Korean peninsula has now technically been at war for over 60 years, as no official peace agreement has yet been reached between the parties involved in the Korean War of the 1950s. There is now renewed hope that a formal peace agreement may finally be reached as the leaders of the Korean nations recently met for the first time in over a decade.

policy. The cause of this sudden change is debatable, with many in the US media crediting President Trump’s aggressive rhetoric for Kim’s new attitude. While the US leader undoubtedly deserves some credit for contributing to the emergence of these new talks, the new tone is really the result of Chinese foreign policy, and it will be China who determines whether these talks lead to a concrete mending of relations between the two nations.

The move towards peace talks began in January, when Kim expressed an interest in meeting Moon and suggested that he was willing to work towards denuclearising the Korean peninsula. This change in tact came in the same month that Chinese oil exports to North Korea dropped to their lowest level since June 2014. This drop follows an ongoing trend of declining Chinese exports to

The inter-Korean summit represents a historic breakthrough in relations between the two Koreas. Just over a year ago, it seemed that we were on the brink of nuclear war, but Kim Jong-Un has completely reversed his foreign

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North Korea throughout 2017, which has shocked the North Korean economy because 90 percent of its trade goes through China. While China has previously supported UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea, it has not diligently adhered to sanctions once they were passed. Therefore, this sharp decline in trade between China and North Korea does represent a change in Chinese foreign policy, and indicates strained relations with North Korea. It is precisely because of this fall in Chinese exports that Kim has reached out to old enemies, in the hope that they may provide a potential source for the trade needed to prevent any further famine and poverty, and to ensure the stability of his regime.

policy. Trade between North Korea and China fell 10.5 percent in 2017, compared to 2016, before peace talks were even seen as a remote possibility. The frosty economic relationship between China and North Korea over the last 18 months could well be the result of Xi’s particular dislike towards Kim Jong-Un. Chinese Communist Party officials have previously been recorded expressing their contempt for the North Korean dictator and suggesting that his brother, Kim Jong-Nam, who was assassinated last year, would be a better choice for the leadership. Moreover, North Korea’s resistance to economic liberalisation has frustrated China for some time.

Chinese pressure could well be a means for forcing North Korea to come out from the cold. As China looks to build a trade network across Asia, North Korea’s participation would only strengthen its geopolitical position as the dominant economic power in Asia.

The March meeting between Kim and Xi further highlights China’s influence over Kim’s foreign policy change. It was a secretive event that marked Kim’s first foreign excursion since ascending to power in 2011. It is no coincidence that this meeting was scheduled as soon as plans for an inter-Korean summit were announced, suggesting a central role for China in the talks.

Chinese Communist Party officials have previously been recorded expressing their contempt for the North Korean dictator.

However, it is still debatable whether Chinese pressure is pushing Kim towards peace talks, or whether the pressure is actually a response to Kim’s new foreign policy direction, in an attempt to ensure that China plays a central role in the talks. It is undeniable that the decline in Chinese exports has been more pronounced since Kim made some movement toward peace, but the trend goes back to 2017. Kim was still very much on a warpath when Chinese economic support began to subside, which suggests that Chinese economic pressure has indeed contributed significantly to the change in North Korean

North Korea has often defied Chinese wishes in the past, but this level of economic pressure is unprecedented and gives China more leverage to dictate North Korean policy than ever before.

Perhaps China’s most significant tool is its control over North Korean energy.

Almost all of North Korea’s energy production comes from oil and coal,

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and nearly all of their access to these resources comes from China, giving Xi’s government the power to completely shut down North Korea’s energy production if it wishes. Estimates suggest that North Korea’s existing reserves can last for a few months at most. Therefore, China holds the power to completely collapse the North Korean economy should it fully cut off its support for North Korea’s energy, which gives it the ability to dictate North Korean policy.

tive resulted from either meeting, and relations cooled again. South Korean political support for the policy died and, with no resources to tempt them, North Korea returned to expanding their nuclear arsenal and relations broke down. The history of the Sunshine Policy suggests that North Korean interest in peace is highly dependent on the economic circumstances. Therefore, the actions of China will be vital in determining what direction North Korean policy will take from here onwards.

The talks themselves have yielded little concrete progress towards demilitarisation or reunification, but do seem to suggest that some progress could be made. The two leaders agreed to work together towards the ultimate denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and have agreed to further talks in the future. Kim has also invited the media to observe the denuclearisation of a single nuclear site in North Korea, in anticipation of a further meeting with the USA. These steps do suggest that this policy change could well be a legitimate change in tact that may move towards what is the ultimate aim for many Korean people - reunification.

If Chinese pressure continues and exports are continually squeezed, then it seems likely that Kim will continue to pursue his reconciliation as a means of ensuring the North’s economic stability.

Therefore, continued economic pressure will ultimately determine whether or not the new talks between North and South will actually lead to any concrete improvement in relations, and any progress towards the ultimate goal of reunification, or at the very least denuclearisation.

Even so, caution should be exercised when considering these talks. While they do represent a new breakthrough, we have been here before. Kim Jong-Il met with South Korean leader Kim Dae-Jung in 2000, as the result of extensive South Korean attempts to set up investment and business relations with the North; this was dubbed the Sunshine Policy. Both parties agreed to work towards peace and Kim Dae-Jung was awarded with a Nobel peace prize, but few concrete results came out of the conference. Relations did warm for a period and another summit occurred in 2007, but ultimately nothing substan-

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MYANMAR:

A FRAGILE TRANSITION Michelle Huang

St. Hugh’s College recently removed a portrait of Nobel Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, the latest in a series of blows reflecting Myanmar’s downward trajectory since the nation’s 2015 elections. Myanmar seemed to be fulfilling its democratic potential after the elections, when Suu Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD) won a sweeping majority of parliamentary seats. For a country that gained independence from the British in 1948 only to endure decades of military rule, the election results signalled a promise of hope.

Unfortunately, this promise has yet to be realised.

genocide.” As atrocious as Myanmar’s crimes are, media coverage largely fails to address its other troubles. This article seeks to situate the Rohingya genocide in its broader context by shedding light on other aspects of Myanmar’s transition. It will chronicle developments in the country’s ethnic conflicts, path to democratisation, and growing Buddhist nationalism, and attempt to predict its trajectory in each.

First, Myanmar has witnessed seven decades of ongoing civil conflict. The conflict is driven by paramilitaries and independence movements resisting what they view as the imposition of a singularly Buddhist Barma state.

This perception is deeply rooted in Myanmar’s history. Sixty-eight percent of the country is Barma, or ethnically Burmese, and eighty-eight percent is Buddhist. In the wake of colonial independence, Bamar Theravada Buddhists

The government has been in headlines lately for its inaction in the face of violence against the Rohingya Muslim minority. The UN branded Myanmar’s campaign against Rohingyas an ethnic cleansing carrying the “hallmarks of

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dominated the government, systematically repressing religious and ethnic minorities.

Repressive measures included denying citizenship and restricting the number of children some minorities can have, which continue to be enforced to this day.

Conflict is likely to escalate in Shan State, further jeopardising the delicate peace process. The proliferation of armed groups in the region, especially the ethnic Paluang Ta’ang National Liberation Army, which is backed by the powerful UWSP, have put the military on edge. Large-scale military offenses would intensify the humanitarian plight and discourage militias from acceding to peace negotiations. With the next session of the Panglong Conference planned for late May 2018, heightened fighting on the ground may undermine militias’ willingness to negotiate, destroying the peace process’s legitimacy.

Suu Kyi is personally leading the peace process, but her 21st Century Panglong Conference has produced few visible results. Its primary stumbling block is that only eight of Myanmar’s 21 armed groups have signed the 2015 National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), which the government holds as a prerequisite to further meaningful negotiation. A seven-member alliance led by the United Wa State Party (UWSP) has opposed the proceedings, refusing to sign the NCA until it is either replaced or revised. A comprehensive peace agreement is an impossible dream unless Myanmar can engage non-signatories in negotiations and establish an effective ceasefire.

Unfortunately, neither appears likely.

The military, too, casts a shadow over Myanmar’s politics, the second aspect of the country’s stunted democratisation. Myanmar revised its constitution in 2008, but the resulting document nonetheless ensures the military’s grip on power. Under its provisions, the military – or Tatmadaw – appoints one quarter of seats in Parliament, and three key cabinet members. Moreover, the Tatmadaw runs the Ministry of Home Affairs, which oversees the implementation of laws, prisons, and the police. It lastly controls an extensive intelligence apparatus which is inaccessible to the civilian government, heightening its political domination. The 2008 Constitution thus undermines any attempts at revision, as the quarter of military-appointed seats in parliament grant it an effective bulwark to outvote any amendments. It also gives the military considerable influence over selecting the President. The NLD was able to secure the presidency in 2015 because it won a landslide vote, but it will be hardpressed to repeat such a feat.

Military operations against armed groups further undermine attempts at peace because the military frequently commits human rights abuses, stoking tensions even higher. Human rights organisations have criticised the military for gang-raping Kachin and Karen women. The military has also been accused of forcing minorities to act as human minesweepers. The violence is worst in Northern Shan State and Kachin State, which have borne the brunt of the fighting; the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that at least 100,000 ethnic Kachins are currently displaced due to ongoing violence. The humanitarian situation there is rapidly deteriorating, yet Myanmar continues to restrict aid from NGOs.

Myanmar’s

crackdown

on

press

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freedoms reflects the deteriorating state of its civil liberties, and the considerable sway that the Tatmadaw wields over the civilian government. Although the NLD promised to expand civil liberties in the country, more cases have been brought against journalists during its tenure than any time in the preceding years. The local watchdog We Support Journalists reports that cases have been brought against 32 journalists since 2016, oftentimes on negligible grounds. Furthermore, over 100 online defamation cases have been filed under section 66d of the telecommunications act, a provision which is loosely applied to silence journalists and government critics. Myanmar has also enforced a media blackout in Rakhine State, the epicentre of the Rohingya genocide, severely restricting access to independent investigators and journalists. Two Reuters journalists who documented a massacre of Rohingya men are currently facing up to 14 years in jail under the Official Secrets Act. This chilling of free speech highlights both the civilian government’s complicity, and the Tatmadaw’s ability to exercise its will with impunity.

Myanmar’s civil and political turmoil is further exacerbated by the rise of Buddhist nationalism. The social, religious, and political organisation Ma Ba Tha rose to prominence over the last few years. Its surge in popularity reflects a widespread fear that the NLD, which is seen to espouse Western liberal values, will fail to protect and promote Buddhism in the country.

Although it provides social services such as education and charity work, Ma Ba Tha has also fuelled violence against Rohingyas. Its supporters were recently accused of spreading anti-Rohingya hate speech on Facebook.

The government-appointed Sangha Council, which regulates the Buddhist clergy, banned Ma Ba Tha in 2016 but most chapters have persisted in their activities. In retaliation, the government has threatened to brand Ma Ba Tha as an unlawful association akin to terrorist organisations. Such a move is unlikely to pass, but reflects the growing tension between political and religious authority. Should the government move against the organisation, it risks stoking further nationalist violence. The Democratic Kayin Buddhist Armed group has vowed to defend the organisation with violence if necessary. The government needs to diffuse nationalist tensions by addressing grievances, promoting civic engagement, and developing the economy, but such measures will not be easy.

Myanmar’s political future unfortunately appears rather pessimistic, as Aung San Suu Kyi continues to face international criticism for her silence in the wake of the Rohingya genocide.

This unrelenting criticism, alongside her failure to deliver on campaign promises, may weaken the NLD considerably in the coming elections. Meanwhile, it is rumoured that current Commanderin-Chief General Min Aung Hlaing has his eyes on the presidency in 2020. If he comes to power, any hopes for constitutional revisions to establish civilian control of the military will effectively be quashed.

Myanmar has made notable strides since its day of overt military rule, but the brutal reality of its situation looks bleak. The NLD’s electoral victory heralded a hope for democratisation, but given the herculean task ahead of it, Myanmar’s trajectory will likely continue its decline.

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EASTERN EUROPE'S RIGHT-WING SWING Verity Bligh

In the past three years, legal paradoxes have emerged across Eastern Europe.

Despite its long history of refugee emigration, it is impossible to apply for asylum in Hungary. Although ski-masks are still allowed, it is now illegal to wear a veil in Austria. Most shockingly, in spite of the physical testament of Auschwitz-Birkenau, it is a crime to blame Poland for any involvement in the Holocaust. These new laws are evidence of a broader trend in European politics: Eastern Europe’s right-wing swing. Countries such as Hungary, Austria, and Poland are diverging from their expected liberal democratic paths.

Instead, these “illiberal democracies” are shifting course to pursue new directions of their own.

the European Union, and a sense of lost national identity, right-wing parties have made increasing electoral gains across the continent. In fact, at an average of 16% in each country’s most recent parliamentary election, a Bloomberg analysis found that support for populist radical-right parties is at its highest point in over thirty years. Whilst these far-right parties span a great spectrum, from populist to nationalist to neo-fascist, most share a fervent opposition to migration, the European Union, and the complexities of the past. Consequently, they point toward a common vision of a more authoritarian and more insular Europe.

Each party couches its claims to legitimacy in terms of its national history and charismatic leadership. In Hungary, Europe’s largest and most strident far-right party, Fidesz, was re-elected

Moving Rightwards Amid a migrant crisis, economic inequality, growing disillusionment with

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with a supermajority in April, under Viktor Orban’s promise to build a “Christian democracy.” Having personally pitted himself against Brussels on the issues of refugee quotas, the free media, and judicial independence, Orban has become Brussel’s biggest headache, whilst Hungary continues to pick up the cheques. Furthermore, a new law, dubbed the “Stop Soros Plan,” is an attack on George Soros. Soros is a Hungarian business magnate and human rights philanthropist who ironically paid for Orban to briefly study Political Science at Pembroke College, Oxford, on a scholarship. Meanwhile, Austria’s Chancellor, Sebastian Kurz, poses himself as the far-right’s answer to Justin Trudeau, as the country’s saviour from “political Islam”. Under his Freedom Party, Austria has become the only “Western” European state with a radical-right government. However, to draw such an artificial distinction between East and West is to buy into a teleological narrative of Western liberal democracy (particularly as Vienna is further to the East than Prague).

Assuming that History will continue to move in an ever-progressive direction is to ignore the very real inequalities and insecurities that characterise world politics today. It is these anxieties that Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s Law and Justice Party have effectively tapped into.

Kaczynski is Poland’s most important politician, despite serving as neither prime minister nor president. Rather, his populist emphasis on returning to the nation’s conservative Catholic roots has secured his de facto rule.

Eastern Europe’s right-wing swing also has global implications. In particular, a strongman club including Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu, has been informally created

through meetings and statements of support amongst the six leaders.

Turning Inwards As well as moving rightwards, countries such as Hungary, Austria, and Poland are also turning inwards, marked by a sharp increase in xenophobic rhetoric and policies. Here, the three states strongly criticised the European Union’s policies during the 2015 migrant crisis and its refugee quota and open border systems in particular. In response to these obligations, Hungary and Austria built border barriers to physically block asylum seekers from entering the country; all three countries refused to participate in the relocation scheme and are now being prosecuted by the European Commission as a result.

Such parochial behaviour has been associated with a simultaneous rise in nationalism in Europe - one that stresses an essential white Christian identity.

Moreover, as some of the world’s most ethnically homogenous and Catholic states, the rapid influx of predominantly Arab and Muslim refugees has been seen as especially threatening by the Hungarian, Austrian, and Polish regimes. Yet the xenophobic character of Eastern Europe’s turn inwards is not novel; in fact, it is depressingly commonplace across the globe today.

Instead, what is new and dangerous is the willingness of government leaders to openly denounce the “clash of civilisations” that they perceive. Orban, Kaczynski and, to a lesser extent, Kurz, live in a world beyond political correctness, where to claim that “migration is not a solution but a problem… not a medicine but a poison, we don’t need it and won’t swallow it” resonates deeply with one’s electoral base. Such “telling it like it is” actually boosts leaders’ popu-

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larity, allowing them to centralise power within their party and personal rule, and thus giving them greater control over the nation’s future direction.

Western European countries, or more precisely, progressive and conservative nations. Here, Austria’s ambiguous case highlights the way in which the reasons for Europe’s right-wing swing lie deeper than its Cold War division. Often dubbed as the “kings” of their respective countries, Orban, Kaczynski, and Kurz, have facilitated democratic backsliding whilst reaching back further into the past for “Habsburg nostalgia.”

Looking Backwards As Eastern European leaders transform their states’ politics, they are doing so while looking backwards to their national pasts. This “right-wing swing” is critically not occurring in a vacuum: on the contrary, the phenomenon is deeply embedded in the region’s history and geopolitics. These countries experienced enormous upheaval in the second half of the twentieth century - particularly under Nazism and Marxism-Leninism.

Crucially, Orban, Kaczynski, and Kurz do not seek a return to the past, instead they seek to reassert their national strength and independence in contradistinction to it. For example, Warsaw has asserted the right to demand reparations from Germany potentially worth $850b for destroyed property and people killed during the Second World War. Ultimately, Eastern European far-right parties seek to rewrite their histories in order to lay claim to an exceptional national direction. This strategy has led to stricter controls on education and language policies, as well as restrictions on media and judicial independence in all three states. For instance, following a law that effectively gave the Law and Justice Party control over all judicial appointments and the supreme court, the European Commission triggered Article 7 in December 2017, which threatens to suspend Poland’s EU voting rights. However, Hungary has warned that it would block this so-called “nuclear option,” which requires the approval of all member-states. The row underlines the escalation of tensions between self-identified Eastern and

Marching Forward Even more important than the question of why Eastern Europe is experiencing a right-wing swing is the question of what is next. Current trends suggest far-right Eastern European regimes are moving towards greater insularity, centralisation, and authoritarianism. Effectively, Orban, Kaczynski, and Kurz seek to respectively make Hungary, Poland, and Austria great again. However, when examining states’ future directions, it is essential not to take liberal democratic progress for granted. History is never teleological; rather, it zig-zags, slows down and speeds up, switches course, and loops back. In this way, the growing confrontation between illiberal democracies and other European Union states is not inevitable - neither is its outcome easily predictable, even if actors on both sides claim moral authority. If one is to end on a note of cautious optimism, it is perhaps to suggest that history will continue to twist and turn in the future. Perhaps Hungary, Austria, and Poland will recognise the way in which they have diverted from the liberal democratic path and approach the international community for directions to get back on track.

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BRITAIN'S HISTORY OF DEPORTATIONS Magda Rodríguez Dehli

the citizen and the foreigner. Although in Roman times the word ‘deportatio’ meant sending a person away within the confines of the empire - still a prominent practice during the early days of modern European empires - today’s notion of deportation crosses and reinforces the border lines of the political community.

Only foreigners can be removed from a country and forced to remain outside of it. At the same time, deportation has become a policy instrument for the state to ‘protect’ the community from non-members whose presence is deemed to breach the legal codes or to pose a threat to the nation. This new paradigm of expulsions has intensified particularly in the last twenty-five years. Looking at the recent history of deportation as part of British immigration policy and ideas of state and citizenship will help us understand the current crisis, and envision how events may turn in the future.

Earlier this spring, the British media and Parliament were shaken by the evidence that the government was treating some members of the ‘Windrush generation’ as unauthorized immigrants. The Home Office destroyed the arrival records of 500,000 people from Commonwealth Caribbean countries between 1948 and 1971; people who, according to legislation, were granted indefinite leave to remain. Now, some of them are subject to welfare restrictions, detention, denial of re-entering the country, and deportation. In the wake of the scandal, the Home Secretary, unable to provide figures of those affected, nor to recognise the deportation policies that the government carries on, submitted her resignation. How did we arrived at a situation where the UK government is deporting its own citizens?

Deportation, in contemporary times, marks the ultimate difference between

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What is deportation?

sufficient infrastructural capacities and a favourable public opinion.

The legal basis of the current British deportation system was laid by the 1971 Immigration Act and refined in subsequent pieces of legislation. According to it, there are three legal categories of expulsion of foreigners: deportation as ‘conducive to the public good’ as ruled by the Secretary of State or recommended by a convicting criminal court; administrative removal of non-citizens whose entry or stay in the UK is unlawful; and voluntary departures of those who leave once removal procedures have been initiated against them.

Systems of immigration control and removal became increasingly complex.

Deportation is a difficult and expensive practice; identifying, apprehending and repatriating foreigners requires great material resources, information, and the ability to coordinate numerous levels of enforcement. Successive laws in the late 1990s and early 2000s aimed at increasing the ‘efficiency’ of the system, reducing the length of the deportation procedures and the rights to appeal, and leading to an increasing convergence between immigration control and criminal law. The first detention centre for immigrants awaiting deportation - currently known as Immigration Removal Centres (IRCs) - was created in 1996. The national security turn that followed 9/11 and 7/7 exacerbated these dynamics, multiplying the numbers of deportation cases on grounds of presumed threats to national security.

All this resulted in the coming of what is often termed the ‘deportation state’, which has normalised deportations as one more instrument of border and social control.

The process of deportation is usually painful and deeply traumatic, dominated by uncertainty and fear, and subject to great lengths of political and administrative discretion. Before being send away, individuals often endure institutional violence and long periods of detention. In the last decades, several systems of appeal have been turned down in court because they would not grant basic rights to the appellant.

Families and other social ties become divided by borders, and sometimes deported individuals who have grown up and lived their lives in the UK are sent to societies of supposed ‘origin’ that are completely alien to them.

Fame and shame in the twenty-first century

Mission: deportable. The 1990s and the ‘deportation turn’.

The number of deportations has doubled under this paradigm change.

Although it is difficult to offer a final figure, the Migration Observatory estimates that almost 40,000 foreigners were deported in 2016. Additionally, the Home Office’s statistics reveal that another 20,000 people were deported upon arrival that year. The number of deportations reached a peak in 2013, but the levels have been rather stable throughout the last decade.

Deporations spiked at the end of the Cold War. In her acclaimed book Why I’m No Longer Talking to White People About Race, Reni Eddo-Lodge documents expulsions of black immigrants in response to race riots in the early twentieth century. However, the ‘deportation turn’ in Western politics only started in the 1990s, when the legal provisions dating back to the 1970s met

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Authorities take pride in reporting high deportation numbers, which are also celebrated by a large segment of the public opinion. In the heyday of the national security ideology, Blair’s government made the removal of failed asylum seekers a policy priority. Later on, the Home Office’s lack of ability to deport a number of convicted non-citizens led to a public scandal and an institutional crisis. Subsequent Labour and Conservative administrations have shared the same enthusiasm for deportation; boasting about deportation figures in official statistics, electoral campaigns, and internal political communications has become the norm.

As stated in the leaked letter to the Prime Minister that forced the resignation of former Home Secretary Amber Rudd some weeks ago, “illegal and would-be illegal migrants and the public more widely, need to know that our immigration system has ‘teeth’”. This ‘go-home’ rhetoric is pervasive of the whole political spectrum and extends across the globe.

services, landlords and charities into informers for the Home Office - have been decried by human rights activists and migrant organisations. Its latest consequence is the Windrush scandal, but its roots are decades old.

However, some things have changed.

In 2006, a ‘deportation crisis’ resulted in the resignation of a minister, who took responsibility for failing to expel convicted foreigners from the UK. As a consequence, the Ministry of Justice became independent from the rest of the Home Office, and more restrictive immigration laws were enacted. Today, the Windrush crisis and the government’s reluctance to acknowledge deportation policies have caused a public outcry and led to the resignation of another Home Secretary. The initial anger was directed at the mistreatment of individuals who are a legally recognised part of the polity, and yet were wrongfully threatened with deportation. The leaks from the Home Office that revealed the existence of numerical deportation targets have reoriented the conversation, focusing not only on the wrong done in some cases, but also on the system that makes removing foreigners a productive goal. Although Brexit at times seems to leave little room for political optimism, it is safe to say that public perceptions and frames of value are shifting, and that the political scene is starting to host powerful voices in favour of a more humane immigration policy.

The Home Office’s lack of ability to deport a number of convicted non-citizens led to a public scandal and an institutional crisis.

In recent years, the Hostile Environment policy, enacted by the Home Office in 2010, has aimed to make staying on British soil as hard as possible for unauthorised immigrants. The draconian measures it envisages - turning medical

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COLOMBIA: NARCOS OR NIRVANA? Kyra Leyland

What does the average Westerner picture when they think of Colombia?

It is rarely the innovative tech startups, booming tourism industry or a Nobel Peace Prize. For decades, even the most reputable media outlets have perpetuated an image of Colombia as a drug-fuelled, war-torn nation, through an unrelenting and disproportionate coverage of narcotrafficking in the region. Given the international reputation that this Latin American country has for violence and cocaine production, these representations are not entirely unfounded.

surely. Tourism has grown by 300% since 2006 and in 2016 a peace treaty was signed with the Marxist guerrilla group FARC (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). Evidence suggests that Colombia is rapidly moving forwards, in terms of both security and development – so why is the world refusing to acknowledge the progress of this budding nation?

“Plata o plomo” Tendencies to focus on Colombia’s history are problematic, but it would be naïve to ignore the extent to which the nation has been plagued by violence.

During the reign of Pablo Escobar, the renowned Colombian narcotrafficker, Colombia was regarded as one of the most dangerous countries in the world.

At the peak of his success Escobar was responsible for 80% of all cocaine exported to the USA and the 7th richest

In the height of the Drug Wars of the 1980s, the homicide rate soared high above international standards at 57 per 100,000 of the population. Nonetheless, it is clear that times are changing.

The green zones on the FCO map of Colombia are spreading slowly but

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man in the world. His combined criminal, economic and political power enabled him to live by the ominous motto ‘plata o plomo’, literally translated as ‘silver or led’. Even the general public were not safe from his reign of terror, which involved explosives, kidnappings and the famous bombing of Avianca flight 203, which killed 110 civilians.

course of the 52-year conflict they killed over 220,000 people and conducted several high-profile abductions, including presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt in 2002 and General Ruben Darío Alzate in 2014.

The Peace Treaty of 2016 signalled the beginning of the end of paramilitary violence. Seven thousand weapons were symbolically handed over to the Colombian government at a historic ceremony in Mesetas, led by President Juan Manuel Santos and FARC leader Rodrigo ‘Timochenko’ Londoño. In 2017, Londoño formed a legal political party to replace the paramilitary called the Common Alternative Revolutionary Force, which still bears the acronym ‘FARC.’ If other paramilitaries see FARC functioning effectively as a legal, democratic body, this could encourage them to follow suit. Santos was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for his diplomatic success and is currently using the treaty as a model to combat the smaller paramilitary group ELN (National Liberation Army).

The efforts of the Search Bloc - a US-trained Colombian task force – resulted in Escobar’s death in 1993.

However, Pablo Escobar is still one of Colombia’s most famous figures and perceptions of the country’s security are still skewed by public memory of his criminal activity. Western media, such as the popular Netflix series ‘Narcos’, has to a certain extent glamorised the drugs trade and reduced Colombia’s international image to one of the world’s ‘cocaine capital’. Although cocaine production and violence persist in Colombia, the homicide rate is a third of what it was at the height of Escobar’s power. This one-sided portrayal hinders the nation in its journey towards an image that is untarnished by the drugs trade. The chain-smoking, brick phones and rolled-up sleeves in ‘Narcos’ should serve as a reminder that these are events of the past.

Transitionary Troubles Unfortunately, this treaty by no means guarantees peace. The reintegration of paramilitaries is still proving problematic. In 2017, a Colombian UN team member was kidnapped by dissident former FARC soldier. Unfortunately, this instance of rebellion was not isolated: given that 20% of FARC fighters had no families to return to and many lacked a formal education, further remilitarisation was and is a legitimate fear. On the other hand, nineteen ex-fighters have been assassinated by members of the public or rival paramilitaries since the signing of the peace treaty. Before it was successfully passed through Congress,

Paramilitary Peace This does not mean to say that drug trafficking and violence have come to an absolute halt. In subsequent years, guerrilla groups and paramilitaries replaced Escobar as the main perpetrators of large scale violence, clandestinely controlling the drugs trade and using its revenue to fund their wars. It was the Marxist organisation FARC, founded in 1964, that posed the greatest long-term threat to Colombian security. Over the

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a more lenient version was rejected in a plebiscite by a slight majority of 50.2%, suggesting that the public feels ex-FARC soldiers should be held more accountable for their crimes.

paramilitary violence. Yet, an analysis of the current political situation reveals that media and popular culture are not the only barriers to Colombia being considered a ‘nirvana’. Other paramilitary organisations, such as the ELN, still persist, and the successful demilitarisation of FARC remains an arduous, ongoing project. It would be naïve and unconstructive to ignore the challenges that Colombia still faces, but there is certainly cause for cautious optimism.

Santos and Londoño famously signed their peace treaty using a pen in the shape of a bullet – one can only hope that this will set an example to other guerrilla groups and convince them to renounce their weapons in favour of words.

This one-sided portrayal hinders the nation in its journey towards an image that is untarnished by the drugs trade.

The creation of an ECONMUN, a FARC-run organisation which administers material assistance and economic projects to assist with the reintegration of his ex-soldiers seems to be improving the situation. Meanwhile, the ACR (Colombian Agency for Reintegration) is providing ex-soldiers with security and legal advice and housing them in ‘peace homes’ – small houses with a private location – to reduce risks to their personal security. As part of the treaty, FARC agreed to renounce drug trafficking and assist the Colombian government with its aim to eliminate 100,000 hectares of coca by the end of the year, through a combination of forcible eradication and crop substitution. Ex-FARC soldier Jhon Steban Pérez is even launching a career in rap, and reports that he is “breathing the air of peace” with his 2017 track entitled ‘Reconciliation Song.’

What does the future hold for the ‘hidden gem’ of Latin America? As FARC was once the most dangerous and prominent guerrilla groups in Colombia, the peace treaty constitutes a significant step towards the eradication of

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KAZAKHSTAN:

WHERE IS IT WANDERING NOW? Max Randall & Nicholas Ching Kazakhstan, which literally means ‘land of the wanderers’, is drifting gently away from Russia and into the arms of China, which promises greater economic prosperity. This is something that Russia has not been able to provide as successfully since the start of Western sanctions, its costly war in Eastern Ukraine, and its recent involvement in Syria and the Middle East.

China continues to invest in Kazakhstan in a bid to access the region’s oil and natural gas: indeed, in 2017 the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline transported 12.3 million tonnes of oil and 44 billion cubic metres of natural gas, while the Central Asia-China natural gas pipeline conveyed 34 bcm of natural gas in 2016.

The forefather of Kazakh literature, Abai Qunanbaiuly (1845-1904), whose importance as a cultural figure is still felt today, instructed his people to learn Russian, “even if you might have to sacrifice everything else good in your life.” Writing at the end of the 19th century, Abai could already identify Russia’s importance for his nation.

However, it is important to consider just how prophetic and influential his views were, and in what way they might be able to help us better understand the direction in which Kazakhstan might be heading today.

In one of Abai’s most famous works, the forty-five philosophical and moral parables which make up his Book of Words, he reflects on issues related to national identity, morality and the rights of ethnic Kazakhs. Abai had a significant influence on the development of Kazakhstan’s intelligentsia,

As far as trade and investment in Central Asia are concerned, China has surpassed Russia in recent years, yet stronger political and cultural ties remain between Russia and Kazakhstan.

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and a survey of his views can explain much about Kazakhstan’s historical and political consciousness, as well as what President Nazarbayev might view as the next step for Kazakhstan in its foreign policy. In Word 25, Abai writes that “their land is Dar-al-Harb.” Dar-al-Harb refers to the countries where Islamic law is not in force, and in effect, he is saying that Kazakhstan should learn from the West’s political and judicial systems.

He also believed that Russian scholarship and culture was the “key” to the world’s treasures, and that the country’s economic and political development would come naturally after that. This is not the case today: English is now viewed more as the global language, explaining the state’s decision to change from a Cyrillic alphabet to a Latin one.

In his Book of Words, however, Abai viewed Russia more as a stepping stone for Kazakhstan and not as a political and cultural model, writing that Kazakhs must learn to be the Russians’ equals while not adopting their vices.

countries for increased cooperation. For the most part, Kazakhstan welcomes China’s engagement as a way to help modernise its ageing infrastructure and diversify its economy. Growing Chinese investment also allows it to signal to Russia that it enjoys the backing of other allies, and that any attempt by the Kremlin to replicate a Ukraine-type scenario within Kazakhstan – a country with a large ethnic Russian population – would not go ahead without running into China. China has already shown in the recent trade war with the US that it is not afraid to take significant economic measures to assert its authority. Russia, however, is still the primary destination for Central Asian migrant workers, and remittances from the three million or so Central Asians who currently live and work in Russia comprise a substantial part of the region’s economies. Yet Kazakhstan’s primary sources of revenue are oil and gas, and so such remittances are not as valuable as they are in countries more dependent on them, such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

For the most part, Kazakhstan welcomes China’s engagement as a way to help modernise its ageing infrastructure and diversify its economy.

Despite distancing itself from Russia, Kazakhstan remains cautious of countries like China, whose values and culture are perceived as being hostile to its own. Beijing’s policy of clamping down on Xinjiang’s Muslim populations, for instance, is no secret. As well as closing down mosques and greatly restricting their religious practices and traditions, China has mounted a re-education campaign in Xinjiang targeted towards the Turkic Muslim peoples whose ancestors inhabited the area for many centuries. This is perceived as problematic by Kazakhstan, a country where roughly 70 per cent of the population is Muslim. In May 2016, major protests broke out over Chinese invest-

Kazakhstan has now opened itself up more to the rest of the world, as hoped for by Abai, and as a key transit state, it stands to benefit the most from the Belt and Road Initiative – a development strategy conceived by China in conjunction with a host of Eurasian

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ments in agriculture after a law was amended to allow the lease of land to foreign investors for 25 years. Russia has also fostered these negative perceptions of Chinese labour and environmental practices in Central Asia by using its media to condemn Chinese regulatory and environmental standards, and to spread rumours about large influxes of Chinese migrants. According to Dr Steven Parham from the University of Bern, “the attitude of Kazakhstanis, regardless of whether they are ethnic Kazakhs or Russians, towards ‘the Chinese’ is generally either non-interest or negative.”

and the influence of political elites. So long as there exists a threat of radical extremism, even if only a perceived one, Russia is sure to maintain its influence.

As time passes and generations change, Kazakhstan is becoming less reliant on Russia and its system of values. Perhaps what will be seen instead is a coexistence of both Russian and Chinese policies in a way that suits Kazakhstan best. This seems the most reasonable solution to the current situation, particularly as Russia and China have already established their own differing, yet complementary, spheres of influence: China’s being the economic issues in the region and Russia’s being those related to security.

It is clear that Russia does not require Central Asia’s raw materials in the same way that China does, nor does China require the region’s low-wage workforce in the same way as Russia. Ultimately, both countries have an overlapping interest in trying to stabilise Central Asia in order to safeguard their interests there, and to keep militancy from reaching their borders. Kazakhstan is being pulled in two different directions, yet for the time being it benefits from both countries’ policies. Given the sensitivity of the situation, however, only time will tell where Kazakhstan’s future lies. An unfortunate terrorist attack or a misguided BRI deal may be all that it takes for Kazakhstan to sway one way or the other.

China has already shown in the recent trade war with the US that it is not afraid to take significant economic measures to assert its authority.

It might still seem that Russia, at least for the foreseeable future, is likely to remain the dominant player in Kazakhstan. This is compounded by the fact that many of the former Soviet states’ economies remain heavily dependent on Russia. President Nazarbayev, for instance, has been careful to ensure that Kazakhstan’s economic reforms and modifications are aligned with those implemented by Russia. Moreover, the persistent threat of radical Islam – as seen in nearby countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan – means that Russia’s position in the region remains unchallenged, as it exercises its power through its management of regional security

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FUTURE-PROOFING IN THE FACE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE Nathania Silalahi

“No matter how low their wages are, they’ll never be able to compete with the next generation of robots.” This is what Erik Brynjolfsson, director of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy, asserted at the Jobs and the Fourth Industrial Revolution panel hosted by the World Economic Forum in 2017. By ‘they,’ Brynjolfsson was referring to the many workers providing low-cost labour in developing countries. With the rise of identity politics, concepts such as ‘the division between them and us’ or expressions like ‘those left behind’ have become ubiquitous buzz phrases. Nevertheless, it is hardly the right time to become desensitised to these issues. Momentous developments in technology, specifically big data and artificial intelligence (AI), are increasingly pervading society and can potentially polarise it further. These drivers of the so-called fourth industrial

revolution will likely lead to increasingly unequal relationships between people and between countries. We must stop to think about the direction AI will take us in. Where are we headed and how can we future-proof our institutions?

To begin, we need to know where we are now and the medium-term foreseeable consequences of AI. These can be segmented into implications for the global economy, warfare, and foreign policy. The destruction of jobs that comes with AI technology are significant. Although studies disagree over whether lower- or middle-skilled jobs will be affected the most, they generally agree that the most routine tasks are most vulnerable to automation and that high-skilled workers would be least affected. Increasing automation in developed countries would also affect developing countries, as demand for

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low-cost labour from abroad would fall. This may worsen unemployment particularly for youth. India and China alone will have roughly half a billion young people join the workforce in the next 15 years, and 11 million young Africans are expected to join the labour market every year for the next decade.

Thus, the livelihoods of many depend on the creation of new jobs - some of which we cannot even imagine today.

As we have seen, AI has the potential to alter the power dynamics of global markets. Thus it is vital for governments to build domestic economic interests in global AI and set up AI-inspired development programs. According to Stiftung Neue Verantwortung, a German think tank, market forces are likely to move faster than policy making. As a result, countries should appropriately adjust to handle turbulent times for the labour market. Countries should invest more in monitoring developments in AI technologies and markets, turning this data into risk assessments in regional instability, migration, and trade. Flexible cycles of knowledge acquisition, problem definition, testing and developing prototypes, and reviewing may be key. In reality, these changes demand substantial institutional reorganisation. Effective collaboration between ministries, private companies, research institutions, civil society organizations, the media, and other government agencies will form the backbone of such future-proofing efforts. Only through such collaboration can knowledge be acquired quickly to identify the most useful interventions, avoid the duplication of effort, and prevent the repetition of others’ mistakes.

With regard to warfare, current AI allows autonomous function in a variety of tasks - take-off and landing, threat assessment, and speed variation, for example. On top of this, concept vehicles, tanks, and even humanoid robots are being designed for land power operations in a number of countries.

As a result, crucial decision-making systems are no longer purely based on human thought processes. Decision-making systems with the power to harm lives are now composed of different layers of influence and interaction between their human, augmented, and artificial elements. In light of this, human-to-machine and machine-tomachine interactions are changing the norms of international relations and warfare in general. After all, current and emerging technologies are increasingly dependent on virtual networks and cloud based systems. Thus the challenge for societies will be to use these technological advances in the most effective way to dominate global political and social interactions. In light of this, could the race to AI be our era’s version of the nuclear arms race during the Cold War? World leaders in AI will have the edge both in economic efficiency and warfare.

This question is especially relevant today considering China’s rise and the fragility of Sino-Western relations.

Clearly, considering the potential of an escalating AI arms race, adapting arms control and nonproliferation strategies is key to aligning major powers around common policies (such as limitations on offensive capabilities) and working together to prevent these weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists. This work should be accompanied by significant public diplomacy to establish moral red lines and convene influential stakeholders across sectors to contain the threat of AI weapons and initiate disin-

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formation campaigns. Also, developing platforms for international dialogue to prepare the groundwork for collective action, like regulatory policy on AI, is an important goal. This dialogue should extend to governments worldwide to prevent strategic antagonism. Perhaps the creation of a more powerful UN body to deal with AI involving academics, private businesses, and governments is on the horizon. Employing scientists, engineers, legal experts, philosophers, and more, this body could focus on analysing the potential ethical impacts of AI on humanity, finding ways to prevent the global digital divide from growing larger, enforcing transparency in AI research at different levels, as well as encouraging knowledge-sharing and international cooperation. Even though realists may doubt the probability of such large-scale collaboration, pushing for as much transparency as possible is paramount in light of the high stakes.

new opportunities for free expression, civic activity, and social progress, they also raise the unwelcome possibility of deepening existing social discrimination. The challenge for foreign policy will be to promote a positive agenda in the face of these risks – communicating and developing multilateral policy to pursue rights-based goals. All of this is significant considering the role that AI can play in security and weapons using algorithms to deliver lethal force as well.

In a sense, all of these methods to future-proof our diplomatic institutions force us to be more human. They require a constant recognition and evaluation of our limitations to find new ways to form and build effective relationships. We need to be faster, more experimental, open to adaptation, and risk-tolerant in problem solving. We need to integrate technology knowledge into the conventional organisational units of our institutions. Without competency in the language of AI research and the technical advances in the commercial marketplace, it is unlikely that our diplomatic practice will suffice to meet the need. In the end, as Brynjolfsson says, “you want to be working with them, not competing with them.”

Another goal is to pursue a human and civil rights-based system of governance, commerce, and security in the international community. The Facebook–Cambridge Analytica scandal illustrates the tensions between security and freedom implicit in interconnected societies. AI will heighten this tension by supercharging surveillance and censorship capabilities.

Companies, like IC Realtime, are developing surveillance cameras’ capacity to analyse live video footage on their own. This benefits public safety, helping police detect crimes and accidents more easily through its range of scientific and industrial applications. But these developments also raise serious questions about the future of privacy and pose novel risks to social justice.

Even as these technologies enable

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A Note About Oxford IRSoc Lighthouse is the Oxford International Relation Society’s termly journal. In it are published a collection of student-written articles, both undergraduate and postgraduate, edited by a team of Oxford students. Each article is the result of a collaborative effort between writer and editor, and is written over the first four weeks of term.

This finished journal is the final product of countless hours of work put in by the writers, editors, and the committee of IRSoc. If you are interested in being involved in next term’s edition of Lighthouse, please follow the Lighthouse Journal page on Facebook. Applications for editing positions will be opened in seventh week, and the call out for articles in the print journal will be at the beginning of next term; both will be published on Facebook. Articles are published on the blog on a rolling basis.

Thanks go to this term's team of editors Editor in Chief Tom Hunt Co-Editors Hugh Thomas Owen Brooks

Sub-Editors Cara Exall Julia Routledge Michelle Huang Nathania Silalahi Graphic Designer Robert Harrison

May / June 2018 Issue 18 (Formerly 'Sir') email: editor-in-chief@oxirsoc.org Printed by Anchorprint Group Ltd. The fonts used are Didot (titles) and Seravek (body)

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INSIDE LEAF

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BACK COVER