Geospatial Technologies and Human Rights: Analyzing Mass Graves in Raqqa, Syria

GEOSPATIAL TECHNOLOGIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: ANALYZING MASS GRAVES IN RAQQA, SYRIA

The University of Dayton's Mann Chair in Natural Sciences, Department of Geology and Environmental Geosciences, & Human Rights Center in partnership with the AAAS Scientific Responsibility, Human Rights and Law Program

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This brief analysis was produced through a partnership between the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) and the University of Dayton’s Human Rights Center, together with the University’s Mann Chair in Natural Sciences and the Department of Geology and Environmental Geosciences. The analysis was undertaken at the request of the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC).

Lead contributors include: Jonathan Drake, AAAS Senior Program Associate Umesh K. Haritashya, Ph.D: Professor, Department of Geology and Environmental Geosciences & Mann Chair (Endowed) in the Natural Sciences Chia-Yu Wu, Ph.D: Lecturer, Geology and Environmental Geosciences, College of Arts and Sciences Haochun Ling, J.D. Candidate 2022: Graduate Assistant, HRC Aidan Mornhinweg, History Major: HRC GIS intern Laura Franklin, Assistant for Special Projects, Institute for Pastoral Initiatives Taylor Collins, Sustainability Major: HRC GIS intern The following authored the background and human rights implications and conducted editorial and technical review: Satang Nabaneh, Ph.D: Director of Programs, HRC Chelcie Barnett, J.D. Candidate 2023

DISCLAIMER The interpretations and conclusions contained in this report are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the AAAS Board of Directors, its Council and membership, or the University of Dayton.

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INTRODUCTION This brief analysis was prepared for the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC) by the partnerships between the University of Dayton’s Human Rights Center, its Mann Chair in Natural Sciences, and its Department of Geology and Environmental Geosciences and the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Scientific Responsibility, Human Rights and Law Program.

SJAC is a non-profit justice and legal documentation organization that monitors and reports on violations by various actors in the Syrian conflict. The organization collects documentation of violations from all available sources, stores it in a secure database, catalogues it according to human rights standards, and analyzes it using legal expertise and big data methodologies. SJAC provided the coordinates of the eight confirmed mass graves1 that had been exhumed in Syria and background information concerning these sites. The purpose of the assessment was to establish a satellite-based chronology of events surrounding the creation of eight mass graves within Raqqa city and province (Figure 1) which could assist Syrian groups in identifying the victims from the exhumed remains, ensuring that families of the missing know the truth, and holding perpetrators accountable for the killings. SJAC utilized this satellite imagery analysis in its latest report, Unearthing Hope: The Search for the Missing Victims of ISIS. The report provides an update on the progress of the Missing Persons Program through which they have documented cases of missing persons and ISIS crimes in the 2 Northeast and trained the Raqqa-based Syrian Missing Persons and Forensic Team (SMFT) to apply forensic methods in exhumation and identification processes.3

FIGURE 1: MASS GRAVE SITES IN RAQQA, SYRIA

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These are: Site 14: Fkheikha, Site 22: Maqla, Site 24: Tell Zeidan, Site 1: Al-Taj, Site 13: Panorama, Site 5: Al-Rashid, Site 21: Western Salhabiya, and Site 19: Jabal al-Shamiya.

See generally, https://syriaaccountability.org/updates/2021/11/10/press-release-first-forensic-training-for-syrianmissing-persons-and-forensic-team/.

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SJAC ‘Unearthing Hope: The Search for the Missing Victims of ISIS’ (April 2022). Available at https://syriaaccountability.org/unearthing-hope-the-search-for-the-missing-victims-of-isis/. See also interactive map of I SIS grave and prison locations. Available at https://syriaaccountability.org/missing-persons/.

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BACKGROUND For more than a decade, Syria has suffered from internal conflict that has been further complicated by the engagement of international players. The Syrian civil war was sparked by pro-democracy protests that began in early 2011 and spread throughout countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa.4 In Syria, protests began after several young people were detained and tortured for scrawling anti-regime graffiti on public property in the city of Dara’a in the country’s southwest. Peaceful protests calling for the release of the adolescents gradually shifted to protests against the oppressive regime of Syria’s long-time president, Bashar al-Assad. As protests gained momentum and spread throughout the country, the Assad regime employed military firepower to quell the peaceful demonstrations. Armed revolutionary groups formed in response to the government-sanctioned violence, and by mid-2012, the country was engulfed in a civil war.5 As the conflict in Syria escalated,6 many countries supported different parties to the fighting, leading to extreme instability within the region. On the Syrian government’s side, allies including Iran and Russia continued their support. An anti-Assad bloc consisting of Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia soon formed to fund and arm the Syrian opposition. Remnants of al-Qaeda forces that were pushed out of Iraq in 2008 took advantage of this instability to strengthen their ranks, forming the Islamic State group in Syria, better known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).7 By 2014, ISIS had taken control of roughly one-third of Syria. Along the way, ISIS militants carried out egregious human rights violations, including kidnapping and detaining thousands of people taken from their homes and various regional checkpoints.8 As a response, the U.S led a multinational coalition to counter ISIS. Inr 2019, the US-led military engagement, including airstrikes that began inside Syria in 2014, resulted in ISIS losing control of large swathes of territory in Syria, including Raqqa.

By 2014, ISIS had taken control of roughly one-third of Syria. Along the way, ISIS militants carried out egregious human rights violations, including kidnapping and detaining thousands of people taken from their homes and various regional checkpoints.

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United States of Institute of Peace (USIP) ‘Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising Against Assad’ ( 2021). Available at https://www.usip.org/syria-timeline-uprising-against-assad.

‘Syria Conflict Now A Civil War, U.N. Peacekeeping Chief Says’ Reuters, 12 June 2012. Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-un-idUSBRE85B11V20120612.

Council on Foreign Relations ‘Who’s Who in Syria’s Civil War.’ Available at https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/whoswho-syrias-civil-war.

USIP, supra note 1.

Human Rights Watch ‘Kidnapped by ISIS: Failure to Uncover the Fate of Syria’s Missing,’ 11 February, 2020. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/02/11/kidnapped-isis/failure-uncover-fate-syrias-missing.

4 Human Rights Watch published a report in February 2020 documenting the failure of the 9 Syrian government to uncover the fate of thousands of people kidnapped by ISIS. Under international human rights law, families of the missing and disappeared have a right to know what happened to their loved ones and the government is responsible for conducting impartial and timely investigations into the circumstances surrounding disappearances.10 Thousands of people have been forcibly disappeared by the Syrian government or non-state actors, including 11 ISIS, since 2011. With no information or investigations, the victims’ families continue to suffer and wonder about the fate of their missing loved ones. As ISIS forces lost control over regional territories, local Syrian groups began searching for mass graves in an effort to recover 12 the remains of those murdered. Since 2018, the Raqqa First Responders Team (now SMFT), has exhumed more than 20 mass graves,13 and hundreds of bodies of people who were likely killed by ISIS in field executions.14 15

While there is no settled definition of “mass grave” in international law, for the purposes of this brief analysis a mass grave is defined as “a burial site containing remains of two or more 16 victims of extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary executions.” Whether discovered after a change in regime or when one party takes over territory previously controlled by another during a conflict, mass graves indicate the possibility of war crimes or crimes against humanity.17 Preservation of documentary evidence in mass graves can be used during criminal prosecutions.18 In addition, preserving mass grave evidence can also help to identify victims and provide answers for families.19

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Id. See art. 7 of the Rome Statute; art. 5 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and the International Covenant on Economic and Social and Cultural Rights.

Syrian Newtrok for Human Rights ‘The Ninth Annual Report on Torture in Syria on the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture,’ 26 June 2020. Available at https://snhr.org/wpcontent/pdf/english/The_Ninth_Annual_Report_on_Torture_in_Syria_on_the_International_Day_in_Support_of_Vict ims_of_Torture_en.pdf.

For more on the history of First Responders Team, See International Commission on Missing Persons ‘Missing persons in North East Syria: A stocktaking,’ 25 March 2020. Available at: https://www.icmp.int/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/icmp-grmena-065-6-w-doc-stocktaking-missing-persons-in-north-east-syria.pdf.

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Human Rights Watch ‘Syria: Mass Graves in Former ISIS Areas,’ 3 July 2018. Available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/03/syria-mass-graves-former-isis-areas.

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SJAC, supra note 3, p.16.

See Melanie Klinkner, ‘T owards Mass-Grave Protection Guidelines’ (2017) 3(1) Human Remains and Violence, 52–70.

16 Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Agnes 15

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Callamard, submitted in accordance with Assembly resolution 71/198, A/75/384, (2020), para 11.

Ellie Smith, “Universal Standards for Investigation of Mass Graves.” EJIL: Talk!, 1 April 2021, www.ejiltalk.org/universalstandards-for-investigation-of-mass-graves/?utm_source=mailpoet&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ejil-talknewsletter-post-title_2

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Id.

19 See Alexa Koenig, Keith Hiatt & Khaled Alrabe, ‘Access Denied? The International Criminal Court, Transnational Discovery,

and the American Servicemembers Protection Act 36’ (1) Berkeley Journal of International Law, (2018).

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Perpetrators of mass killings, summary executions, and other deadly human rights violations employ a variety of methods, including mass burials, to dispose of their victims. The use of remote sensing is valuable in establishing the chronology of events leading to the creation of mass graves and can support human rights advocates investigating the potential identities of persons buried in these graves. This provides essential supporting information to hold perpetrators accountable for international crimes and ensure the realization of truth, effective remedies, and reparations for families of the deceased.

DATA & METHODS SJAC provided information, including the coordinates and circumstances of eight confirmed mass graves, that is referenced throughout this brief analysis. Using these locations, the team was able to identify several hundred high-resolution satellite images that covered the areas in question between 2011 and 2021. All of these images were acquired by spacecraft operated by Maxar, Inc., and delivered to the research team through their SecureWatch portal. Most images had a spatial resolution of 30 centimeters per pixel, and none had spatial resolutions of more than one meter per pixel. The temporal resolution, or time between images, over each site varied significantly. In some areas, such as sites within the city of Raqqa, the separation in time between images was typically measured in days. Elsewhere, far from areas of clear strategic interest, months or even a year or more could go by between images.

In all cases, the available images were examined visually for signs consistent with the creation of mass graves at the coordinates provided by SJAC, as well as within a 2km radius around the site. In previous cases where satellite imagery was used to analyze mass graves, the visual signatures of mass graves have appeared similar, if not identical, to signs associated with a variety of benign earthmoving activities. As such, it is only in the context of eyewitness reports of mass graves, and post-conflict forensic investigation of the gravesites, that the imagery can be used to support the identification of a particular site as related to mass graves. When such information is available, however, imagery can be a powerful tool to establish the timeline of events associated with the creation of mass graves.

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RESULTS Site 14: Fkheikha (35.54475ºN, 38.58482ºE)

This site is located on agricultural land located south of the city of Raqqa. According to SJAC, most of the bodies recovered here were of ISIS members, and had been buried in an orderly and proper manner. The information from SJAC left open the possibility, however, that there may have been ISIS victims buried at the site as well. There were a limited number of images in existence for this site, but those that were available provide a timeline and several potential locations that appear to have changed over time and match the general description provided by SJAC. These are shown in Figures 2 and 3.

Figure 2: This disturbance appears to be present in 2011, although it looks different than in subsequent years. This may be due to the image resolution and satellite sensor characteristics, however it seems to have changed significantly over time. In 2016, the feature appears to contain narrow trenches, an appearance that continued in images from 2017 and 2019. Unfortunately, no images were available between 2011 and 2016 to narrow down this timeline further.

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Figure 3: This location was undisturbed in 2011 and 2016 and appeared to be mostly a flat field. No disturbances were observed on 24 August 2016 or 9 September 2016. Soil disturbances first appeared in the next available image on 26 July 2017 (not shown above since it is only available in grayscale). The next image, acquired 12 days later on 7 August 2017, shows six spots where the soil has been disturbed, as well as a hole that may have been dug. The area remains the same in the next available image from 2019. Unfortunately, no images were available between 2011 and 2016 to narrow down this timeline further.

SITE 22: MAQLA (35.868030ºN, 38.925927ºE)

According to SJAC, this site was located Southwest of Raqqa, in a quarry in Jabal al-Shamiya. No further information about the site was available, however analysis of the available imagery identified a number of sites of potential interest, as shown in Figures 4 through 7.

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Figure 4: Points of potential interest (rectangular disturbances) appear as early as 1 August 2017. Although earlier images are available, these features are not yet visible in them. Of all identified features of interest at this site, these are the closest to the coordinates provided by SJAC. The features are visible until 2019 and onwards, when vegetation begins to grow and the landscape changes.

Figure 5: Beginning on 22 August 2018, a highly concentrated group of features is visible to the west of the quarry, which appears to have positively affected the vegetation visible in January 2019. By November of 2020, however, all signs of the disturbance had faded. If the features in 2018 represent a herd of livestock, fertilization due to their manure may explain this phenomenon. If they are graves, however, a similar effect may also be possible due to the presence of human remains.

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Figure 6: In August 2018, a linear mound is visible to the west of an isolated structure, the latter of which was destroyed between 29 January 2019 and 20 November 2020.

Figure 7: In 2018, eighteen approximately human size objects were lined up in close proximity and in orderly fashion adjacent to two vehicles. This is very close to what is presumably Al Maqla camp, approximately 1,000 meters east north-east of the quarry visible in figure three.

10 SITE 22: MAQLA (35.868030ºN, 38.925927ºE)

SJAC indicated that this site was located east of Raqqa, near al-Hamrat in the area of Tel Zeidan. Reports indicated that all of the bodies recovered at this site were buried en masse after field executions, and are thought to have been soldiers in the Syrian army, as they were all young men wearing the army uniform. At the coordinates provided by SJAC, analysts identified what appeared to be a pre-existing burial ground. As shown in figures 8 and 9, between 27 September 2014 and 25 November 2020 the number of apparent burials at this location appears to have expanded significantly. Our data revealed there were approximately 607 objects-ofinterest in September 2014, and approximately 1032 objects-of-interest in November 2020. The data we gathered suggests there are approximately 425 new objects-of-interest between 2014 and Nov. 2020. As of 13 April 2020, SJAC reported 234 bodies were exhumed at the exact coordinates provided to us, with work still ongoing.

Figure 8: Between 2014 and 2020, approximately 425 new burials were apparent at these two burial grounds adjacent to the coordinates provided by SJAC.

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Figure 9: A significant number of new depressions have appeared between September 2014 and November 2020. These pits are located approximately 800-900 meters west of the burial ground shown in Fig. 8.

SITE 1: AL-TAJ (35.938398ºN, 39.010829ºE)

Sites 1, 13, and 5 were all located in the city of Raqqa, which was the capital of the ISIS militant group until it was forced from the city by military pressure and coalition forces. Because of ISIS rule and coalition airstrikes, significant war-related destruction to the urban area was visible in satellite imagery, particularly in areas that were far from the coordinates provided by SJAC, but within the two kilometer buffer zone. Because comprehensive analysis of such an extensive urban war zone would require a significant amount of time, and because the goal of this analysis was the identification of potential gravesites and the documentation of their chronologies, the analysis of imagery in the city of Raqqa covered only the landscape changes within 200 meters of each site.

Figure 10 shows the vicinity of Site 1 at different times between February and May 2017, whereas the red polygon indicates the area with apparent landscape change near the location provided by SJAC. Based on the description of this mass gravesite from SJAC, “most of the exhumed bodies were men, women and children killed in military operations in the city. Some of the bodies were in body bags that belonged to the National Hospital in Raqqa, indicating that some may have died at the hospital. Some of the bodies may not have been buried in the main cemeteries outside the city due to the siege.”

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Based on our observation, the most likely potential gravesites in this location appeared as trenches across the landscape. By February 2017, no trenches were present on the landscape (Figure 10-1). However, by May 2017 the trenches which covered the site had begun to be dug and were visible until 2018 (Figure 10-2). After July 2018, all the trenches gradually faded from view. In light of these images, one can conclude that the trenches at this site were dug between March and May 2017.

(1) February 2017

(2) May 2017

Figure 10: Satellite images of Site 1, from February 2017 (Left) through May 2017 (Right).

SITE 1: AL-TAJ (35.938398ºN, 39.010829ºE)

Site 13 was located in Panorama Park in the city of Raqqa. Based on the description of this mass gravesite from SJAC, it had been “a dedicated cemetery before the period of ISIS rule, all of the bodies had been buried in an orderly and proper manner (with tombstones or shrouds).” SJAC believed this site to “contain ISIS members and victims; two families of ISIS members said that they were there when their sons were buried in the cemetery; women in the family tried to visit the graves, but ISIS would only let the mother visit once and then refused visits altogether.”

Visual inspection of satellite images of this site revealed similar changes to those seen at Site 1 and followed a similar chronology. Figure 11 shows the temporal variation of the trench-like features that appeared on the landscape (red polygon). Before February 2017, none of these trenches were apparent (Figure 11-1). Between March and May 2017, however, all the trenches that were ultimately visible had begun to appear (Figure 11-2).

The trenches appeared to expand gradually from west to east during this time period. The trenches existed until January 2019 and then gradually disappeared. Therefore, we conclude that all the trenches were constructed between March to May 2017, similar to Site 1.

13 (1) February 2017

(2) May 2017

Figure 11: Satellite images of Site 13, from February 2017 (Left) through May 2017 (Right).

SITE 5: AL-RASHID (35.952234ºN, 39.007695ºE)

This site was located near the National Hospital in the city of Raqqa. The majority of the victims were civilians (men, women, and children) killed in military operations, while others may have died in the hospital, as indicated by the fact that some of the bodies were in body bags that belonged to the National Hospital. Some of these people might have been ISIS victims who were slain at the hospital. The burial also included the remains of troops who were unable to be buried in the city's major cemeteries owing to the siege. Figure 12 shows the vicinity of Site 5 over time, with red polygons representing areas of landscape change. It was an open space before February 2017 (Figure 12-1). However, by May of that year, this open space had changed to a trench-like landscape similar to sites one and thirteen. As shown in Figure 12-2, those trenches remained visible until July, 2018, after which they gradually disappeared. In sum, all three sites within the city of Raqqa exhibit a similar trench-like landscape, and the chronology of the construction for each site are highly similar. We could conclude that all three grave sites were established between March and May 2017, then gradually disappeared from view after 2018.

14 (1) February 2017

(2) May 2017

Figure 12: Satellite images of Site 5, between February 2017 (Left) and May 2017 (Right.

SITE 21: WESTERN SALHABIYA (35.940012 N, 38.7491220 E)

This grave was located to the west of the city of Raqqa, near the town of Western Salhabiya. According to SJAC, this grave contained the remains of 137 individuals when it was exhumed between October 2019 and April 2020. All of the bodies were reportedly the result of field executions and had been decapitated, with only heads remaining in some cases.

At this site, thirty-nine images were available, covering a period from 22 August 2011 until 28 April 2020. The majority of them showed little appreciable change, however between 7 June 2013 and 22 January 2015 a series of four images was acquired that revealed earth movements consistent with the potential creation of mass graves at or near the relevant coordinates. These are illustrated in Figures 13-16 below.

15 Figure 13: Site 21 on 7 June 2013

As shown in Figure 13, on 7 June 2013, Site 21 is a vacant dirt lot, roughly square in shape, within which is located a hill that is roughly circular. The site is surrounded by agricultural fields. No sign of recent digging is apparent on the site itself, however several dump trucks and a temporary structure were observed to the west of the site. One year later, on 19 June 2014, however, the terrain of the site shows signs of having been modified. As shown in Figure 14, on this date, a series of five new mounds is visible on the southern flank of the hill (yellow arrows), just to the north of the dirt road that follows the hill’s base. To the west of the site, dump trucks similar to those that were observed in 2013 are present, as are a number of piles of light-colored material, possibly sand or gravel.

Figure 14: Site 21 on 19 June 2014

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Figure 15: Site 21 on 18 December 2014

Six months later, on 18 December 2014, even more modifications to the site were evident. Although the image is somewhat hazy, on the hill itself, it can be discerned that a series of new trenches and earthworks had been constructed (red arrows), while to the west of the site, temporary structures had been erected where the piles of material were visible on 19 June, and additional piles had been created where the dump trucks had been observed.

Figure 16: Site 21 on 22 January 2015

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Finally, on 22 January 2015, a cloud-free image of the site was acquired which clearly showed the extent of the modifications to the site. The mounds first observed on 19 June 2014 were still visible on the southern flank of the hill, and the new terrain modifications created between 19 June and 18 December were all clearly visible. To the west of the site, the mounds that were visible on 18 December had been graded flat, and the temporary structures had been removed. This construction and removal of temporary structures was observed across multiple years in this location, suggesting that it may be a separate phenomenon unrelated to the activity on the hill. At the coordinates indicated by SJAC however (that is, on the hill itself), the majority of activity appears to have taken place between 7 June 2013 and 18 December 2014.

SITE 21: WESTERN SALHABIYA (35.940012 N, 38.7491220 E)

This grave is located at the Jabal al-Shamiya dumpsites south of the city of Raqqa. The grave is located approximately 250 meters west of the main road. The surrounding terrain is a rocky desert with topography of varying elevation. In the imagery, the grave appears to be located next to a gully that runs along its western and southern edges, as shown in Figure 17. According to SJAC, the grave contained bodies of civilians who were executed in a field and buried en masse while wearing orange uniforms. The remaining dump site appeared to continue in use following the creation of the grave.

Figure 17: Jabal al-Shamiya on 20 November 2020.

There is imagery of this location from as early as December 31, 2011. Figure 18 shows the area prior to the creation of the grave. There were no abnormal changes at this location between that date and 14 October 2015, when a series of earth movements consistent with graves appeared, alongside well-defined tire marks which created a trail from the main road to the potential gravesite. The grave manifested as three separate groupings of mounds, shown in Figure 19.

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Figure 17: Jabal al-Shamiya on 20 November 2020.

Figure 19: On 14 October 2015, numerous potential graves are visible at the area indicated above in Figure 18.

This surrounding area is used as a dumpsite where there are regular changes in the surrounding terrain and vegetation. Following the establishment of the probable graves, little to no additional grave-related activity is visible until the beginning of exhumation on 6 October 2019, shown sixteen days later in Figure 20.

Figure 20: Jabal al-Shamiya on 22 October 2019.

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HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS Syria has ratified the majority of core international human rights treaties.20 As a party to these conventions, Syria is obligated to undertake measures in compliance with international human rights norms and standards articulated in these treaties.21 It should, however, be noted that the applicability of international human rights law assumes that the state has effective control of the territory. In the case of the geographical location of interest in this brief analysis, Raqqa is not currently under the control of the Syrian government but is held by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) with U.S. support.

In addition, since 1953, Syria has also been a party to the four Geneva Conventions.22 Although international humanitarian law is applicable within the Syrian context, the armed conflict is complex due to the involvement of multiple groups and internationalized support constituting both State and non-State actors. Those complexities notwithstanding, core norms of international humanitarian law support the view that mass graves established in wartime present serious human rights concerns.

The United Nations (UN) has taken several measures in response to those concerns, including adopting several resolutions on the Syrian situation.23 The UN Human Rights Council established the International Independent Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (COI) to monitor all human rights violations in Syria since 2011.24 As of 2021, the COI has noted that it continues to receive accounts of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearances perpetrated with impunity.25 In December 2016, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) also established an International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) on Syria.26 The mandate of the IIIM is: 27

TO COLLECT, CONSOLIDATE, PRESERVE AND ANALYZE EVIDENCE OF VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND ABUSES AND TO PREPARE FILES IN ORDER TO FACILITATE AND EXPEDITE FAIR AND INDEPENDENT CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW STANDARDS, IN NATIONAL, REGIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL COURTS OR TRIBUNALS THAT HAVE OR MAY IN THE FUTURE HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THESE CRIMES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW.

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Ratification Status for Syria, available at https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?

CountryID=119&Lang=EN.

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See generally, Human Rights Watch ‘“Targeting Life in Idlib,”’ 15 October 2020. Available at: www.hrw.org/report/2020/10/15/targeting-life-idlib/syrian-and-russian-strikes-civilian-infrastructure.

Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, ICRC, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp? xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=380.

23 https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/syria/.

24 25

Mandate - IIIM. iiim.un.org/mandate/.

Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,’ A/HRC/46/55 (2021). Available at https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G21/059/73/PDF/G2105973.pdf?

OpenElement. See various reports of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic

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(COI), https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/iici-syria/documentation.

‘Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 21 December 2016: 71/2 48. International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011,’ A/RES/71/248 (2017). Available at https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a_res_71_248.pdf.

Id, para 4.

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Thus, IIIM has been helping to establish accountability procedures and serving as a repository for information and evidence of crimes, drawn from various sources, including the SMFT, to aid in Thus, IIIM has been helping to establish accountability procedures and serving as a repository for information and evidence of crimes, drawn from various sources, including the SMFT, to aid in bringing justice to victims of serious international crimes committed in Syria since March 2011.28 All the underlying data used in this brief analysis has been shared by SJAC with the IIIM and the COI. According to Amnesty International,“parties to the [Syrian] armed conflict committed war crimes and other grave violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses with impunity.” 29 The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Agnes Callamard has noted that “under barrage of aerial bombings, Syrian civilian markets, hospitals, schools and homes have been rendered sites of mass killings and burials.’ 30 While it is beyond the scope of this brief analysis to indicate who might have committed these serious crimes, mass graves reflect a range of violations committed by states or parties to a conflict, including arbitrary killings and other unlawful deaths and enforced disappearances.31 Since 2011, tens of thousands of people have been forcibly disappeared in Syria.32 According to SJAC, it is widely documented that ISIS engaged in extrajudicial killings on a mass scale in Syria.33 ISIS ruled Raqqa for almost four years as the group's former so-called "capital" in Syria.34 From June to October 2017, a US-led Coalition conducted a military operation in support of the SDF, a local Kurdish-led militia fighting ISIS on the ground. Following ISIS’ defeat, in early 2018, SMFT was created by the Raqqa Civil Council (RCC), through the support of U.S, to oversee the process of excavating mass clandestine and irregular graves in Raqqa.35 As of April 2022, 29 graves have been excavated in Raqqa governorate, containing 4,171 remains and an additional 1906 bodies were found

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Syrian Legal Development Programme ‘The Human Rights and Business Tool Kit for Syria the Syrian Legal Development Programme with the Support Of: European Union‬.’ Available at https://sldp.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/ToolkitEN.pdf.

Amnesty International, ‘Everything You Need to Know about Human Rights in Syria.’ Available at: www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/syria/.

‘Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Agnes Callamard, submitted in accordance with Assembly resolution 71/198, A/75/384,’ (2020), para 8. Available at: https://daccessods.un.org/tmp/5492804.646492.html. See also ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,’ 28 January 2020, A/HRC/43/57. Available at https://documents-dds-

31 32

ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G20/022/08/PDF/G2002208.pdf?OpenElement. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/EnforcedDisappearance.aspx.

‘Enforced Disappearances,’ Amnesty International, www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/enforced-disappearances/. See also SNHR, ‘The Tenth Annual Report on Enforced Disappearance in Syria on the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances; Long Years of Constant Grief and Loss’ (2021) p.8. Available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/The_Tenth_Annual_Report_on_Enforced_Disappearance_in_Syri a_on_the_International_Day_of_the_Victims_of_Enforced_Disappearances_Long_Years_of_Constant_Grief_and_Los

33

s_en.pdf.

SJAC, supra note 3.

34 Amnesty International, ‘War in Raqqa: Briefing’. Available at https://raqqa.amnesty.org/briefing.html.

35

ICMP, supra note 12.

21

in and around Raqqa City, totaling 6,088 bodies.36 According to SJAC, approximately 12,000 people have gone missing in northern Syria during the period of ISIS control.37 This brief assessment has provided further supporting evidence for these violations. Using satellite imagery, with the coordinates provided by SJAC, our analysis shows that the majority of sites (Site 1: Al-Taj, site 5: Al-Rashid, site 13: Panorama, Site 14: Fkheikha and Site 22: Maqla) were likely established between March-May 2017 and around 26 July and 1 August 2017, respectively, during the period of presumed ISIS control and the US-led Coalition engagement. Two other sites (Site 21: Western Salhabiya and Site 19: Jabal al-Shamiya) were likely established between June 2013 and December 2014 and around 14 October 2015 respectively, during the period of presumed ISIS control of the territory. In the case of Site 21: Western Salhabiya, the majority of activity appears to have taken place between 7 June 2013 and 18 December 2014. One site (Site 24: Tell Zeidan) was likely created around September 2014, during a period of presumed ISIS control, and expanded to include 600 burial grounds by 2020. These findings are informed by the SMFT exhumation efforts, which are also central to ICMP’s report on the recovery of bodies from mass graves.38 Bodies were recovered from the following mass graves covered in this analysis: Site 1: Al-Taj (402), Site 5: AlRashid (533), Site 13:Panorama (793), Site 14: Fkheikha (673), Site 22: Maqla (46), Site 21: Western Salhabiya (137) and Site 19: Jabal al-Shamiya (42).

The families of those who are missing have a right to know about the circumstances surrounding the disappearance and death of the victims, and to seek reparation, a form of compensation, for their suffering and loss. Principle 24 of UN’s Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law provides that:39

[V]ICTIMS AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO SEEK AND OBTAIN INFORMATION ON THE CAUSES LEADING TO THEIR VICTIMIZATION AND ON THE CAUSES AND CONDITIONS PERTAINING TO THE GROSS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND TO LEARN THE TRUTH IN REGARD TO THESE VIOLATIONS.

Hence, this obligates states to take action to investigate, gather evidence and establish facts around past injustices and violations, and ascertain who the perpetrators are.

36

Latest statistics from SMFT. See also SNHR ‘The identification of bodies in mass graves in Raqqa governorate is an international responsibility,’ 28 March, 2019. Available at https://snhr.org/wpcontent/pdf/english/The_Identification_of_Bodies_in_Mass_Graves_in_Raqqa_Governorate_is_an_International_Resp onsibility_en.pdf.

37

SJAC, supra note 3.

ICMP, supra note 12, pp. 31-32.

39 ‘Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 2005: 60/147. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to 38

a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law,’ (21 March 2006). Available at https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/202108/N0549642.pdf.

22

CONCLUSION The Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC) requested the partnership between the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) and the University of Dayton’s Human Rights Center, together with the University’s Mann Chair in Natural Sciences and the Department of Geology and 34 Environmental Geosciences, to establish a satellite-based chronology of events surrounding the creation of eight mass graves within Raqqa city and province in Syria. It is important to note that this brief analysis reinforces a familiar lesson from the analysis of mass graves using satellite imagery: in the absence of corroborating evidence such as eyewitness testimony, these features are difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish from benign earth movements. As many of the examples above illustrate, even with groundbased confirmation of a grave’s presence, its identification using remote sensing is far from assured, as the uncertain repeat cycle of high-resolution imagery over a given point, combined with the effects of rain, dust, and other natural weathering, can frequently obscure the soil disturbances upon which the identification of such a grave depends. Nevertheless, in those instances where the quantity of imagery is sufficiently high, the location information sufficiently accurate, and the timing of the satellite passes fortunately enough to closely bracket the creation of a grave, remote sensing can be a powerful tool for establishing the chronology of events and bolstering the search for accountability. 40

40

See, e.g., Abate, Dante et al., Optimizing Search Strategies in Mass Grave Location through the Combination of Digital Technologies, 1 Forensic Science International: Synergy (2019) 95-107.