Trinity Papers No. 10 - 'Australia's Role in Asia'

Australia’s Role In Asia

by John Sanderson

Trinity Papers Number 10

Trinity College

The University Of Melbourne

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Lieutenant General John Sanderson is a former Chief of the Australian Army, who served in 1992-93 as Military Commander of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. Chairman of the Paxiquest Group and a world authority on peacekeeping, and Trinity Visiting Scholar in 1999, General Sanderson delivered this paper during an international dinner bringing together young leaders from Australia and Asia. It outlines his vision for Australian leadership in the Asian region.

This paper represents the tenth in a series prepared by Trinity College which focus upon broad issues facing the community in such areas as education, ethics, history, politics, and science. Copies are available upon request from the Tutorial Office, Trinity College, Parkville, Victoria 3052 Australia.

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Australia’s Role In Asia Firstly let me begin by saying how much my wife and I are enjoying our time at Trinity. After so many years of military life, it is a great pleasure to do something entirely different, particularly in such a special place as this. In the short time we have spent here I have come to admire the vitality of the College, and find the combination of educating for life and educating for employment in the corporate workforce a wise and sensible blend. I congratulate the Warden, the College Council and the tutors on their commitment to these objectives.

There is a defining debate emerging on the role of universities in preparing leaders for the corporate and information environment developing around us.

Because it is so strongly founded on a balanced and liberal approach that recognises the fundamental spiritual essence of human creativity, I am sure Trinity will play an important part in showing the way ahead. What is also important is that Trinity students recognise that this privileged opportunity requires that they prepare themselves for a leadership role in the future of our region. The Trinity Foundation Studies Program is therefore an important contribution to our mutual futures. In terms of the way we live and relate to each other, the 21st century world will be even smaller than that of this century. We are inextricably locked into a future with Asia for the simple reason that Asia is where we live.

When I was commanding the United Nations peacekeeping force in Cambodia I had under command 16,000 troops from some 34 nations. A majority of them were from Asian countries, but there was also a strong contribution from former colonial powers such as Britain, Holland and France. One French colonel I have particularly strong memories of had a habit of wearing those white sharkskin suits that colonial officials appear in in old sepia photographs of colonial administrations and clubs where plantation owners gathered. One day, without prompting, this chap showed me some photographs of his father and his grandfather, similarly attired. He explained that his family had a long association with Cambodia and that one of his ancestors had been the French resident. He said, ‘and so you will see general Sanderson that we French have a much stronger commitment to this place than you Anglo-Saxons can understand’.

I was taken aback by this assumption of my capacity to understand what was going on about me. When I very quickly asserted that I wasn’t an Anglo-Saxon, and that I was an Australian whose nation existed in this part of the world, and that we had a strong commitment to an enduring relationship based on stability, friendship and mutual prosperity, his response was, ‘oh no general Sanderson, you are an Anglo-Saxon’. I began to comprehend his attitude even more clearly when, not long after, I read an article in a right wing French newspaper which referred to me as ‘an Australian pilot -fish guiding the Anglo-Saxon shark into French waters’.

I was concerned that we should be so grossly misunderstood by these people who chose to see our commitment to Asia in general, and Cambodia in particular, in terms of some 19th century colonial rivalry, or worse still, in terms of 1066. Nevertheless, I was prepared to concede that there might have been something in our previous foreign policy which might have led people to believe that we saw our interests in purely western terms, and that there have been various Asian responses to our overtures to our neighbours, which have been very pointed about our relationship with the United States.

So my purpose tonight is to identify for you Australia’s changing foreign policy towards Asia, and to give you my view of where we should be taking our relationships. What are my credentials for doing this? Let me say at the start that I do not profess to be an Asian scholar, although, like most Australian military officers, I have spent a good part of my career in Asia, and much of the rest of my time considering Asian issues.

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What is little understood is that the Australian regular army was born in Asia. Prior to 1947 this country did not have a regular army. What we were in the habit of doing was raising volunteer forces for special events, such as the first and second world wars and Korea. For the first two of these events our status was that of a dominium of the British empire, and we had overwhelming volunteer support for the defence of that empire. At all other times up to 1948, the standing army had been a militia or ‘part time reserve’ force. But the second world war and the follow on cold war had changed all that. And so a regular army was raised based on the volunteer occupation force in Japan. Its first task was to fight in Korea as part of the US led United Nations coalition, ‘peace enforcement’ force.

Not long after the Korean war, the army was engaged in Malaya during the communist emergency. I joined the army in this period. My first operational service was in Malaysia during confrontation in the mid-1960s, when the army joined other forces of the British commonwealth to support the formation of the new federation against Indonesian resistance.

While this was going on, and in parallel with it, Australia became engaged in the Vietnam war, an engagement which was to last until 1972.

So you can see what I mean when I say that the Australian army was born in Asia. It stayed there for the first quarter century of its life, until two emerging strategic events combined to changed the nature of this engagement. The first was the British withdrawal from east of Suez, which began in the second half of the fifties, and, with the exception of Hong Kong, was completed by 1975. The second was the announcement in 1969 of the Nixon or Guam doctrine through which the Americans stated their intention that henceforth every nation would have to make arrangements to look after their own area of strategic interest, and that there would be no more Vietnams for the United States.

It will come as no surprise to you that Australia had to set about writing a new and now independent strategic policy for itself as a consequence of these events. I think I am safe in saying that defence led the way in this endeavour, identifying our interests as lying solidly in developing a new relationship with Asia, and focussing our defence development on building up more self reliant capabilities to this end. This wasn’t to say that we cast away all our traditional alliances with those nations with whom we shared a strong cultural history. Far from it. Because the underlying foundation of our society is democratic and liberal, it was natural that we would continue to act in concert with those nations to propogate what we saw as the appropriate basis for a working set of international relationships.

Of course, the other major development, which changed the focus of our national endeavour, was the British shift into the European economic community, and our growing dependence on Asian trade as a consequence. It was indeed fortunate, that as we were forced to make this shift, the Asian economies began a pattern of rapid growth that was complementary to our needs. In the late 1960s there was a huge commodities boom in this country which was to distort our economy and force us rather hastily into services based patterns of training and employment, where we remain to this day.

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Asia in the 1970s Before exploring these contemporary strategic issues any further, I would like to go back and remind you of what Asia was like in the 1970s. Many Australians were fearful at the way the situation was unfolding in many places. Because the Japanese and the South Korean economies were growing so strongly, things looked better economically than they did militarily.

The communists had won the war in Vietnam, and the Russians were beginning to build up a strong presence from the horn of Africa to Cam Ranh Bay. The Khmer Rouge had control of Cambodia, the cultural revolution was raging in China, the Indians and the Pakistanis had fought a terrible war over Bangladesh, and North Korea was probably at its peak in terms of its ability to threaten the south. India, in a fit of pique at apparent American favouratism for Pakistan showed signs of a strategic partnership with the Soviets, which was aimed at the Chinese as much as the Americans. To cap all this off, towards the end of the decade the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia. China then invaded northern Vietnam to teach the great lesson.

What we in Australia did not understand at the time, was that these culminating events of the decade were symptoms of the demise of communism as a global force. They brought the contradictions in the communist movement out into the open and laid the groundwork for the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1980s. They meant that Australia could start dealing with its Asian neighbours on a less fearful basis, helping to support the growth of less ideologically inclined, and more fruitful partnerships for economic and cultural development.

This was realpolitik in the sense that we could start listening to what Asians had to say about the way they did business.

It was at this time that Australia became more multi-cultural and more accepting of Asian immigration. Even though the white Australia policy, a product of Australia’s early sense of aloneness, had been eliminated in the late 1960s, it had continued to resonate throughout Asia, and still does to this day. Fortunately, throughout the latter period of this policy Australia had been seized of the need to promote Asian development, and had been very active in the field of education. Under the Columbo plan, many future Asian leaders had enjoyed an education experience in Australia, and particularly here in Melbourne. This gave us many friends throughout the region who were able to advise and help us in this new climate.

China post Mao Lurking in the back of everyone’s mind was concern about China’s response to this new environment. After the end of the cultural revolution, and the finish of the gang of four in 1978, gradually a new breed of technocrats appeared to replace the old order. Deng Xiaoping then began to confirm all the signs of his early promise before he was incarcerated by the cultural revolution. His pragmatic approach to the attraction western and Japanese capital investment also included bringing a new generation of managers to the task of organising the economy. All these positive signs suffered a setback in the early 1990s with Tiananmen Square, but China has continued to expand the exposure of its people and its economy to global market forces.

This new phase of engagement began to reveal to many the depth of the problems faced by China in bringing its people to a harmonious and sustainable lifestyle. As a consequence of the great leap forward and the cultural revolution, so many people had lost the opportunity to prepare themselves for a mid to high technology future. Some estimated 350 million people approaching middle age had been disadvantaged by this black hole in Chinese history. There was also a need to make massive investment in infrastructure to make up the backlog. This work on roads and dams etc. might have been useful in employing low technology labour, but

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it also swallowed up resources for new investment in high technology and education, creating a desperate need for investment from outside.

At the same time, Beijing saw a number of threats to its central authority, which had to be addressed. This required a strong hand towards Taiwan, Tibet, and the South China Sea. It has led China into offensive opposition to human rights activists inside China, and vigorous support of regimes whose human rights records are widely regarded as abominable. These include Myanmar and now Serbia. This engendered a difficult predicament whereby china had set itself for leadership of nations whose behaviour is unacceptable to the international community at large.

These contradictions in China, an opening up to investment on one hand, and a hardening of attitude on human rights and international law, makes life difficult for those who would do business with china in particular, and Asia in general.

The Asian economic boom Throughout the period from 1980 to 1990 there was enormous economic growth in all Asian countries except those that remained under communist domination. A combination of stability through the flowering of such institutions as the association of south east Asian nations (Asean), wider education opportunity, low labour costs, and a surplus of capital in Japan and Europe stimulated infrastructure development and labour intensive industries. All western markets were the target for Asian products. Among other consequences of this growth was the inception of the idea of turning battlefields into market places, first expounded in Thailand by General Chatichai, the Thai prime minister. This idea was subsequently taken up

by Asean as a way of addressing the Cambodian problem, which continued to engage the Vietnamese, preventing them from becoming a part of Asian prosperity. It was the genesis of the Paris agreements of 1991 on Cambodia, and captured the imagination of a number of other countries, Japan and Australia included.

The ongoing problem of Cambodia provided a good vehicle for Australia to engage with Asian nations in developing a solution to a problem in which all nations saw that they had a vested interest in finding a solution. It cast Australian diplomats into more intimate planning relationships with nations from China through to India, and provide openings for collaboration on a much wider range of initiatives than simply Cambodia. By 1989, with the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, Australia had begun to play a leadership role in developing a solution, which all the warring factions could agree to.

Long before this happened, Australia had set itself to play a brokering role between Vietnam and the West, developing and retaining a diplomatic presence in Hanoi from the early 198os.

Australian aid to Vietnam and the acceptance of Vietnamese students in Australia began long before the United States was able to feel comfortable about a relationship with its recent enemy.

All these issues have been raised for your consideration because too often, people are inclined to think of Australia’s relationship with Asia in purely business terms; how much of our produce can they buy, and how many things can we produce there at low cost? But clearly, if our relationship is to endure with real harmony we must engage at many levels and at least come to a more advanced form of cultural tolerance. There are many difficulties, which lie across this path. Let me speak of some of them.

The Asian way From 1989 on, while Asia was at the peak of its economic boom, Australia was experiencing the recession that it ‘had to have’. Our trade deficit was growing rapidly, the provision of government services was inefficient, and the trend in Australian secondary and tertiary industry was seen to be towards being uncompetitive. Asian leaders, the main ones being Lee Kuan Yu 7

and Doctor Mahatir, had taken to telling us what was wrong with our attitude, and suggesting that we would eventually fall back into second rate status. Much Australian capital was being invested outside the country because of the more favourable business climate elsewhere, and the true impact of multinational corporate behaviour was being revealed. In the sense that you could no longer rely on patriotism to sustain inefficient industries.

In this climate we had to give much thought to what it was we had to sell, and what was the best way of selling it. I now come back to our reliance on a combination of commodity extraction and service industries, for it was very clear that, except in a few very specialised and high technology fields, Australia’s labour costs and distance from markets would make the development of competitive secondary industry very difficult. Three things however, weighed heavily in our favour: • • •

we had very strong and stable institutions because of our liberal democratic form of government, and the fact that our distance from the world’s trouble spots did not demand significant state security systems, we had education systems which were at least as good as any northern hemisphere nation with the capacity to take in many more students, and we had an ecology, which was very different and very interesting to people who lived primarily in urban areas.

These are formidable assets once they are realised, and providing that, in the process of using them, they are not destroyed. Fortunately for Australia, the tightening of fiscal policy in the early 1990s and ‘the recession we had to have’, forced us into a full realisation of this before the Asian economies began to go into decline in 1996. We were already on the path of economic rationalisation, forcing all institutions into a more businesslike approach, and tightening up the long term debt. We seem to have come through this period relatively unscathed by Asia’s misfortune, but there is the beginning of a debate in Australia about just who has paid the price for this transition, and what it is about our lifestyle and institutions we have sacrificed to maintain a favourable international position.

In the meantime, we have also been in the process of redefining our relationship with Asia.

Australia has moved even further into the role of providing a bridge between Asia and the northern hemisphere nations. The previous labor government played a leading role in promoting the idea of an Asia-Pacific economic community, which had some momentum up to the time of the Asian economic downturn. This proposal, which embraced all nations of the pacific rim and Asia, was designed to create a trading bloc who could compete with the European economic community and other arrangements on the horizon. Australia’s motives in this endeavour were readily transparent. Without it, Australia would be excluded from all trading blocs, and very vulnerable to any serious fluctuations in demand, whether politically or economically motivated. Within an arrangement such as APEC, Australia could move closer to Asia, which is where it saw its future, and where it wanted to be.

As we all know, there has been some reluctance on the part of some Asian nations with respect to APEC, and this has extended to Australia’s participation in the Asia-Europe discussions from which Australia has been excluded. Some Australians who might have waivered on the need for their nation to move closer to Asia, have concluded from this rejection that we should not bother as we will never have any cultural compatibility, and the lack of strong support for our presence is adequate proof that we are not wanted. Others, myself included, believe that the nature of governance in Asia is changing, and that our destiny lies firmly in a more developed, more liberal Asia in which mutual prosperity is sought on the basis of an appreciation of the diversity and strengths of each other’s culture.

Fortunately, the Australian government continues to push for greater understanding of Asia’s problems and needs in those places where it has a voice, and this includes in America where the bulk of support for institutions such as the IMF and the world bank reside. At the same time, Australia strives to provide a balanced view of the reactions of Asian nations to internal dissent, 8

which often offend the western liberal view of human rights. There are clearly limits to how far Australians will tolerate this approach on the part of their government, but there is also a widespread appreciation of how difficult it is for Asian nations to manage the aspirations of their people, otherwise Australians would not tolerate it at all.

One argument which I have heard over and over again from Asian leaders is that human rights is an over valued European concept which inhibits the development of Asian societies by undermining the Asian way. The argument goes, that economic rights must come first, and that forms of guided democracy are needed to ensure that investment is focussed in the right areas. The Asian economic downturn has eroded the belief in this philosophy, particularly among the educated youth. Who, in some countries, have been suggesting that some of those who were guiding the economy were doing more than simply well out of their position of trust.

It is a relatively simple truth, that in order to prosper in the future economic environment you must have an educated workforce. And if you have an educated workforce, you must be prepared to share power with them. While some cultures may have a greater tolerance for authoritarian management structures than others, no amount of guided democracy can deny this reality forever. Even those most tolerant of all workforces, the Korean and the Japanese, have begun to show impatience with their politicians and their bosses.

What has this to do with Australia’s role in Asia?

Before I answer this question let me return to my experience of UN command in Cambodia.

As everyone knows, the Cambodians had suffered many years of horror with the Khmer Rouge and in the following conflict with the Vietnamese. They were desperate for the opportunity offered by the UN presence and fearful that it would fail and they would be thrown back in the darkness. As a buffer state Cambodia had been a source of conflict between the Thai’s and the Vietnamese for centuries, so this situation was not new. China had manipulated Cambodian affairs to gain leverage against the Vietnamese for even longer.

The Khmer Rouge began its life as a revolutionary movement whose aim was to make Cambodia strong and independent. Its leaders sacrificed much of their humanity to do this.

What the UN attempted to do was to unite Cambodia through democratic process, and then set it on a road towards prosperity within a community of nations who respected each other’s borders and culture.

For this to occur of course, all the neighbouring states have to respond to international standards of behaviour instead of leaving commerce to the gangsters. To do this, each state has to build up infrastructure and institutions, which allow them to manage their affairs and relate properly to their people and their neighbours. This is a long term prospect, in which elections can only play a small if vital part.

For some time now Australia has been headed down the path of helping the nations of Asia to do this. It is a two way interchange. There is now a much greater appreciation of Asian culture and we haven’t heard too much lately about the superiority of Asian business practices. Neither is this to propose that Asia becomes Australian or American, nor that Australia becomes Asian.

The ultimate objective is a harmonious and prosperous future together, which will not be possible unless we all attend to it. Australia’s role in Asia, as I see it, is to provide a bridge to this future, helping to educate young people in the development and establishment of democratic institutions and business practices which will endure. It is in places like Trinity College where there is the greatest opportunity to establish the understanding on which such leadership will be founded.

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