CO-OPTICON | PLURALISM IN THE CONTROL MECHANISMS by Mengdan

CO-OPTICON PLURALISM IN THE CONTROL MECHANISMS

Mengdan Liu Syracuse University School of Architecture Fall 2013 Advisors Larry Bowne & Lori Brown 1

CONTENTS

OVERVIEW Forward Existing Condition Contention | Framework

AIRPORT SECURITY|SITE 1. A Tough Departure 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Tension|Exposure|Objectification 1.3 Exodus

PANOPTICON|PROTOTYPE STUDY 2. Panopticon in Security 2.1 Airport Security is a Panopticon 2.2 Surveillance Mechanisms as Necessity

COMPUTER LAB|STUDY 3. “Autonomy“ in Computer Lab 3.1 An Innocuous Watching 3.2 Computer Lab in Two Parts

GOOGLE OFFICE|STUDY 4. Pluralism in a Control Mechanism 4.1 Google Office Studies

PROJECT PROPOSAL 5. Test the Pluralism for Security Check

0 4

OVERVIEW Forward Existing Condition Contention | Framework

FOREWARD At the airport security check, every traveler suffers to experience the checking and waiting to be checked. Although the target is the very small group of people who break the security rules, the spatial quality resulted that all the travelers are involved and confined in a usually tight, enclosed security check space. Compared to the other areas in the airport, the security is rather a box, with vision and activity highly confined. It is an additional stop in the passengers’ one-directional movements towards the aircrafts. It is a seam the travelers wish they could pass through and not stop. It is a seam space between the place left behind and the one about to enter. At both the security check and Foucault’s panopticon, diverse travelers and inmates share the status of “being watched” in the similar way. Both confine people and limit the activity within an unpleasant space. In panopticon, it is highly controlled by the panoptic visibility on the “watching” side and the ambiguity of “whether being watched or not” on the other, the facility is giant to house as well as to separate hundreds of inmates in one closed building. While the process of security provides an experience as monotonous as in the prison, with the vision, activity, mobility highly restricted by the “controlling” spatial strategy. (low roof, window-less, rails, …) Primary difference of these two being that, the panopticon is intended to provide a disciplinary and captive space for the inmates who violated; the security, on the other side, is mandated and tackle all the passengers, most of whom do not have security issues.

Why we are being treated in the same way as inmates at the security even we do not violate? And

why we make airport security such a form of prosecution?

However, different from the solution we see in the airport security or panopticon, the Slocum hall computer lab proposes a more pleasant and efficient self-discipline control mechanism, regarding its no food and drink rule. In the lab, the same psychological influence of being watched and controlled only works on those who “violates”, without causing any potential tension for those who do not. If we draw a parallel line here between the lab and airport security, with the rule for the latter being “no dangerous items for air travel”, one unpleasant character worth noticing is that the supervision and examination of “the rule” becomes the exculsive activity and reason for the space, which I define it as a “control is the only program”; while the efficiency of the lab typology is seen from the way it works as a “control along with the other program”, or “control is one of the programs”, in which the experience from the more engaging program dominates, rather than that from the control mechanism.

Google office is an example that broad array of amenities dominate the space, while the condition of “being watched” is relatively undermined. It is a type of “control along with lots of other programs”. By infusing the daily necessities such as free gourmet food, fitness center, laundry…all into the office, Google, the search engine giant is successful in keeping its employees anchoring in the space and enjoy their working under watching, therefore greatly reduced the likelihood that employees let out their work information in an anonymous street corner café. Learning from the benefits of offering distractions and undermine the acknowledgement of “being watched”, my goal is to apply and test the Pluralism idea at the security in airport terminals, ultimately propose an efficient while autonomous security environment.

Existing Condition

The contemporary built environment is characterized by mechanisms of control and surveillance, such as airport security, gated and fenced communities. In the cities with rapidly growing technology and crowding traffic, such interventions surely gain us a sense of protection and ease.

However, when we consider the life in the modern city, it goes way beyond the barrier of the control mechanisms. In the city we work but we also recreate, we learn and we entertain. As control and surveillance mechanisms start to be fully integrated with our lives, the boundaries between these activities are formed.

0.1 porta-sebastiano, 0.2 1 Wall Street, 0.3, 0.4

Contention|Framework

AIRPORT SECURITY|SITE

PANOPTICON|PROTOTYPE

The objectification of human being has taken importance over individual needs of users over time.

COMPUTER LAB|A NEUTRAL SETTING

CORPORATE OFFICE|PLURALISM

The objectification is a form of violation that will encourage a mass of passive citizens and totalitarian control. Architecture should acknowledge the violation, and operate to promote autonomous controlling settings, by applying pluralism in the current power structure.

“

1 14

AIRPORT SECURTY|SITE 1. A Tough Departure 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Tension|Exposure|Objectification 1.3 Exodus

1.1 Introduction

At today’s airport, all the passengers pass through the security without exception. Queuing in a long line before the security becomes inevitable if we leave at a busy airport, or during a travel rush. Knowing that we are important objects for video monitors and authority, our actions are molded to look “normal” and fit in these numerous gazes. We watched how the others behave: what items they hold in hands, where they put the shoes, cell phones or sunglasses. The impulse to have a cigarette to kill time, or to make a phone call to families is desisted, for fear of the embarrassment of getting called to stop and become the focus of attention. Feeling ill at ease, the desire to pass through the gazes mounted, while the line is not moving as fast. The time of waiting and well behave, behind and ahead of someone, seems elongated and deferred. Acknowledging that “someone out there is watching”, help construct a deep sense of self and other. Some eyes are watching me, directly and behind some screens. In movies, this moment is often an overture to horror and scream. The sense of exposure keeps us in suspense. Therefore the waiting in front of the security—no matter short or long, produces a feeling of tension.

1.1 The Terminal Movie Poster

Departure 17

Although the waiting lines are linear and have some orders in it, our sights are circuitous rather than one-way. “Looking” becomes the only legitimate thing we could do without causing unnecessary attention. We look around, up, side to side. Other than out of boredom, sometimes the looking has a purpose. We try to recognize ourselves in this process, by identifying and being identified: “I”, as one anonymous passenger, queuing in the line while wondering whether my nail clipper is a problematic item. The wandering sight finally stays at a lady in the middle of the next line, who wears a zipped vest and holds nail clipper with a key chain in hand, which is a similar image of me. The matching identification gains myself subtle sense of peace.

6:00 am

The aforementioned moment is a common scene at the pre-screening zone, the mass “identifying” moments forms a network of public gazes, and the overlapping and interaction of sight imply a potential participation of performance and display. Because this generalized watching moment forms how we act accordingly in the waiting line, and this action would soon deform after we passed the security; it is the “watching” that locates everyone involved: Passengers, security officers, and sometimes families and friends behind and watching. Passengers fear being watched, authority fear the any passengers are not being watched. Thus the tension necessitates a reliable while endurable space to facilitate surveillance video system and help shape the passengers’ actions in the train of the queuing under gazes.

Figure 1.2 Big Sign Little Building

Building As Sign

Big Sign Little Building

Just like on the highway everyone must drive either on the right or on the left. Somtimes it doesnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t even matter which is which, only that there is a conformity. The airport security is the same as any public infrastructure, which requires common standards of procedure.

Human Variation in Physical Form As Sign

1.2

Tension|Exposure|Objectification

Why do we make the security space full of tension? If we take a look at some parts from the design guidance for the airport security: …..to establish security areas and boundaries, any area designated as requiring control for security and/or safety purposes must have identifiable boundaries for that area to be recognized and managed….natural boundaries such as water or tree lines, or simply geographic coordinates. ---“TSA(Transportation Security Administration): Recommended Security Guidelines for Airport Planning, Design and Construction” p8

…walls surrounding the security checkpoint must be a minimum of 8’ high. Ideally, walls that separate sterile areas from non-sterile areas should be floor to ceiling, and designed without gaps so that no prohibited items could be placed into the secure side of the terminal when the SSCP is closed. Exit lane walls adjacent to the checkpoint are to be 8’ minimum and constructed of transparent material where possible. Where possible, walls or other barriers adjacent to X-ray TSO should prevent public view of the x-ray monitor screen. ---TSA: Checkpoint layout design guide p34

INGRESS/PUBLIC

EGRESS/STERILE

We could find the field of vision and visual quality for passengers at security is considered as highly restrained purposely. Good design conforms to the activities that it supports; as the activity at the current security is a one-way screening process from security officer towards the passengers, no wonder the airport security designers endeavor to make the space convenient for the exclusive controlling process.

information screening

arrival

Figure 1.3 Airport Departure Panorama

ticket counter

Existing security condition Although each airport and airport terminal building is unique in terms of physical design and operational requirements, over the past 40 years a number of critically important checkpoint design elements have been identified and integrated to create a typical Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Security Screening Checkpoint (SSCP). Accroding to the TSA Security Design Guidelines:

Proper SSCP design helps avoid a host of problems for the airport and airlines, including terminal and queuing congestion, delays, and unnecessary security risks. ---TSA: Checkpoint layout design guide p7

The problem of stagnant line would be solved alternately if we turn the queuing into a rather spontaneous movement by proposing activities, attrations or distractions.

Figure 1.4, 1.5. Security Process

Figure 1.6--1.12. Public Gazes in Terminals

People mover system|Departure flow

Entrance Ticket sales

Ticket check-in

Emigration control

Security check

Departure lounge

Gate lounge

Aircraft

Baggage security check

Baggage sort

What is the deficiency in the current condition? A typical security layout The current security zone is planned carefully centering on “screening”: The screening of passengers by walkthrough metal detector as well as the screening of luggage by X-ray detection system. The pre-screening zone is divided into a preparation instruction zone, which is pre-occupied with signage and posters, aiming at “instructing and directing passengers for efficient screening flow”(Checkpoint layout, P15); a queuing zone which include room for queuing, as well as tables for passengers to preparing their belongings for screening. TSA requires all checkpoints to be formed as collections of single

“and double-lane team modules as illustrated in “SSCP layouts.”

Modular design enables a controlled and contained screening environment where “sterile” and “non sterile” passengers and baggage are separated from each other. Whenever possible, allowances should be made for flexibility and expandability of the checkpoint space to respond to changes in technology, equipment or processing procedures.

“

---TSA: Checkpoint layout design guide p8

Architects design the layout of the queue, bearing in mind that it should help the screening operation efficient while not interfering with other travel patterns. They also act as stage directors. They take care of the choreography of the movement through their architecture.

The process is characterized by the setting which played out as a serious of obstacles.

Screening zone gears the passenger flow walking through a metal-detector gate, while divest of their personal items and pass these through x-ray chamber machine. Everyone and everything is watched in full and thorough view during the screening. And we pass through it and reach the safe zone. At the security gate, state thinking needs a standardized person. The pressure is to break down each human, her or his behaviors, and accompanying artifacts, and to convert each into an actionable item. Excerpt, <Against Security> p88, Harvey Moloch

The problem is obvious here: In the airport security process, our design missed to take into account the feeling of the passengers. Security operation turns those passengers on, even though they do not have security issue. Although the security check is necessary to assure a safe travel, the experience of passing it through is in many ways so similar to that of an inmate in the prison.

As the passengers load gets heavier, the size of the obstacle settings start to occupy larger space.

INGRESS/PUBLIC

A B C L

C J

J H I

EGRESS/STERILE

A = Pre-screening Preparation Instruction Zone B = Queuing Space C = Divest & Composure Tables D = Walk-Through Metal Detector (WTMD) E = Carry-on Baggage X-ray (TRX) Machine F = Explosives Trace Detection (ETD) Machine with table G = Explosive Trace Portal (ETP) â&#x20AC;&#x201C; (not illustrated) H = Passenger Containment I = Passenger Inspection J = Metallic/Non-metallic Barrier K = Non-metallic ADA Gate L = SSCP Adjacent Walls/Barriers

A – PRESCREENING PREPARATION INSTRUCTION ZONE

This zone is an area in front of the SSCP that uses architectural features, simple signage, instructional videos, and “ambassador” staff, trying to create a more efficient throughput by instructing and directing passengers for efficient screening flow.

Simple and effective signage, including including TSA prohibited items, film advisory, notice of private screening, TSA warning signs, airline carry on requirements and pet restrictions, can be used to direct and instruct users of the SSCP, increasing the speed and perception of service.

INGRESS/PUBLIC

A B C

L J

Video monitors may be used to illustrate prohibited items, divesting, loading bags on the conveyor, and walking through the metal detector and ETP.

H I

EGRESS/STERILE

Figure 1.13--1.15

B â&#x20AC;&#x201C; QUEUING SPACE

This space should include room for tables near the screening equipment, for preparing their belongings for screening. Emphasis on efficient queue management, passenger education and divestiture in this area will greatly improve the efficiency of operations for all.

As a general rule in the current security design, the passenger queuing area should be sized to contain a 10 minutes wait of passengers when all lanes of a checkpoint being fed by a particular queuing area are open.

INGRESS/PUBLIC

A B C C

Also, lack of an allocated queue space will cause the passenger queue to expand into adjacent areas and will impede the general flow of passengers through the airport.

J H I

EGRESS/STERILE

Figure 1.16

J – NON-METALIC BARRIERS

Barriers are required to install to close all gaps exceeding 15” across the front width or façade of the checkpoint, in order to prevent passengers and items from passing into the sterile area without being screened by a WTMD (Walk-through Metal Detector).

In current designs, these barriers are constructed from primarily non-metallic materials, and rigid enough to prevent vibrations that could interfere with the WTMD.

INGRESS/PUBLIC

A B C

L J

J H I

EGRESS/STERILE

Figure 1.17

Criticism Fourth Amendment Wear TEXT: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” -Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution The project is basically an invention of metallic ink formula that shows up on TSA scanners and created a product that would display the 4th amendment. The clothes are designed as a silent protest against the new reality of being searched to the point where we’re basically naked. It is a critique and a thought-provoking way to fuel the debate about safety vs. civil liberties.

http://cargocollective.com/4thamendment 44

Criticism Stealth Wear -A Design for Countersurveillance The project explores the aesthetics of privacy and the potential for fashion to challenge authoritarian surveillance. It is a suite of new designs that tackle some of the most pressing and sophisticated forms of surveillance today. The anti-drone hoodie and anti-drone scarf: garments designed to thwart thermal imaging, a technology used widely by UAVs. The XX-shirt: a x-ray shielding print in the shape of a heart, that protects your heart from x-ray radiation.

Adam Harvey / ahprojects.com 46

Evolution| US Airport

Security Measure Timeline

1.3

Exodus

Underground--50

minutes

tes

minu 0 8 g in

Driv

0 2 1 -

tes

nu mi

end

It’s It’s not not an an airport, airport, it’s it’s

ss aa boutique. boutique.

Copenhagen airport Figure 1.17.

It’s It’s not not an an airport, airport, it’s it’s 56

ss aa gallery. gallery. Figure 1.18. Jet Blue Terminal in JFK Aiport

It’s It’s not not an an airport, airport, it’s it’s aa department department store. store.

Figure 1.19. Interior View of Copenhagen Aiport

BEFORE arrive

check-in

security

shopping AFTER arrive

check-in

shopping

gate lounge

shopping

board aircraft

shopping

security

gate lounge

MAKING PEOPLE ANXIOUS IS THE WHOLE POINT.

board aircraft

2 62

PANOPTICON| PROTOTYPE STUDY 2. Panopticon in Security 2.1 Airport Security is a Panopticon 2.2 Surveillance Mechanisms as Necessity

2.1 Airport Security is a Panopticon

In panopticon, the centripetal layout implies a clear hierarchy in the positions of “watching” as well as the “being watched”. The panoptic visibility from the “watching” side, as well the ambiguity of “whether being watched or not” on the other, together construct a theater of domination clearly, with the hundreds of cell units on the peripheral ring exposed onstage and the only potential audience hided within the watching tower. The panoptic model has been considered as a prison paradigm for its efficiency in operation and self-discipline. The architecture facilitates the functioning of control by inducing in the inmates a sense of permanent and conscious visibility. The perfection of this architecture

it creates and sustains a continuous controlling relation independent of the apparatus is that

physical person and the person’s exercise.

2.2 Surveillance Mechanisms as Necessity

Figure 2.1 Security Area

Figure 2.2 Detention Center Interiror

Figure 2.3 Real-Time Airport Security Checkpoint Surveillance

Figure 2.4 Live Video Room in Prison

While when we are queuing at the airport security, as discussed in the last chapter, the state of “watching” is the same unverifiable and visible as in the panopticon. Passengers could constantly see security officers and CCTV cameras ahead, behind and around, from which they are

the presence or absence of the sight is unverifiable, passengers, with this spied upon. Although

acknowledgement, have to keep fully alert about their activities before they pass through this zone. The process implies that, the security is to assume everyone

as potential violator first, and those non-violators would not be distinguished until after a process of “panopticon ” surveillance.

RECORDER B

in prison

06:00am 06:10 06:20 06:30 06:40 06:50 07:00am 07:10 07:20 07:30 07:40

Figure 2.5 00:00:00

RECORDER A

07:50 08:00am

airport security checkpoint

08:10

00:01:00 00:02:00

08:20

00:03:00

08:30

00:04:00

08:40 08:50

00:05:00

09:00am 09:10 09:20 09:30 00:10:00

Figure 2.6

09:40 09:50 10:00am 10:10 10:20

00:15:00

10:30 10:40 10:50 11:00am 11:10

00:20:00

11:20 11:30

Figure 2.7

11:40 11:50

00:25:00

00:30:00

00:35:00

Figure 2.8

Odds of being a violator for air travel

1 in 29.4 million

However, the panopticon is intended to help enforce the confinement as a punishment for convicting crimes, and to prove itself a crucial instrument of discipline; while for the airport security, although it is set to protect the air travels from any threats and is at least a modestly successful means of control, it is mandated for all the passengers, from their physical body to every personal items, most of whom do not have security issues.

06:00pm

07:00pm

08:00pm

09:00pm

10:00pm

11:00pm

Figure 2.9-2.12

3 70

COMPUTER LAB|STUDY 3. “Autonomy“ in Computer Lab 3.1 An Innocuous Watching 3.2 Computer Lab in Two Parts

3.1 An Innocuous Watching

How could architecture make response to promote a rather healthy and rational process, when the innocuous are involved while the control mechanism is an unavoidable necessity? With this question I start to examine the computer lab in the Slocum hall as a more generic space with control mechanism behind: Facts |The room is occupied with desktops, and is set as a workspace for convenience of students. Same as all other computer labs, it has the general policy that no food or drink is allowed in the room, which would ensure the normal operation of the lab. The lab monitor Ron, whose work time is between 8:00am to 5:00pm on weekdays, deploys the supervision of this policy.

The tricky part is that, we are conscious of the state of “being watched” by Ron is time-based, as a result the eating pattern in this space is fluctuant and contingent accordingly, which is conveyed in both the sitting pattern and in the stacked-food quantity: During the daytime, students with food are inclined to sit at the corner seats, which are assumed to have more visual obstacles ahead and around, therefore the sight upon entering is framed with a more restrained thus safer visual domain, while leaving a blind zone for hiding and storing the food. This sitting trend is captured most obviously when the 5:00pm draws close. The thing that draws us together in the lab is working on computers, while during the 5:00 pm to 8:00am “unattended” period, the “eating” and “drinking” becomes another official activity appearing on the scene from backstage. Quite a bit of food packs appear alongside the working screens. The space is suddenly pervaded with the smell of food, which becomes an entrapment that empowers the whole room as a working-eating environment.

Travellers

â&#x20AC;&#x153;Lab-ersâ&#x20AC;? mobility for food

Anchors

4:00pm

8:00am

8:00pm

5:00pm

Travellers

Quantity of food packs appear in the computer lab

monday

Anchors

4:00pm

8:00am

(Bookstore opens at 4:30pm)

8:00pm

5:00pm

weekend

Guggenheim Museum proposes a decentralized watching which is an opposition of panoptic watching for prisons.

Figure 3.1

Panopticon| â&#x20AC;&#x153;All-seeingâ&#x20AC;? prison|Hierarchical surveillance

Figure 3.2

3.2

Computer Lab in Two Parts

If we draw a parallel line here between the lab and airport security, with the rule for the latter being “no dangerous items for air travel”, one unpleasant character worth noticing is that the supervision and examination of “the rule” becomes the exclusive activity and reason for the space, which I define it as a “control is the only program”; while the efficiency of the lab typology is seen from the way it works as a “control along with the other program”, or “control is one of the programs”, in which the experience from the more engaging program dominates, rather than that from the control mechanism.

PRECEDENT STUDY

DILLER SCOFIDIO+RENFRO

EYEBEAM MUSEUM OF ART AND TECHNOLOGY|CULTURAL Competition entry

By bending and folding a single surface into a ribbon shape, D+S transforms a fairly common design convention which is typically employed as aethetic device, and set a new standard for programmatic employment of folded shapes. The blue “production” side and the gray “presentation” side each possesses a core at opposite ends, thus making it possible for one population ”to pass through the other, acknowledging each other and communicating visually and sometimes physically.”

Figure 3.3

The gray “presentation” side

The blue “production” side

Figure 3.4-3.7

Eyebeam

Computer Lab A

Security cross programming

4 96

GOOGLE OFFICE|STUDY 4. Pluralism in a Control Mechanism 4.1 Google Office Studies

4.1 Google Office Studies

Google office VS airport security Google, among many of today’s IT companies, has realized the benefit of locking their employees in, in name of helping its employees to achieving its work-life balance, by integrating perks into its work places. Google office is an example that broad array of amenities dominate the space, while the condition of “being watched” is relatively undermined. It is a type of “control along with lots of other programs”. By infusing the daily necessities such as free gourmet food, fitness center, laundry…all into the office, Google, the search engine giant is successful in keeping its employees anchoring in the space and enjoy their working under watching, therefore greatly reduced the likelihood that employees let out their work information in an anonymous street corner café.

Figure 4.1

Googleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s headquarter in New York city for example, is a large open-planned building with rooms and individual workstations scattered across the floors. A generous amounts of the square footages in this building is dedicated for its perks. One may argue Google is attempting to create a miniature city in this building and went as far as painting the street scene onto the walls and â&#x20AC;&#x201C;the food trucks into the building.

100

Figure 4.2

Figure 4.3

Figure 4.4

Food Amenities

Disorientation & Euphoria 2.9 million square feet

101

An Acknoledgement of Pluralism â&#x20AC;&#x153;...morale will decline if management views employees as costs rather than assets...companies want to create both an appealing environment to attract and retain employees and make people feel they belong, but they also want to increase productivity. Worries like childcare, cooking, going to the dry cleaners and visiting the doctor off-site during the week, distract employees at the workplace.â&#x20AC;? ---Nancy Rothbard, Wharton Management Professor

Google Office Streetview 102

Miniature city

t 0f 90 0ft

Real NYC Street Experience 103

5 104

PROJECT PROPOSAL 5. Pluralism for Security Check

105

A critique The current security control environment is excessive and it is a process of objectification. The objectifying of human being cultivates a mass of PASSIVE citizens. The state of being passive is dangerous because the authority would easily steer us where it wants us to go, leaving us in an unawareness of any totalitarian trends.

Aircraft

Terminal Entrance

Terminal

Security

106

Therefore, I contend the control environment should be in a form of pluralism instead. The physical settings should be instructions that acknowledge the existence of diverse security experiences, and ultimately promote autonomy for users.

Aircraft

Terminal Entrance

Terminal as Security

107

108

APPENDIX & ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY Outtake Works Glossary Image Credits Annotated Bibliography

109

Outtake Works Case Study: Auburn Prison Vision Relationship Diagram

TENSION AND RELI

Re ten

110

Case Study:Madison Square Garden MADISON SQUARE GARDEN Spatial Behavior Diagram

111

ON EVENT DAY

10AM waiting

food

112

ticket

transportatio

113

ON EVENT DAY

intimate space temporality Queue

Event on-going

black space between event and outcomes of desires

power of movement

10AM

movement of power (shifting of power)

-on subway -spatial enclosure as disciplinary device

114

-security checkpoint -pinnacle of control

-event on-going -under consistent control/unconscious of power

SPATIAL PROXEMICS

PU BLIC SPACE

“the organization of space in hours and buildings, and ultimately the layout of towns.”

SOCIAL SPACE

PERSONAL S PA C E

intimate space

INTIMATE S PA C E 1.5 ft (0.45 m)

social space

4 ft (1.2 m)

12 ft (3.6 m)

Edward T. Hall's personal reaction bubbles, showing radius in feet and meters

public space 25 ft (7.6 m)

“Freedom arises through the ability of a 'body' to realize two things: the exercise of power along one's full spectrum of possibilities, both physical and virtual; and secondly but more importantly an evolving awareness in this exercise of power, such that intelligent and self regulating structures form in the 'consciousness' of individuals and groups able to achieve such a state. ” ---Ed Keller

115

Gates 23–29

Gates 30–42

10 minute walk

20 minute walk

D Departure lounge-airport shopping mall

Caffè Italia

Gates 13–22 20 minute walk Lounges B, F, H

Gates 1–11

10 minute walk

Security

Special Assistance

12 11 10 9 8

Security

Boarding

116

C Security

1 3

Because so much at airport security (and other security settings as well) seems to make so little sense, it is tempting to use the term “security theater” for the whole apparatus and to see it as deliberately engineered to engender supplication and deference to the powerful. Those motivated by significant and serious commitment—including concerned travelers—must join in the performance. Any initiative for change must take on the fact that airports, as with other security venues, are indeed places of threat ambiguity. We don’t know where trouble might be coming from, in what way, from whom, or precisely where.(Molotch, p119)

B Check-in

Arrive from ground transportation

Theater of Domination Terminal 3, Heathrow Airport, London

117

Image Credits

Cover Image. By Korye Nelson www.pinterest.com Overview 0.1. Porta-sebastiano in Rome www.nycerome.com 0.2. 1 Wall Street www.thecityreview.com 0.3. Scanning : the aberrant architectures of Diller + Scofidio. Page 95 0.4. By Tarsha Blythe www.pinterest.com Chapter 1 1.1. The Terminal Movie Poster agrandeilusaocaminha.wordpress.com 1.2. “Big Sign Little Building”, Learning from Las Vegas. Page 17. 1.3. Airport Departure Panorama www.colossalwaste.com 1.4. “Bay Area transit, airports beef up security.” www.sfgate.com/news 1.5. -1.6-1.12. -1.13. www.flickr.com 1.14. Security Checkpoint Layout Design/Reconfiguration Guide. Transportation Security Administration. 1.15. www.flickr.com 1.16. Security Checkpoint Layout Design/Reconfiguration Guide. Transportation Security Administration.

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1.17-1.19.www.pinterest.com Chapter 2 2.1-2.2. www.flickr.com 2.3. Real-Time Airport Security Checkpoint Surveillance Using a Camera Network. Ziyan Wu and Richard J. Radke 2.4. www.wordpress.com 2.5. Photo by Reed Saxon, AP Photo www.thedailybeast.com 2.6-2.7. www.pinterest.com 2.8. www.businessinsider.com 2.9-2.12. www.pinterest.com Chapter 3 3.1. www.jmg-galleries.com 3.2. Heterotopia and the panopticon. www.heterotopiastudies.com 3.3-3.7. Diller Scofidio + Renfro : architecture after images. Chapter 4 4.1-4.4. Inside Google: An Exclusive Look at Its NYC Office live.wsj.com

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Annotated Bibliography

Surveillance, Vision & Control Mechanisms Studies Dimendberg, Edward. Diller Scofidio + Renfro : architecture after images. Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 2013.Print. Debord, Guy. Society of the spectacle. New York : Zone Books, 1994. Print. Betsky, Aaron, et al. Scanning : the aberrant architectures of Diller + Scofidio. New York: Whitney Museum of American Art ; New York : Distributed by Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 2003. Print. Diller, Elizabeth and Ricardo Scofidio. Flesh : architectural probes. New York : Princeton Architectural Press, 1994. Prison Typologies & Criminology Wright, Richard. In defense of prisons. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994. Print. Abrams, Laura and Ben Anderson-Nathe. Compassionate Confinement: A Year in the Life of Unit C. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2013. Print. Lynch, Michael. Big prisons, Big dreams: Crime and the Failure of Americaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Penal System. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2007. Print. Haney, Craig. Reforming punishment : psychological limits to the pains of imprisonment. Washington D.C:American Psychological Association, 2006. Print.

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Alcatraz : history and design of a landmark / Donald MacDonald and Ira Nadel. San Francisco : Chronicle Books, 2012. Print. Johnston, Norman. Human cage : a brief history of prison architecture. New York: Walker, 1973. Print. Public Transportation Design, Construction & Theory Edwards, Brian. Modern airport terminal : new approaches to airport architecture. New York : Spon Press, 2005. Binney, Marcus. Airport builders. West Sussex : Academy Editions,1999. Print. Le Corbusier. Aircraft. New York: The Studio publications inc,1935. Print. Foster, Norman and Chris Abel. Beijing International Airport : Foster + Partners . Munich ; New York : Prestel, 2010. Print. Powell, Kenneth, Richard Bryant and Philip Sayer. Stansted : Norman Foster and the architecture of flight. London: Fourth Estate Wordsearch, 1992. Print. Transportation Security Administration. Recommended Security Guidelines for Airport Planning, Design and Construction. May 2011. Transportation Security Administration. Security Checkpoint Layout Design/Reconfiguration Guide. November 7, 2006

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Social Science, Social and Cultural Analysis Molotch, Harvey. Against security : how we go wrong at airports, subways, and other sites of ambiguous danger. Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2012. Print. Molotch, Harvey and Laura Noreﾌ］. Toilet : public restrooms and the politics of sharing. New York : New York University Press, 2010. Print. Keim, Kevin. You have to pay for the public life : selected essays of Charles W. Moore. Cambridge: MIT Press, 200. Print. Ellin, Nan. Architecture of fear. New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1997. Print. Urban Design & Planning Okamoto, Rai, Frank E. Williams, Klaus Huboi, Dietrich Kunkel, Carlisle Towery, C. McKim Norton, Stanley B. Tankel, Boris Pushkarev, and William B. Shore. Urban design Manhattan. New York, Viking Press,1969. Print. Others Chung, Judy and Sze Tsung Leong et al. Harvard Design School guide to shopping. New York : Taschen, 2001. Print. Robin Evans. Figures, Doors and Passages.

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Metabolism, the city of the future : Dreams and visions of reconstruction in postwar and present-day Japan. Tokyo : Mori Art Museum, 2011. Print. Davidson, Cynthia. Anytime. Cambridge: MIT Press,1999. Print. Venturi, Robert, Denise Scott Brown, and Steven Izenour. Learning from Las Vegas. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press 1972. Print.

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