Quick, safe, secure

Quick, Safe, Secure: Addressing Human Behavior During Evacuations at LAX

Jonathan Diamond, Melinda McVay, Mary Wassel Zavala UCLA Department of Public Policy April 2010

Table of Contents Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………….3 Executive Summary…………………………………………………………………4 Introduction………………………………………………………………………....6 Evacuations at LAX…………………………………………………………………9 Methodology……………………………………………………………………….11 Key Themes: Panic, Training, and Response……………………………………….14 Policy Options for Consideration…………………………………………………..18 Criteria for Evaluating the Policy Options………………………………………….20 Methods of Evaluation……………………………………………………………..22 Evaluation of the Options………………………………………………………….24 Recommendations………………………………………………………………….37 Conclusions………………………………………………………………………...40 Bibliography………………………………………………………………………..41 Appendix I: Case Studies…………………………………………………………...42 Appendix II: Analysis of Evacuee and Personnel Behaviors………………………..45 Appendix III: NIMS/ICS…………………………………………………………..48 Appendix IV: Evacuee Interview Questions………………………………………..50 Appendix V: Evacuation Personnel Interview Questions…………………………...51 Appendix VI: Participant Survey…………………………………………………....52

This report was prepared in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master in Public Policy degree in the Department of Public Policy at the University of California, Los Angeles. It was prepared at the direction of the Department and the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) Airport Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) Executive Board as a policy client. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department, the UCLA School of Public Affairs, UCLA as a whole, or the client.

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Acknowledgements Acknowledgements This report was made possible by the time and dedication of many important individuals.

We first want to thank the LAX Airport Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) Executive Board for supporting our project and allowing us to conduct this research at LAX. We are especially grateful for the contribution of the participating agencies. The personnel we interviewed shared their insight, wisdom, and experiences in an incredibly candid manner, giving us a unique understanding of evacuations at LAX. One special thank you goes to LAX Airport Police Sergeant Tony Boisselle. Not only did he provide us with crucial ideas and suggestions throughout the process, but he also worked tirelessly to make sure we had everything we needed to make this project successful. We also owe a great deal to former LAX Airport Police Assistant Chief Erroll Southers. His guidance, constant availability, and dedication to us and to this project is deeply appreciated.

We also want to thank Dr. Amy Zegart at UCLA’s Department of Public Policy. This project began as a result of her direction, and we were grateful for her ongoing advice and availability. We are extremely appreciative for the input of Dr. Meredith Phillips, also at the Public Policy Department at UCLA; Dr. Roxanne Cohen Silver of the University of California, Irvine; and Dr. Richard John of the University of Southern California as well.

Finally, we are greatly indebted to Dr. Mark Peterson for his thorough, thoughtful reviews of every report draft, availability to answer questions, and direction throughout the course of this project.

This report would not have been possible if not for his invaluable guidance.

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Executive Summary Executive Summary At the hub of travel and commerce connecting the nation’s second-largest city to points across the continent and across the Pacific, Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) attracts tens of millions of visitors each year. LAX experiences dozens of security incidents that disrupt service. Although most are minor, in an age of terrorism each requires thorough investigation.

To respond to threats both real and perceived, local and federal agencies charged with security at LAX have implemented policies and procedures for evacuating the public and airport employees.

These procedures are regularly employed and revised. Yet while there are several events each year that require some form of evacuation from the eight terminals at LAX, a gap in knowledge about the public’s behavioral and psychological reactions during times of airport crisis and evacuation remains.

This void prompted security officials at LAX to request our study. These individuals, all represented by agencies on the Airport Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) Executive Board, sought a better understanding of the behaviors they could anticipate from the public and airport staff and how these reactions might inhibit evacuation procedures or the ability of these agencies to keep the public safe during an emergency. Among the questions they posed were: • • •

What reactions can be expected from the public and employees in a crisis situation at LAX, and what factors influencing those reactions can be addressed in advance?

How should airport employees respond in crisis situations in order to best facilitate evacuations? What types of actions and leadership would be most effective in carrying out an evacuation? What failures of performance can be anticipated and circumvented?

What policy or policies would be the most cost-effective and feasible for airport agencies and affiliates to implement?

We took a three-pronged approach to answer these questions. We interviewed participants in three case studies of large-scale evacuations at LAX that occurred over the last eight years; reviewed publicly available videos of evacuations at other airports; and surveyed academic and industry literature on human behavior in crisis situations. This process led us to examine evacuations in three key areas: the relationships among the security agencies at LAX, the training of evacuation personnel, and mechanisms for communicating with evacuees to mitigate anxiety and physical discomfort.

No comprehensive assessment of human behavior during airport evacuations had been conducted before, so we evaluated the options that grew from our assessment based on the unique perspective we gained through the research, as well as the professional expertise of those who would be implementing recommended policies.

In developing the criteria for analyzing the options, we considered whether or not the options would: 4

1.

2.

3.

4.

Address the concerns raised by both evacuees and security personnel Have an affirmative impact on the evacuation process Raise any ancillary safety or security concerns Be feasible in the context of the multiple jurisdictions serving at the airport, the organizational “culture� of the airport, and the spatial and staffing dimensions of LAX 5. Be cost prohibitive We presented the options to a set of airport personnel involved in implementing the evacuations.

We reconciled our analysis with theirs and compiled a set of policy recommendations. The policies most strongly recommended were formal involvement of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in the evacuation process, the training of all TSA employees at LAX in the Department of Homeland Security’s National Incident Management System (NIMS), the use of LAX security videos for training Los Angeles Airport Police officers for evacuations, the design of a mechanism to keep evacuees appropriately informed, and standardized safety and security training for all workers employed at LAX.

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Introduction Introduction Saturday, September 4, 2004, began as an unremarkable start to a long Labor Day weekend.

Thousands flowed into LAX by car and plane, on their way to Los Angeles or bound for destinations across the continent or the world. And yet by mid-morning the sixth busiest airport in the world1 was enveloped by an “eerie silence,” broken only by the prerecorded refrain, “the white zone is for the loading and unloading of passengers only.”2 The silence that enveloped the airport belied the chaos just outside, as evacuees flooded Century Boulevard on foot, the main thoroughfare leading to the airport, ushered away from LAX in the wake of two security alarms.3 Two nearly simultaneous events prompted this evacuation – a man walked unchecked past a TSA checkpoint into Terminal 8, and the batteries in the flashlight of a passenger bound for Japan through Tom Bradley International Terminal (TBIT) “exploded” in the hand of a TSA officer.

The dual alarms had many responding security officers thinking it was a reprise of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., three years earlier.4 It was not. In fact, both incidents turned out to be relatively benign. But the chaos on the streets outside LAX on a heavy travel day that would reach 86 degrees5 illustrated exactly where the security apparatus at LAX was working to its highest capacity – and where there were still great lengths to go. (The details of the evacuation can be found in Appendix I.) Recognizing the shortcomings in an evacuation at one of the world’s busiest airports is relatively easy. Addressing those shortcomings poses challenges due to the spatial dimensions of the facility, the layers of governmental jurisdictions that have a stake in its operations and security, the workforce of some 50,000 people, and the fluidity of the estimated 160,000 passengers who move through it each day.6 These are the dimensions security personnel face as they deal with the challenge of evacuating thousands of passengers.

Collectively, the agencies responsible for security at LAX comprise the Airport Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) Executive Board, a multi-jurisdictional group that also includes representatives from the offices of local elected officials. This project evaluates human behavior during emergencies and evacuations at LAX, and offers recommendations to ASAC Executive Board and its members about how improvements could be made to current processes and procedures.

1

http://www.lawa.org/welcome_lax.aspx?id=40, Retrieved March 7, 2010.

Jennifer Oldham, Steve Hymon, Cara Mia DiMassa. “2 Incidents Force LAX to Evacuate 4 Terminals; About 10,000 passengers are ordered out and 250 flights delayed. Officials see no sign of terrorism.” Los Angeles Times. A1. Sept. 5, 2004.

3 Ibid.

4 This information came from interviews conducted with LAX evacuation personnel.

5 LATimes.com, http://weather.latimes.com/auto/latimes/history/airport/KCQT/2004/9/4/DailyHistory.html?req_city=NA&req_state=NA&req_st atename=NA, Retrieved February 26, 2010.

6 http://www.lawa.org/uploadedfiles/LAX/statistics/tcom-1209.pdf, Retrieved March 7, 2010 2

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We presented this project to the ASAC Executive Board, and member agencies that chose to participate in the project are as follows: LAX Airport Police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Los Angeles Emergency Management Department, Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD), and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).

ASAC Executive Board member agencies relevant to our project that are not included in this report are the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). LAPD did not respond to our requests to participate, and CBP declined.

To provide clarity throughout the following chapters, the principle evacuation roles of the agencies involved in responding to security incidents and carrying out evacuations are briefly outlined below: • • • • • •

•

LAX Airport Police—Airport Police have the formal responsibility of carrying out evacuations. As the primary local law enforcement agency on the site, other security-related agencies defer to Airport Police on these matters.

CBP—Customs and Border Protection is an agency of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. If the incident has an international component, CBP will be involved as needed and will defer to Airport Police.

FBI—The FBI is called to respond to an incident when there is a suspicion of terrorism or other federal crime. Once on scene, the FBI has primary responsibility over any investigations related to those crimes.

LAFD—The LAFD responds to incidents requiring paramedics, the presence of chemical or biological substances, fires, and explosions.

LAPD—The LAPD has a substation at LAX, with a number of officers permanently stationed there. During an evacuation, the LAPD will assist Airport Police as requested.

Los Angeles Emergency Management—LAX has a division of the Los Angeles Emergency Management department stationed at the airport. Its primary role is to write and coordinate evacuation plans. It houses the Emergency Operations Center, and during an emergency, airport stakeholders meet to implement and coordinate emergency and evacuation efforts.

TSA—The TSA, an agency within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, is a federal regulatory agency and as such its employees do not have powers of arrest and are not armed.

Its role during evacuations is to maintain the sterile area prior to and during repopulation.

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Figure 1: LAX Security and Evacuation Agencies

A number of agencies respond to threats and evacuations at LAX. For the purposes of this report, we refer to all law enforcement, TSA, LAFD, and emergency management personnel collectively as “evacuation personnel.� Additionally, we chose to define evacuation as the removal of nonevacuation personnel from the terminal(s), the time these individuals spend outside the terminal(s), and the repopulation of the terminal(s). Repopulation is the return of evacuees to the terminal.

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Evacuations at LAX Evacuations at LAX Airport crises and mass evacuations are rare, and thus offer limited insight into the public’s behavioral and psychological reactions during these events. Security officials at LAX wanted to better understand what types of behaviors are most often displayed by travelers and staff.

Moreover, they sought information about how these reactions may inhibit evacuation procedures and efforts to keep the public safe during emergencies. This project is designed to fill the existing void of knowledge about likely behavioral and emotional reactions in an airport crisis, by suggesting possible changes in policies and practices.

As this study began, we considered the following questions: 1. What are the reactions travelers and employees are most likely to have in response to a crisis situation at an airport?

2. What variables may influence these reactions and how can they best be addressed in advance? For example, do evacuee reactions differ based on variations in the size or spatial layout of the terminal, language barriers, number of travelers in a party (i.e., families or individual travelers), the experience of the traveler, the location of the traveler (i.e., whether or not the individual is in his/her hometown and hence in the airport with which he/she is most familiar)?

3. How should airport employees respond in crisis situations in order to best facilitate public evacuations? What type of actions and leadership would be most effective in carrying out an evacuation? What failures of performance can be anticipated and circumvented?

4. What policy or policies designed to address these concerns would be the most costeffective and feasible for airport agencies and affiliates to implement?

There are two distinct characteristics about LAX that make addressing these types of concerns particularly important. First, according to local terrorism experts, LAX is one of the most significant terrorist targets in the region, if not the country.7 There have been three significant terrorist plots thwarted or incidents carried out there in the last eleven years. Al Qaeda has demonstrated that it returns to and retargets sites of unsuccessful terrorist attempts, and many at LAX believe that the failure of the Millennium Bomber will cause Al Qaeda to target LAX again.8 Additionally, the July 4, 2002, shooting at LAX demonstrates that there is little that can be done to prevent a lone gunman from walking into a public area of the airport and opening fire (See Appendix I).

Second, the size and layout of LAX set it apart from other airports. Approximately 160,000 people fly through the airport each day,9 making it the sixth busiest airport in the world.10 The horseshoe layout of the airport is also distinct, making evacuations more challenging, as an incident at one terminal inevitably affects the traffic flow and operations at other terminals. Interviewees referred to LAX as “eight different airports in one,” because each terminal has its own security checkpoint.

These characteristics challenge evacuation personnel who are responsible for the safety of thousands 7

This information came from interviews conducted with LAX evacuation personnel.

The Millennium Bomber, Ahmed Ressam, planned to set off a number of bombs inside and outside the terminals at LAX. He made it to the Port of Los Angeles on December 14, 1999, but was stopped when Customs officials discovered his trunk full of explosives.

9 Los Angeles World Airports, http://www.lawa.org/uploadedfiles/LAX/statistics/tcom-1209.pdf, Retrieved February 11, 2010 10 Los Angeles World Airports, http://www.lawa.org/welcome_lax.aspx?id=40 Retrieved February 11, 2010 8

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of people. These dual challenges make understanding human behavior critical in ensuring that employees are able to carry out evacuations as efficiently and effectively as possible.

The economic losses resulting from evacuations only magnify these concerns. Although security is a great concern, the airport is a business reliant on revenue generated from travel. Approximately 60 million passengers and more than 2 million tons of cargo pass through LAX annually. An LAX analysis found that this activity generates more than $70 billion in revenue for Southern California every year.11 This analysis estimated that for every hour one terminal is closed, more than $1 million is lost. Evacuation personnel said that during evacuations they often receive calls from individuals on the operations side of the airport wanting to know how quickly flights can resume.12

11 12

This information came from interviews conducted with LAX evacuation personnel.

This information came from interviews conducted with LAX evacuation personnel.

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Methodology Methodology We used a three-tiered approach to study human behavior during emergencies and evacuations at LAX. This included a review of existing research, a review of videos of evacuations at other airports, and an analysis of three LAX-specific case studies to learn from past incidents at LAX. Review of Existing Human Behavior and Evacuation Research We conducted a review of academic and industry literature along three general lines: professional training for police, fire, and other first-responder personnel in evacuation procedures; the psychological reactions to crisis events; and case studies of large-scale evacuations. The literature was drawn from a pool of academic papers and books, trade magazines, and trade book publishers. We interviewed academics with expertise in the fields of human behavior and emergency preparedness.

Airport Evacuation Video Review One of the best ways to evaluate human behavior during crises is to witness the behavior firsthand.

However, the security tapes of emergencies and evacuations at LAX are considered “sensitive security information” (SSI) and therefore unable to be used for this project. There are, however, a number of videos on websites such as YouTube that were filmed by members of the public. We entered the search term “airport evacuation” on YouTube and found more than 300 videos. We systematically reviewed every video, and selected 20 that were deemed relevant to the project because they reflected an airport evacuation in progress. They were coded based on the following information: location, nature of the threat, official notifications, narrator details, commentary, and employee and evacuee behaviors.

LAX Case Studies In lieu of being able to view security tapes at LAX and witness behavior directly, we selected three case studies at LAX to evaluate. These LAX-specific incidents gave us the opportunity to gather information from people who were present during these events. These particular case studies were chosen because they represent a range of different incidents with varying perceptions of danger – a shooting, a security breach/explosion, and a bomb threat. Additionally, the size of each incident was very different. These variations allowed us to understand human behavior and the impact it has on evacuation procedures in a variety of different contexts. (Each of the case studies is outlined in detail in Appendix I.) Our first case study was the July 4, 2002, shooting at Tom Bradley International Terminal (TBIT).

Three people were killed and four were injured in this incident. Following the shooting, most individuals self-evacuated, and those who remained were escorted out by law enforcement. This evacuation lasted approximately eight hours. We selected this case because it was an example of a worst-case scenario incident that law enforcement officials prepare for at LAX. The second case study occurred on Labor Day weekend, September 4, 2004. It was the result of a simultaneous battery explosion in TBIT and a security breach in Terminal 6. These events prompted the subsequent evacuation of terminals 3, 6, 7, and 8. Everyone interviewed remembered it as one of the largest (involving greatest number of terminals and people), most poorly executed, and hardest to manage evacuations at LAX—making it an ideal case to study. We wanted to

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evaluate behavior in these difficult situations, as well as study what policies and procedures may have exacerbated these reactions.

Our third case study was the July 2, 2008, bomb threat at TBIT. At this event, an individual walked up to a police officer outside of TBIT, claimed to have a bomb in his bag and then raised his bag above his head (an act often performed by suicide bombers before they blow themselves up).13 This resulted in the evacuation of TBIT. We selected this case in part to see what improvements had been made since the 2004 evacuation.

We interviewed evacuation personnel who were present at one or more of the case studies. We also interviewed management-level personnel in the agencies who were not at the case studies but who would be able to provide insight about evacuation processes and procedures. We interviewed eighteen people, in variety of positions and roles, from the following agencies: Airport Police, the FBI, Los Angeles Emergency Management department, the LAFD, and the TSA. After the policy options were compiled we went back to many of these individuals, as well as other evacuation personnel, to get feedback about the policy options. This resulted in an additional 10 interviews.

We contacted airline representatives to participate in the project, but received no response. Time and logistical constraints prevented us from contacting other airport personnel including vendors, janitors, or other employees.

We also interviewed four evacuees from the 2002 shooting. We found names of individuals who made statements to the media after each of the case studies, and sent them letters indicating our interest in interviewing them for the project. We sent letters to approximately 12 people from the 2002 incident, seven people from the 2004 incident, and five people from the 2008 incident. For the 2004 and 2008 incidents, we sent letters to everyone whose name and address we could find.

However, no one responded to our request.

All interviews were anonymous and confidential, and thus no names or other identifying information from the interviews appears in this report. As such, we did not audio record any interviews due to the sensitive nature of the topics being discussed. However, in effort to increase the reliability of the data collected, two or more members of our team were present and took notes at each interview. Following each interview, we collectively compared our notes to confirm the accuracy of the information gathered and reported here.

This project met and complied with the UCLA Institutional Review Board’s requirements for ensuring and protecting confidentiality.

Limitations Our study has limitations. We were unable to interview personnel from certain agencies who play a role in the evacuation process, and we had an overrepresentation of respondents from one agency.

Both of these factors could distort our overall perspective of the evacuation process. Additionally, interviewing individuals from an agency does not necessarily offer a representative agency perspective. We only contacted evacuees who had previously given statements to the media. It should be noted that the evacuees we spoke with went through a dual self-selection process: they 13

This information came from interviews conducted with LAX evacuation personnel.

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chose to speak to the media and they chose to speak with us. Their evacuation experience may not be representative of all evacuees. Also, none of our participants were randomly selected.

Despite these limitations, participant experiences were uniform across agencies, as well as among evacuation personnel and evacuees. The process has yielded the fullest assessment yet of evacuations at LAX and did offer a number of ways to improve the status quo.

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Key Themes: Panic, Training, and Response Key Themes: Panic, Training, and Response What the Literature Tells Us There is a common perception that at the onset of a critical incident – a shooting, earthquake, or explosion – people will panic. And while this expectation has become accepted by the public, fed perhaps by scenes from movies,14,15 there is ample academic literature asserting that this is not an accurate assessment of human behavior under these circumstances.16,17 The literature revealed that panic an “intense fear” that results in “irrational flight, running in any direction without thought given to a rational escape route.”18 To the extent “panic” does occur it is often a result not of the critical event but a loss of trust in figures of authority on the part of the population. Indeed, the existence of the myth itself may contribute to circumstances that may precipitate panic “by eroding citizens’ confidence in social order.”19 This finding both reinforces the notion that training on the part of first-responders is vital to ensuring the cooperation of evacuees and provides a framework for those officials as they prepare themselves for these events.

Most incidents requiring evacuations from terminals at LAX do not rise to the level where they could be expected to induce panic. The majority of evacuations are routine events taken out of caution. And yet, those charged with clearing the terminals must be prepared for the worst-case scenario and the fear that may come with it. That fear is a very real factor in dealing with crowds in emergencies.

The shooting at TBIT on July 4, 2002, was a rare incident, but the behaviors of members of the public in the terminal at the time, as observed and recounted in our interviews with both evacuation personnel and evacuees, corroborated findings in the literature on behavior in times of crisis. Panic might be a myth, but fear is real, and it tends to follow a pattern. “Stunned inactivity” is found to be the initial response to an event of this nature, marked by a period of as long as fifteen minutes in which people cannot be counted on to act “effectively.”20 While there is literature that holds that the “freezing” period is considerably shorter – on a scale of seconds rather than minutes – there is a common finding that these delays can prove costly. 21 Whatever its length, the period of ineffectiveness can, depending on the circumstance, exacerbate the danger of the underlying event by making it harder for authorities to evacuate the premises.22 The literature in this regard points to the value of training for those who would be involved in keeping order or facilitating evacuations during these events. Training serves two purposes in these 14

B. Fischhoff, RM Gonzalez, DA Small, and JS Lerner. “Evaluating the Success of Terror Risk Communications,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science. 1 (4)(2003): 255.

15 Telephone interview, Dr. Roxanne Cohen Silver, February 11, 2010.

16 Kathleen Tierney. “Disaster Beliefs and Institutional Interests: Recycling Disaster Myths in the Aftermath of 9–11,” Research in Social Problems and Public Policy. 11 (2003):33-51.

17 Henry W. Fischer. Response to Disaster: Fact Versus Fiction and Its Perpetuation:Tthe Sociology of Disaster (Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 2008), 49-50.

18 Ibid.

19 Fischhoff B., et al, 2003.

20 Harold E. Russell, and Allan Beigel, Understanding Human Behavior for Effective Police Work. (New York: Basic Books, 1976). 258.

21 John Leach, “Why People ‘Freeze’ in an Emergency: Temporal and Cognitive Constraints on Survival Responses,” Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine.75 (6) (2004): 539-42.

22 Russell & Beigel. 1976; Leach. 2004

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circumstances: it goes a long way toward numbing the responsible personnel to fear during the critical event and therefore helps solidify their authority which facilitates the evacuation. 23 Further, airport terminals are unlike large public venues like office buildings or hospitals because the vast majority of those to be evacuated are transient visitors. As a result, these visitors are far less likely than the smaller cohort of airport personnel to be intimately familiar with the physical space and therefore more reliant on instructions from authorities. This added responsibility is cited as further evidence for the need for training, as evacuees “are very likely to look for staff members to obtain information; they are regarded as knowledgeable, they are expected to know the situation, the best course of action and the closest exit.”24 Once on scene, how authorities communicate the need to evacuate is vitally important.

Straightforward commands clearly delivered have been shown to speed the process.25 The literature also supports the need for post-event assessments to “identify deficiencies.” 26 Original Research Findings Our research yielded insights that generally fell into three categories: evacuees, evacuation personnel, and institutional. Institutional refers to the collective behavior of the agencies at LAX. Evacuees—The Public Interviews with evacuation personnel and members of the general public who were evacuated during the case studies, as well as a review of online videos, helped to shed light on the behaviors evacuees are likely to exhibit during an airport emergency. During the interviews we found that evacuees can be calm during an emergency, will usually follow the instructions provided by evacuation personnel, ask many questions, and tend to become progressively more frustrated as the duration of the evacuation increases.

In the moment of an airport emergency, such as the July 4, 2002, shooting, most evacuees described their immediate reaction as “ducking for cover.” One evacuee described the seconds following the shooting as “complete silence,” stating surprise that so many people could be so quiet. Screaming, yelling, running, and crying were subsequent reactions that came seconds later. In other instances where people were asked to evacuate the airport due to a bomb threat or security breach, they were described as being “concerned” and “compliant with the evacuation.”

When asked to leave, evacuees followed the guidance of evacuation personnel. Online videos showed that evacuees looked to evacuation personnel for instructions on how to get out of the airport, as well as indications of the severity of the incident. Many of the videos show evacuation personnel directing compliant evacuees. Video commentary illustrated that evacuees gauge the severity of the event based on the presence of the bomb squad, fire trucks, and behavior of evacuation personnel. In one video, the narrator discounted the severity of the incident because he saw two evacuation personnel standing around talking and laughing during the evacuation.

23

Leach. 2004 Guylène Proulx,. “Occupant Behaviour and Evacuation” Proceedings of the 9th International Fire Protection Symposium.

Munich (2001). 291-232 25 Fischer. 2008.

26 Proulx. 2001.

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From our interviews, we learned that evacuees repeatedly ask questions of evacuation personnel.

Among the most common: “What’s happening?” “Where should I go?” “Should I take my bags?”

Similarly, evacuees we spoke with stated they asked personnel for information regarding the incident, assistance locating restrooms and refreshments, as well as updates on scheduled flights.

Interviewees, both evacuation personnel and evacuees, recognized the difficulty that evacuation personnel have answering all of these questions from evacuees. Because they were unable to have their questions answered by evacuation personnel, evacuees we interviewed sought information from other evacuees, the media, or people outside the airport whom they were able to reach by cellular telephone.

In addition to having a multitude of questions, interviewees explained that evacuees become increasingly frustrated as the evacuation wears on. The two primary sources of evacuee frustration we identified are inability to access information about scheduled flights and a lack of information about the emergency incident. Other frustrations stem from lack of familiarity with surroundings, including not knowing where to access restrooms, food, water or chairs. Once safely outside the terminal and in the secure area, evacuees were described as “frustrated,” “keyed up,” “annoyed,” and “angry.” Some evacuation personnel reported seeing evacuees “yelling at each other,” and becoming “selfish,” complaining because they did not “understand why they could not get on the planes and get on their way.”

Evacuees—Other Airport Personnel While we did not speak with other airport personnel such as airline representatives, maintenance workers, or vendors, we did ask interviewees to describe reactions they witnessed among this group during emergency situations. Generally, interviewees described the behavior of the additional airport personnel to be similar to that of evacuees. These airport personnel were described as “frustrated with the mass evacuation,” and reacted by “leaving with the passengers,” or in more serious incidents by “hitting the floor,” “crawling to get out,” or “seeking cover.”

Evacuation Personnel Our interviews with evacuation personnel revealed they possess a sense of calm and duty during times of airport emergencies, and instinctually revert to their extensive training to get them through the process.

When asked to describe their feelings going into the case study events, all law enforcement personnel we interviewed experienced an adrenaline rush upon learning of the emergent incidents.

Interviewees described their emotions as “anxious,” “nervous,” and “fearful” of a possible repeat of the events of September 11, 2001. Regardless of the instigating event – a shooting, bomb threat, or explosion – all stated they experienced feelings of concern for the well being of both their fellow officers and the public. They also expressed a tremendous sense of duty, with many interviewees stating they responded to incidents despite not being nearby, scheduled for duty, or being unarmed.

From the interviews, the extent to which evacuation personnel revert to their training became abundantly clear. Interviewees recalled their training and knew what steps needed to be taken to secure the scene and get the job done. Upon arriving at the scene, interviewees explained that they immediately began to think tactically, assessing “the best way to get in,” “where to park,” “how to get the job done,” and the best “calculated response.” One interviewee specifically stated, “My training helped calm me down.”

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All interviewees seemed to be emotionally unaffected in the moment by the scenes they encountered; many stated they felt “no” or “zero emotion” during the incident. For the majority of evacuation personnel with whom we spoke any emotion related to the events did not surface until they went off duty. Some said they used their commute home as a time to process the day’s events, while others explained that emotions do not emerge until the next day or until seeing loved ones.

Institutional Responses People not familiar with the workings of LAX might expect to see jurisdictional conflicts that inhibit the behavior of, or create frictions among, evacuation personnel. Specifically, there may be an expectation that turf battles can arise between federal and local agencies over control of critical incidents. This, like the “myth of panic,” may be fed by dramatizations and it may contain elements of truth in other circumstances. With regard to responding to incidents that might necessitate an evacuation at LAX, however, we found that such questions did not create conflict. Interviewees said three factors contributed to this circumstance.

The first is that there has been a generally positive working relationship among the agencies and an understanding of their respective roles. A contributing factor is that these agencies are constantly responding to events – bomb threats, evacuations, shootings, earthquakes, pandemics, fires, biological threats – together. As a result, personnel from the management and command levels down to the line level have become familiar with one another.

Second, a nationally recognized unified command structure is utilized during emergencies and evacuations. This command structure, the National Incident Management System (NIMS), was created by the Department of Homeland Security and is utilized by all law enforcement agencies throughout the country (see Appendix III). All those who respond to evacuation calls at LAX are trained in this system, which provides a framework for ensuring that the response is coordinated, resources are managed, and all participating agencies are organized and communicating efficiently.

Finally, the mandates of each of the agencies participating in evacuations as previously described are distinct enough that roles do not come into conflict.

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Policy Options for Consideration Policy Options for Consideration Based on these findings, we generated the following policy options for consideration and analysis.

The options are grouped into the same categories as outlined in the findings. The evacuee option focuses on an unmet need of this group during evacuations; the evacuation personnel options take into account the challenges faced by these individuals as they carry out their duties; and the institutional options are airport-wide or system level changes that would improve the evacuation process by taking human behavior into account.

The options within these categories are not mutually exclusive, and it is possible to select as many or as few from each category as appropriate.

Evacuee Related Option 1: Design a Mechanism to Provide Information to Evacuees This option would involve taking measures to alleviate the distraction that extensive evacuee questions pose to personnel trying to conduct evacuations. Information that would be provided may include how to find bags, what flight delays have occurred, where to get medical attention, and other information of concern to evacuees. The most effective messages would be delivered by law enforcement personnel and would also address evacuee safety concerns.

Evacuation Personnel Related Option 2: Develop Terminal Specializations for Airport Police Officers Airport Police Officers rotate among terminals and spend time in each terminal. This option would revise the current deployment plan so that specific officers spend the majority of their time stationed in no more than two terminals.

Option 3: Offer Evacuation Video Training for Airport Police Given the challenges of conducting evacuation exercises, this option would have all new Airport Police officers participate in evacuation training that includes a review of videos of past LAX evacuations. These videos would include a representative sample of events and would highlight situations that were executed successfully as well as those that were not. An experienced officer would lead the training and narrate the videos, highlighting both effective and ineffective techniques for dealing with evacuees. If these videos do not exist, future evacuation videos could be saved for this purpose.

Option 4: Train Airport Police Officers in Behavior Modeling Training in behavior modeling would provide officers with the tools to remain poised during stressful situations and demonstrate behaviors that affirm their authority, elicit responses they desire from evacuees, and smooth the evacuation process. The techniques include focusing on non-verbal actions and ensuring that these behaviors do not contradict verbal instructions given to evacuees.

Option 5: Provide Additional Communication Training to Airport Police Officers “Verbal Judo” is a communication technique employed by law enforcement that uses “presence and words” to calm people in stress situations. It is also used to defuse the anxiety of people who may be hostile, suffering emotional distress, or otherwise dangerous. This training is given to Airport

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Police by video on a biannual basis. This option would entail having the training occur more frequently and be interactive.

Institution Related Option 6: Formally Utilize TSA Officers in the Evacuation Process TSA has the largest uniformed presence at LAX, with approximately 500 officers on duty at any given time. Under this option, TSA and Airport Police would collaborate to develop a plan to more formally utilize TSA in all aspects of the evacuation process.

Option 7: Train TSA Employees in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS) NIMS and ICS are the primary command structures used during an evacuation at LAX. NIMS is a nationally recognized system that standardizes the emergency response among agencies, creates an adaptive command structure and coordinates resources and communication. ICS is a component of NIMS. Participants in this study told us that this system allows everyone to “speak the same language” during emergencies and ensures jurisdictional issues do not arise. All law enforcement agencies and emergency management staff at LAX are trained in NIMS. TSA management staff is trained in NIMS, but only a select number of TSA officers or supervisors are trained. Under this option, all officers would receive this training course, which can be completed online in less than three hours.

Option 8: Enhance the Current Debrief (“Hotwash”) Process Debriefing sessions involving participating agencies occur following all incidents. The number of the participants at the debriefing varies based on the nature of the event. At present, these sessions are largely focused on tactics, and notes to document important “lessons learned” are not taken.

This option has four elements: 1. Notes would be taken during these meetings, focusing specifically on actions and tactics that were successful and those that were unsuccessful.

2. These notes would be circulated to the employees of all participating agencies.

3. These notes would be collected in a central location and utilized in the training of new employees.

4. Time would be allocated at these sessions to discuss the behavior of both the personnel and civilians being evacuated.

Option 9: Familiarize All Airport Employees with the New LAX Evacuation Plan In 2009, the LAX office of Los Angeles Emergency Management took the 800-page Airport Emergency Operation Manual (AEOP) and condensed it into a 90-page, airport-wide “Terminal Evacuation and Repopulation Plan.” This option would train emergency personnel to use this plan.

Option 10: Stay Apprised of New Evacuation Research and Technology This option would have the Airport Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) Executive Board designate an agency or individual to regularly collaborate with academics and businesses about any new developments or research that may enhance current evacuation procedures.

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Criteria for Evaluating the Policy Options Criteria for Evaluating the Policy Options We analyzed the policy options against two different sets of expertise. From our research findings, we developed a criterion, called evacuee and evacuation personnel concerns, to evaluate how each option would address issues and concerns raised by each of these groups. Evacuation personnel have an entirely different type of expertise gained from their experiences interacting with other agencies and carrying out evacuations. The rest of the criteria reflect their specialized knowledge.

Evacuee and Evacuation Personnel Concerns Informed primarily by the interview process (which was confirmed in many cases by the review of existing literature), we sought to take into account evacuee and evacuation personnel behaviors during the evacuation process. We found that evacuees may be compliant in the beginning but typically become increasingly annoyed and frustrated as time wears on, inundating airport personnel with repeated questions most often related to travel plans and personal comfort. Airport Police and other evacuation personnel, in the throes of removing the public from an impacted area, instinctually revert to their training to empty public spaces to ensure safety. These sets of responses can come into conflict, especially in circumstances where uncertainty over the scope of the threat reigns for an extended period. We drew on the knowledge gained in our interviews and the specific examples given in a variety of evacuation contexts, and sought to balance these concerns when evaluating each policy option.

Improving Efficiency and Efficacy of Evacuations Having safe yet expeditious evacuations is a priority for everyone at LAX, and any policy option must further that goal. Specifically, an efficient and effective evacuation is one that (as quickly as possible) gets everyone out of the terminal or affected area without injuries; secures the scene and source of danger; appropriately controls and manages the public; best utilizes the time and resources of all evacuation personnel; and gets everyone back into the terminal and on their way as quickly as safety permits.

Security Concerns Protecting the safety and security of evacuees and airport infrastructure is the primary mission of the law enforcement agencies at LAX. Any new policy must not inhibit this goal in any way.

Additionally, new procedures must not risk the divulging of sensitive security information (SSI).

Feasibility We anticipated a number of practical issues possibly affecting the implementation of our options, including jurisdictional complexity, concerns about organizational culture, logistical feasibility, and budgetary constraints.

1. Jurisdictional Complexity Given the number of agencies present at the airport, a number of factors must be considered when evaluating the policy options: conflicts could arise over jurisdictional questions; the presence of multiple armed law enforcement agencies could complicate evacuations; and broader questions of authority in the time of an event could inhibit operations. Specifically, does the involvement of multiple agencies or different levels of oversight impede implementation?

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2. Organizational Culture The myriad of agencies responsible for public safety at LAX each have their distinct organizational cultures. Each agency goes through different training, has a different set of responsibilities and has a different organizational structure. In an environment where many organizations with distinct cultures are thrust into working together for a common goal in a crisis situation, we favored options that improved evacuations while minimizing the friction that might arise under these circumstances.

3. Logistical Complications The logistics of an evacuation from a terminal at LAX can be complicated. Some evacuation personnel are on duty in the terminals at all times, some are based in offices on-site but not in individual terminals. Others are based off-site, complicating access in the event of an evacuation. Spatially, the terminals at LAX are built along a large horseshoe road. We favored options that took these factors into consideration and mitigated logistical problems.

4. Cost Budget constraints are an ongoing concern for public entities, and we considered cost in developing these recommendations. We considered both the direct and indirect costs of each option. Direct costs are strictly financial in nature, whereas indirect costs could include the expense incurred by removing officers from rotation.

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Methods of Evaluation Methods of Evaluation Our research has provided us with an understanding of emotions, reactions, responses, and opinions about airport evacuations. Evacuation personnel involved in evacuations are experts when it comes to considerations such as logistical complications, organizational culture, and costs. Our analysis of each policy option entailed a three-fold approach.

Stage 1: Our Evaluation of the Options We started the evaluation process by analyzing the options according to how successful each possible alternative would be in mitigating evacuee and evacuation personnel behaviors. This assessment was informed by our research of existing literature, video analysis, and individual interviews with evacuation personnel and evacuees regarding the three selected case studies. We then came to a consensus and rated each option in accordance with the descriptions below: Figure 2: Description of Our Rankings Rating (1) strongly oppose (2) oppose (3) neutral (4) support (5) strongly support

Description Addresses identified research needs in an indirect way or not at all; significant conflict between concerns of evacuation personnel and evacuees.

Addresses identified research needs in an indirect way or not at all; moderate conflict between concerns of evacuation personnel and evacuees.

Conflicting findings from the research; not necessary to address identified research needs.

Limited conflict between concerns of evacuation personnel and evacuees; more indirect approach to addressing identified research needs; supported by the research; success dependent on means of implementation.

No conflict between concerns of evacuation personnel and evacuees; directly addresses needs identified by our research; supported by the research.

Stage 2: Participant Evaluation of the Options Once we completed our analysis of the options, we contacted the evacuation personnel we interviewed about the case studies to obtain their input regarding the policy options. We asked participants to evaluate each option based on the following criteria: improving efficiency and efficacy of evacuations, security concerns, and feasibility. We met with one to four people from each agency, ranging from command positions to line personnel. They completed a survey (see Appendix III) evaluating the policy options based on the criteria outlined above. Upon completion of the survey, we spent time discussing each individual’s feedback in an effort to better understand the options’ limitations, strengths, and weaknesses. The options were evaluated against the criteria on the following scale: (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neutral, (4) agree, and (5) strongly agree.

We then combined all of the survey responses and feedback to determine the participant’s evaluation for each option and rated it in accordance when the descriptions below:

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Figure 3: Description of Participant Rankings Rating (1) strongly oppose (2) oppose (3) neutral (4) support (5) strongly support

Description Consistently unfavorable responses; no benefit perceived; significant resistance to concept or implementation.

Modest benefit perceived; significant resistance to concept or implementation.

Potential for benefit; ultimate benefit unclear; implementation could be met with significant resistance.

Strong benefit perceived; obstacles may complicate implementation.

Consistently favorable responses; strong benefit perceived; minor obstacles to implementation exist, but can be easily overcome.

Stage 3: Overall Evaluation Finally, we arrived at an overall evaluation for each option by combining our rating and the rating of evacuation personnel. In cases where the ratings matched, the overall rating reflected that agreement. In cases where the ratings did not match, how we arrived at an overall rating is described in the analysis of those specific options. Reconciling these differences was an optionspecific process not suited to general characterizations like those outlined in the charts above.

Rather than using a three-tiered low-medium-high ranking to evaluate our policy options, we chose to use a five-tiered scale to help delineate the difference between strong and moderate support or opposition. The five-point scale also provided us with a more nuanced understanding of each option’s strengths and weaknesses, which proved especially useful given the large number of options for consideration.

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Evaluation of the Options Evaluation of the Options In determining each option’s overall evaluation, we balanced the insights we gained through both the interview process and review of outside sources against the first-hand knowledge of the survey respondents. In most cases, our evaluation was corroborated by the participants’ evaluation of the options. For the cases where there was disagreement between our evaluation and that of the respondents, the reasoning behind our choices is described in full.

The analysis that follows is based on all collected information. However, given the small number of participants, the unequal distribution of participants among agencies, the fact that interviews were not audio recorded, and the need to protect confidentiality, we do not directly attribute feedback to a specific individual or agency.

Option 1: Design a Mechanism to Provide Information to Evacuees Our Evaluation: Strongly Support The need to provide information to evacuees was the most common finding of the interviews.

Interviews with evacuation personnel and evacuees emphasized the public’s need for information during an evacuation. Evacuation personnel explained they are constantly barraged with questions, while evacuees recounted that they were rarely able to receive answers to their questions regarding flight schedules (both departing and arriving), location of restrooms, available seating areas, food, and safety. In fact, one evacuee revealed that evacuees often rely on the media to get answers to their questions.

Understandably, law enforcement officers are unable to provide answers to all evacuee questions, sometimes due to security concerns, but also because they are occupied securing the scene and conducting investigations. However, developing a mechanism to provide basic information to evacuees could ease their concerns, ensure the dissemination of accurate information, as well as curb the constant stream of questions officers encounter while trying to evacuate, secure the scene, and conduct investigations.

Participant Evaluation: Strongly Support Survey respondents recognized the provision of information to evacuees to be a deficit in existing procedure, and strongly supported the creation of a mechanism that could provide the necessary information. They believed this mechanism would allow them to better do their jobs and execute evacuations in a more efficient and effective manner.

Concerns were raised about jurisdiction, logistical feasibility, and airport culture – namely who would decide what information is provided to evacuees, how that information is delivered, and who delivers it. Despite these concerns, all agreed that the benefits outweighed the costs. LAX can use existing infrastructure at a nominal cost to provide necessary information.

Overall Evaluation: Strongly Support

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Option 2: Develop Terminal Specializations for LAX Airport Police Our Evaluation: Strongly Support We were told that on average, it takes about two weeks for officers to become intimately familiar with the layout of a terminal. However, we found during the interviews that the current rotation schedule does not allow Airport Police officers to develop relationships with vendors, TSA officers, airline employees, and others in the terminal.

Two Airport Police officers cited the benefit of being familiar with airport employees when responding to the shooting on July 4, 2002. These employees recognized the officers as they entered the terminal, and pointed them in the direction of the shooter. Additionally, TSA officers are currently stationed in a single terminal, an arrangement that allows them to become familiar with others working there. Other evacuation personnel highlighted the importance of developing relationships which could result in ease of communication and evacuation of resistant employees from the terminal. Although the number of large-scale evacuations has diminished, being familiar with the people working in the terminal will provide a benefit during both emergencies and evacuations.

Participant Evaluation: Support with Modifications Survey respondents expressed support for this option, stating that terminal specialization has, in fact, been considered in the past. Most respondents agreed that focusing on specific terminals during their deployments could improve the effectiveness of evacuations by increasing an officer’s familiarity with the vendors and employees working in that area. This enables officers to quickly recognize airport employees, and could enhance the likelihood that suspicious activity would be reported to the officers. Security was the most prevalent concern.

Respondents thought that because the terminals are so small officers would become complacent or bored if they were stationed in only one or two terminals for extended periods of time. One individual noted that officers may make friends with those working in the terminal, become caught up in their personal lives, and lose the objectivity needed to manage the security operation. A few others interviewed were concerned about loss of familiarity with other terminals and other areas of the airport. However, those most intimately familiar with the airport indicated that the layout of the airport does not change and once an officer becomes familiar with the terminal he/she does not lose that knowledge. Thus, this concern would only apply if airport specializations were implemented for new officers.

While survey respondents had some concerns about how a specialized deployment schedule would be designed, most supported concept and understood the benefits it could provide. Those opposed to certain elements of the option suggested modifications that would overcome the concerns expressed.

The criteria of jurisdictional complexity and organizational culture were not raised because the only agency affected is Airport Police. Cost would not be an issue, as this option requires simply a modification of deployment schedules.

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Overall Evaluation: Support with Modifications Both sets of analyses determined that developing relationships could improve evacuation procedures. While there was some resistance regarding the specifics of a specialized rotation schedule, we learned that there was support for this option with minor modifications to the deployment plan. The modified version of this option appears in the recommendation section.

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Option 3: Offer Evacuation Video Training for Airport Police Our Evaluation: Strongly Support Every Airport Police officer we interviewed mentioned the paramount importance of his or her training. The officers credited their training when talking about what goes into conducting successful evacuations without experiencing fear or panic. However, law enforcement officers do not receive any formal LAX-specific evacuation training. Current practice is for new officers to wait until they experience an evacuation and “learn on their feet.�

Using existing security footage from LAX to train officers would be an ideal way to prepare them for evacuations. It would be specific to the terminals at LAX, would address situations that had arisen before, and would help Airport Police officers become familiar with the types of evacuee and evacuation personnel reactions they could expect to see. Additionally, interviewees stressed the importance of learning from past mistakes. Giving new officers the opportunity to visualize these failures (as well as the successes) would be an easy way to learn before they experience their first evacuation.

Participant Evaluation: Strongly Support Some respondents expressed concerns about the cost associated with removing officers from rotation to attend evaluation video training. However, the overwhelming response from survey respondents was that offering evacuation video training would be inexpensive and feasible because the training would use existing LAX-specific evacuation footage and could be done in-house.

Respondents stated they have received positive feedback about video training from officers, as visual aids provide effective learning tools. Further, they commented that using video footage from evacuations would provide another opportunity in which officers can use past errors as learning opportunities and increase familiarity with terminal-specific evacuation tactics. Utilizing these videos would not raise security concerns, as all Airport Police officers are cleared to view sensitive security information. The criteria of jurisdictional complexity and organizational culture were not mentioned because the only agency affected is Airport Police.

Overall Evaluation: Strongly Support

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Option 4: Train Airport Police Officers in Behavior Modeling Our Evaluation: Neutral Analysis of online evacuation videos (none of which showed evacuations at LAX) repeatedly revealed that travelers take cues from the behavior of uniformed evacuation personnel for guidance.

Narration of many videos highlighted the fact that uniformed officers were seen standing around, talking or laughing during an airport evacuation. Such behavior prompted travelers to doubt the gravity of the situation. Additionally, a review of the psychology literature found that in the moments after a critical incident the reactions of those nearby are most likely to be those of “stunned inactivity,” during which people will not act effectively. The “effective behavior” of first responders—executing responsibilities according to their training—was found to both save lives and mitigate the effective confusion in the wake of the event.27 LAX Airport Police Officers currently receive academy training in “Command Presence” that teaches similar principles. However, it is only provided to officers during their police academy training and does not focus specifically on the airport environment.

While evacuees do look to the behavior of law enforcement and this training is extremely valuable, we did not find a specific need for it at LAX. In interviewing evacuees and evacuation personnel, we found that Airport Police officers display appropriate behavior during evacuations and emergencies.

Participant Evaluation: Strongly Support Survey respondents expressed broad support for this option. They said it would directly enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of evacuations. Moreover, this type of training was perceived to be an important and practical tool for Airport Police officers as they carry out evacuations. The criteria of jurisdictional complexity and organizational culture are not applicable because the only agency affected is Airport Police. Security was not a concern.

The only resistance to this option involved cost and logistics of training. Concerns were raised about the length of time it would require to train officers, because behavior training would be an ongoing process. However, despite the reservations about cost survey respondents felt that this training would a novel enhancement to existing training.

Overall Evaluation: Recommend for Further Study We cannot conclusively make a recommendation about this option. This training is highly evidencebased and shown by the literature to be extremely effective. It was a novel idea that was very well received by participants and seen as worthwhile in its ability to be successful.

Despite the support for the training, our research did not find a need for implementation at this time. We found no evidence to suggest that Airport Police officers at LAX behaved in a manner that would hinder the effectiveness of the evacuation. The evacuees we interviewed noted that the officers they watched and interacted with were concerned yet calm, took the incident seriously, and commanded respect.

27

Russell & Beigel. 1976; Leach. 2004

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We cannot give this option an overall evaluation of support given that our research did not find a need for it. However, given the limited scope of our study, the support for this option in the literature, and the interest shown by participants, this option should be considered further by Airport Police.

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Option 5: Provide Additional Communication Training to Airport Police Officers Our Evaluation: Neutral Several of the Airport Police officers with whom we spoke explicitly identified the importance of being able to communicate with and manage the public once they have been cleared from the terminal. Officers stated evacuees become increasingly frustrated, annoyed, and even argumentative as the duration of the evacuation lengthens. Different officers emphasized the various techniques they use to manage the crowds, including monitoring tone of voice, speaking to evacuees with respect, and using force and threats of arrest when necessary. During the case study interviews, one officer spoke particularly favorably of the department’s biannual training in “Verbal Judo,” observing that the skills learned in the training have been particularly helpful in managing the crowd.

Conversely, other interviewees did not see the benefit of verbal judo training, feeling that their own techniques were more effective.

Providing officers additional training in “Verbal Judo” may enhance the officers’ ability to communicate with the crowd, but does not resolve the evacuees’ need for information, another theme identified in nearly every interview.

Participant Evaluation: Neutral Respondents stated that in theory additional training could be useful in making evacuations more efficient and effective. This training would also fulfill the requirement of more frequent communication training, which is considered to be a “perishable skill.” Concerns included resistance to the training on the part of officers (as most do not believe they need the training and thus do not take it seriously), taking officers out of the field to receive more training, and the cost, length, and frequency of the training. This option would not involve the communication of any security information, and thus did not raise any security concerns. Overall, respondent evaluation reflected a balance between advantages and disadvantages, with neither outweighing the other.

Overall Evaluation: Neutral

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Option 6: Formally Utilize TSA Officers in the Evacuation Process Our Evaluation: Strongly Support An analysis of the online videos showed evacuees seek guidance from TSA officers during evacuations and emergencies. Additionally, TSA officers at LAX have undergone extensive training to prepare for emergencies and evacuations. TSA officers are trained on evacuation routes specific to their assigned post, and have access to emergency supply kits and handbooks.

While Airport Police execute the evacuations, TSA will always have a greater number of employees working at any given time. The 2004 evacuation, in which multiple terminals were evacuated and thousands of travelers were affected, demonstrated the importance of having the assistance of additional evacuation personnel. TSA officers are already utilized by Airport Police on an ad-hoc basis and evacuees look to them during a crisis. Utilizing TSA to aid Airport Police in a more formal way would free up Airport Police officers to focus on securing the scene and neutralizing the incident, which will allow repopulation of the terminal to occur in a quicker, more efficient manner.

Participant Evaluation: Support A majority of survey respondents expressed support for the utilization of TSA in the evacuation process, and agreed that the creation of a more systematic and formalized way to include them would make the process much more effective and efficient. Some concerns existed over jurisdictional issues that could emerge between local and federal agencies, but all entities we spoke with were in favor of integrating TSA’s role in evacuations. Another concern was whether training would be necessary, who would pay for it, and how it would be conducted (with most participants agreeing that joint training would be incredibly beneficial by mitigating jurisdictional issues). In spite of these concerns, respondents recognized the fact that TSA has high visibility and would likely be the first point of contact an evacuee has in an evacuation. Respondents also supported this option because it forces the agencies to address and resolve jurisdictional concerns by working together on a more consistent basis.

Overall Evaluation: Strongly Support Both sets of analyses acknowledged TSA’s high visibility, large presence, and the potential to utilize its officers to improve evacuations. Across all agencies, survey respondents saw the need for and benefit of TSA’s expanded role in all aspects of the evacuation process. Based on the feedback we received during the interviews, we are confident that the creation of a task force could aid in both the development of a plan and the resolution of any jurisdictional issues that may arise.

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Option 7: Train TSA Employees in NIMS/ICS Our Evaluation: Strongly Support The interviews indicated that understanding NIMS is important in clarifying agency roles and providing a more complete understanding of how inter-agency collaboration operates and is successful during evacuations. Because TSA has such a visible presence and the videos indicate that evacuees will seek the help during emergencies, they should become familiar with this system so that no jurisdictional or other authority problems arise.

Participant Evaluation: Strongly Support This option received broad support from nearly all survey respondents. Cost was the main concern mentioned by survey respondents. Although the training is free and online, the TSA workforce is large and it would require taking them away from their job for approximately three hours to complete. A couple of individuals felt that it was important for management and supervisory level TSA staff to be trained, but that it was an unnecessary use of resources to train all TSA officers.

Most respondents indicated that training all TSA officers in NIMS/ICS was a way to facilitate communication and ensure all evacuation personnel are “speaking the same language.� They also said it would aid in resolving jurisdictional or organizational culture issues likely to arise during an emergency or evacuation, which could occur at the line level. This option would not raise any security concerns as the training is publicly available.

Overall Evaluation: Strongly Support

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Option 8: Enhance the Current Debrief (“Hotwash”) Process Our Evaluation: Support These sessions are an ideal place to discuss the behaviors of evacuees and to brainstorm new ways in which these behaviors can be handled. Additionally, taking notes, sharing them with staff, and using them as a training tool can be useful for new hires. Our interviews revealed that important lessons and useful tips have been learned during these debriefs, and the notes could be a valuable way to teach incoming officers about tactics during evacuations and emergencies as well as strategies for dealing with public and employee behavior.

Our interviews revealed that the debrief sessions are not always attended by representatives of all pertinent agencies because the debrief may be seen as not relevant to an agency’s specific role in the evacuation. Agency representatives are highly encouraged to attend, but no one has the authority to make them mandatory. Enhancing the debrief process would require a shift in current attitudes, thereby making this option more complicated than simply instituting relatively minor changes in the meeting’s format. However, this shift in attitudes could come as a result of the change in format.

Participant Evaluation: Support Survey respondents were generally supportive of this option, but voiced some concerns over the specific components. Two issues surrounding airport culture were raised. First, some respondents indicated that the success of a debrief session is largely dependent on the officer in charge of the meeting (which varies from debrief to debrief), and questioned whether any of the proposed improvements would change that dynamic. Second, others indicated that the current format promotes an “open dialogue,” and wondered whether taking notes for the purpose of future training would allow people to be as candid about their mistakes and the mistakes of others. Some respondents confirmed that the primary focus of the debrief is to transform errors into learning experiences. They reiterated that several key policy changes have originated because of discussions that occurred in debrief. Respondents supported the ideas of taking notes of key conclusions as a way of generating new policy ideas and saw the utility of having records that could be handed down to new officers. Cost and security concerns were not raised.

Overall Evaluation: Support

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Option 9: Train Evacuation Personnel on the New LAX Evacuation Plan Our Evaluation: Neutral In discussing the case studies, we asked the evacuation personnel about current LAX evacuation plan. These interviews revealed that there is little familiarity with the revised LAX Terminal and Repopulation Plan. Some agencies have reviewed the document, others are aware it exists but have not read it, and others are completely unaware that a revision occurred. Complicating things further, some entities have their own evacuation plans. Additionally, interviewees said they were unlikely to make use of any written plan, even one that is 90 pages, and will instead revert to agency specific training during a crisis.

The idea of a centralized evacuation plan for LAX is logical, therefore, but perhaps not practical.

Given the size of the airport, the number of different agencies involved in executing an evacuation, and the lack of uniform airport-wide evacuation training, we see benefit of training LAX evacuation personnel on the relevant aspects of the revised LAX Terminal and Repopulation Plan. However, this option would be met with a significant level of resistance from most agencies and from all levels of personnel.

Participant Evaluation: Oppose The option of training evacuation personnel in the new LAX Terminal Evacuation and Repopulation plan prompted concerns among all respondents across several criteria. Respondents questioned how useful training would be on an evacuation plan of which they did not see the necessity. They also wondered whether the option would really improve the efficiency and efficacy of evacuations. Specifically, concerns included fear that training could be a poor use of time and resources. Additionally, respondents said that some officers may not take the training seriously because they do not perceive the need for an airport-wide evacuation plan in order to effectively do their job. Security concerns and logistical feasibility were not perceived to be obstacles.

Overall Evaluation: Oppose Although there could be benefit to training evacuation personnel and airport employees on the LAX Terminal Evacuation and Repopulation plan, the level of resistance was significant enough to limit the viability of this option.

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Option 10: Stay Apprised of New Evacuation Research and Technology Our Evaluation: Support While the desire to stay apprised of developments in evacuation research and technology was not a theme that emerged directly in our interviews, it was the origin of our project. Research is underway that could provide accurate, realistic simulations of emergency evacuations at LAX. In theory, advancements in research have the potential to make evacuations more efficient.

Participant Evaluation: Support In considering this option, respondents cited jurisdictional issues (namely who would be charged with staying apprised of this information) and cost as their two primary concerns. One respondent stated the airport constantly receives offers from companies to purchase new technology that can aid in security and evacuations. Other respondents cited concerns about having limited financial resources, as well as limited time and staff to devote to the effort. Despite these concerns, however, respondents expressed an overall interest in reaching out to the academic and business community to see what new information and technology may be available to assist them. They believed that this technology would aid in the efficiency and effectiveness of evacuations. The criteria of security concerns and organizational culture were not raised.

Overall Evaluation: Support

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Figure 4: Evaluations Our Evaluation 1: Information to Evacuees 2: Terminal Specializations

Strongly Support Strongly Support

3: Evacuation Video Training 4: Behavior Modeling

Strongly Support

Participant Evaluation Strongly Support Support with Modifications Strongly Support

Neutral

Strongly Support

5: Additional Communication Training 6: Formally utilize TSA in Evacuations 7: Train TSA in NIMS/ICS 8: Enhance the Debriefs 9: Training on the New Evacuation Plan 10: Research and Technology

Neutral

Neutral

Recommend Further Study Neutral

Strongly Support

Support

Strongly Support

Strongly Support Support Neutral

Strongly Support Support Oppose

Strongly Support Support Oppose

Support

Support

Support

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Overall Evaluation Strongly Support Support with Modifications Strongly Support

Recommendations Recommendations The following recommendations are the result of the preceding analysis. They are categorized based on the overall evaluation of each option. Additionally, suggestions that may aid in the implementation of the recommended options have been outlined. .

Strongly Supported Options

Option 1: Design a Mechanism to Provide Information to Evacuees This option should be a priority because it is uniformly supported by all participants and all aspects of the research. The ASAC Executive Board should work with LAX Airport Operations Public Relations office to ensure this recommendation is implemented. Additionally, we make several recommendations about implementation based on findings from our research: 1. Information provided to evacuees should include where to find food, water, emergency and non-emergency medical attention, chairs, and bathrooms; inbound and outbound flight information; and where to pick up bags that may have been left inside.

2. When possible, evacuees should also be given information that will alleviate their safety concerns.

3. Information should be delivered by law enforcement. Our review of existing research indicates that the public is more likely to trust and listen to this group of individuals.

4. Airlines should designate employees to assist law enforcement in providing flight information to evacuees in both English and other relevant languages. Airlines should also be encouraged to utilize the electronic message system they already have set up with travelers (i.e., voicemails, text messages, etc.).

5. If the message cannot be communicated by an individual, other mechanisms that could be considered are: flashing messages over portable TV screens; setting up a call center; utilizing the announcement systems that play outside terminals.

6. Consideration should be given to the public at large. Disseminating information about flight delays and terminal closures will alleviate unnecessary trips to the airport.

Option 3: Offer Evacuation Video Training for Airport Police This option should be a priority for the Airport Police because it fills an unmet need for LAXspecific evacuation training and the department already possesses the expertise and materials to conduct this training. Based on the feedback received during the evaluation, no changes to the option were found to be necessary.

Option 6: Formally Utilize TSA in the Evacuation Process With the broad support from all participating agencies and the anticipated improvement in evacuation efficiency, developing a plan to formally utilize TSA in all aspects of the evacuation process should be a priority. To implement this option, we strongly recommend that TSA and Airport Police form a task force to determine the most effective way to incorporate TSA into the evacuation process. Though we did not analyze specific mechanisms, some ways in which TSA can be used include training its officers in crowd control or in how to hold a perimeter, designing a mechanism to identify the designated evacuation-trained TSA officers for easy recognition in an emergency, or creating official cross-departmental evacuation teams comprised of Airport Police and TSA.

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Option 7: Train All TSA Officers in ICS/NIMS Training all TSA officers in NIMS/ICS should be a priority to ensure effective inter-agency communication during evacuations. Although there may be concerns about the cost of training so many officers, this online course is relatively brief and would greatly enhance the evacuation process.

Based on the feedback we received during the evaluation, no changes to the option were found to be necessary.

Supported Options

Option 2: Terminal Specializations for Airport Police Officers During the evaluation process, significant concerns were raised about officer boredom and complacency if terminal specialization were pursued. Based on participant feedback, we found that a modification of the option in which Airport Police officers specialize in certain airport areas (i.e., LAX’s North side, encompassing Terminals 1-3 and part of the airfield; the Central Area, encompassing Tom Bradley International Terminal, the Central Terminal Area and part of the airfield; or the South side, encompassing Terminals 4-8) would alleviate these concerns while still providing the benefits of increased familiarity with airport employees regularly stationed in those areas. We recommend that Airport Police pursue a deployment plan that enables the creation of Area Specializations with these modifications.

Option 8: Enhance the Current Debrief (“Hotwash”) Process We recommend implementing this option as described. Based on the feedback received during the evaluation, no changes to the option were found to be necessary, and we encourage the ASAC Executive Board to oversee the recommended enhancements and their implementation.

Option 10: Stay Apprised of New Evacuation Research and Technology Based on the feedback received during the evaluation, no changes to the option were found to be necessary. The ASAC Executive Board should determine whether it is most efficient to designate an agency or individual to regularly review any new developments or research that may enhance current evacuation procedures.

Non-Recommended Options The following options received an overall rating of neutral or opposed and therefore are not recommended for implementation at this time.

Option 5: Provide Additional Communication Training to Airport Police Officers Option 9: Familiarize Employees with the New LAX Terminal Evacuation and Repopulation Plan

Recommended for Further Study

Option 4: Train Airport Police in Behavior Modeling Although this option could not be definitively recommended, we do suggest that Airport Police further investigate the need for this type of training. Additionally, those findings should be balanced against the cost of the training (both financial and the losses that could be incurred if this training is implemented in place of an existing training), as well as the strength and availability of current programs and their applicability to LAX.

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New Option for Further Evaluation Option 11: Safety and Security Training for All Badged Employees LAX Employees A new option emerged during our evaluation and analysis. It was not thoroughly evaluated by all survey participants and thus was not given a participant evaluation. However, we evaluated it based on our knowledge and expertise.

This option would provide safety and security training for all badged employees at LAX. Badged employees include everyone with access to restricted areas of the airport, including the airfield, airline hangars, cargo facilities, and the sections of the terminals past the screening stations. There would be three primary components to this training.

1. Briefly familiarize employees with the history of threats against LAX. Educate new and existing staff about the history of threats against LAX so they understand the environment in which they are working and the seriousness of the threat.

2. Provide security awareness training to employees. Train employees to be more aware of their surroundings and look for suspicious items (possibly even suspicious behavior). This would also include training about how to appropriately handle bomb threat calls.

3. Train employees on emergency exit routes at the airport.

Our Evaluation: Strongly Support During our interviews, we found that non-evacuation personnel behave in the same manner as travelers during evacuations. They ask a number of questions that distract law enforcement from their tasks and are often reluctant to follow instructions. We also learned that most of these employees are not aware of the history of threats against LAX. However, when told about past security incidents, we learned that they become much more willing to abide by security procedures and participate in making them effective. Training employees would not only mitigate the distraction, but would also allow them to be of benefit as they begin to take incidents more seriously and become a model to evacuees.

Additionally, once employees better understand the threat environment they can begin looking for suspicious activity. One survey respondent indicated that a benefit of the terminal specializations is that developing strong relationships between police officers and vendors may make it more likely that a janitor, for example, would tell a police officer with whom she or he is familiar or friendly about a suspicious object. Training employees about the threat of that suspicious package would highlight the importance of bringing that package to the attention of the police officer even if they did not have a close relationship.

When discussing Option 8 (familiarize employees with the new LAX evacuation plan) with the survey respondents, many believed a valuable aspect of the option could be ensuring that employees learn more about the layout of the airport and emergency exit routes. That option was not recommended, but a similar component could be included in this training.

We cannot give this option an overall recommendation, as we did not seek the input of all survey participants. However, this option would address many of the evacuee and evacuation personnel concerns raised in our research, and we highly recommend that LAX explore this option further.

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Conclusions Conclusions The evacuation process at LAX has been modified over time. The necessity and duration of evacuations has declined in the past several years; changes which are reflective of “lessons learned” from each preceding event. These modifications, however, have been iterative and have not been informed by a unified, strategic approach. Our report offers insight into the behaviors of evacuees and of those responsible for ensuring their safety and the security of the airport. It provides options for further advances in the efficiency of the evacuation process.

Together, our interviews and a review of the existing research, confirmed that training and preparation is paramount in ensuring the highest-level performance of evacuation personnel. Each event is distinct, and in times of stress or crisis evacuation personnel instinctually fall back on their training. This maintains focus on the task at hand and reduces the “noise” that may distract from the efficient execution of an evacuation.

Observations gleaned from interviews, as well as our review of literature and videos, confirmed consistency among the behaviors evacuation personnel could expect from the evacuee population as well. The understanding that evacuees do not in fact panic, that they seek authority figures in times of crisis, and that effective communication with them eases the process is important both for the training of evacuation personnel and for the airport as an institution.

The recommendations that emerged from our report are plausible, feasible, actionable strategies for advancing the Airport’s goals when it comes to evacuations. Coupled with the practices and procedures already in place at LAX, these recommendations enhance the efficiency of LAX evacuations while addressing safety and security concerns related to the public, airport facilities, and LAX personnel.

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Bibliography Fischer, Henry W. Response to Disaster: Fact Versus Fiction and Its Perpetuation : The Sociology of Disaster.

Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 2008.

Fischhoff B, RM Gonzalez, DA Small, and JS Lerner. “Evaluating the Success of Terror Risk Communications.” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism : Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science. 1 (4) (2003): 255-8.

Leach, John. “Why People ‘Freeze’ in an Emergency: Temporal and Cognitive Constraints on Survival Responses.” Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine.75 (6) (2004): 539-42.

Proulx, Guylène. “Occupant Behaviour and Evacuation” Proceedings of the 9th International Fire Protection Symposium. Munich (2001). 291-232 Russell, Harold E., and Allan Beigel. Understanding Human Behavior for Effective Police Work. New York: Basic Books, 1976.

Tierney, Kathleen. “Disaster Beliefs and Institutional Interests: Recycling Disaster Myths in the Aftermath of 9–11,” Research in Social Problems and Public Policy. 11 (2003):33-51.

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Appendix I: Case Studies Appendix I: Case Studies These case studies are based on interviews with participants and published reports. While published reports have been cited, to protect the confidentiality of interviewees under IRB protocols, individual participants have not been cited.

Case Study – July 4, 2002 Mid-morning on Independence Day 2002, his 41st birthday, Hesham Mohamed Hadayet parked his Mercedes in the garage across from the Tom Bradley International Terminal (TBIT) at Los Angeles International Airport.

He crossed the street, entered the terminal and headed to his right, queuing at the ticket counter for El Al, the Israeli national airline, with about 10 other people. When he was within 20 feet of the counter, Hadayet pulled out one of two handguns he was carrying and opened fire, killing a 20-yearold El Al ticket agent and a 46-year-old traveler.

As Hadayet was shooting, an off-duty, unarmed Israeli air marshal hit him. An armed El Al security officer came from behind the ticket counter and fired a single shot from several yards away that hit the gunman in the torso. The wound would prove fatal, but Hadayet still managed to stab the security agent, who had moved in to subdue him, three times with a 6-inch knife he carried in the attack.

Amid the gunfire, which lasted only a few seconds, passengers and others in the row of ticket counters and the mezzanine above hit the ground or froze where they were. For several, the first thought on this July 4 was “Who’s setting off fire crackers inside?” The next thought for some, less then eight months after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, was “Is this a terror attack?”

When the shooting stopped there was dead silence.

The call of shots fired was made by a veteran Airport Police officer stationed at the terminal and the response, including from some off-duty personnel on the grounds at the time, was quick. Unaware of the status of the shooter, Airport Police officers rushed into the building with weapons drawn shortly after the shooting stopped, passing a crowd of travelers and airport workers streaming out of their own accord.

Some evacuees ran, some screamed and cried. Others, however, were still in the terminal, splayed on the floor or crouched behind luggage. TBIT is a two-tiered facility, its public spaces consisting of ticketing and check-in services on the street level and restaurants on a mezzanine above and to the West, directly opposite the street-level entrance. In the immediate aftermath of the shooting, large numbers of the public and airline personnel “self evacuated” from the terminal. Some remained behind, hidden in small airline offices behind ticket counters, others were still splayed on the floor.

As uniformed officials poured into the terminal building, they forcefully ordered diners in the mezzanine to leave through an upper level exit. After a few minutes of quiet, some who had stayed behind in airline offices tentatively peeked out and quickly headed for the front doors.

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Once outside on the warm, overcast day,28 evacuees forced from terminal by the violence were directed further away while officials secured the building and tried to determine the full nature and extent of the attack. Some evacuees found their way to the Encounters theme restaurant, others retreated to the shade of the bridge linking the adjacent terminal to the parking structure across Avion Way. Many could not find shade or shelter. Eventually, as the police extended the perimeter further from the crime scene, some sought refuge in Terminal 4, which houses American Airlines.

There, they heard from other evacuated people, was a place to sit, restrooms, and snack machines.

For one, the Coca-Cola she bought in the terminal that day proved to be the only thing she consumed until she returned home that night. “It was the best Coke I ever had,” she said.

Case Study – September 4, 2004 Around 8 AM on September 4, 2004, the Saturday of a long Labor Day weekend, two events within an hour of each other forced the evacuations of two terminals at LAX, disrupting the plans of thousands of travelers.

Not long after the batteries in the flashlight of a passenger bound for Japan through Tom Bradley International Terminal (TBIT) “exploded” in the hand of a Transportation Security Agency (TSA) officer, a man slipped past a TSA officer into Terminal 8. With two emergency calls within minutes of each other, one responding security officer thought the airport was seeing a reprise of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., three years earlier. It wasn’t. In fact, both incidents turned out to be relatively benign. But the result was chaos on the streets outside LAX on a heavy travel day that would reach 86 degrees.29 The evacuation started out smoothly. The stale batteries in a flashlight of a passenger bound for Japan popped rather than exploded, causing minor injuries, but the initial report of an explosion was enough to clear TBIT. The early stages moved quickly. Incoming traffic was halted and there were no cars at the center of the horseshoe where TBIT is located. “Smooth and nice,” said one person involved in the evacuation. But before TBIT could be fully cleared, word came that there had been a security breach in Terminal 8. That evacuation was less controlled. Though there was no panic, people were leaving the terminal in a disorganized fashion. And in the moments after the second call, security personnel could not be sure that the two events were unrelated, causing further anxiety.

As a result, roughly 200 representatives of the Airport Police, Los Angeles Police Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other “Transportation Security Officers” responded. The Los Angeles Times reported that an estimated 10,000 people were pushed out of the terminal area, with many starting to walk down Century Boulevard, further impacting traffic.30 One participant called it a “mob.”

The Times reported that “scores of perspiring travelers grumbled as they waited in long lines, but they were generally calm, accustomed to airport delays. Shawn and Pinky Clive, Los Angeles 28

Los Angeles Times online. http://weather.latimes.com/auto/latimes/history/airport/KCQT/2002/7/4/DailyHistory.html?req_city=NA&req_state=NA&req_st atename=NA. Retrieved on 19 February 2010.

29 Los Angeles Times online. http://weather.latimes.com/auto/latimes/history/airport/KCQT/2004/9/4/DailyHistory.html?req_city=NA&req_state=NA&req_st atename=NA, retrieved on 26 February 2010.

30 Jennifer Oldham, Steve Hymon, Cara Mia DiMassa. “2 Incidents Force LAX to Evacuate 4 Terminals; About 10,000 passengers are ordered out and 250 flights delayed. Officials see no sign of terrorism.” Los Angeles Times. A1. Sept. 5, 2004.

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residents headed to India, waited an hour just to get into the airport. ‘It’s frustrating, but if this is a genuine threat, it’s understandable,’ Shawn Clive said. Many did not know what was happening, but simply followed evacuation orders.”31 Case Study – July 2, 2008 A limousine driver was being written up for a traffic violation by an Airport Police officer outside Tom Bradley International Terminal (TBIT) shortly before 11 AM on July 2, 2008, when a man walked up to the driver and calmly held up a bag.

“I’m a terrorist, I have a bomb,” he said. It was nearly six years to the day after a shooting left three dead at the same terminal and the man was holding the bag up near his head – something officers have been trained is a mark of a suicide bomber.

The driver ran off. The officer, a veteran of the department who was riding with a trainee that day, drew his weapon and ordered the suspect to put the bag down. He complied and was handcuffed as other Airport Police units arrived. As with the July 2002 incident, some officers not on patrol duty at the time responded to the call. Not knowing whether or not the threat was legitimate, Airport Police began to establish a perimeter.

Getting people to move out of the area was a challenge. Passengers were concerned about missed flights; and airport workers, jaded perhaps by the frequency with which they had been evacuated for false alarms, were slow to move away from the building. Then the curiosity set in – people wanted to get close, to ask what happened.

The Los Angeles Police Department bomb squad arrived and the bag was determined not to be a threat. But in some ways, the damage was done. The terminals were not repopulated for about three hours after the evacuation was called, delaying more than 130 flights and affecting an estimated 20,000 passengers.32 Non-emergency airport workers started to pepper Airport Police with questions about returning to work. Outside TBIT, traffic was blocked for three hours. As a result, “(s)everal travelers had become so frustrated with the traffic jam that they parked their cars outside the airport and walked along Century Boulevard to the terminals. Others who were stuck at the airport and couldn't reach their cars at the outer parking lots also decided to walk.” 33 One flight attendant for an international airline told a local paper that “I’ve never seen something like this. At first I thought this kind of thing comes with the territory, but you can’t get used to this.”34

31

Ibid Art Marroquin and Sonja Sharp. “Bomb threat snarls LAX.” Long Beach Press-Telegram. July 3, 2008. Page A1.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

32

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Appendix II: Analysis of Evacuee and Personnel Behaviors Appendix II: Analysis of Evacuee and Personnel Behaviors The “Key Themes: Panic, Training and Response” section of our paper outlines the major findings about human behavior generated through interviews with evacuees and evacuation personnel. This appendix details some of the additional behaviors apparent during the case studies that were not addressed in the “Key Themes” section above. The behaviors evaluated in this section are broken into three categories: overall themes, case studies, and behavior by evacuee type.

The only types of behavior discussed below are those of evacuees, including airport personnel. The “Key Themes” section above sufficiently details our findings about the behaviors of evacuation personnel.

Overall Themes A number of evacuation personnel told us that evacuees often try to get close to the incident so that they might get a “better look” at what was transpiring. This occurred at all three of the case studies.

Evacuation personnel said this can represent a noteworthy security challenge because those moving closer to the scene could be involved in the initial incident and may be engaged in carrying out a secondary attack. Typically, however, these are evacuees motivated by curiosity or fascination. One interviewee compared them to people slowing down to look at a car wreck.

Additionally, a few evacuation personnel noted that airport employees often feel as though the rules do not apply to them during evacuations. This can be compounded when these airport employees are personally familiar with the personnel carrying out the evacuation. Evacuation personnel noted that they have to switch roles. Instead of being friendly, they must establish more of a command presence. This allows them to relay the importance of following orders and quickly exiting the terminal.

There was also a general agreement, across all events, that behavior inside and outside the terminal during an evacuation was very distinct. Inside the terminal there was a heightened concern for safety and security. Once outside the terminal, evacuees more often expressed concern with other issues such baggage, flight schedules, etc.

While the evacuation is often what most people remember about the process, the repopulation effort is also a time of high emotion for evacuees. Some evacuation personnel noted that it is during this period that some evacuees, intent on making a flight, have become frantic about getting back inside the terminal. These passengers, evacuation personnel said, do not consider that everyone has been outside the terminal and thus they are not at risk of missing flights.

Other factors influencing evacuees’ behavior and emotions are weather, season (during holiday seasons people may experience heightened stress and anxiety about travel), and the layout of the airport (the airport is not “user-friendly,” an interviewee said, which leads to general anxiety).

Additionally, the prospect of terrorism can affect behavior as well. Evacuation personnel noted that for a brief period after major incidents—most significantly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, but also after the bombings in London and Madrid—people become more compliant and patient with security procedures. However, this only lasts a few weeks and then the typical behaviors described above ensue.

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Case Studies The July 4, 2002, shooting at Tom Bradley International Terminal (TBIT), was the only incident where evacuees self-evacuated from the terminal. To self-evacuate means that an evacuee exits the terminal without assistance or without being directed by evacuation personnel. We found three factors influence evacuees’ decisions to self-evacuate: they assess it is safe to do so, they are mobile enough to do so (parents with children and the elderly typically do not self-evacuate), and there is a clear exit route.

At the September 4, 2004, evacuation, we found that the length and nature of the evacuation had a substantial effect on the behavior of evacuees. Interviewees indicated told us this was the incident where evacuees were the most annoyed, and some were angry and yelling. Those yelling were saying things like “hurry up.” However, there were a few evacuees who yelled back at this group and said “shut up, do you want us to go back inside and get blown up?” Interviewees said that although the crowd was restless, most people were fairly compliant.

At the July 2, 2008, evacuation, the reactions of the few individuals near incident confirmed the findings of this project. Interviewees said that as officers drew their guns on the suspect, people in the immediate vicinity froze. After a few seconds, members of the public realized what was going on turned, and quickly walked away.

When the inside of the terminal was being evacuated, many evacuees chose to leave their bags behind. Two interviewees found this noteworthy because these evacuees had not witnessed the event prompting the evacuation. They said evacuees are typically slow moving and take their bags with them, but there was something different about this event that led this particular group of evacuees to believe that they must exit the terminal as quickly as possible.

Evacuee Type We found that most evacuees act in similar ways during emergencies and evacuations. When we asked evacuation personnel if they noticed different types of behaviors among evacuees, most said reactions were uniform regardless of factors such as reasons for travel (business vs. pleasure), age, gender, ethnicity, and the number or type of people in the party. However, there were some noteworthy distinctions.

We received conflicting feedback when discussing the behavior of employees working in the terminal. Some of those interviewed indicated that they have a harder time convincing airport employees to leave, and others we interviewed indicated that airport employees take evacuations more seriously than evacuees.

Most agreed that international travelers can be a somewhat challenging group. No one thought that language barriers present a large logistical problem because hand gestures typically work, airline employees can assist with translation when necessary, and these international travelers tend to follow the crowd. However, evacuees and evacuation personnel observed that the language barrier does lead to heighted anxiety and stress during times of emergency and evacuation.

Interviewees remarked that parents are a fairly compliant group, with interviewee noting that parents often just want to know where they need to be. Larger groups travelling together, including families, are concerned about staying together. During the 2008 evacuation, part of a group was in the

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restroom when the evacuation started and the rest of the group was worried about being separated from them.

Multiple interviewees also commented that young adults and teenagers are groups that ask a number of questions during evacuations.

Business travelers were the most likely to be remembered as impatient. Two evacuation personnel said business travelers were yelling during the 2004 incident. This group was generalized as the least likely to care about what was going on and the most concerned about connecting flights.

Almost all interviewees agreed that older evacuees are the quietest group, but also the most likely to become anxious, indicating that this group is the most oblivious to what was happening around them.

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Appendix III: NIMC/ICS Appendix III: NIMS/ICS “On February 28, 2003, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD–5), “Management of Domestic Incidents,” which directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a National Incident Management System (NIMS). This system provides a consistent nationwide template to enable Federal, State, tribal, and local governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector to work together to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity. This consistency provides the foundation for utilization of NIMS for all incidents, ranging from daily occurrences to incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response.

“NIMS is not an operational incident management or resource allocation plan. NIMS represents a core set of doctrines, concepts, principles, terminology, and organizational processes that enables effective, efficient, and collaborative incident management.

“HSPD–5 also required the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop the National Response Plan, which has been superseded by the National Response Framework (NRF). The NRF is a guide to how the Nation conducts all-hazards response. The NRF identifies the key principles, as well as the roles and structures, that organize national response. In addition, it describes special circumstances where the Federal Government exercises a larger role, including incidents where Federal interests are involved and catastrophic incidents where a State would require significant support.

“HSPD–5 requires all Federal departments and agencies to adopt NIMS and to use it in their individual incident management programs and activities, as well as in support of all actions taken to assist State, tribal, and local governments. The directive requires Federal departments and agencies to make adoption of NIMS by State, tribal, and local organizations a condition for Federal preparedness assistance (through grants, contracts, and other activities). NIMS recognizes the role that NGOs and the private sector have in preparedness and activities to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents.

“Building on the foundation provided by existing emergency management and incident response systems used by jurisdictions, organizations, and functional disciplines at all levels, NIMS integrates best practices into a comprehensive framework for use nationwide by emergency management/response personnel1 in an all-hazards context. These best practices lay the groundwork for the components of NIMS and provide the mechanisms for the further development and refinement of supporting national standards, guidelines, protocols, systems, and technologies.

NIMS fosters the development of specialized technologies that facilitate emergency management and incident response activities, and allows for the adoption of new approaches that will enable continuous refinement of the system over time.

“The Secretary of Homeland Security, through the National Integration Center (NIC), Incident Management Systems Integration Division (formerly known as the NIMS Integration Center), publishes the standards, guidelines, and compliance protocols for determining whether a Federal, State, tribal, or local government has implemented NIMS.

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“Additionally, the Secretary, through the NIC, manages publication and collaboratively, with other departments and agencies, develops standards, guidelines, compliance procedures, and protocols for all aspects of NIMS.”35

35

Department of Homeland Security. “National Incident Management System.” (2008) 3-4, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf/, Retrieved on March 6, 2010.

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Appendix IV: Evacuee Interview Questions Appendix IV: Evacuee Interview Questions 1. Were you present at the time of:  the shooting at Tom Bradley International Terminal on July 4, 2002?  the evacuation of multiple terminals due to the simultaneous battery explosion and security breach on September 4, 2004?  the bomb threat at Tom Bradley International Terminal on July 2, 2008?

2. Can you please describe for us the events you witnessed on that day? Specifically, where were you? What did you see happen? What was the duration of the events?

3. What were the characteristics of the people around you? Was there a greater proportion of older adults, middle-aged, young adults, children; business travelers, families; people traveling alone or in groups; seemingly international travelers or people who appeared to be residents of Los Angeles?

Did you notice different reactions or behaviors for these different groups?

4. Can you please describe the reactions you observed in other passengers and the public? What were the most common reactions? Were there reactions that surprised you? Were there reactions you expected to observe but did not?

5. What words would you use to describe passengers’ responses to the events? What kind of emotions did you witness?

6. Can you please describe the reactions you observed in airport employees or other personnel – this could include airport/airline baggage handlers, concession workers, TSA, airport police, private security, etc? What were the most common reactions? Were there reactions that surprised you?

Were there reactions you expected to observe but did not?

7. Can you please tell us a little about your reactions to the events? What was the first thought that came into your mind? The second thought?

8. What emotions did you experience as the events were transpiring?

9. Did you speak to other passengers? Did others experiences/reactions similar to those you described to us?

10. Is there anything else you would like to share with us about your experience that day?

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Appendix V: Evacuation Personnel Interview Questions Appendix V: Evacuation Personnel Interview Questions 1. Were you present and on duty at the time of:  the shooting at Tom Bradley International Terminal on July 4, 2002?  the evacuation of multiple terminals due to the simultaneous battery explosion and security breach on September 4, 2004?  the bomb threat at Tom Bradley International Terminal on July 2, 2008?

2. Can you please describe for us the events you witnessed on that day or those days (if present at more than one of the events)? Specifically, where were you stationed? What did you see happen?

What was the duration of the events?

3. What were the characteristics of the people around you? Was there a greater proportion of older adults, middle-aged, young adults, children; business travelers, families; people traveling alone or in groups; seemingly international travelers or people who appeared to be residents of Los Angeles?

Did you notice different reactions or behaviors for these different groups?

4. Can you please describe the reactions you observed in passengers and the public? What were the most common reactions? Were there reactions that surprised you? Were there reactions you expected to observe but did not?

5. What words would you use to describe passengers’ responses to the events? What kind of emotions did you witness?

6. Can you please describe the reactions you observed in airport employees or other personnel – this could include airport/airline baggage handlers, concession workers, TSA, airport police, private security, etc? What were the most common reactions? Were there reactions that surprised you?

Were there reactions you expected to observe but did not?

7. Can you please tell us a little about your reactions to the events? What was the first thought that came into your mind? The second thought?

8. What emotions did you experience as the events were transpiring?

9. Did you speak to other airport employees/personnel following these events (you do not need to list/name them)? Did others experiences/reactions similar to those you described to us?

10. Is there anyone else you can think of who was present and on-duty that same day who might be willing to answer these same questions and share their experience with us?

11. Additional Questions

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Appendix VI: Participant Survey Appendix VI: Participant Survey NOTE: The numbers of the options have changed since creating and administering this survey.

SURVEY

Thank you for your help with our Applied Policy Project, “Evaluating Human Behavior in Times of Airport Crises.”

The work is almost done, but we would like to ask for your help in one last element.

Because you are the experts about what works, what doesn’t and what might be most effective at LAX, we would appreciate your input as we consider how to prioritize and rank the recommendations we have developed. We hope you can take a few minutes to complete this survey, which will give us a better idea of which ideas might be the most effective in facilitating evacuations given our findings about human behavior during airport crises.

We have listed our potential recommendations below and ask that you rank their effectiveness based on six evaluative criteria on a scale of 1 to 5. For your answers: 1 = Strongly Disagree 2 = Disagree 3 = Neutral 4 = Agree 5 = Strongly Agree Please assess each of the following policy options according to the criteria listed below.

1. Develop Terminal Specializations for Airport Police Officers Airport Police officers could spend the majority of their time stationed in no more than two terminals to become expertly familiar with their surroundings and other employees regularly present there.

Assessment Criteria

1=Strongly disagree; 5=Strongly Agree

This would make evacuations more efficient and effective

1

2

3

4

5

This does not raise any jurisdiction issues

1

2

3

4

5

Airport “culture” would not impede implementation

1

2

3

4

5

This is logistically feasible

1

2

3

4

5

This would not be cost-prohibitive

1

2

3

4

5

This would not hinder other operational efforts

1

2

3

4

5

This would not raise security concerns

1

2

3

4

5

Overall ranking of the option

1 - strongly opposed

2 - opposed

3 - neutral

4 - support

5 - strongly support

Additional Comments____________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________

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2. Utilize TSA Officers in the Evacuation Process TSA officers could participate in the evacuation process in a more formal way (one that would not inhibit their ability to be at their posts before repopulation begins). TSA and Airport Police would need to collaborate to find the most appropriate strategy, but possible options include: training TSA officers in crowd control or holding a perimeter or making them aware that they will be utilized more frequently by Airport Police officers, or creating official crossdepartmental evacuation teams.

Assessment Criteria

1=Strongly disagree; 5=Strongly Agree

This would make evacuations more efficient and effective

1

2

3

4

5

This does not raise any jurisdiction issues

1

2

3

4

5

Airport “culture” would not impede implementation

1

2

3

4

5

This is logistically feasible

1

2

3

4

5

This would not be cost-prohibitive

1

2

3

4

5

This would not hinder other operational efforts

1

2

3

4

5

This would not raise security concerns

1

2

3

4

5

Overall ranking of the option

1 - strongly opposed

2 - opposed

3 - neutral

5 - strongly support

4 - support

Additional Comments____________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________ 3. Train TSA Officers in ICS/NIMS All TSA Officers could be trained in the Incident Command Structure and National Incident Management System.

Assessment Criteria

1=Strongly disagree; 5=Strongly Agree

This would make evacuations more efficient and effective

1

2

3

4

5

This does not raise any jurisdiction issues

1

2

3

4

5

Airport “culture” would not impede implementation

1

2

3

4

5

This is logistically feasible

1

2

3

4

5

This would not be cost-prohibitive

1

2

3

4

5

This would not hinder other operational efforts

1

2

3

4

5

This would not raise security concerns

1

2

3

4

5

Overall ranking of the option

1 - strongly opposed

2 - opposed

3 - neutral

4 - support

5 - strongly support

Additional Comments____________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________

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4. Enhance the Current Post-Incident Debrief Process To maximize the utility of the standing post-incident debriefing process, this option has several components: a. Notes could be taken, focusing specifically on actions/tactics that were successful and unsuccessful. These could be distributed to all involved. b. An emphasis could be placed on discussing the reactions of both employees and travelers. c. These notes could be saved and utilized in some way to train new employees about the “lessons learned” in past evacuations.

Assessment Criteria

1=Strongly disagree; 5=Strongly Agree

This would make evacuations more efficient and effective

1

2

3

4

5

This does not raise any jurisdiction issues

1

2

3

4

5

Airport “culture” would not impede implementation

1

2

3

4

5

This is logistically feasible

1

2

3

4

5

This would not be cost-prohibitive

1

2

3

4

5

This would not hinder other operational efforts

1

2

3

4

5

This would not raise security concerns

1

2

3

4

5

Overall ranking of the option

1 - strongly opposed

2 - opposed

3 - neutral

4 - support

5 - strongly support

Additional Comments____________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________

54

5. Offer Evacuation Video Training New Airport Police officers could participate in evacuation training that includes a review of video footage of past LAX evacuations. The reviews would ideally be led by a senior officer who will narrate the videos and highlight both effective and ineffective actions in dealing with evacuating passengers and securing the scene.

Assessment Criteria

1=Strongly disagree; 5=Strongly Agree

This would make evacuations more efficient and effective

1

2

3

4

5

This does not raise any jurisdiction issues

1

2

3

4

5

Airport “culture� would not impede implementation

1

2

3

4

5

This is logistically feasible

1

2

3

4

5

This would not be cost-prohibitive

1

2

3

4

5

This would not hinder other operational efforts

1

2

3

4

5

This would not raise security concerns

1

2

3

4

5

Overall ranking of the option

1 - strongly opposed

2 - opposed

3 - neutral

4 - support

5 - strongly support

Additional Comments____________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________

55

6. Train Airport Police in Behavior Modeling Additional training could be provided for Airport Police officers in behavior modeling. This provides officers with the tools to remain poised during stressful situations and demonstrate behaviors that affirm their authority, elicit responses they desire from travelers and smooth the evacuation process.

Assessment Criteria

1=Strongly disagree; 5=Strongly Agree

This would make evacuations more efficient and effective

1

2

3

4

5

This does not raise any jurisdiction issues

1

2

3

4

5

Airport “culture� would not impede implementation

1

2

3

4

5

This is logistically feasible

1

2

3

4

5

This would not be cost-prohibitive

1

2

3

4

5

This would not hinder other operational efforts

1

2

3

4

5

This would not raise security concerns

1

2

3

4

5

Overall ranking of the option

1 - strongly opposed

2 - opposed

3 - neutral

4 - support

5 - strongly support

Additional Comments____________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________

56

7. Provide Additional Communication Training to Airport Police Officers Bi-annual training in “Verbal Judo,” using “presence and words” to calm people in stress situations, could be given to Airport Police personnel more frequently.

Assessment Criteria

1=Strongly disagree; 5=Strongly Agree

This would make evacuations more efficient and effective

1

2

3

4

5

This does not raise any jurisdiction issues

1

2

3

4

5

Airport “culture” would not impede implementation

1

2

3

4

5

This is logistically feasible

1

2

3

4

5

This would not be cost-prohibitive

1

2

3

4

5

This would not hinder other operational efforts

1

2

3

4

5

This would not raise security concerns

1

2

3

4

5

Overall ranking of the option

1 - strongly opposed

2 - opposed

3 - neutral

5 - strongly support

4 - support

Additional Comments____________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________ 8. Familiarize Employees with the New LAX Evacuation Plan Airport Employees could be trained on the new LAX evacuation plan (the 90 page version created by LAWA Emergency Management).

Assessment Criteria

1=Strongly disagree; 5=Strongly Agree

This would make evacuations more efficient and effective

1

2

3

4

5

This does not raise any jurisdiction issues

1

2

3

4

5

Airport “culture” would not impede implementation

1

2

3

4

5

This is logistically feasible

1

2

3

4

5

This would not be cost-prohibitive

1

2

3

4

5

This would not hinder other operational efforts

1

2

3

4

5

This would not raise security concerns

1

2

3

4

5

Overall ranking of the option

1 - strongly opposed

2 - opposed

3 - neutral

4 - support

5 - strongly support

Additional Comments____________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________

57

9. Design a Mechanism to Provide Information to Evacuated Passengers Measures could be taken to alleviate the distraction that passenger questions may pose to officers trying to conduct evacuations. Information provided may include how to find bags, flight delays, where to get medical attention, etc. This information could be made available by a call center, a series of announcements made by one or more people, prerecorded messages to replace the looped announcements outside terminals, etc.

Assessment Criteria

1=Strongly disagree; 5=Strongly Agree

This would make evacuations more efficient and effective

1

2

3

4

5

This does not raise any jurisdiction issues

1

2

3

4

5

Airport “culture� would not impede implementation

1

2

3

4

5

This is logistically feasible

1

2

3

4

5

This would not be cost-prohibitive

1

2

3

4

5

This would not hinder other operational efforts

1

2

3

4

5

This would not raise security concerns

1

2

3

4

5

Overall ranking of the option

1 - strongly opposed

2 - opposed

3 - neutral

4 - support

5 - strongly support

Additional Comments____________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________

58

10. Design a Risk Communication Strategy A communication strategy could be prepared to effectively convey appropriate messages to the public during an evacuation or in the aftermath of an emergency. These messages would be designed to ensure that panic does not ensue and should be designed to reassure the public about the need to remain calm. These messages should be written and tested in advance of an event.

Assessment Criteria

1=Strongly disagree; 5=Strongly Agree

This would make evacuations more efficient and effective

1

2

3

4

5

This does not raise any jurisdiction issues

1

2

3

4

5

Airport “culture” would not impede implementation

1

2

3

4

5

This is logistically feasible

1

2

3

4

5

This would not be cost-prohibitive

1

2

3

4

5

This would not hinder other operational efforts

1

2

3

4

5

This would not raise security concerns

1

2

3

4

5

Overall ranking of the option

1 - strongly opposed

2 - opposed

3 - neutral

5 - strongly support

4 - support

Additional Comments____________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________ 11. Stay Apprised of New Evacuation Research and Technology ASAC could designate an agency or individual to regularly consult academics about any new developments or research that may enhance current evacuation procedures.

Assessment Criteria

1=Strongly disagree; 5=Strongly Agree

This would make evacuations more efficient and effective

1

2

3

4

5

This does not raise any jurisdiction issues

1

2

3

4

5

Airport “culture” would not impede implementation

1

2

3

4

5

This is logistically feasible

1

2

3

4

5

This would not be cost-prohibitive

1

2

3

4

5

This would not hinder other operational efforts

1

2

3

4

5

This would not raise security concerns

1

2

3

4

5

Overall ranking of the option

1 - strongly opposed

2 - opposed

3 - neutral

4 - support

5 - strongly support

Additional Comments____________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________

59

Thank you again for taking the time to help us with this survey, and for all your help and support of our project. We look forward to sharing our findings and recommendations with you.

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