Journal of International Affairs 2018 by JIA TEAM

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THE 2018 ISSUE OF THE UBC JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The Annual Publication of the International Relations Student Association The University of British Columbia Situated on the traditional, ancestral, and unceded territory of the Musqueam people

Cover Design: Katelyn Roberts Cover Photograph: Avril Espinosa-Malpica Back Cover Photograph: Melissa Lee The cover photograph entitled “Moroccan girl’s pause at the foreigners” was taken in April 2016. The photographer describes the moment as follows: The pause the young Moroccan girl gave, as she rounded the corner and was confronted by a group of tourists, is something I will never forget. Her little brother ran past us, but she just stared. At what age do we begin to notice how different we are from one another and forget we are all just human? The back cover photograph was taken in June 2017. The photographer describes the photo as follows: The photo was taken in the small Quechua-Lamista community of Alto Pucalpillo where we were invited to help prepare and enjoy a community feast together. A group of us were tasked to fetch water to bring back to the preparation area to cook and wash with. We followed a woman who led us on a beautiful hilly path to the nearby spring, carrying ceramic pots each weighing about two to three pounds. Before we filled the pots with water and clumsily carried them over our heads on the trail back, the woman showed us how to do a preparatory rinse by scooping some water in them with a coconut shell and then swishing it around. It was the purest water that I have ever seen. For the first time in front of me, I recognized the true sacredness of water to human life.

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CONTENTS Contributors Foreword Introduction Hopping on the Emergency Bandwagon Rachel Herold US Hegemony and the Internationalization of Domestic Space Law Andi Jordan Constructed Voices Jack McClelland Committed Allies, Polar Opposites Ella Champion On the Subjectivity of Universal Value Annie Lee Jurisprudential Philosophies Brett Shearing Article References Contributor Biographies Sponsors

IV VI VII 1 15 27 36 47 58 68 78 82

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CONTRIBUTORS EDITORS-IN-CHIEF Maahin Ahmed, Verna Yam

SENIOR EDITOR Jake Harms

EDITORS Phebe M. Ferrer, Sawyer Junger, Katherine Kirst, Olamide Olaniyan, Mathieu Oppermann, Johnsen Romero, Poonam Sandhu, Morgan Slessor, Angela Tien, Kitty Wang

HEAD CREATIVE Katelyn Roberts

AUTHORS Rachel Herold, Andi Jordan, Jack McClelland, Ella Champion, Annie Lee, Brett Shearing

PHOTOGRAPHY Avril Espinosa-Malpica, Melissa Lee

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FACULTY REVIEWERS Dr. David Boyd

Institute for Resources, Environment, and Sustainability

Dr. Michael Byers

Department of Political Science

Dr. Peter Dauvergne

Department of Political Science

Dr. Paul Evans

Institute of Asian Research and Liu Institute for Global Issues

Dr. Judith Paltin

Department of English Language and Literatures

Dr. John Roosa

Department of History

Dr. Youcef Soufi

Department of Classical, Near Eastern, and Religious Studies

Dr. Lisa Sundstorm Dr. Pheroze Unwalla

Department of Political Science Department of History

SPECIAL THANKS Camile Oliveira

International Relations Students Association

Dr. Steven Lee

International Relations Program

Andrea Reynolds

International Relations Program

Paige Jung

UBC Outside-In International Photojournal

Jack Jefferson

UBC Journal of Political Studies

Tiago de Souza Jensen

UBC Journal of Political Studies

Tara Stephens-Kyte

cIRcle, UBCâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Digital Repository

2018 UBC International Relations Student Association 6476 NW Marine Drive, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2 The Journal of International Affairs is a publication of the International Relations Student Association of the Alma Mater Society of the University of British Columbia. All articles published in the Journal of International Affairs represent the opinions of the authors and do not reflect the policies or opinions of the University of British Columbia, the staff of the Journal of International Affairs, or the International Relations Student Association. The University of British Columbia does not assume any responsibility for errors or omissions in this journal.

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FOREWORD Dear Reader, I am delighted to write this foreword to one of Canada’s most distinguished student publications, the Journal of International Affairs. The journal operates along lines very familiar to academics: it makes a regular call for papers, sends the essays to knowledgeable reviewers, asks authors for revisions to their submitted pieces, and selects the best articles based on an evaluation of the reviews and the edited submission. The Co-Editors-in-Chief, Maahin Ahmed and Verna Yam, along with their editorial team, have produced another excellent issue. The six articles highlight topics of contemporary interest. Brett Shearing problematizes the “Clash of Civilizations” debate, while articles by Ella Champion and Jack McClelland discuss issues linked to the legacies of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union: the Arctic in NATO strategy and the challenges of national identity in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Annie Lee explores current UNESCO operations while offering recommendations for reform, and Andi Jordan’s article contributes to the truly global character of the issue with a discussion on space law and its relationship to American federal legislation. Rachel Herold explores the motivations behind the making of Canadian foreign aid policy. Collectively, these articles illuminate critical issues affecting the international system and educate and inform us about subjects of national and global importance. Sincerely, Steven Lee Department of History Chair, International Relations Program

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INTRODUCTION Dear Reader, As UBC’s oldest undergraduate publication, the Journal of International Affairs has a long history of providing students with the invaluable opportunity of having their work published early on in their careers. This is our 33rd year of publication, and we have continued our dedication to high editorial standards and the publication of exceptional undergraduate research. The Journal of International Affairs received an impressive number of submissions this year. Reflecting the journal’s diverse readership, the submissions offered unique and multidisciplinary perspectives on issues in international affairs. The six papers published in this year’s edition were selected because they stood out in their originality, argumentative strength, composition, and diversity. In this year’s top Political Science thesis, Rachel Herold explores determinants of Canada’s humanitarian assistance for political and non-political humanitarian disasters. Andi Jordan’s piece explores gaps in international law pertaining to outer space exploration in the context of expanding commercial activities in space, highlighting the potential for US domestic legislation in this area to become customary international law. In “Constructed Voices”, Jack McClelland uses language as a frame for analyzing post-Soviet nationalism in Kazakhstan and Ukraine and highlights the problematic implications of putting language at the forefront of national identity formation in these states. In “Committed Allies, Polar Opposites”, Ella Champion unpacks reasons for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s lack of engagement in the Arctic despite the region’s geopolitical importance. Annie Lee evaluates the efficacy of the World Heritage Convention in preserving natural heritage sites deemed to have “outstanding universal value”. Lastly, Brett Shearing’s piece highlights the commonalities in jurisprudential philosophies of the Shi’a tradition in Islamic law and English common law, thereby emphasizing the importance of appreciating shared philosophies across diverse societies. Beyond publishing the journal, the Journal of International Affairs has strived to increase its community engagement and increase support for undergraduate work on international issues. The journal launched two initiatives this year: an editing workshop for authors interested in submitting papers and a weekly online commentary by editorial staff. These have served to advance discourse on international affairs at UBC and beyond, and assisted undergraduate students in developing skills for their future pursuits in academia or elsewhere. We would like to express our gratitude to all the students, faculty, and staff who contributed to this year’s edition. Our immensely dedicated editorial and production staff have invested many hours of work to make this year’s publication of the Journal of International Affairs possible. We would also like to thank UBC faculty reviewers for their timely and constructive feedback, without which we would not be able to maintain our high academic standards. Our continued partnership with UBC Outside-In: International Photojournal has allowed us to source our front and back covers from their submissions. Thank you to the Outside-In staff and photographers for their contribution. Last but not least, we would like to thank our many readers for their continued support and interest, without whom there would not be a Journal of International Affairs. Sincerely, Maahin Ahmed and Verna Yam Editors-in-Chief UBC Journal of International Affairs 2018

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Hopping on the Emergency Bandwagon

CANADIAN HUMANITARIAN AID PROVISION 2000-2015

RACHEL HEROLD

INTRODUCTION Between 2000-2015, the Canadian government reportedly donated an average of $300 million in international humanitarian assistance each year (all Canadian aid values reported in constant 1999 Canadian dollars).1 The goals of this aid were “to save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain the dignity of those affected by conflicts and natural disasters by providing appropriate, timely, and effective responses”.2 In this way, Canada has portrayed itself as a truly altruistic actor on the global stage. However, Canadian foreign aid policy has also been accused of being motivated by self-interested economic and diplomatic concerns rather than humanitarian considerations.3

The motivations of state humanitarian aid have repeatedly come under scholarly

examination.4 This concern originates from the apparent irreconcilability of nationalist, political institutions and the principles of neutrality and impartiality, which distinguish the humanitarian morality. Uncovering the determinants of humanitarian aid distributions can help to understand whether or not a government is providing aid on the basis of self-interested or humanitarian concerns, and thus, whether or not they are deserving of the international reputational benefits entailed in the moral superiority of true humanitarianism.

In this paper, I seek to comprehensively evaluate the Canadian government’s

motivations for providing humanitarian aid, ostensibly the most non-political form of aid, to both political and non-political disasters. I begin with an overview of the normative and 1

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Financial Tracking Service (FTS) — The global humanitarian aid database, last

Global Affairs Canada, “Our Priorities,” last updated 10 March 2016, http://www.international.gc.ca/department-ministere/priorities-

Cranford Pratt, “The impact of ethical values on Canadian foreign aid policy,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 9, no. 1 (March 2011): 44, doi:

R. D. McKinlay and R. Little, “A foreign policy model of US bilateral aid allocation,” World Politics 30, no.1 (October 1977): 58–86, doi:

updated 2016, https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=Profile-donorCountrylist. priorites.aspx?lang=eng.

10.1080/11926422.2001.9673271.

10.2307/2010075; Paul A. Raschky and Manijeh Schwindt, “On the channel and type of aid: The case of international disaster assistance,” European Journal of

Political Economy 28, no. 1 (July 2011): 119-131, http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.07.001; David Strömberg, "Natural Disasters,

Economic Development, and Humanitarian Aid," The Journal of Economic Perspectives 21, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 199-222, http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library. ubc.ca/stable/30033741; Gunther Fink and Silvia Redaelli, “Determinants of International Emergency Aid – Humanitarian Need Only,” World Development 39, no. 5 (May 2011): 741-757, http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/10.1016/j.worlddev.2010.09.004.

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empirical literature related to determinants of state humanitarian aid. I then investigate the degree to which both Canada’s decision to provide humanitarian aid and the quantity of aid distributed are motivated by (1) humanitarian need, (2) strategic foreign policy interests, and (3) domestic political concerns. While the decision to provide aid is informed by a combination of foreign policy interests and the financial need of the recipient country, the most significant determinants of aid quantity are the number of fatalities and the quantity of aid provided by other donors. This suggests that while Canadian aid is sensitive to humanitarian need, it is also largely motivated by political concerns and a bandwagon approach to foreign policy.

LITERATURE REVIEW

For over 150 years, humanitarianism has been associated with the five principles

of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, independence and universality.5 The Government of Canada directly cites the first four of these five principles on its webpage describing how Canada responds to humanitarian crises.6 However, the practicality of these principles in the contemporary field of disaster relief and the relationship of politics to humanitarian activity are the subjects of contentious debate.

On one side, traditional humanitarians are concerned that political influence and

interests will divert aid away from those with the greatest need.7 They argue that governments will only intervene selectively in humanitarian crises that serve their own strategic interests and will limit their intervention wherever possible because “being seen to act” is really all that matters from a political perspective.8 On the other side, new humanitarians argue that the principles of humanitarianism are only valuable in so far as they express and facilitate the essential goal, which is to save lives. For these humanitarians, saving lives and ‘doing good’ often requires humanitarians to act politically by publicly denouncing states for mistreating their citizens and encouraging the development of more just political systems.9 In other cases, humanitarian work may require engagement with political actors, such as states, in order to 5

Jenny H. Peterson, “Introduction,” in The Routledge Companion to Humanitarian Action, ed. Roger Mac Ginty and Jenny H Peterson (New York:

Government of Canada, “About humanitarian Assistance,” last updated 28 February 2017, http://international.gc.ca/world-monde/aid-aide/

Jenny H. Peterson, “Humanitarianism and Peace,” in Palgrave Handbook of Disciplinary and Regional Approaches to Peace, ed. Oliver Richmond,

David Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond: Human Rights and International Intervention (Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2006), 87, 78.

Peterson, “Humanitarianism and Peace,” 2, 5.

Routledge, 2015), 5.

about_humanitarian-a_propos_humanitaire.aspx?lang=eng.

Sandra Pagoda and Jasmin Ramovic (New York: Palgrave, 2016), 6.

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secure resources. For new humanitarians, the presence of political motives does not negate the possibility of ethically preferable outcomes.

This debate regarding the ethics of humanitarianism is significant because the historic

association of humanitarianism with altruism has granted anything labeled as ‘humanitarian’ automatic moral legitimacy.10 There is therefore a potential hypocrisy underlying all state humanitarian aid agendas if political interests are pursued under the guise of morality. Numerous empirical studies have been motivated to investigate the key determinants of aid distribution. These studies test a broad range of social, political and economic variables in search of factors that increase the probability and quantity of aid given to particular disasters or beneficiary states. Overall, previous studies find that greater humanitarian need related to natural disasters increases humanitarian aid donations, all else being equal.11 Kevlihan et al. confirm that this effect is consistent across natural and conflict-related disasters, at least with regards to the United States’ (US) humanitarian aid.12 Nevertheless, there is also unanimity in empirical research that humanitarian assistance to natural disasters is far from non-political. Former colonial links, bilateral trade, oil exports, democracy, and political alignment are all found to have significant relationships with the provision of disaster aid.13 In addition to measures of donor strategic interests, Drury et al. found domestic political concerns to have a slight impact on the provision of US disaster aid.14 The findings of these previous studies inform my research design for a more recent sample of Canadian humanitarian aid.

Focusing on the distribution of Canadian Official Development Assistance (ODA)

between 1984-2000, Macdonald and Hoddinott find that Canada actually demonstrates sensitivity to both recipient need and strategic interests (e.g., income inequality and trade).15 Similarly, in her investigation of the Canadian response to the earthquake in Haiti and the flooding in Pakistan in 2010, Aaida Mamuji finds that public will, domestic politics and public 10

Peterson, “Introduction,” 3.

A. Cooper Drury, Richard Stuart Olson, and Douglas A. Van Belle, "The Politics of Humanitarian Aid: U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance,

1964–1995," The Journal of Politics 67, no. 2 (May 2005): 454-73, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00324.x; Strömberg, "Natural Disasters, Economic Development, and Humanitarian Aid"; Fink and Redaelli, “Determinants of International Emergency Aid – Humanitarian Need Only”; Raschky and Schwindt, “On the channel and type of aid: The case of international disaster assistance.” 12

Rob Kevlihan, Karl DeRouen Jr., and Glen Biglaiser, “Is US Humanitarian Aid Based Primarily on Need or Self-interest?” International Studies

Strömberg, "Natural Disasters, Economic Development, and Humanitarian Aid"; Fink and Redaelli, “Determinants of International Emergency

Quarterly 58, no. 4 (February 2014): 839-854, doi: 10.1111/ isqu.12121.

Aid – Humanitarian Need Only”; Jean-Claude Berthélemy and Ariane Tichit, “Bilateral donors’ aid allocation decisions—A three-dimensional panel analysis,” International Review of Economics and Finance 13, no. 3 (December 2003): 253–274, doi:10.1016/j.iref.2003.11.004. 14

Drury, Olson, and Van Belle, "The Politics of Humanitarian Aid: U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, 1964–1995."

Macdonald and Hoddinott, “Determinants of Canadian Bilateral Aid Allocations: Humanitarian, Commercial or Political?” 311.

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administration influenced how Canada provided aid to these disasters.16

During the period under investigation, Canada’s response to foreign disasters was the

joint responsibility of numerous government agencies, including the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). Canada’s Cabinet allocated an International Assistance Envelope at the beginning of each fiscal year with a certain portion (less than 10%) designated to a Crisis Pool to be distributed in the case of emergencies.17 CIDA and DFAIT provided monitoring and “technical expertise” while the Cabinet was responsible for defining priorities, setting budgets and authorizing interventions.18 Therefore, Canadian humanitarian aid decisions were largely in the hands of political actors.

DETERMINANTS OF CANADIAN HUMANITARIAN AID

I hypothesize that there are three general factors influencing Canadian humanitarian

aid decisions: (1) humanitarian need, (2) strategic foreign policy interests, and (3) domestic political concerns. Each of these factors could be expected to influence both whether or not Canada provides aid and the quantity of aid distributed to a particular country-year. First, presumably there must be some form of humanitarian need present before humanitarian aid is given. Furthermore, if the desire to help suffering people does truly motivate Canada’s provision of humanitarian aid, then greater need should attract larger provisions of aid. The measure of need most often found to have a significant impact on aid provision is the number of fatalities.19 In addition to fatalities, the humanitarian need generated by a disaster is closely related to a state’s vulnerability to potentially catastrophic impacts. For instance, there is consistent evidence that a higher gross domestic product (GDP) per capita has a consistently negative impact on the allocation of humanitarian aid.20 Indeed, the Government of Canada explicitly states that it only provides humanitarian assistance “when the needs of the affected communities exceed 16

Aaida Mamuji, “Canadian military involvement in humanitarian assistance: progress and prudence in natural disaster response,” Canadian

Development Assistance Committee (DAC), “Canada: Development Assistance Committee peer-review,” Organization for Economic

Mamuji, “Canadian military involvement in humanitarian assistance: progress and prudence in natural disaster response,” 220.

Raschky and Schwindt, “On the channel and type of aid: The case of international disaster assistance”; Strömberg, "Natural Disasters,

Foreign Policy Journal 18, no. 2 (October 2012): 213-19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2012.709054.

Cooperation and Development, prepared on 10 October 2007, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/61/39515510.pdf, 20.

Economic Development, and Humanitarian Aid"; Fink and Redaelli, “Determinants of International Emergency Aid – Humanitarian Need Only”; Kevlihan, DeRouen, and Biglaiser, “Is US Humanitarian Aid Based Primarily on Need or Self-interest?” 20

Raschky and Schwindt, “On the channel and type of aid: The case of international disaster assistance”; Strömberg, "Natural Disasters,

Economic Development, and Humanitarian Aid"; Fink and Redaelli, “Determinants of International Emergency Aid – Humanitarian Need Only”; Berthélemy and Tichit, “Bilateral donors’ aid allocation decisions—A three-dimensional panel analysis.”

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the capacity of their government to respond”.21 H1: Canada provides more aid to countries that experience more destructive disasters (measured by number of fatalities). H2: Given a recipient country’s capacity to mitigate disaster impacts, Canada provides more aid to more vulnerable countries (measured by GDP per capita). Regarding strategic foreign policy interests, I predict that Canadian aid provision will favour countries with whom Canada is more closely aligned politically, economically and historically. These alignments can be measured in terms of United Nations (UN) voting patterns, bilateral trade, and shared membership in international organizations. Regardless of the direction, any significant impact that political, economic or historical affinity has on aid provision is evidence of foreign policy motivations. Strategic foreign policy can also influence humanitarian aid when, ceteris paribus, donors are more likely to provide aid when other donors also provide aid.22 Canada is likely susceptible to this bandwagon effect because Canadian public will is strongly influenced by foreign media and because the Canadian government is concerned with showcasing our capabilities in areas of interest to other states. H3: Canada provides more humanitarian aid to countries with which it is more closely aligned, politically. H4: Canada provides more humanitarian aid to countries with which it engages in more bilateral trade. H5: Common membership in international organizations increases the probability of receiving Canadian humanitarian aid, as well as the quantity received. H6: The more humanitarian aid provided by other donors to a given countryyear, the more aid Canada provides.

The final proposed determinant of Canadian humanitarian aid is domestic political

concerns. Regardless of any ethical responsibility to populations suffering in the face of major disasters, Members of the Canadian Parliament have fiduciary duties to local constituents. 21

Government of Canada, “About humanitarian Assistance.”

Fink and Redaelli, “Determinants of International Emergency Aid – Humanitarian Need Only,” 753; David Fielding, “The Dynamics of

Humanitarian Aid Decisions,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 76, no. 4 (August 2014): 554, doi: 10.1111/obes.12033; Jónína Einasdóttir and Geir

Gunnlaugsson, “Applied ethics and allocation of foreign aid: disparity in pretensions and practice,” Development Policy Review 34, no. 3 (April 2016): 353. doi: 10.1111/dpr.12156.

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Therefore, Canada’s annual aid provisions are likely sensitive to changes in Canada’s budget deficit as well as the total number of disasters in a particular year. Canadian aid budgets are also likely to grow and shrink in accordance with the general fiscal strength of the Canadian government, measured in terms of government debt. H7: Canada provides more humanitarian aid in years when the Canadian budget surplus is greater. H8: Canada provides more humanitarian aid to a given country-year in years when the total number of disasters is lower. H9: Canada provides more humanitarian aid when the Government of Canada’s debt is lower.

The nine hypotheses listed above form the core of this investigation of the motivations

behind Canadian humanitarian aid provision and distribution.

METHOD

Within the limitations of available data, this paper investigates the independent factors

influencing both the probability that Canada provides humanitarian aid to a given recipient country-year and the quantity of Canadian humanitarian aid (in 1999 CAD) provided per recipient country-year. A set of cases where Canada provided humanitarian aid is generated from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking System (OCHA FTS).23 OCHA provides reports on Canadian aid by recipient country from 1999-2016. However, given the irregularly small amount of aid reported in 1999 and the recent end of 2016, I exclude these years from my analysis.

In addition to restricting my time frame and unit of analysis, the OCHA dataset is

dependent on voluntary donor reporting, and does not specify the recipients of large portions of aid to disasters affecting multiple countries, such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. My study omits unspecified funding because it does not fit the country-year model. This omission is unlikely to bias the overall direction of my estimations. Although voluntary reporting may be a source of measurement error, this risk is reduced because the general trends of Canadian humanitarian aid found in the OCHA database are consistent with evidence

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Financial Tracking Service (FTS) — The global humanitarian aid database.

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from different datasets on Western disaster aid generally and Canadian aid specifically.24 Despite its limitations, this paper makes use of available data to provide initial insight into Canadian humanitarian motivations. Sources and descriptive statistics for all dependent and independent variables are presented in Table 1. No available dataset offers statistics for both natural and conflict-related disasters. As a result, I use two separate databases to compile a set of cases and fatality statistics for every country-year where a disaster took place, regardless of whether or not Canada provided aid. The emergency events database from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (EM-DAT) provides information on all natural, technological and complex disasters (which are related to, but not directly caused by, natural disasters)25. For data on disasters related to armed conflict, I rely on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED).26 Unfortunately, there are regional disparities in the comprehensiveness of the GED. In order to account for the lack of conflict related statistics for the Americas and Europe prior to 2005, I re-run all estimations for the restricted time period (2005-2015) and compare the fatality coefficient with results for the full period.

GDP per capita data is available in the collection of World Bank Development

Indicators and reported in constant 2010 USD in order to ensure comparability.27 Political affinity is measured by Gartzke’s affinity index, measuring affinity in UN voting patterns, which only provides information up to 2002.28 In the absence of more recent data, and given the general consistency of voting relations in most cases, I take the average of affinity scores across the years available for every recipient country and employ a cross-sectional model of average political alignment. I measure bilateral trade relationships in terms of the total value of Canadian exports to a given aid recipient, as reported in the UN Comtrade database.29 The effect of shared international organizational (IO) membership on Canadian 24

Fink and Redaelli, “Determinants of International Emergency Aid – Humanitarian Need Only,” 741; Kevlihan, DeRouen and Glen Biglaiser,

“Is US Humanitarian Aid Based Primarily on Need or Self-interest?” 841; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Creditor Reporting System, accessed 29 March 2017, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=58192. 25

D. Guha-Sapir, R. Below, and Ph. Hoyois, EM-DAT: The CRED/OFDA International Disaster Database. Brussels: Université Catholique de Louvain,

Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Georeferenced Event Dataset, Version 17.1, Uppsala University, 2016. http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/

World Bank, “World Bank Development Indicators,” last updated 14 October 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-

Erik Gartzke, The Affinity of Nations Index, 1964-2002, Version 4.0, Columbia University, 2006, http://pages.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/data/

United Nations Comtrade, “United Nations commodity trade statistics database,” last updated 2016, http://comtrade.un.org.

accessed 30 November 2016, http://www.emdat.be/database. UCDP/.

development-indicators.

affinity_codebook_03102006.pdf.

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humanitarian aid decisions is measured in terms of membership in La Francophonie and the Organization of American States (OAS). These IOs were selected because they are nonuniversal membership organizations with contemporary relevance as indicators of Canadaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s political links to countries with GDP per capita low enough to be likely recipients of Canadian aid. The impacts of membership in the Commonwealth and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) were also tested, but did not demonstrate significant effects. Table 1 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Descriptive Statistics

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The ‘bandwagon effect’ is measured as the extent to which the allocation and

distribution of Canadian humanitarian aid is influenced by changes in the total amount of other humanitarian aid provided to a given country-year, available from the OCHA FTS. The same potential measurement errors that limit the reliability of the Canadian aid data also apply to this variable. This is particularly evident in cases where the total value of aid is less than the value of Canadian aid provided to the same country-year. In these cases, I assume a reporting error and correct the value of humanitarian aid provided by other donors (the difference between total aid and Canadian aid) to equal zero. Unfortunately, I am unable to identify reporting errors where the difference is positive. Nevertheless, measurement error is unlikely to significantly impact the relationship between these two variables because data on total aid is unlikely to be consistently more or less comprehensive than data on Canadian aid.

The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) collects data on annual Canadian

budget surpluses and deficits.30 The total number of disasters per year is calculated as the sum of cases per year from EM-DAT and GED. However, while EM-DAT defines a case as a single disaster, such as a drought or an earthquake, GED defines a case as any reported instance of conflict. Therefore, the presence of conflict drastically over-estimates the total number of disasters in a particular country-year because a given conflict is re-counted every time an incident of violence takes place. This must be accounted for when analysing any significant result for this variable. Finally, annual data on Canadian government debt as a percentage of GDP is available from the World Bank Development Indicators.

As Canada only provided aid in 27% of all country-years that experienced natural

or conflict-related disasters between 2000-2015, a simple linear estimation model would be distorted with a large concentration of countries receiving zero aid.31 Aid allocation decisions must therefore be evaluated in two stages: the selection or gate-keeping stage and the distribution stage. Accordingly, I employ a two-part model in which the probability of receiving aid is estimated by a Logit regression, while an Ordinary Least Squares regression estimates coefficients for the distribution of aid in all cases where some aid is received.32 The 30

CBC News, “Canada's deficits and surpluses, 1963 to 2015,” CBC News, last updated February 11, 2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/multimedia/

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Financial Tracking Service (FTS) — The global humanitarian aid database;

canada-s-deficits-and-surpluses-1963-to-2015-1.3042571.

Berthélemy and Tichit, “Bilateral donors’ aid allocation decisions—A three-dimensional panel analysis,” 259; Eric Neumayer, Explaining the pattern of aid giving (London: Routledge, 2005), 33, http://www.myilibrary.com?ID=10718. 32

Neumayer, Explaining the pattern of aid giving, 38.

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same nine hypotheses apply to both of these stages, but they are tested separately in order to examine varied dynamics at play in different stages of Canadian humanitarian decisionmaking. In both the Selection and Distribution stages, simple additive models are used to estimate the effects of each independent variable.

RESULTS

Although results differ between the Selection and Distribution stages; both estimations

find that Canada’s aid decisions are influenced by humanitarian need, strategic foreign policy interests and domestic political concerns. The effects of all variables significantly influencing the selection of aid recipients are displayed in Figure 1. Figure 2 depicts all variables found to have a statistically significant impact on the quantity of aid distributed.

Whereas total fatalities, the primary indicator of humanitarian need, does not

significantly influence the probability of receiving aid, it does exert a positive effect on the quantity of aid received (H1). For all previously selected aid recipients, my model predicts that for every additional hundred disaster-related fatalities in a given country-year, Canada provides an additional $12,478 in aid, ceteris paribus. When the effects of natural disasterrelated fatalities and conflict-related fatalities are separated, the effect of natural disasterrelated fatalities is statistically insignificant. Therefore, Canada’s distribution of disaster relief is primarily determined by need derived from conflicts. Canada’s sensitivity to humanitarian need is also demonstrated by the predicted negative effect of GDP per capita (H2). Canada concentrates its humanitarian aid in disaster-stricken countries that are least capable of autonomously mitigating impacts.

Regarding the predicted indicators for foreign policy concerns, Canada’s political

affinity to a recipient country significantly decreases its likelihood of being selected to receive aid and has no significant impact on the Distribution stage (H3). Trade links (H4) demonstrate no significant effects. Membership in La Francophonie unexpectedly decreases the probability that a particular country receives Canadian humanitarian aid, but has an insignificant positive impact on the quantity of aid distributed (H5). Conversely, OAS membership demonstrates the predicted positive correlation with both the probability of receiving aid and the quantity received (H5); with insignificant results in the selection stage.

As anticipated, Canada is sensitive to the international ‘bandwagon’ of humanitarian

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aid (H6). Funding from other donors overshadows the influence of other motivators of Canadian humanitarian aid in both the Selection and Distribution stages (H6). The bandwagon effect eliminates the statistical significance of bilateral trade and the total number of disasters on the probability that Canada provides aid. Moreover, the inclusion of this variable increases the predictive strength of both estimations.

Regarding domestic concerns, the only significant result was the unexpected positive

relationship between Canadian government debt (as a percentage of GDP) and the probability of providing aid (H9). Canada appears to be more likely to provide aid to a given recipient in years when it is fiscally weaker. However, this could be a spurious result due to the fact that governments with higher spending strategies will simultaneously increase spending on humanitarian aid and raise debts. Figure 1 Logit Regression for Selection Stage

Predictions derived from Logit Regression for the probability of receiving Canadian Aid (2000-2015).

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Figure 2 OLS Results for Distribution Stage

Predictions derived from OLS Regression for the quantity of Canadian humanitarian aid received in tens of thousands of constant 1999 CAD.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

To some extent, the motivations behind Canada’s aid allocations do meet the standards

of humanitarian ethics. By prioritizing countries experiencing greater need, in terms of fatalities and GDP per capita, Canada upholds the principles of humanity and impartiality. However, there is also evidence of political processes at play. Canada has a greater sensitivity to more politicized disasters as the distribution of Canada’s aid is more significantly influenced by conflict-related fatalities than by natural disaster-related fatalities. International political ties, measured in terms of affinity in UN voting patterns and membership in international organizations, also have significant impacts on aid provision. The impacts of these different measures of political ‘friendliness’, however, vary both in direction and significance between

HEROLD

the two stages of analysis. Perhaps, Canada places more emphasis on certain political ties over others, such that OAS members receive more generous donations, while La Francophonie members and closely aligned UN-members are less likely to receive aid all together. Alternatively, Canada may be seeking new friends by prioritizing less closely aligned countries in the selection stage, and yet may be more generous to OAS countries in the distribution stage because it is more concerned with ameliorating suffering in countries with which it is already politically linked. These unexpected and inconsistent results may also result from specification errors. Results reveal an overpowering influence of global aid activity on the allocation of Canadian aid – evidence of a very strong bandwagon effect. This effect may be a product of the Canadian government’s sensitivity to public opinion or its concern for its international reputation. The bandwagon effect is prominently featured in this thesis because it surpasses all other variables in its influence of Canada’s aid decisions, as demonstrated by substantial increases in the predictive capacity of both estimations. However, the validity of present results regarding the bandwagon effect is limited because of the likelihood of covariance between recipient specific factors that influence the provision of aid by both Canada and other donors. Future studies that instrument the variable for aid from other donors could bring greater clarity to this bandwagon effect. Subsequent studies could also investigate the specific dynamics of the bandwagon effect by testing for the effects of public opinion or media coverage.

Despite limitations, the motivating question for the present investigation was

whether or not Canada deserves its reputation as an altruistic, humanitarian nation. First and foremost, I have demonstrated the uncertainty that surrounds this question. Canadian aid is motivated to do ‘good’, but also to serve Canada’s political interests. Moreover, by hopping on the international bandwagon for humanitarian assistance, Canada may actually be promoting the political interests of other donors. While the presence of political motives does not disqualify Canada from its ‘humanitarian’ title, these motives are worthy of consideration. The purpose of the present study is to question the official narrative and bring clarity to the underlying dynamics of Canadian humanitarianism.

Overall, the problem with Canadian humanitarian aid is not that it is

fundamentally unethical; it is that it is not transparent. This is evident first of all in the lack

HOPPING ON THE EMERGENCY BANDWAGON

of comprehensive and reliable sources of data on both humanitarian aid and the impacts of humanitarian disasters. Humanitarian scholars ought to be very concerned about this lack of data as it impacts their capacity to challenge the actions of governments and to improve the international aid structure. Furthermore, while Canadian policy makers may wish to maintain obscurity regarding the motives of their humanitarian allocations, an unwillingness to clearly define a set of goals will ultimately undermine the effectiveness of aid to achieve those goals. My findings do not suggest that Canada should stop providing humanitarian aid, or even be condemned for doing so. Rather, there needs to be greater scrutiny of the motivations behind government policy, because these motivations will ultimately determine the impacts of those policies. Therefore, it is the right and responsibility of the Canadian public to look for accurate data, analyze purported motives, and hold the government accountable to its humanitarian ideals. So far as the Canadian public is concerned with humanitarian need around the world (and that is a another topic worthy of subsequent study), they should not be satisfied with large sums of total aid or unjustified claims of neutrality. Holding the Canadian government accountable for its aid decisions is essential to upholding both the principles of democratic governance and the ethics of humanitarianism.

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US Hegemony and the Internationalization of Domestic Space Law ANDI JORDAN

INTRODUCTION

Sixty years ago, humankind successfully entered Earth’s orbit for the first time. The

98 minutes it took Sputnik I, a Soviet artificial satellite, to orbit the Earth ushered in a new era of space exploration, and with it, many legal challenges.1 The unprecedented nature of the Soviet mission brought about significant uncertainty, due both in part to the tensions of the Cold War and the lack of legal regulation addressing the exploration and use of outer space.2 In turn, the international community needed to respond quickly given the potential security risks of unregulated space exploration. Within ten years of the launch of Sputnik I, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) was born and succeeded by four other multilateral United Nations (UN) treaties on the exploration and use of space. Since 1979, however, no international treaty on space has been signed, while the United States (US) has developed domestic legislation on space in the form of the 2015 United States SPACE Act (USSA).

The OST regime was created in the context of the bipolar, state-centric international

system that characterized the Cold War and formally established outer space as a global commons in order to prevent either Cold War power from monopolizing the exploration and use of space, celestial bodies, and their resources.3 Yet, as a consequence of changes within the international system since then, international relations scholars have highlighted the OST’s inapplicability in the current context of space exploration. Recent technological developments have not only increased the number of space actors but have also changed the nature of space activities.4 Space exploration in the 21st century is predominantly pioneered by commercial, non-state actors – particularly, private corporations interested in extracting 1

“60th Anniversary of Sputnik: Dawn of the Space Age,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), accessed 27 Oct 2017,

Freeland, Steven, “International Law and the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,” in Risk and the Regulation of Uncertainty in

https://www.nasa.gov/specials/60th/sputnik/.

International Law, ed. Monika Ambrus, Rosemary Rayfuse, and Wouter Werner, (Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online, 2017), 77, DOI: 10.1093/acprof:o so/9780198795896.001.0001. 3

Reinstein, Ezra J., “Owning Outer Space,” Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 20, no. 1 (1999): 66, ProQuest Ebrary; Peterson,

Fabio, Tronchetti, Fundamentals of Space Law and Policy, (New York: Springer, 2013), 52, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-7870-6.

M.J., “The Use of Analogies in Developing Outer Space Law,” International Organization 51, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 261, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2703450.

US HEGEMONY AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF DOMESTIC SPACE LAW

space resources – and not the states that initiated space exploration. Thus, the treatment of outer space and its celestial bodies as a global common is now increasingly challenged by technologically advanced and commercially driven private actors.

The international community’s lack of response to technological advancements

and the increased role of non-state commercial actors in space has called into question the sufficiency of the OST regime as the central body of international space law. In response to the uncertainty regarding the OST’s ability to regulate activities such as extraterrestrial mining, the USSA provides legislation that allows for the commercial exploitation of natural resources in space. Considering the lack of relevant multilateral international law relating to commercial non-state actors in space and the unilateral development of national space legislation by the US, one prominent question arises: Why has the US taken it upon itself to fill this gap in international law? This paper will argue that the USSA has the potential to become accepted as general practice among states and established as customary international law, thereby enabling the US to gain unilateral influence and access over the up-to-now collectively held area of space.

ASTEROID MINING AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF SPACE

The commercialization of space arose as expensive government space operations

became increasingly unjustifiable and allowed for private actors to fill the gap vacated by government inaction. Requests to scale back the US government space program appeared in the early 1970s but were largely dismissed by both the Nixon and Reagan Administrations due to the political necessity of maintaining US superiority in space exploration.5 Following the end of the Cold War, however, the Soviet Union posed less of a military threat globally, and technological achievement in space “lost its potency as a symbol of US power.”6 Thus, the American public lost interest in space exploration, disenfranchised by immense government spending on space operations and a lack of tangible achievement since Apollo 17, the last of the manned lunar landing missions.7 As a result, the 1980s and 1990s saw the beginning of private operators entering the space market as national space agencies needed to find additional sources of funding and more cost-efficient means of technological production 5

John M. Logsdon, “A Sustainable Rationale for Human Spaceflight,” Issues in Science and Technology 20, no. 2 (Winter 2004): 33.

Ibid., 32.

Ibid.

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and transport to and from Earth’s orbit.8 The initial involvement of private actors in the US was restricted to public–private partnerships by which National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) contracted with private companies for specific projects like launching satellites.9 Yet as technologies developed, particularly in the telecommunications industry with “dual-use” satellites, the utilization of space technology came to be understood both in terms of a military resource and a commercial opportunity.10

The significant role that commercial actors have played in the development of

space technologies following the Cold War era calls for new international law to regulate the political and legal uncertainties of private operations. The rapid pace of scientific progress by companies involved in space exploration, such as Planetary Resources, raises various legal concerns, but as of yet the international community remains unresponsive to the expansion of space technologies. Planetary Resources is a private company based in the US that is developing the capacity to mine the natural resources found in Near-Earth Asteroids (NEAs).11 After seven years of research and billions of dollars invested since the company’s founding, Planetary Resources is closer than ever to establishing the first commercial mine in space and hopes to launch multiple spacecrafts to extract and test material samples as early as 2020.12

There are numerous potential benefits of conducting commercial activities on

celestial bodies such as asteroids - mainly, that this requires lesser distances to travel, thus reducing fuel costs, and that their mineral resources and water deposits can be mined for monetary gain.13 However, multiple legal uncertainties underpin asteroid resource extraction and must be addressed in order to create a fair and stable international regulatory framework for future missions. The most fundamental of these uncertainties is whether or not a private, for-profit company has the right to adopt private ownership of an extracted resource. As the aforementioned legal uncertainty calls into question the validity of extraterrestrial mining operations, it must be addressed by either new international law; or failing that, national legislation in order for Planetary Resources to begin commercial asteroid mining. Comparing 8

Tronchetti, Fundamentals of Space Law and Policy, 52.

Ibid.

Dual-use satellites host both military and commercial telecommunications. Freeland, “International Law,” 78, 94-5.

“Asteroid Mining Plans Revealed by Planetary Resources, Inc.,” Planetary Resources, accessed 27 October 2017, https://www.

“ARKYD-301: About the Exploration Program,” Planetary Resources, accessed 2 Nov 2017, https://www.planetaryresources.com/missions/

Reinstein, “Owning Outer Space,” 60.

planetaryresources.com/2012/04/asteroid-mining-plans-revealed-by-planetary-resources-inc/. arkyd-301/.

US HEGEMONY AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF DOMESTIC SPACE LAW

the OST and USSA according to their provisions on the legality of the appropriation of asteroid resources will illustrate how the USSA is an attempt by the US to legalize commercial asteroid mining and establish customary law unaligned with the foundational intentions of the international community and OST regime.

LEGAL ANALYSIS OF EXISTING SPACE LEGISLATION

Central to the controversy of whether private companies can claim private ownership

of extracted resources is Article II of the OST. Article II prohibits the “national appropriation” of outer space and other celestial bodies and clarifies that territorial claims of celestial bodies like planets or asteroids are not applicable in the way customary international law allows for on Earth.14 The “object of controversy” concerning the legal interpretation of Article II surrounds the extent to which its provisions apply to non-state actors.15 The inclusion of vague prohibitions against “means of use or occupation, or by any other means” in Article II encourages the widely accepted understanding that the non-appropriation of outer space and celestial bodies applies not just to state actors but also, commercial, non-state actors.16 Thus, the OST does not grant companies like Planetary Resources the right to appropriate asteroids for private means.

While the non-appropriation of celestial bodies by both public and private actors is

largely settled, there is no definitive interpretation on whether the prohibitions of Article II extend to extracted natural resources. One obvious interpretation is that the appropriation of natural resources in not exempt from Article II. However, while Article II prohibits the appropriation of outer space, the Moon, and other celestial bodies, it does not explicitly reference resources that are removed from celestial bodies. Thus, another interpretation is that without explicit reference to natural resources, the OST is insufficient in addressing Planetary Resources’ future operations because asteroid mining would only require the exploitation of asteroid resources, not ownership of the entire body. The USSA pursues the latter interpretation by ensuring private ownership rights over extracted asteroid resources – at least 14

Article II, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

(hereinafter the Outer Space Treaty), http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/STSPACE11E.pdf; Tronchetti, Fabio, “The Non-Appropriation Principle as a Structural Norm of International Law: A New Way of Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty,” Air and Space Law 33, no.3 (2008): 280. 15

Tronchetti, “The Non-Appropriation Principle,” 280.

Article II, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

(hereinafter the Outer Space Treaty);; Philip,De Man, “Commercial interests are even muscling in on the use of outer space,” Financial Times, 29 October 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/e1181092-b588-11e7-aa26-bb002965bce8.

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within US law. Article 51303 of the USSA entitles American citizens “engaged in commercial recovery of an asteroid resource or a space resource […] to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid resource or space resource obtained.”17 The notion that asteroid mining is not in violation of the OST because Article II only prohibits the appropriation of asteroid resources that are in place is one of two interpretations, both potentially valid pending state practice and the establishment of customary law.18

As the legality of treaty interpretation is determined by Article 31 of the Vienna

Convention on the Law of Treaties, either interpretation of Article II could be permissible under international law depending on the object and purpose of the OST. Article 31 of the Convention states that a treaty interpretation is permissible if “in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”19 Relatedly, the US government maintains that the USSA is consistent with international law based on their interpretation of the OST.20 However, a major potential conflict between the USSA and international law is its compliance with the principle of res communis omnium: the formal establishment of outer space as a global common. Res communis omnium ensures free and equal right of exploration and use by all states — which many legal scholars argue is the object and purpose of the OST, due to the political climate in which it was negotiated.21 Both Article I and II heavily reinforce the principle of res communis omnium.22 Although the legislators behind the USSA were careful to build it legally consistent with the OST, their rationale relies on an interpretation of Article II that is in violation of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention and would contrast with existing international law if practiced.23

Hypothetically, the USSA’s successful legalization of the appropriation of extracted

space resources would prompt international space mining companies to establish their operations in the US in order to gain this benefit. The increased registration of international companies under US regulation would situate the country as a global hegemon in the 17

Article 51303, U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (hereinafter the US SPACE Act),

Article 31.2 (b), Vienna Convention on the law of treaties (hereinafter referred to as the Vienna Convention), https://treaties.un.org/doc/

Article 31.1, Vienna Convention.

Brian J. Egan, “The Next Fifty Years of the Outer Space Treaty,” 7 December 2016, United States Department of State, https://2009-2017.state.

Article I, Outer Space Treaty; Tronchetti, “The Non-Appropriation Principle,” 280.

Freeland, “International Law,” 85; Article I, Outer Space Treaty.

Egan, “The Next Fifty Years”; Tronchetti, Fabio, “Title IV - space resource exploration and utilization of the US Commercial Space Launch

https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2262/text. publication/unts/volume%201155/volume-1155-i-18232-english.pdf.

gov/s/l/releases/remarks/264963.htm; Article I, Outer Space Treaty; Tronchetti, “The Non-Appropriation Principle,” 280.

Competitiveness Act: a legal and political assessment,” Air and Space Law 41, no. 2 (2016): 149.

US HEGEMONY AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF DOMESTIC SPACE LAW

extraterrestrial mining industry, similar to Canada’s dominant status as a hub for extractive mining companies.24 If the US were to own the registration rights for the majority of space mining companies, then their economy would disproportionately receive investment from the associated operating expenses to the detriment of the rest of the world. Thus, the USSA and the potential establishment of the US as a hegemon in the extraterrestrial mining industry do not comply with the object and purpose of the OST.

ANALYSIS OF THE 1979 MOON AGREEMENT

The international community was not oblivious to the potential for a major space

power to disproportionately gain from their exploration and use of space while creating the OST regime. Indeed, the 1979 Moon Agreement was intended to provide a legitimate legal framework for the future regulation of the exploitation of space resources but failed to garner substantial ratification. Only 16 out of 193 UN Member States are parties of the Moon Agreement to date, among the absent state parties are key state actors such as the US and Russia.25 The absence of key parties undermines the Moon Agreement’s ability to provide a binding legal framework for the future regulation of space resource. The dynamics surrounding the failed Moon Agreement will be analyzed below in order to explain why the US has chosen to pursue domestic law to resolve the uncertainties of commercial space mining.

Despite being drafted prior to the existence of Planetary Resources or the realistic

prospect of commercial space mining, the Moon Agreement recognizes the OST’s failure to address the appropriation of asteroid resources. Building upon the provisions found in Article II of the OST, Article 11 (3) of the Moon Agreement states that “neither the surface nor the subsurface of the Moon, nor any part thereof or natural resources in place,” shall be subject to ownership claims.26 The addition of “in place” to this provision indicates that natural resources that have been removed from their original celestial body are subject to public or private ownership. Thus, the Moon Agreement is consistent with the US’ interpretation 24

Seventy-five percent of “the world’s mining industries are headquartered in Canada” and approximately “1,300 mining companies based out

of Canada are investing hundreds of billions of dollars in over 100 countries around the world”. See Dave Dean, “75% of the World's Mining Companies Are Based in Canada,” VICE News, 9 July 2013, https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/wdb4j5/75-of-the-worlds-mining-companies-are-based-in-canada. 25

Lefeber René, “Relaunching the Moon Agreement,” Air & Space Law 41, no. 1 (2016): 41.

Article 11(3), Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (hereinafter the Moon Agreement), http://

www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/moon-agreement.html#a18.

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of Article II of the OST. On the basis of this provision alone, the Moon Agreement would prevent the US from drafting the separate national legislation on resource extraction in space, but be in violation of the object and purpose of the OST. However, the other provisions included under Article 11 of the Moon Agreement counteract the potential effect of Article 11 (3).

In combination, the multiple provisions under Article 11 require that states undertake

the necessary procedures to establish an international regime “to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon [and other celestial bodies].”27 The main purposes of the international regime would include establishing “the orderly and safe development” of the natural resources in space, “the rational management of those resources,” and “an equitable sharing by all State Parties in the benefits derived from those resources.”28 Extraterrestrial mining under this regime would have therefore been legally analogous to the deep-seabed regime established under Part XI of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), negotiated at the same time as the Moon Agreement.29 Part XI states that the resources mined from the deep-sea bed collectively belong to all states and require international protection and economic distribution due to variance in mining capacity among states.30 Unlike the Moon Agreement, however, the US had a leading role in negotiating the UNCLOS and was able to shape the terms of ratification in their favour, agreeing to aid the establishment a deepseabed regime in exchange for exclusive freedom of navigation benefits.31 The incentive to gain specific benefits through negotiation therefore led the US to ratify UNCLOS. Without state-specific incentives built into OST regime negotiations, developed nations with space capacity like the US and Russia remain against the idea that celestial resources are collective property that require economic distribution amongst all states. Consequently, they still have not ratified the Moon Agreement.32 The travaux préparatoires of a treaty are relevant to understand if “the parties considered

Article 11 (5), Moon Agreement.

Article 11 (7), Moon Agreement.

Peterson, “The Use of Analogies in Developing Outer Space Law,” 261-3.

Part XI, Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, http://www.un.org/depts/los/

John N Moore, “UNCLOS KEY TO INCREASING NAVIGATIONAL FREEDOM,” Texas Review of Law and Politics 12, no. 2 (2008): 459-475.

Article 11(1), Moon Agreement; Tronchetti, Fabio, “The Moon Agreement in the 21st Century: Addressing Its Potential Role in the Era of

convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindxAgree.htm.

Commercial Exploitation of the Natural Resources of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” Journal of Space Law 36 (2010): 505, Hein Online.

US HEGEMONY AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF DOMESTIC SPACE LAW

the treaty to be declaratory of customary international law.”33 Since the Moon Agreement has low participation levels and has yet to be put into practice, it cannot be considered binding customary international law. Customary international law is defined as “the general practice of states which is accepted and observed as law.”34 According to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, there are two prerequisites for an internationally binding custom.35 First, “the provision concerned should be of a fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law.”36 In other words, a law begins becoming customary when it becomes the general practice among states (usus).37 Second, the general practice “is accepted by states not as an option but as a requirement” and is considered in accordance with international law (opinio juris).38

The second condition is particularly essential because general state practice is not

alone sufficient to “distinguish between legally binding rules and patterns of behaviour which are not legally required.”39 Fundamental to the establishment of opinio juris is the general assumption that “the rules of international law do not bind States against their will” and that accordance with international law is determined by consensus, not “explicit consent.”40 The common legal view is that general practice is considered to be in accordance with the law when there is “inferred consent” among states.41 The consensual basis of international law creates an inference-based obligation system because consent “is determined partly on the basis of State practice, and not in the absence of any evidence of consent.”42

After having defined the process of a law becoming customary, it is evident that

the Moon Agreement fails to satisfy either prerequisite of international customary law. Disagreement over the Moon Agreement’s authority is analogous to the legal debate surrounding the Responsibility to Protect doctrine (R2P) and whether or not it justifies 33

Travaux préparatoires is a legal term pertaining specifically to international treaty law and refers to the preparatory documents used in

composing the final treaty. The documents are useful for secondary interpretation of a treaty in order to clarify intent. Byers, Michael, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and Customary International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 167-8; Article 32, Vienna Convention. 34

Gary D. Solis, “Rules of War, Laws of War,” in The Law of Armed Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 12.

Article 38 (1)(b). Statute of the International Court of Justice, http://www.icj-cij.org/en/statute.

Solis, “Rules of War,” 12.

Tronchetti, “The Non-Appropriation Principle,” 292.

Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and Customary International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Byers, Custom Power and the Power of Rules, 130.

Ibid 142.

Ibid., 142-3.

Ibid. 143.

Press, 1999), 130; Solis, “Rules of War,” 12.

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humanitarian intervention.43 Although many international lawyers hold the view that R2P is sufficient to granting states the right to intervene in a conflict on humanitarian grounds, critics of R2P argue that humanitarian intervention “has not yet been widely accepted by states as a matter of customary international law” due to the current absence of state practice, including against ISIS in Syria.44 Thus, although the Moon Agreement could sufficiently regulate commercial resource extraction in space, it is not accepted as general practice and states are not obligated to abide by its provisions.

Without ratification of the Moon Agreement, the US is not legally bound by its

provisions and thus, has the opportunity to independently pursue asteroid mining, free from any profit-sharing requirements. The US retains this right also because the Moon Agreement has not obtained customary status. The rights granted by the USSA still have the potential to become internationalized as a customary international law and regulate commercial resource extraction. Two conditions are necessary to establish the USSA as customary law: first, the exploitation of extraterrestrial resources must become general practice among states and regulated through this national legislation; and second, the absence of international objection to general state practice.45 While it is not yet technologically possible to observe whether the USSA has been established as general practice, the current lack of multilateral response to the USSA from other nations, including those with technological space capacity and future asteroid mining plans like China and Luxembourg, indicates that establishing opinio juris is possible once the USSA is operational.46

The internationalization of US domestic law initially inconsistent with existing

international law is not unprecedented. For example, in 1945, President Truman issued Proclamation 2667: an official announcement that claimed the United States had control over natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf contingent to its coasts but not restricted to its territorial waters.47 The Truman Proclamation was the first of 43

Robert J. Lesperance, “Canada’s Military Operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria and the Law of Armed Conflict,” Canadian International

Ibid., 51.

Lawyer 10, no.2 (2015): 60, https://cbaapps.org/CBA_CIL/search.aspx. 45

Article 38 (1)(b). Statute of the International Court of Justice, http://www.icj-cij.org/en/statute.

See Andrew Griffin, "China to send people to live on asteroids and mine them, authorities announce." The Independent. May 12, 2017. Accessed

February 24, 2018. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/china-nasa-asteroid-space-agency-beijing-a7732306.html; Stephen Chen, "China's nuclear spaceships will 'mine asteroids, fly tourists' by 2040." South China Morning Post. November 19, 2017. Accessed February 24, 2018. http://www.scmp.com/ news/china/policies-politics/article/2120425/chinas-nuclear-spaceships-will-be-mining-asteroids; Aliya Ram, “US and Luxembourg frame laws for new space race,” Financial Times, 18 October 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/af15f0e4-707a-11e7-93ff-99f383b09ff9. 47

Hereinafter referred to as the Truman Proclamation. Ibid., 90-91.

US HEGEMONY AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF DOMESTIC SPACE LAW

its kind pertaining to continental shelf resource extraction and instead of facing opposition on the basis of international waters being exempt from sovereign claims, it catalyzed similar claims to jurisdiction by other coastal countries and the establishment of general practice.48 Furthermore, the customary status of the rule derivative of the Truman Proclamation was reinforced by its inclusion in both the 1951 Draft Articles of the International Law Commission and the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.49

The USSA’s ability to become successfully established as customary law is strengthened

by the common factors it shares with Proclamation 2667. For example, both promote other states to make similar claims.50 Since the US maintains that the USSA is consistent with the OST’s mandate of outer space as a global common, it serves as a justification for similar national space legislation in other countries. Indeed, Luxembourg enacted legislation in August 2017 that “officially allows space resources to be ‘appropriated’ by commercial groups based in the country.”51 Also, the customary status of the Truman Proclamation was strengthened by the fact that if other coastal states with the potential to benefit from the rule were to deny US the right to continental shelf mining, they also would effectively restrict future economic gain for themselves, a catch-22 dilemma reflected in the dynamics surrounding the USSA and asteroid mining. The economic benefits to be gained from enacting similar legislation are illustrated in events proceeding Luxembourg’s commercial asteroid law. Already “more than 60 space start-ups” have requested formal registry in Luxembourg and two notable US companies, Planetary Resources and Deep Space Industries, have already set up offices and entered into financial agreements with the Luxembourg government.52

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the economic need of developed countries to allow for the private

exploitation of natural resources of celestial bodies has brought about a new era in the regulation of extraterrestrial mining. While the major obstacles to the successful extraction and transportation of natural resources in space are still financial and scientific, the lack of

Ibid., 91.

Ibid.

Ibid. 92.

Ram, “US and Luxembourg frame laws for new space race.”

Ibid.

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legal regulations produce substantial uncertainties.53 In light of the technological progress advanced by companies like Planetary Resources, the need for sufficient legislation has increased. Unfortunately, the OST Regime in its current form does not provide specific provisions guaranteeing the right of private actors to exploit the natural resources of celestial bodies.

In response, the US has enacted national legislation addressing the uncertainties

of extraterrestrial mining. The USSA has the potential to become established as customary international law. The Moon Agreement lacks binding enforcement as it has yet to become general practice and therefore the US is not obligated to abide by provisions requiring that space resources be treated as the common heritage of mankind. The future investment in the US spurred by the registration of international space mining companies under the USSA enables the country to gain unilateral influence and access over the collectively held area of space. In the absence of international objection and future asteroid mining plans from other space-faring nations like China and Luxembourg, the USSA has favourable conditions for garnering international consensus once established as general practice among states.

If the international community and non-space-faring nations consider the commercial

development of space mining to be undesirable, or believe that it should be subject to an international revenue sharing scheme, they cannot afford to stay silent. The only way to prevent the USSA from developing into customary international law is through widespread diplomatic protest, ideally coupled with a renewed effort to adopt the Moon Agreement – or some similar, newly negotiated international instrument. However, the current low participation level in the Moon Agreement serves “as an excuse for not taking action, rather than as an impetus to act” and make amendments.54 For example, in 2008, the Legal Subcommittee of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space “issued a joint statement on the benefits of adherence” to the Moon Agreement and “commenced the elaboration of a joint declaration on exploitation of space mineral resources.”55 As of 2016, the joint declaration “is still in progress” and has yet to be released.56 Notably, recent statements indicate that “the purpose of the Joint Declaration is not to set out the international regime for the exploitation 53

Ibid.

Lefeber, “Relaunching the Moon Agreement,” 41.

Ibid., 42.

Ibid., 44.

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of natural resources on celestial bodies, but to outline the principles for such exploitationâ&#x20AC;? and likely lack binding authority.57 Regardless of the current lack of diplomatic response, the customary rules derivative of the events that will unfold over the next few decades are not permanent. International law is not static; it evolves continuously as states make claims and protests, negotiate new agreements, and engage in physical actions of various kinds.

Ibid.

MCCLELLAND

Constructed Voices

HOW LINGUISTIC NATIONALISM IS SHAPING UNITY AND DIVISION IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION JACK MCCLELLAND

INTRODUCTION

Language is often regarded as a cornerstone of collective social identity, or as the

late historical sociologist Anthony Smith described, essential to the phenomenon of the nation.1 Within post-Soviet Eurasia, a region that holds thousands of years of cultural and anthropological history, the nation-states existing today are strikingly young and the result of an often overlooked colonial project. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many post-Soviet nation-states have relied on their distinct titular language – the language spoken by the nation state’s ethno-linguistic majority – as a claim to territorial indigeneity, and have created policies putting language at the forefront of national identity.2 In the quarter-century since the breakup, however, language has proven to be a problematic unifying force, and is often the driver of intense identity politics across this post-Soviet space.3 While there are certainly other drivers of identity politics in the region, including sovereignty disputes and religious differences,4 language serves as an insightful case study of how both post-Soviet states are constructed from imagined historical groups, and the experiences of said groups during the years of Russian and Soviet colonialism. By framing the language policies of today as responses to perceived and actual Russian encroachment, it becomes clear that language has fueled not only national identity, but also contentious, identity politics across the postSoviet world.

This paper compares two post-Soviet states, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, and explores

how language jointly serves and complicates the national projects and identity politics in each. I will begin by exploring the historical precedent for these two modern nations. Shedding light on their histories and colonial experiences will provide the necessary foundation for understanding each of these groups as a “post-Soviet” nation-state. I will then compare the 1

Anthony Smith, “The Origins of Nation,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 12, Iss. 3 (1989): 110.

Ronald Suny, “State, Civil Society, and Ethnic Cultural Consolidation in the USSR—Roots of the National Question,” in Guy Lapidus, Victor

Ibid., 16.

Barnett R. Rubin & Jack Snyder, Post-Soviet Political Order, Routledge (1998), 14.

Zaslavsky, and Philip Goldman, From Union to Commonwealth: Nationalism and Separatism in the Soviet Republics. Cambridge University Press (1992), 30.

CONSTRUCTED VOICES

modern manifestations of lingual nationalism in contemporary Kazakhstan and Ukraine, and conclude by assessing some of the repercussions language policies have left each country to grapple with today.

NATIONAL AND LINGUISTIC HISTORIES OF POST-SOVIET STATES

The Soviet Union is often regarded as the largest multinational political entity of

its time, and some scholars have argued that the sheer number and depth of ethnic groups united under the Soviet banner forecasted the Union’s collapse in 1991.5 An exploration of some of the linguistic patterns leading up to the collapse will explain how claims to sovereignty in the closing decade of the 20th century have perpetuated linguistic nationalism into the 21st century. As Jack Snyder writes in the introduction to Post-Soviet Political Order, “When empires come crashing down, they leave hunks of institutional wreckage scattered across the landscape.”6 In this case, the Soviet-constructed ethnic-lingual groups were left behind as the foundations for post-Soviet nations to emerge. The comparison between Kazakhstan and Ukraine provides an interesting contrast here; whereas prior to the USSR Central Asia acted relatively autonomously, Ukrainian historians claim that “Russification” – a colonial process of replacing Ukrainian culture and language with that of Russia – was occurring many years prior to 1917.7 For this paper, I will only address “Russification” in how it replaces native languages with Russian, beginning with a brief review of linguistic and cultural histories in modern Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

In the case of Ukraine, historical memory is often politically charged. Ukrainian

historians claim direct ethnic and linguistic indigeneity from the history of the Kievan Rus’, and Russian historians similarly claim ancestry from this group, framing the Kievan Rus’ as a pan-Slavic ethnic group rather than a distinctly Ukrainian one.8 Ukrainian historians often contrast their ancestry in the Rus’ to the historic Muscovy group, which occupied areas spreading from modern Moscow to Novgorod, and from here histories of oppression and colonialism take on a larger historical narrative.9 Russian and Soviet historians have 5

Graham Smith, Vivien Law, Andrew Wilson, Annette Bohr, and Edward Allworth, Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands, Cambridge

Snyder and Rubin, Post-Soviet Political Order, 1.

Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia, I. B Taurus & Co (2000), 2-3.

Smith et al, Nation Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands, 24.

Ibid., 25.

University Press (1998), 1.

MCCLELLAND

often described Ukraine as the region’s window to Europe, underplaying the cultural and linguistic differences claimed by Ukrainian historians.10 While a similar claim of collective incorporation did not occur in Central Asia until the years of the Soviet Union, a particularly effective tool for implementing Russian and Soviet hegemony in both regions was the Russian language. This implementation eventually both triggered oppositional nationalist movements and created fractures that are present in both Kazakhstan and Ukraine today.11

In the case of Kazakhstan, early Soviet policy in Central Asia aimed to establish

distinct independent autonomous republics, each with their own national identities and languages.12 Beyond simple, bureaucratic establishment of the republics, national identities were further ingrained into the region by national censusing, which forced people to choose an ethnic identity from the list of options provided by the Kremlin.13 The region was primed for its role in the Soviet project during the 1920s and 1930s when the Bolsheviks standardized each autonomous republic with its own language, and transcribed the texts of these languages from their Arabic script, first to the Latin alphabet, and then into Cyrillic.14

The transcription of regional languages into the Cyrillic alphabet was foundational

to the region’s incorporation into the Soviet project, and is an important marker of colonialist action. While this was not as oppressive as “Russification” in Ukraine, Central Asia certainly experienced a “Sovietization” wherein the region was organized into linguistically distinguishable groups and incorporated into the Soviet Union’s economic and social project. However, the consolidation of national identities and languages in Central Asia was not the final extent of this Sovietization. The introduction of the Cyrillic text to the region was only the beginning of a larger plan of indoctrination into Moscow’s multinational project.15 The new autonomous republic of Kazakhstan in particular was subject to the mass immigration of ethnic Russians through the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s to populate Stalin’s labour camps that were being built in Central Asia.16 This demographic transition saw ethnic Kazakhs for the first time become a minority in their own country, and the influx of Russians without Kazakh 10

Ibid., 44.

Pauline Jones Luong, The Transformation of Central Asia, Cornell University Press (2004): 19.

Roy, The New Central Asia, vii.

David Kertzer and Dominique Arel, Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses. Cambridge University

Luong, The Transformation of Central Asia, 126.

Ibid.

Almira Sagimbayeva, "Implementing Prospects of Multiculturalism Theory in Kazakhstan," Politické vedy, no. 2 (2014), 156.

Press (2002), 179.

CONSTRUCTED VOICES

language skills created an environment where the ability to speak Russian became increasingly valuable throughout the years of the Soviet Union.17 Through this process, the Soviet project was able to not only construct cohesive linguistic and national identities in Central Asia, but also indoctrinate those groups into a paradigm of inequality where their national identities and languages became second-rate to those of the colonizing ethnic Russians.

In modern Ukraine, on the other hand, the role of ethnic Russians has a much

longer history, and for that reason has created a more polarizing debate around the politics of language and national identity today. The country is often described along demographic lines as containing three ethnolinguistic groups: ethnic-Ukrainian Ukrainophones, ethnicUkrainian Russophones, and ethnic-Russian Russophones.18 However, since the history of Ukraine is framed differently by Ukrainian and Russian historians, the accuracy of this demographic categorization should be questioned. While Ukrainian historians may frame the Russians in Ukraine today – whose ancestral roots to the modern territory may date back hundreds of years – as colonizers, these ethnic Russians themselves often feel little connection to the supposed “homeland” of the modern Russian Federation.19 The role of language in this paradigm is essential, as during years under the Russian Empire, and later the Soviet Union, Russian became the bureaucratic language of the region, thus accentuating the idea of “Russians” as colonizers of the “Ukrainian” nation.20 Censusing may have even further polarized these distinctions during the years of Russian Empire and the USSR, forcing Ukrainians to choose an identity defined by their “mother-tongue,” (rodnoĭ i͡azyk in Russian) which was far from a perfect measurement of ethnic identity.21 This is just one example of linguistic differences being politicized in the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries between Russia and its neighbours, but demonstrates more broadly how language was used to polarize nonRussian groups during the years of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union.

Censusing and language policy were sources of divisiveness in the Russian Empire

and Soviet Union, and continue to define difference in the post-Soviet world. While Russian and Soviet oppression was exercised via multiple tools, a brief discussion on the framing of the post-Soviet states as “post-colonial” helpfully explains how language policy in particular, 17

Ibid.

Smith et al, Nation Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands, 119.

Ibid., 124.

Ibid., 127.

Ibid., 119.

MCCLELLAND

integrated in a colonial system, was used to fulfill larger systems of colonial oppression.

POST-COLONIAL ISSUES IN MODERN KAZAKHSTAN AND UKRAINE

Post-Soviet Ukraine and Kazakhstan certainly had very different experiences as

colonial holdings during the Russian Empire and Soviet years. As discussed, while Ukraine was often framed as Russia’s window to Europe and historic ethnic Russian settlement across the modern territory complicates the notion of Russia as a colonizing “other”, Kazakhstan was granted comparatively greater autonomy in its years incorporated in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union.22 From a “post-colonial” lens, however, these two countries face similar challenges, most notably in the necessary development of language policy to accommodate their post-Soviet populations. On a theoretical level, both Ukraine and Kazakhstan may be identified as “post-colonial” in that the modern nation-builders easily paint the Russians and Soviets as colonizers, specifying these two historical groups as the identifiable “other”.23 By constructing this binary, the governments of Ukraine and Kazakhstan not only create a platform for advancing titular national political parties, but also validate a “perennialist” view of the modern states, framing years included in the Russian Empire and Soviet Union as mere breaks from the nations’ longer histories.24

Beyond this theoretical level of “post-colonialism”, more visible scars of the Russian

Empire and Soviet Union colonial projects lie in the prevalence of the Russian language throughout contemporary Kazakh and Ukrainian societies. In Ukraine, while the Ukrainian Ukrainophone/Ukrainian Russophone/Russian Russophone demographic paradigm is problematic, it does bring light to the prevalence of the Russian language in contemporary society, and suggests the complexity of its role in the Ukrainian nation-state. There is little pre-Soviet historical precedent for the Russian language in Central Asia,25 and the continued prevalence of Russian as the lingua franca across the region today is thus clear evidence of Kazakhstan’s experience as a colonial entity during the Soviet Union. With the massive Russian migration to the region in the 1930s and 1940s, few of the permanent settlers picked up the native language of the republic in which they resided.26 While Soviet citizens 22

David Laitin, Identity in Formation: The Russian Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad, Cornell University Press (1998): 59.

Smith et al, Nation Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands, 8.

Ibid., 16.

Roy, The New Central Asia, 2-3.

Ibid., 106.

CONSTRUCTED VOICES

indigenous to Central Asia were expected to become bilingual in Russian, the ethnic Russian immigrants rarely were expected to learn the local languages, and though this process, Russian was correspondingly asserted as the dominant language across the region.27

Thus, in the wake of the Soviet breakup, the scars of Kazakhstan’s colonial experience

are visible, not just in this theoretical “othering” of Russia as a colonizer, but in the prevalence of the Russian language and the Cyrillic transformation of the Kazakh language. A similar argument can also be made regarding the role of the Russian language in contemporary Ukraine, but the longer history of colonialism from the Russian Empire may explain why the post-Soviet experience of Ukraine has been more violent than that of Kazakhstan. With this “post-colonial” context in mind, I will now explore the particularly “post-Soviet” characteristics of these two countries, and explain how each region’s Soviet experiences have not only justified the sovereignty practiced by Ukraine and Kazakhstan, but also led to the major linguistic issues visible across the post-Soviet world.

LANGUAGE IN THE POST-SOVIET SPHERE

In post-Soviet Kazakhstan, language policies have now shifted towards multilingualism

as the government has recently adopted a wider approach of “multiculturalism” in developing its national identity.28 As the Soviet years saw the consolidation of the dominant Kazakh nation in the autonomous Soviet republic of Kazakhstan, independence initially seemed to promise a revival of Kazakh dominance and a reversal of roles between the Kazakh nation and the Russian “colonizers”. While the sheer number of Russian-speakers in Kazakhstan made such a transition practically impossible, the government now operates exclusively in the Kazakh language, and has taken measures to bolster the role of the national language and identity in contemporary Kazakhstan.29 Kazakhstan’s multilingualism policy has arguably been the most moderate of the post-Soviet states, but language is still at the forefront of identity politics through the Kazakh languages exclusive use in government. This plays an important role in the perpetuation of Kazakhstan’s single-party political system. For instance, a national ban on non-Kazakh speaking political parties helps sustain soft-authoritarian rule 27

Ibid.

Sagimbayeva, "Implementing Prospects of Multiculturalism Theory in Kazakhstan," Politické vedy, 153.

Yves-Marie Davenel, “Cultural mobilization in post-Soviet Kazakhstan: views from the state and from non-titular nationalities compared,”

Central Asian Survey, 31, no. 1, (2012), 17.

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by marginalizing non-Kazakh political interests, and thus aiding a president who has kept his seat in power for the country’s twenty-six years of independence.30

In post-Soviet Ukraine linguistic differences have also strongly fueled recent identity

politics, but in contrast to Kazakhstan the results have been grassroots nationalist movements rather than top-down government policy. As aforementioned, the simple dichotomy of colonizers/colonized does not sufficiently explain Ukraine’s long history with the Russian language. However, post-Soviet Ukraine is a particularly interesting case study since the years under Soviet reign, specifically the years of famine and terror under Stalin, are very recent in the country’s memory, and heavily influence modern historical imaginings of “Russian oppression.”31 Similar to Kazakhstan, where language is the main manifestation of modern identity politics, many Ukrainian nationalists use lingual differences to frame a larger history of conflict and oppression between Russia and the modern Ukrainian territory.32 For these Ukrainians, the Soviet years were the pinnacle of Russian oppression, when the Russian language was instituted as the language of bureaucracy in the region, and Ukrainians were generally persecuted and their identities eclipsed by the greater Soviet project.33

Beyond this frame of a perennial clash between Ukrainians and Russians, however,

many moderate Ukrainians challenge the notion that the Russian language has always simply been a colonial impression onto Ukrainian society.34 Language has thus been a major challenge in developing a contemporary Ukrainian national identity, and efforts at unity under the banner of the Ukrainian language isolate those Russian speakers whose roots in modern Ukraine may date back hundreds of years. Instead of adopting a clear policy on multilingualism, Ukrainian politics in recent years have characteristically alternated between asserting the dominance of the Ukrainian language to more friendly policies towards Russianspeaking minorities.35 These shifts in language policies are also often framed in the larger economic and political foreign relations of whichever regime holds power, with the escalation of a Russian language-friendly – and Russian Federation-friendly – regime being ousted in the Maidan protests and the ensuing revolution in 2013-14. Lingual differences will continue 30

Luong, The Transformation of Central Asia, 19.

Smith et al, Nation Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands, 40.

Ibid., 41

Ibid., 40.

Ibid., 23

Smith et al, Nation Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands, 46.

CONSTRUCTED VOICES

to be a challenge for modern Ukraine, with the recent annexation of Crimea by Russia and ongoing civil war in the Donbas region, illustrating the potentially violent manifestations of these problematic identity politics.

LINGUISTIC

NATIONALISM

THROUGH DIVISION

THE

POST-SOVIET

WORLD:

UNITY

Overall, this paper has explored the post-Soviet experiences of two of the fifteen

independent states to emerge from the Soviet Union, noting how national identity relies heavily on linguistic differences that specifically result from the Soviet experience. Whereas Ukraineâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s longer history of colonialism has created a comparatively more strained debate around the role of language in national identity, Kazakhstanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s multilingual approach has stymied any violent fruitions of identity politics, all the while keeping comfortable a soft-authoritarian political body. While this paper has focused specifically on the situations of Kazakhstan and Ukraine, this type of post-Soviet nationalism that relies heavily on language can be observed throughout the other Central Asian countries, the Baltic states, Transcaucasia, and certainly the Russian Federation.

These contemporary post-Soviet nationalisms are the product of Soviet experiences

and reactions to linguistic oppression during the Soviet years, which most often involved adopting Russian or transcribing a native language into the Cyrillic text. This paper has demonstrated that post-Soviet countries carry with them specific and nuanced experiences of lingual oppression from both the Soviet Union and earlier Russian imperialism, highlighting Ukraine and Kazakhstan as two key, comparative examples. While there are certainly other elements of post-Soviet nationalism, I urge scholars, policy-makers, and those interested in understanding this post-Soviet region to emphasize language as a crucial frame for analyzing nationalist movements across contemporary Eurasia. The experiences of Kazakhstan and Ukraine demonstrate how the language policies of the USSR have left open wounds on the social landscape. While in Kazakhstan these wounds have led to a single-party political system masked by quasi-multiculturalism, Ukraine has seen more violent conflicts emerge in the ongoing war in the Donbas region. Nevertheless, by understanding the post-Soviet states as products of their Soviet experiences, carrying the weight of their colonial histories, policymakers and civil society can work towards developing policies and cultures around language

MCCLELLAND

that celebrate identity without isolating linguistically marginalized groups.

APPENDIX

Gary F. Simons and Charles D. Fennig (eds.), “Kazakhstan” Ethnologue: Languages of the World, Twenty-first edition. Map. (2018).

Denali Marsh, “Ukraine’s Native Russian Speakers,” The Global Slate. Map. (2015).

COMMITTED ALLIES, POLAR OPPOSITES

Committed Allies, Polar Opposites

THE LIMITATIONS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE ARCTIC ELLA CHAMPION

NATO AND THE ARCTIC

Given the Arctic’s position on the military frontlines of the Cold War, as well as

both its proximity and relevance to the borders and interests of Russia and the four founding members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a casual observer might expect the Arctic to be a region of key strategic interest for NATO. However, even with the renewal of heightened tensions between Russia and Western states, which many have jumped to label a “new Cold War”,1 and with a thawing, increasingly accessible Arctic, NATO has not given the region the strategic attention a perfunctory examination of its history and geography might suggest is merited. Indeed, NATO has never expressed a specific Arctic strategy, and no mention of the Arctic has appeared in any NATO summit declaration in the past decade. For example, there is no mention of the Arctic in “NATO 2020”,2 the May 2010 report of expert recommendations compiled to inform the creation of NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept.3 Subsequently, there was no mention of the Arctic in the 2010 Strategic Concept itself.4 While the Arctic is indeed rapidly becoming an area of new and varied security challenges for Arctic states, those who are NATO members have not collectively responded to these developing challenges by re-orienting the organization’s attention toward the region.

The lack of a strong Arctic strategy for NATO is not an oversight, but the result

of its Arctic members seeking to maintain their own individual security equilibriums in the region. This paper will lay out how the diverging security interests of NATO’s Arctic member states divide them on the question of greater alliance involvement in the Far North. Norway (holding a longstanding position of wanting a greater NATO presence in the Arctic) and 1

For example, see: Sohrab Ahmari, “The New Cold War’s Arctic Front”, The Wall Street Journal, June 9, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/

the-new-cold-wars-arctic-front-1433872323; Michael Comte, “The North could become a frontline in a new Cold War”, Business Insider, April 23, 2015, http:// www.businessinsider.com/afp-arctic-nations-meet-under-threat-of-new-cold-war-2015-4. 2

NATO Group of Experts, NATO 2020; Assured Security, Dynamic Engagement (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2010), http://www.

The 2010 Strategic Concept is the latest outline of NATO’s official strategic priorities.

NATO, “Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation” (Lisbon, 2010), http://

nato.int/strategic-concept/expertsreport.pdf.

www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf.

CHAMPION

Canada (actively advocating against such a position), represent the “polar opposites” of a spectrum on the question, with the remaining three states (Denmark, Iceland, and the United States) each falling somewhere in the middle. This paper will then additionally outline the strong parallels between the context of NATO’s role in the high north, and that of Nordic defense integration. The individual interests of Nordic states, particularly in relation to the question of a formal Nordic collective security guarantee, have also prevented the deepening of security cooperation in the high north. The fact that a majority of NATO’s Arctic members have declined to seek more alliance involvement in the region, and that the Nordic countries have also declined to seek a formal collective security guarantee amongst themselves, points to a broader conclusion of collective security being too blunt a political instrument for maintaining stability in the high north’s political environment.

DIVERGING NATIONAL INTERESTS

NATO’s lack of a specific Arctic policy is primarily a result of the diverging interests

of its Arctic members. In “NATO and the Arctic”, Helga Haftendorn discusses how, despite the common interest in having NATO as a guarantor of stability and a provider of deterrence, “NATO’s Northern members… don’t have a common perspective on Arctic issues and the role the alliance should play. [...] They instead follow individual interests in the region.”5 Due to their particular geopolitical positions and national security interests in the region, the relevant Arctic member states not only hold differing positions on the potential character and extent of NATO’s Arctic involvement, but polar opposite views on whether the alliance ought to have any active presence in the Arctic whatsoever. These political and geographic incentives that the five states in question hold regarding alliance involvement in the Arctic effectively divide them into three blocs. The first bloc is comprised of Norway, which has long supported more active NATO involvement in the high north. The second includes Denmark and Iceland, who have not shown enthusiasm for greater “hard security” (military security) involvement, but who do show support for many regional security integration initiatives. The third group includes Canada and the United States (US), respectively strongly and passively opposed to increased NATO involvement in the region due in large part to their capacity to 5

Helga Haftendorn, "NATO and the Arctic: Is the Atlantic Alliance a Cold War Relic in a Peaceful Region Now Faced with Non-military

Challenges?" European Security 20:3 (2011), http://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/doi/full/10.1080/09662839.2011.608352?scroll=top&needAc cess=true : 345.

COMMITTED ALLIES, POLAR OPPOSITES

resolve their own particular Arctic security-related concerns within their own independent frameworks.

In discussing how diverging national interests discourage Arctic NATO states from

using the alliance as a tool for collective security in the region, it is important to note that the Arctic contemporarily has largely been an area of constructive and peaceful interstate engagement. Political challenges that have arisen in the region have been of a sort best addressed through more specifically mutualistic – rather than security-based – organizations.6 Although the Ukraine crisis in 2014 led to further deterioration of West-Russia relations in general, this mainly cooperative state of affairs in the Arctic has largely held. The security stakes in the region, for the moment, remain relatively low. This creates a context where individual nations prioritize other considerations ahead of collective security where they see fit.

NORWAY

Norway has long considered NATO membership to be the cornerstone of its own

security.7,8 Norway, amongst others, lobbied for specific mention of the Arctic in the documents of the 2009 Strasbourg-Kehl NATO summit, as well as those of NATO’s key 2010 Lisbon summit (an effort stymied primarily by Canada).9 While it is widely acknowledged that there is overall virtually no foreseeable risk of interstate conflict in the Arctic,10 renewed Russian territorial aggression in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (as of 2014) highlight the potentially sensitive position states bordering Russia face, even if significant tensions that might arise in the Arctic would likely only do so as a result of political ‘spillover’ from events elsewhere in the world. In the words of Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg at a US-Nordic Leaders Summit in 2016: “We don’t believe they [Russia] are a threat to us directly. But what we know is if something happens in the world, the north is a strategically important area.”11 Within NATO, Norway has sought to draw back emphasis from the overseas missions that have gained 6

Michael Byers, International Law and the Arctic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013): 1-9.

Norwegian Ministry of Defense, Capable Force: Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces (Norwegian Ministry of Defense, 2010), https://

Haftendorn, “NATO and the Arctic,” 345.

www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/FD/Dokumenter/Capable-force_strategic-concept.pdf, n.p. 9

Ibid, 342.

Byers, “International Law and the Arctic,” 248.

Thomas Nilsen, “Arctic security, climate and resources in focus at U.S.-Nordic Leaders’ Summit,” The Independent Barents Observer, May 14,

2016, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2016/05/arctic-security-climate-and-resources-focus-us-nordic-leaders-summit. Haftendorn, “NATO and the Arctic,” 346.

CHAMPION

much of NATO’s focus in recent years and toward strengthening the alliance’s “core function” of providing for the defence of the territory of its member states. As outlined in a 2010 Defense Ministry document, Norway is “actively engaged” in this debate, and has “presented a number of concrete proposals” for enhancing NATO operations with this regional focus, a contentious prospect within the alliance.12,13 Norway’s attempts to turn NATO’s attention toward the high north and its own security – which is increasingly synonymous with Arctic security – face challenges not just in terms of rank in alliance priorities, but in terms of deeper questions about NATO’s role in the region. These questions have been a source of deep disagreement among NATO member states.

DENMARK

While significantly less invested in the issue than Norway, Denmark’s stance on NATO

Arctic involvement, particularly when compared to the attitudes of its North American allies, can still be qualified as favourable. Given that Denmark’s security concerns in the Arctic consist only of matters concerning Greenland (for which Denmark maintains security and foreign policy responsibility),14 NATO’s security guarantee covering these territories is integrally valuable for Denmark. However, due to Greenland’s position, Danish geopolitical concerns in the Arctic actually resemble those of Canada and the US more closely than those of Norway: Arctic security threats to Danish interests are strategic, not existential. Denmark has also made the Arctic more of a military priority in recent years, “assuming that new human activities will enhance the geostrategic significance” of the region,15 and emphasised its intention of working more closely with regional partners.16 Denmark’s 2020 Arctic strategy outline contains almost no mention of an increased role for NATO in the region, and instead emphasizes cooperation within other bodies, particularly the Arctic Council, the “Arctic 5” (the

Norwegian Ministry of Defense, “Capable Force”, 34.

The idea of “regional” emphases for the alliance is a point of contention: one Danish proposal for the establishment of a special Arctic

committee or other body within NATO to deal specifically with Arctic issues was rejected specifically on the grounds of the alliance having “functional, not regional tasks.” (Haftendorn, “NATO and the Arctic,” 354, 355). 14

While Greenland has gained a measure of independence from Denmark, including limited self-government since 1979, Denmark still maintains

Haftendorn, “NATO and the Arctic,” 347.

Kingdom of Denmark, Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greenland Department of Foreign

responsibility for its foreign affairs and national security.

Affairs, Faroes Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011), http://um.dk/en/foreign-policy/the-arctic, 49.

COMMITTED ALLIES, POLAR OPPOSITES

Arctic coastal states, parties to the Ilulissat Declaration), and amongst the Nordic countries.17 Denmark could thus most accurately be thought of as a potential passive supporter of greater NATO involvement in the Arctic, but has shown little desire to actively promote such a role for the alliance.

ICELAND

Iceland was amongst the countries requesting a specific reference to the Arctic in

the 2010 Lisbon summit documents.18 Nonetheless, Iceland, like Denmark, would have little use for an increase in NATO’s hard security presence in the Arctic. As a demilitarized country, NATO membership and the military security it provides is an important aspect of Iceland’s security.19 Indeed, most of the military security presence of any kind in the country consists of NATO-authorized air patrols of Icelandic airspace, carried out by a rotation of member states.20 However, as with the vast majority of the region, any direct security threat to Iceland remains theoretical, and Iceland today concerns itself almost entirely with ‘soft’ or civilian aspects of security, such as Search and Rescue and Coast Guard activities. A 2011 parliamentary resolution outlining the overarching principles of Iceland’s Arctic policy included “safeguarding broadly defined security interests in the Arctic region through civilian means and working against any kind of militarisation of the Arctic.”21 Avoiding the impression of pushing for Arctic militarization has become important in Icelandic domestic politics,22 and so NATO’s modern emphasis on soft security and preparation for threats from non-state actors makes working closely with the alliance potentially somewhat more politically appealing in Iceland.23

The Ilulissat Declaration of 2008 by the five Arctic coastal states (Canada, the US, Norway, Russia, and Denmark) included a public re-

commitment to collective adherence to the international law of the sea as the primary mechanism for resolving any disputes over maritime boundaries in the Arctic, and to cooperation on other matters pertaining to governance of Arctic waters. The declaration raised controversy over its exclusion of the three other Arctic states (Iceland, Finland, and Sweden) and Arctic Indigenous groups. 18

Haftendorn, “NATO and the Arctic,” 342.

Ibid, 348.

Ibid, 343.

Althingi, Iceland, A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy, (Leg. Sess. 139, 2011), https://www.mfa.is/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/

Haftendorn, “NATO and the Arctic,” 349.

Alyson JK Bailes and Kristmundur Þór Ólafsson, “Nordic and Arctic Affairs: Iceland’s National Security Policy: Latest Progress,” Small State

A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policy-approved-by-Althingi.pdf, 2.

Briefs – University of Iceland Centre for Small State Studies (2014), http://ams.hi.is/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Small-State-Briefs-4_Bailes-and-Olafsson.pdf, 2.

CHAMPION

The US overall does not have a history of making the Arctic a geopolitical priority.

While it has not shown any significant opposition to an increased NATO presence in the Arctic (and was among the countries asking for specific language on the Arctic in the StrasbourgKehl summit declaration),24 the US does not have “high expectations” with regard to NATO activity in the Far North.25 Thus, while NATO values American support of various securityrelated operations in the high north, NATO is not, in turn, “a primary US vehicle for ensuring Arctic security.”26 The low priority level of collective Arctic security for the US overall, as illustrated by this somewhat “low-key”27 Arctic policy, combined with the lack of significant territorial security concerns in the Arctic, mean that NATO’s cornerstone nation has not shown any significant will to address security in the north through any broadly collective means. The US instead focuses its efforts on addressing its own concerns through more unilateral and bilateral initiatives.

CANADA

Canada has, in the recent past, been the primary voice of opposition to increased

NATO involvement in the Arctic.28 While the specific basis for Canada’s opposition to expansion of NATO involvement in the region remains somewhat unclear,29 a number of theories exist. For example, there has been speculation that, in 2009 – the year of the Strasbourg-Kehl summit – the Canadian government was resentful towards other alliance members over their reluctance to expand their role in the NATO mission in Afghanistan.30 More pertinently, it has been suggested that Canada harbours a concern that a new institution’s involvement in the Arctic could potentially upset the current political balances over its claims to Hans Island, the Beaufort Sea boundary, and the Northwest Passage.31 The US, on the 24

Haftendorn, “NATO and the Arctic,” 350.

Michał Łuszczuk, "The Formation of NATO’s Approach to the Arctic in the First Decade of the 21st Century", in NATO: Towards the Challenges of

Haftendorn, “NATO and the Arctic,” 351.

Ibid, 350.

Łuszczuk, “The Formation of NATO’s Approach to the Arctic,” 204.

Rob Huebert, “NATO, NORAD, and the Arctic: A Renewed Concern”, in North of 60: Toward a Renewed Canadian Arctic Agenda, ed. John

a Contemporary World, ed. Robert Czulda and Robert Łoś, (Warsaw-Lodz: International Relations Research Institute in Warsaw, 2013), 204.

Higginbotham and Jennifer Spence, (Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2016), https://issuu.com/cigi/docs/north_of_60_special_ report_lowres?e=4209517/39035005, 96. 30

Ibid., 96.

Haftendorn, “NATO and the Arctic,” 341.

COMMITTED ALLIES, POLAR OPPOSITES

other hand, similarly does not consider NATO to be a desirable forum for discussion on the Northwest Passage.32 While these territorial disputes remain outstanding for Canada, the strong bilateral relationships within which they are being disputed likely promise simpler and more productive solutions than potentially opening negotiations to intrusions by other states via NATO involvement. On this note, in a cable describing a 2010 meeting between then-Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper and then-NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen released on Wikileaks, Harper expressed the belief “that some non-Arctic members favoured a NATO role in the Arctic because it would afford them influence in an area where ‘they don't belong.’”33 Harper also reiterated that there is “no likelihood” of war between Arctic states, that Canada had “a good working relationship” with Russia in Arctic affairs, and that “a NATO presence could backfire by exacerbating tensions.”34

Overall, more NATO involvement in the Arctic would not provide Canada or the

US with security guarantees that they are not already able to establish via other means and associations. Instead, increased NATO involvement could potentially insert unwanted complications into issues that are already on an acceptable trajectory for both nations. Canada and the US have no impetus to further involve NATO in an area where they already enjoy generally stable security and a generally good – while not so robust as to be taken for granted – working relationship with Russia, despite being overwhelmingly politically at odds with Russia in other settings.

Overall, the possibility of expanded NATO involvement in the Arctic is hindered by

the differing wants and needs of its Arctic members, some of which specifically reject collective security in the region in the interest of not destabilizing the specific security equilibriums that they have established there.

NORDIC SECURITY INTEGRATION

Questions around collective security amongst the Nordic countries additionally

highlight how diverging domestic security interests supersede attempts at integrated or collective security in the high north. Despite the Nordic countries’ general high degree of 32

Ibid., 352.

“Canadian Pm And NATO S-G Discuss Afghanistan, The Strategic Concept, And The Arctic”. January 20, 2010, Wikileaks, https://wikileaks.

Ibid.

org/plusd/cables/10OTTAWA21_a.html.

CHAMPION

political cooperation and tight historical and social linkages, security is a sphere in which their differing geographic situations and political affiliations have historically waylaid significant cooperation.35 The same basis for the unpopularity of collective security in the Arctic that has blocked NATO involvement in high north can be seen in the diverging reactions of the Nordic countries to the possibility of their own Nordic mutual defense guarantee. This was illustrated by responses to a 2008 proposal for such a guarantee made by former Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Thorvald Stoltenberg as part of his report on possible areas of increased Nordic security integration (also known as the Stoltenberg Report).36 The diverging national security interests of the Nordic countries precluded the adoption of Stoltenberg’s proposed mutual defense guarantee, much in the same way that diverging national interests preclude the establishment of a stronger NATO presence in the high north.

No Nordic country was distinctly in favour of Stoltenberg’s proposed mutual defense

guarantee, but bases for their opposition were all unique, stemming from each country’s individual geopolitical positions, outside alliances, and political traditions. For Sweden, any formal mutual security agreement, even one between Nordic nations, remains off the table, in no small part due to the strength of the Swedish political tradition of neutrality. The Swedish government has essentially signalled that a security guarantee amounts to the upper limit to its participation in Nordic defense cooperation.37 Finland’s negative position towards a security guarantee is informed by its geographic position and the difficulty of guaranteeing support in the event of a conflict between Russia and a Western ally.38 Denmark’s overall position toward the Stoltenberg Report was tempered by the fundamentally different outlook of Danish security policy than those of all other Nordic countries. Denmark’s defense strategy has moved entirely away from any focus on defending its home territory39 – a luxury that geography does not grant any other Nordic state. A Nordic security guarantee would thus have significantly less value for Denmark than for its neighbours. Norway proved hesitant to support the idea of a Nordic security guarantee for the fear of conflicts with its pre-existing

Clive Archer, “The Stoltenberg Report and Nordic Security: Big Idea, Small Steps,” in Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2010, ed. Nanna Hvidt and

Thorvald Stoltenberg, Nordic Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy, presented to extraordinary meeting of Nordic Foreign Ministers, Oslo,

Archer, “The Stoltenberg Report”, 60.

Ibid., 61.

Ibid, 67.

Hans Mouritzen. (Danish Institute for International Studies, 2010): 44.

February 9 2009, https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/UD/Vedlegg/nordicreport.pdf, 5.

COMMITTED ALLIES, POLAR OPPOSITES

commitment to NATO’s Article 5 – the alliance’s guarantee of collective defense.40

The Nordic countries’ geopolitical differences and web of conflicting outside

allegiances have also undermined Nordic defense cooperation in other ways, such as participation in Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO). Conceived in 2009 as an amalgamation of a number of pre-existing cooperation arrangements,41 NORDEFCO is a coordination structure with a rotating national chair designed to streamline cooperation on defense issues between the Nordic countries. Participation in NORDEFCO has been, however, tempered by its member states’ concerns about maintaining sovereign control over national defense.42 These concerns mostly boil down to states’ reluctance to yield military power to other states, even to close Nordic neighbours – with whom they do not share or have fundamental security allegiances. Namely, NORDEFCO’s struggles have mostly fallen along the lines of two security blocs within the Nordic countries: Norway and Denmark, wary of any security commitment that would detract from a full commitment to NATO; and Sweden and Finland, careful not to undermine their non-alignment by too strong a security link to any NATO country.43 In the absence of a full mutual security guarantee, such as the one suggested in the Stoltenberg Report, there are distinct limits to the extent to which the Nordic states will be willing to surrender control of security infrastructure to any kind of collective arrangement. Differences in national security stances, based on geopolitical positions and outside affiliations, have thus made coming together behind a formal guarantee of collective security, or even too high a degree of military integration, politically difficult. These difficulties in many ways parallel the complications faced by NATO with regards to the Arctic – in a security environment where actual risk is relatively low, the benefits of defense cooperation seldom outweigh the value to states of maintaining political manoeuvrability. Overall, the carefully balanced and geographically specific national security positions by states in the high north tend to disqualify the use of formal collective security or full defense cooperation as political tools in the region.

Ibid., 64

“The Basics About NORDEFCO”, NORDEFCO, accessed October 30, 2016, http://www.nordefco.org/the-basics-about-nordefco.

Håkon Lunde Saxi, “Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO): Balancing Efficiency and Sovereignty, NATO and Nonalignment,” in

Lunde Saxi, “Nordic Defence Cooperation”, 68.

Perspectives on European Security, (Helsinki: STETE- the Finnish Committee for European Security, 2013), 70.

CHAMPION

CONCLUSION: SECURITY FEEDBACK LOOPS

The divergent interests of the Arctic NATO member states and lack of incentives for

these states to push for greater regional involvement for the alliance means that there is little probability of NATO becoming more involved in the Arctic in the foreseeable future. Similar dynamics can also be seen in the overall lack of interest amongst the Nordic countries to commiting to collective security amongst themselves, such as a mutual defense guarantee or full commitment to NORDEFCO. This state of affairs is permitted by, and itself contributes to, the generally stable and peaceful security equilibrium that exists in the Arctic region, which has been strained but not fundamentally disrupted by political events elsewhere in the world. It is hard to imagine a scenario wherein more NATO involvement in the Arctic would not lead to a more bipolar conception of Arctic relations between Russia and the West, and a shift toward a more security-focused dialogue in the region overall. Involving NATO in international Arctic affairs runs the risk of starting a political feedback loop – a type of security dilemma – wherein a greater security focus on the region and the responses of an alienated Russia would build on each other. Based on the reluctance amongst a majority of Western states to invoke a collective security presence in the Arctic, we can conclude that collective security has been seen as too heavy-handed a political tool for use in the finelytuned atmosphere of balance and general cooperation between otherwise antagonistic spheres that exist in the Arctic. The maintenance of mostly normal relations in the Arctic between Russia and the West, despite deteriorated relations elsewhere in the world, is not incidental, but a result of willingness by both sides to consciously compartmentalize and insulate Arctic cooperation from the larger security landscape.44 It is difficult to imagine that maintaining this state of affairs post-Ukraine would not have been significantly more difficult if the Arctic players involved had been Russia and a northern arm of NATO, rather than Russia and its individual fellow Arctic Council states. Given the unique geopolitical security strategies that hold sway in most Arctic countries, a broader role for collective security in the region has overall been, quite simply, more trouble than it would be worth.

MOVING FORWARD – THE ARCTIC AS A GLOBAL ECHO CHAMBER

The overall rejection of hard-power international politics in the Arctic region means

Bailes, “Small States in the Arctic”, 2.

COMMITTED ALLIES, POLAR OPPOSITES

that the possibility of any future role for NATO in the region will depend on the alliance’s ability to perform much more subtle security functions than the collective security purpose it was originally established for. The Arctic may also serve as a sort of echo chamber for the impacts of actions and stances taken by the alliance on other situations and issues around the world. While the risk of interstate conflict occurring in the Arctic over actual Arctic regional issues is fairly negligible, the risks of conflict elsewhere in the world upsetting the political dynamics of the region, or even potentially causing conflict to occur there, are more significant. This could be seen as applying to actual territorial security issues in the Arctic’s neighbourhood, such as the Baltic, or issues further afield that have implications for the transnational security issues that are concerns in the Arctic. These include border security, smuggling, and the security of energy projects. For example, in early 2015, migration flows primarily from Syria into the European Schengen zone45 via Russia resulted in controversial deportations by Norwegian authorities of migrants back into Russia,46 the building of a fence by Norway at the border,47 and a closure of the Russia-Finland border to all third-country citizens.48 The political complications around how to handle an unprecedented movement of people through Arctic borders – a problem whose source has nothing to do with the Arctic whatsoever – is symbolic of the type of challenges that have a real possibility of impacting Arctic security in the future.

Haftendorn suggests that while NATO’s role in projecting power in the Arctic has

become somewhat obsolete, the alliance might still find a role for itself in the Arctic from within its developing soft security mandate. These include contributing to things such as search and rescue networks and providing air and maritime presences.49 While hard power has come back to the forefront of European geopolitics as a result of Crimea and the Ukraine crisis, there has not been enough tangible political spillover from the crisis into the Arctic region to suggest that this conclusion does not still point to the most productive potential way forward for the alliance in the region. 45

Andrew Higgins, “Avoiding Risky Seas, Migrants Reach Europe With an Arctic Bike Ride”, New York Times, October 9, 2015, http://www.

Al-Jazeera, “Refugees in Arctic Norway resist deportation plans”, Al-Jazeera, January 19, 2016,

Reuters, “Norway Will Build a Fence at Its Arctic Border With Russia”, New York Times, August 24, 2016, http://www.nytimes.

Atle Staalesen, “Finland, Russia close border for third-country citizens”, The Independent Barents Observer, March 23, 2016, http://

Haftendorn, “NATO and the Arctic,” 355.

nytimes.com/2015/10/10/world/europe/bypassing-the-risky-sea-refugees-reach-europe-through-the-arctic.html. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/refugees-arctic-norway-160119043144709.html.

com/2016/08/25/world/europe/russia-norway-border-fence-refugees.html?_r=0

thebarentsobserver.com/en/2016/03/finland-russia-close-border-third-country-citizens

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On the Subjectivity of Universal Value

THE INTERSECTION OF WORLD HERITAGE AND THE ENVIRONMENT ANNIE LEE

INTRODUCTION

The creation of the 1972 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural

Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Convention signalled a shift in the realm of international politics, conceptualizing a distinct approach to international security through the recognition of cultural and natural heritage belonging to the international community. This intergovernmental agreement promotes the protection of cultural and natural heritage for future generations, calling for states to identify heritage sites to be placed under this title. As of 2018, 193 states have ratified the Convention and 1,073 World Heritage Sites have been designated.1 The World Heritage Convention integrates conservation and preservation,2 constructing obligations erga omnes partes by allowing countries to take responsibility to conserve heritage sites within their national boundaries for the international community.3

Article 2 of the World Heritage Convention defines natural heritage as environmental,

geological, and physiological formations or sites which have outstanding universal value for aesthetic, scientific, or conservation purposes.4 Signatory states have a duty to identify and safeguard these areas through national policies and services, or by means of international assistance or cooperation. In theory, the World Heritage Convention provides an unprecedented foundation by which the international community can work together to preserve and protect critical areas threatened by environmental degradation. However, common to many international agreements, reality exposes a discrepancy between the ideal and its implementation. While the UNESCO World Heritage Convention conceptualizes soft power framed around norm-creation with the placement of universal value on areas within national territories, the impact of this designation, especially in the case of natural heritage, 1

"World Heritage List," UNESCO World Heritage Centre, 2018, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/.

Lynn Meskell, "UNESCOâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;S World Heritage Convention at 40," Current Anthropology 54, no. 4 (2013): 483, doi:10.1086/671136.

Roger O'Keefe, "World Cultural Heritage: Obligations To The International Community As A Whole?" International And Comparative Law

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage

Quarterly 53, no. 1 (2004): 190, doi:10.1093/iclq/53.1.189. (Paris: UNESCO World Heritage Centre, 1972).

ON THE SUBJECTIVITY OF UNIVERSAL VALUE

has been limited.5 What substantial effect does the concept of universal value have on natural heritage? This paper argues that despite some successes in environmental conservation, accompanied by spillover social and economic benefits, the UNESCO World Heritage concept is hindered by unintended consequences on the heritage site itself, the politics of site designation, an inability to address the specificities of natural heritage sites, and institutional limitations.

SUCCESSES Direct effects of World Heritage status

The UNESCO World Heritage Convention and inscription on the list of World

Heritage encourages states to take action in conserving heritage sites. This also allows access to the provision of technical assistance and financial support through the World Heritage Fund, which allocates funds according to urgency, government capacity, and the importance of safeguarding the site.6 Well-known effects of UNESCO designation include increased attention and improved protection of sites as designation can draw attention from the general public, decision-makers, potential donors, and for-profit firms,7 which can in turn generate other positive spillover effects by providing incentives for further conservation.8

Along with World Heritage designation comes prestige and opportunity. A 2008

study on the effects of World Heritage status on United States (US) national parks revealed an overall consensus that the title was useful in amassing more funding within the US park management system, and being part of the World Heritage list meant access to sharing of ideas and opportunities for collaboration among the international community.9 Moreover, UNESCO designation is beneficial in areas where there are previously undetected heritage sites, commercially exploited land, inadequate public resources, insufficient political controls, or a lack of technical knowledge.10 World Heritage sites become symbols of national pride 5

O’Keefe. “World Cultural Heritage,” 202 – 203.

Bruno S. Frey and Lasse Steiner, "World Heritage List: Does It Make Sense?” International Journal Of Cultural Policy 17, no. 5 (2011): 556, doi:10.10

Bruno S. Frey, Paolo Pamini and Lasse Steiner, "Explaining the World Heritage List: An Empirical Study," International Review of Economics 60,

Frey and Steiner, “World Heritage List,” 558-559.

Helen Hazen, "“Of Outstanding Universal Value”: The Challenge of Scale in Applying the World Heritage Convention at National Parks in the

Frey and Steiner, “World Heritage List,” 567-568.

80/10286632.2010.541906.

no. 1 (2013): 3, doi:10.1007/s12232-013-0174-4.

US," Geoforum 39, no. 1 (2008): 257, doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2007.05.007.

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and can generate regional value through increased tourism. In 2012, a study conducted by the Centre for Development and Environment at the University of Bern determined that 63% of management in surveyed natural heritage sites stated that tourism was a prominent source of additional funding for conservation efforts.11

Nonetheless, it is imperative to note that the World Heritage Convention is not

binding as states are free to adopt their own laws, though its influence is evident in usage of sustainability language in new policies. World Natural Heritage status can foster stricter conservation regimes – for example, at sites such as Mount Kenya, projects successfully replaced fuelwood collected from protected forest areas with alternative fuel sources to reduce environmental pressure.12 Thus, the concept of “world natural heritage” can act as a vessel to link environmental and economic institutions while coupling international and national governance. States can subsequently adopt policies that are relevant to the specificities of their natural heritage sites, and the status that comes along with the World Heritage title can add symbolic and economic value. Indirect effects of World Heritage status

World Heritage designation can not only trigger positive adjustments in economic

value, symbolic value, and management of natural sites, but can also lead to positive spillover effects in local communities. From a sociocultural perspective, World Natural Heritage status can lead to a rise in environmental education and awareness, where local communities advocate for and practice greater conservation. For example, in the Mount Kilimanjaro region, the tourism generated by a prominent and picturesque waterfall encouraged local communities to modify their agricultural use of this water source, as tourism was more profitable. As well, the resulting modest use of water benefited communities downstream, as they had additional water resources.13

The management of World Natural Heritage sites also highlights the prevalence of

grassroots movements and participatory democracy in local communities that ensure the protection and preservation of natural heritage. The governance of the Ennedi Massif site 11

Katharina Conradin and Thomas Hammer, "Making the Most of World Natural Heritage—Linking Conservation and Sustainable Regional

Conradin and Hammer, “Making the Most of World Natural Heritage,” 323.

Ibid., 323.

Development?” Sustainability 8, no. 12 (2016): 323, doi:10.3390/su8040323.

ON THE SUBJECTIVITY OF UNIVERSAL VALUE

in Chad is an example of local participation. Since 1999, the National Centre for Research Support of Chad and the University of Cologne have collaborated on endeavors to expand technical files and management for the site, and throughout this process, the local population has been involved in discussions and decision-making. This demonstrates the potential of cooperation between traditional and institutional management systems while linking social and environmental spheres in governance, in addition to the simultaneous development of international information-sharing and increased domestic capacity-building.14 The management of the Bwindi Impenetrable National Park and the Rwenzori Mountains National Park in Uganda also offers positive examples of collaboration between conservation efforts, economic generation, and social benefits. These two parks are major sources of biodiversity, but were threatened by harvesting, poaching, and unsustainable water use both by Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Wildlife Act, passed in 2000, put in place revenue-sharing schemes between the two states and a tourism regime that benefited local communities. Under this legislation, the Ugandan Wildlife Authority allocates 20% of park entry fees generated from tourism to local populations for development projects and livelihood improvement, such as supporting 170 community groups who have established small income-generating projects. As of 2016, this regime has disbursed over $3.5 million USD to local communities.15 In addition, the Ugandan government also oversees the water supply in these areas, provides irrigation to local populations for everyday and agricultural use, and invests in the development of hydropower projects. Overall, the example of Uganda offers a balance between sustainable environmental policies coupled with efforts to address social issues such as poverty alleviation.16 However, as promising as this narrative appears, sustainable management of the site will be a significant challenge given the threat of pressures such as human activity, rising populations, and receding glaciers. There is a division between the needs of the environment and of society which can be difficult to balance. As such, the designation of World Natural Heritage can also be a double-edged sword.

Baba Mallaye and Stefan Krรถpelin, "Ennedi Massif, Chad: A Cultural and Natural Gem," World Heritage, no. 82 (2016): 31-37, http://whc.

John Makombo, "Wealth Creation through Conservation: National Parks, Uganda," World Heritage, no. 82 (2016): 41-42, http://whc.unesco.org/

Ibid., 42.

unesco.org/en/review/82. en/review/82.

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FAILURES Consequences of UNESCO designation

While securing a place on the coveted World Heritage List can encourage consideration

and conservation of natural sites, the increased attention and value given to these areas can lead to increases in human pressure and conflict with national laws. A 2016 study published in the journal Biological Conservation revealed that 63% of analyzed UNESCO natural heritage sites experienced increases in human-induced pressures such as tourism, economic activity, and agricultural use since 1993. Furthermore, out of the areas analyzed, 91% experienced a loss in forests, attributed to factors such as wildlife poaching, resource use, tourism pressure, and climate change effects.17 The tourism industry in particular profits immensely from World Heritage status and thus has a vested interest in securing and exploiting designation. This can lead to the substitution effect of allocating funds from other natural sites to the List site, while simultaneously contributing to degradation of the List site through increased human activities.18 Another negative dimension of World Heritage status is unwanted attention. Heritage sites become salient targets during conflicts, such as the case of ISIS targeting cultural heritage sites in Syria,19 leading to further deterioration and destruction.20

The World Heritage Convention succeeds on the basis that international norms

are incorporated into national laws. However, this can result in overlapping legislation and uncertainty in interpretation. A study of the US parks management system showed that obtaining UNESCO status did not lead to improvements in the administration, and park management rarely used the designation to promote tourism or increase environmental protection given that US federal laws already had such mechanisms in place. In this sense, the UNESCO designation became more of a superficial title rather than an instrument to encompass international standards and a commitment to sustainability and conservation in national consciousness. The discord between international and federal law was also illustrated by the addition and removal of Yellowstone Park to the List of World Heritage in Danger. In 17

Michael Slezak, "More Than 100 Natural World Heritage Sites Degraded by Human Activity, Says Report," The Guardian, January 31, 2017,

Frey and Steiner, “World Heritage List,” 563.

Anne Barnard, "ISIS Speeds up Destruction of Antiquities in Syria," The New York Times, August 24, 2015, https://www.nytimes.

Frey and Steiner, World Heritage List,” 564.

https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jan/31/more-than-100-natural-world-heritage-sites-degraded-by-human-activity-says-report.

com/2015/08/25/world/isis-accelerates-destruction- of-antiquities-in-syria.html.

ON THE SUBJECTIVITY OF UNIVERSAL VALUE

1995, Yellowstone Park was placed on this list due to the proposal of a mine and evidence of declining wildlife – however, this act was opposed by the US government and led to a reintroduction of the American Land Sovereignty Protection Act in Congress.21 The Land Sovereignty Protection Act would lessen UNESCO influence by merit of congressional approval needed for any new List nominations, as politicians argued that international conservation efforts threatened US sovereignty.22 The removal of Yellowstone Park from the List of World Heritage in Danger was also met with international protest that underlying threats to the site were not addressed, demonstrating the limits of international organizations and the complexity of intersections between national and international interests. The pursuit of World Heritage Status can also result in tensions with other international norms, such as social concerns and the marginalization of certain local groups. In Thailand, the establishment of government-controlled protected areas for forests and biodiversity conservation that began in the 1950s overlooked Indigenous groups as traditional residents of these areas, thus forcing them to resettle. The World Heritage Committee failed to address the social implications that followed Thailand’s nomination proposal of these forested areas in 1991, demonstrating the overlap and paradox of international advocacy of social rights and environmental protection.23

Another aspect to consider is the asymmetry between cultural and natural heritage

sites: the World Heritage Convention has appeared to revolve more around the issue of cultural heritage, which does a disservice to addressing the specificities of natural heritage sites. Cultural heritage – defined in the Convention as monuments, groups of buildings, or sites – are highly subject to the volatility of politics, such as disputed histories, individual biases, and religious tensions, while natural heritage sites are subject to factors such as resource-heavy economy activity, pollution, and climate change.24 However, the nature of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention does not distinguish heavily between the distinctive attributes of cultural and natural heritage, and other agreements under UNESCO’s mandate refer overwhelmingly to cultural heritage. For example, the 1995 International Institute for the Unification of private law (UNIDROIT) agreement facilitates cooperation between states 21

Hazen, “Of outstanding universal value,” 257-259.

Ibid., 258-259.

Reiner Buergin, "Contested Rights of Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples in Conflicts over Biocultural Diversity: The Case of Karen

Meskell, “UNESCO's World Heritage Convention at 40,” 485.

Communities in Thung Yai, A World Heritage Site in Thailand," Modern Asian Studies 49, no. 6 (2015): 2032-2059, doi:10.1017/s0026749x14000390).

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and commercial parties solely on cultural property. Moreover, “value” itself is contextual and heterogenic and states often have differing visions of what constitutes “universal value.”25 This seemingly contradicts the UNESCO ambition of recognizing and preserving sites of “universal value” – the designation process of which further echoes the subjectivity in defining “universal value.”

BECOMING A WORLD HERITAGE SITE: THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE The politics of designation

Prior to obtaining World Heritage status, a state must first undergo the designation

process. Claiming heritage is one of the ways to bolster nationalism, foster social identity, and contribute to a sentiment of belonging or exclusion.26 In August 2016, Canadian Environment Minister Catherine McKenna called for the Canadian public to suggest sites for nomination for the World Heritage List in commemoration of Canada’s 150th year.27 This action demonstrates an implicit use of World Heritage status as an immediate political tool to promote national pride, contrasting with the explicit intention of World Heritage designation to preserve and protect sites for future generations. Undoubtedly, being designated on the World Heritage List accompanies prominence and monetary revenue. Therefore, obtaining World Heritage status is very lucrative and the process of designation is not objective or apolitical.

The process of designation is outlined in the Convention: a site must meet at least

one of ten criteria, and the process begins with a state nomination, followed by inscription proposals and evaluation of sites by Advisory Boards, culminating in a final decision made by the World Heritage Committee.28 All substantive power – deciding the composition of the World Heritage List, the List of World Heritage in Danger, disbursing funds from the World Heritage Fund, and distributing financial assistance – is concentrated in the Committee, which is made up of 21 members elected by the General Assembly, a body formed by all 25

Frey and Steiner, “World Heritage List,” 560.

Michael Dumper and Craig Larkin, "The Politics of Heritage and the Limitations of International Agency in Contested Cities: A Study of the

"Environment Minister Seeks UNESCO World Heritage Site Nominations," CTV News, August 8, 2016, http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage.

Role of UNESCO in Jerusalem's Old City," Review of International Studies 38, no. 1 (2011): 26, doi:10.1017/s026021051100026x. environment-minister- seeks-unesco-world-heritage-site-nominations-1.3019533.

ON THE SUBJECTIVITY OF UNIVERSAL VALUE

signatory members of the Convention.29 Similar to other international institutions, Article 13 of the Convention states that decision-making by the Committee is to be taken by a two-thirds majority of voting members present. Nonetheless, decision-making is usually done through consensus, illustrating the intergovernmental nature and lack of supranational influence embodied by the Convention. Moreover, findings suggest that verbal intervention and informal consultations in the Committee are influenced by cultural, political, and economic relationships between the nominating nations.30 There are also geopolitical voting blocs, one of the most effective being the BRICS (coalition of five major emerging economies, namely Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), through which Brazil and India have both prevented national parks with mining interests from obtaining designation.31 Additionally, in 2012, South Africa objected to the proposed placement of the Mapungubwe Cultural Landscape on the endangered list after UNESCO’s advisory bodies produced reports regarding the destructive impacts of mining in the site.32 Indian and Russian delegates voiced criticism about these reports in support of South Africa, which ultimately led to a deadlock.33 The political and economic incentives and pressures exerted by states on the designation process, resulting in “questionable selection”, also lead to a lack of objectivity in determining the fulfilment of the criterion of sites with “universal value”.34 Furthermore, a 2010 audit of the Committee revealed that the decisions taken within the Committee increasingly diverged from scientific opinions from the Advisory Bodies – this finding threatens the credibility and reliability of the institution, as there is growing emphasis on political pressures in lieu of assessment exclusively on heritage value.35

INSTITUTIONAL SHORTCOMINGS

The distribution of designated heritage sites is also highly unequal as a majority of

sites are located in Europe and North America. As of 2018, 47.16% of sites are located in Europe and North America, 23.58% located in Asia and the Pacific, 12.95% located in Latin 29

Frey and Steiner, “World Heritage List,” 556-557.

Enrico Bertacchini et al., "The Politicization of UNESCO World Heritage Decision Making," Public Choice 167, no. 1-2 (2016): 125, doi:10.1007/

Meskell, “UNESCO's World Heritage Convention at 40,” 489.

Ibid., 489-490.

Ibid.

Frey and Steiner, “World Heritage List,” 560.

Meskell, “UNESCO's World Heritage Convention at 40,” 486-487.

s11127-016-0332-9.

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America and the Caribbean, 8.67% are located in Africa, and 7.64% are located in Arab States.36 However, the factors correlating with unequal global distribution of heritage sites go beyond geographic location. A study by Frey et al. determined that economically, total GDP and GDP per capita were positively correlated with the number of total heritage sites inscribed on the World Heritage List, which could be attributed to wealthier states’ greater capacity to lobby for interests and to meet the criteria to be considered World Heritage relatively easily.37 During the process of designation, Advisory Bodies do not directly assist countries with their nominations. Thus, poorer states are less likely to coordinate successful nominations, furthering the divergence between the number of heritage sites located in wealthy and poorer nations.38 In addition, media distribution, public awareness, public engagement, public expenditures, federalism, and membership of the United Nations Security Council have also been found to be positively correlated with the number of sites a state had on the World Heritage List.39

Nonetheless, the intergovernmental nature of the Committee inherently weakens

the ability of this institution to instigate reform, as a two-thirds majority is needed to pass decisions and states are free to unilaterally act against the Convention to voice objections. In 2011, the United States cut off funding to UNESCO after it accepted Palestinian membership,40 demonstrating the weakness of UNESCO and its lack of capacity.41 The Committee is also hindered by a lack of mandate and institutional competence. For example, destruction in Mali during the 2012 coup d’état pushed Mali to request assistance in restoring and protecting their heritage sites from rebel attacks. However, the Committee was unable to offer tangible aid, hindered by issues of translation, lack of mandate and ability, and the fact that the rebel group was technically not a state actor and thus would not take notice of a statement of condemnation.42 The unassertive nature of the UNESCO Convention can also lead to overextension, as there is no numerical limit for List nominations or a clear definition of “heritage”, leading to increased nominations and increased difficulty in monitoring and 36

“World Heritage List Statistics,” UNESCO World Heritage Centre, 2018, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/stat/.

Frey, Pamini and Steiner, “Explaining the World Heritage List,” 11-12.

Meskell, “UNESCO's World Heritage Convention at 40,” 488.

Frey, Pamini and Steiner, “Explaining the World Heritage List,” 12-15.

Note: According to Blomfield’s article, Israel also threatened to withdraw entirely out of UNESCO.

Adrian Blomfield, "US Withdraws UNESCO Funding after It Accepts Palestinian Membership," The Telegraph, October 31, 2011, http://www.

telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/palestinianauthority/8860951/US- withdraws-Unesco-funding-after-it-accepts-Palestinian-membership. html. 42

Meskell, “UNESCO's World Heritage Convention at 40,” 491-492.

ON THE SUBJECTIVITY OF UNIVERSAL VALUE

managing heritage sites. This also speaks to the inherent subjectivity of “value”.43 Despite the entrenchment of politics in the inscription of World Heritage sites, the evident inequalities in distribution of these sites and an inadequate institutional capacity can lead to constructive discussions on the future of this institution.

BEYOND THE UNESCO WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION

Notwithstanding the successes in natural conservation efforts and indirect social

and economic benefits, the politicization and vague mandate of this UNESCO institution – especially given the imbalanced designation of heritage sites and the characteristics of natural areas that demand capable management – call into question possibilities of establishing a more significant institution. Two main trajectories emerge: one where global communities “stand up and hold governments to account so they take the conservation of natural world heritage sites seriously,”44 and one where UNESCO must establish itself as a convincing independent mediator and protector of heritage. The latter implies that states should internalize the objective of UNESCO in promoting universal value as a vessel for shared existence and understanding instead of using World Heritage status solely for national purposes.45 The recent ruling by the International Criminal Court marked the first prosecution for destruction of cultural heritage as a war crime, reflecting a “belief that international law must address attacks on a people’s heritage”.46 Thus, in order to foster stronger mechanisms for environmental conservation for natural heritage, management of World Natural Heritage sites could draw inspiration from this ruling and hold national governments more accountable not only to their citizens, but also to the international community in protecting all sites of universal value.

Thus, the question is how the international community can ensure the concept of

universal value is applied in a constructive and effective manner. In particular, how can the World Heritage Convention be adapted in a way that is more applicable to natural sites? One argument draws inspiration from the Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention, a document based on the principle of cooperation between states and interest groups which uses a practical

Frey and Steiner, “World Heritage List,” 563.

Slezak, "More Than 100 Natural World Heritage Sites."

Dumper and Larkin, “The politics of heritage,” 52.

Marlise Simons, "Prison Sentence over Smashing of Shrines in Timbuktu: 9 Years," The New York Times, September 27, 2016, https://www.

nytimes.com/2016/09/28/world/europe/ahmad-al-faqi-al-mahdi-timbuktu-mali.html.

LEE

definition of underwater cultural heritage and operates beyond coastal state jurisdiction.47 A “Natural Heritage Convention”, separate from the World Heritage Convention, could allow for more relevant rights and obligations that pertain to the complexities of natural heritage. Natural areas are subject to factors different from cultural threats and a single document cannot properly address both. On the other hand, the World Heritage Convention could become supplementary to national management systems and disburse funds and assistance only to countries which have fewer resources. However, as evidenced by the asymmetrical balance of heritage sites and the influence of political and economic power on the designation process, this solution would be unlikely. Thus, while reform of the UNESCO Convention is plausible, it is doubtful whether states would support the creation of a new regime that would demand stronger commitment to environmental ambitions which could contradict national and economic interests.

CONCLUSION

The UNESCO World Heritage Convention offers an unprecedented narrative

in international law with the creation of “universal value” as a vessel to spur preservation and protection of areas for future generations. It also implies a universal standard of what is considered valuable, juxtaposed against the intention to celebrate cultural diversity. Conceptually, this notion decentralizes obligations of the international community to guard the heritage sites, addressing states which have sites within their territorial boundaries. However, obtaining UNESCO designation results in consequences from increased visibility and tourism that can outweigh conservation efforts. Natural heritage sites in particular are also prone to indirect transboundary consequences, such as rising temperatures or pollution. Furthermore, the process of designation challenges the credibility of this institution with the permeation of political and economic interests. Unless there is a transformation in the implementation of universal value to elevate the accountability and responsibility of states, a reform of the institution, or a creation of stronger enforcement mechanisms, the title of World Heritage and its “universal value” will remain a superficial one, threatening UNESCO’s own belief that “our cultural and natural heritage are both irreplaceable sources of life and inspiration.”48 47

Craig Forrest, "A New International Regime for the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage," International and Comparative Law Quarterly 51,

“World Heritage,” UNESCO World Heritage Centre, 2018, http://whc.unesco.org/en/about/.

no. 3 (2002): 522-523, doi:10.1093/iclq/51.3.511.

JURISPRUDENTIAL PHILOSOPHIES

Jurisprudential Philosophies SHI’ISM AND COMMON LAW BRETT SHEARING

INTRODUCTION

In 1993, Samuel Huntington, an influential academic and political theorist, published

“The Clash of Civilizations?” in Foreign Policy magazine.1 In it, he outlined a new post-Cold War global order, one where inter-civilizational conflict would replace those based on political ideology. As part of the essay, Huntington predicted that one of the primary “civilizational clashes” would be between the Islamic world and the West.2 Since its publication, “The Clash of Civilizations?” has been an academically controversial doctrine in the field of international relations. Predicated on delineating boundaries between cultural “civilizations”, Huntington’s work assumes that geographic and cultural distance would be the most likely cause of violent conflict in the post-Cold War global order. While what Huntington calls “inter-civilizational conflict” has occurred in our contemporary world, his underlying thesis of a re-imagined world order has not been definitively validated. While it is not this paper’s purpose to engage directly with Huntington’s seminal work, I will take issue with his “civilizational classifications” and the assumption that what appears heterogeneous will entail conflict.

In this paper, I examine the legal theory of Shi’a Islamic law – comprised of Sharia,

the law as legislated through the Quran (the Islamic holy book seen as the literal word of God), Sunnah (collections of verbally transmitted teachings of the prophet Muhammad that were compiled in writing after his death), and fiqh (the human interpretation and implementation of this law) – with English common law. In doing so, I use John Makdisi’s “Islamic Origins of the Common Law” as an analytical basis to demonstrate that despite differences in their implementation, Shi’a Islamic law and English common law share a similar jurisprudential philosophy. Among a wide body of literature on the coexistence of Islamic and common law, particularly in British post-colonial literature, Makdisi’s work stands out as a unique 1

Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Policy 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49. http://online.sfsu.edu/mroozbeh/CLASS/h-

Ibid.

607-pdfs/S.Huntington-Clash.pdf.

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examination of the origins of common law itself.3 Rather than delving into how the two systems interact in post-colonial polities which have maintained a dual legal identity, Makdisi seeks to demonstrate how English common law emanated directly out of Islamic jurisprudence (defined as a theory or philosophy of law).

This paper begins by introducing key components of Shi’a Islamic jurisprudence and

how they relate to English common law. It then engages with Makdisi’s analysis of Islam’s influence on English common law before examining the importance of legal interpretation in Shi’a Sharia and English common law. Finally, I conclude by briefly examining the practical significance of these two systems’ similarities. Although this paper is concerned solely with the comparison of Shi’a Sharia and English common law, with greater attention dedicated to an analysis of Shi’a legal theory, it is necessary to briefly address several components of Sunni legal theory to contextualize the Shi’a variation of Islamic jurisprudence. Accordingly, I address this subject matter in the first part of the paper. Otherwise, unless explicitly stated, all discussion of Islamic law will refer specifically to the Twelver Shi’a iteration.

SITUATING SHI’A SHARIA AND ENGLISH COMMON LAW: MAKDISI AND THE NORMAN KINGS

In his article, Makdisi seeks to address the historical ambiguity surrounding the

establishment of common law by King Henry II in the twelfth century. He states that the Norman king of England directly incorporated crucial aspects of Islamic law into the country’s newly founded legal code.4 Makdisi argues this transmission happened by way of the Norman kingdom in Sicily, which existed in the same era as Henry II’s English reign and had incorporated aspects of the region’s former Islamic military, administrative, governance, and judicial structures under King Roger I and II.5 The area’s previous Islamic legal framework was heavily influenced by the Maliki school of Sunni jurisprudence,6 and its incorporation into the Norman kingdoms occurred at a time when the emergence of Shi’a law as a separate identity to its Sunni counterpart was still in its early stages.7 3

John A. Makdisi, "Islamic Origins of the Common Law," North Carolina Law Review 77, no. 5 (January 6, 1999): 1635-1740.

Ibid.

Ibid., 1720-1727.

Ibid., 1639.

See Vikør S. Knut, Between God and the Sultan: an historical introduction to Islamic law (London: C. Hurst, 2004), 122. for more information on the

development of a separate Shi’a legal identity.

JURISPRUDENTIAL PHILOSOPHIES

While Makdisi’s work focuses primarily on the anthropological origins of English

common law, for this analysis it is necessary to demonstrate the philosophical similarities between it and the Shi’a iteration of Islamic law. Makdisi’s analysis would seemingly suggest that English common law would be in closer ideological kinship with Sunni jurisprudence, given that it was the Maliki school of Islamic law that the Norman kings borrowed from in the creation of the common law legal system. However, over the nearly one thousand years since its transmission, both Sunni and Shi’a Sharia have undergone substantial change, and the role of juristic interpretation in the two systems is critical to understanding their trajectory in relation to common law. Ultimately, the divergence of Shi’a and Sunni jurisprudence and the preservation of ijtihad (discussed in the next section) in the Shi’a tradition became the fundamental bridge between Islamic legal thought and English common law.

DELINEATION OF SUNNI AND SHI’A JURISPRUDENCE

Under common law, judges are vested with the ability to interpret how laws that

have been legislated will be implemented in the judicial system. Operating through a system of precedent, judges must adhere to past rulings in their deliberations and create new legal precedent when no applicable prior rulings exist. Their ability to interpret legislated laws is also known as “juristic interpretation”. Similarly, in Islamic law, ijtihad is interpretation of the Sharia performed by a qualified practitioner known as a mujtahid, using the legal provisions of the Quran and Sunnah to extrapolate on matters of legality not explicitly referenced in these foundational sources.8 Following the Twelver Shi’a doctrine, twelve Imams were able to provide rightly guided reflections of God’s “true law”, and independent interpretation was unnecessary for followers of the Shi’a faith.

After the Ghaybah or the Greater Occultation of the Twelfth Imam, when he went

into a protracted period of hiding, Shi’a Muslims gradually but vigorously incorporated the practice of ijtihad into their spiritual and political practices. The primacy of the Imams is a feature completely absent from Sunni legal philosophy and is a central component of the Shi’a legal structure.9 In the Twelver Shi’a religious doctrine, the absent Twelfth Imam will return from Occultation and install a perfect legal and moral order in line with the will of 8

These sources are considered the revealed and literal word of God and constitute the unalienable laws of God.

Norman Calder, "Accommodation and revolution in Imami Shii Jurisprudence: Khumayni and the classical tradition," Middle Eastern Studies 18,

no. 1 (1982): 9.

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God. In his absence, it is the obligation of properly trained jurists to interpret the laws of the material world as they can be best ascertained from the Quran and Sunnah. This is distinct from Sunni Sharia, which largely eliminated independent ijtihad after the 10th century CE.10 Unlike Sunni Islam, ijtihad remains a central component of Shi’a jurisprudential philosophy in the contemporary era.11

In common law jurisdictions, a constitution establishes a fundamental framework for

how the law is to be understood, and then allows legal interpretation to extrapolate on how it will be implemented in practice. The foundational sources of Islamic law (the Quran and Sunnah) have a similar practical application, establishing a narrow body of explicit legislation, and guiding interpretation as to how its underlying jurisprudential philosophy will govern contemporary society. This is evidenced by Imams Sadiq and Rida, who each stated that “[the Imams] are only obliged to announce to you [mujtahids] the principles, you are obliged to deduce.”12 Not only does this reaffirm the obligatory nature of practicing ijtihad in Shi’a law, but endorses the need to progressively interpret how the law is to be practiced until the return of the Twelfth Imam and the advent of a religiously and legally just society.

JURISPRUDENTIAL PHILOSOPHY: SHI’A AND COMMON LAW

In common law systems, judges are vested with the authority to interpret existing

legislation, applying it to contemporary circumstances that may not have been foreseen in the text of the original statute. They may also intercede to maintain a law’s contiguity with the society’s written constitution or set of legal precedents.13,14 Judges cannot change established rules by themselves but can create new precedent on the argument that the current case is unlike any that has come before. 15

This particular conception of juristic interpretation is impossible in Islamic law, as

the sovereignty to establish laws is not considered to emanate from a mortal authority, but directly from God.16 The literal word of God is revealed through the Quran and comprises 10

Robert Gleave, "Conceptions of Authority in Iraqi Shi’ism," Theory, Culture & Society 24, no. 2 (2007): 65.

Ibid.

Robert Gleave, Inevitable Doubt: two theories of Shīʿī jurisprudence (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 228.

John Laws, The common law constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 7.

Unlike common law countries such as Canada, the United States and Australia, the United Kingdom does not have a formal written

Knut, Between god and the sultan, 6.

Ibid., 3. ; Noel J Coulson, Conflicts and tensions in Islamic jurisprudence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 1.

constitution.

JURISPRUDENTIAL PHILOSOPHIES

the foundation of Islamic law. As Ayatollah Murtadha Muttahhari argued in his publication on the Shi’a practice of ijtihad, there exists a ruling for every eventuality in these foundational texts.17 This means that although they do not explicitly dictate every piece of legislation, jurists, through the use of ijtihad, can ascertain an adequate reflection of God’s “true law”. In Islamic jurisprudence, it is naïve to think that law can be perfected by human practitioners, and the jurist recognizes that human nature prevents a full understanding of God’s law.18 However, it is still the religious obligation of the jurist to ascertain and implement the best approximation of the law “in reality” (the undistorted law of God).19 The underlying principle in Shi’ism is that mujtahids should strive for rulings to which the Imams (who promulgate God’s true law) would not disagree, despite the fact it is not strictly a perfect reflection of the law in its “true” form.20

Although mujtahids have an obligation to rely on the interpretation of past scholars,

Islamic law does not have the concept of precedent in the actual application of the law.21 Laws emanate directly from God, but scholars must interpret how cases in the Quran and Sunnah extend to situations not explicitly referenced in these foundational texts. It would seem then that Islamic law simultaneously embraces and rejects juristic interpretation. To understand how this apparent paradox is reconciled, it is important to grasp the practical differences of juristic interpretation in Shi’a Sharia and common law. While in the latter system interpretation can be issued as a direct challenge to a piece of legislation, Shi’a interpretation seeks to discern the true nature of God’s legislated law. In both systems, legal practitioners are tasked with interpreting how legislation affects specific circumstances, but common law judges act as a check on the legislature, while mujtahids are an interpretive conduit to it.

In Islamic law, average Muslims (muqallids) are required to model themselves (perform

taqlid) on the mujtahid they believe to be “most learned”. Each mujtahid is themselves required to practice taqlid to their more learned superiors. With the exception of those at the pinnacle of the hierarchy, this means mujtahids both engage in ijtihad, interpreting how their followers should 17

Ayatullah Murtadha Mutahhari, "The Principle of Ijtihad in Islam," Books on Islam and Muslims 10, no. 1, accessed November 30, 2017, https://

Calder, "Accommodation and revolution in Imami Shii Jurisprudence," 9. ; Gleave, Inevitable Doubt, 253.

Ibid., 28.

Knut, Between God and the Sultan, 133.

Ibid., 9

www.al-islam.org/printpdf/book/export/html/21866.

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adhere to Islamic law, and follow the jurisprudential example set by their model(s) (marjas). Given that each mujtahid is individually interpreting laws, juristic difference is inevitable.22 However, the practice of ijtihad has not led to the development of a wildly divergent body of law within Shi’ism due to its loosely formalized hierarchy of “learned scholars”.23,24 By both incorporating the rulings of fellow mujtahids and performing independent legal interpretation, Shi’a religious scholars have developed a body of law that is able to be simultaneously elastic and grounded in the existing religious establishment.

When formulating a legal interpretation, mujtahids must not only rely on the guidance

of their living contemporaries, but must respect and adhere to decisions rendered by previous scholars as well.25 The observance of past mujtahids’ interpretations is interesting given that it is forbidden for Shi’a Muslims to practice taqlid of deceased scholars.26 This is because an individual mujtahid’s ruling holds authority since it is their best interpretation, not because it is necessarily correct.27 While muqallids are not permitted to follow a deceased mujtahid as their model, mujtahids engaging in legal interpretation have an obligation to draw from past interpretations of their predecessors, both living and deceased. This is not strictly the same as pure taqlid, which calls for adherence to a given interpretation, but is more similar to common law’s practice of precedent, with the mujtahid considering the “precedents” of past jurists in pursuit of their own independent reasoning. The differentiation between taqlid performed by a mujtahid and a muqallid is that the latter does not have any religious-clerical training and must choose a new model when their previous marja dies, while the mujtahid uses their own knowledge to complement or grasp the teachings of other learned scholars. The learned scholar is not permitted to imitate the opinion of another mujtahid without performing any independent reasoning but may look to another’s opinion for confirmation or guidance.28

Precedents set in other cases have no formal bearing on the case at hand – with

the underlying philosophy that the law God has enacted will not differ between two cases, regardless of how humans may interpret them. Despite this, jurists do look to previous rulings to better understand how God’s will has been interpreted in the past, and the use of 22

Gleave, Inevitable Doubt, 246.

Ibid., 220.

For more information on who one qualifies as a mujtahid, see Ibid., 23, 240; Gleave, “Conceptions of Authority in Iraqi Shi’ism,” 67-78.

Coulson, Tensions and Conflicts, 107.

Mutahhari, “Principle of Itjihad in Islam.” ; Gleave, Inevitable Doubt, 226-227.

Gleave, Inevitable Doubt, 226-227.

Ibid., 237. ; Knut, Between God and the Sultan, 160.

JURISPRUDENTIAL PHILOSOPHIES

these insights to understand and implement Islamic law is an accepted practice. In common law, individuals are restrained by laws enacted as organic statute (laws implemented by a parliament). These pieces of legislation are in turn bound to a legal framework codified by a written constitution or established by a wide body of legal precedent, which dictates how laws may be legitimately developed. Considering the canonical texts of Islamic law to be “constitutional” documents of their own that establish an accepted legal framework, laws conceived by mujtahids through ijtihad are the statutes that govern those abiding by Shi’a Islamic law. Similarly, while a legislative body (such as a Parliament) promulgates statutes in common law systems, judges have the authority to challenge those laws if they fail to reflect principles established by a constitution. Both Islamic and common law “constitutional” frameworks establish a narrow range of explicit legislation, but dictate the way laws will be enacted to address a broader set of circumstances.29 These foundational texts are finite documents but establish a set of rules for how the law will address an infinite range of possibilities.

Common law’s legitimacy stems then from it being a counterbalance to the legislator.

It acts as both a check on, and protector of, the governed. Islamic law acts similarly, but answers to a higher authority – God directly. Mujtahids must also aim to reflect the true reality of God’s law provided by the Imams, and their legitimacy flows from their role as the best substitute during the Ghaybah. As a result, legal interpretation performed under common and Islamic law is not vested with State authority but operates in conjunction and parallel to it. Ultimately, emancipation of juristic interpretation from State power allows the practice of ijtihad and juristic interpretation to develop a body of law more reflective of their guiding texts than would be possible under political constraint.

Common law and Shi’a Islamic law both enable a wide degree of juristic interpretation

within their legal theory. In Shi’a law, juristic interpretation takes the form of ijtihad and seeks to interpret laws God has legislated through the Quran and Sunnah. Shi’ism’s hierarchy of scholars creates a degree of orthodoxy within the judicial establishment, but no individual’s interpretations can be considered a perfect reflection of God’s “true law”. By choosing their marja, muqallids have a religious duty to adhere to that individual’s interpretations, but they are free to select a new model to follow if they believe that person to be more learned. Similar to the foundational texts of Shi’a law, common law jurisdictions are bound to legislation 29

For a small selection of examples, see Article 36 (2) of the Canadian Constitution Act, 1982, the third amendment to the US Constitution, and the

prohibition on certain foods and alcohol in the Quran.

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emanating from Parliament, constrained by constitutional texts and interpreted through the use of legal precedent. In both systems, there are significant levels of individual autonomy, constrained by the body of legislation society has accepted as being legitimate.

Overall, a principal jurisprudential similarity between English common law and Shi’a

Islamic law is the incorporation of juristic interpretation. This delineates Shi’a from Sunni legal theory and displays that nearly a millennium after King Henry II borrowed concepts from Islamic law, the preservation of ijtihad in the Shi’a tradition upheld a close philosophical kinship with common law. It is inevitable that legal systems emanating from different social, political and cultural contexts will produce different laws. What is important is that despite their differences, these legal traditions share a similar underlying jurisprudential philosophy.

PERCEPTION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPARISON

Thus far, this paper has sought to outline a fundamental similarity between the

jurisprudential philosophies of English common law and Shi’a Sharia. This overarching similarity is interesting in its own right, but the importance of such a comparative analysis lies in how we make cross-cultural perceptions in a globalized world. Samuel Huntington’s influential idea that the world would come to be characterized by “inter-civilizational” conflicts became popular at the end of the twentieth century. These conflicts, it was argued, would be characterized not by inter-state tensions, but by cultural and religious identities, with the “Islamic world” forming a polity in a multi-polar world. Although Huntington’s thesis remains controversial in academic circles, the “War on Terror” and the perceived risk of religiouslymotivated violence has sharpened this type of rhetoric in political circles. This effect can be directly witnessed by the emergence of populist leaders in Europe or North America, who invoke “inter-civilizational” rhetoric predicated on a sense of societal vulnerability to increased migratory pressures from various parts of the world.

This paper did not delve into the complicated nuances of immigration, security or

extremism, nor does it claim to provide any answers as to how these issues can be solved. Rather, the analysis provided throughout this paper points to the existence of unexpected similarities between peoples who might see themselves at opposite ends of Huntington’s civilizational classifications. The ideological kinship between Shi’a Islamic and English common law shows that great distance does not necessarily entail great difference, and it is

JURISPRUDENTIAL PHILOSOPHIES

misguided to think of our institutions, even those as fundamental as law, as being completely alien to one another. By exploring their shared philosophy, I have sought to demonstrate that concepts which seem worlds apart in their implementation may share similar practice and methodology. Ultimately, I am hoping this article contributes to the deconstruction of societyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ideological binaries and challenges the polarization of socio-political discourse.

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US HEGEMONY AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF DOMESTIC SPACE LAW BY ANDI JORDAN Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/moon-agreement.html#a18. Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindxAgree. htm. BBC News. “Moon dust bag sold for $1.8m at New York auction.” 20 July 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-40677650. Byers, Michael. Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and Customary International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Chen, Stephen. “China’s nuclear spaceships will ‘mine asteroids, fly tourists’ by 2040.” South China Morning Post. November 19, 2017. Accessed February 24, 2018. http://www.scmp.com/ news/china/policies-politics/article/2120425/chinas-nuclear-spaceships-will-be-mining- asteroids. De Man, Philip. “Commercial interests are even muscling in on the use of outer space.” Financial Times, 29 October 2017. https://www.ft.com/content/e1181092-b588-11e7-aa26-bb002965bce8. Dean, Dave, “75% of the World’s Mining Companies Are Based in Canada.” VICE News, 9 July 2013, https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/wdb4j5/75-of-the-worlds-mining-companies-are based-in-canada. Dodge, Michael. “Public Law 114-90: Governing Commercialization & Space Resource Utilization.” American Bar Association. Accessed 10 November 2017. https://www.americanbar.org/ content/dam/aba/images/air_space/course/16-update/uc16-spl-space-act.pdf. Egan, Brian J. “The Next Fifty Years of the Outer Space Treaty.” United States Department of State, 7 December 2016. https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/264963.htm. Freeland, Steven. “International Law and the Exploration and Use of Outer Space.” In Risk and the Regulation of Uncertainty in International Law, ed. Monika Ambrus, Rosemary Rayfuse, and Wouter Werner. Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online, 2017. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198795896.001.0001. Griffin, Andrew. “China to send people to live on asteroids and mine them, authorities announce.” The Independent. May 12, 2017. Accessed February 24, 2018. http://www. independent.co.uk/news/science/china-nasa-asteroid-space-agency-beijing-a7732306.html. Jakhu Ram S., Joseph N. Pelton and Yaw Otu Mankata Nyampong. “National Space Laws and the Exploitation of Natural Resources from Space.” In Space Mining and its Regulation, Cham: Springer International Publishing Switzerland, 2017, 131-144. https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/10.1007/978-3-319-39246-2.

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Moore, John N. “UNCLOS KEY TO INCREASING NAVIGATIONAL FREEDOM.” Texas Review of Law and Politics 12, no. 2 (2008): 459-475. Hein Online. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). “60th Anniversary of Sputnik: Dawn of the Space Age.” Accessed 27 Oct 2017, https://www.nasa.gov/specials/60th/sputnik/. Lefeber, René. “Relaunching the Moon Agreement.” Air & Space Law 41, no. 1 (2016): 41-48, Kluwer Law Online. Lesperance, Robert J. “Canada’s Military Operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria and the Law of Armed Conflict.” Canadian International Lawyer 10, no.2 (2015): 51-63. https://cbaapps.org/ CBA_CIL/search.aspx. Linter, Andrew. “Extra-terrestrial Extraction: The International Implications of the Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015.” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 40, no. 2 (2016): 144. Hein Online Logsdon, John M. “A Sustainable Rationale for Human Spaceflight.” Issues in Science and Technology 20, no. 2 (Winter 2004): 31-34. ProQuest Ebrary. Peterson, M.J. “The Use of Analogies in Developing Outer Space Law.” International Organization 51, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 245-274. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2703450. Planetary Resources. “ARKYD-301: About the Exploration Program.” Accessed 2 Nov 2017, https://www.planetaryresources.com/missions/arkyd-301/. Planetary Resources. “Asteroid Mining Plans Revealed by Planetary Resources, Inc.” Accessed 27 October 2017. https://www.planetaryresources.com/2012/04/asteroid-mining-plans-revealed by-planetary-resources-inc/. Planetary Resources. “The Arkyd Name (Origin) And YOU.” Accessed 27 October 2017. https://www.planetaryresources.com/2012/07/the-arkyd-name-origin-and-you/. Ram, Aliya. “US and Luxembourg frame laws for new space race.” Financial Times, 18 October 2017. https://www.ft.com/content/af15f0e4-707a-11e7-93ff-99f383b09ff9. Reinstein, Ezra J. “Owning Outer Space.” Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 20, no. 1 (Fall 1999): 59-98. ProQuest Ebrary. Solis, Gary D. “Rules of War, Laws of War.” In The Law of Armed Conflict, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 3-26. Statute of the International Court of Justice. http://www.icj-cij.org/en/statute. Traa-Engelman, H.L. van. Commercial Utilization of Outer Space. Houten: Springer Netherlands, 1993. Tronchetti, Fabio. Fundamentals of Space Law and Policy. New York: Springer, 2013. DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-7870-6. Tronchetti, Fabio. “The Moon Agreement in the 21st Century: Addressing Its Potential Role in the Era of Commercial Exploitation of the Natural Resources of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.” Journal of Space Law 36 (2010): 489-524. Hein Online. Tronchetti, Fabio. “The Non-Appropriation Principle as a Structural Norm of International Law: A New Way of Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.” Air and Space Law 33, no.3 (2008): 277-305. Kluwer Law Online. Tronchetti, Fabio. “Title IV - space resource exploration and utilization of the US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act: a legal and political assessment.” Air and Space Law 41, no. 2 (2016): 143-156. Kluwer Law Online.

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Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/ publications/STSPACE11E.pdf. U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act. https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2262/text. Vienna Convention on the law of treaties. https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20 1155/volume-1155-i-18232-english.pdf.

CONSTRUCTED VOICES BY JACK MCCLELLAND Davenel, Yves-Marie. “Cultural mobilization in post-Soviet Kazakhstan: views from the state and from non-titular nationalities compared,” Central Asian Survey 31, no. 1 (2012): 17-29. Kertzer, David, Arel, Dominique. Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Laitin, David. Identity in Formation: The Russian Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad. New York: Cornell University Press, 1998. Lapidus, G., Zaslavsky, V., and Goldman, P. From Union to Commonwealth: Nationalism and Separatism in the Soviet Republics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Logvinovaa, Olga K., Ivanovaa, Galina P., Shakirtovab, Aizhan T. “Multicultural Education in the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan: General Trends and National Peculiarities” IEJME Mathematics Education 11, no. 9 (2016): 3301-3312. Luong, Pauline Jones. The Transformation of Central Asia. London: Cornell University Press, 2004. Marsh, Denali, “Ukraine’s Native Russian Speakers,” The Global Slate. Map. 2015. Roy, Olivier. The New Central Asia. New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2000. Rubin, Barnett R., Snyder, Jack. Post-Soviet Political Order. New York: Routledge, 1998. Sagimbayeva, Almira. “Implementing Prospects of Multiculturalism Theory in Kazakhstan.” Politické vedy, no. 2 (2014): 150-169. Simons, Gary F. and Charles D. Fennig (eds.). 2018. “Kazakhstan” Ethnologue: Languages of the World, Twenty-first edition. Map. Dallas, Texas: SIL International Smith, Anthony. “The Origins of Nation,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 12, Iss. 3 (1989): 106-130. Smith, G., Law, V., Wilson, A., Bohr, A., Allworth, E. Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

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COMMITTED ALLIES, POLAR OPPOSITES BY ELLA CHAMPION Al-Jazeera. “Refugees in Arctic Norway resist deportation plans.” Al-Jazeera, January 19, 2016. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/refugees-arctic-norway-160119043144709.html. Archer, Clive. “The Stoltenberg Report and Nordic Security: Big Idea, Small Steps.” In Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2010, edited by Nanna Hvidt and Hans Mouritzen, 43-74. Copenhagen, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2010. http://pure.diis.dk/ws/ files/61432/YB2010_Danish_Foreign_Policy_Yearbook_WEB.pdf. Bailes, Alyson JK. “Nordic And Arctic Affairs: Small States In The Arctic: What Impact From Russia West Tensions?” Small State Briefs – University of Iceland Centre for Small State Studies (October 2015). http://ams.hi.is/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Small-State-Brief-7-Nordic-and Arctic-Affairs.pdf Bailes, Alyson JK, and Kristmundur Þór Ólafsson. “Nordic and Arctic Affairs: Iceland’s National Security Policy: Latest Progress”. Small State Briefs – University of Iceland Centre for Small State Studies (December 2014). http://ams.hi.is/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Small-State Briefs-4_Bailes-and-Olafsson.pdf. Braw, Elizabeth. “Sweden and Finland’s awkward NATO tango.” Politico, August 24, 2015. http:// www.politico.eu/article/sweden-finland-nato-russia-defense-nordic-military/. Byers, Michael. International Law and the Arctic. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. doi:10.1017/ CBO9781107337442. De Hoop Scheffer, Jaap. “Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer on security prospects in the High North.” Speech, Reykjavik, January 29, 2009. NATO. http:// www.nato.int/docu/speech/2009/s090129a.html. Denmark, Kingdom of. Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greenland Department of Foreign Affairs, Faroes Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011. http://um.dk/en/foreign-policy/the-arctic. Emmott, Robin and Sabine Siebold. “NATO agrees to reinforce eastern Poland, Baltic states against Russia.” Reuters, July 8, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit idUSKCN0ZN2NL. Haftendorn, Helga. “NATO and the Arctic: Is the Atlantic Alliance a Cold War Relic in a Peaceful Region Now Faced with Non-military Challenges?” European Security 20, no. 3 (September 2011): 337-361. http://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/doi/ full/10.1080/09662839.2011.608352?scroll=top&needAccess=true. Higgins, Andrew. “Avoiding Risky Seas, Migrants Reach Europe With an Arctic Bike Ride.” New York Times, October 9, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/world/europe/bypassing-the risky-sea-refugees-reach-europe-through-the-arctic.html. Huebert, Rob. “NATO, NORAD, and the Arctic: A Renewed Concern.” In North of 60: Toward a

Renewed Canadian Arctic Agenda, edited by John Higginbotham and Jennifer Spence, 9199. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2016. https://issuu.com/cigi/ docs/north_of_60_special_report_lowres?e=4209517/39035005

Iceland. Althingi. A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland’s Arctic Policy. Legislative Sess. 139, March 28 2011. https://www.mfa.is/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE Arctic-Policy-approved-by-Althingi.pdf. Kucharek, Michael. “Vigilant Eagle 2013 called “unprecedented” success”. NORAD and U.S. Northern Command Public Affairs. August 29, 2013, http://www.norad.mil/Newsroom/ Article/578663/vigilant-eagle-2013-called-unprecedented-success/. Liljas, Per. “Sweden’s Military Scours for Possible Russian Submarine in Its Waters.” Time, October

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20, 2014. http://time.com/3523644/swedens-military-scours-for-possible-russian submarine-in-its-waters/. Lunde Saxi, Håkon. “Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO): Balancing Efficiency and Sovereignty, NATO and Nonalignment,” in Perspectives on European Security, 67-71. Helsinki: STETE- the Finnish Committee for European Security, 2013. Łuszczuk, Michał. “The Formation of NATO’s Approach to the Arctic in the First Decade of the 21st Century.” In NATO: Towards the Challenges of a Contemporary World, edited by Robert Czulda and Robert Łoś, 193-205. Warsaw-Lodz: International Relations Research Institute in Warsaw, 2013. Available from: https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=rgCPAgAAQB AJ&rdid=book-rgCPAgAAQBAJ&rdot=1&source=gbs_vpt_read&pcampaignid=books_ booksearch_viewport. NATO. “Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation”. Lisbon, 2010. http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010 eng.pdf. NATO Group of Experts. NATO 2020; Assured Security, Dynamic Engagement. Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2010. http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/expertsreport.pdf. Nilsen, Thomas. “Arctic security, climate and resources in focus at U.S.-Nordic Leaders’ Summit,” The Independent Barents Observer, May 14, 2016. http://thebarentsobserver.com/ en/2016/05/arctic-security-climate-and-resources-focus-us-nordic-leaders-summit. NORDEFCO. “The Basics About NORDEFCO.” Accessed October 30, 2016. http://www.nordefco.org/the-basics-about-nordefco. Nordenman, Magnus. “NATO Summit Special Series: Sweden and Finland”. NATOSource, June 30, 2016. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/nato-summit-special-series sweden-and-finland. Norwegian Ministry of Defense. Capable Force: Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces. Norwegian Ministry of Defense, 2010. https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/ upload/FD/Dokumenter/Capable-force_strategic-concept.pdf. Radio Sweden. “More Swedes are for joining NATO than against”. The Independent Barents Observer, May 10, 2016. http://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2016/05/more-swedes are-joining-nato-against. Reuters. “Norway Will Build a Fence at Its Arctic Border With Russia.” New York Times, August 24, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/world/europe/russia-norway-border-fence refugees.html?_r=0. Staalesen, Atle. “Finland, Russia close border for third-country citizens.” The Independent Barents Observer, March 23, 2016. http://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2016/03/finland-russia-close border-third-country-citizens. Stoltenberg, Thorvald. Nordic Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy. Report presented to extraordinary meeting of Nordic Foreign Ministers, Oslo, February 9 2009. https://www. regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/UD/Vedlegg/nordicreport.pdf. Tolgfors, Sten. “Speech by the Minister for Defence Sten Tolgfors at Almedalen on the Baltic Sea Co-operation”. Speech, Visby, July 3, 2009. Government of Sweden. http://www. government.se/contentassets/e778cdd9d1e44ca2a852e7c99c87b498/speeches-20062010-- sten-tolgfors Wikileaks. “Canadian Pm And Nato S-G Discuss Afghanistan, The Strategic Concept, And The Arctic”. January 20, 2010. Wikileaks. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10OTTAWA21_a. html.

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YLE News. “NATO membership not joint Finnish-Swedish decision: President Niinistö”. The Independent Barents Observer, May 3, 2016. http://thebarentsobserver.com/en/ security/2016/05/nato-membership-not-joint-finnish-swedish-decision-president-niinisto.

ON THE SUBJECTIVITY OF UNIVERSAL VALUE BY ANNIE LEE Barnard, Anne. “ISIS Speeds Up Destruction Of Antiquities In Syria.” The New York Times, August 24, 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/25/world/isis-accelerates destruction-of-antiquities-in-syria.html. Bertacchini, Enrico, Claudia Liuzza, Lynn Meskell, and Donatella Saccone. “The Politicization of UNESCO World Heritage Decision Making.” Public Choice 167, no. 1-2 (2016): 95-129. doi:10.1007/s11127-016-0332-9. Blomfield, Adrian. “US Withdraws UNESCO Funding After It Accepts Palestinian Membership.” The Telegraph, October 31, 2011. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ middleeast/palestinianauthority/8860951/US- withdraws-Unesco-funding-after-it-accepts Palestinian-membership.html. Buergin, Reiner. “Contested Rights of Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples in Conflicts over Biocultural Diversity: The Case of Karen Communities in Thung Yai, a World Heritage Site in Thailand.” Modern Asian Studies 49, no. 6 (2015): 2022-2062. doi:10.1017/s0026749x14000390. Conradin, Katharina, and Thomas Hammer. “Making the Most of World Natural Heritage— Linking Conservation and Sustainable Regional Development?” Sustainability 8, no. 12 (2016): 323. doi:10.3390/su8040323. Dumper, Michael, and Craig Larkin. “The Politics of Heritage and the Limitations of International Agency in Contested Cities: A Study of the Role of UNESCO in Jerusalem’s Old City.” Review of International Studies 38, no. 1 (2011): 25-52. doi:10.1017/s026021051100026x. “Environment Minister Seeks UNESCO World Heritage Site Nominations.” CTV News, August 8, 2016. http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/environment-minister- seeks-unesco-world-heritage-site nominations-1.3019533. Forrest, Craig. “A New International Regime for the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage.” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 51, no. 3 (2002): 511-554. doi:10.1093/ iclq/51.3.511. Frey, Bruno S., and Lasse Steiner. “World Heritage List: Does It Make Sense?” International Journal of Cultural Policy 17, no. 5 (2011): 555-573. doi:10.1080/10286632.2010.541906. Frey, Bruno S., Paolo Pamini, and Lasse Steiner. “Explaining the World Heritage List: An Empirical Study.” International Review of Economics 60, no. 1 (2013): 1-19. doi:10.1007/s12232-013 0174-4. Hazen, Helen. ““Of Outstanding Universal Value”: The Challenge Of Scale In Applying The

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World Heritage Convention At National Parks In The US.” Geoforum 39, no. 1 (2008): 252264. doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2007.05.007.

Makombo, John. “Wealth Creation through Conservation: Bwindi Impenetrable and Rwenzori Mountains National Parks, Uganda.” World Heritage, no. 82 (2016): 38-42. http://whc.unesco. org/en/review/82. Mallaye, Baba, and Stefan Kröpelin. “Ennedi Massif, Chad: A Cultural and Natural Gem.” World Heritage, no. 82 (2016): 31-37. http://whc.unesco.org/en/review/82. Meskell, Lynn. “UNESCO’S World Heritage Convention at 40.” Current Anthropology 54, no. 4 (2013): 483-494. doi:10.1086/671136. O’Keefe, Roger. “World Cultural Heritage: Obligations to the International Community as a Whole?” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 53, no. 1 (2004): 189-209. doi:10.1093/ iclq/53.1.189. Simons, Marlise. “Prison Sentence over Smashing Of Shrines in Timbuktu: 9 Years.” The New York Times, September 27, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/28/world/europe/ahmad-al faqi-al-mahdi-timbuktu-mali.html. Slezak, Michael. “More Than 100 Natural World Heritage Sites Degraded By Human Activity, Says Report.” The Guardian, January 31, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/ jan/31/more-than-100-natural-world-heritage-sites-degraded-by-human-activity-says-report. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. Paris: UNESCO World Heritage Centre, 1972. “World Heritage.” UNESCO World Heritage Centre, 2018. http://whc.unesco.org/en/about/. “World Heritage List.” UNESCO World Heritage Centre, 2018. http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/. “World Heritage List Statistics.” UNESCO World Heritage Centre, 2018. http://whc.unesco.org/en/ list/stat/.

JURISPRUDENTIAL PHILOSOPHIES BY BRETT SHEARING Alexander, Larry. “Waluchows —living tree constitutionalism.” Law and Philosophy 29, no. 1 (2009): 93-99. Accessed November 30, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-009-9051-4. Black, Ann. “Court Ceremonies, Ritual and Symbolism.” Griffith Law Review 21, no. 2 (2012): 499 532. Accessed November 30, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1080/10383441.2012.1085475. Calder, Norman. “Accommodation and Revolution in Imami Shii Jurisprudence: Khumayni and the classical tradition.” Middle Eastern Studies 18, no. 1 (January 1982): 3-20. http://www.jstor. org/stable/4282865. Coulson, Noel J. Conflicts and Tensions in Islamic Jurisprudence. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969.

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Deeb, Lara. An Enchanted Modern: gender and public piety in Shii Lebanon. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. Gleave, Robert. Inevitable Doubt: two theories of Shīʿī jurisprudence. Leiden: Brill, 2000. Gleave, Robert, and Eugenia Kermeli. Islamic Law: theory and practice. London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001. Gleave, Robert. “Conceptions of Authority in Iraqi Shi’ism.” Theory, Culture & Society 24, no. 2 (2007): 59-78. Accessed November 30, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276407074996. Hallaq, Wael B. “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?” International Journal of Middle East Studies 16, no. 1 (March 1984): 3-41. Accessed November 30, 2017. http://www.jstor.org/stable/162939. Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Policy 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49. Accessed February 24, 2018. http://online.sfsu.edu/mroozbeh/CLASS/h-607-pdfs/S. Huntington-Clash.pdf. Knut, Vikør S. Between God and the Sultan: an historical introduction to Islamic law. London: C. Hurst, 2004. Laws, John. The Common Law Constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Accessed November 30, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139939478. Makdisi, John A. “ Islamic Origins of the Common Law.” North Carolina Law Review 77, no. 5 (January 6, 1999): 1635-740. Accessed November 30, 2017. http://heinonline.org/HOL/ P?h=hein.journals/nclr77&i=1651. Mir-Hosseini, Ziba. “How the Door of Ijtihad Was Opened and Closed: A Comparative Analysis of Recent Family Law Reforms in Iran and Morocco.” Washington & Lee Law Review 64, no. 4 (Fall 2007): 1499-511. Accessed November 30, 2017.ProQuest. Mutahhari, Ayatullah Murtadha. “The Principle of Ijtihad in Islam.” Books on Islam and Muslims. Vol. 10, No. 1. Accessed November 30, 2017. https://www.al-islam.org/printpdf/book/export/ html/21866. Waluchow, Wil. “Constitutions as Living Trees: An Idiot Defends.” The Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 18, no. 02 (2005): 207-47. Accessed November 30, 2017. http://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/caljp18&i=211.

CONTRIBUTOR BIOGRAPHIES

STAFF EDITORS-IN-CHIEF MAAHIN AHMED is a fourth year student in the International Relations program, with a focus on peace and conflict studies. In particular, her research interests include challenges of postcolonial nation-state making in South Asia; private/public memory and remembrance of the 1947 Partition of India; and social repair in the aftermath of conflicts or mass violence. Outside of classes, she is extremely grateful for having had the opportunity to work with her peers through the JIA for three consecutive years now, and would like to thank everyone who dedicated their time and efforts to the JIA’s 2018 edition. VERNA YAM is a fourth year International Relations Major and Asian Area Studies Minor. To supplement her research interests in Canada-Asia cooperation, she has completed an exchange term in South Korea and co-op terms with the Canadian government. She has thoroughly enjoyed her time serving the JIA and would like to thank all who contributed their hard work to make the JIA a success. SENIOR EDITOR JAKE HARMS is a fourth year student pursuing a double major in History and Human Geography. He is particularly interested in Great Power relations and patterns of human migration throughout history, especially as a result of conflict. Jake hopes to continue pursuing his passion for History after completing his undergraduate degree, and eventually aspires to enter the academic field. He is delighted to be back with the Journal, and very much looks forward to the upcoming year. EDITORS PHEBE M. FERRER is graduating with a major in International Relations and minor in Asian Canadian and Asian Migration studies. Her interests focus on the intersection between dynamics in international relations and on the local level involving communities and individuals. She strongly opposes the general theoretical basis in international relations that ‘imagines a world without people,’ and so supports feminist and individual-centered frameworks and theories. Phebe also enjoys studying Southeast Asia relations, particularly concerning the Philippines and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and she works to push for a greater focus on this region within UBC and the work of Asia-focused organizations like the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. SAWYER JUNGER is a fourth year student majoring in Political Science with a minor in Anthropology. His research interests typically centre on state development in the Global South, security studies, and public opinion analysis. He recently completed a semester abroad at the University of Amsterdam where he concentrated on migration studies and African politics. After graduation, Sawyer plans on working and travelling for a couple of years before pursuing graduate studies in Political Science. KATHERINE KIRST is a fourth-year student, completing her degrees in Political Science and International Relations. Her academic interests include contemporary political theory, public policy and international security. Upon completing her undergraduate degrees, she hopes to

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attend law school to study international and maritime law, and endeavours to build her career with a focus in these areas. When she isnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t catching up on readings, she enjoys power napping, drinking wine, and reading. OLAMIDE OLANIYAN is graduating with a double major in Economics and Political Science. His academic interests are focused on international development, foreign policy, conflict resolution and African international relations. He is also interested in revolutionary histories and progressive perspectives in international relations theory. He spends most of his free time ranting about the internet and frantically trying to get to the bottom of his reading list. MATHIEU OPPERMANN is a third year Dual Degree Student between UBC and Sciences Po Paris. At UBC, he is pursuing a major in International Relations and a minor in Human Geography. As a French and German national, his research interests include European affairs, diplomacy and international law, as well as processes of globalization and urbanization. In the future, Mathieu hopes to work for the German Foreign Office. JOHNSEN ROMERO is in the fourth year of his undergraduate degree, pursuing a major in International Relations. Aside from a research interest in the Asian region, he also focuses his studies on political economy, developmental policy, and emerging forms of multilateral engagement. When not thinking about his courses or his co-op terms, he usually can be found collecting articles or adding books to his mounting and excessively long reading list. After his time at UBC, he hopes to enter graduate studies and find a place for himself in the civil service. POONAM SANDHU is a fourth year student in the International Relations program, with a focus on peace, conflict and security studies. Her research interests include sexual and gender based violence in contemporary South Asia, the political economy of conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. She recently studied abroad at Sciences Po in Paris through which she was able to deepen her understanding of global issues while exploring Europe. Upon graduating, she hopes to pursue graduate studies at the intersection of international affairs and law. MORGAN SLESSOR is a fourth year student majoring in Political Science. His interests are numerous in amount, including US politics, political theory, and international relations. He is also interested in the philosophy of law and the intersection of law and political science. ANGELA TIEN is a fifth year political science major with a passion for international finance that began with an encounter of discussions on the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. Her research interests lie in the global political economy, particularly in the financial infrastructure of Asia, and the financial regulations and policies that accompany the rise of Chinese investments both abroad and domestically. When she is not discussing the future of financing in green technology, she is on the lookout for new art galleries and jazz and blues venues or busy championing more diverse and minority representation in media with her peers. KITTY WANG is a fifth year student majoring in International Relations and minoring in Economics. Her research interests include foreign policy, identity politics, international trade, and economic development in the Asia-Pacific. She has supplemented her academic pursuits with co-op terms with the Canadian government and UBC, as well as a study abroad term in Japan. She intends to undertake graduate studies in public policy in the future.

CONTRIBUTOR BIOGRAPHIES

HEAD CREATIVE KATELYN ROBERTS is finally becoming the evil woman she always knew she could be. She has found grace in the mystical power of art but even deeper, she prides herself on her tenderness for her alien dog, her dearest friends and the sweetness of an early morning. She is indebted to her newfound abilities to prosper under pressure, seek love in all wickedness, and to recognize when The Man is present. She sees her time at UBC as a triumph but after five years of reading, writing and crying, Katelyn is finally graduating knowing that there is more power in laughter than there are in tears.

THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

AUTHORS ELLA CHAMPION is graduating this year with a degree in International Relations. Her particular areas of interest include feminism and social justice, comparative politics with a focus on Scandinavia, BC provincial and Canadian federal politics, and Crown-Indigenous relations in Canada. She currently works as a forest firefighter in the Cariboo-Chilcotin region of BC, and hopes to pursue graduate studies with a focus on public policy. RACHEL GRACE HEROLD graduated from UBC in May 2017 with an Honours degree in Political Science with International Relations and was awarded the Political Science Gold Medal for her outstanding academic achievement. She is currently exploring her passion for connection and global understanding as she leads students from the Canadian Mennonite University across Canada and to Guatemala. Following this adventure, she plans to further pursue her interest in humanitarianism by diving into the field of disaster management and response. ANDI JORDAN is a third year student in the Honours Political Science with International Relations program. Her research interests include the comparative politics of Southeast Asia and, more recently, global governance and international law. She will explore these topics while on international exchange at Humboldt University in Berlin, Germany during the spring of 2018, and in her fourth year at UBC. ANNIE LEE is finishing up her second undergraduate degree as part of the Dual Degree Program between UBC and Sciences Po Paris. She is currently majoring in International Relations with a minor in Environment and Society, after completing her first degree in Economics. Her research interests include collective memory, heritage definition and management, and peacebuilding. After her time at UBC, she intends to pursue graduate studies in post-conflict and international development. JACK MCCLELLAND is a fourth year UBC student double-majoring in International Relations and English Literature. Through his studies at UBC he has attempted to bridge the gap between these two disciplines, scrutinizing the ways literature is used to document and perpetuate narratives of ethnic, national, and group identity across the world. In the Summer of 2017 he completed a lingual immersion program in St. Petersburg, Russia, and has since developed a passionate curiosity for contemporary issues in the former Soviet Union. After completing his undergraduate degree he hopes to pursue graduate studies in journalism. BRETT SHEARING is a fourth year International Relations major at UBC. His academic research interests include religious anthropology, international law, and public policy. Having worked in the Canadian government for the past three years, Brett is fascinated by the confluence of domestic and international governance, as well as the interconnectivity of global affairs, transnational commerce, and human migration. Originally from Vancouver, he strives to spend as much time as he can in nature and is happiest when hiking. Brett will graduate from UBC in May 2018 and intends to pursue graduate studies beginning in 2019.

SPONSOR ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

SPONSORS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS STUDENT ASSOCIATION UBC has long encouraged global citizenship as a key part of academic development. For many years, the International Relations Students Association (IRSA) has worked to develop co-curricular programs that help achieve this goal. We aim to provide students from a variety of disciplines with a forum for discussing international issues. IRSA membership is available to all UBC students and alumni.

THE STUDENT ENVIRONMENT CENTRE The Student Environment Centre (SEC) is a resource group mandated by UBC Alma Mater Society to provide environmental and sustainability resources to the UBC community. SEC is actively involved in promoting various initiatives that critically examine the interactions between humans and the environment.

GLOBAL FUND Based at the Simon K. Y. Lee Global Lounge and Resource Centre at UBC, the Global Fund provides funding for student-led initiatives with an international or intercultural focus.

UBC INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAM The UBC International Relations Program is a degree-granting undergraduate program in the Faculty of Arts. With approximately 300 majors, the program is one of the largest in the Faculty, International Relations is an interdisciplinary major which permits students to take courses in a variety of disciplines including History, Political Science, Economics, Geography, Asian Studies, and Sociology, among others. The International Relations Program is a proud sponsor of the UBC Journal of International Affairs. LIU IR COMMUNITY FUND This program is intended to provide funding and support for undergraduate studentinitiated activities that build community amongst International Relations students and that are aligned with the mandate of the Liu Institute for Global Issues. OTHER SPONSORS The JIA would like to thank the following organizations for their generous support: The Liu Institute for Global Issues UBC Alma Mater Society UBC Arts Undergraduate Society