The Yale Globalist - Borders by The Yale Globalist

BORDERS FALL 2019 | VOLUME 20 | ISSUE 2

Editors in Chief Claire Zalla Vy Tran Managing Editors Mercy Idindili Michelle Kim Keigo Nishio Clare Morneau Manuel Schneider Associate Editors Abigail Grimes Ariq Hatibie Shreeya Singh Chief Online Editor Nicole Zhen Online Editors Yilin Chen Megan He Byron Ma Martina Amate Perez

Copy Editors Yasmin Alamdeen Sean Callahan Kara Liu Marlika Marceau Sherrie Wang

In This Issue

FALL 2019 | VOLUME 20 | ISSUE 2 | BORDERS

04. SCATTERED BUT TRAPPED Palestinian Identity Amid Border Issues BY YILIN CHEN

08. SI / SAW BY LUKA GAWLINSKI SILVA

Business Director Karen Lu Business Team Julia Brown Phoebe Campbell Mary Chen Xiaoke Luo Sandhya Kumar Shirley Shi Creative Director Vera Villanueva Production & Design Editors Isabella Canava Alexandra Galloway Dylan Kim Tessa Mapplebeck Find us online: www.tyglobalist.org @yaleglobalist tyglobalist@gmail.com Cover photo by: Darius Jing (Checkpoint Charlie, Berlin)

09. OVER THE WATER, BYE AND BYE Crossing Borders With a Book BY KELLEN SILVER

13. GOVERNMENT ON RAILS

The Evolution of Railways, Foreign Influence, and State Power BY NICK MCGOWAN

18. BREXIT AND THE IRISH BORDER

LETTER FROM THE EDITORS

BY CLAIRE DONNELLAN Dear Globalist Readers,

19. BACKPACKING HOME BY CAROLINE BEIT

20. ADIMERA

Reflecting on the EthiopiaEritrea Border Conflict BY MCKENNA CHRISTMAS

27. THE GUATEMALANMEXICAN BORDER Central American Immigration to the United States Today BY FRANK LUKENS

32. HUMANITARIAN CRISES The Dilemma Behind Cross-Border Interventions BY SASHA THOMAS

A border is the line drawn between countries, people, and competing ideologies that separates us and creates an “us” and “them” binary. Yet, a border is also the only place where two opposing sides may touch. While these demarcations are important in the formation of our own identities, they are the site where growth, change, and dialogue may occur as well. In these dynamic places of conflict where our differences are starkest, what can we discover about ourselves and each other? How can this knowledge be used for peace? In our second issue of the academic year, we consider strife at borders as well as successes in crossing them. Kellen Silver ‘20 reflects on apartheid after finding handwritten notes in a secondhand book in Eswatini. Yilin Chen ‘23 writes about the plight of Palestinians and their sense of identity. Sasha Thomas ‘22 considers the challenges of cross-border interventions in humanitarian crises. Nick McGowan ‘23 reflects on the construction of railways as a method of domination but also as a path to development. McKenna Christmas ‘23 explores the recent peace deal between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Frank Lukens ‘22 sheds light on the struggles of Central American immigrants. We invite our readers to take note of where borders exist in our own lives, our hearts and our minds, and reflect on how they can be used to foster empathy and understanding. Ignorance is a border itself, but it is not intraversable. Please check out the National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, the South Texas Human Rights Center, and RAICES to learn more about border activism, advocacy groups, projects, and how you can get involved in human rights protection at the US-Mexico border.

Warm regards, Claire & Vy

S cat ter ed

but

Trapped :

Palestinian Identity Amid Border Issues

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BY YILIN CHEN Stretching over seven hundred kilometers, the Israeli West Bank separation barrier sharply cuts through the local landscape. In some places, it is a thirty-foot concrete wall. Elsewhere, it is a series of electric and razor wire fences. Sprinkled along the barrier and within the West

Bank area are ominous watchtowers, cement blocks, and armed soldiers. These are constant reminders of an Israeli military presence in the State of Palestine. The most distinctive physical feature of the Palestinian experience occurs at borders, checkpoints,

roadblocksâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;essentially any form of barrier that requires a scrutiny of identity. For Palestinians, what are routine activities for most citizens of the world become a daily nuisance that often entails humiliation and violence. Whether they are visiting relatives, seeking emergency

The wall between Israel and West Bank. healthcare, or simply driving to work, they are subjected to inhumane and often violent treatment. Occasionally, Israeli soldiers force them to take off their jackets, t-shirts, and even their pants to show they have nothing to hide. In a cruel metaphorical sense, this procedure reflects how frequently Palestinians are stripped of their dig-

nity. Their individual identities are disregarded as Israeli soldiers treat them uniformly as security threats. Apart from physical barriers, however, what constitutes the Palestinian experience? How has the Palestinian identity evolved historically? More importantly, in a region plagued by conflict, where civilians fight on the

ground and politicians clash in legislative institutions, what invisible barriers do Palestinians face in the struggle to find a sense of belonging? Lauren Banko is a lecturer in modern history of Arab Middle East at Yale. According to Banko, a Palestinian-Arab identity developed as a separate concept from other Arab

IMAGES: RIANNE VAN DOEVERN

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or were expelled from their homes, becoming refugees scattered across the Middle East. The residents of Mandatory Palestine who remained inside Israeli borders later became Arab citizens of Israel, often referred to as Arab Israelis. Arabs currently represent twenty-one percent of the Israeli population, according to a 2019 report from the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. At first glance, the distinction between the categories of Palestinians is simple. Palestinian citizens of Israel and East Jerusalem Palestinians have a blue ID card, while those in the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip hold green ones. In reality, the col-

ors make a world of difference. Those colors directly translate to the amount of freedom and rights that the cardholders possess. Palestinians living under Israeli occupation in East Jerusalem, Gaza, and the West Bank are effectively a stateless people who lack the rights of citizenship to any sovereign nation. Without the right to vote, they cannot elect the Israeli officials who have direct control over the occupied territories. They lack the right to due process under the law and civil rights granted to Israeli citizens, often subjecting them to longer trials, prolonged or indefinite “administrative detention,” and even torture. In every aspect of their

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nations during the British mandate period in Palestine (1923-1943). Palestinian people constructed a definition of themselves as a response “against Jewish immigration and Zionism” in order to actively protect their territory, she says. They also voiced a desire for self-determination, a crucial component of the political trend of nationalism after World War I. Then came the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. For Israelis, the war was a triumph that created the State of Israel. For Palestinians, on the other hand, the war is referred to as nakba, or catastrophe, a throbbing wound in the national memory. Seven million Palestinians fled

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lives, including needs as fundamental as food and healthcare, residents of the occupied territories have only the bare minimum of freedom. It is almost impossible for Palestinians in the occupied territories to gain Israeli citizenship.

Even for those Palestinians who do become Israeli citizens, they face both de jure and de facto discrimination based on their Arab identity. Central to this problem is the Israeli dual construct of citizenship and nationality, unlike most other coun-

tries where the two terms are more or less interchangeable. In March 2019, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu posted online that “Israel is not a state of all its citizens. According to the basic nationality law we passed, Israel is the nation-state of

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2500 Palestinians with a work permit for Israel pass the Bethlehem checkpoint on a daily basis. Whereas the checkpoint usually opens at 5 AM, it is never fully operational and often randomly opens and closes. In the morning it easily takes hours to pass through the labyrinthian complex. Workers start lining up as early as 2 AM to make sure that they make it to work on time.

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IMAGE: MICHAEL-ANN CERNIGLIA

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A Palestinian refugee camp outside Damascus, Syria the Jewish people—and only it.” He referred to a deeply contentious law passed in July 2018 that upheld the status of Jews while relegating Arabic from an official language to one with “special status.” The outraged Arab community has denounced the law as racist and undemocratic and has likened it to the Apartheid. Professor Banko explains that nationality in Israel is deeply linked with religion. The Israeli citizenship does not give Arabs the same rights as Jews. As non-Jews, they face institutionalized racism cleverly concealed beneath the appearance of equal rights and humanitarianism. For example, according to The Middle East Policy Council, Arab Israeli citizens don’t have access to the land owned by the Jewish Agency, a national institution with vast resources. It controls ninety-two percent of the land of Israel, much of which has been taken from the Arabs. Non-Jews can neither own the land nor work on it. For Palestinian refugees scattered in the surrounding areas, the vague and varying definitions of their legal status entail equally disturbing consequences. In a presentation at the Yale MacMillan Center, Professor Michael Vicente Pérez from the University of Memphis detailed the invisible barriers around the Gazan refugee experience in Jordan, despite

their access to legal residence and humanitarian aid. When Gazans were displaced by the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Jordan allowed their entry through the category of foreign citizens. “Their status denies the fact that Gazans came to Jordan as an already displaced community of stateless refugees, not citizens.” Pérez says, “[It also] subjected them to a host of restrictions that precluded their access to some of the most basic needs . . . including prohibitions on work, education, healthcare, property, voting rights, etc.” Without citizenship, these refugees must perpetually grapple with a sense of uncertainty about their future prospects. They live on the margins as a people unmoored. To remain stateless or to accept the citizenship of another country? Palestinians are internally divided on this issue. Professor Banko explains, “The idea after 1948 is that to grant the Palestinian refugees citizenship of another state would take away their right to someday claim Palestinian citizenship in a future Palestinian state.” Echoing this sentiment, many Palestinians in exile choose to endure the pervasive limitations that come with statelessness. Meanwhile on the other end of the spectrum, there are Arab Israelis who are satisfied with their citizenship status and even choose to

become Israeli soldiers. Although the mandatory conscription of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) does not apply to Muslim, Christian, and Bedouin Arabs, more and more Arab Israelis are volunteering to serve in the army. Now, the number of Arab Israelis serving in the IDF has reached several hundred. In an interview with BBC news, Muslim Arab soldier Mahmud Kashua says, “I consider myself an Arab and a Muslim but I also consider myself part of [Israel].” By serving in the Israeli army, Arabs like Kashua are defying their ethnic tradition. Within the Palestinian community, this decision is synonymous with joining an oppressive regime, betraying one’s own people, and indoctrinating the youth with more anti-Palestinian sentiment. Even though the Palestinian identity partly emerged as a response against the Jewish and Zionist identity, framing the two sides as sharply antithetical overlooks the fundamental similarities in the people. Beneath the violence and chaos emblazoned across newspaper front pages stirs rising activism at the Israeli and Palestinian grassroots level aimed at promoting mutual understanding. Founded in 1995, the Parents Circle - Families Forum (PCFF) is a joint Israeli-Palestinian organization of over 600 families who have lost

IMAGE: AHMED ABU HAMEEDA

conjunction with indigenous people under occupation, African-American people dealing with police brutality, and workers advocating for labor rights. It’s a struggle that transcends borders in its core pursuit of resistance, justice, and a sense of belonging. Tyler stresses the importance of hearing directly from the Palestinian diaspora. He says, “We can make the occupation of Palestine part of the public sphere and something that people can’t look away from.” Drawing from her own experience of visiting Jerusalem and Palestine, Siddiqi echoes this sentiment by referencing disparities between media coverage and the reality in Palestine. But Siddiqi also expresses her hope for the future: “I had the chance to visit Jerusalem and Palestine a few years ago. One thing that really stuck with me was the common characteristics that Palestinians shared: a strong national identity and [pride] despite the humanitarian crisis. Palestinians that I’ve met at Yale also hold a very strong love for their country. They strongly hope that one day activism and advocacy will end the occupation.” The everyday experience of Palestinians involves passing through obstacles and barriers, but that is by no means the whole picture. Compared to the physical discomfort and humiliation, the intangible limitations on their status pose a more severe problem that extends to the broader Palestinian diaspora. In addition to asking what the Palestinian identity means, it is crucial to consider what it lacks: the rights and privileges that are denied based on citizenship, or simply which side of the border one lives in. Despite the territorial and legislative disputes, however, grassroot dialogues and ongoing activism offer hope of chipping away at the wall—both literally and figuratively. Yilin Chen is a first-year in Timothy Dwight College. She can be contacted at yilin.chen@yale.edu

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A man waving the Palestinian flag

stories that are overshadowed by national struggles. Whether one is Israeli or Palestinian, Jewish or Muslim, a speaker of Hebrew or a speaker of Arabic, these stories show that the two groups of people possess a multitude of experience that defy generic labeling. Israelis begin to understand the grievances of the Palestinians, and in turn, Palestinians recognize that many Israelis strongly desire peace as much as they do. The younger generation plays an increasingly active role in amplifying the voices of the Palestinian experience. Francesca Maviglia (Yale School of Public Health ’20), Mojique Tyler (Yale College ’20), and Alysha Siddiqi (Yale College ’23) are members of the Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) at Yale. They particularly emphasize the ways that the Palestinian struggle relates to other movements. Maviglia says, “We want to highlight issues like the training of U.S. police in Israel, the U.S. military support of Israel, and how Israel’s security technology is also used at the U.S. Mexico border to control the flow of migrants. We try to bring attention to the way that Palestine is relevant everywhere and for everyone. It shouldn’t be an issue that only concerns a faraway people.” They point out that the Palestinian struggle can be considered in

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loved ones to the conflict. Its Parallel Narrative Project gathers participants from both sides to share personal narratives. The conversations transcend the barrier between the two sides and gives a voice to the suppressed Palestinian experience. Alon Simon, an Israeli living in Tel Aviv, describes his loss of words upon hearing the obstacles that Palestinians encounter at the borders. “What could I say?” he writes, “I am on the stronger side, free to go where I choose, and have never been humiliated or abused by the authorities.” It is also worth noting that many initiatives for bilateral empathy have recognized the importance of integrating the youth. For example, the PCFF’s Peace & Reconciliation Camp brings together forty Israeli and Palestinian teens for five days of shared experience each year since 2003. Through activities, workshops, and casual conversation, the camp aims to dispel stereotypes of the “other” and promote leaders of the next generation. The camp counselors are alumni of the program, no more than young adults themselves, who choose to continue the mission of educating the youth. Efforts like these embrace dialogue as an alternative to violence. It brings both sides together to acknowledge the individual, human

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SI (Spanish):

SI (English)

Él no sabe lo que la pared quiere decir. Él no mira el alambre de espino o los agentes y soldados nos observan con sus tasers y pistolas. Él sólo mira el brinquedo, un balancín rosa, pero creo que en el otro lado ellos le llaman el sísó, y me da risa pues es un nombre muy ridículo y porque, para ellos, somos un río. Una infestación, una plaga, no personas. Creen que solo queremos hacer mal en sus ciudades. Que yo sacrificaria todo, mi vida entera, solo para destruir la vida dellos.

He doesn’t know what the wall means. He doesn’t see the barbed wire or the agents and soldiers observing us with their tasers and pistols. He just sees the toy a pink “balancín” but I think on the other side they call it a “sisó” and I laugh because it’s a very ridiculous name, and because, to them, we are a river. An infestation, a plague, not people. They believe we only want to do bad to their cities. That I’d sacrifice everything, my entire world, just to destroy theirs.

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See-saw at the US-Mexico border.

IMAGE: RONALD RAEL

VA NSKI SIL

GAWLI BY LUKA

SAW

Que ridiculo esto, y qué ridículo llamar una cosa de sisó. Ja ja ja. Ja ja ja. Pero de repente no me estoy riendo. Porque yo miro de nuevo a la pared, y miro a Joaquín, en este lado del balancín, de la moneda, y el otro niño, en el otro lado del balancín, y al mismo tiempo en un lado completamente diferente de la moneda, del mundo. Cómo serían nuestras vidas si viviamos allá? Si las estrellas que brillan por encima del otro lado de la barricada de odio tendrían la coragen de brillar con la misma fuerza para nosotros también?

How ridiculous this is, and how ridiculous it is to call something a “seesaw”. Ha ha ha. Ha ha ha. But suddenly I am not laughing. Because I see the wall again, and I see Joaquín, on this side of the seesaw, of the coin, and the other boy, on the other side of the seesaw, and at the same time on a completely different side of the coin, of the world. How would our lives be if we lived there? If the stars that shine above the other side of that barricade of hate had the courage to shine with equal force on us as well?

IMAGE: KELLEN SILVER

BY KELLEN SILVER

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Over the Water, Bye and Bye: Crossing Borders with a Book neatly organized library books covered in plastic. The door on the left opens to an even smaller room, covered floor to ceiling with secondhand books for sale. Packed wooden shelves of books, aging cardboard boxes of books, haphazard leaning towers of books. There is hardly a cubic inch left unbooked. As I sit on the floor of this beautifully chaotic room, combing through Shakespearean sonnet collections and pulp fiction paperbacks lying side-by-side, my eyes fall on a weathered hardback. Its cover is scratched and worn, the plastic peeling like dead skin in places, but its interior is intact. In a bubbled, green serif, the title reads: Roll of Thunder, Hear My Cry. The name sounds vaguely familiar, a teacher’s recommendation floating into my head. I pick it up and turn it over in my hands. Inside the front cover of the book is a purple stamp, marking a return address, “St. Mark’s High School, P.O. Box 31, Mbabane,” and a date, “1992-01-15”. At the top of the page are the names of two students to whom the book was

issued, one neatly printed and one hastily scrawled. I bring the book to the small plastic folding table that blocked half the doorway. “Twenty rand,” the woman says, using the South African currency which is used interchangeably with the local emalangeni in Eswatini. I hand her a twenty, about 1.50 USD, and walk up the hill back toward home. I would start reading on the plane back to the United States, and as I read, I noticed pencil marks in the margins, which had smudged and faded over the years. They started slowly, none on the first page, one on the second, two on the third. But by the end, the notes spilled across the pages, arching over and around paragraph breaks, little arrows snaking around important points. Roll of Thunder, Hear My Cry follows Cassie, a young, Black girl in 1930s Mississippi, the middle child of a family of independent farmers living in the long shadow of racism in the South. In the first chapter, the author, Mildred D. Taylor, provides a look into Cassie’s classroom on the first day of school, in which

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The main road unfurls like a red carpet from the foothills of mountains streaked with forest fire ash to the bustling city center below. At the bottom of the hill lies Mbabane, the capital of Eswatini, formerly called Swaziland. Fruit vendors line the street overlooking the city’s transportation hub, where kombi drivers in their Volkswagen vans shout their destinations. “Manzini! Manzini! Manzini! Manzini! Manzini!” one rattles off like an auctioneer. Car horns honk are as they depart. A few blocks away, on a side road filled with fabric stores and bank branches, everything slows to a more leisurely pace. Amid the lull of weekend errands, the Mbabane Library Association sits quietly, a small square building painted a muted olive green. The neat white grids on the windows call to mind a pre-1968 British outpost, a ghost of colonial design. A black wrought iron gate spans the archway that leads to two doors inside. The door on the right opens to a small room of no more than two hundred square feet, filled with

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sued, secondhand copy of Roll of Thunder, Hear My Cry found itself in the hands of a young Black girl at a critical time of racial tension, and her notes in the book tell a story of their own. By 1992, when Roll of Thunder, Hear My Cry was being taught at St. Mark’s High School, racial tensions in South Africa were coming to a head. Two years later, amid mass demonstrations and global pressure, the apartheid regime would fall. In the decades prior, freedom fighters fled to Swaziland to escape perse-

The owner of this book may have been one such child herself. At the end of the first chapter of Roll of Thunder, Hear My Cry, and at the end of every chapter thereafter, the student has written a list of notes, streaming in neat lines, covering every inch of the page left where the last paragraph ends: “Writer is portrail’s [sic] that black families are poor in contrast to the whites.” “The black school is neglected.” “Whites are unfairly privileged.” The student’s notes continue throughout the book. Some are notes about vocabulary: the word “haughtily” gets defined as “full of pride”, and “weather-beaten” as “not in good condition, neglected.” Some distill the finer details of the plot: the student notes that Papa’s instructions to the kids about not going to the bigoted Wallace family’s store “develop a background of racial tension.” Still others note historical context for America in the 1930s, the “time when the trade union started. When a lot of exploited groups stood

Despite vast differences in time and place, the similarities between the real world and the world of Taylor’s novel are striking. cution by the South African government, and many sent their children to Swazi schools. Some of these children may have found themselves at St. Mark’s High School, a few seats away, reading a similar copy of Taylor’s novel, taking their own notes.

IMAGE: KELLEN SILVER

each student receives a copy of the class reading book. The children open their new books excitedly, only to find out that they have been given secondhand books from the white school down the road. A table in the front of Cassie’s book lists the book’s previous issuances in a two-page spread. Eleven lines list the white students who owned the book before Cassie, the years growing larger and the condition deteriorating with each entry. The last line of the table in Cassie’s book reads issuance: “12,” date: “September 1933,” condition of book: “Very Poor,” race of student: “nigra.” Cassie and her brother storm out of the room to the classroom where their mother teaches, and their mother pastes over the table with a blank sheet of paper. She later loses her job for it. Despite vast differences in time and place, the similarities between the real world and the world of Taylor’s novel are striking. This school-is-

IMAGE: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

The transportation hub of Mbabane. One of the rolling hills surrounding Mbabane.

coming to her own conclusions, drawing connections she may not have seen before. Instead of trying to remember details for an upcoming exam, the student here seems to be writing for posterity, understanding that these lessons just might be more important than they seemed at first. I don’t think Mildred D. Taylor, writing in the 1970s, expected that her book about the American South in the 1930s might end up in the hands of a Swazi high school student in 1992. Even if she did, I can’t imagine that she would have thought that same book might end up in my hands, a Yale student in 2019, spending a summer in Mbabane. But someone at St. Mark’s High School decided that the lessons of interwar Mississippi could cross the borders of time and space and infuse the lives of young Swazi students, who just might have been sharing a school with freedom fighters. And here I sit, five decades and five thousand miles away, learning from Cassie and from this anonymous student alike, learning about the world as it is, and as it can be, if we’re willing to fight for it. Kellen Silver is a senior in Pierson College studying Global Affairs. He can be contacted at kellen.silver@yale.edu.

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up for their rights.” Most of the early notes have an air of adulthood, as if the teacher wrote them on a chalkboard, and this student copied them dutifully into her book. I can almost hear the student ask, “Will this be on the test?” But as the book continues, the notes begin to feel more natural and age-appropriate. The line blurs, and it becomes harder and harder to tell which are the teacher’s words and which are the student’s. On one particularly slow school day, the student writes, “Boring!! Slept for two periods...feel very sleepy, hungry.” Notes like these mix with notes about the text and its commentary as the student engages more and more with the book. On the last page of the novel, the student has written two notes that are particularly striking. First, she writes, “Segregation - keeping two groups separate; apartheid - separateness,” explicitly noting the similarities in the injustices of the United States and South Africa. And second, at the very bottom of the page, “Whites in SA have very high standard of living/Wallaces are strong coz of the economic position.” Something about these final notes doesn’t read the same way as the earlier ones. They seem to to show the student

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ON RAILS

The Evolution of Railways, Foreign Influence, and State Power

BY NICK MCGOWAN walking speed or the typical mule and cart, travelling along gleaming new rails and bridges. Horse-drawn railways and tramways were built on smaller scales before by the British, but these unlocked a whole new realm of possibilities for develop-

The day was exalted ... as “one of the most important days, if not the most, in the annals of British India.”

IMAGE: SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY

A train running on India’s first railway line between Bombay and Thane.

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ment, connecting people and goods across vast distances in a way never before seen on the Indian subcontinent. However, with newfound speed and efficiency came Westernization and stronger British control over the hinterlands. In an interview with The Yale Globalist, British railway historian and journalist Christian Wolmar explained that after the 1857 Rebel-

lion in India, the British built more railways than barracks as a cost-effective way to move troops in times of rebellion and conflict. As a result, the British continued to build railways for almost the next eighty years in pursuit of political and military control rather than for the economic and developmental needs of the Raj. If the British were building railways to encourage India’s development and industrial growth, they would have encouraged efforts to create local industries and to build their own railway facilities and infrastructure. One example of this type of development was when Japan brought British and European technical advisors and contractors to build the first Japanese railway from Tokyo to Yokohama. In this case, foreign experts were contracted specifically to educate Japanese workers so that Japan could build a self-sufficient industry. While the British-Japanese relationship was very different at the time than the relationship between Britain and the British Raj, any opportunities for Indian economic development around the railroad were built purely around British interests, in direct contrast to the

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On April 16th, 1853, a train of three engines and fourteen carriages left Bombay (now Mumbai) for Tanna (Thane). It was the first passenger train to run in the British Raj, and the day was exalted in the Times of India’s inaugural report as “one of the most memorable days, if not the most, in the annals of British India.” British officials occupying India heralded the railway as a major leap forward for the region’s development, with one official at the inaugural function saying that this “was not the triumph of nation over nation, of race over race, of man over his fellow man. It was the triumph of mind over matter, of patience and perseverance.” Yet, looking back at their origin, railways were more than just a means to transport goods and passengers: railways were extensions of British political and military control over the Indian subcontinent and represent a greater trend of governments using transportation infrastructure to expand their power and reach. When railways first came to India, locals were shocked by the foreign machinery: tens of thousands of pounds worth of steel, moving twenty to thirty times faster than

Japanese model of railway-driven economic development. Wolmar said that “in India, they were not allowed to use the railways as a […] form of economic development. In other words, you have a railway, and then the supply industry becomes a great economic generator towards that, and none of that happened.” Instead, he said, the British exported all rolling stock, stations, and rail building materials, taking away any opportunity for India to build self-sustaining industries. Around this time, the United States was one step ahead with a flourishing domestic railway industry, and grand plans to build a transcontinental railroad linking East with West. By the 1860s, most Native

American tribes had, knowingly or not, signed away the rights to their land in treaties with the federal government. In efforts to populate these newly acquired Western lands, the Homestead Act of 1862 gave 160 acres of surveyed government land to any adult citizen in exchange for a filing fee of $18. As people rushed to take up this opportunity, the market for the transcontinental railway was created, and the battleground was set for conflict between white and native populations. From 1863 to 1869, railroads and affiliated industries acquired millions of acres of land through the Pacific Railroad Act and legislative loopholes. This land was then sold to white settlers at inflated prices after construc-

tion of the Transcontinental Railroad was completed. During construction, the U.S. military occupied Native communities throughout the Western United States to inhibit any opposition to construction, razing towns, destroying food sources, and executing political leaders. The disappearance of wild game and bison and the disruption to Native trade routes led to immense cultural and economic losses, which were only exacerbated by altercations with white settlers. In the end, the Transcontinental Railway was an effective mechanism for securing control of Native American land while encouraging white immigration to the West, strengthening the American government’s hold over the Wild West. Since then, railways have been an

IMAGE: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

LEFT: Jerusalem Light Rail. RIGHT: Kenya’s new rail line between Nairobi and Mombasa.

economic driver throughout the world, with varied social consequences. In areas such as Japan and Europe, national and international high-speed rail networks have connected people, cultures, and places, making it easier to work, trade, and explore. But, the historically colonialist trends from India and the U.S. — utilizing infrastructure to expand state power and influence — continue today under various guises. Currently, one of the largest global infrastructure initiatives is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), started in 2013 under Chinese President Xi Jinping. The BRI includes projects in 152 countries around the world, covering areas such as energy infrastructure, transportation, cyber-

security, and more. Yale Professor Denise Ho said in a conversation with The Yale Globalist that the BRI can be seen from two perspectives, both rooted in modern Chinese history. One is that it is a “soft power move,” a repeat of China’s work during the Socialist period in which Chinese officials and workers went to different countries in Africa and Asia and worked to promote the “socialist brotherhood” and technology transfer. The biggest example of this was the TAZARA Railway in Tanzania, which was built by China, Tanzania, and Zambia to reduce Zambia’s economic reliance on white-ruled Rhodesia (modern-day Zimbabwe) and South Africa in the spirit of Pan-African socialism. At the time, China

was using these soft power moves to gain support in its fight against the Soviet Union and the United States, and the railway project did succeed in bringing the attention of the West to both China’s influence-building and its potential to help foreign infrastructure development. A second perspective is that after ten to twenty years of huge investments into urban renewal and economic growth, China is looking to export its excess industrial capacity and infrastructure spending overseas while helping other countries. Professor David Lampton, from the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and the current Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute

IMAGE: MWANGI KIRUBI

Chinese High-Speed Train

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for International Studies, brought up a third perspective: the BRI is China’s way of making itself the hub of the Asian economic system, which will not only promote economic growth but also security and friendlier relations with its neighbors. The BRI’s largest project in Southeast Asia involves a railway from Kunming in China to Singapore, a dream first hatched by the British and French in 1900. It was later attempted by the Japanese, then by the French again, but efforts failed as other infrastructure and internal political issues were prioritized. Now, China is leading the efforts to construct a 2,400 milelong high-speed rail route, crossing through Laos, Thailand, and Malaysia before ending in Singapore. If the entire project is constructed, this railway would complete a dream for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) — which has been pushing for this since the early 1990s as a way to connect ASEAN states and integrate the region into the global economy — and would change Southeast Asia forever. The first stage of the railway from

the Chinese border to Vientiane, Laos is under construction and scheduled to open in 2021. However, the financial and social terms of the project are controversial. According to a study by the Center for Global Development, Laos will need to pay $1.8 billion US dollars out of the $6 billion dollars project cost, and has only allocated $715 million for the project so far. The over $1 billion remaining balance will be covered mostly by Chinese

to Singapore, said that the picture isn’t all bleak. Planners in Vientiane, he said, made an intentional decision to join the project because, as a landlocked country, Laos needs to connect somewhere to develop, and that somewhere is China and Southeast Asia. The country faced a stark choice: it could “revel...in [its] sovereignty and non-dependence” and be left out of a “transient opportunity” that could transform its economy, or it could accept economic development on China’s terms. Studies done on the Kunming-Vientiane railway, however, show that the larger Southeast Asia region and China will benefit more directly than Laos from the completion of this project, but Laos has “made the judgment that [they] can manage this, and that its the only way out [of poverty].” The exclusive reliance on China for funding, construction, and support in the project will inevitably tie Laos and the broader region closer to China, but according to Lampton, this is exactly what Laos wants. China is likely getting a better deal while helping Laos achieve its goals of development, but in Laos,

Are these gigantic infrastructure projects inherently tools for control and power? loans, in addition to the $465 million already borrowed from China. The human cost is also evident: with most local government structures considering the project a federal-level deal and taking a hands-off approach, the Laotian government has relocated over 4,000 families, evicting them before compensation and only paying them a fraction of the actual price of their land. Lampton, who recently finished research for his upcoming book on high-speed railways from Kunming

Nick McGowan is a first-year in Pauli Murray College. He can be contacted at nick.mcgowan@yale.edu.

T H E YA L E G L O B A L I S T

the project is merely seen as the best possible option. China’s reach isn’t exclusive to Southeast Asia: Kenya’s shiny new Madaraka Express provided a much-needed infrastructure update, but at a potentially catastrophic cost. The new railroad between Kenya’s capital Nairobi and the main port city of Mombasa cut the train travel time between the two cities from 24 hours to just over four, and has made the journey much more affordable and pleasant for Kenyans. However, the $3.6 billion USD price tag (90% of which was financed by loans from Chinese banks) has made people wonder if Kenya bit off more than it could chew. Not only is Kenya’s budgetary health on the line, but also its sovereignty: The Daily Nation newspaper reported that the Kenyan government put up the Mombasa Port as collateral. Gaining the port would give China a new base in East Africa while depriving Kenya of control over its main seaport — a catastrophe for Kenya both symbolically and financially. Similar to British railway development in the late 19th century, China exports its own rolling stock, tracks, workers, and construction

been used as a way to connect cultures and cross borders. According to an NPR article, transit officials in Jerusalem describe passengers as a “mosaic” of “Jews and Arabs, men and women, tourists and more.” Keshia Badalge, a freelance journalist, wrote in CityLab about a light-rail-based tour initiative called Dissolving Boundaries, which uses the light rail to bring “participants in Jerusalem to places they didn’t know existed’’ and exposes people to the perspective of “boundary dissolvers”: people whose backgrounds don’t fall neatly into the strict Israel-Palestine dichotomy that dominates people’s perspective of Jerusalem and the larger conflicts at hand. In the article, Palestinian activist Riman Barakat said these cultural and open dialogue initiatives in the larger scheme of things showed that “Jerusalem could be the blueprint for how to negotiate boundaries in the future.” So, why does this matter? Are these gigantic infrastructure projects inherently tools for control and power? The answer is more complex than it seems. In the past, the British and French built railroads and infrastructure to control their colonial subjects under the guise of “civilizing” their colonial lands, or, as Wolmar says, the Victorian concept of “altruism.” Nowadays, the main powers in infrastructure project funding — China, the European Union, Japan, and the United States — are looking for more subtle, soft power ways to exercise influence, spread their political messages, and promote their economic interests. While in the past, railway infrastructure was used to tear down borders by force, today’s railways are built to connect people across borders, encourage cultural and economic exchange, and spread political messages and power. With improvements in speed and connectivity, the world seems a smaller place, but with a global push for development, countries must be wary about what they may be giving up in the quest for economic growth.

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IMAGE: UNSPLASH

materials for rail projects, and has done little to help develop a local railway industry in Kenya, further tying Kenya to China for infrastructure assistance. Many recent reports say that Chinese drivers on the railroad continue to outnumber Kenyan drivers, and most management positions are filled by Chinese employees. Ho said that the contrast between the socialist brotherhood method of development between China and Africa in the 1960s and the current export-all style of Chinese infrastructure projects could result in miscommunication and animosity between Chinese workers and local populations. Wolmar agrees, and drew a parallel between the Madaraka Express project and the development of British Railways in the British Raj: the lack of communication and of local industry development, along with the debt situations could lead to the same anti-imperialist sentiments and political ramifications that developed over one hundred and fifty years ago in India. The potential for cultural conflict and politics come into play with smaller rail systems, too. In Jerusalem, controversy began from the moment tracks were laid down in 2002 for the city’s light rail system. Today, the Red Line runs from Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem, through Palestinian neighborhoods, downtown Jerusalem, and to the West. The line is a gleaming symbol of a united Jerusalem, but for some, that’s where the problem inherently lies. The UN Human Rights Council in 2010 passed a resolution expressing “grave concern” for the “Israeli decision to establish and operate a tramway between West Jerusalem and the Israeli settlement of Pisgat Zeev, which is in clear violation of international law and relevant United Nations resolutions.” Critics of the project have argued that the line makes it easier for Israel to give legitimacy to its settlements in the West Bank and to show that Jerusalem is the united capital city of the Israeli state. The rail project continues to be a target of vandalism and protests, and it is not uncommon to find stones thrown at trams in protest, resulting in hundreds of thousands of dollars in repair costs for the city to foot. At the same time, the light rail has

Brexit and the

Irish Border

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BY CLAIRE DONELLAN

T H E YA L E G L O B A L I S T

The prospect of Brexit is causing stress throughout the United Kingdom, particularly in Northern Ireland. Brexit would cause Northern Ireland, a part of the UK, to leave the European Union, while the Republic of Ireland would remain in the EU, shattering decades of work to create peace along the border. Ireland was partitioned in 1921, with the southern part of Ireland gaining independence and Northern Ireland remaining part of the UK. The partitioning has led to conflict between Republicans who wish to reunite the island and Unionists who wish to remain in the UK. Physical violence instigated by paramilitary groups reached its peak at the end of the 20th century. This violence was brought to an end in 1998 by the Good Friday Agreement, and the two have since shared an open border, but Brexit could disrupt this by reinstating a physical border. According to Yale political scientist Bonnie Weir, who focuses on Northern Ireland, there are three main effects of a post-Brexit physical

border. First, a sense of identity for people on both sides of the border could be threatened. One accomplishment of the Good Friday Agreement was parity of esteem for Irish and British cultures. Citizens can identify as Irish, British, or both, and since there is little indication that one has crossed the border, it is easy to claim whichever national identity one wants. For many people, this fluidity of identity may be challenged if a physical border is reinstated, as it will provide a clear delineation between British and Irish identity that people living along the border may not conform to. Secondly, a physical border would complicate daily life for thousands by creating slowdowns and annoyances for ordinary people. Lastly, a physical border would provide an easy target for paramilitary violence, reinstigating the violence that Ireland and the UK have worked so hard to end. Professor Weir states that if there is physical infrastructure at the border, the patterns that paramilitary groups have

used in the past suggest there will again be violence. One proposed solution to the issue is a so-called ‘Irish backstop,’ in which Northern Ireland could retain some of the EU’s benefits while the rest of the UK leaves and an open border is included between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Due to the need to avoid physical infrastructure at the border, Professor Weir and others see it as the only viable solution to avoid violence following Brexit. There has also been talk of a vote for reunification of the island, especially following a no-deal Brexit. Professor Weir noted a growing sense of all-island identity, but stressed that there is not enough clarity and too much political anxiety to call for a vote at the moment. Claire Donnellan is a first-year in Saybrook College. She can be contacted at claire. donnellan@yale.edu.

IMAGES: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

Left: Posters of an Anti-Brexit meeting in Carrickcarnon. Right: Protest by Sinn Fein, a left-wing republic group, countering “hard borders.”

A series of backpacks Possess everything dear Carrying home with me: holding me back, pushing me to explore Sometimes my whole life seems to fit: the tiny house, in the tiny town, can all fit into the tiny backpack placed upon my tiny back As childhood curiosities stretched and grew, the backpack of home followed too

If everything around me constantly grows, from my home to my bags, to the bounds and bordes of space, time, and place: Do I grow or just find myself home in a continually smaller constellation? The universe into my bag, my home and burden expandi ng at a humbling rate

In the tiny town, with my now less tiny backpack, I went to the tiny school, a tiny distance away

backpacking

home

By Caroline Beit

Enduring the tribulations of school, my backpack collected momentos and projects and learnings.

Did home travel with me or I away? Or was home simply redefined

School, a piece of my home, haphazardly fitting on my back in my ever-growing backpack As I grew, my backpack followed too As friends moved away, the places they now called home from Hershey to Hong Kong to Mozambique were tiny threads sewn into the fabric of my abode. Reminding me of places I should go

IMAGE: CAROLINE BEIT

But soon the confines of home simultaneously too small and heavy, and the world calling my name made me decide to fly and soar and go to places Iâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;d only dreamed of before

So this time, into my backpack I packed, a home of sorts my worldly possessions for the many months of travel ahead Out of the tiny town I flew From Vietnam to India, to Ecuador and Peru

I carried a backpack, but was home even there? My tiny town and home eclipsed by the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s wonders. A child of the earth, the bride of travel, redefining the home I carried But when you explore and expand your worldview, how can you carry it all on your back At some point, wearied by rickshaws and boats, trains and freights, I returned home only to venture out again, this time 61 miles and one border away, yet somehow the furthest place While I still carry home with me, nothing fits neatly anymore Home can no longer be packed up, yet somehow still moves Packed and unpacked at a fragile equilibrium at best.

Adimera:

Reflecting on the Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Conflict BY MCKENNA CHRISTMAS

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IMAGE: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

T H E YA L E G L O B A L I S T

Joint Peace Declaration, 2018 “The first half of the song’s name refers to the capital of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa; the second half to the capital of Eritrea, Asmera,” Degefu Degefu, a first year from Ethiopia and a member of the Yale Eritrea and Ethiopian Student Association, explains to me. “In Ethiopia, a wedding has two celebrations. The lyrics of the song are saying we can be wed in Addis Ababa and then we can have the second celebration in Asmera. It says decades of war are in the past. At least now, we can be together.” On October 11 2019, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The award honored his work in procuring the 2018 peace deal, which proclaimed that Ethiopia would adhere to the peace treaty signed in 2000 with Eritrea. The deal instituted an open border as well as other reforms, such as air travel and nonrestrictive telecommunication

between the two countries. These progressive policies were met with much celebration, including the release of songs like “Adimera.” But what caused this conflict? And how have people in both countries been impacted by a border dispute that lasted three decades? In his response to pinpointing the origins of the conflict, Christopher Clapham, a renowned political scientist, past professor of Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University, and recently retired editor of The Journal of Modern African Studies, who is now based at the Centre of African Studies at Cambridge University, explained that the border dispute can be traced back to Italian colonial efforts: “The border was never properly demarcated on the ground, during the relatively short period [1890-1936] for which it was the international frontier between two states. This was entirely because

the Italian government did not want to demarcate it, despite Ethiopian requests to do so.” Degefu also addressed this past history of colonial occupation in our interview. Her school curriculum reflected the influence of war and continued tense relations. “I was not taught about Eritrea in school, except in relation to the Battle of Adwa,” she said. The Battle of Adwa which took place in the late 1800s was a historical Ethiopian victory that asserted independence from encroaching Italian forces. The land designated to the Italians in the war’s treaty became the colony of Eritrea. Following the Italian colonization of Eritrea, borders grew more contested when Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1936 forming its “Italian East Africa.” Clapham reasoned that the original unwillingness of the Italians to demarcate the border after the Battle of Adwa is “best explained by continuing Italian ambitions to

the world stage, it has more support from a lot of the countries involved. [...] And so there was a sense that it wasn’t a fair enforcement of the ruling, and as a result the Eritrean government decided to take action.” This action was the 1998 invasion of Badme, which prompted the 2005 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. It ruled that Eritrea had violated

mission, a claims commission, and for the withdrawal to positions held prior to the 1998 war. However, Ethiopia refused to acknowledge the peace treaty and the boundary commission’s ruling, which designated the territory of Badme to Eritrea. Eritrea would not renegotiate. Professor Lea Brilmayer is a Howard Holtzmann Professor of International Law at Yale Law School, who served as lead counsel in Eritrea’s arbitration efforts. She advised the State of Eritrea in the negotiations leading up to the signing of the December 2000 Algiers Peace Treaty, representing Eritrea as both a liaison to the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) and at the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission. She commented, “I think that in many respects, the government did the right thing in resisting Ethiopia’s attempt to alter the decision of the boundary condition [...] what Ethiopia wanted was to negotiate with Eritrea, over what parts of the Boundary Commission line would become final and to make some swaps or trades.” Professor Brilmayer emphasized that such discussion would have been a disaster. “Once a country says, ‘well, this is supposed to be ours, but we’ll negotiate over it.’ Then, nothing is sacrosanct.” She followed this bold statement by citing that the ramifi-

Despite the shifting borders, the two countries developed distinct national identities. international law by taking violent actions against Ethiopian troops. When answering my question of why Eritrea would take such risky action, Clapham also addressed this feeling of Ethiopia being favored, he responded, “Again, this goes back to the Eritrean struggle for independence, in which ‘international law’ consistently took the Ethiopian side [...] Having won their own bitter struggle for independence, as they saw it against the full might of a hostile international system, the Eritreans had little if any respect for ‘international law’.” In 2000, Eritrea and Ethiopia signed the Algiers Agreement. The agreement, facilitated by the Organization of African Unity, called for the creation of a boundary com-

T H E YA L E G L O B A L I S T

IMAGE: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

Eritrean–Ethiopian War Map, 1998

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conquer Ethiopia (as happened in 1935-1936), and incorporate it into a single territory joining Italian Somalia and Eritrea.” The Allied victory of World War II meant that Italian colonial powers came crashing down, and Ethiopia, under British supervision, occupied Eritrea. In 1952, after much international debate, the UN federated Eritrea to Ethiopia, and in an attempt to appease both sides, oversaw the formation of the Ethiopian–Eritrean Federation. However in 1962, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie dissolved the federation and annexed Eritrea. This began the violent struggle for Eritrean independence. Despite the shifting borders, the two countries developed distinct national identities. This is largely attributed to separate movements under an oppressive Ethiopian government known as the Derg, an entity that held power from 1974 to 1987. Two movements the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) were allied against the Derg, but had significant differences from one another. As emphasized by Clapham, “The ‘struggle’ gave a sense of sacredness to the territories for which they had fought and died, and made compromise much more difficult.” Throughout this time period, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) had been fighting for independence and in 1991 it captured the Eritrean capital, Asmera, and established a provisional government. Independence was formally established following an internationally monitored referendum in 1993. However, tensions soon arose as a result of the Ethiopian occupation of Badme, but because of Ethiopia’s bigger presence on the world stage, there was limited international pushback. This aspect of favoritism motivated Eritrean forces to retaliate. Kesete Kesete, an Eritrean student from Emory University who immigrated to the U.S. in 2004 with her mother because of the unrest, expressed, “Eritrea felt that because Ethiopia was more influential on

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cations of such negotiations would have devastating effects “Even if you reach an agreement, there is no way of making it stick. Because if they can disregard the treaty that they signed, creating the boundary commission, then they can disregard any other treaty that they make subsequently [...] And the choice that you’re making is a choice between certainty and stability versus chaos.” Working on the negotiation, Professor Brilmayer could attest to witnessing this bias first-hand, “Of course, Ethiopia was favored. There’s no doubt about it. And none of the Westerners that I talked to about the situation made any bones about it. The American a m b a s s a d o r, for example, just said ‘Look, Ethiopia is our ally and it’s a powerful country. We’re not going to side with Eritrea.’ I think it is undeniable. Why would it be the case that for 15 years, the United States would quietly back Ethiopia? [...] The boundary commission unanimously thought and the Secretary General of the United Nations consistently thought that there was absolutely no doubt that Eritrea was entitled to the land and that Ethiopia was legally obligated to comply. Why were they allowed to occupy that land [...] Ethiopia had a much more favorable presence on the world stage.” Eritrea and Ethiopia’s dispute over Badme has been coined “two bald men fighting over a comb” due to the western perception that Badme is neither agriculturally feasible nor thought to possess any sort of utility. However, Brilmayer offered a poignant insight into the value of the land to the Eritrean people. “That was Eritrean territory... Any country values its territory [...] It wasn’t simply that Ethiopia was occupying Badme, it was their aggressive behavior in the area around Badme and in a place called Bada.” In fact, at the time Ethiopia’s troops were

focused on expanding control in three main areas the Badme area, Bada, and Tserona. These actions warranted Eritrean concern, as put by Brilmayer, “If you don’t take a stand against aggression it’s going to become progressively worse.” The bitter war and the losses on both sides, as well as the prolonged period of stagnation beg the question: Why now? What is different? Through the conducted interviews, it was clear that both sides had benefits to gain from such a deal, which were finally being realized by the progressive actions of the new Ethiopian administration. “I think a lot of what you saw in that peace treaty were just conversations that should have been had a long time ago, that were finally being had because there was fresh blood. This new prime minister that Ethiopia elected, was very progressive, and he was very open to the idea of peace. And I think you saw the Eritrean president respond well to that, and so they were able to reach some sort of agreement,” Kesete commented. Why would the prime minister want this agenda? The answer seems to be a combination of his character and potential benefits to the nation. Degefu sees promise in the new minister. “I genuinely believe he’s a good person. As any leader should be, he’s there to help Ethiopia grow and that means having peace with every other country not just the neighboring countries. You can’t have growth with a negative mindset.” Clapham also acknowledged the current administration’s influence, along with the trade incentives for both nations, stating that, “On the one hand, it can be seen as an entirely rational move, which in exchange for giving up a trivial strip of land would give Ethiopia access

If you don’t take a stand against aggressions, it’s going to become progressively worse.

An Eritrean man casts a line into the Red Sea. April 1993. Massawa, Eritrea

to Eritrean ports, remove an ongoing source of insecurity, and enable Ethiopia to build a relationship with Eritrea that would be to Ethiopia’s advantage. On the other, it can be seen as a move to isolate and contain the major source of potential opposition in Ethiopia, which came from the TPLF which had been ousted from its previously dominant role in the central government. For Eritrea, it offered the chance to escape from isolation, and especially from UN-approved sanctions.” Brilmayer elaborated on the benefits of such a deal from the Eritrean perspective, “They (Eritrea) would like to be on good terms with Ethiopia. Ethiopia is their single largest boundary. It’s an area that they have huge cultural connections to.” In addition to cultural benefits, the deal would bring economic advantages. Currently, the majority of Eritrea’s imports are agricultural goods, such as wheat flour and sorghum this is largely attributed to the food insecurity caused by Eritrea’s dependency on rainfed agriculture. Contrarily, Ethiopia is a prominent producer of both manufactured goods and farm

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IMAGE: UN PHOTO / MILTON GRANT

products due to their more reliable access to water. A lenient border policy would allow for greater efficiency and a potential new source of agricultural imports. Most notably, it could lead to potential revenue from Ethiopia’s usage of Eritrean ports. Taxes, fees, salaries paid to dock workers, and other expenses would greatly benefit the economy. Brilmayer addressed this unparalleled potential, “It’s a very important economic asset and something that can really only be sold to Ethiopia. It’s a function of the geographic layout.” Despite the mutual benefits, Eritrea announced soon after the initial deal that it had restricted the terms solely to air travel which is more easily monitored. Clapham com-

mented this action was most likely in response to “one immediate result of the opening of the border was a flow (though not really a flood) of Eritreans into Ethiopia”. Indeed, Kesete

to leave I don’t know if they would want to come back.” The motivation for the departure of Eritreans is often associated with the country’s poor economic status and mandatory military service. An obligation that perhaps has created internal borders between generations of Eritreans. As Brilmayer explains “the older people remember the independence war and they are motivated by a kind of gratitude towards the existing state that tempers their desire to criticize. There’s no doubt that Eritrea is much better off economically than it was when it was part of Ethiopia, or during the first few years of independence. But younger people don’t focus on that, because they are understandably focused on what’s

“Our similarities far outweigh our differences in a way that it doesn’t really make sense for us to be completely hostile to our neighbors.”

also commented on the potential events if complete open borders were made possible, “Eritrea has an entire lost generation of people who have left Eritrea and are not coming back […] honestly the government that we are under and the regime that we are under if people had the opportunity

IMAGE: UN PHOTO / MILTON GRANT

Long term Eritrean refugees returning from Sudan. 01/07/2001. Tesseney, Eritrea.

She had never heard the sound of her grandmother’s voice. Now, she has the opportunity to learn more about herself and her family. I have even heard of kids in Ethiopia separated from their parents in Eritrea.” Kesete echoes this sentiment: “I think for the significant majority of people, we can acknowledge that our cultures and our histories are very similar [...] Our similarities far outweigh our differences in a way that it doesn’t really make sense for us to be completely hostile to our neighbors. And I think a lot of people understand that the fights that were happening, most of them are fights from the previous generation, the current generation has no real problems amongst each other [...] more than anything, it’s a matter of politics. It’s a chess game between the two leaders that happen to be in control at any point. ” When asked about common misconceptions she observes, Degefu was quick to respond similarly,“I would say one of the biggest misconceptions is the idea that Ethiopia and Eritrea fully hate each other and that they’re complete opposites. Many families are divided because of the border. The fact that the governments have tension between them doesn’t mean the individuals do [...] The majority of people want peace.” She pauses for thought, “No one is benefiting from war; no one wants to hear about more people dying. A small piece of land is insignificant when compared to the value of a person’s life.” McKenna Christmas is a first-year in Jonathan Edwards College. She can be contacted at mckenna.christmas@yale.edu.

T H E YA L E G L O B A L I S T

have to put off what what they want to do in their lives and that’s really unfortunate and a big mayer states. Indeed, the length of mandatory service and the desperate measures taken to avoid it have raised concern with the United Nations Human Rights Council to the level of warranting a Special Rapporteur designated specifically to the country. Another postulation was that open borders could facilitate the spread of political ideas resulting in the alteration of Eritrea’s strict one-party system. However, Kesete pointed out that with recent emigration out of the country, an ideological shift away from a one-party system may not be possible due to the fact that: “ Eritrea has experienced such brain drain within the last decade. In a lot of ways, people who are capable of initiating a political shift have left.” Despite the restrictive setbacks, the border deal itself is seen as an opportunity to learn from each other. Reflecting on the reactions she observed when news of the peace deal broke, Degefu described “People were calling random numbers out of sheer happiness because the signals were no longer blocked.” The possibility of forming ties offers a chance for the exploration of shared history and heritage. “Growing up, I knew more about Kenya than Eritrea even though it is much closer and we are from the same people. The conflict was affecting us many years later in terms of our school curriculum, so this will finally allow us to learn about each other.” Another aspect, is the opportunity for reconciliation for those with familial ties. Degefu gave a personal example, “One of my neighbor’s family was from Eritrea.

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available to them. And to hear that things are better than they used to be is not really, it does not satisfy them.” Eritrea maintains its system of military service as a response to potential outside threats, despite the peace deal, Brilmayer cautiously points out that “any country that has serious military threats would not last very long, if they just planned for current conditions. That’s particularly true if you’re a small country, because Eritrea has about one-twentieth the population of Ethiopia.” In addition to a greater populace, Ethiopia also outdoes Eritrea in terms of economic wealth and armament. These factors encourage a drafting system, the problem is that Eritrea’s mandatory military service does not have a fixed end date. “Young people want to go to school, they want to get a job, they want to start a family. This (compulsory military service) means that they

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The Guatemalan-Mexican Border: Central American Immigration to the United States Today BY FRANK LUKENS While anti-immigrant rhetoric in the U.S. has historically targeted Mexicans, there has been a shift toward marginalizing Central Americans, reflecting the rapidly rising number of immigrants from the Northern Triangle over the past twenty years. In response to this influx of Central American migrants, the U.S. government has pressured Mexico to limit Central Americans entering through Mexico’s border with Guatemala—effectively extending border security from the U.S.-Mexico border to the Mexico-Guatemala border through what is known as border externalization. Yet, these measures do not address the reasons why Central Americans are leaving their countries. Cinthia Zavala Ramos, a junior at Yale College, immigrated to the United States from Honduras in 2005. Cinthia’s father, previously a farmer in rural Honduras, had

immigrated to the U.S. earlier and was able to start a construction company in South Carolina, working hard to provide Cinthia’s family with a higher standard of living and better access to education than in Honduras. Thousands of Central American families like Cinthia’s are immigrating to the United States for similar reasons. Pedro Pablo Solares, an immigration lawyer and journalist based in Guatemala City, cites the lack of human development in Guatemala—demonstrated by malnutrition; low educational attainment; high illiteracy rates; and lack of health, hygiene, and infrastructure, among other problems—as the main push factor for Guatemalans, leading to emigration from poor, rural, and mostly indigenous communities. Solares also notes climate change as a reason why Central Americans are leaving their home countries.

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Borders may strengthen, but they will never be as strong as the hope of immigrants in search of greater opportunities. The issue of Latin American immigration is more politicized than ever in the United States, especially with the 2020 election around the corner. The U.S. government has been placing significant pressure on the governments of Mexico and Central America—most notably Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, collectively known as “The Northern Triangle”—to deter migrants from immigrating to the United States. Deterrence, however, is not an effective policy strategy to stop migrants and only makes their journey longer and more dangerous. Government policies will never change the fact that seeking a better life for oneself and one’s family is a human endeavor, rather than the polarizing political issue it has become in the United States.

October 2018: A caravan of thousands of Honduran migrants force their way through the GuatemalaMexico border and are halted by Mexican riot police

IMAGE: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

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According to Solares, irregular rain patterns in Guatemala have caused a significant decrease in agricultural production. In some cases, farmers are yielding only 40 percent of what they were yielding three years ago, hurting their ability to sustain their families. Former ambassador and President of Guatemala Alejandro Maldonado Aguirre also attributes migration to the inability of the rural poor in Guatemala to sustain themselves economically, citing insufficient agricultural production, the scarcity of industrial plants as job opportunities, and the shortage of jobs in the service industry. Maldonado adds the importance of remittances—U.S. dollars sent from family members already in the U.S. back to their families in Guatemala—to the economic factors driving immigration to the United States. Because the U.S. dollar is much more valuable than the Guatemalan quetzal, families in Guatemala are able to increase their quality of life, albeit marginally. The 956 kilometer-long border between Guatemala and Mexico, mostly through remote, jungled areas, has historically been porous and easy to cross. Professor Rebecca Galemba, an anthropologist at the University of Denver who specializes in Central American migration, lived and conducted research at this border in the mid-2000s. Galemba emphasizes how easy it was for her to cross the border almost daily: “It was relatively simple to cross the actual border at the time, and there were very few security checkpoints with authorities. Depending on the location, this is largely still the case, as people who live in the border region rely on crossing it for their everyday livelihoods—to buy basic commodities such as toilet paper, soap, or sugar for their homes or stores. Now, however, checkpoints have been intermittently present on the highways once migrants attempt to travel further north.” Rodolfo Córdova Alcaraz, Vice President of Impacto Social MetGroup, a social service and human rights consultancy in Mexico City, agrees that

La Mesilla, Guatemala, a town located at the border with Mexico. According to Professor Galemba, “people who live in the border region rely on crossing it for their everyday livelihoods—to buy basic commodities such as toilet paper, soap, or sugar for their homes or stores.” it’s historically been easy to cross the border between Guatemala and Mexico: “[Migrants] see the border as if it didn’t exist at all. They can literally cross the river between the two counties in balsas, or wooden rafts, without getting stopped by authorities.” By contrast, according to Mr.

glers play on a migrant’s journey: “Smugglers are very creative in how they pitch their services to vulnerable people. They work to manipulate people, and view their clients as commodities. However, most migrants who are victims of crime in Mexico aren’t traveling with a smuggler. While those who travel with a smuggler may be abused on the journey and may be extorted for money, they will get to the U.S. border much quicker, because the smuggler knows who to pay off in order to help their clients.” In response to the almost uninterrupted flow of Central Americans through Mexico and into the United States, the U.S. government has increased pressure on Mexico to stem the flow of Central American migrants through the implementation of deterrence policies. In the mid2010s, according to Meyer, for the first time, more Central Americans were being apprehended in the U.S. than Mexicans due to an increased presence of Central Americans in the

The 956 kilometerlong border between Guatemala and Mexico... has historically been porous and easy to cross. Córdova, getting into the U.S. is much more difficult due to tightened U.S. border policy. To help them reach—and cross—the U.S. border, migrants often hire smugglers. Maureen Meyer, Director for Mexico and Migrant Rights at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), highlights the helpful—but not always trustworthy—role smug-

The Guatemala-Mexico border, which mostly traverses remote areas. IMAGE: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

There was no concern for the rights of migrants, who, in remote areas, were being abused and extorted by security forces, immigrant agents, and criminal groups. According to Meyer, even federal police officers along the Mexican-Guatemalan border were extorting migrants, forcing them to pay in return for not being turned in to immigration officials. Despite the Programa’s attempt to deter migrants, however, the number of Central Americans traveling through Mexico was not decreasing enough to satisfy the United States. “At the beginning of President Lopez-Obrador’s term in 2018,” Meyer reported, “Mexico wanted to have a more humane, welcoming policy [toward migrants], but the high demand for humanitarian visas—mostly to stay in Mexico—by Central Americans became difficult to address, especially with U.S. pressure to keep migration from Central America down. With increasing apprehensions and the difficulty of obtaining humanitarian visas, Mexico felt the need to respond to President Trump’s threats for tariffs.” As

a result, Mexico pledged to deploy 60,000 members of the National Guard—a mixture between civilian police and the Mexican armed forces—to the border with Guatemala in February 2019. According to Meyer, this action was Mexico’s way of demonstrating to the U.S. that it was capable of enforcing its border. By deploying a military force, Mexico was able to please President Trump with a concrete demonstration of physical force. Despite this strict plan, enforcement along the actual Guatemalan-Mexican border varies in strength by location, whereas checkpoints installed throughout southern Mexico along highways make it harder for migrants to travel north within the country. Professor Galemba added that the deployment of the National Guard is “pretty problematic, given the poor human rights record and lack of transparency and accountability of the military.” “All evidence shows that enforcement-first policies do not deter migration,” stated Professor Galemba, on whether policies like

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U.S. In 2014, only a few days after U.S. President Obama declared a humanitarian crisis on the U.S.-Mexico border, Mexican President Peña Nieto launched the “Programa Frontera Sur”—or Southern Border Program. Meyer states, “In part, this was due to U.S. pressure, but it was also due to the Peña Nieto administration’s own recognition that the fact that there were too many families migrating through Mexico without anybody stopping them was hurting Mexico from a publicity standpoint, damaging its relationship with the U.S. As a result, the Peña Nieto administration decided to crack down in order to please the United States.” The Programa, according to Meyer, was marketed as a way to create more orderly migration and respect migrant rights. In practice, however, it only sent more immigration agents to southern Mexico, increasing the number of security checkpoints throughout the country. As a result of the Programa, the number of Mexican apprehensions of Central Americans skyrocketed, making migrants more vulnerable.

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2014’s Programa Frontera Sur and the 2019 deployment of the Mexican National Guard were effective methods of keeping Central Americans from migrating. “There’s a general lack of resources to fully control a border that has been porous with lots of dense networks that have been crossed over time. The border itself has always remained relatively easy to cross—it’s more that the highway checkpoints have intensified—but that does not necessarily deter people. It does, however, place migrants at risk of a variety of crimes such as extortion, robbery, and sexual assault.” Professor Galemba claimed security checkpoints produce a whack-a-mole effect, in which migrants “find more remote avenues to attempt to circumvent [the checkpoints], which may be in riskier locations in terms of susceptibility to crime or treacherous terrain.” Deterrence has actually led to an increase of apprehensions of Central American migrants—by 76 percent between January and July 2019, according to WOLA’s Ms. Meyer— and no significant decrease of these migrants entering Mexico. Professor Galemba cites Stephanie Leutert, Director of the Mexico Security Initiative at the University of Texas at Austin, by noting a direct correlation between enforcement and crimes against migrants, emphasizing that the deterrence policies only make migrants even more vulnerable, causing them to rely more on smugglers and forcing them into much riskier, remote routes (Leutert 2019, Galemba et al. 2019). Mr. Córdova agreed that migrants’ rights are being hurt by the increase in government enforcement at the Mexico-Guatemala border, citing migrants’ increased demand for smugglers and the subsequent increase in fees that smugglers charge their clients, making migrants both vulnerable economic opportunities and sources of income to their smugglers, bandits, and other extortionists. Like Mr. Córdova, Professor Galemba described these trends as

an economy built around extorting migrants, their vulnerability, and inability to access safe means of mobility (Galemba et al. 2019). Deterring migrants will never solve the problems that are causing them to migrate, according to Professor Galemba. Mr. Alejandro Maldonado Aguirre—who assumed the Guatemalan Presidency following the resignation of his predecessor

should change its approach to migration policy both in the long term and in the short term. In the long term, according to Mr. Solares, “the best immigration policy is to develop the local economy by creating jobs in the rural areas of Guatemala most prone to emigration.” However, he realizes that it would take years for the Guatemalan local economy to develop, and thousands of migrants are leaving the country in the meantime. Because of this, Mr. Solares advocates for a short-term policy change, which would require diplomatic effort between the U.S. and Latin American countries to “improve the conditions of Central American immigrants already contributing to the U.S. economy, eliminate the image of the immigrant as a criminal, and to highlight U.S. society’s reliance on these immigrants’ manual labor.” Like Mr. Solares, Ms. Meyer believes that much of the change related to migration needs to come from migrants’ countries of origin: “Central American governments

“..an economy built around extorting migrants, their vulnerability, and inability to access safe means of mobility.” amidst a corruption scandal—suggested that the Guatemalan government must enact strong policies to create job sources in the industrial, mining, and agricultural sectors, all three of which have been weakened by foreign competition and NGOs, which have obstructed past governmental policies regarding employment in these industries, according to Mr. Maldonado. Without adequate job sources, Mr. Maldonado argued, thousands of Guatemalans have no way to make a living and are attracted to the idea of emigrating from the country. Mr. Solares, on the other hand, is concerned about the lack of political leadership in Central America and a subsequent lack of will to discuss how to handle migration together with Mexico and the United States. Mr. Solares also notes the fact that no foreign industries—such as technology giant Google—will be attracted to the rural majority of the Guatemalan population as a source for human capital due to the lack of human development in the country. Because of this, Mr. Solares argues, Guatemala October 2018: Thousands of Central American migrants attempt to cross the Suchiate River between Guatemala and Mexico, with a Mexican federal helicopter looming overhead, attempting to ward off the migrants. IMAGE: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

should increase strength in the criminal justice system to prosecute all crimes, including corruption, address youth gang violence, create a more effective police system, among other things that need to happen in these countries to strengthen the rule of law and address widespread corruption and impunity.” With corrupt, uninterested politicians embezzling money that could help tackle poverty issues, Central American governments are unable to have the broad, regional discussions about migration with the United States and Mexico that Ms. Meyer—among other experts—believe should take place in order to come to an agreement on how many people each of these countries are able to absorb effectively while providing a safe environment for vulnerable people. However, Ms. Meyer viewed these conversations as difficult to initiate under Trump’s administration, which seeks to minimize the number of Central American immigrants in the United States. The topic of Central American immigration seems like it will loom

over North and Central American politics in the near future. “Between now and the 2020 U.S. Presidential election, Trump’s administration will push hard on the countries in this region to take on more of the U.S.’s responsibility over asylum seekers. We will continue to see a bullying attitude toward Central America, for example, in threats to cut funding to those countries. We will also keep seeing anti-immigrant rhetoric and increasing pressure to repel migrants from the U.S., and in return, lots of pressure on other countries to receive these migrants,” Ms. Meyer stated. The U.S.’s externalization of security from the U.S.-Mexico border to the Mexico-Guatemala border demonstrates the impact U.S. political and economic pressure has on shaping North and Central American diplomacy and exhibits the way borders are used as a political tool to attempt to intimidate populations in search of greater economic opportunities. “At the end of the day,” Mr. Córdova said, “people are escaping violence, poverty, and the impact of climate change. It’s only getting

more difficult to have access to a better life.” Cinthia Zavala Ramos said that while living in the U.S. as a Honduran immigrant has certainly come with many challenges, the “resources and ability to make something of yourself are so much better [than in Honduras].” Cinthia’s family members who remain in Honduras are happy to see their family members in the U.S. “thriving here,” which serves as a testament to the fact that migration is, at its core, a human endeavor—one that can’t be deterred by policies, no matter how hard governments try to politicize and dehumanize it. The approach to Central American migration should not consist entirely of extending or enforcing borders, but should also count on tackling the problems inducing migration in the first place, as difficult as those may be to address. Humanitarian problems call for humanitarian solutions. Frank Lukens is a sophomore in Ezra Stiles College studying History. He can be contacted at frank.lukens@yale.edu.

Humanitarian Crise s: The Dilemma Behind Cross-Border B Interventions

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BY SASHA THOMAS

“Yemen...is plagued by widespread violence, poverty, malnutrition and cholera, amounting to one of the world’s most severe humanitarian crises.” That’s how the International Rescue Committee starts off its blurb about the Middle-Eastern nation, before professing its lifesaving assistance and emergency aid. This is only one of the crises on their list of “Top 10 Crises the World should be Watching,” which is itself only one of the lists aggregated by humanitarian organizations around the world.

Each of these lists describes various conflicts, from Venezuelan refugees escaping to Colombia to over 1.4 million internally displaced people in Ethiopia. In other words, there is a consensus that our world is not lacking in humanitarian crises. There is not a consensus, however, on how the international humanitarian community should respond to such crises. The dilemma of humanitarian aid and intervention has been long debated by scholars and practitioners alike. Crossing borders to intervene

MSF Health Worker Examining Child for Malnutrition in Ethiopia

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IMAGE: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

in political situations and conflicts is a consequential act. From past experiences in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Libya, Western intervention undoubtedly has underlying political motives that can exacerbate conflicts. With this in mind, NGOs and other humanitarian organizations are often seen as a better solution. They typically claim neutrality in their attempts to provide civilians with protection from genocides, wars, and other disasters. This allows them to seemingly cross boundaries without bringing overt state motivations. However, this neutrality does not answer the question of how to address and resolve a humanitarian crisis. In an article for Foreign Policy, Jason Cone, the Executive Director for Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders in the U.S., neatly sums up the moral quagmire in a few words: “This is the humanitarian’s dilemma: How to alleviate the suffering of a population while not enabling the powers at the root of the pain.” There has already been progress towards this alleviation of suffering. NGOs around the world provide medical care, food and supplies, and short-term infrastructure. The UN sends peacekeeping forces to protect civilians, observe events, and broker peace. And from those interventions, we hear powerful stories. Cone describes a moment with a psychologist working for MSF where he was able to counsel a mother to “talk about her fears without breaking down.” NGOs also provide aid when states refuse or cannot support citizens. In one scenario, human rights journalist Peter Gourevitch narrates a tale in The New Yorker about how only NGO responses provided med-

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33 Distribution of Water to Children in Sana’a, Yemen the dilemma, illuminating that even before thinking of regime change or government modifications, NGOs and humanitarian organizations need access to people in need. Karunakara agrees that organizations such as Doctors Without Borders are expressions of civil society, a form of solidarity between people going through periods of crisis. Their main purpose, or loyalty, is to the people and not the governments. Yet, he emphasizes that it “does not mean that you can roll into a country and ignore government.” According to Louisa Lombard, a Yale professor of sociocultural anthropology, while “interventions take a lot of authority and sovereignty away from these host countries, on the other hand, they are totally beholden to those host countries’ good will in allowing

them to even stay there.” Lombard gave The Yale Globalist an example, mentioning that in Darfur, the government did not want peacekeeping missions to come in to the city. It kept denying visas and prohibiting peacekeepers from taking action and gathering information. Karunakara supported this point, offering the example of Syria, where the government led by Bashar al-Assad had been very clear that Doctors Without Borders was not welcome. In these cases, NGOs and UN peacekeeping forces had no choice but to abide by governmental decisions in order to even enter the country and provide aid. As their primary purposes were to focus on the afflicted citizens, they had to do whatever possible to reach them. In an interview with The Yale Globalist, Mr. B. Elias Shoniyin, the

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IMAGE: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

ical supplies and food during the siege in Biafra in 1968. Without government help, humanitarian groups organized an airlift over several nights because Biafra was otherwise inaccessible and under constant fire from Nigerian forces. Yet, centering back on our dilemma, David Rieff, another journalist specializing on humanitarian issues, wrote in the New York Times Magazine that “in the end these interventions have to be about regime change if they are to have any chance of accomplishing their stated goal.” He asks the question that plays in everyone’s minds: “How can the people of Darfur ever be safe as long as the same regime that sanctioned their slaughter rules unrepentant in Khartoum?” Does the work of humanitarian forces become futile without structural change? Dr. Unni Karunakara, the former International President of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) or Doctors Without Borders, also attempted to break down this dilemma. He started by telling the The Yale Globalist that the “delivery of humanitarian assistance is a balancing act between being principled and being pragmatic.” He said that first and foremost, aid is about the people in need. “The very first principle is that of humanity, the core belief that all people have the right to live a life of respect and dignity,’’ Karunakara emphasized, and continued on to say that it is difficult to make subjective decisions when delivering aid, as the very act of Doctors Without Borders deciding to provide assistance in a particular location is in itself a political act. At any point, stepping over borders and partaking in actions with or against a state is inherently political. The difficult part, as we have seen, is to decide whether to “call states out on practices that lead to structural inequality or structural injustice” or to use neutrality to “gain access to these populations living in remote parts of the world, where [states] might provide you with the security you might need to provide assistance,” says Karunakara. This perspective brings a new light to

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of how their people live and what they need. Karunakara agrees, adding that while NGOs have to mark independence by forming their own assessments and analysis, a response to the crisis “doesn’t happen in isolation...this can be collective effort.” It still brings us back to the

outside, often Western countries and organizations, can lead to saviorism and ulterior motives of global governance, even bringing to mind historical issues of colonialism. In other words, advocating for regime change requires prolonged knowledge and lived experience in societies. It is not reasonable to simply rush into a country and advocate for political upheaval from the get-go. Lombard suggests that using more local organizations and people such as peacekeeping troops from neighboring states may help with politics because they care about their communities. Shoniyin adds that in the scenario of Liberia’s crisis, it was in ECOWAS’ own interests to insure peace in the region so that other states such as Sierra Leone and Guinea were not heavily affected. He echoes Lombard and Karunakara’s statements by agreeing that it is better to use local resources, “[Regional organizations] have similar characteristics, they’ve probably got similar politics, in many ways. And it gives some form of legitimacy. They have a stake to ensure peace within the region.” Crossing borders for international interventions can help to a certain point, but regime change and development of better societies, according to the three experts, needs to take place according to the agency of populations within a state. Karunakara ends the conversation by asserting that what humanitarians can do, if anything, is work with affected citizens to restore their capacity for choices.

Deliver y of humanitarian assistance is a balancing act between being principled and being pragmatic. dilemma: how do we advocate for state or regime change if the government itself is the one inflicting abuses on a certain population? What do we do about institutional transformations? Lombard negates that the UN is the sole leader, saying that because “it is a diplomatic organization,” it is constrained and “bound to the power dynamics that exist.” Countries such as the United States and China that provide more money to support UN causes have a larger say in UN decisions, which might make regime changes a political playground for superpowers. Karunakara also says that “it’s not the job of humanitarian organizations to bring about change, their job is to help people survive.” He instead suggests that institutional change falls more on the development side, but states that development cannot be imposed from outside state borders. Karunakara argues that the citizens themselves have to engage with their government and their leaders to develop a society based on their personal visions. In his opinion, “the political vision of how society should be constructed...is a very local conversation, not something you can fly in from Washington or Brussels.” He goes on to cite the examples of Iraq and Libya where we’ve seen negative, unintended consequences because they were attacked or invaded in the name of freedom and democracy. Placing the power of regime change on the hands of

Sasha Thomas is a sophomore in Ezra Stiles College. She can be contacted at sasha.thomas@yale.edu.

Ghanaian UN Peacekeeper in Liberia

IMAGE: UN PHOTO

former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in Liberia, offered another perspective on the importance of working with government. “I would think that in recent times, in recent history, Liberia saw the largest deployment of NGOs in a conflict... than in any other country in Africa.” Shoniyin is talking about the series of civil conflicts that took place in Liberia. The first was centered around a coup d’état of a Liberian president led by sergeant Samuel Doe that represented tensions between ethnic African groups and African-American immigrants. The second war resulted in another shift in government from Samuel Doe to Charles Taylor. Both conflicts saw much international intervention, both by multinational organizations such as Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and by NGOs and humanitarian groups. He said, “There was so much money announced internationally to Liberia, but on the ground, Liberians were complaining they were not feeling the impact of those resources.” This prompts the question of whether the presence of NGOs or multinational organizations are actually automatic resources of help and benefits to citizens. Shoniyin described the hundreds of millions of dollars poured into Liberia to intervene in particular sectors, yet concrete improvements were not apparent. In this situation, he suggested that engaging with NGOs and advocating for his people’s needs was what actually made NGO support effective. Shoniyin understands that in fragile states, “there are a lot of questions around accountability and transparency, so many [donors] don’t want to give money directly to the government.” Thus, they channel money through NGOs and humanitarian groups. But ideally, especially when building states up from conflicts, government should have a say. They can have an understanding