Thesis | State Power and the Trompe-l’oeil Effect

Copyright by Pasquale J. Festa 2008

State Power and the Trompe-l’oeil Effect: A Critical Examination of America’s Army through the Lenses of Baudrillard and Althusser

by Pasquale J. Festa, B.A.

Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Masters of Science in Information Studies

The University of Texas at Austin December 2008

State Power and the Trompe-l’oeil Effect: A Critical Examination of America’s Army through the Lenses of Baudrillard and Althusser

Approved by Supervising Committee: Philip Doty Laura Stein

Dedication

Mother, Father, Sister, and Lover.

Without whom none of this would ever be possible.

Oh, and Frankie too.

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Acknowledgements

I wish to acknowledge a number of individuals have who been a part of my academic career, both past and present, without whom I would not have been able to arrive at the point I find myself today. To begin, I wish to thank Philip Doty for his invaluable assistance in preparing this thesis. His guidance, knowledge, and wisdom has aided me greatly in making sense of the topic of which you are about to read. I also wish to thank Laura Stein whose course on Communication, Law, and Power was a catalyst for such an examination. Her taking of the reins as second reader for this project is something I greatly thank her for. Lastly, I wish to thank Bill Aspray for taking on the responsibility of being my third, unofficial reader. His input is of tremendous value and I thank him for fitting this responsibility in to his busy schedule.

I also wish to thank Michael Joyce, Nick Adams, Molly Nesbit and Giovanna Borradori who were mentors of mine at Vassar College during my undergraduate career.

The seeds they have planted in me in have only begun to grow full bloom.

December 5, 2008

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Abstract

State Power and the Trompe-l’oeil Effect: A Critical Examination of America’s Army through the Lenses of Baudrillard and Althusser

Pasquale J. Festa, MSInfoStds The University of Texas at Austin, 2008

Supervisor: Philip Doty With the introduction of the Internet into mainstream culture and subsequent advancements in application and graphical technology that parallel its entanglement with the fabric of everyday life, interactive media becomes more a tool of mass communications. Whereas preexisting media systems such as radio and television remain fundamentally top-down, one-way communication conduits under the control of a relatively consolidated power group, the Internet allows for the democratization of widerange communication and information dissemination. This sprawling and open network structure coupled with the evolutions in interactive media design brought about a complex communication and information landscape. A landscape in which the range of messages and communiqués floating in the digital sea are multifarious based open the fundamental vi

openness of the network and tantalizing due to the sleek image and immersive nature of the media utilized.

While opinions regarding the positive and negative aspects of digital culture clashed numerous times in the past, this grating between the “good and bad sides” of the Internet is most apparent in the realm of national defense in the post-September 11 world.

Particularly at the American Department of Defense and in the chambers of the U.S. Legislature, a series of arguments are being made which, while seeming to contradict one another, both highlight the State’s inherent fear of enemy uses of the Internet. In addition we find in this rhetoric the State’s affirmation of the need to utilize new media for carrying out strategic and tactical operations for the sake of achieving its own objectives.

As is written in the Department of Defense Information Operations Roadmap, a prevailing mentality exists to “fight the Net.” With some degree of digging it becomes apparent that in spite of the rhetoric targeting the Internet as a new front in the War on Terror, the fundamental inability to control the messages communicated through it is a much greater concern that raises the most anxiety for State actors. The goal of this thesis is to illustrate the way the American State generates fear in regarding the dangers of new media systems while simultaneously being an active participant in commandeering the same for reinforcing its own ideological stance. First, the language utilized by the American Congress and Department of Defense illustrates a fundamental fear of the power that democratized mass communication has in opposing the State apparatus. Following this analysis a discussion of Louis Althusser’s vii

Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses illustrates the way interactive media on the Internet functions as a communicative arm of the State. Thirdly, this thesis illustrates how State power is exerted over the Internet and through interactive media through the first-person shooter video game America’s Army. Finally, concepts culled from critical theory highlight some of the possible dangers state systems’ use of interactive media for ideological objectives may bring to the understanding of the state of reality. Ultimately, this thesis will culminate with a theory of a new State information taxonomy best defined as Trompe-l’oeil.

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Table of Contents

WARFARE IN CYBERSPACE - AN INTRODUCTION.................................................................. 1 Towards a New Knowledge: An Objective ............................................................................... 8 SCREAMS AND WHISPERS OF THE STATE: THE RHETORICAL FRAMING OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REGARDING THE INTERNET ..................................................12 The Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Act of 2007.................................13 The Department of Defense’s Information Operations Road map .....................................22 ALTHUSSER AFTER THE INTERNET: THE IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUS IN A NETWORKED WORLD .................................................................................30 Althusser’s Ideological Apparatus: A Brief Overview..........................................................30 The Internet and Interactive Media: Similarities to ISA Institutions .................................34 How the Internet differs from Althusser’s ISA Institutions...................................................37 REPRODUCING THE MEANS OF P RODUCTION: AMERICA’S ARMY AND NEW APPROACHES TO RECRUITMENT IN AMERICA .....................................................................42 The State on the Internet: America’s Army ...........................................................................42 The Goal of the Game: Recruitment and Enlistment through America’s Army ..............45 From Propaganda to Media: A Short History of the American Message.........................50 MISINFORMATION AS EDUCATION: AMERICA’S ARMY AS A FLAWED SIMULATION OF WARFARE ...................................................................................55 UN Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.......................56 Lack of Gore ..............................................................................................................................58 Psychological Effects of War....................................................................................................59 The Loss of Values in Warfare..................................................................................................61 HYPERREALITY AND SEDUCTION: DESIRE AT P LAY IN AMERICA ’S A RMY ...................64 The Simulacrum of Warfare: America’s Army......................................................................65 T HE CONCEPT OF TROMPE L ’OIEL: A CONCLUSION .............................................................70 APPENDIX A: T HE VIOLENT RADICALIZATION AND HOMEGROWN T ERRORISM A CT OF 2007 ..............................................................................76 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..............................................................................................................................89 VITA .................................................................................................................................................94

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Warfare in Cyberspace - An Introduction Because we inhabit a comfort zone far from the trauma of conflict zone, we Americans have become desensitized to the violence of war. We are disconnected, disengaged while many others do the suffering. The game holds up a mirror that reveals our own propensities for violence, racism and propaganda. We can close our eyes, our ears and deny that it exists, but the issue won’t go away (Bilal, 2008. ¶5).

In March of 2008, at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in Troy, New York protest banners and signs fluttered in the air as a mob of hundreds coalesced on campus to have their voices heard in a collective statement. The target of the group’s unified frustration was not the War on Terror, genocide in Darfur, human rights in China or the need for environmental change to curb global warming. The reason behind the collective mass coming together to express a shared sensibility was the canceling of the campus exhibit of the interactive media artwork Virtual Jihadi by Wafaa Bilal (Crigger, 2008. ¶2). The work itself, fundamentally a modification of the commercially released Hunt for Saddam firstperson shooter video game, places the player in the role of an Iraqi civilian recruited by Al Qaeda after the death of his brother in the Second Gulf War on a quest to carry out suicide bombings with the ultimate goal of assassinating George W. Bush. While censorship and outcry concerning artistic works occurred numerous times in the past, with examples in the cases of Robert Mapplethorpe’s risqué photographs in Washington, D.C. (New York Times, 1990. ¶2) and Andre Serrano’s Piss Christ (Casey, 2004. ¶1) being exemplary, such controversies tend to focus on sexually explicit materials or overtly scathing commentaries on religion. In the case of the RPI incident, the work engaged political and national identity. Beyond the violent characteristics of the work, its physical 1

form as a video game simulation (rather than a film, photograph or other representation) did little to quell concerns of the community opposed to its exhibition. While Hermann Nitch’s Theatre of Orgies and Mysteries or Damien Hirst’s Mother and Child Divided, with their uses of dismembered, disemboweled and mutilated live animals had their share of detractors, in their particular cases, to be colloquial, “the shows did go on”. Despite Bilal’s use of pixilated sprites as the chief medium for creating his statement about war, violence, and ideology, his work instigated an emotion that Nitch’s and Hirst’s works failed to conjure: fear and animosity. The make believe wields a power far superior than artifacts of the real. While no humans were harmed in the making of the work, no living beings were exploited, and no sacred belief systems (or so it appears) were criticized, the work was censored by School President Jackson in large part due to outcries from the campus College Republican organization. To those who were offended by it, Bilal’s Virtual Jihadi became a symbol of sympathy and support for Islamic extremism.

Ironically enough, when, in his work Domestic Tension, Bilal locked himself in a gallery for a month and allowed the nameless and the faceless citizens of the world to take shots at him with a remote-controlled paintball gun over the Internet no public outcry was heard. It appears imagined violence elicits deeper and stronger emotions than real violence.

The real questions given the history of school shootings combined with public outcry over glorification of violence in video games and special interest group lobbying in opposition to negative values expressed in violent video games, do video games have an actual negative effect on their intended audience with regards to their global consciousness 2

and do games elicit destructive and aggressive actions in players? According to Craig A. Anderson, Professor of Psychology at Iowa State University, the answer is a resounding “yes”. Anderson states: When one combines all relevant empirical studies using meta-analytic techniques, five separate effects emerge with considerable consistency. Violent video games are significantly associated with: increased aggressive behavior, thoughts, and affect; increased physiological arousal; and decreased pro-social (helping) behavior. Average effect sizes for experimental studies (which help establish causality) and correlational studies (which allow examination of serious violent behavior) appear comparable (2003. ¶4).

While Anderson addresses the impact of video games on adolescent behavior in regards to their influence on affect and behavior, further the investigation must be taken.

Namely, if these video games instigate negative tendencies in players, what is the broader socio-political impact?

The growing use of interactive media systems in everyday life in recent years points to influence digital technologies and the Internet have on individuals the world over. Beginning with the general public’s first introduction to the Internet in the 1990s and followed by a period of adoption that shaped its current form, the Internet’s presence in the household has grown exponentially. Nielsen//Netratings, the global standard for Internet usage statistics, reported in 2004 that 75% of the American population report having access to the Internet (Netratings, 2004. ¶1). One may surmise this number has grown exponentially after four more years. The Internet and interactive media available on it are shaping an increasing number of American lives. Just as radio, television, and the telephone all brought ways in which individuals communicate, share information, and 3

build knowledge into a state of flux, so to has the Internet instigated change in terms of communication, media, and human behavior.

With the transition from a defense industry experiment, to Academic communication network to finally a publicly utilized system, the Internet has become embedded into most mundane practices within day-to-day life. Education, commerce, and journalism changed due to the adoption of digital technologies by their fields. The utilization of the Internet and interactive media by business and corporate organizations cannot be ignored. The Internet has allowed for penetration of markets that were once difficult or wholly impossible to locate within the seemingly homogenous fabric of the social landscape. New media technologies allow the creation of innovative communication methods and tools. As a result, mass communication has shifted from a top-down single message system (i.e., radio and television) to a correspondence delivery network that can broadcast “custom-made” and “unique” communiqués regarding products and services.

The emergence of interactive media and marketing organizations and the 100 million plus domain names registered illustrate the power of such a system. Within the contemporary world of business and commerce it is starkly apparent that a presence on the Internet is imperative to survival and prosperity. According to Domain Tools, an Internet domain name statistical site, over 75% of registered sites are in the .com domain as of September 26, 2008 ((Domain Tools, 2008. ¶2).

While the impact of the new media on business organization and marketing strategy has been discussed at length by a number of diversified disciplines, little has been 4

written on a topic which is both resolutely similar yet wholly unique to those business oriented models; namely the impact of the Internet and interactive media on State methods for nationalistic indoctrination and, in particular, militarization of the citizenry.

For the most part, discourse concerning the Internet in regards to States and Politics has focused on topics such as eGovernment and the positive impact of such tools on citizenbased participation in the democratic process. In a departure from this discourse, this thesis explores the manner in which the State utilizes the Internet and interactive media for solidifying its ideological stance within the psyche of its citizens. In the realm of business organizations a discussion of interactive media would focus on markets and consumers and eGovernment would take as its points of reflection concepts like representatives and voters. Instead the discussion here will center on citizens and soldiers.

While a dialogue concerning business organization uses of Internet communication and media systems would make the selling of goods and market penetration its predominant focus, a conversation framed by the topics discussed by this thesis will highlight the manner in which the State system utilizes such tools for the building of national identity among its young citizens and attempts to exploit these new methods of communication for building a sustainable military presence in the world. In effect, it is my main goal to highlight the manner in which these new means that have been so heavily utilized by business are now being embraced by the controlling agents of the Nation-State system of the United States of America for the sake of achieving their own goals of political and ideological indoctrination. In addition, I wish to point out that the systematic use of new 5

media by the Nation-State is at odds with these tools very same use by opposing agents.

The mirror it appears is concave in nature. While the American State is demonizing the new media systems due to their utilization by enemy actors it is also utilizing them for their own ends The rhetorical debate regarding the Internet and digital media highlights the potential threat such systems may pose in the hands of the State’s enemy in regards to dissemination of opposing ideological speech. To make the point succinctly, it is not so much the medium as it is the message that is under attack.

While the role of politically charged communication is thoroughly discussed in terms of a propagandistic metaphor, for the most part such inquiries into the subject have been on top-down media systems such as television and print. With the emergence of cyberspace as an information environment, mass communication has shifted at least in part from a one-way conduit system to a networked and distributed web allowing more voices, and therefore more perspectives, to contribute to political discourse. As the global communication infrastructure has changed so too has the nature of political speech in the sense that varying viewpoints and dissenting opinions now have the means to broadcast to the world in a more rapid and efficient manner. This thesis proposes that the emergence of interactive media on the Internet has brought about a new form of nation building communiquĂŠ that, while still relying on the traditional tools of image and text, also incorporates active agency (as Heidegger may have interpreted; a phenomenology) for maximizing ideological dissemination and amalgamation. This change is interpreted as bringing into existence a new form of politicized speech (and thus a new class of 6

information) that is best categorized as trompe l'oiel. To be more to the point and allow the reader to better understand how this broad topic of discussion is approached by here I will define this thesis’s aim as such: The interactive video game America's Army will be critiqued utilizing a series of concepts culled from critical theory to highlight the way in which emergent interactive media and the Internet have become a new front in the War on Terror as characterized by the U.S.A. as a State power. In particular, the works of Louis Althusser, Jean Baudrillard, and a host of other critical theorists will be utilized to explain how signs are used to create symbolisms in line with the dominant State ideology. The emergent media genre of first-person gaming will be exposed as a tool for the manufacturing of a hyperreal perception of warfare, national identity, and history. In addition, the theory of the Internet as a democratic public space will be questioned in regards to its role as a new extension of the Ideological State Apparatus. Recently proposed legislation, particularly HR1955 (The Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Act of 2007), and statements coming from the Department of Defense regarding information technologies express how the current War on Terror is being used as a means to eradicate democratic speech in cyberspace and place the new information environment under the auspices of the State system.

In formulating any strategic plan it is always necessary to differentiate between goals and objectives. As the goals of this thesis are discussed above, it is now pertinent to give my audience a greater understanding of why such a study is to be undertaken by Information Studies and what may be introduced to this discipline by this study. In 7

further explaining the motives behind this work, this author hopes that the ideas presented in this paper may be taken into consideration for further rounding out and enhancing the overall field of Information Studies itself.

TOWARDS A N EW KNOWLEDGE: AN O BJECTIVE While Information Studies has intertwined with varying threads of multifarious other disciplines, it appears that upon a more scrutinizing inspection that examinations within the field are focused predominantly on the question of how individuals and groups use information systems and technologies. This is not to say that Information Studies is without an acknowledgment of issues concerning the fundamental definition of information, but rather makes note of the fact that any fringe methodologies or subject matters are always digested and internalized by the discipline in a manner that make them subservient to the overarching goals of the discipline itself. While research is necessary for new discovery, it is my assertion that Information Studies has yet to break out of its role as a trade discipline and that it would benefit greatly from taking on a more accepting air of the fringe facets of study which exist outside of the discipline. That this viewpoint may be amateur and naive is admitted. To make the point more concisely: Information Studies, it appears, is still attempting to find comfort in its new skin as it has emerged from the cocoon of Library Science. While emergent information technologies have been embraced by the discipline, the fundamental philosophical, theoretical, and ethical dilemmas that have sprung from the genesis of these tools are, at best, understood through a reading of scholars outside of the discipline. While holding high esteem for the discipline 8

of Information Studies, I wish to point out that the discipline still has much to learn in terms of exploratory study and that it has yet to achieve its potential solely based on a fear or apprehension of taking on the daunting task of making enquiries into the factuality of the premises on which it is built. Any conceptualization of the manner in which emergent information and communication technologies affect behavior, knowledge, and learning in terms of the contemporary world should take into account not only the credibility of the source, but also the intentions of use. One fundamental question has yet to be answered by this discipline and has, for the most part, been left to the scholars of philosophy and science. What are the dangers inherent in utilizing these new systems and technologies in terms of shaping understanding of the world and building knowledge?

The staunch in regards to our understanding of reality is that the winners of the war always write the history one learns. The tale of the colonization of the United States comes to us from the perspective of the European, stifling the voice of the Native American – the savage, for both ends of the spectrum, is always the other although one has come to dominate its adversary through the ability to control the ink, paper, and presses writing history. Our understanding of the contemporary world is defined by corporate entities that filter and tailor the information they broadcast to us through their ability to control of the means of production: the Fox, CNN and MSNBC wars, and within the spheres of their influence the need to represent the “liberal” and “conservative” view, only illustrate more clearly how “spin” has become a fundamental in terms of discerning information credibility. As time passes and the world’s information and 9

knowledge builds, old truths become falsehoods. The Earth that was once flat is now round. The sun once revolved around us, but now we revolve around it. The ability to control “weapons of mass communication,” to be cliché, is a power that is as substantial as the ability to control nuclear arms or large military organizations. As the communicative landscape of World War II and its subsequent next phase as the Cold War illustrate all States, independent of particular objectives, ideologies, or political philosophies utilize propaganda. The ability to influence thought and perception is a form of, as Joseph Nye attests, “Soft Power” that both complements and takes over other methods of control that are understood to be more oppressive and violent. As Nye writes in Soft Power, “Information is power, and modern information technology is spreading information more widely than ever before in history” (2004. 1). If this is the case, it is an objective of this thesis to instigate a dialogue concerning the ethics of the use of contemporary information systems characterized by the Internet and interactive media. It is necessary to keep in mind that the topic of study does not exist independent of context. An objective of this thesis is to shine some light on the place of information and communication technologies in terms of a post September 11 world. With the use of services such as Google, Wikipedia, and MySpace on the rise for simultaneously attaining and distributing information, it is now necessary to come to examine the complexities regarding the search truth that have emerged in a networked world. For this thesis the philosophical concept of truth will be defined as knowledge existing a priori of the manipulation, spin, and editing that comes with communication. In this sense, the truth of 10

warfare is the totality of its history and not merely the way in which it is described by a particular entity or information resource. In effect, the plurality of resources, with their different interpretations facilitates the attainment of truth. This is a fundamental topic for Information Studies due to the fact that if we are unable to understand the manner in which information is created we are also unable to know if the knowledge we are contributing to the world is premised on Truth. Without engaging this question of the most fundamental nature we will find ourselves in great danger because, As Harry Frankfurt writes in On Truth: Without truth, either we have no opinion at all concerning how things are or our opinion is wrong. One way or the other, we do not know what kind of situation we are in. We don't know what's going on, either in the world around us or within ourselves (2006. p. 59).

This thesis will work towards building an understanding of the importance of Truth by exposing what is believed to be a new information class that takes as its main goal the creation of misinformation. This taxonomy, dubbed trompe l’oiel is explained as information that has been tailored or edited by an information provider for the sake of influencing the information reader. Our study will take multiple paths that seem to meander away from our main road, but will ultimately bring us to our intended destination in the end. With the goals of this Thesis now laid it out it is possible to delve into the topic of interest.

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Screams and Whispers of the State: The Rhetorical Framing of the American Congress and Department of Defense regarding the Internet We Must Fight the Net. [The Department of Defense] is building an informationcentric force. Networks are increasingly the operational center of gravity, and the Department must be prepared to “fight the net.” (Department of Defense, 2003. p. 6).

As the above chapter has made clear, the objective of this thesis is an exploration in which State systems utilize interactive media and the Internet for the sake of infusing their ideological standards into the body politic of the citizenry. While the use of the term “rhetoric” in the title of this chapter is admittedly dubious, note for the sake of making intentions clear that the use of this term is wholly without judgmental connotation. The objective is not to cast aspersions or stake a claim to the fundamental validity of the arguments being brought against the Internet by the State, but rather is to illustrate that the wording being used has a definitive and formalized function in terms of generating a certain sentiment in regards to it. Namely, while the term rhetoric can be interpreted as a way in which to attack the credibility of a particular orator, it is much more important and quite imperative to keep in mind that the term fundamentally frames speech in regards to a function centering on debate and reasoning. In this sense, this thesis will engage and critique the rhetorical framing utilized by arms of the State in regards to the Internet and examine how such rhetoric illustrates a particular sensibility. Now is the proper time to begin an exploration of speech coming from both the U.S. Congress and Department of Defense in terms of the Internets role in the post-9/11 American world.

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To bolster this argument that the State interprets the Internet as a threat it is pertinent to begin with a discussion of how its effects are perceived by governmental agencies. To begin we will discuss the terminology and rhetoric coming from Congress in the form of the proposed Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Act of 2007 and then turn our attention to some of the internal communications of the Department of Defense.

THE VIOLENT RADICALIZATION AND HOMEGROWN TERRORISM ACT OF 2007 The Internet has aided in facilitating violent radicalization, ideologically based violence, and the homegrown terrorism process in the United States by providing access to broad and constant streams of terrorist-related propaganda to United States citizens (HR 1955, 2007. sec.899B Âś3).

On October 24th, 2007 the United States Senate received, read twice, and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs HR 1955, a draft of an act short titled “The Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Act of 2007�.

With the events of 9/11 and their subsequent brightening of the spotlight on terrorist organizations significant changes regarding how the State approaches safety and security within its own borders have come in to existence for the United States of America. From strengthened security at border crossings, the planting of armed troops in public transit terminals, and newly implemented protocols and procedures for domestic and international travelers in American airports, the impact of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks on the daily life of those on United States soil is ever present. As the September 11 attacks were the largest attack against American citizens within U.S. borders in history, the need to reevaluate the manner in which the U.S. government has approached terrorism, non-State sponsored extremism, and internal security became ever 13

more apparent. While there are numerous examples of violently radicalized groups through out the course of history (i.e. the Simbanese Liberation Army in America, the Baader-Meinhoff and Red Army Faction in Germany to name only a couple), it appears that the World Trade Center attacks the inherent dangers of State independent radicalized and terrorist organizations are all the more apparent.

Recent news reports regarding terrorism, media, and violent radicalization all point the way in which ideological violence may be cultivated in individuals through information resources. Most notably, Al Qaeda’s militant Muslim extremists utility of the Internet to post videos accessible across geographic borders filled with expressions of animosity towards westernized culture has prompted press coverage. According to the Washington Post’s Susan B. Glasser and Steve Coll, the Internet has become a new hotbed of activity in the War on Terror. While telecommunication systems have functioned as tactical and strategic planning tools in the past, the advent of the Internet as a commercially available speech environment has allowed for its use as a broad-spectrum marketing machine.

Glasser and Coll write that a June 29th 2005 Al Qaeda video entitled All Religion will be for Allah: is 46 minutes of live-action war in Iraq, a slickly produced video with professional-quality graphics and the feel of a blood-and-guts annual report. In one chilling scene, the video cuts to a brigade of smiling young men. They are the only fighters shown unmasked, and the video explains why: They are a corps of suicide bombers-in-training (2005. ¶2).

If high quality design and the work needed to produce such media is not enough to highlight the newfound attention paid to the medium by the radical extremist group, the 14

well thought out information architecture scheme utilized to distribute the it makes the point all the more clear: As notable as the video was the way Abu Musab Zarqawi's "information wing" distributed it to the world: a specially designed Web page, with dozens of links to the video, so users could choose which version to download. There were large-file editions that consumed 150 megabytes for viewers with high-speed Internet and a scaled-down four-megabyte version for those limited to dial-up access. Viewers could choose Windows Media or RealPlayer. They could even download "All Religion Will Be for Allah" to play on a cell phone (Coll and Glasser. ¶3).

The acceptance of technology and, in particular, the communication capabilities available via the Internet have only served to aid Al Qaeda and other militant organizations in spreading their ideological stance and personal missions. As terrorism and media consultant Evan F. Kohlmann states in regards to insurgent fighters in Iraq, “I don't know how to distinguish the Internet now from the military campaign in general in Iraq” (Coll and Glasser. ¶11).

The use of information technologies by terrorist organizations has aided in giving radical extremists a new media arm in regards to the War on Terror. From cellular phones to personal Blogs to clandestine websites extremist groups have found a manner in which to combat representations of their cause as expressed through American culturally dominated media. With a leveling of the information and media playing field it comes as little surprise that the activities taking place in cyberspace regarding ideological struggle would be of great interest to the American State. However, it is argued that the specific example of violent Muslim extremism as framed by the War on Terror may only point to a more important and overarching concern regarding the Internet and personal computer: 15

the ubiquity of the Internet in daily life brought into existence a communication and information sharing structure that, while buttressing the explicit virtues of a democratic society in strengthen the right to free speech, exists as a threat to dominant State ideological control. Such a statement, while appearing hyperbolic prima facia, is supported by real life examples: China’s censorship of the Internet within its borders, France’s lawsuit against Yahoo! for allowing Nazi memorabilia on its auction site to be displayed within the country, and even the blocking of certain pornographic subject matter within the United States. It is apparent that State systems, not only in America but also abroad, have their fair share of difficulties in regards to the concepts of free speech and acceptable behavior on the Internet.

With such examples of radicalized media on the Internet, it difficult to ignore the how the changing form of communications has influenced ideological indoctrination, militarization, recruitment, and warfare. In 2007 the United State’s government chose to step up its approach to curbing the use of the Internet by radical organizations with the introduction of HR1955, entitled the Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Act of 2007. Fundamentally, the bill proposes the design and implementation of a “center for excellence for the study of violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism in the United States” (HR1955. p.18). The bill’s main sponsor was Democratic representative Jane Harman from California and was cosponsored by fourteen other representatives (of which ten were Democrats and four Republican). On October 23, 2007 the bill was voted on in the House of Representatives and passed by a margin of 404 “aye” votes to 6 “nay” 16

votes. The following day it was received and read by the Senate and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Since this last action little has been heard in regards to the fate of the bill.

While text of this 22-page bill primarily focuses on the administrative aspects of implementing a center for excellence for the study of violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism, there are at least two instances of dubious wording that cannot be hastily glanced over. In addition, a level of interpretive reading is necessary to understand the implications of HR1955’s codification. First, it is necessary to understand what the United State’s Congress is implies when it uses the term “Ideologically based Violence.”

After this it is necessary to identify just how this concept of “Ideologically based Violence” intersects with the Internet.

According to HR1955, Congress defines “Ideologically based Violence” as, “the use, planned use, or threatened use of force or violence by a group or individual to promote the group or individual’s political, religious, or social beliefs” (HR1955. p. 3).

With the War on Terror marking a shift from State versus State violence to Individual/Group versus State warfare the need to clearly define the intentions and methodologies of the enemy has changed. While the quotation above clearly includes terrorist organizations within its terminology, it is the fundamentally broad scope of such a statement that causes some alarm. Despite the bill’s purported focus to primarily curb terrorist activity within the United States, the concept of “force” is never defined or clearly explained by this legislation. Such a term, without a specified definition, can allude 17

to a number of activities that are wholly legal and, in some cases, encouraged within the borders of the State. This lack of limiting the concept of force to physical, rhetorical, or coercive means leaves much room for interpretation in regards to what constitutes “Ideologically based Violence”. Under the wording of this act could not something such as Martin Luther King’s March on Washington be considered an act of “Ideologically based Violence”? In addition, the marriage of “force” (which is loosely defined) with the concept of “violence” (which brings to mind issues of bodily harm, bloodshed, and physical attack) places the expression of ideas on the same level of warfare.

As force is construed as a number of diverse activities, the broad nature of such wording opens the door for the suppression and punishment of a number of actions that are taken for granted within a democratic society. A reading of the above findings raises a series of pertinent questions regarding the possible impact on free speech and democracy due to passing this legislation. Does organizing a protest against dominant State practices construe a use of force? Is it possible that creating a web Blog focusing on fringe political ideals may be a promotion of Homegrown Terrorism or Violent Radicalization? Is it far fetched to ask that terrorism may not be the only enemy of the State targeted by this legislation or, at the very least, that there is the possibility that non-radical or nonterrorist movements also fall under this rubric? In effect, is it possible that any form of dissent against State policy may be construed as ideologically based violence?

The broad scope and lax definitions of this act point to the manner in which such political rhetoric may create a new class of innocent bystanders. It is necessary to 18

understand that the impact of such legislation is far reaching when the focus shifts from its loose definition of ideological based violence to the particular media and communication tools utilized for such ends. As was quoted at the beginning of this chapter, HR1955 states, “The Internet has aided in facilitating violent radicalization, ideologically based violence, and the homegrown terrorism process in the United States by providing access to broad and constant streams of terrorist-related propaganda to United States citizens” (HR 1955. sec.899B ¶3). Terrorist activity, a term that is in and of itself unclear in its definition, can encompass a broad spectrum of actions that may not be intrinsically tied to terrorism as we currently understand it. Michael E. Tigar writes in Thinking about Terrorism: The Threat to Civil Liberties in Times of National Emergency: Today, terrorist and terror have become epithets or insults and are used often with no sense of a specific meaning. We accept this sort of imprecision in daily speech, because we understand what we are doing . . .. However, the terms terror and terrorism are being used in a dual and, therefore, dangerous way. They are epithets, but they are also words used increasingly in laws and judicial decisions as the predicate for governmental conduct directed against individuals and groups (2007. pp.1-2).

With the 9/11 attacks, the use of the term “terrorism” grew exponentially within mainstream media and infiltrated the daily vocabulary of citizens throughout the world.

While Google Trends can only index a search term as far back as 2004, usage and news reference data concerning the term “Terrorism” shows that from the first quarter of 2004 through roughly the first quarter of 2006 the word itself was entered into the engine at a rate twice that than its average usage (it has recently been tapering off in the last couple of years). With the September 11 attacks being 3 years out from this available data it is safe 19

to say that usage of the term was likely more frequent prior to this time. Initially, the terrorist label was attached primarily to the agents of Al Qaeda and the followers of Osama bin Laden by the mainstream media. Following the U.S. led war on Iraq the term (along with its familial brother “insurgent”) began to be utilized (incorrectly) for description of opposition forces trying to push the U.S. Coalition out of the country. The symbolic power of the term coupled with its unspecific meaning allows such a label to be replicated and transplanted onto entities that may not realistically be classified as such.

This lax use of such a loaded term may cause collateral damage to seemingly unconnected aspects of geopolitics. As Tigar states, “Given the ways in which the terms terror and terrorism can be and have been manipulated for political advantage, there is a great danger of harming the very ideas of constitutional liberty, separation of powers and principles of international order” (2007. pp. xi-xii).

This lack of specific definitions of “terrorism” and “force” in the bill, coupled with the finding that the Internet aids in terrorist activity, illustrates how the three, seemingly independent concepts of terrorism, ideology and mass communication, find a fulcrum in HR1955. While the majority of the bill concerns itself with administrative and organizational aspects concerning a school for the study of “Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism,” the interjection of findings placing the Internet at the center of the problem, in conjunction with loose definitions of what actually constitutes “Ideologically based Violence,” creates a conundrum regarding how free and legal democratic speech may find itself sucked into the vortex of the “War on Terror.”

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As House Resolution 1955 is still undergoing review it would not be accurate to state that these initial findings may truly communicate what the Congress intended them to. In spite of this, a series of fundamental flaws in the wording of the legislation are cause for concern. As the language of the Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Act of 2007 illustrates: 1. There is a fundamental lack of understanding of what constitutes “Ideologically based Violence” by the State that allows broad application of the terms in regard to individuals or groups participating in numerous legal and democratic activities.

2. The Internet’s role in the “War on Terror” is becoming an ever-increasing point of focus due to its use as a mass media communication tool for recruitment and propaganda dissemination.

3. These two initial findings put together allow the State far reaching and broader power concerning its ability to define what constitutes a Terrorist or agent of ideologically based violence based solely on examples culled from an individual or group’s activities in cyberspace.

The State rhetoric has opened the door for an attack on the Internet and those communicating over it. It is now necessary to turn our attention to more detailed and explicit language coming from the State in terms of the perception of the Internet as a threat to national security and the need to conduct a strategic and tactical attack against it.

The Department of Defense’s Information Operations Roadmap will illustrate just how internal State communications from the defense industry take a more aggressive approach to the Internet.

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THE D EPARTMENT OF D EFENSE’S INFORMATION OPERATIONS ROADMAP While HR1955 points to the manner in which rhetoric concerning the role of the Internet in the War on Terror is composed of vague wording and loose definition for public consumption, it is necessary to now examine the way in which an internal conversation regarding these topics is versed. It has been exposed that the Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Act of 2007 illustrates a fear in regards to the possible uses of the Internet for ideological radicalization and homegrown terrorism.

Simultaneously, HR1955 is also broadening the spectrum of what constitutes an enemy to include any and all actors who may utilize the medium for a number of ends, both within and without legality. It is now integral to emphasize the manner in which the State takes a more aggressive stance and technical approach to combat its enemies in cyberspace through a critique of the Department of Defense’s Information Operations Roadmap. While government’s are not monolithic it is important to note that the rhetorical framing of the discussion as put forth by the Defense Department highlights the manner in which one particular mechanism of the State assemblage interprets the Internet and its newfound communication capabilities.

On January 26, 2006 the National Security Archive at George Washington University, through a Freedom of Information Act request, obtained and posted to the Internet a copy of the Pentagon’s Information Operations Roadmap of 2003 (National Security Archive, 2006. ¶2). According to the National Security Archive, the Information Operations Roadmap, signed by then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “calls for ‘boundaries’ between information operations abroad and the news media at home, but 22

provides for no such limits and claims that as long as the American public is not ‘targeted,’ any leakage of PSYOP to the American public does not matter” (National Security Archives. ¶1). According to the Joint Publication 3-13 by the United State’s Joint Chiefs of Staff entitled Information Operations, available via the Defense Technical Information Center, a Department of Defense Field Activity realigned under the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics in 2004, Information

Operations are defined as: the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own (2006. pp. ix).

As can be seen a series of independent yet integrated operations make up the anatomy of Information Operations and all, in some shape or form, are directly or indirectly tied to networked computer systems. While the above definition explicitly names 5 areas of interest in regards to Information Operations, for this thesis we will focus almost exclusively on the area of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) as these deal predominantly with media systems but also take into account such aspects as representation, information credibility, and psychological impact (i.e., it is both technical and social in nature). Psychological Operations, as defined by the same document, are: planned operations to convey selected truthful information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of their governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives (Joint Chiefs of Staff. pp. II-1).

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In the preceding discussion of Al Qaeda video media, we see that such tactics of warfare are being utilized on the Internet already. With a growing presence of the enemy in cyberspace, it is apparent that the United States’ Department of Defense would have to increase its presence in the new information environment. As is written in the Information Operations Roadmap, “The importance of dominating the information spectrum explains the objective of transforming [Information Operations] into a core military competency on a par with air, ground, maritime and special operations” (Department of Defense. p. 4).

PSYOP tactics have undergone a series of transformations over the decades since their inception. Traditionally, activities such as airplane leaflet drops and radio broadcasts have been utilized for the goal of providing information with the intent to influence enemy behavior. With the introduction of networked computing to the general public in the latter part of the 20th century, PSYOP have found both a new medium for achieving its aim as well as a new obstacle to overcome in carrying out its mission. While the Internet allows for efficient and easy dissemination of information to disrupt enemy actions, its distributed network form and relatively uncensored media allow for information counterattacks from the enemy. As is quoted in the Roadmap Secretary’s Foreword: The Roadmap stands as an another [sic] example of the Department’s commitment to transform our military capabilities to keep pace with the emerging threats and to exploit new opportunities afforded by innovation and rapidly developing information technologies. The recommendations in the Information Operations Roadmap begin the process of developing IO into a war fighting capability that will enable Combatant Commanders to target adversary decisionmaking while protecting our own (Department of Defense. p. 1).

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It is important to note that in the initial pages of the Roadmap the discussion of information as being key to warfare focuses almost exclusively in terms of foreign adversaries. According to the Roadmap, “Information, always important in warfare, is now critical to military success and will only become more so in the foreseeable future” (Department of Defense. p. 3). Despite this assertion that the strategy focuses primarily on State versus State warfare, a series of statements found in the conclusions of the Executive Summary of the document bring up a number of concerns. Through aggressive wording, the Department of Defense makes it apparent that foreign adversaries are not the only threat to national security during wartime. As has been quoted at the beginning of this chapter and will be reiterated here for the sake of emphasizing the point, the Department of Defense finds: We Must Fight the Net. [The Department of Defense] is building an informationcentric force. Networks are increasingly the operational center of gravity, and the Department must be prepared to “fight the net.” (2003. p. 6).

What is most jarring about this quotation is that any attempt to define “the Net” is not made within the Roadmap. With recent media coverage and academic and commercial discussion concerning the issue of Net Neutrality, the definition of the “Internet” is unstable. On one hand, it is understood to be a technical infrastructure, or as Senator Ted Steven’s attests, “a series of tubes” (Wired, 2006. ¶12). On the other hand, the Internet may be understood or interpreted as a virtual environment or community space that does little without the participation of the world’s inhabitants. As Steve Jones 25

writes in CyberSociety 2.0, “Computer-mediated communication (CMC), it seems, will do by way of electronic pathways what cement roads were unable to do, namely, connect us rather than atomize us‌.â€? (Jones, 1998. p. 3). This important and imperative distinction is not made clear. One may wonder exactly what the Department of Defense is targeting: the street ways or the pedestrians.

Upon further examination of the Information Operations Roadmap it becomes clearer that the true locus of attention are more the voices and messages echoing within the environment. From the Executive Summary, another crucial finding is: We Must Improve PSYOP. Military forces must be better prepared to use PSYOP in support of military operations and the themes and messages employed in a PSYOP campaign must be consistent with the broader national security objectives and national-level themes and messages. Currently, however, our PSYOP campaigns are often reactive and not well organized for maximum impact (Department of Defense, p.6).

What is unique about the Internet regarding its place in the history of telecommunication technologies is its allowance for cross border information access and retrieval in a way not provided for by television or radio. In addition, its distributed network architecture differs from the one-to-one connection of the telephone or the oneto-many systems of television and radio. The Internet allows for a wide broadcasting of a message to a larger audience from multifarious information providers. The utilization of the Internet as a means to advance PSYOP strategy by the Department of Defense creates a conundrum. While specific legislation is in place to make sure that American citizens are not targeted for propagandistic media, the Pentagon has done little to set up safety nets to keep PSYOP information from falling back to the domestic public. In addition the 26

intercontinental nature of the Internet itself makes the task all the more difficult.

According to the Information Operations Roadmap, “The likelihood that PSYOP messages will be replayed to a much broader audience, including the American public, requires that specific boundaries be established for PSYOP” (Department of Defense, pp.

15-16). Despite making a prima facia statement that the PSYOP projects should be kept from integrating with the American information environment, the particular boundaries proposed by the Department of Defense state otherwise. To quote the Roadmap [emphasis added by this author], “PSYOP should focus on support to military endeavors (exercises, deployments and operations) in non-permissive or semi-permissive environments (i.e. when adversaries are a part of the equation)” (Department of Defense. p. 16).

With the events of 9/11 illustrating that American soil has now become a location from which adversaries may plan and implement strategies of warfare against the State and past examples of the U.S. Government utilizing this shift in combat to allow for a more pervasive surveillance of the American public (i.e. the recent issues concerning FISA and domestic wiretapping of U.S. citizens), it is apparent that the possibility for PSYOP endeavors to be integrated into the fabric of the American information landscape.

Regarding the bleeding of PSYOP material into the U.S. public information sector, Pentagon spokesman Lawrence DiRita acknowledged the difficulties according to the French Newsource Agence France Presse: He said that the Pentagon has sought to erect "firewalls" between psychological operations that aim to "influence" foreign publics and public affairs, which 27

"inform" the press and the US public. But he acknowledged that the distinction between the two has become blurred. "It's an important distinction to understand, but increasingly in the world we're in it's a distinction that deserves scrutiny," he said (2006. ¶13).

What emerges from an analysis of the Department of Defense rhetoric is an aggressive and unfocused approach to curtailing terrorist related materials on the Internet.

With its lax definition of what the Internet actually is (an infrastructure or a community), its acknowledgment of PSYOP information leaking back into the U.S. public media stream, and its insistence on maintaining operations in “semi-permissive” environments, it is apparent that the Department of Defense’s approach to Information Operations has little regard for maintaining an acceptable level of credibility in terms of information flow to the American public. When all the issues presented within this chapter are brought together a series of observations are made. The main arguments of this chapter may be best summarized as thus: 1. Through loose language and broad definitions, the United States Congress has put into place possible legislation that does not accurately articulate what “Ideologically based Violence” constitutes.

2. This lack of strict classification allows for a seemingly capricious application of epithetic terminology across a large spectrum of individuals and groups both outside and within the United States with the possibility of dire penalties.

3. While the rhetoric of the Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Act of 2007 does not expressly state that the Internet itself is an enemy of the State, the aggressive nature of the idiom coming from the Department of Defense does highlight a State mentality built upon a need to “fight the net”.

4. The emphasis placed on creating a more robust Information Operations strategy, coupled with a focus on maintaining and enlarging the impact of Psychological Operations are examples of the State’s aim to control information dissemination both within and outside of its borders.

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5. The lax and inadequate safety nets to provide protection for U.S. citizens regarding digestion of PSYOP information open a doorway for utilizing such tools of warfare on the State populous through a loophole in reasoning that, coupled with the ambiguous nature of the Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Act of 2007, would allow the State to both shape and define national ideology through the use of media while giving it the means and powers to quell and punish dissent not in line with its touted doctrine.

While such statements may be seen as hyperbolic and fanatical in terms of illustrating a power fetish by American State actors, an illustration of how ideology is fundamentally fused within State structures is necessary. In the examples of HR1955 and the Information Operations Roadmap, there exists among State actors a degree of fear and animosity towards the ideological battleground that is the Internet. This dialogue framing cyberspace as a threat that must be fought against illustrates a State need to take control of the new information landscape. Now it is pertinent to illustrate how State power may be strengthened through non-oppressive (i.e., non-physical) methods of control concerning its populous. In the next chapter our focus shifts from the particular rhetoric of the American State to a broader discussion of ideology as described by critical theorist Louis Althusser. Althusser’s work will illustrate how State systems go about maintaining order and just how the Internet plays a role in the system of Ideological State Apparatuses.

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Althusser after the Internet: The Ideological State Apparatus in a Networked World I shall then suggest that ideology “acts” or “functions” in such a way that it “recruits” subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or “transforms” the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: “Hey, you there!” (Althusser, 2008. p. 48).

Louis Althusser’s seminal essay Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses conducts an investigation of the manner in which State systems exert power over their subjects through a series of coercive methods that rely more so on building ideological sentiment rather than on physical oppression. While the concept of the Nation-State is relatively young, his examination of the structure of this system and the tools it utilizes to stake its claim and buttress its control over citizens raises a series of critical questions in regards to agency, freedom, control, and power. The concept of State power has already been touched upon in the previous chapter of this thesis. I will now turn our attention to manner in which state power is exerted through Ideological Apparatuses as conceptualized by Louis Althusser and how the Internet, and in particular interactive media, fit into his theory.

ALTHUSSER’S IDEOLOGICAL APPARATUS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW A description of Althusser’s apparatus first requires his thought to be framed within its historical context. Louis Althusser, born to a pied-noirs (French colonial) family in Algiers during the height of French rule, became accustomed to the manner in which a ruling State would utilize both oppressive and ideological means to keep 30

adversaries at bay and under control. After experiencing colonial rule in French occupied Algeria first hand (during the Algerian War some 150,000 plus are believed to have died) Althusser, much later in his life after departing for France, formulated through a synthesis of his observations and Marxist theory his concept of the State Apparatus.

As a colonial transplant in a foreign land as a young child, Althusser became preoccupied later in his life with the ways in which a State system quelled dissent, maintained order, and continued to hold power. This interest came to be articulated in the following manner: How is the reproduction of the relations of production secured (Althusser. p.22)? Althusser explored how an ideological system that has attained and secured power maintains and fortifies that power over an extended period of time.

According to Althusser there were two distinct tools utilized for such a goal: “it is secured by the exercise of State power in the State Apparatuses, on the one hand the (Repressive) State Apparatus, on the other the Ideological State Apparatuses” (p. 22).

This thesis will predominantly focus on the concept of the Ideological State Apparatus, though we will find through the course of our journey that the Repressive Apparatus can and will glide into the careful cropping of our frame (according to Althusser this is logical as all “the State Apparatuses function both by repression and by ideology” (Althusser. p. 23)). To best articulate Althusser’s theory we must then give a definition of what constitutes the Ideological State Apparatuses and just how he conceptualized Ideology itself.

According to Althusser: 31

. . . the Ideological State Apparatuses are multiple, distinct, “relatively autonomous” and capable of providing an objective field to the contradictions which express, in forms which may be limited or extreme, the effects of the clashes between the capitalist class struggle and the proletarian class struggle, as well as their subordinate forms (p. 23).

In addition to being multiple in their forms, the Ideological State Apparatuses gain their strength and unity “usually in contradicting forms, by the ruling ideology, the ideology of the ruling class” (Althusser. p. 23). Whereas the Repressive State Apparatus functions primarily through force (as Althusser asserts may be “physical or otherwise”) the Ideological State Apparatus functions primarily through Ideology. What then constitutes Ideology?

According to Althusser, Ideology is not simply the dominant thought outlining a particular individual or group’s sociopolitical outlook, but rather “represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (p. 36). The State Ideological Apparatuses act as a means for stabilization, guideline making, and construction of social behaviors. While the police may be understood to be a part of the State Repressive Apparatus (as they function by force), the concept of Law belongs to that of the Ideological Apparatuses (it serves to define behavior, the Police and subsequent Court and Penal system step in only when statutes fail to coerce behavior).

According to Althusser, “no class can hold State power over a long period without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the State Ideological Apparatuses” (p. 20).

If the State Ideological Apparatuses serve to illustrate, “not the system of the real relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those 32

individuals to the real relations in which they lives” (Althusser. p. 39) then it would make sense that there would be a number of material artifacts through which such a concept is manifest. According to Althusser, a number of institutions embedded within the social fabric play such a role. Writing back in the late 1960’s, Althusser composed his empirical list as such: Ideological State Apparatus Institutions The religious ISA The educational ISA

Description of the Institution as provided by Althusser The system of the different Churches The system of the different public and private “Schools” The family ISA --The legal ISA --The political ISA The political system, including the different Parties The trade-union ISA --The communications ISA Press, radio and television, etc.

The cultural ISA Literature, the Arts, sports, etc.

Figure 1: Althusser’s list of Ideological State Apparatuses (p. 17).

With his theory generally outlined it is possible to apply Althusser’s ideas to the 21-century and apply it to what we have learned over the course of this thesis. As can be gleamed from the above table, there are a number of Apparatuses that Althusser identifies that have changed since his theory was initially conceptualized. This thesis will focus on a select few of the above institutions though it is admitted that most, if not all of them, can in some way be applied to the topics of the Internet and interactive media. We may now move on to illustrating how the Internet and interactive media have become intertwined with the Ideological State Apparatuses.

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THE INTERNET AND INTERACTIVE MEDIA: SIMILARITIES TO ISA INSTITUTIONS There are a number of institutions which Althusser sees as being apart of the Ideological State Apparatus structure (again, they are a series of apparatuses that are each distinct but yet work in cooperation with one another). The Internet, and thus the interactive media available on it, fit within the frameworks of a number of the already preexisting categories that Althusser has conceptualized. This thesis will examine how the Internet and interactive media play into the hands of the communications, educational, and cultural Ideological State Apparatuses with a goal of illustrating how such a theory materializes in physical artifact. In placing the Internet into these three separate containers it is possible to see just how the media system may be integrated into Althusser’s Ideological State Apparatuses. I shy away from placing it within one particular Institution for a couple of reasons. First, I am trying to integrate a new system into Althusser’s pre-existing conceptualization and do not feel it would be proper to make an argument for one over the other as Althusser himself could possible disagree with my interpretation – by spreading it out I am able to cover many possible interpretations Althusser may have. Secondly, by illustrating similarities between the Internet and interactive media to numerous preexisting institutions I am able to exhibit a stringer bond, therefore making the case for its integration into this concept more qualified.

The Communications ISA First and the foremost it must be stated that the Internet and interactive media fit squarely within the frame of the Communications Ideological State Apparatus. As media 34

forms have been utilized throughout history to disseminate the decree of lords and rulers, one can surmise how the Internet plays into the ISA rubric. From www.whitehouse.gov to Associated Press news stories to distinct websites for particular agencies and branches of the Government, the Internet has an increasing role to play in the State’s communication wing. The fusion of the State and the Internet is all the more apparent when one remembers that its very infrastructure was born from the work at ARPAnet.

From e-mail to Blogging to video conferencing, one is able to see quite easily that the Communications ISA family Althusser has conceptualized is a fitting container for the Internet and interactive media. Recent blogsphere conversations regarding Barack Obama’s usage of web 2.0 applications in his campaign only further such an argument (Ogg, 2007. ¶3).

The Educational ISA In terms of distinguishing the Internet and interactive media as a member of the Educational Ideological State Apparatus, we find ourselves having a bit more difficulty.

While there is little dispute concerning then fact that the Internet and new media serve educational functions it is difficult to situate these emergent technologies within the Educational ISA container with much ease. In spite of this it is possible to locate evidence which situates these systems within the confines of Althusser’s theory. From the Library of Congress to High Schools and Higher Educational Institutions across America, the use of the World Wide Web as a way to extend the educational mission beyond the walls of their brick and mortar structures has become ever more permissive. The introduction of 35

the .edu domain emphasizes that educational institutions in the “real world” also have a special niche within cyberspace. Even if such digital simulations of the “real” school (though this is becoming blurred with the advent of online educational institutions) only act as marketing materials for the traditional institution, the point is still made that the Internet and its various media forms have served in a number of capacities which aid, buttress and homogenize with the Educational Ideological State Apparatus.

The Cultural ISA The Internet’s connection to the concept of the Cultural Ideological State Apparatus is not a difficult one to make the case for. With the ever increasing number of websites on the Internet devoting themselves to all aspects of cultural influence, from sports to literature, arts to humor, the Internet and the media available through its community of participants and fiber optic web play an ever increasing role in the American cultural landscape. With the genesis of the “Internet celebrity” and the rise of memes as miniature blockbuster performances, it is not difficult to surmise how the Internet has come to dominate a substantial market share of the cultural sphere. To emphasize this point further, the ability to tinker and create a hobby out of the Internet (i.e. web design, posting photographs, hacking, etc.) points to the way in which this Institution may be seen as being Cultural in nature. While some may argue that the Internet is solely a Communications ISA and that these cultural aspects are merely byproducts of its function as a communication system, this author would disagree. The Communications ISA focuses predominantly on sending messages to the public from a 36

central orator while the Cultural Apparatuses allow for citizen activity and participation.

The Internet and interactive media are straddling a line between the two.

HOW THE INTERNET DIFFERS FROM ALTHUSSER’S ISA INSTITUTIONS. As Althusser is conducting his investigation during a period of history prior to the invention of the Internet it is unclear how this technological breakthrough would have impacted his thought. Despite the inability to situate his theory within this context in a manner that takes into account all his possible interpretations it is possible to imagine some ways in which the Internet both emulates and differs from the traditional Ideological State Apparatuses that he proposed.

All traditional means of maintaining State control are in some way apart of the Apparatuses (either ideological or oppressive) themselves. Laws, statutes and regulative bodies are pervasive throughout the sociopolitical landscape and command and define the behavior of almost all areas of human existence. From baseball to driving to education to telephone networks, all are defined and regulated by rules and laws which the State has in some way helped scribe.

The Internet is relatively young in age (coming into its first public vestige in the early to mid-1990s). There is little in terms of a comprehensive legal armature to regulate its use. Means of attacking information on the Internet have, for the most part, relied on the utilization of other aspects of law, such as copyright, obscenity, and commerce statutes. In addition, speech rights, particularly in America, have kept the Internet open as a democratic forum for discourse on a diverse set of topics for the most part, though 37

the possibility of this changing is drawing near. Recent Judicial precedent has been shying away from speech rights as a means for keeping the communication landscape open and democratic as of late. According to Laura Stein, “the U.S. Supreme Court has responded ambivalently to claims that public spaces exist in established media or that people have speech rights there� (Stein, 2008. p. 2). If the analysis of the rhetorical framing of Congress and the Department of Defense illustrates a fear of fostering an open and diverse communication space on the Internet, the rulings of the Supreme Court only further illustrate a course set in such a direction. This fundamental lack of an omnibus control system in regards to the Internet puts the State at relative disadvantage in regards to fully integrating it within the fabric of the Ideological State Apparatuses. While traditional communication systems and educational institutions come under the auspices of the State (notable by and through the Federal Communications Commission and the U.S. Department of Education respectively), the Internet has yet to fully be integrated within such a power superstructure. In addition, most regulations set up by the FCC regarding the Internet have been on behalf of consumers (such as rulings on traffic blockage) rather than on the institutions and agencies which may be interpreted as belonging to the State Apparatus (i.e. corporate entities). While corporate media cannot be directly tied to State power (i.e. it is not an arm of the State), the nature of the system coupled with the political environment does highlight a connection between the two.

According to Robert W. McChesney: The public's elimination from the process is encouraged by the corruption of the U.S. political system, in which politicians tend to be comfortable with the status 38

quo and not inclined to upset powerful commercial media owners and potential campaign contributors (2004. p. 263).

In effect, while the State does not exercise control over commercial media it does have some degree of influence in regards to its operations.

To make the point succinctly, the Internet and its media forms differ from the traditional ISA institutions in that they have yet to be fully reined in under State control.

The points made concerning the rhetoric coming from Congress and the Department of Defense only serve to emphasize this point.

Another manner in which the Internet and its media methods differ from the ISA systems that Althusser has proposed concerns the technical structure of the system. The Internet is a distributed network which allows for communication and broadcast in a manner that is horizontal rather than top-down. While in the particular cases of the radio and television there exists a power structure with consolidates control at the top of the broadcast spectrum within the hands of a relative few, the Internet is, fundamentally, under no control. The nature of the space is democratic and diverse, unlike that which we find in television, radio, and print. Unlike these traditional means, where the State could commandeer the system through taking control of the central actors, State dominance of the Internet is a difficult task based upon the widespread nature of the system itself (i.e. anyone may become a broadcaster or publisher). To fully control the institution for State use it would be necessary to obtain technical control (i.e. own the “pipes�) in a manner that would allow the State to define the information flow through them. At the current

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state of time this has yet to happen, though the growing interest in the Net Neutrality debate amongst stakeholders signals that this may change in the near future.

To conclude this chapter it would be best to sum up the current state of our travels. In looking over the path we have followed there are a number of observations which must be emphasized to provide for a better understanding of where we have been and where we may be going. In drawing up the following summary we will look at the way in which our previous ground, though separated by the stylistic element of chapter headings, synthesize into a number of points: 1. We find that a number of pre-existing ISA institutions as proposed by Althusser converge within the structure of the Internet and its media. While it is difficult to pin the system within any one of them exclusively, this multiplicity of its locality within numerous types illustrates that it is plausible that the Internet has emerged as a new (or advanced) form of these pre-existing conditions. While this observation can be made for a multiple number of other media types, we are fundamentally concerned with it in terms of the Internet based upon the recent rhetorical framing coming from the State regarding this particular youthful system.

2. The rhetoric coming from Congress and the Department of defense exhibited in the previous chapter points to specific examples of State ambivalence concerning its control over this Apparatus. Fundamentally, there is a degree of fear on the part of the State in regards to its place within maintaining the dominant State ideology.

3. Despite this lack of a clear means of taking control of the system and integrating it within the assemblage of the Ideological State Apparatuses, the necessity of somehow bringing the system under State auspices is clear to the dominant class due to the need to “reproduce the means of production� of its ideology. What is at stake is a need to utilize the technology to disseminate one’s own message while simultaneously staving off those of the opposition.

There is now a formidable base to express the way in which the Internet and the State system are at odds with one another. It is imperative that a clear and convincing 40

example of how the State attempts to infiltrate the system be illustrated. In the following chapter we will begin our examination of such an artifact through an analysis of America’s Army, an interactive video game created, distributed, and endorsed by the United State’s Army.

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Reproducing the Means of Production: America’s Army and New Approaches to Recruitment in America The groundwork has been laid for an analysis of current State methods of integrating the Internet into the State Ideological Apparatus. It is now necessary to begin a dissection of a particular artifact to illustrate how such a strategy works. To make a detailed investigation we must give the audience some background regarding this tool. This chapter begins with a general overview of the U.S. Army endorsed video game America’s Army and proceeds from there.

THE S TATE ON THE INTERNET: AMERICA’S ARMY America’s Army, first released as a free download on the Internet by the United State’s Army, was initially revealed to the general public at the 2002 Electronic Entertainment Expo. This first unveiling was rounded out by the employment of U.S. Soldiers and an M6 Bradley Linebacker vehicle to provide flare for the public relations project (Breznican, 2002. ¶9). On July 4, 2002 the game was officially unveiled for download (this initial version was named Operations Recon). The game itself was a massive undertaking for the United State’s military and took three years to develop and cost between $6 and $8 million to complete (Turse, 2003. ¶4). The game was the brainchild of Colonel Casey Wardynski, who holds a PhD in Policy Analysis and saw the potential for video games as a marketing tool for the teenage and young adult demographic (Verklin and Kanner, 2007. ¶8). The project was generally successful in terms of bringing

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attention to the United State’s Army. As the America’s Army Game Leadership Team explains on the official website: In July of 2002, the Army turned on the servers for the America's Army game and watched as thousands of gamers rushed to download our America's Army: Operations RECON version. Since then, more than 9 million players have registered to join the America's Army experience. These players have participated in over 205 million hours of online play exploring Soldiering as members of elite U.S. Army units. These devoted fans catapulted America's Army into the top five online action games at its launch and have kept America's Army in the top ten on the charts ever since (America’s Army Game Leadership Team, 2008. ¶1).

In general, America’s Army is an online first-person shooter multiplayer video game. Despite the fact that the vast majority of first-person shooter video games are rated “M” for mature (i.e. 17 years of age and older), America’s Army received a rating of “T” for teen by the Entertainment Standards Rating Board. The rationale for such a rating was based upon the lack of explicit gore in the game compared to others. To differentiate itself other commercially available first-person shooters which focus purely on entertainment value, The United States’ Army devised an explicit mission for the interactive adventure. According to the official website: In the America's Army game, players are bound by Rules of Engagement (ROE) and grow in experience as they navigate challenges in teamwork-based, multiplayer, force versus force operations. In the game, as in the Army, accomplishing missions requires a team effort and adherence to the seven Army Core Values. Through its emphasis on team play, the game demonstrates these values of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity and personal courage and makes them integral to success in America's Army (America’s Army, n.d. ¶2).

In terms of form, the game is structured into a series of timed missions that pit human teams against each other. The virtual environment is designed to mirror real world 43

locales rather than taking on the more science fiction oriented and fantastical architectures of other first-person shooters. Currently, there are 46 missions available which present players with a unique immersive challenge that helps them learn the values of teamwork and strategy. The missions themselves are categorized by true Army divisional operations with levels for Infantry, 82nd Airborne, 75th Rangers, and Special Forces. In addition to this the Army allows for user created campaigns as well. The individual roles available to players span the spectrum of military operations including such specialized tasks as medics, armor based infantry, intelligence and military police.

Before delving into true simulated combat, America’s Army requires that a series of training missions must be accomplished which serve to emulate realistic progress in terms of moving through the ranks. As the official website states: America's Army provides required training missions that attempt to accomplish two goals: first, to give the player an idea of what it's like for real U.S. Army Soldiers to train for duty, and second, to give the player a better understanding of how to play the game, what his or her duties will be, and how to accomplish certain tasks in-game (America’s Army Game Training, n.d. ¶1).

Once training is completed the player is allowed to join in on official missions that require the fulfillment of particular goals and tasks. Unlike “deathmatch” themed firstperson shooters the object is not so much to kill as many opponents as possible, but rather requires strategy and tactics to be planned ahead of time in contrast to the formers’ rather chaotic “running and gunning.” Missions include a broad range of operations from real world Army scenarios. Parachute jumps, urban assaults, headquarter raids, and defensive positioning are all represented in-game.

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In terms of its physical appearance the sprites, sounds and physics of the game were designed to accurately model real-life conditions. Locations are composed to express real world geographic locations (such as the desserts of the Middle East or the mountains of Afghanistan). Weapons, unlike other first-person shooters, are designed to accurately reflect those used by the military in terms of their technical specifications and overall capabilities replete with jamming problems and the need to reload ammunition.

If this general overview suffices for those unaccustomed to first-person shooter video games it is now be possible to move on to situating the game within the context of real world State politics. As the fundamental objectives of the game (as educational tool, marketing project, and media program) are laid out and the subsequent technical means for which such goals are achieved is explained, we may now look at the manner in which this virtual world relates to the real-life needs of the State.

THE GOAL OF THE GAME: RECRUITMENT AND ENLISTMENT THROUGH AMERICA’S ARMY Since the Second World War, U.S. Army participation as compared to the national population has been on a steady decline despite attenuated spikes during the Korean and Vietnam wars. As of 2005, even after the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the overall participation of the U.S. citizenry in military operations (as non-civilians) has been on the decline (Segal and Segal, 2004. p. 5). This increasing drop in enrollment coupled with no significant halt in military campaigns by the U.S., illustrates that there is a serious need to reevaluate traditional recruitment methods by the Army to maintain its level of military dominance. The technological changes of the late 20-century would aid in such a quest.

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The use of games to advertise has been on the steady rise with the invention of the Internet. Corporations and private industries, with everyone from Shell gasoline to Wrigley’s gum, utilize interactive media as a means to put their brand in front of the eyes of possible consumers. In these particular examples, games are of the casual type, offering entertainment and distraction to their players rather than information regarding their product. In the case of America’s Army, however, we find these two intentions (distraction and education) coming to synthesis. As Max Lendermann, creative director of GMR Marketing writes in Experience the Message: How Experiential Marketing Is Changing the Brand World, “Not only do players get a fun and exciting experience, they also get as close to the real thing of being in the army as possible, without actually getting a buzz cut and general-issue fatigues” (2005. p. 222).

In Authenticity: What Consumers Really Want by James H. Gilmore and B. Joseph Pine II, Col. Wardynski is quoted as saying “20 percent of those matriculating at West Point in 2005 had played America’s Army, along with 20 to 40 percent of enlisted soldiers recruited that year” (2007. p. 168). The game is understood to be an even greater success when the economics of such an undertaking are factored in. In 2005 Wardynski estimated the $2.5 million the Army put into the program each year resulted in a cost to the Army per person per hour of 10 cents against the more expensive $5 to $8 per person per hour for Television (Gilmore & Pine. p. 173). According to Changing the Game: How Video games are Transforming the Future of Business by Microsoft Xbox executive David Edery and co-author Ethan Mollick, “30% of all Americans age 16 to 24 had a 46

more positive impression of the Army because of the game and, even more amazingly, the game had more impact on recruits than all other forms of Army advertising combined (2008. p. 141).

Licensed products also speak to the success of America’s Army. Since its first inception as a free online download the game has been ported to a number of other systems, including multiple games for the Xbox 360 and a mobile phone version. In 2007 an arcade game version was implemented and the technology utilized in the game was eventually used for creating in-house Army training simulators.

To further connect the game to the “real world” for its audience, the U.S. Army created the Real Heroes program in 2006 to highlight some of the institution’s members’ accomplishments. According to an U.S. News and World Report article by Julian Barnes, the Real Heroes program: is to tout ordinary people who, when thrust into danger, showed extraordinary courage… Today, there is a public recognition of a certain kind of heroism. The press regularly memorializes those soldiers who have been killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. What's missing are the tales of the soldiers who embody the Army's warrior ethos--men and women who have fought and killed the enemy (Barnes, 2005. ¶3).

The Real Heroes program operates by highlighting of real soldiers on the America’s Army game homepage, offering players a glimpse into the everyday lives of exemplarily soldiers. Real Heroes award winners attend public relation events and travel to gaming conferences where they speak on behalf of the Army and serve as a tangible face for the organization to the general public.

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Preceding are a number of examples of the way in which the U.S. Army creates a digital analog to the Army experience to educate and recruit young men and women into military service. With this shift from passive modes of advertisement (i.e., traditional media such as television, radio, and print) to interactive media, the Army has found not only a means to express itself to the masses, but a way to allow the public to experience some of the true to life activities of the military. Such an observation does not come without its critiques of course. As we illustrated how this first-person shooter video game acts as a recruitment tool and explained how its developers and backers see it as an adequate mirror world to the true life experience of the institution, it is necessary to represent some of the criticisms that come along with using interactive media, in this particular instance of a video game, as a means to recruit and enlist the public for military service.

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MANUFACTURING WARFARE: SIMULACRA AND SIMULATION AT PLAY IN AMERICA’S ARMY We are so accustomed to viewing all films over and over again, the fictitious ones as well as those pertaining to our lives; we have been so thoroughly contaminated by a retrospective technique that we are quite capable, under the blow of contemporary vertigo, to rethread history as one threads a film wrong side up (Baudrillard, 1994. ¶26).

In articulating how the use of interactive media in America’s Army is utilized for marketing and recruiting purposes by the U.S. Armed Forces to penetrate a youthful demographic and how specific political rhetoric proselytized by both Congress and the Defense Department points toward a growing fear regarding how the Internet may be used as a tool for warfare by opposing agents and rogue enemies, it is now possible to open up the discussion centering on how these facets intersect in the game and set into play a series of phenomena that work to reinforce the dominant state ideology amongst players. A discussion of the forces at play will require an analysis of the game within its context as a broadcast or, to be metaphoric, speech of the State. It is proposed here that America’s Army is much more than just a tool for educating the youth of America about the Armed Forces and that the utilization of an immersive interactive media system, fundamentally placing the player in the role of an active agent, also exerts a degree of power that reinforces State control over its subjects and attempts to buttress the ideological framework and institutional perceptions of the State itself. As Michel Foucault stated that “power is in the hands of the government” (Foucault & Chomsky, 1971) it may be surmised that America’s Army, as a governmental statement to the citizens of the nation, can be interpreted as an expression of this power in the chaotic 49

landscape of Internet communications. The following sections will work to conceptualize the game as a statement of power through the utilization of various metaphors and themes culled from the area of critical theory with the goal of illustrating how state sponsored simulated warfare works towards consolidating power in regards to building a militarized force and attempts to bolster ideological following through own use of the Net. FROM PROPAGANDA TO MEDIA: A S HORT HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN MESSAGE Before 1914, “propaganda” belonged only to literate vocabularies and possessed a reputable, dignified meaning . . .. For propaganda, before the World War, meant simply the means which the adherent of a political or religious faith employed to convince the unconverted. Two years later the word had come into the vocabulary of peasants and ditchdiggers and had begun to acquire its miasmic aura. In loose, popular usage it meant the next thing to a damned lie (Irwin, 1936. p. 3).

Whereas this section will deconstruct the application that is America’s Army as a message, it is necessary to first give a short explanation of the history of the term “media” itself so we may understand the historical context from which America’s Army was born.

While the term “propaganda” has yet to be used within this thesis, it is necessary to understand the manner in which a term with such a dubious air and negative connotation is at play within the rhetoric of the contemporary Armed Forces in the game America’s Army.

As MIT linguist Noam Chomsky states in the audio archive of his speech on mass media, Propaganda and the Control of the Public Mind, “It’s hard to call on State violence to crush people’s efforts to achieve freedom and rights and justice” (1998). Whereas in a totalitarian regime, such as Hitler’s Nazi Germany, the use of explicit violence by the State to solidify its ideological stance within the psychology of the public coalesces well 50

with the particular political philosophy of the system itself, in a democratic and free society the use of violence by the State is understood as being fundamentally in opposition to the stated values of such a system. As Chomsky states, in both Eastern and Western power structures regardless of the specific political ideology of the State, control of message systems and mass media are fundamental to shaping the thoughts of the populous and have intrinsic value in helping “to maintain power structures” (1998).

In a non-totalitarian state, namely one that stakes its claim as a democratic and free society, “All sorts of mechanisms of control are going to have to be devised which will replace the efficient use of force and violence” (Chomsky). These particular “other methods of control” came to light in the early 1920s with the beginnings of the public relations industry. In spite of the fact that the term “propaganda” is saturated with negative connotations in terms of its place in the contemporary lexicon, perception of the term was quite different in the first quarter of the 20-century. To quote Chomsky: Terminology changed during the Second World War. Prior to the Second World War the term propaganda was used quite openly and freely for controlling the public mind. It got bad connotations during the Second World War because of Hitler (Chomsky).

In times of conflict, the battle for minds of the takes center stage. During World War II a number of experts took to the task of devising schemes and designs for utilizing scientific knowledge for the shaping of public opinion. Around this time we first find the term “psychological warfare” coming into common usage among practitioners of public opinion building and mass communication media taking on a newfound role as the mouthpiece of the State (Irwin. p. 185). While propaganda is grounded within the world 51

of religious conversion, the ideological conflict between States as characterized by the Second World War and the subsequent need of Nations to exert power and control in terms of shaping public opinion made it a fitting operation for political goals. Fellows Irwin best describes the changing role of media and propaganda in his 1959 article “’Propaganda: History of a Word� when he summarizes this metamorphosis: In the case of propaganda, then, we have an instance of shift in meaning from a religious to a military and then to a political context, during a period of less than two hundred years. This shift may reflect a change in the institutional locus of power, from Church to State. Attitudes toward the word seem to have shifted from the generally favorable to the strongly unfavorable, and perhaps back in the favorable direction again. This changing attitude may be partly a result of the changed meanings just mentioned. The recent shift to a less unfavorable attitude probably reflects also increased public recognition and acceptance of the use of powerful channels of communication by special interest groups (Irwin. p. 188).

During World War I we find the use of information to control the public mind taking on an increasing role. With the finding of the U.S. Committee on Public Information propaganda took on a newfound role in shaping domestic ideology. As the father of modern day public relations, Edward Bernays, signaled there was now a need to engineer public consent for State activities. Propaganda, according to Bernays, serves as a means to bring into being the desired outcomes of the public. As Bernays states: The new propaganda, having regard to the constitution of society as a whole, not infrequently serves to focus and realize the desires of the masses (2004. p. 57).

While the purpose of propaganda argued by Bernays is to serve the desires of the public there does exist the potential for propaganda to manifest negative effects. Bernays writes:

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Propaganda bears the same relation to education as to business or politics. It may be abused. It may be used to over-advertise an institution and to create in the public mind artificial values. There can be no guarantee against its misuse (cover ¶2).

With Bernays’ assertion that propaganda is capable of misuse it is possible to thread a line from this concept to America’s Army via an analysis of the game regarding what it does not illustrate in terms of the reality of warfare. With Bernays’ own acknowledgement of the potential negative aspects of the use of propaganda it is necessary to turn our attention to the manner in which such a blowback may come from the use of America’s Army as a means of recruiting. With our focus having meandered from State rhetoric to Althusser’s concept of the Ideological State Apparatuses to a general description of America’s Army to its current point of rest in the realm of media and propaganda, it is possible to pull a thread through the seemingly isolated geographies to come to the over purpose of this thesis. Before we move on, our new discoveries should be articulated again to aid in comprehension: 1. We see through particular examples of State rhetoric that there is a growing fear in regards to the open nature of the Internet and its impact on dominant State ideological control of the means of reproducing the means of production for maintaining the dominant State ideological status quo.

2. As Althusser has expressed, no agency may maintain power over an extended period of time without controlling the Ideological Apparatuses.

3. The Internet and new media available via its fiber optic web of networked computers may be understood to be an institution of substantial importance in regards to its place as an Ideological Apparatus while, due to its architecture and relatively recent emergence as a part of everyday life, still exists in a relative state of limbo in regards to its full assimilation within the State Apparatuses.

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4. The development and distribution of the game America’s Army by the United States’ military points to the way in which the State system, particularly in regards to military operations, is utilizing interactive media over the internet as a way to staking its claim in the digital environment, further emphasizing tactical and strategic moves to “fight the Net” through education and entertainment platforms.

5. A brief historical explanation of the role of propaganda and its metamorphosis into a part of the public relations discipline shows just how America’s Army may be interpreted as not just an educational exercise, but also as a highly calculated move by the U.S. Army to engineer public perception of the role, values, and operations of the American military.

6. Bernays’ acknowledgement of the potential for abuse of propagandistic tools highlights that such uses of information for shaping public perception do come with their warranted critiques.

It is now pertinent to look at the manner in which all these findings coalesce. We will now look at some of the recent criticisms of America’s Army with an emphasis on the concept of hyperreality as put forth by Jean Baudrillard to examine some of the potential pitfalls the utilization of interactive media for military recruiting may bring regarding knowledge building, history recording, and the attainment of truth.

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Misinformation as Education: America’s Army as a Flawed Simulation of Warfare The masters who make history their private property, under the protection of myth, possess first of all a private ownership of the mode of illusion: in China and Egypt they long held a monopoly over the immortality of the soul, just as their famous early dynasties are imaginary arrangements of the past. But the masters’ possession of illusion is at that moment the only possible possession of a common history and of their own history. The growth of their real historical power goes together with a popularization of the possession of myth and illusion (Debord,1967. Thesis 132).

As has been illustrated through the examples of the Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Act of 2007 and the Information Operations Roadmap, the need for greater control over information “on the Net” is of grave concern, particularly since the beginning of the War on Terror signaled by the events of September 11, 2001. As Peter Taylor reported for the BBC in 2005, radical Islamic groups, particular Al-Qaeda, have been using “underground networks” to broadcast political messages and jihadi calls for uprising on the Internet to penetrate geographic locations such as the United Kingdom and even America for the sake of recruiting members to their missions (Taylor, 2005. ¶5).

The boundless, cross-boarder nature of the Internet coupled with its ability to allow once dormant and silent voices of political dissent to amplify the volume of their message in the International arena is at odds with the State system. While other methods of communication have similar capabilities in terms of crossing borders, they do lack the circulation power that is characteristic of the Internet based upon its coding (i.e., copying and pasting allow for infinite replication). Whereas the State relies upon containment and control, the emergence of a dispersed communication network undermines any sense of 55

State hegemony in regards to ideology building. As Althusser writes, “no class can hold State power over a long period without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the State Ideological Apparatuses” (p. 20). With the fundamental American focus on the First Amendment it is not possible for the State to explicitly dismantle or censor the Internet due to the hysteria such an action could produce in regards to the free reign of Democracy. On the contrary, the State system, to stake its claim to the new Ideological apparatus, would have to more subtly and covertly find a way to infiltrate (the “in” for Althusser) the landscape that is the Internet and systematically push messages over it for the sake of reinforcing its own Ideological stance (the “over” so to speak).

In making such a move to infiltrate the information environment of the Internet, the State has made a series of tactical decisions that do not come without criticism from the public. With this being the case, it is now time to turn our attention to some of the particular arguments that have been made against America’s Army in regards to what it actually does and what it is stated to do.

UN OPTIONAL PROTOCOL ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF C HILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT One of the main criticisms for America’s Army deals with the manner in which it targets the teenage demographic. With “T” for teen rating by the ESRB that literally gives the game a rubber stamp for thirteen to seventeen year old players, there are some serious critiques of the game that highlight both legal and moral standards which the Army may or may not be breaking through its use of media.

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In 2001, with the increase of children being recruited for armed conflict across the globe, the United Nations put forward the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict on the rights of children regarding their enlistment for warfare.

Most notably, parties to the protocol condemned with the gravest concern the recruitment, training and use within and across national borders of children in hostilities by armed groups distinct from the armed forces of a State, and recognizing the responsibility of those who recruit, train and use children in this regard (United Nations, 2001. annex I, ¶11).

While this resolution states explicitly that the focus is on groups that are distinct from those of a State, legitimate Nation-States are not free from criticism. Article 3 of the resolution makes clear, State’s must take precautions to ensure that “persons under 18 are entitled to special protection” from recruitment methods (United Nations. Art.3 ¶1).

Despite such an acknowledgement of the need to shield those under the age of 18 from recruiting techniques, the UN resolution says nothing as to what these special protections are.

In August of 2008 the San Francisco based activist group Direct Action to Stop the War conducted a protest against game publisher Ubisoft, who aided in publishing the Xbox port of America’s Army (Gamepolitics, 2008. ¶4). According to the group: The military recruitment of children under the age of 17 . . . is a clear violation of international law (the U.N. Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict). No attempt to recruit children 13-16 is allowed in the United States, pursuant to the treaty (Gamepolitics. ¶3).

With this statement one comes to wonder how America’s Army provides special protection for those under the age of 18. With its tantalizing and fun form as an 57

interactive video game, focus on infusing entertainment value into its educational program, and active development decisions to place it within the “T” for teen bracket, the intention of the Army is quite clear. In using interactive media the U.S. Army is able to circumvent the unarticulated laws in regards to recruitment and target a demographic which is outlawed by the UN protocol. The military man in the office, waiting for would be individuals to come and sign up has been replaced by a digital entity which serves to represent a career in the military as fun, adventurous, and exciting. With first-person shooters growing in terms of popularity ever since the days of Wolfenstein 3D and Doom and the nature of military operations lending itself to such a format, the synthesis of these two forms makes sense.

LACK OF GORE A second criticism of America’s Army deals with the nature of gore as it is exhibited within the game. Despite the fact that the U.S. Army touts the game as a fine example of the true to life military experience, there is little in terms of illustrating the violent nature of warfare. When a player is shot and killed he or she falls over in a slumped manner and lies listless on the floor of the environment. Blood splatter, loss of appendages, and the explosive impact of grenades are all missing from the experience.

This lack of overt blood and gore lends itself to the game’s “T” for teen rating that has been discussed above. A second opinion is that by integrating gore into the game the U.S. Army could be seen as condoning and promoting violence rather than core Army values.

A number of first-person shooter video games have already come under fire for their use 58

of blood and gore and it is intuitive that the Army would want to distance themselves from such criticisms.

This lack of gore is also the subject of controversy for another reason: while the U.S. Army claims that the simulation is as close to the real thing as possible it is questionable why such a major aspect of warfare, namely that of violence, is wholly missing from the game. From newsreel footage of Vietnam to the cinematic depiction of World War II in Saving Private Ryan one can see that the true ravages of war are hematic in nature. One comes to wonder why such a vital characteristic of warfare would be missing from this true to life representation. The U.S. Army’s need to focus on a younger demographic (the 17 and below age) again lends it’s hand to this in one way, but also, as a poster wrote on an America’s Army forum, “I doubt anyone would want to join the Army after watching their arms and limbs get shot off and such” ([USMC]Pendragon, 2005. A. 3.5par.1) PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF WAR With the current military campaign in Iraq and a number of high profile cases regarding soldiers with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder making the news, another criticism of America’s Army is that it does not accurately reflect the emotional and psychological damages that come with warfare. In early 2008 a CNN article entitled “Concern mounts over rising troop suicides” quoted Army psychiatrist Col. Elspeth Cameron-Ritchie as stating, "Suicide attempts are rising and have risen over the last five years” (CNN, 2008. ¶3). As of that time it was estimated that everyday 5 soldiers attempted suicide whereas 59

that number was 1 a day prior to the War in Iraq (CNN. ¶1). In discussing the skyrocketing suicide rate Cameron-Ritchie noted that post-traumatic stress disorder might have a role to play as it usually results in broken relationships and drug and alcohol abuse (CNN, ¶20).

With the impact of warfare on the mental health of soldiers becoming all the more apparent the U.S. Army has initiated the Battlemind program to aid soldiers in preparing themselves for life in a warzone and to help them make the adjustment back to civilian life. According to the Army Behavioral Health department: “Battlemind” is the Soldier's inner strength to face fear and adversity with courage.

Key components include: - Self confidence: taking calculated risks and handling challenges.

- Mental toughness: overcoming obstacles or setbacks and maintaining positive thoughts during times of adversity and challenge. Battlemind skills helped you survive in combat, but may cause you problems if not adapted when you get home (2008. ¶3).

Despite the U.S. Army’s attempt to aid in curbing the effects of post traumatic stress disorder, some veterans are skeptical as to its efficiency (Scott, 2008. ¶2).

This lack of the psychological effects of warfare transposing over to America’s Army must be noted. As the game itself is a simulation of warfare as opposed to actual warfare there does not exist a way to infuse such an impact into the system. The Army and the game itself come under fire regarding this glaring omission for a couple of reasons.

First, in not illustrating the actual psychological impact of warfare the U.S. Army is essentially disseminating false information claiming it to be a credible educational 60

resource. Secondly, in marketing the game to a teenage demographic it is fundamentally targeting a market that is without the mature comprehension necessary to discern the future implications of making a decision to join the U.S. Military. As the “running and gunning” aspect of the game is what most entices young players (a sample of YouTube videos of America’s Army game play show a predilection towards the more adventurous side of the game), it is possible that such users may be caught up in the fantastical action and forego any critical inquiry into exactly what a life in the military may constitute for their future.

THE LOSS OF VALUES IN WARFARE The invention of the Internet has given users the ability to easily post content for mass consumption. With this a new form of journalism has come into being that relies on first person narratives culled from the general public. New communication technologies placed relatively inexpensive media tools in the hands of everyday consumers. In terms of catching a glimpse of what takes place within a warzone, there are now journalistic news sources that come face-to-face with the subject which they dissecting in a manner far more intimate than traditional means. The rise of personal blogs, video media sites such as YouTube and LiveLeak, and collaborative encyclopedias such as Wikipedia have allowed for a democratization of news media that does not rely on the hierarchical structure of traditional corporate media systems. This change in journalism has an impact on the representation of warfare that helps us to gauge how successful America’s Army is in mirroring the real world of the battle zone.

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In the early half of 2008 a video surfaced on the Internet of a U.S. Marine tossing a young puppy off a cliff. The video, originally circulating only on the Internet, soon garnered mainstream media attention to the point where it prompted a military investigation (Wortham, 2008. ¶1) U.S. Marine officials called the video “shocking and deplorable” and stated that it violates “the high standard we expect” (Wortham. ¶2).

Despite the fact that this video deals with a member of another military branch (i.e. the Marines rather than the Army) it is apparent that despite the emphasis on standards and values, these aspects of military life are not steadfastly adhered to. While America’s Army places an emphasis on education to promote positive values of the military, such a transposition from the game to a real military life should not be expected. While the puppy video incident appears to be an exceptional case, the media’s revelation of the atrocities at Abu Ghraib only emphasize the manner in which stated values may erode in war torn environments. Wired reported: The Abu Ghraib prison made international headlines in 2004 when photographs of military personnel abusing Iraqi prisoners were published around the world. Seven soldiers were convicted in courts martial and two, including Specialist Lynndie England, were sentenced to prison (Zetter, 2008. ¶4).

In his interview with Wired, Psychologist Philip Zimbardo, who acted as an expert witness on behalf of one of the Abu Ghraib guards, made it apparent that the war torn environment and institutional insistence on doing whatever it takes to get the job done wielded great influence in turning good people bad. As Zimbardo states in his interview: Abu Ghraib was under bombardment all the time. In the prison, five soldiers and 20 Iraqi prisoners get killed. That means automatically any soldier working there 62

is under high fear and high stress. Then the insurgency starts in 2003, and they start arresting everyone in sight. When Chip Frederick [starts working at Abu Ghraib] in September, there are 200 prisoners there. Within three months there's a thousand prisoners with a handful of guards to take care of them, so they're overwhelmed. Frederick and the others worked 12-hour shifts. How many days a week? Seven. How many days without a day off? Forty. That kind of stress reduces decision-making and critical thinking and rationality. But that's only the beginning.

He [complained] to higher-ups on the record, "We have mentally ill patients who cover themselves with [excrement]. We have people with tuberculosis that shouldn't be in this population. We have kids mixed with adults."

And they tell him, "It's a war zone. Do your job. Do whatever you have to do."

(Zetter. ¶13-15).

What we find in Zimbardo’s testimony is not only acknowledgement of the stress and strain that warfare has on the human psyche, but also exposure of a mentality among the military’s top brass focused on ends with an indifference to means. This evidence brings in to question whether or not the “core values” expressed in America’s Army are indicative of the true nature of the military. With such examples as the puppy video, which highlight the way in which the purported values of the Army may not be wholly ingrained in soldiers, and the extreme case of the Abu Ghraib tortures, it is apparent that America’s Army, which does not allow players to make such personal decisions in the game, is deficient at truthfully communicating the experience of warfare. With these differences exposed it is now possible to delve into the conundrum of how such an inadequate simulation of war may effect human perception, understanding, and history in terms of reality.

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Hyperreality and Seduction: Desire at Play in America’s Army For me, the universe of seduction was what stands out radically against the universe of production. It was no longer a question of bringing things forward, of manufacturing them, of producing them for a world of value, but of seducing them – that is to say, of diverting them from that value, and hence from their identity, their reality, to destine them for the play of appearances, for their symbolic exchange (Baudrillard, 2003. p. 21).

According to Jean Baudrillard human beings inhabit a "hyperreality" of simulations in which images, spectacles, and signs take the place as key architects of contemporary societies (Kellner, 2007. ¶31). The quotidian statement that “it’s just a game” is understood as false through a Baudrillardian lens. While some may make the claim that America’s Army is only a simulation of warfare and should be understood as such, the fact that the game does not accurately reflect the reality of war, targets a younger demographic, and fails to warn players of the true long term impact participation in warfare may have on one’s psyche is at odds with this flippant dismissal of danger. As Baudrillard writes, Hyperreality is "the simulation of something which never really existed" (Baudrillard, 1983. p. 473). In developing and distributing America’s Army the State is fundamentally creating a false reality of warfare to entice and coerce young players to join the real life struggle. The game itself mediates a relationship between the player and the true reality of the institution which it claims to mirror. What we find beginning to emerge in the case of America’s Army is the use of interactive media, distributed via the Internet, to create a new information class which may be best defined as Trompe l’oiel. To explain this concept properly it is necessary to first discuss a number of topics engaged or conceived by Baudrillard and then illustrate how such ideas 64

synthesize with America’s Army. First, hyperreality’s and seduction’s powers will be discussed to illustrate how the game works to, as Althusser states, reproduce the means of production for military recruitment and enrollment.

THE S IMULACRUM OF WARFARE: AMERICA’S ARMY So long as an illusion is not recognized as an error, its value is exactly equivalent to that of reality. But once the illusion is recognized as such, it no longer is one. It is therefore the concept of illusion itself, and this alone, that is the illusion (Baudrillard, 1993. ¶7).

What we find in America’s Army is a simulacrum of warfare of Baudrillard’s third order. What this means is that the simulacrum replaces the original and the boundary between reality and simulation crumbles (Hegarty, 2004. p. 50). In trumpeting America’s Army as an educational tool which aids teenagers in coming to understand the workings of the U.S. Armed Forces, the U.S. Army creates a false reality of warfare and the military – a point that has already been made clear by holding the game up to the mirror of the realities of physical violence, post traumatic stress disorder and the atrocities at Abu Ghraib just to name a few. This operation is necessary if the game is to fulfill its goal of reproducing the means of production for the State military. An exhibition of warfare as it truly is would be interpreted in a negative manner by the subjects of the State (i.e., the dangers both physical and mental would drive them away rather than pull them closer).

What we find at play in America’s Army are two aspects of Baudrillard’s thought. The First, which has already been discussed, is the concept of the simulacrum, the copy more real than the original. The second Baudrillardian theme is that of seduction. We will begin with the simulacrum first and then discuss seduction.

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America’s Army is in and of itself a simulation of warfare. The quotations describing the game coming from its development staff have already made it apparent that the intention to “accurately” reflect the true military experience is a goal of the game.

While members of the public whom are older in years with their more attuned intellect would be able to understand this is as such (i.e. this is not war, but rather is a representation of war), the game’s target market (teenagers) may not be so apt to make a distinction. For individuals of this class, it is possible that the game itself could replace the reality of warfare. In essence, the game itself is warfare, not merely a representation of it. This concept of the copy which replaces the original is known as the simulacrum.

While Baudrillard was one of the first philosophers to delve into this topic at length, the idea originally came from Jorge Luis Borges’ short story On Exactitude in Science about a group of cartographers who drew a map of the world so detailed that it covered the ground beneath it such that the two were indistinguishable (Borges, 1998. p. 325). In trying to create a digital map of the world of warfare and the military we are finding the U.S. Army doing much the same thing.

Much as in the way that pornography has become a simulacrum of sex and the World Pavilion at Disney’s Epcot Center stands in for the true cultures and localities they represent, America’s Army may be read as a fable tale of warfare that mirrors it so closely in some respects and so dishonestly in others that it may create a sense of vertigo for young teenagers. The overly glaring lack of gore, editing out of the atrocities of warfare, and inability to communicate the mental and emotional impact of warfare on the player 66

are fundamental aspects of war which are absent in the game that serve to illustrate the dangers of utilizing such systems for the recruitment of teenagers. In effect, America’s Army may be understood as one of those PSYOP messages that have bleed back into the public media pool. While a number of other media sources on the Internet have allowed for a more intimate look at the realities of warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Army has chosen to take a more “politically correct” approach to the way in which it represents itself to the world through this game. It would have to of course. With the growing fear amongst the State regarding the use of the Internet by enemies, it is apparent that the Army would have to put forth its own presentation that would coerce individuals to join its side. In its haste to create a message that would be welcomed by recipients, the U.S. Army has created a simulacrum of warfare that replaces the true reality of the situation in the minds of its target audience. As Baudrillard writes in The Perfect Crime, “Now, the image can no longer imagine the real, because it is the real” (Baudrillard, 2008. p. 4).

This replacing of reality with the virtual simulation is only one prong of danger at play in America’s Army. What creates a perfect storm for a world in which the true nature of warfare may recede into the mists of hyperreality is the manner in which seduction is at play in the game itself. As we have set out how the game acts as a simulacrum of warfare (through what it does and does not show in regards to the matter) it is now time to see how seduction augments the simulation and creates out from it a fetish object for the players.

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Baudrillard writes, “Seduction is a challenge, a form which tends always to unsettle someone in their identity and the meaning they can have for themselves” (Baudrillard, 2003. p. 22). In America’s Army we find seduction at play when we take on the role of the soldier. From this author’s personal experience, the game conjures feelings and emotions which elicit in a desire to attain a “radical otherness” (Baudrillard, 2003. p.

22). From the minute the first mission begins, the player strives to attain the status of hero, something which we see emphasized by the developers of the game itself in their Real Heroes campaign. The killing of the digitized enemy brings with it a sense of triumph and mastery which builds in the player a feeling of superiority. As may be gleamed from the numerous YouTube videos of the game, the true trophy is the kill, not the service.

Videos by the hundreds all focus on the act of killing the enemy, and this activity becomes seductive over time – the number of videos focusing on “headshot” kills speaks volumes to this statement alone. When the teenagers who play this game do join the armed forces, one must wonder if it is for the sake of following the institution’s values or for the sake of attaining this godlike status of the victor. The game comes to play with the desires of its audience and, as Baudrillard states, “Seduction is not so much a play on desire as a playing with desire” (Baudrillard, 2003. p. 22).

Now it would be time to explain just how all of the topics which have been covered in this thesis come together. It is noted that the stream of ideas does, at times, take windings roads away from the main artery of the argument put forth. It should not, however, be mistakenly thought that such tangential discussions are without a bearing on 68

the overarching topic of this paper. As the multifaceted landscape of the issue has been laid out and dissected like a cadaver, it is now possible to see how all of these seemingly divergent ideas (that of the game, the State, the Internet, and hyperreality) come together in this concept we shall refer to as Trompe l’oiel.

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The Concept of Trompe l’oiel: A Conclusion There's a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it's not about whose got the most bullets. It's about who controls the information. What we see and hear, how we work, what we think. It's all about the information! (Sneakers, 1992) To best explain the manner in which the preceding points coalesce to form the theory of information that is about to be put forward it is best to systematically list some of the key findings which have been made to expedite our understanding of the topic. Through the course of this investigation we have found: 1. There is a fundamental fear in regards to this information environment called the Internet by the State because its horizontal and distributed architecture allows adverse messages to be easily accessed by subjects within its boundaries. This finding is characterized by the rhetoric which comes from the U.S. Congress and Department of Defense.

2. For the dominant ideology of State to maintain power and control it is necessary that it exhibit control over the institutions of the Ideological State Apparatuses.

The Internet, while similar to traditional ISAs is also unique in some ways. As the State would not be able to exert its power over and through the Internet in the same manner as it has with traditional ISA institutions, new methods for obtaining and maintain control are necessary.

3. The U.S. Army’s development and distribution of the game America’s Army is interpreted as an approach to exacting power over its subjects through using interactive media as a means to disseminate its ideological perspective. While the ability to censor messages that are at odds with the State ideology is not yet available, the need to “market” and “advertise” its own ideology is imperative.

4. While the U.S. Army maintains that America’s Army is an educational tool that gives the player a true representation of military life and warfare, a number of glaring omissions in the game in regards to how it mirrors true warfare illustrate that such a statement is flawed.

5. By distributing the game, particularly to a younger demographic, the U.S. Army is aiding in the creation in a simulacrum of warfare that may take the place of the reality in the minds of teenagers and facilitate in them an inaccurate 70

conceptualization of warfare.

6. This simulacrum of military life and war, coupled with the seductive nature of the game which places an emphasis on heroism as defined by military combat, creates for the player an alternate reality that does not adequately mirror that of reality but yet entices one to partake in the experience in “real life”.

7. By creating a false representation of warfare, the State is able to coerce its subjects into following the State’s ideology through enlistment in the military despite the fact that such a representation is wholly propagandistic in nature.

With our initial findings now being systematically reviewed we are able to make the argument for how all of these concepts coalesce in the information taxonomy of Trompe l’oiel. I will begin with a general definition of what Trompe l’oiel is.

Trompe l’oiel (in general), in the discipline of the visual arts, is a two dimensional image which is composed in a manner as to trick the viewer into thinking it is actually three-dimensional. Examples of trompe l’oiel include Baroque paintings of heaven on the inside of cathedral domes which work to make the viewer interpret the hard stucco of the ceiling as the blue and white of the sky above. Another example would be painting of a corkboard, complete with notes and thumbtacks, which tricks the viewer into believing it is such. The trompe l’oiel, usually when viewed from an angle, is understood to be a two dimensional composition that takes on the lighting and perspective effects of a three dimensional figure. When viewed straight on it is convincing, when seen from the side the trick becomes apparent.

So then, what is trompe l’oiel as information taxonomy? As conceptualized by this author a trompe l’oiel is this: A simulation or simulacrum which is distributed as an accurate representation of information for the purpose of influencing a reader’s 71

perspective to aid in the influencing or coercing of his or her behavior to follow a particular path as laid out by the information disseminator. Trompe l’oiel may be thought of as the grade in the spectrum where “media” and “propaganda” mix. Whereas media is considered accurate information distributed to the citizens and propaganda is inaccurate information distributed to foreign entities, trompe l’oiel is inaccurate information distributed to citizens – a mixture of the two.

Trompe L’oiel comes in to existence through a process. First, there exists information on a subject or topic which reflects it as it truly is (i.e., the reality of the situation). An information distributor, whom has a particular agenda, may appropriate that information and filter it in a manner to alter it in a way such that it aids in coercing a reader into interpreting it in a manner which is beneficial to the distributor. When this takes place a simulacrum of that information is created. The distributor must them disseminate this customized information to a series of readers (the more, the better). The distributor does so by using a media system for distributing the simulacrum. Once the pure information is filtered and distributed it is then received by a reader who then internalizes the message as the distributor intended. An outline of the process can be found in Figure 2 below:

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Real Information

Distributor

Filter

Simulacrum Reader Media

Figure 2: The process of creating a Trompe l’oiel.

For the particular examples used in this thesis we can find analogous parts and operations to those of the general theory. The “real information” is the reality of warfare with all its bloody atrocities, psychological byproducts, and inhumane acts. The distributor of the information is, at the same time, the State and the U.S. Military. This pure information is filtered into the simulacrum of America’s Army which takes the very adult aspects of gore and turmoil out of the “real information” and creates a hyperreality of warfare through the utilization of digital code to construct an interactive media form.

The Internet is used as the medium through which this information is disseminated to the players, who can be understood to represent the readers in this particular case.

This process exists within a particular context. The need for the State to express it hegemony over the information landscape of the Internet in the “war on terror” is the overarching reality of the situation. This need to reinforce the dominant State ideology becomes the impetus for this process and is its fundamental reason for such an undertaking. If the figure above sets out the process, the frame in which it is contained can be thought of as this context in which it exists. This entire process (the actions within the 73

context) is understood as “a deliberate choice on the part of the human race, fascinated by the idea of inventing an artificial destiny for itself” (Baudrillard. 2008. p. 24).

What comes of this is a moment of aporia, a decisive fork in the road of progress where humans must make the choice to follow the path of reality or the streets of hyperreality. As Baudrillard questions, “In this case, what is there to guarantee that our world is not as false as the simulacrum of an earlier world?” (Baudrillard, 2008. p. 25).

In engaging with the atrocities of warfare through the digital simulation of America’s Army we are living in a world of the obscene. As Baudrillard states, “when we are in obscenity, there is no longer any scene or stage, any play, and the distance of the gaze is abolished” (Baudrillard, 2003. p. 27). There is, in the use of interactive media for the sake of simulating warfare, a collusion of elements. The passive reader becomes an active participant, the image becomes an environment, and the representation becomes a lived phenomenon. Through this interaction we become cursed. According to Baudrillard (interjection by this author), “Our curse is that we are brought up ultra-close against them [warfare and its atrocities], that everything is immediately realized, both things and ourselves” (Baudrillard, 2003. p. 28).

What we find coming into existence is Baudrillard’s concept of the perfect crime.

As Baudrillard states, “The perfect crime would be the elimination of the real world” (Baudrillard, 2003. p. 61). Due to the need to maintain its power over its subjects in a networked world, the State has chosen to put into play a process by which the very realness of war is threatened. In targeting the younger demographic the U.S. Army has 74

targeted the very future of its own State for the sake of reproducing the means of production. Through nursing the young on a simulacrum, the death of reality becomes a possibility. All of this brings in to possibility, what Baudrillard refers to as “the end”. In closing I will end with a statement from Baudrillard which I hope will resonate with members of the Information Studies discipline and serve as a reminder for the seriousness of the work they have ahead of them in the networked world: Clearly, it is no longer God overseeing all this, as in Gosse. It is our own apparatus of knowledge, by which we are currently obliterating the traces of our own existence, spiriting away the evidence for our sensible world. We have supplanted the God of Omphalos in the invention of a definitively fictitious past.

Yet there is a difference in the ways of simulation. For though the illusionist God of Gosse had completely invented the races of the past of the species, his creation set in train a real world and a history. Once set in place in that creation, things drift on towards their final destinations unaffected by their illusory pasts. This special effect of the divine imagination or the Creator’s irony has no impact on their present state. We, on the other hand, are no longer part of reality and simulation. For us, the question of Adam’s navel . . . no longer even arises: it is the whole of the human race which will have to be rigged out with a trompe l’oiel navel, in so far as there is no longer any trace, with us, of an umbilical cord which might connect us to the real world (Baudrillard, 2008. p. 22).

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Appendix A: The Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Act of 2007 110th CONGRESS 1st Session H. R. 1955 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES October 24, 2007 Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

AN ACT To prevent homegrown terrorism, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the `Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007'.

SEC. 2. PREVENTION OF VIOLENT RADICALIZATION AND HOMEGROWN TERRORISM. (a) In General- Title VIII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 361 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new subtitle:

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Subtitle J--Prevention of Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism SEC. 899A. DEFINITIONS. For purposes of this subtitle: (1) COMMISSION- The term `Commission' means the National Commission on the Prevention of Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism established under section 899C. (2) VIOLENT RADICALIZATION- The term `violent radicalization' means the process of adopting or promoting an extremist belief system for the purpose of facilitating ideologically based violence to advance political, religious, or social change.

(3) HOMEGROWN TERRORISM- The term `homegrown terrorism' means the use, planned use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual born, raised, or based and operating primarily within the United States or any possession of the United States to intimidate or coerce the United States government, the civilian population of the United States, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.

(4) IDEOLOGICALLY BASED VIOLENCE- The term `ideologically based violence' means the use, planned use, or threatened use of force or violence by a group or individual to promote the group or individual's political, religious, or social beliefs.

SEC. 899B. FINDINGS. The Congress finds the following: (1) The development and implementation of methods and processes that can be utilized to prevent violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence in the United States is critical to combating domestic terrorism.

(2) The promotion of violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence exists in the United States and poses a threat to homeland security.

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(3) The Internet has aided in facilitating violent radicalization, ideologically based violence, and the homegrown terrorism process in the United States by providing access to broad and constant streams of terrorist-related propaganda to United States citizens.

(4) While the United States must continue its vigilant efforts to combat international terrorism, it must also strengthen efforts to combat the threat posed by homegrown terrorists based and operating within the United States.

(5) Understanding the motivational factors that lead to violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence is a vital step toward eradicating these threats in the United States.

(6) Preventing the potential rise of self radicalized, unaffiliated terrorists domestically cannot be easily accomplished solely through traditional Federal intelligence or law enforcement efforts, and can benefit from the incorporation of State and local efforts.

(7) Individuals prone to violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence span all races, ethnicities, and religious beliefs, and individuals should not be targeted based solely on race, ethnicity, or religion.

(8) Any measure taken to prevent violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence and homegrown terrorism in the United States should not violate the constitutional rights, civil rights, or civil liberties of United States citizens or lawful permanent residents.

(9) Certain governments, including the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia have significant experience with homegrown terrorism and the United States can benefit from lessons learned by those nations.

SEC. 899C. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT RADICALIZATION AND IDEOLOGICALLY BASED VIOLENCE. (a) Establishment- There is established within the legislative branch of the Government the National Commission on the Prevention of Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism.

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(b) Purpose- The purposes of the Commission are the following: (1) Examine and report upon the facts and causes of violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence in the United States, including United States connections to non-United States persons and networks, violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence in prison, individual or `lone wolf' violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence, and other faces of the phenomena of violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence that the Commission considers important.

(2) Build upon and bring together the work of other entities and avoid unnecessary duplication, by reviewing the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of-(A) the Center of Excellence established or designated under section 899D, and other academic work, as appropriate; (B) Federal, State, local, or tribal studies of, reviews of, and experiences with violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence; and (C) foreign government studies of, reviews of, and experiences with violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence. (c) Composition of Commission- The Commission shall be composed of 10 members appointed for the life of the Commission, of whom-(1) one member shall be appointed by the President from among officers or employees of the executive branch and private citizens of the United States; (2) one member shall be appointed by the Secretary; (3) one member shall be appointed by the majority leader of the Senate; (4) one member shall be appointed by the minority leader of the Senate; (5) one member shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives; 79

(6) one member shall be appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives; (7) one member shall be appointed by the Chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives; (8) one member shall be appointed by the ranking minority member of the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives; (9) one member shall be appointed by the Chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and (10) one member shall be appointed by the ranking minority member of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate. (d) Chair and Vice Chair- The Commission shall elect a Chair and a Vice Chair from among its members. (e) Qualifications- Individuals shall be selected for appointment to the Commission solely on the basis of their professional qualifications, achievements, public stature, experience, and expertise in relevant fields, including, but not limited to, behavioral science, constitutional law, corrections, counterterrorism, cultural anthropology, education, information technology, intelligence, juvenile justice, local law enforcement, organized crime, Islam and other world religions, sociology, or terrorism. (f) Deadline for Appointment- All members of the Commission shall be appointed no later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this subtitle. (g) Quorum and Meetings- The Commission shall meet and begin the operations of the Commission not later than 30 days after the date on which all members have been appointed or, if such meeting cannot be mutually agreed upon, on a date designated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Each subsequent meeting shall occur upon the call of the Chair or a majority of its members. A majority of the members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum, but a lesser number may hold meetings.

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(h) Authority of Individuals to Act for Commission- Any member of the Commission may, if authorized by the Commission, take any action that the Commission is authorized to take under this Act. (i) Powers of Commission- The powers of the Commission shall be as follows: (1) IN GENERAL(A) HEARINGS AND EVIDENCE- The Commission or, on the authority of the Commission, any subcommittee or member thereof, may, for the purpose of carrying out this section, hold hearings and sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, receive such evidence, and administer such oaths as the Commission considers advisable to carry out its duties.

(B) CONTRACTING- The Commission may, to such extent and in such amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts, enter into contracts to enable the Commission to discharge its duties under this section.

(2) INFORMATION FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES(A) IN GENERAL- The Commission may request directly from any executive department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the Government, information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics for the purposes of this section. The head of each such department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality shall, to the extent practicable and authorized by law, furnish such information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics directly to the Commission, upon request made by the Chair of the Commission, by the chair of any subcommittee created by a majority of the Commission, or by any member designated by a majority of the Commission.

(B) RECEIPT, HANDLING, STORAGE, AND DISSEMINATION- The Committee and its staff shall receive, handle, store, and disseminate information in a manner consistent with the operative statutes, regulations, and Executive orders that govern the handling, storage, and dissemination of such information at the department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality that responds to the request.

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(j) Assistance From Federal Agencies(1) GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION- The Administrator of General Services shall provide to the Commission on a reimbursable basis administrative support and other services for the performance of the Commission's functions.

(2) OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES- In addition to the assistance required under paragraph (1), departments and agencies of the United States may provide to the Commission such services, funds, facilities, and staff as they may determine advisable and as may be authorized by law. (k) Postal Services- The Commission may use the United States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions as departments and agencies of the United States. (l) Nonapplicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act- The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the Commission. (m) Public Meetings(1) IN GENERAL- The Commission shall hold public hearings and meetings to the extent appropriate.

(2) PROTECTION OF INFORMATION- Any public hearings of the Commission shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the protection of information provided to or developed for or by the Commission as required by any applicable statute, regulation, or Executive order including subsection (i)(2)(B). (n) Staff of Commission-

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(1) APPOINTMENT AND COMPENSATION- The Chair of the Commission, in consultation with the Vice Chair and in accordance with rules adopted by the Commission, may appoint and fix the compensation of a staff director and such other personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its functions, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay fixed under this subsection may exceed the maximum rate of pay for GS-15 under the General Schedule.

(2) STAFF EXPERTISE- Individuals shall be selected for appointment as staff of the Commission on the basis of their expertise in one or more of the fields referred to in subsection (e).

(3) PERSONNEL AS FEDERAL EMPLOYEES(A) IN GENERAL- The executive director and any employees of the Commission shall be employees under section 2105 of title 5, United States Code, for purposes of chapters 63, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 89, and 90 of that title.

(B) MEMBERS OF COMMISSION- Subparagraph (A) shall not be construed to apply to members of the Commission.

(4) DETAILEES- Any Federal Government employee may be detailed to the Commission without reimbursement from the Commission, and during such detail shall retain the rights, status, and privileges of his or her regular employment without interruption.

(5) CONSULTANT SERVICES- The Commission may procure the services of experts and consultants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, but at rates not to exceed the daily rate paid a person occupying a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code.

(6) EMPHASIS ON SECURITY CLEARANCES- The Commission shall make it a priority to hire as employees and retain as contractors and detailees individuals otherwise authorized by this section who have active security clearances.

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(o) Commission Personnel Matters(1) COMPENSATION OF MEMBERS- Each member of the Commission who is not an employee of the government shall be compensated at a rate not to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day during which that member is engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the Commission.

(2) TRAVEL EXPENSES- While away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission, members of the Commission shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission.

(3) TRAVEL ON ARMED FORCES CONVEYANCES- Members and personnel of the Commission may travel on aircraft, vehicles, or other conveyances of the Armed Forces of the United States when such travel is necessary in the performance of a duty of the Commission, unless the cost of commercial transportation is less expensive.

(4) TREATMENT OF SERVICE FOR PURPOSES OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS- A member of the Commission who is an annuitant otherwise covered by section 8344 or 8468 of title 5, United States Code, by reason of membership on the Commission shall not be subject to the provisions of such section with respect to membership on the Commission.

(5) VACANCIES- A vacancy on the Commission shall not affect its powers and shall be filled in the manner in which the original appointment was made. The appointment of the replacement member shall be made not later than 60 days after the date on which the vacancy occurs. (p) Security Clearances- The heads of appropriate departments and agencies of the executive branch shall cooperate with the Commission to expeditiously provide Commission members and staff with appropriate security clearances to the extent possible under applicable procedures and requirements. (q) Reports84

(1) FINAL REPORT- Not later than 18 months after the date on which the Commission first meets, the Commission shall submit to the President and Congress a final report of its findings and conclusions, legislative recommendations for immediate and long-term countermeasures to violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence, and measures that can be taken to prevent violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence from developing and spreading within the United States, and any final recommendations for any additional grant programs to support these purposes. The report may also be accompanied by a classified annex.

(2) INTERIM REPORTS- The Commission shall submit to the President and Congress-(A) by not later than 6 months after the date on which the Commission first meets, a first interim report on-(i) its findings and conclusions and legislative recommendations for the purposes described in paragraph (1); and (ii) its recommendations on the feasibility of a grant program established and administered by the Secretary for the purpose of preventing, disrupting, and mitigating the effects of violent radicalization, homegrown terrorism, and ideologically based violence and, if such a program is feasible, recommendations on how grant funds should be used and administered; and (B) by not later than 6 months after the date on which the Commission submits the interim report under subparagraph (A), a second interim report on such matters.

(3) INDIVIDUAL OR DISSENTING VIEWS- Each member of the Commission may include in each report under this subsection the individual additional or dissenting views of the member.

(4) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY- The Commission shall release a public version of each report required under this subsection. (r) Availability of Funding- Amounts made available to the Commission to carry out this section shall remain available until the earlier of the expenditure of the amounts or the termination of the Commission.

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(s) Termination of Commission- The Commission shall terminate 30 days after the date on which the Commission submits its final report.

SEC. 899D. CENTER OF EXCELLENCE FOR THE STUDY OF VIOLENT RADICALIZATION AND HOMEGROWN TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES. (a) Establishment- The Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish or designate a university-based Center of Excellence for the Study of Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism in the United States (hereinafter referred to as `Center') following the merit-review processes and procedures and other limitations that have been previously established for selecting and supporting University Programs Centers of Excellence. The Center shall assist Federal, State, local and tribal homeland security officials through training, education, and research in preventing violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism in the United States. In carrying out this section, the Secretary may choose to either create a new Center designed exclusively for the purpose stated herein or identify and expand an existing Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence so that a working group is exclusively designated within the existing Center of Excellence to achieve the purpose set forth in subsection (b). (b) Purpose- It shall be the purpose of the Center to study the social, criminal, political, psychological, and economic roots of violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism in the United States and methods that can be utilized by Federal, State, local, and tribal homeland security officials to mitigate violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism. (c) Activities- In carrying out this section, the Center shall-(1) contribute to the establishment of training, written materials, information, analytical assistance and professional resources to aid in combating violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism; (2) utilize theories, methods and data from the social and behavioral sciences to better understand the origins, dynamics, and social and psychological aspects of violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism; (3) conduct research on the motivational factors that lead to violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism; and 86

(4) coordinate with other academic institutions studying the effects of violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism where appropriate.

SEC. 899E. PREVENTING VIOLENT RADICALIZATION AND HOMEGROWN TERRORISM THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE EFFORTS. (a) International Effort- The Secretary shall, in cooperation with the Department of State, the Attorney General, and other Federal Government entities, as appropriate, conduct a survey of methodologies implemented by foreign nations to prevent violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism in their respective nations. (b) Implementation- To the extent that methodologies are permissible under the Constitution, the Secretary shall use the results of the survey as an aid in developing, in consultation with the Attorney General, a national policy in the United States on addressing radicalization and homegrown terrorism. (c) Reports to Congress- The Secretary shall submit a report to Congress that provides-(1) a brief description of the foreign partners participating in the survey; and (2) a description of lessons learned from the results of the survey and recommendations implemented through this international outreach.

SEC. 899F. PROTECTING CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES WHILE PREVENTING IDEOLOGICALLY BASED VIOLENCE AND HOMEGROWN TERRORISM. (a) In General- The Department of Homeland Security's efforts to prevent ideologically based violence and homegrown terrorism as described herein shall not violate the constitutional rights, civil rights, or civil liberties of United States citizens or lawful permanent residents. (b) Commitment to Racial Neutrality- The Secretary shall ensure that the activities and operations of the entities created by this subtitle are in compliance with the Department of Homeland Security's commitment to racial neutrality.

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(c) Auditing Mechanism- The Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Officer of the Department of Homeland Security shall develop and implement an auditing mechanism to ensure that compliance with this subtitle does not violate the constitutional rights, civil rights, or civil liberties of any racial, ethnic, or religious group, and shall include the results of audits under such mechanism in its annual report to Congress required under section 705.'. (b) Clerical Amendment- The table of contents in section 1(b) of such Act is amended by inserting at the end of the items relating to title VIII the following: Subtitle J--Prevention of Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Sec. 899A. Definitions.

Sec. 899B. Findings.

Sec. 899C. National Commission on the Prevention of Violent Radicalization and Ideologically Based Violence.

Sec. 899D. Center of Excellence for the Study of Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism in the United States.

Sec. 899E. Preventing violent radicalization and homegrown terrorism through international cooperative efforts.

Sec. 899F. Protecting civil rights and civil liberties while preventing ideologically based violence and homegrown terrorism.'.

Passed the House of Representatives October 23, 2007.

Attest: LORRAINE C. MILLER, Clerk.

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Vita Pasquale J. Festa was born on January 20, 1981 in New Haven, Connecticut. As a child and teenager he had a predilection towards arts and culture. He attended Vassar College in Poughkeepsie, New York for his undergraduate studies where he majored in Art History with a focus on contemporary Art and Design as well as philosophical approaches to representation and semiotics. His undergraduate studies fused aspects of Art History and postmodern literary criticism as he came to understand them under the tutelage of hypertextual author Michael Joyce, architectural historian Nicholas Adams, contemporary art critic Molly Nesbit and philosophical scholar Giovanna Borradori. In 2007 through 2008 he attended the University of Texas at Austin’s School of Information where he combined new media studies into his intellectual interests with a focus on information use and representation by ideological classes in regards to maintaining power structures. He currently works and resides in Austin, Texas with his girlfriend Elizabeth Page Kanetzky and their dog and cat.

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