The Yale Globalist: Haze

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MAURICE R. GREENBERG WORLD FELLOWS INTERVIEW SERIES

PUBLISHED AT GLOBALIST.YALE.EDU

Dear Globalist Readers,

The Fall of 2022 began with undergraduates descending on New Haven in droves, once more. But even from the very beginning, the future was hazy. Would our new set of classes delight and disappoint? Would inflation stay high or come down? What would happen in the midterm elections? Recognizing this obscure future, the GLO community chose the theme HAZE, a theme under which it could investigate and hopefully reduce the haziness of our time.

HAZE asks what aspects of the world are hard to understand at first glance, and maybe even hard to understand at second glance, but which we can begin to understand clearly with a concerted look. Our writers took on this challenge with vigor and have put together work that should make our world look a little more clear.

Ariel Kirman breaks down one of the most significant conflicts of our time, that happening in Ukraine and reflects on Russia in the light of its history. Ted Shepherd interviews Professor Harold Hongju Koh and clarifies the role of international law in the conflict, the power it has, and what needs to happen for it to be as effective as possible.

Camila Young also interviews an expert, in this case her aunt who speaks about Hurricane Fiona, the latest hurricane to hit and devastate Puerto Rico, and what that means for the complex political system there. Finally, in a most timely piece, Lekha Sunder uncovers the story behind the sports stories of the 2022 FIFA World Cup, and the connections between the sports and political match-ups to be had. We extend gratitude towards our writers, our editors, and the entire team at the Globalist for pouring themselves into this issue of the Globalist. We also extend our gratitude to you, the reader, and hope you enjoy reading this issue as much as we enjoyed producing it.

Warm wishes, Amre and Victory

Maurice R. Greenberg World Fellows at Yale University from Yale Jackson School of Global Affairs website

A Political Hurricane:

Puerto Rico's Storm Response Amid Bureaucratic Blight

by Camila Young

Rincon, Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria in 2017 by Getty Images

As sheets of rain pummeled the windows and the winds whistled through the cracks in the door, I toasted a bagel on a candle: my makeshift toaster.

My little brother was sneaking out the door to run in the wind, while my dad was taking a video of his idiocracy. When a palm frond almost collapsed on his head, I heard a yelp and a loud slam as he was ushered back inside. The candle blew out, and I was left in the dark with a half warmed bagel. The Hurricane Irma impact in Miami was my first real hurricane, during which I had to evacuate home and stay with friends who lived inland. Our diet consisted mostly of sandwiches and oranges that week, since making them didn't require any electric power. When my family arrived back home, the streets were flooded enough to canoe down. Power cables littered the grounds, electrifying the flooded streets, and trees obstructed the way. The waters receded after a few days, leaving crabs scurrying around. Catching them made for a lively pastime for my brother and I. Fortunately, our power returned within the month, and the shingles of our roof were repaired along with the traffic lights down the street. We were lucky.

My family in Puerto Rico had a very different story. Category 5 hurricane Maria whipped out the island's infrastructure. Trees obstructed the streets you’d have to walk to get to the pharmacy for your medications, so my grandma called my uncle to make the walk for her. Flash flooding and landslide alerts rang through the phones of my grandparents. Their power was gone for months, and it took up to 11 months to get it back for some residents. Having to rely on expensive gas-powered generators meant a huge economic burden to the island. Beyond that, fear shook the community as collapsed safety systems meant theft was becoming more common.

The worst part is the excessive delay in repairs. Even four years later, my aunt tells me she can expect the power to go out once a week in her home since the power systems weren’t replaced properly. When I visited my grandparents seven months after the storm, some traffic lights were not fixed yet and fallen trees still sprawled along the sides of the streets. Shops were closed since they couldn’t afford the renovations. Recreational activities were stalled.

The island was left in a depression, and with

the trailing COVID outbreak, it seemed as if Puerto Rico couldn’t get a break. This year, alerts of another hurricane rang through the islander’s phones: Hurricane Fiona. Although a much weaker storm, given the botched recovery from the last storm, I wondered how the islanders were reacting to it. Politically and economically questionable transitions, like the privatization of the power grid and corruption in office, left the island particularly vulnerable.

storm than the civilians were. After both Hurricane Maria and the COVID pandemic, businesses lost many workers and thus incurred many expenses. The economy is suffering, so it is hard for them to take on another disaster.

But in general, Fiona was nothing like Maria, since Maria had shut down the whole island. Fiona was more a reminder of the political and economic decline we are in.

Remember, we have seen many events in a very short amount of time: Maria, the 6.4

I spoke to my aunt, Lili Lopez, to gain a greater insight on what the reaction to Fiona was like for residents. She lives close to the capitol, San Juan, and has grown up in Puerto Rico.

*Some answers were edited for clarity*

Do you feel like people were more frantic for hurricane Fiona because of what happened with Maria?

Considering how devastating Maria was, people were very prepared for Hurricane Fiona. They knew what to expect, and were able to collect the supplies needed very quickly. It brought back flashbacks of the difficult time.

I remember watching a meteorologist give a report to Puerto Rico about Fiona when it was first thought to make landfall, and she was explicit in telling people to remain calm since this storm was not as strong as Fiona. Do you think there was a sense of dread in the community?

Keep in mind, I didn’t have power for 3-4 months after Hurricane Maria. Now, Hurricane Fiona was not that bad, and only hit a few areas in the island. Regardless, it took out our power because we never truly recovered from Maria for political reasons. Our energy system is practically obsolete, and the problem hasn’t been updated for 40 years, so the community feels any small shock very intensely.

When it comes to those impacted, businesses were more concerned about the

magnitude earthquake, COVID. This really impacted people’s pockets and social life. Nevertheless, in response, we are very social people, so we tried everything we could to help each other out.

Do you think people are mad at the political situation which allowed these consequences to get this exasperated?

Oh yes, all of our energy service bills are going up, and we are experiencing rapid inflation. The people are frustrated with the government. There is a lot of depression in the island because of how difficult it is to respond to these economic lows. Yes, we are afraid. Yes, we are mad. Many people have to take on multiple jobs to keep up, and it’s tough.

What do you think was the hardest environmental concern to deal with for this storm?

Fiona brought a lot of water through storm surges, and in contrast Maria came with many winds. So different parts of the island were affected this time, especially low lying houses.

Have you noticed any other social phenomenon as a result of these storms?

At the time of the earthquakes prior to Maria, there was a sentiment of fear. Many landslides followed the shocks, and the tremors lasted for several weeks, so we never truly knew when we were safe. You can imagine how the towns became ghost

“Fiona was more a reminder of the political and economic decline we are in.”

towns. Since there were so many extra repair expenses, people avoided many social activities, and this is very out of place for a Puerto Rican culture where we love to gather.

Then, when Maria and the COVID pandemic arrived, it was a time of survival. We had hit rock bottom, and regardless of social class everyone felt the stagnation of the community. The government disproportionately

I was in middle school at this time, so I can only really describe what the social life was like for a young girl. There was definitely isolation, in the sense that you couldn’t see your friends. In this way you were forced to spend time with people who were close in proximity to you, like your neighbors. Right after Maria was when I actually met my neighbors. There was a lot of immediate

cause my power didn’t come back until the end of December (Maria hit in September).

In contrast to Maria, what was your family’s reaction to Fiona?

helped civilians, and those in the working class were hit very hard. This was when we went into an economic depression, and in response, we reactivated our social activities because we had to find a way to enliven our mental health as a community. We are a country which understands the importance of community building for mental health.

Now for Fiona, it didn’t come with the same force as hurricane Maria, but as I mentioned before, for political reasons it shut down the whole island for 3 weeks. Obviously, social outings decreased because of the expenses, but we still tried to keep our community alive in the ways we could. Because we tried to keep up this happiness, we were able to be resilient.

Do you feel like safety was a concern after Fiona considering how theft was a problem after Maria?

People felt the same as they did before the storm, safety wasn’t a big concern. The true problem was economic because of government decisions.

Mrs. Lopez felt the burden of the storm as a working citizen, but I wondered how this climactic time affected the younger generation. I asked my friend, Ingrid Rodriguez Vila, to share her experience as a student in these storms. Ingrid is a Yale student in Branford who grew up in Puerto Rico.

*Some answers were edited for clarity*

What was social life like after hurricane Maria?

community bonding because everyone was going through the same thing, but there was also distancing from traditional friendships. Telecommunications were down, so you couldn’t text people. I remember how there was a time when we had to get on the roof of our house and hold the phone out at a certain spot to get a signal.

How did you go to school, considering the circumstances?

When it was that bad, we didn’t go to school. When we did come back, my school

The impact was definitely less, based on what I heard from my family. It was only category one. The problem in Puerto Rico though is that just a category one storm knocks out the infrastructure because of how weak it is. The biggest problem they had with Fiona was power, which was the same problem with Maria, but now there is an added layer. There was a privatization of the Puerto Rican power grid, where the formerly government run power grid was sold to a Canadian company called Luma. It was a very controversial decision because this company is not really qualified to run a power grid in Puerto Rico. Since March of this year, the power has been unreliable, and there would be power outages when nothing even happened. So with Fiona, it exasperated the unreliable power situation.

I was under the impression that this was a political problem, I hadn’t realized it was a private issue as well.

Well the governed was the one who sold the power grid, so I guess it is a political issue as well.

didn't have a large generator, just a lot of small generators, so the power fluctuated.

On the first day it flooded, which was kind of funny. The roof of the cafeteria was made of zinc, so it flew off. We got an interior patio, which was very nice. They didn’t replace the roof until my senior year, which is also funny.

School was difficult because our books were digital, and we didn’t have access to signals. A lot of the time, we used handouts. When it came to studying, I have a strong memory of using a lantern in the dark, be -

With the context of there being a revolt against the corrupt governor in the Ricky Renuncia movement, and then on top of that, this controversial privatization decision?

I speak for people that are my age, a lot of people are disillusioned. There is a lot of resignation, among youth. As soon as you start looking into the current system, it’s hard to see a way out of it. All the candidates are the same, and there is a lot of corruption. But

"The biggest problem they had with Fiona was power, which was the same problem with Maria, but now there is an added layer..."

Do you feel like Puertoricans are skeptical of their governing bodies?

“Then, when Maria and the COVID pandemic arrived, it was a time of survival. We hit rock bottom...”

there is a new I put ice to change the two party political structure. The last election was the last time when an independent party got an unprecedented amount of votes. Now there is talks of joining forces of the small parties to get out of the two-party choke hold, but the parties do have a lot of differences and drama. It’s a very Puerto Rican thing, where there is petty drama everywhere, even in politics. I guess that’s the same everywhere, but it’s emphasized here because the island is so small and everyone knows each other through some connection.

Do you feel like our generation is more open to diverging from the two party system?

Totally. These independent parties

have gotten this surge because of young voter demographics. There is a very entrenched family partisanship in Puerto Rico, where there is generational party affiliation. If your dad voted for Penepe you’ll vote for him too. But this generation now has been faced with so much, like Ricky Renuncia, and we have seen how fundamentally flawed the political system is. We are more willing to gamble on new ideas and parties we haven’t seen before because it is clear these other parties haven’t worked. At least I am hopeful this is what our generation will come to share a sentiment in.

A lot of the political themes Ingrid described can also be said to some degree for politics in the continental United States. As a society, we need to start prior-

itizing innovation, and having faith in the unknown isn’t always a bad thing.

As for the hurricane accounts, it really opens our eyes to how human condition and climate change has intensified the danger of natural disasters.

With warming seas, we can expect tropical storms to increase in magnitude.

With burning politics, we can expect compromise to fall to ash.

Now, we are left at a point where choices need to be made, and hopefully we can start moving towards a more sustainable future.

Camila Young is a first-year in Ezra Stiles College and can be reached at camila. young@yale.edu.

Satellite image of Hurricane Maria from AP Images

Politics is the Goalpost

The Geopolitics and Diplomacy of International Soccer

by Lekha Sunder

President of FIFA Gianni Infantino and Qatar's Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani in 2021

With the kickoff to the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar came an inflammatory gesture from the Iranian national team, who refused to sing the country’s national anthem just before its match against the United Kingdom on Monday, November 21st.

The gesture far outshone the results of the match—a resounding 6-2 defeat against the UK—and many political commentators and Iranian citizens praised the team for finally supporting recent protests against the regime. Iranian state TV cut its coverage of the anthem, quickly switching to pre-filmed footage of the stadium. Fans in the stands joined the team in its political stance, holding up signs that said “Woman, Life, Freedom.”

Monday’s demonstrations are hardly unusual for the World Cup, an event that many people assume is politically agnostic. In fact, the World Cup (and the institution of international soccer in general) has long been used by state actors and civilians as a vehicle for political

If We Build it, They Will Come Soccer diplomacy begins well before the match—it starts with the stadiums. Stadium diplomacy (you may notice a pattern here) is a form of cultural diplomacy where nations build stadiums or sports facilities in order to exert soft power and establish regional relevance. These stadiums are financed typically as gifts, paid through low-interest concessional loans (loan agreements that favor the receiving country) and often involve labor partnerships or resource contingencies. Donor countries have included India (who financed the Providence Stadium in Guyana in 2006) and the United States (who funded the Phoenix Stadium in Haiti post-2010 earthquake), but the overwhelming majority of stadiums have been funded by China.

Since 1970, China has financed 42 stadium projects, with total construction costs estimated at $1.9 billion. Its first investment was in the development of the National Sports Stadium in Mongolia.

Latin American and Caribbean countries. Not only did these strengthen bilateral relations, but they often served as “dressing to more controversial announcements,” focusing attention on unity rather than division.

These nations were drawn to China’s offerings because the country could construct stadiums at comparatively low cost and local politicians could tout the development as proof of their success and accomplishments in office—they inaugurate the stadiums with “great fanfare,” integrate them into their national identity, and use the venues to hold political conferences.

For China, this diplomatic tool was relatively painless to use. As August Rick of Forbes notes, “gifts [can] be tricky in politics. Infrastructure investment requires research, new schools can favor certain politicians….By comparison, sporting facilities are simple, high-visibility contributions.”

China, of course, was rewarded with access to political leaders, expanding the nation’s sphere of influence. For example, Latin American countries began relying less on the United States, despite the nation being closer in geographic proximity. Moreover, China leveraged the investment to tap into resources. In 1989, China built a football stadium for Guinea-Bissau in return for China’s ability to explore the nation’s sea and forest.

expression, soft power, and diplomacy. “Soccer Diplomacy”—a term coined by De Montfort University Professor Heather Dichter—has been a political tool in nearly every arena, from constructing stadiums to creating national teams to hosting the World Cup.

And given the current geopolitical climate—marked by the war in Ukraine, tensions between Israel and the Middle East, and, of course, Iranian revolts—this year’s World Cup will be watched with anticipation by not only avid soccer fans, but world leaders as well.

China’s stadium diplomacy has been focused in Latin America and Africa, two regions of strategic importance for the People’s Republic due to potential resource acquisition. During the 1970s and 1990s, China “devised a niche” on the African mainland through stadiums, which “signified a symbol of Sino-African associations in the harmonious times of third world non-alignment,” according to Preethi Amaresh from the Geneva School of Diplomacy. In the mid-2000s until around 2013, soccer stadiums were often gifts to

Most recently, stadium diplomacy has been a central pillar of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the global infrastructure development strategy adopted by the Chinese government in 2013—namely through its often under-discussed people-to-people element (P2P). P2P is China’s effort to build social and cultural “networks” with foreign nations in an effort to increase connection and rapport. China sees soccer as a prime way to connect with other nations.

China has never been a power player in international soccer, but the

Soccer diplomacy begins well before the match–it starts with the stadiums. Stadium diplomacy is a form of cultural diplomacy...

nation is hoping to change this, both to boost national pride and to bridge cultural divides with the rest of the world. As a part of its vision for the coming three decades, the country has pledged to win the Football World Cup by 2050. And they are “spending big” to make this happen: in 2016, Chinese clubs spent over $450 million on international players, the majority of which were Latin Americans. By investing in its own national soccer team, China aims to expand its network with other nations. World Cups can become stages for negotiations.

BRI’s expansion of stadium diplomacy has shined light on the way the tactic harms and preys on developing nations. Amaresh furthers that through BRI, “China is attracting underdeveloped nations into unsustainable debts…that allow China to take these assets when receivers encounter [a] debt crisis.”

Moreover, reports of human

rights abuses—from wage theft to physical harassment—by Chinese companies constructing BRI projects and contracting domestic labor have raised alarm bells from international NGOs.

These stadiums temporarily stimulate the economy, but prevent investment in more immediately vital areas, such as health care, education, and water access. The pandemic exacerbated tensions and hostility towards these seemingly unnecessary gifts. Photos circulated on social media of stadiums overgrown and in disarray, leading to protests across Africa.

“People see that there's no such thing as a free gift," says researcher Itamar Dubinsky of Oregon State University in the United States.

Post-construction, the maintenance costs have been dumped onto recipient countries, breeding issues for under-resourced and corrupt local governments to handle. The Sli -

goville stadium in Jamaica was left in ruins just years after the Chinese left. China left Costa Rica’s The Monster’s Cave—a $100 million stadium—with no funding for maintenance. Oftentimes, post-construction maintenance is contingent on the recipient nation’s unequivocal support of China: China’s gift of a stadium in St. Lucia was abandoned after the nation’s recognition of Taiwan. Many stadiums report faulty sewage systems and eroding infrastructure.

Needless to say, China’s stadium diplomacy is facing an overdue yellow card.

Unfriendly Rivalries

Once the stadium is built, however, the politics are only magnified. Indeed, while sports may seem like passive hobbies at best and indulgent passions at worst, international soccer has become a proxy for geopolitical feuds, heightening the stakes of simple matches to often

Croatia's national soccer team in a match against Brazil at the FIFA World Cup 2014.

violent degrees. Benign acts such as holding up a poster have made national headlines, largely because they breach the understanding that soccer is a political safe-space, where players leave stances outside the stadium. They also metaphorize the match—victory transcends the field.

At the 2012 Olympics during a match against Japan, South Korean midfielder Park Jong-Woo held up a flag that read “Dokdo is our territory,” in reference to contentious islets that

inating the national team from the Qatar World Cup.

In 1969, a series of three qualifying matches between El Salvador and Honduras—two nations in bitter conflict due to land disputes and immigration—catalyzed violence in an event known as “Soccer War” or “The Hundred Hour War.” Violent riots were reported right before and during the matches—1,700 Mexican police attended the final match to prevent outbursts. 18-year-old Salva -

opportunity for many Croatian fans to vent their frustrations against the team that represented Belgrade,” a dispute that was “partly nationalism, partly sporting fervour,” says Zakariyya Ali of Varsity UK.

The Bad Blue Boys began throwing stones, causing the Delije to tear up the stadium, corner Croatian Dinamo fans, and chant Serbian nationalist slogans. One Delije member was Zeljko Raznatovic, who went on to lead the paramilitary group “the Tigers,” which killed roughly 3,000 people over the course of the Yugoslav wars. The event would ultimately come to “symbolise the beginning of Croatian resistance against Serbia,” Ali continues. To this day, there is a dedication in the Dinamo’s stadium which reads: “to the supporters who began the war with Serbia in this ground on May 13, 1990”.

Japan has also claimed in a centuries-old dispute. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) and FIFA accused Park of displaying a politically-charged sign, a violation of organization rules against players demonstrating political leanings. Park was banned from medal ceremonies and initially denied his medal.

More recently, in the 2020 Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) championship—which was co-hosted by Russia—Ukrainian players showed up with a map of their country printed on the front of their jerseys. The map, according to Grace Wyner of Georgia Tech’s School of International Affairs, included Crimea, a territory Russia annexed in 2014. The jerseys sparked outrage amongst Russian senior officials, including parliamentary deputy Dmitry Svishchev who called the jersey “a political provocation” and “illegal.”

On February 29th of this year, FIFA indefinitely suspended all Russian teams from its competitions, elim -

dorean Amelia Bolaños shot herself in the heart with her father’s pistol after watching Honduras win in the first game. She was declared a martyr by the Salvadoran government and her funeral was televised.

Yet arguably the most contentious “World Cup Proxy War” arose in the May 1990 match between Serbia's Red Star Belgrade and Croatia’s Dinamo Zagreb, in a riot seen as the cause for the wars in Yugoslavia.

The “Dinamo-Red Star riot” took place at Maksimir Stadium in Zagreb, Croatia (then part of Yugoslavia) between the Bad Blue Boys—supporters of Dinamo Zagreb—and the Delije—supporters of Red Star Belgrade, derived from the Serbian word for brave. The clash took place just weeks after Croatia’s election of pro-Croatian independence candidate Franjo Tudjman and increased fear-mongering about the potential for a Croatian genocide. Thus, the football match served as the “ideal

Soccer has an unusual ability to rile up existing geopolitical tensions, because matches like the World Cup are seen as a friendlier form of interstate rivalry and posturing. The idea of a “national team” lends itself to, you guessed it, nationalism—international soccer is associated with national pride, strict allegiances, and a firm sense of identity. This is especially true for countries in Europe or Latin America, where their prowess in soccer has been a notable characteristic of their identity for decades. It, thus, becomes less surprising why emotions become so easily tangled with 90 minute matches.

Sportswashing

Here comes another term: “sportswashing.” Sportwashing was coined by Amnesty International and refers to the usage of sports as a tool of soft power and reputation-building, typically by drawing attention away from human rights abuses, corruption and other domestic issues. Sportswashing, in theory, can be an effective national strategy— particularly if it comes in the form of hosting international events—as they garner enough media attention to effectively drown out other stories. The last World Cup, hosted by Russia

Soccer has an unusual ability to rile up existing geopolitical tensions because matches like the World Cup are seen as a friendlier form of interstate rivalry and posturing.

(who could certainly use sportswashing), attracted 3.5 billion viewers.

Qatar hosting the World Cup has been labeled sportswashing by many, a consummation of its decades-long efforts to rebrand and elevate the nation's image through sport. Like other Gulf states, Qatar has sought to improve its FIFA ranking by sponsoring and directly investing in more leagues. It has also participated in sports migration, the signing of foreign athletes (on the condition of citizenship) to local leagues or national teams for international events. Qatar has invested in an ambitious scouting program for young athletes, the “Aspire Academy,” and has emerged as a “leading destination” for sports clubs preparing for international competitions or training camps. To guarantee that its efforts haven’t gone unnoticed , Qatar has expanded the reach of broadcasting networks such as Doha-based beIN to markets in Europe, North America, and Asia.

As Giorgio Cafiero and Kristian Alexander of the Middle East Institute note, Qatar’s sports engagement promotes three themes intended to rewrite the nation’s old narrative. The first goal is to improve ‘health and well-being,’ intended to reorient a country whose “overweight and obese” rate is nearly double the global average at 70 percent. The second is ‘modernization and progress,’ which will confront negative stereotypes about technological backwardness in Gulf States. Lastly is ‘prestige or attractiveness’ to boost its tourism sector and diversify an economy that has—for too long—been reliant on oil and gas.

International soccer may seem like a bizarre and ineffective means to achieve a “national overhaul,” of a sort, but for Qatar—a nation with limited hard power and little international muscle—sports diplomacy can dramatically level the playing

field. You see, on the soccer field, Davids and Goliaths are equals. The United States plays Wales, Cameroon plays Brazil. The formation of a skilled national soccer team can attract more attention to Qatar than a free trade agreement or press conference could.

However, as Cafiero and Alexander caution, sportswashing can also backfire with “soft disempowerment,” the loss of influence and reputational damage that amounts when the spotlight shines light on nefarious actions of the state. For Qatar, soft disempowerment is already occurring.

Since the ground broke on Qatar’s eight new World Cup football stadiums, human rights organizations and NGOs have criticized Qatar for its mistreatment of migrant construction workers. Roughly 1,200 migrant workers have died since the country began preparations for the World Cup. The cause of death was most often heat stress-related cardiovascular distress. Studies show that in the summer months in Qatar, it is only safe to work for a maximum of 15 minutes an hour between 9am and 3pm. Migrant workers in Qatar reported receiving a 30 minutes break every eight hours.

Moreover, many workers have

reported wage theft and unsafe living conditions—in 2019, a group of 1,200 workers went unpaid for several months and went weeks without running water or electricity. Much of the abuse towards Qatar’s migrant workers—who make up 95% of the nation’s labor force— stems from the Kafala system, a sponsorship-based employment system which legally binds foreign workers to their employers, limiting their ability to change jobs, advocate for better pay, or even leave the country.

While Qatar has passed legislation to reform the Kafala system and reinforce labor standards, World Cup contractors seemed especially resistant to new reforms—a significant majority of contractors still abused workers post-reform.

Qatar has faced soft disempowerment before, when it hosted the IAAF World Athletic Championships in 2019. Stadiums were empty even though tickets were handed out for free, demonstrating the country’s incompetence with marketing and logistics. Events were held late at night and in high humidity, jeopardizing player’s health and leading to protests from athletes. In short, sportswashing is proving more harm than good for Qatar—the corruption and dysfunction it is trying to

International soccer may seem like a bizarre and ineffective means to achieve a "national overhaul," of a sort, but for Qatar–a nation with limited hard power and little international muscle–sports diplomacy can dramatically level the playing field.

conceal is too large to hide. And while experts worry that journalists will let these issues flow back with the tide of the news cycle, it is imperative that this labor abuse and corruption doesn’t go forgotten once the games end.

Between Games, After Games

As players cool off between matches, discussions heat up amongst world leaders at the World Cup. Antony Blinken plans on holding crucial diplomatic talks with Qatar, one of America’s most trusted interlocutors with Iran.

Israeli officials are working with Qatar to ensure the 10,000 Israeli tourists at the World Cup will be safe in a country where their state isn’t recognized. Behind every match is a meeting.

A gathering of 32 states—each with ideologies, agendas, and issues of their own—cannot be disentangled from geopolitics. Rather than an oasis from alliance and opposition, the World Cup is a pillar of nationalism and power struggles— from the first brick of a stadium to the cheers at the match’s end.

Lekha Sunder is a senior in Silliman College and can be reached at lekha.sunder@yale.edu.

Migrant workers in Qatar from Wikimedia Commons

The Legal Front of the Russo-Ukranian War:

An Interview with Harold Hongju Koh

by Ted Shepherd

Harold Hongju Koh is Sterling Professor of International Law at Yale Law School and one of the leading experts on international law and national security law. He served as the Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State during the Obama Administration, earning the Secretary of State's Distinguished Service Award for his service. Professor Koh served as the Dean of Yale Law School from 20042009. In addition to being a prolific and renowned scholar, he regularly testifies before Congress and litigates international law cases in both U.S. and international tribunals. He has received more than 30 awards for his human rights work, including two lifetime achievement awards in international law.

and whether this violates an international convention for the suppression of financing of terrorism. The other half of that case is about racial discrimination against indigenous Crimeans and Ukrainians in Crimea based on the Russian occupation. We’ve been working on this case for years and it’s gone to the merits. We’re waiting to have a hearing on it, and we’ve submitted all the documents. But while we were working on this case at the end of 2021, we asked our client, the Ukrainian Government, “What would you do if Putin invaded you?” They said, “We’d probably like to file another lawsuit. Do you have a theory for what we could do?” We said “Yes, if he continues to say that the

gal?” He responded, “Well, yes, that has a lot to do with it.” We got a very early declaration of illegality, and now the question is how to use it to weaken the Russian position and isolate them and hopefully, combined with the military efforts, get to a better outcome.

Are you expecting Russia to appear in the next hearing?

Yes. The Russians didn’t appear in the hearing we had on March 9th. Their lawyers quit, because ethically they could not defend the invasion. But Russia has subsequently filed a number of pleadings which suggests they got new lawyers. We’re not sure who they are, but the papers show they’re making more sophisticated legal arguments so they’ve obviously found somebody. I assume those people will appear, along with Russian government lawyers.

Do you have any other forecasts about the future of the ICJ case? Do you think there will be Security Council implementation of the decision, for example?

In March 2022, Professor Koh argued at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on behalf of Ukraine in the country’s recently-filed case against Russia. Soon after Koh’s closing argument, the ICJ ordered the Russian Federation to immediately cease its military operations in Ukraine. Professor Koh is also involved in Ukraine’s 2017 ICJ case against Russia over the latter’s invasion of Crimea. I had the opportunity to interview Professor Koh about the ICJ cases and the implications of the Court’s recent ruling for the international legal order.

Could you give our readers a brief description of the International Court of Justice case and of your involvement in it?

There are actually two cases, both Ukraine against Russia. The first began in 2016 and it concerned terrorist activities supported by the Russians in the Eastern Ukraine region of the Donbas–

Ukrainians are committing genocide in Ukraine, which is clearly false, then we could bring a case arguing that these are false allegations of genocide against Ukraine that form the basis for Russia’s illegal use of force. This would have the advantage that we could get before the Court very quickly to get a preliminary ruling saying that any activities of the Russians in the territory of Ukraine are illegal. We ended up bringing that suit and got the ruling on March 16. As a result, everything the Russians have been doing since is illegal by order of this court. Now, some people say the court can’t enforce its own ruling. But no court can enforce its own ruling. The point is the court can say what is legal and illegal. When one person called the court’s ruling “purely symbolic,” I asked him. “Do you think what the Russians are doing is illegal?” He said, “Yes.” I said, “How do you know?” and he gave a bunch of reasons. And I asked, “Is it because the International Court of Justice ruled on March 16 that it is ille -

Well, we just got a General Assembly vote a couple days ago, 143 countries condemning the annexation of the 4 provinces as illegal, which I think bolsters our case. We’re in the zone of what’s called the “Uniting for Peace Resolution” which was used to authorize U.N. action in Korea, despite vetoes that paralyzed the Security Council. Obviously, the Russians and the Chinese were vetoing the Security Council resolution, so this is a return to an earlier time. From 1987-88 to 2010, the Russians played ball and didn’t veto everything. But then in Syria, they started vetoing everything. A lot of what international lawyers did during the Cold War was to figure out lawful ways around their veto. So, we’re back where I was at the start of my career.

I’ve read that people describe this period from 1991-2011 as this peculiar unipolar moment where the liberal order and international courts of justice had sway, but that, before that, during the Cold War, and now

"We got a very early declaration of illegality, and now the question is how to use it to weaken the Russian position and isolate them..."

today, when there is competition among the great powers, that the courts won’t be as influential. What is your take on that?

Well, law and politics have to work together. And lawyers have to figure out legal strategies that bolster the political position they’re trying to achieve. The Russians are openly defiant to the rule of law. But as I said in the argument, Putin’s short game is force. The world’s long game is law. That’s

China hasn't come out in support of Russia, as you predicted after the ruling, and has recently called for peace talks. Do you think the ICJ ruling played a part in this?

China had a different strategy which Putin upset. They wanted to use their economic power to create an alternative system to the Bretton Woods system. They wanted to create a “beltand-road” initiative and an Asian Development Bank which they fund and then

going to take longer, but the Russians need to be part of an interdependent world, and they can’t do it if they’re an outlaw. There’s a five-part strategy here: illegality, isolation, information, accountability, and diplomacy. First, declare all the actions of the Russians illegal. If they do them, it leaves them more isolated. The fact that neither the Indians nor the Chinese have openly backed Russia shows that they don’t want to be on the wrong side of the law either. And then information—use open sources to show exactly what the Russians are doing, to combat their fake news. And all of social media is working on the side of the Ukrainians right now. And then you have open dissent within Russia, especially about their draft. Hopefully this will lead them, eventually, to a position of diplomacy where they agree to a cease-fire. Where they try to figure out the future. And, within that ceasefire, we keep accountability alive. In other words, don’t let Putin bargain for his own amnesty. That’s the long-term strategy. The question is how to maintain commitment to that strategy over the long term. This legal strategy has also turned crucially on the Ukrainians not being beaten on the battlefield. Putin obviously is going to be more inclined to go into diplomacy if it’s not going well on the ground. And it’s going terribly for him on the ground right now.

use their money to buy off non-aligned countries. But they don’t want to adopt a position of open illegality. And their claim is that whatever they’re doing in Xinjiang against the Uyghurs is an internal affair. In the middle of this comes Putin. Putin went to China during the February 2022 Winter Olympics, and they clearly asked him, “Don’t invade during the Olympics.” And he didn’t, but he invaded soon after. And at the most

called up a draft. As yesterday’s New York Times reported, these men are being sent to the front with no military training, and their families are incredibly upset, as you can imagine. At some point, they have to say, “How did we get into this mess?” And the answer is Putin. Putin wasn’t satisfied with occupying Crimea. He had to do more. And, even more than that, he had to back his aggression with atrocities which make Russians war criminals. And the average Russian doesn’t want to be thought of as a war criminal. They view themselves as victims of war crimes in World War II, which is why they participated in Nuremberg. So, you can sense it’s not going the way Putin wanted. We just have to hang on and keep doing what we’re doing. Putin also “succeeded” in getting NATO extended to now include Finland and Sweden, which is an amazing accomplishment. You can understand what Putin thought. He sees Donald Trump, he sees Boris Johnson. He thinks the West is weak; they can’t get their act together to respond. He thought, if I do this, I’ve got China and India on my side, it will go fast, and it will be like Crimea all over again. But the game plan didn’t play out as he thought. And now he’s paying for his miscalculation.

recent meeting between Xi Jinping and Putin, Xi said “I don’t know what your endgame is, but it’s not working for us.” They want to be members of the World Trade Organization. So, they’re saying things that are critical of the West, but they’re not backing Putin. And he desperately needs their help. And the same with the Indians: Modi is even more direct in rebuffing Putin. So Putin’s isolated abroad, and now he’s

Does the US submitting a Declaration of Intervention in the ICJ case signify anything?

Yes, they are one of many countries that did so. The important thing is that this is not Russia against Ukraine. This is Russia against the international legal order and these interventions show that Ukraine is not by itself. It has all of these “rule of law” countries supporting it.

“And the average Russian doesn't want to be thought of as a war criminal. They view themselves as victims of war crimes in World War II."

"Putin's short game is force. The world's long game is law."

In an international system that many political theorists see as characterized by anarchy, what in your view is the role of international law and courts? Can courts be useful when there is no centralized authority capable of executing their orders, or do you reject the idea that countries exist in a state of nature towards each other?

I reject that. We’re not living under a world government, but we’re not living in anarchy either. There’s a system of rules, norms, and institutions that have been created, particularly since World War II—the UN Charter and the Bretton Woods system—that distinguish between legal and illegal activities in the global realms. So, is that as well defined as a domestic legal order?—no. But it’s not anarchy. The real question is: can that system of the rule of law rally to sustain itself when it’s under tremendous stress. That means we have to fight to save the system we’ve created because we don’t have anything better. This is what has existed as long as I’ve been alive. Is it imperfect? Unbeliev-

ably. But if it falls apart, what have we got? We’d have to start from scratch. And then you’d still have to do alliance politics to organize countries for a collective response. What would you call that? A “United Nations” (laughing). So why don’t we keep the United Nations we have, try to sustain it and improve it.

I've read many of the interviews you gave in March, immediately after the ICJ ruling, and you seemed very optimistic about the ruling and its effect on the war. Have the past six months given you any reason to think differently about the importance of the ICJ ruling?

No, not at all. A couple of things have surprised me, but they’re all positive surprises. Number one—Zelensky is an extraordinary leader. People didn’t know much about Zelensky. He’s an actor, but it turns out his talent with the media and his resolve have really held the country in good stead. Among Ukrainians, he’s extraordinarily popular. Second, the Ukrainian fighting force, with the aid of Western weapons

and support, is unbelievably effective. They’ve had victory after victory. Putin has a tremendous material advantage. He thought he was going to win by “shock and awe” in the first couple of months, and he hasn’t done so. An analogy I made early on was, “If someone gets fast-acting cancer, you don’t have that many options. You can do surgery or radiation, but the patient has to survive. And if the patient can survive, then there are all these other treatments, like chemotherapy, that can fight the cancer and put the person in remission and restore them to health.” And Ukrainians haven’t just survived; they’ve gotten the upper hand. They’ve used brilliant military techniques. For example, the Crimean resistance has done many things inside Crimea. There’s been many unexpected events like the blowing up of the Kerch Strait bridge. When the Russians left Kharkiv and went down the east coast, the Ukrainians came up behind them and seized back Kharkiv. The Russians haven’t made a lot of progress in acquiring territory, and they’ve suffered huge losses, including public relations losses, and they’re

The International Court of Justice in the Hague, March 2022 from UN Photo

tapped out. Putin increasingly looks like a man in desperation. Look at what’s happened to him. His assets are frozen outside of Russia, his children can’t travel, he can’t travel, his oligarchs are also frozen. He’s like Pinochet in Chile— isolated in his own country.

How would you respond to those who see hypocrisy in America’s involvement in this case about a country’s right to not be invaded, given, for example, our cross-border military activities in Kosovo and Iraq, neither of which were clearly authorized by the United Nations security council?

I think George W. Bush’s War in Iraq was illegal. We shouldn’t have done it and we’re paying the price for that. I think the intervention to protect and create an independent Kosovo was lawful and justified and the merits of that have been proven. But this kind of moral relativist argument can’t be used to justify what Putin is doing. Putin is engaging in a campaign of aggression and atrocity of the kind that we haven’t seen since World War II. It’s not just that they’re blatantly invading. It’s that they are killing everybody, including innocent civilians. From a distance, they fire shells indiscriminately. And up close, in places like Bucha, they just kill everybody. This is unbelievable. This from a country that signed all these treaties and that professed a commitment to human rights and the rule of law. But now, their rules of engagement are savagery and war crimes.

In your book "The Trump Administration and International Law" you explained how transnational legal process — the idea that international law is actually a set of norms that becomes internalized and, therefore, binding under domestic law — could be used as a strategy to control the Trump administration's flouting of international norms. Do you see this ICJ case as another example of transnational legal process at work? Or, do you think there is any argument that Russia’s invasion,

in 2022, of a sovereign European country, is a refutation of your theory about norm internalization?

Yes, it does illustrate transnational legal process at work. It’s not over until it’s over. I believe this invasion will not hold. They’re going to have to walk it back. And it will be proof that they failed because of violation of the law and inadequate ability to carry out their aggressive objectives by force. I think this will go down in history as Putin’s fatal error.

Do you think that this episode will make countries internalize the prohibitions on invasion and aggressive war, or will this be a turning point in which it will become more acceptable for countries to invade and engage in aggressive war? I’m thinking specifically of a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

It depends on the outcome. It’s an existential moment. The rule of law has to win. We should not lose focus or get fatigued. This is the biggest challenge to the post-war legal order since 1945. There’s now a path forward that we can see, we just have to fight for it. Nobody gets anything without fighting for it.

I’m lucky enough to be taking a class with Paul Kennedy right now, and I saw that you referenced him in the first chapter of your book “The Trump Administration and International Law.” You cited his ideas on “imperial overstretch,” referring to America. But do you think that Russia right now is overstretching its hard power, without enough soft power support, and falling into the same trap?

Oh, absolutely. What soft power does Russia have? Soft power turns on the perception that what they’re doing is legitimate. Instead, it’s viewed as a sham. Even their allies, Belarus and Iran, don’t believe it. They’ve sided with the Russians not because they believe their cause is legitimate, but because of some calculation of what sphere of influence they want to be a part of.

To return to the subject of your aforementioned book, do you think Trump's undermining of international norms and institutions precipitated Putin's willingness to defy the international world order and disregard international law by using war crimes as a tool of aggression?

Yes. He said we don’t need NATO; he wanted to withdraw. The irony is that Putin’s invasion came when Biden is president and NATO is stronger than it’s ever been. It’s expanded to include Finland and Sweden, and other countries would like to join. It’s ironic that Estonia, with 1.4 million people, is part of NATO. So if they were invaded, Article 5 of the NATO treaty would mean all NATO members would come to their aid. But Ukraine, with 44 million and much larger territory, is not part of NATO. One of the issues being debated is whether Ukraine will ever become a member. Ukraine would like to join but that could end up being decided around the bargaining table.

Since we spoke, many more European countries have joined the U.S. in submitting Declarations of Intervention to the International Court of Justice in support of Ukraine’s plea for help. The ICJ has issued provisional orders demanding that Russia ‘immediately suspend the military operations that it commenced on 24 February 2022 in the territory of Ukraine.’ The world now awaits Russia’s counter-memorandum, which is due on March 23, 2023. Then the ICJ will issue its binding final judgment. The Security Council is responsible for implementing the ICJ ruling, and Russia’s veto power will undoubtedly stop such an effort in its tracks. International experts like Koh, though, do not see this exercise in international law as futile. They think that the ICJ rulings — in conjunction with other rulings against Russia by international courts — have already been effective in gathering international consensus for the opinion that Russia’s invasion constitutes a violation of international law.

Ted Shepherd is a sophomore in Pierson College and can be reached at ted.shepherd@yale.edu.

Russian troops in Mariupol, Ukraine by Reuters.

Russian Military History of Yesterday and Today:

by Ariel Kirman

Few geopolitical conflicts feel more “current” than the most recent one between Russia and Ukraine. For months, the war has dominated news headlines, social media feeds, and dinner conversations alike. To be clear, this level of attention is absolutely merited — and perhaps even insufficient — for a war that has been rife with atrocities and human rights abuses from its imperialist inception. Yet in the search to decipher Russia’s motivations in catalyzing and perpetuating this war, perhaps it is wise to turn our attention away from the present and instead towards the past.

To better understand the conflict in Ukraine, we must analyze its similarities and differences with conflicts that came before it. Below I present a broad outline of recent Russian military history, and the ways that the Russian strategy of yesterday has influenced that of today.

World War II: 1939-1945

In the mid-20th century, the Soviet Union served as a crucial member of the Allied Powers in World War II. Though initially an ally of Germany, Russia joined forces with the United States and Britain after Germany invaded the USSR in 1941. Soviet resistance was crucial to an Allied victory – but it also took a toll on Russia. Russians suffered the loss of thousands of villages, factories, and railroads; however, perhaps the most devastating effect of the war was the human one. It is estimated that 20 to 27 million citizens of the USSR died, many of them civilians. Many millions more were critically wounded. Thus, it is no shock that for the USSR, the scars of World War II were lasting and deep. In remembrance of the many citizens they lost, Russia established traditions such as the “Day of Remembrance and Sorrow,” which takes place every year on June 22, the anniversary of the German invasion of the USSR. Still, there is a distinction to be made between remembrance of Russia’s role in the war

and glorification of it.

Indeed, the latter has proven to be Vladimir Putin’s favorite if subtle tool in justifying the current war. Specifically, Putin has painted Ukraine as a damsel in distress – a nation in need of denazification. As reasoning for the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in a February 2022 address Putin asserted that Ukrainians had been “subjected to bullying and genocide … for the last eight years. And for this we will strive for the demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine.” Similarly, Russian government officials asserted that the West’s “neglect” of Ukraine “encouraged the onset of neo-Nazism and Russophobia.” There is certainly some merit to a fear of nazification in Ukraine: for instance, the far-right Azov movement in Ukraine, which has played a role in the nation’s defense, has a history of antisemitism and neo-nazism. Yet the world can – and should – recognize the imperfections of Ukraine while simultaneously seeing Putin’s claims of nazism for the political pawn that they are.

In October, I had the privilege of sitting down with Professor Ted Wittenstein, Executive Director of International Security Studies at the Yale Jackson School of Global Affairs, who comes from a background in diplomacy and intelligence. As Wittenstein put it, “there are white nationalists on both sides of the conflict. I don’t think that this is what the war is about.

present.

Afghanistan: 1979

The Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was a highly formative event of Russian history, yet one which Putin has made fewer references to since the invasion of Ukraine. Perhaps the war in Afghanistan has played a smaller role in Putin’s rhetoric surrounding Ukraine because it fails to shed a positive light on Russia's military strategy. In spite of its relatively minor role in current public discourse, the war in Afghanistan presents valuable lessons about Russia’s military values. In fact, one key similarity between Russia’s involvement in Afghanistan and Ukraine lies in Russia’s incorrect estimations of their own military and those of their enemies.

The war is about Putin’s vision for Eastern Europe.” In other words, although Ukraine certainly struggles with antisemitism and white supremacy, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has more to do with a desire for power and “reunification” than a concern for Ukrainian minorities. Putin’s “denazification” rhetoric thus makes reference to the past in order to justify invasions of the

In the late 1970s, the USSR invaded Afghanistan in the hopes of instating a communist puppet leader. Though Moscow’s motivations for doing so were complex, central catalysts for the invasion included a fear of Afghanistan’s growing relationship with the West and a commitment to the 1968 “Brezhnev Doctrine,” which dictated that Soviets had a responsibility to uphold socialist governments across Europe. In spite of the vast resources that the USSR spent on the war in Afghanistan, its efforts proved to be largely unfruitful. The war killed 1 million civilians and an estimated 125,000 troops from both sides. How could an effort so ardently supported by Soviet ideology prove to be so harmful for the nation? Much of the answer relates to Russia’s underestimation of the Mujahideen, the rebel forces whom Russia was trying to oust. Griff Witte of The Washington Post writes that “in plotting to oust Amin, the Soviets had not counted on the fervor or resilience of Afghan rebels — known as Mujahideen — who launched a David vs. Goliath rebellion against what was then the world’s largest conventional army.”

"Yet the world can–and should–recognize the imperfections of Ukraine while simultaeously seeing Putin's claims of Nazism for the political pawn that they are."

Russia seems to underestimate Ukrainian defense in a similar manner. Instead of recognizing Ukraine’s power, Putin has repeatedly claimed that past Ukrainian military feats – including the Orange Revolution of 2004 – were products of Western intervention, not Ukrainian strength. Likewise, before invading in 2022, Putin’s rhetoric implied that Ukrainians would “be liberated” and “protected” by Russian troops, using patronizing language that implied that the Ukrainian army would not be able to defend its people. Weinstein mentioned that Putin was “hoping for a swift victory that would make this a fait accompli.” And yet, even the Russian-speaking cities like Kharkiv and Odessa, which Russia expected to surrender, proved to have a remarkably strong resistance. Russia has also underestimated the threat of civilian resistance, which has proven to be incredibly powerful – especially those in “Voznesensk who picked up hunting rifles and hurled bricks to help halt Russian soldiers along the southern coast.” As Wittenstein put it, “part of what Russia is underestimating is the willingness of Western powers to support these third parties that are not their formal alliances in order to resist Soviet Russian influence.”

Chechnya: 1994-1996

Russia’s strategic follies in the first war against Chechnya also bears a striking resemblance to those of their army today. In 1994, Russia attempted to gain control over Chechnya in the name of slavic reunification. Although Russia had superior arms and vastly more soldiers than did Chechnya, the end of the war did not bring Russian victory. After costing the lives of thousands, the war ended with a ceasefire. As in Afghanistan, Russia’s superiority in arms and personnel proved insufficient to win them the war.

One similarity between the conflicts in Chechnya and Ukraine lies in Russia’s refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the wars – throughout the Chechen War’s entirety, Russia referred to it merely as a “contra-terror operation.” Then-President Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999) made a conscious effort to brand Chechens as terrorists, not soldiers fighting for their independence. When I spoke with him, Weinstein highlighted the importance of

rhetoric for the Russian government both today and in past fights.

I would be remiss to argue that Russia’s military strategy is stagnant. Their strategy itself is certainly ever-evolving –the most advanced armies of the day are constantly assessing their past mistakes and successes. However, there are overarching themes that seem to run deeply through Russian military conquests past and present. For Putin, major problems include an underestimation of rival armies

and support, and an overestimation of his own army. Perhaps future conflicts will hold a different fate for the Russian military. But until they do, it is hard to escape the rhymes of Russian military history.

Ariel Kirman is a first-year in Trumbull College and can be reached at ariel.kirman@yale.edu.

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