Research Proposal sample

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Enforcement Mechanism for Corporate Governance in B BRIC or BRICs - A w aand Economics mics A Comparative Law Analysis

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Table of Contents 1.0 Introduction of the Study ..................................................................................................... 3 2.0 Background of the study ...................................................................................................... 4 3.0 Problem statement ................................................................................................................ 5 ..................................................... 6 4.0 Previous Work ..................................................................................................................... ........................... 8 5.0 Gaps Identified in the literature ...........................................................................................

6.0 Purpose of the study .............................................................................................................

8 ................................ ............................................. ................................................................ .............................................. 9 7.0 Aim and Objectives..............................................................................................................

8.0 Proposed Methodology ......................................................

Error!! Bookm Bookmark ...................... Err ark not defined.

9.0 Chapterisation ......................................................................................................................

9 ................................................................ ................................

10.0 Gantt chart ........................................................................................................................

11 ................................................................

References ................................................................................................................................

12 ................................................................

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1.0 Introduction of the Study

governance as a concept and as a problem area was first discussed in the United States; later, the European debate started in the United Kingdom. From there the issue of corporate governance began its pervasive course through all the modern industrial stat states, including Japan (Adams Corporate governance procedures Australia, China and Jap a an (A ap Addams et al., 2010).

2010) Corpor orporaate orpor a gov overnancee is a se sset of of pro ocedures company order internal external stakeholders and nd policies pol adopted adopte dopted by a compa dopted ompanyy iin ompa n orde err ttoo provide pr vide intern inte r al and extern rn ex exte xtern terrn r al al stakeholde stak holde with holders

of their companies. The shareholders’ role in governance rnaan is to app rn pp oin oint th thee directors and the oppriat ggovernance overrnance structure is in place. The auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate ettin the compan responsibilities of the board include setting company’s str strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising rvisin the management ment of the business and reporting rdship. The boar to shareholders on their stewardship. board’s actions are subject to laws, regulations and eeting (S czudl 2013).

013). the shareholders in general meeting (Szczudlik, Private capi ca tal is nece necessary neces ry for economic onomi development, but capi ca tal does not flow to capital capital dangerous neighbourhoods. urho In estors, Investors, stors, wh whether purchasers of equityy oorr lenders, will not invest

– and pprivate ri and nd stat statee own owned d enterprises seeking to attract local or global capital – must develop a ffr framework ramewor worrkk that assures public investors that the assets they provide will be protected. Strong securities ec rities and company law is necessary, but it is not sufficient (Millstein et corporate al., 2005). The prevailing reported cases of unethical practices in corpor r ate entities, rpor attributable a able to poor governance and weak enfor f cement led to many corpor for r ate fa rpor ffailures; ilures; enforcement corporate

regulations and instituting more proactive steps to strengthening compliance with accounting and governance rules (Okereke, 2009). Though countries may differ in establishing their © 2016-2017 All Rights Reserved, No part of this document should be modified/used without prior consent Tutors India™ - Your trusted mentor since 2001 I www.tutorindia.com UK: The Portergate, Ecclesall Road, Sheffield, S11 8NX I UK # +44-1143520021, Info@tutorsindia.com

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corporate statutory frameworks, the general pattern has been the government regulations and professional bodies (Ibadin & Dabor, 2015).

Steier (2009) argues that in emerging and developing mark rket rk et economies, ies, fa ffamily mily market

in firms’ governance. Similarly in transition economies such as Russia, there re remains poor definition and enforcement of ownership rights: ‘ch anging the law on the he books does not guarantee corporate governance improvement’ (Licht et al., 2005 in Stei Steier, 2009). S Steier (2009) emphasizes the role of corruption and black or grey markets ethnic ties rke and nd family or ethn to manoeuvre through complex and corrupt institutions. Globerman erm and Shapiro hapiro a apiro (2003) argue that the strength of governance infrastructure, such as the fu functioning ncti of a range an of formal institutions including property rights, reg regulation, gul ulation, on, tr transpa transparency nsparency nspa ncy off info information r rmation and accountability, are important in attracting fo accountability fforeign reeeig iggnn dir directt invest investme (FDI) to developing and investment

infrastructure for growth, invest investm investment ment and nd new fir firm rm eentry nt is hence of great importance e.g. mo lu eett al al., 2001, 2002, 2003; La Porta et al., 1999; (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2000; A Acemoglu Djankov et al., 2002).

2.0 Background of the study The impact pac of rul ruless an and norms on Corporate Governance practices is the focus of ca e off bbenefits on firm value, minority shareholders protection and caus many stud studies because eff ffici ff ficiency off codes des es ((Dharm Dh rmap a ala & Khanna, 2013; Cai, 2007; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). The ap efficiency (Dharmapala conclusions foundd in the rresearch of La Porta et al. al (1998) pointed poin out that the laws for

how much the law enforcement modifies or influences the Corporate Governance model and disclosure in each country. Cross-countries studies, such as some related to the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) countries, were realized in order to find how the institutional setting as values, laws and recommendations of each country should © 2016-2017 All Rights Reserved, No part of this document should be modified/used without prior consent Tutors India™ - Your trusted mentor since 2001 I www.tutorindia.com UK: The Portergate, Ecclesall Road, Sheffield, S11 8NX I UK # +44-1143520021, Info@tutorsindia.com

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influence the Corporate Governance practices (Majumder et al., 2012; Oliveira et al., 2014; Salvioni et al., 2013). Over the last twenty years, the BRICS countries have undertaken numerous economic refo f rms. Beginning in the 1990s, each country has more or less opened fo reforms.

jurisdictions are also significant sources of outward investment (Wilkins & Papa, p 2012).

Although some studies have an optimistic view, the relation betwee between the laws compliance and enforcement and the firm performance of these countries are still cloudy for ountries ar and Corporate Governance some investors an nd this is why Corpo rporate Govern rpo rnannce ppractices ces and nd disclosures isclosuress aand the enforcement laws spacee forr invest investigation enfo forcement of law fo ws and norms have an wid wide spac spa investi igaation igat ion on in thesee eemerging

2012).

3.0 Problem statement ng number numbe of studies previously mentioned about Even if there is an increasi increasing Corpor r ate rpor te Governance practices ract s recom rac rrecommended, om nded, re required, adopted and requir nd disclosed losed in emerging e Corporate econom economie onomiees, it i is releva relevant ant to ddev develop evelo eve lopp stud studies studie es on B BRICS ccountri countries ountries usin ountri using as parameter paramet meteer of good economies,

is complex, ompllex, as w omp well el ass vvarious arious institutions could be decisive to the establishment of the legal mewo in each nation related to the adoption and disclosure of Corporate and norm normative framework differences Governance practices tices (E (Estrin & Prevezer, 2011). These radical diff dif ferences of social legal and fe captured economic context ontext ca can be captur ca ed only by means of highly interdisciplinary tools of analysis

requires of course the contribution of many other scholarly tools within a genuine effort to make disciplinary frontiers crumble to be replaced by a more holistic social science (Mattei & Monti, 2003). Š 2016-2017 All Rights Reserved, No part of this document should be modified/used without prior consent Tutors India™ - Your trusted mentor since 2001 I www.tutorindia.com UK: The Portergate, Ecclesall Road, Sheffield, S11 8NX I UK # +44-1143520021, Info@tutorsindia.com

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The relationship between comparative law and the field of economics is increasingly important, but controversial. Economists have drawn from comparative law scholarship to suggest that common law systems may be more conducive to financial and economic development than civil law systems (Garoupa & Pargendler, 2014). Comparative law and economics, by contrast, tr treats tre eats the legal aand institutional backgrounds as dyn y amic variables yn a ables dynamic

higher degree of realism to the theoretical analysis (Mattei & Monti, i, 2003).

4.0 Previous Work r orate Govern rp Gov Majumder et al. (2012) conducted a comparative study on Corp Corporate Governance ed to mak mpara Codes in BRICS Nations. The previous work attempted make a compa comparative analysis me ng ec onom in n th among major corporate governance codes of five emerging economies this world-Brazil, ent signific Russia, India, China and South Africa on 14 dif different significant paramet parameters of corporate r rpor governance. The similarities and distinguishing featur featuress oof corpor corporate governance codes of h the gro growing importance portance of BRICS nations in the global these five nations are reviewed. With y be useful eful to stu economic and political map, it may study the corporate governance practices of orp rate governance rnan models are applicable in the BRICS these five nations. Different corporate ctur model like Japanese panes or German model can be observed in nations. The dual board structure countries like Russ R ia and nd C China, hina, wh where the companies prefe f r to have dual boards – fe Russia prefer superviso r rviso ry board and managerial manager ag riaal boar agerial bo boa aard. rd. The Chines Chinese hinese Boards, hines Boards like the German Model may supervisory board.

concluded luded that aall ll the BRICS nations have a formal written code of corporate governance. omm governance aspects, and are similar in many respects, each has its While they cover ccommon own distinctt and uniqu unique provisions.

Hopt (2011) conducted a comparative study on corporate governance policies of 33 countries. Corporate governance, i.e. the system by which companies are directed and controlled, has become a key topic for legislation, practice and academia in all modern industrial states. The financial crisis has highlighted the problems. Yet one goes astray if one does not understand how the unique combination of economic, legal and social determinants of corporate governance functions in each country. A functional comparative analysis based Š 2016-2017 All Rights Reserved, No part of this document should be modified/used without prior consent Tutors India™ - Your trusted mentor since 2001 I www.tutorindia.com UK: The Portergate, Ecclesall Road, Sheffield, S11 8NX I UK # +44-1143520021, Info@tutorsindia.com

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references After on reports fr ffrom om 33 countries and with refe f rences to economic literature may help. Afte fe f r fte dealing with the concepts, pts, instruments (including soft law) and sources of corporate

though many path dependent differences remain.

In a similar context, Bose (2005) compared the US and Indian eexperience of us stud Securities Market Regulations and corporate governance. The previous study analysed regulatory infrastructure of the Indian securities market and see whether there exist well formulated laws with well-defined scope and powers of the regulator, of pres presenting gulator capable a able all investors in the Indian market with a level playing field. Th The previous study sum summarised revious stu some of the regulatory provisions that have evolved for tackl tackling market miscondu misconduct ng ma iscondu and try to see what comes in the way of regulatory action aimed imed at investor pprotection otec in India, as ld’s most sa compared with the US which is perceived as the wo world’s safe and liquid capital market. nges and electronic lectroni databases in aiding The study also discusses the roles of the stock exchanges the regulator in prevention, detection and conviction onv of sec securities frauds. One tends to ecu laws conclude that the scope of Indian securities laws, which have gradually evolved over time, is oblem lies mostly tly in enforcing compliance particularly for now quite pervasive and the problem nipu ation and nd illegal legal insi crimes such as price manipulation insider trading. The discussion suggests that nsure that laws/r there remains a need to ensure laws/regulations are rationalised to completely empower SEBI to carry out its fun ffunctions ions as the principal regulator, while SEBI in turn needs to drastically upgrade surveillance process enabling it to produce evidence that is credible pgrad its surveillanc h to ssecuree convict ion. enough conviction. corporate Olivei et Oliveira e al al. ((2016) made an analysis on corpo r rate governance disclosure which is a rpo study through BRICS ICS countries. The previous study analysed the practices disclosed by a

compared the companies’ Corporate Governance practices disclosed against laws, to rules and norms that are required and/or recommended their adoption and disclosure. The study concludes that it is really hard to trace strong conclusions in the comparison of law enforcement in Corporate Governance among emergent countries because there is a big © 2016-2017 All Rights Reserved, No part of this document should be modified/used without prior consent Tutors India™ - Your trusted mentor since 2001 I www.tutorindia.com UK: The Portergate, Ecclesall Road, Sheffield, S11 8NX I UK # +44-1143520021, Info@tutorsindia.com

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cultural difference in each BRICS country, which leads to major changes in each legal framework.

Becht et al. (2007) conducted a survey on the main mechanisms of corporate law and governance, discussed the main legal and regulatory institutions in different countries, and examined the comparative governance literature. Corporate governance is concerned with the reconciliation of conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders and the ment dilemma resolution of collective action problems among dispersed investors. A fundamental intervention nt needs to of corporate governance emerges from this overview: large shareholder interv be regulated to guarantee better small investor protection; but this may inc increase managerial ase manag discretion and scope for abuse. Alternative methods of limiting g abuse buse have yet to be pproven effective.

5.0 Gaps Identified in the literature This research has identified several gaps previous. Those are as follows: ps based on the previou Previous studies in the context of eenforcement mechanis mechanism in corporate governance have been conducted with the comparative context, critically analysing the various rules, ompa ve cont policies and regulations devised different nations. vised by diff dif fe fe tions. It is in the context of comparative law, onducted. Ho ever, comparative ompa most researches were conducted.

However, law and economics deals with w, fo fforr ins e th analysing certain aspectss of la law, instance the impact of law on a country’s economy in ffic ff fic cy. Suc terms of economicc eff efficiency.

Such stud studies comparing economic efficiency with respect to ng laws are lacking.

Rese hes were focu Researches focussed on comparatively analysing the different corporate anc prac ces of diff dif governance practices different nations and their impact on investors and shareholders. ere mostly conducted so as to analyse the perceptions of shareholders.

Qualitative studiess w were The analysis of enforcement mechanism in corporate governance of BRICS nations is lacking which is also a major gap in the previous literature.

6.0 Purpose of the study The present study aimed at performing a Comparative Law and Economics Analysis of corporate governance enforcement mechanism in BRICS nations. The study will be an analysis of economic as well as legal policies pertaining to the BRICS nations with respect to Š 2016-2017 All Rights Reserved, No part of this document should be modified/used without prior consent Tutors India™ - Your trusted mentor since 2001 I www.tutorindia.com UK: The Portergate, Ecclesall Road, Sheffield, S11 8NX I UK # +44-1143520021, Info@tutorsindia.com

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corporate governance and enforcement mechanism in the countries. The study will analyse the various legal frameworks adopted by different regulatory bodies of the BRICS nations so as to provide valuable insights about the topic of research. Furthermore, the study will be based on the analysis of corporate governance in the viewpoint of comparative law and economic analysis. The study will utilise data collected from various governmental reports and previous literature so as to comparatively analyse the enforcement practices for corporate governance adopted by the different BRICS nations. The role of BRICS nation in the global scenario as emerging economies induces economic changes and hence,, these nations are selected for the present research.

7.0 Aim and Objectives The present research is aimed at comparatively analysing na sing the enforcement nfo f r eme mechanism fo for Corporate Governance in BRIC or BRICS nations law and economic analysis. ons in terms r of la rms nd ec In this regard, the following objectives are framed. med.

To critically evaluate the different lega legal corporate governance ate gove nc policies and regulations prevailing in the BRICS nations so aas to identi identify the potential impacts of these laws on the economic development ment oof the nations dif ferent enforcement fe nfo f r ment poli fo To identify whether diff different policies of different BRICS nations play ulating corporate orpo ate governance ernance in these nations vital role in regulating isation 8.0 Chapterisation ntrod c ntrodu thi Chapter I: Introduction: this section will contain the introduction to the topic along with the round of the study, the problem statement, research objectives, research questions, background pothesis, the statistic hypothesis, statistical methods of analysis and the scope and significance of the study. lso contain The chapter also contains a note on the chapter divisions of the study.

Chapter II: Literature Review: the chapter discusses all the previous literature that has been presented by different authors within the context of corporate governance and enforcement mechanism in different countries.

Chapter III: Corporate Governance in BRICS nations: an overview: This chapter presents a detailed overview of corporate governance and the policies and regulations adopted by different BRICS countries. Š 2016-2017 All Rights Reserved, No part of this document should be modified/used without prior consent Tutors India™ - Your trusted mentor since 2001 I www.tutorindia.com UK: The Portergate, Ecclesall Road, Sheffield, S11 8NX I UK # +44-1143520021, Info@tutorsindia.com

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Chapter IV: Data and Methodology: this chapter details the research design and strategy adopted. In addition, the research philosophy is also included through which the nature and type of data collected are determined. The chapter also encloses the manner in which the data is analysed and how the findings may be derived.

Chapter V: Results: This chapter very specifically encloses the results of the data collected.

The results will be presented in tabular and graphical format along with the interpretation of data Chapter VI: Conclusion and Recommendation: this chapter discusses the findings of the present study in comparison with the previous studies. From the findings, conclusions are drawn and recommendations are discerned.

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10.0 Gantt chart Main Activities/ Stages

Week 1

Week 2

Week 3

Week 4

Week 5

Week 6

Topic selection and its scope Identification of secondary data sources Preparation of research proposal Preparation of literature review Description of research methodology Collecting primary data Analyzing data Comparing findings Conclusion and recommendations Finalizing and submission

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