The Stockholm Journal of International Affairs by UF Stockholm

BRICS Spring issue 2015

The Stockholm Journal of International Affairs

editor in chief

Haroon Bayani general editors

Axel Östling Daniel Lundh Peter Hjertsson writers

Sophia Palmén Elena Bazina Clara Geijer Hanna Müllis Clara van der Berg Love Ahlstrand Daniela Lazorska

utrikespolitiska föreningen stockholm box 500 06 stockholm 103 05 organisation number 08 24 06 38 08 info@ufstockholm.se

content 3 Editorial 4 On the Verge of Disruption 8 False Friends 10 Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership 14 A New Global Order 20 Water Scarcity in Mumbai 24 Discontent in Zuma’s South Africa 28 Violence and Pacification 31 Closing Remarks

Editorial

Haroon Bayani & Axel Östling BRICS is the acronym for the five major emerging national economies, ie Brazil, Russia, India, China and more recently South Africa. These countries represent roughly 40 per cent of the world population and 20 per cent of world gross product. Former Chinese president Hu Jintao portrayed the group as defenders and endorsers of developing countries as well as a force for promoting world peace. Their first formal summit was held in Yekaterinburg, Russia, before South Africa had joined. Shortly after the meeting the group promulgated a strive for a new global currency, and as such rivalling the current dollar hegemony. Last year in July, the formation of the New Development Bank was ratified and recently over 100 billion dollars were put in its reserves. Although the creation of the bank alongside the signing of various treaties are signs of a deepening cooperation there are, negotiations between such very different nations are far from painless. As the following articles will show, in spite of aforementioned developments and a visible trend towards closer partnership, each of these countries suffer domestic troubles: Russia and China are both dealing with extremist sentiments that seem more and more beyond the control of their respective governments; India, and to some extent Brazil too, for better or worse, is suspicious of foreign businesses, and in Brazil the current government of Dilma Roussef is under ever more pressure to deal with inequality and corruption; in South Africa, issues that survived Nelson Mandela do not seem to have been resolved to anyone’s apparent satisfaction. All sources used in the articles can now be found on the Stockholm Association of International Affairs’ website, as of this issue. We have also undertaken a considerable review of the Journal’s style, format and tone. We hope these changes are to your liking.

On the Verge of Disruption Sophia Palmén

In the beginning of December last year the ruble collapsed sparking financial crisis in Russia. The Central Bank of Russia’s immediate recourse was to increase its interest rate to avoid inflation, spending somewhere around 70 billion dollars (USD) from its currency reserves to restabilise the market. Inflation has not ceased and at the end of January Russia’s creditworthiness was downgraded to an A by the Chinese credit rating agency Dagong. Seven years ago Russia experienced a deep but brief recession, it being one of the many countries affected by the global economic crisis. It quickly rebounded, however, but not since 1998 has the situation in Russia looked so grim. The World Bank expects a decline in Russian GDP this year and the Central Bank of Russia projects it could decline by as much as five per cent. Two factors seem to be at the root of Russia’s present predicament. One is the quite unforeseeable but considerable fall in oil prices and the other the conflict in Ukraine and its consequences. The Russian economy is highly dependent on petroleum product exports with as much as 70 per cent of the country’s export revenues coming from oil and gas sales, totaling almost 15 per cent of GDP. Thus international oil prices have a direct effect on the economy and when oil prices started to fall mid-2014 this spawned a recession in Russia. World oil prices continue to stay low owing to an unmoved rate in oil production and a ill-timed reduced demand for the commodity. One response could be for the biggest oil producers to decrease their production, pushing 4

prices up again. However, competition between the largest producers and a fear of losing market share has meant that neither Russia nor the OPEC countries are cutting their production. Oil is often used efficaciously as a political tool. An analysis carried out in Forbes before the current recession stated that a stabilisation of the US dollar could drive Russia bankrupt. This is because most oil trading countries use the petrodollar system where the price per barrel is pegged against the US dollar. Now, when the US is not as reliant on oil imports as it once was due in some parts to oil fracking, this strategy will probably be utilised more vigorously. The conflict in Ukraine has been a costly affair for both Russia and Ukraine. Large amounts have been spent on military support that has put a further strain on Russian state coffers. There are doubtless political explanations as to why Russia, despite financial difficulties, is a candidate in something of an arms race. Russia is the largest country in the world geographically and it wants to remain a strong geopolitical power in the East. As regards the Crimean peninsula the Russian view is that they were reclaiming national territory, whilst also expressing opposition to Western hegemony. Consequently the EU and US decided to sanction Russia, which resulted in Russia retaliating with an embargo on EU products. Relations are now frosty with Germany, one of Russia’s main importers of gas, and Russian companies have been excluded from international markets. There are several reasons behind Russia’s economic turmoil, many

“AS TIES WITH EUROPE AND THE US GROW EVER COLDER, RUSSIA IS LOOKING FOR FRIENDS ELSEWHERE. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT ALL CLEAR WHO IS THE PRIME BENEFICIARY OF THESE ARRANGEMENTS. “

of which look likely to persist. President Putin himself has allegedly admitted that the Ukrainian crisis has had a negative impact on the economy, according to the Russian news agency Russia Today, but there also pointed to internal economic mistakes made over a longer period of time as a contributing factor to the recession. He mentions these mistakes as a historical inheritance but does not further go into what these might be. Western media have stressed the effects of widespread corruption in the country. Its institutions are described as weak and private interests are said to indirectly run parts of the country. A large share of the economy is privatised, and the country has been criticised for state involvement in its oil corporations giving them an unfair edge internationally. The state is often said to favour corporations on the basis of their support for the current leadership, affording them with financial assistance, and distributing oil money between national banks. Lack of transparency has led to Western speculations about bond placements in Gazprom and Rosneft as contributing factors to the crisis. Russian media seem to believe that the aim of Western sanctions is just that, to undermine President Putin’s power. They are of the opinion that the West is using the wrong methods if they want to see real policy changes. A scenario where the Russian economy proceeds to deteriorate further will lead to economic hardships in European countries where the Russian economy is integrated. Nevertheless, crucial for Putin’s maintaining popularity is that the economy stabilises, or dissatisfaction may well spread beyond placation. Russia is a country with a wide socio-economic divide, as is the case within most of the BRICS countries, and without the political support of low-income earners his position could be in danger. The immediate effect of the crisis for the Russian people is its impact on their purchasing power with regards to exports and overpriced domestic products. To begin with, imported foods are limited as a result of the embargo, and in any case inflation has made imports more expensive. A considerable amount 6

of medical products available in Russia are imported and so a depreciating currency affects mainly those of limited means who are ill. Many have reacted by withdrawing their savings in an alternative currency, and as a result, banks are running out of euros and dollars. Russia is the world’s sixth largest economy but it is far from certain how or when the economy will recover. The country managed to bounce back quickly from its 1998 crisis, due mainly to a rise in oil prices. Russia is comparatively very rich in natural resources, but the economic sector needs to be diversified to avoid further downsizing. Part of the government’s plan is to use state funds to buy roubles in order to create liquidity. In all however, the situation could be worse: Russia still has immense foreign reserves, but unless measures are taken to quell inflation the crisis will surely escalate. It will take a long time before the situation reaches truly desperate levels, but alongside its many other difficulties, abroad and with the stringent sanctions imposed, it may be sooner rather than later, unless, as is the more feasible outcome, economic policy takes a more pragmatic turn.

False friends Elena Bazina

As ties with Europe and the US grow ever colder, Russia is looking for friends elsewhere. However, it is not at all clear who comes out on top in the resulting arrangements. In response to deteriorating relations with the West, and after sanctions aimed at Russia since the Ukrainian crisis, Russia’s President is trying to reorient Russian foreign policy, making new allies out of neighbours and old rivals, in Asia, across its southern border and beyond. In the beginning of January Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met official delegations from Burundi and Tanzania. Welcoming his counterpart from the former, Laurent Kavakure, Lavrov voiced an interested in joint projects with the country. Tanzania’s foreign minister Bernard Membe’s words “Africa sees Russia as a superpower” were echoed through Russian media afterward. More recently Sergey Lavrov has visited South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Angola and South Sudan. Russia hasn’t shown such an interest in sub-Sahara Africa since the collapse of the USSR. For Soviet Russia the continent was a proxy battle between imperialism and capitalism. Khruschev

and Brezhnev lent budding African nations tons of money during these confrontations (never since repaid), and provided arms. Though some politicians opine that Russia should increase its influence in the African continent, the Kremlin is now putting more energy into bettering relations with the BRICS countries, and with China in particular. The BRICS are maintaining tacit support for Moscow in spite of the Ukraine crisis. In March last year its members abstained from a vote at the UN General Assembly, held to establish that the UN condemns Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The BRICS also showed their support for Russia later, in November when the Australian foreign minister, Julie Bishop, suggested that Russia should be banned from the G20 meeting. Because of Russia’s financial predicament, it has to seek not only politically but also economically advantageous partners as well. Already feeling the effects of Western sanctions, the recent drop in oil prices (with Gazprom a substantial contributor to overall GDP) has left Russia with an ever weakening economy, and an increasingly dissatisfied public. Despite the central bank’s interventions 7

the rouble has dropped by almost 50 per cent in just half a year. For the first month of 2015 inflation in the country rose fourfold. International ratings agencies, such as Moody’s, Fitch and Standard & Poor’s have downgraded Russia’s sovereign credit rating to junk status, meaning the country has little credibility as a sovereign lender/borrower. For now, the country can take care of its foreign debts with a trade surplus and its foreign currency reserves devalued with the fall in oil prices (reserves that in January this year amounted to $386 billion). How Russia will manage this year is uncertain. However, prospects for the next year are far more pessimistic. According to forecasts from some Russian experts, in 2016 the Russian economy will face a currency deficit. Were this to happen, purchasing loyalty, as was practiced by the Soviet Union, is not an option— Russia now needs more profitable cooperation. In discussing instruments for saving the national currency, it was suggested to move away from the dollar in trading across border. Although this alternative still looks unlikely, the idea of a BRICS bank has of late been afforded with more legitimacy from within the Kremlin. The New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement are two thought up alternatives to their respective institutional bulwarks in the ‘dollar zone:’ 8

the World Bank and the IMF. The Headquarters of the BRICS bank is located in Shanghai and it is likely that its main currency will be the Chinese Yuan. Jan Dehn, Head of Research at Ashmore (an emerging markets investment manager) made a promise in the Financial Times that he would eat his hat if the strongest currency in the next decade were not the renminbi. During his February visit to Beijing Sergey Lavrov emphasised that Sino-Russian relations are better than ever. Russia needs China more than ever, and China too has very few partners internationally. Last year Putin met with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping five times, focusing on bettering relations with already friendly China is not surprising. They share in a broadly anti-western philosophy, geographical location as well as sharing a great deal of ideological history. Moreover, economic cooperation with China is potentially much more profitable than one with any of its other likely partners. After eight years of extensive negotiations, Russia and China have agreed on a gas contract under which Russia will supply China with up to 38 thousand cubic metres of gas a year for 30 years. The gas contract [ was signed in Shanghai last May; the $400-billion deal now stands strongly in China’s favour. The gas contract was based on an oil-price, which has since fallen

by 25%. This means that the cost per thousand cubic metres of gas for China will have gone down from $350 to about $260. This is far less than European countries currently pay for Russian gas ($372 per thousand cubic metres). Analysts from Swiss bank UBS have calculated that Gazprom can profit from this gas contract in the unlikely event when the price reaches $570 per thousand cubic meters. China has the upper hand in these negotiations partly because East Siberian gas can only be developed with China as a customer or transport cost would be too high for it to be profitable. Whereas European infrastructure was built to accommodate significant gas imports and with a long-term take-or-pay contract obligation, China’s strategy is to diversify gas sources as much as possible eg, constructing liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals pipelines and storage facilities alongside further developing domestic gas production, including unconventional gas and coal gasification (aka coal-to-gas). What this adds up to is a more Russia dependent Europe (specifically Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria, Finland and the Slovak Republic), whilst China is decreasing their dependency making them more flexible and stronger before fluctuations in supply, and domestic production enabling partial self-sufficiency. Gazprom estimates the cost of developing the Siberian gas field, as well as building the pipeline to funnel it, will land at $55 billion (bn). The company cannot afford this development, already laden with a debt of $50 bn. China has already refused to make a $25 bn prepayment, which means the Russian gas company will have to become further indebted, probably borrowing the money from China National Petroleum Corporation. Gas production under adverse climactic conditions, in areas such as Yakutiya, pushes up the cost to anywhere between $80 and $100 per thousand cubic metres. Adding further expenses, such as transport, and following the terms of the debt agreement, the costs involved in extracting the gas might run as high as $300 per thousand cubic metres.

tional arena, and deepen Russo-Chinese collaboration in other sectors. Gazprom wants to diversify beyond Europe where natural gas demand is projected to grow at a substantially slower rate than in China. Another Russian problem is shortage of it’s own gas reserves which was why Russia bent somewhat in its negotiations with Ukraine last year. In the face of decreasing gas demand from the European Union Russia needs to find alternative markets. China is trying to take advantage of tensions between Russia and the West. Along with signing the aforementioned gas agreement, China hopes to eventually carry weight in the Russian Far East (RFE). China’s Vice President Li Yuanchao speaking at the Economic Forum held at St Petersburg in May called for closer ties between RFE and Northeastern China, hoping to construct a new economic bloc there between. China wants access to RFE natural resources and, generally, more domination in the region. Whilst Russia is in a difficult spot at the moment, there is little to suggest that China will stick to its word. For instance, Iran is still suffering under heavy sanctions levied by the West from sanctions more but Rouhani’s government did not feel obliged to accept disadvantageous terms during negotiations with the Chinese.

Russia wants to enlist China’s support in the interna9

Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership Clara Geijer

Russia and China share a common geopolitical worldview according to an upcoming report from the Swedish Defence Research Agency (SDRA). The two countries established an official strategic partnership in 1996, which later developed into the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;, in 2001. One of the main converging factors is a striving for multipolarity in world politcs.

Russian Minister of Defence Sergey Shoigu and Chinese Minister of Defence and State Counsilor Chang

Presidents Jinping and Putin together claimed in November 2014 that their partnership will contribute to regional and international stability. They share an aversion to the West, particularly the US as a global hegemon. Russia is in need of a partner to counterbalance the threat posed by a NATO alliance and its Missile Defence Project. China, in turn, requires assistance in counterbalancing America’s influence in Pacific Asia. As President Jinping stated during a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in September last year, Russia and China will “jointly face external challenges” from now on. Fortunately, this promise has yet to be put to test, but joint military exercises serve to underpin the notion. Russia and China fundamentally agree on the importance of state sovereignty, self-determination and territorial power, which boils down to a dislike for international intervention broadly, and Western involvement especially. For China, the concept is more principled whereas Russia seems to take a more flexible view on autonomy’s connection to non-intervention. This reflects differing foreign policy goals regarding their respective spheres of influence which they both value highly, for Russia represented in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and for China the Pacific region along with its neighbouring countries and secks of land in the sea. The recent annexation of the Crimean peninsula has put this relationship to test. China has only shown hesitant support for the action but they are certainly not explicitly condemning what can in some ways be seen as a breach of Ukrainian sovereignty. This stands in stark contrast to their stance on the Russo-Georgian War of 2008. According to The Diplomat, China confessed their support for Russia in the more recent conflict, stating that the West has prematurely judged Russia’s actions, expressing respect for the “unique role in mapping out the future of Ukraine” that Russia holds, in March 2014. Alas, the Chinese view on the crisis remains ambiguous. The deep-water port in the Crimean peninsula which is part of the Silk Road Economic Belt project, explicitly leaves Russia out, and the annexation issue has put a strain on the port construction, undermining China’s hopes for increase in trade throughout the region. Nevertheless, China benefits strategically from some of the more short-term consequences, for instance the necessitated shift in America’s focus from the South China Sea and competing claims to islands there, to Eurasia and coordination to European foreign policy. Both nations are seeking to utilise national unification and consolidation of state power to ensure their respective regimes’ survival and prosperity. With pervading state control over large parts of the public sector they minimise oppositional stamina. In order to succeed in this they each need to implement slightly different strategies than

their historical predecessors. Russia, propagating conservative nationalism and the exercise of state control, legitimised by an influential Orthodox church, serves Putin well in reaching a wider audience at home. Similarly, China uses nationalist propaganda through what the SDRA report calls a shift in focus of the social contract from ideology to economic growth. Recent reports indicate that President Xi Yingping is in favour of a “purge of western liberal ideas” in the Chinese universities, and elsewhere, making room for Maoist communist ideals. The Chinese Minister of Education stated in January that all textbooks that promote “Western Values” should be banned in the universities, which shows an overt uneasiness with Western influence. Some might say that America hitherto dominating the international stage should prompt both countries to pursue closer relations with the US instead. It is true that risking undermining relations with the US is not on the wish-list for either country. Whilst China holds a credit relationship with the US; Russia does not. One might even say that the Russian view of international power has not developed much since the Cold War. Both Putin and Jinping have focused on traditional military power and international political influence, but in two different ways: Chinese strategy entails long-term economic growth and internal stability; Russian strategy, on the other hand, might simply be stated as wanting to become a stronger global player, without loosing face. That a unified West is destabilising the geopolitical order is what primarily motivates both nations’ emphasis on national values and what prompts them to reject more traditional liberal ideas as propaganda. Furthermore, interference in a state’s affairs through joint intervention is thought of as a breach of international law by the two. More specifically, and was much protested against, when some members disregarded the vetoes levied by Russia and China in the UN Security Council on intervention in the Middle East. Despite actively trying to undermine Western influence, China recognises and participates in the global market, the merits of economic integration and growth as well as partnerships and interdependence with neighbours and other nations can be pursued without advances towards democracy. They have repeatedly stressed the fact that 14

their global rise is peaceful. China is trying to ensure regional stability through trade. Conversely, Russia is on a path towards ‘strategic solitude’ wherein survival and longevity of the administration as it stands is paramount. This narrow path projects Russia as restricted by the idea of conservatism as policy, which paints a picture of Russia as alone in a hostile world. President Putin stated in his annual briefing of 2014 that “we are stronger, because we are right”. More practically, they constitute a complementary pair regarding energy supply and demand. Russia’s immense natural resources correspond to with China’s need to ensure energy supply to enable further economic growth. Despite this, their economic cooperation and trade is modest in contrast to their other partners. China, perhaps strategically, has chosen to be careful in increasing its dependence on Russia, save the recent 30year agreement on gas-pipelines (see previous article). Current trade between the two represents a mere 2.4% of Chinas total imports, whereas the situation in Russia looks a lot different, most recently underlined by the Ukraine crisis and the following economic plunge. Russia is becoming increasingly dependent on China and their options are scarce. China constitutes 6,8% of Russian exports making them one of their main trading partners. Russia’s subordinate position in Sino-Russian trade emphasises their need to repair damaged relations with EU and the West, else they can garner lucrative partnerships elsewhere. The possibility of escalating rivalry with China suggests Russia ought to be diversifying their trade relations much like they are. Both countries spend heavily on their military forces. Russia still enforces conscription, which most of the Western sphere has abandoned for a professional military. Military cooperation between Russia and China is looking probable, considering the increasing number of joint military exercises under the guise of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Through joint training Putin can keep a close watch on the actual military competence of the Chinese Peoples Liberations Army (PLA) whilst simultaneously sending a powerful message to the international community. Unable to

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match China’s strategic partnership endeavours, Russia is growing worried over what China’s rearmament and improving military might spell in the future. Putin does not want China to outgrow Russia, but he also needs a strong likeminded ally. Arms exports to China have for many years increased exempting a slump between 2007-2010 following reports of China’s allegedly pirating Russian designs. One can argue that military capacity is about the only area in which Russia excels, compared with China. Recent activity by Russia in Asia, seeking partnerships with India, Pakistan and Vietnam, signals an attempt to expand influence toward the East. This could be motivated by a need for buffer-zone countries formerly constituted by the Soviet satellite states, and Putin’s search for multilateral support. In Asia, Russia can play the role of friendly associate rather than the cultural opponent the West may seem. Past as well as current atrocities and Western meddling in the region adds a shine to Russia’s image there. According to the forthcoming report, China is somewhat overlooking Russia’s potential as a serious actor in Asia: instead Putin is seen as an outsider more associated with Europe. China welcomes Russian influence in Asia to a certain degree, since it migwht counterbalance the increasing influence of America in the South China Sea. China recently reached out to the US requesting their minimised interference, to prevent regional instability. Strategically, this falls in line with Russian interests also, possibly outbalancing American post-war supremacy in the region, whilst simultaneously undercutting that of China, if only indirectly. Important to note is the Russian Far East and the geological weak-spot it represents. Through recently contracted pipelines, Putin has secured that the region is economically utilised, but also more territorially contested, especially since population density is higher and infrastructure significantly more developed on China’s side of the border. Russia and China were more or less equals when the partnership was founded in 1996, and again when the Treaty was signed in 2001, but looking ahead the two seem to be moving further apart, exempting trade. His-

torically, Russia has always enjoyed considerable global importance, and will find it difficult to adjust to a world where China has outrun them. China, has grown to hold global importance more recently, although its regional influence has been substantial before what SDRA report calls the century of humiliation (1839-1949). In reality though Russia is underperforming both politically and economically in Asia and has recently lost a lot of trust internationally, still relying on nuclear deterrence tactics. They also lost one of their global influence positions following the suspension from their G8 summit. China, on the other hand, maintains a steadily growing global position. Andrew Korybko in his Oriental View article calls China the dual partnership “Gateway” to further possibilities of business and trade with Russia being the “Balancer” with military and diplomatic abilities, outstretching theirs for now. Sino-Russian relations are complex involving, both converging and conflicting interests. According to the forthcoming report, they represent two differently advancing countries dissatisfied with the post-war order, and trying to regain old power. It also points to their joint advocacy of a multipolar order as a more stable one, compared to that of the West exerting disproportionate influence. The dynamic between the two has shifted making for a more complex partnership. With this in mind, “cooperation, competition and distrust”, quoting the SDRA report, sums up the relationship precisely.

A New Global Order Hanna M端llis

After the Arab Spring, the Middle Eastern political order comprised of secular autocracy of varying formations has been challenged both internally and externally. People rose up against their countries’ rulers due to increasing economic stagnation, and little hope for an often large youth population. These authoritarians were tacitly supported by most world powers until it proved no longer feasible for them to exert control over their people. The outcomes of these revolutions varied widely. Tunisia recently had transparent and legitimate democratic elections, on one hand, whilst Syria, on the other, has been embroiled in a bloody civil war that has truly shaken the region. This has implications for the rise of China and Russia as political players both on the global stage, and in the Middle East. The United States, in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, stood unrivaled when it came to exerting power in the region. The Middle East is important because of its vast oil reserves and geographically as a crossing between Europe, Africa, and Asia. Politically, the Middle East has seen grave destabilisation since the US invasion of Iraq, and the subsequent deposition of Saddam Hussein as part of its Global War on Terror. The invasion turned out to last years, to the detriment of the local population, and it left Iraq with a weak parliamentary democracy. Hussein’s rule was marked by Sunni domination and Shi’a repression in a country with a majority Shi’ites. American-backed Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has since reversed course; he boosted the Shi’ites but has alienated the Sunni population instead. This reversal explains partly the rise of the extremist group Islamic State (IS), who now control large swaths of land in Iraq and Syria. Mosul is Iraq’s second most-populous town and is located both in Iraqi Kurdistan and is adjacent to the ancient Assyrian capital of Nineveh. It is located 400 kilometres north of Baghdad. The conquest of Mosul has led to IS not only gaining control of land in both Iraq and Syria but has also given them access to advanced military equipment abandoned by each respective army and oil reserves from which it derives income to pay for its pursuits. It is for this reason that IS is recognised as the richest and most successful terror group to have ever existed yet. 18

Aside from IS’ gross inhumane violence, the group also poses a threat to the geopolitical order both within the Middle East and the globally. Russia and China are trying to facilitate an end to the Syrian Civil War and, in turn, increase their influence politically and economically in the Middle East. Syria’s civil war creates the most likely environment for the extremist movement to grow and because its legitimacy as a state is far weaker than that of Iraq. Russia and China both want to increase their influence in the Middle East, but in different spheres as each country is hoping for different outcomes for themselves. Russia wants to increase its political influence and sees the crises in the Middle East as an opportunity to do so. China, on the other hand, wants to diversify their trade relations but does not want to be involved politically. In spite of these differences in their position, they share a broader perspective on the region. First they are the only countries that have vetoed all United Nations Security Council resolutions on intervening in Syria. Second, both of these countries inhabit minority Muslim territories. Many of these Muslims have migrated and joined in the Islamic State insurgency, which has seen successes on the battlefield in both Syria and Iraq however weakened it may look today. Returned radicalised Chinese and Russians pose great deal of potential national security issues in both countries. China is an illiberal single-party state, with some restrictions on civil liberties like free speech and with limits on how many children a family may have. In spite of that, China is not an economic basket case like unlike states that impose similar restrictions. It derives its legitimacy to rule the second largest population on the planet mostly from its continued economic success and owes a lot to a broad nationalist sentiment. China is mostly interested in expanding trade ties. It is not concerned with other countries’ domestic disputes. China invests mostly in Africa and neighbouring Asian countries but they see a great opportunity in tacitly supporting Syria. China is dependent on foreign oil production for much if its industry, so the increasing marginalisation of Syria in the global economy, mostly through sanctions and diplomatic alienation, can give China a stable oil flow. Trade relations between Syria and China are also very

beneficial towards China; China is one of Syria’s main import partners. China is also steadfast in not intervening in other countries’ internal affairs so long as trade is not affected. At first, they were reluctant to issue any harsh statements regarding IS due to this policy of non-intervention. This looks likely to change. Usually, China does not interfere in other multi-ethnic countries’ affairs because of its fear of upsetting its own diverse population, many groups of which are now demanding autonomy: for example the independence-seeking Uighur minority, an ethnically Turkic group in Western China. Beijing has, for instance, banned the use of the Uighur language in schools and all state-owned establishments now have mandatory lunches during Ramadan. China defends these practices in the name of “progress” and “good health” respectively. Whilst most Uighurs practice a moderate form of Sufism, more and more have radicalised in the face of religious repression and are travelling to Syria to wage jihad. They receive advanced military training in Syria, and if they were to return to China they could wage an even more violent and militaristic struggle against Beijing than hitherto. This has led China to take a harder line against IS, a policy which is echoed in Russia’s approach to the Middle East. Modern day Russia is no Soviet Union. That being said, the Putin administration has discovered in its decade-long rule that the idea of a strong Russia is popular amongst the electorate especially after the 90’s and the then chaotic desovietization. The Ba’athist Party in control of Syria is officially socialist and was for a long time aligned with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It has proved a consistent ally to Moscow, even after the dissolution of the USSR and the early years of democratisation. Russia, like China, see an opportunity in expanding their influence in the Middle East through the now pariah state of Syria. Indeed, if the Ba’athists were to maintain control, Russian foreign policy would be seen as more influential having backed the winners. With all the turmoil associated with the Arab Spring, having a reliable and in-power ally allows Russia to exert some power in the region and flex its muscles on the world stage.

Like China, Russia has clashes between its Muslim minority and a ruling class of ethnic Russians. One of the more famous conflicts is that between Moscow and Chechnya. It has taken two wars to effectively incorporate Chechnya into the Russian Federation, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. On the Chechen side, many of the nationalists or are now also extreme Islamists. Russia now wishes to impede the rise of IS, as many Chechen radicals have already travelled there to wage jihad. These fighters can return with advanced military training and pose a real threat to Russian influence over post-Soviet states. Russia also has vested interests in the Middle East, particularly Syria. Their sole Mediterranean naval base is located in the port-city of Tartus, Syria. This allows Russia to have a presence in both the Middle East and southern Europe militarily. Syria, in return, is one of Russia’s largest importers of arms. Between 2000 and 2010, Syria purchased 1.5 billion dollars-worth of arms, making it, according to the New York Times, Russia’s seventh-largest client for weapons. On top of this, Syria owes Russia money. Much of this was written off so that Russia could continue operations of its naval base in Tartus, but increasing economic pressures in Russia have made these payments more necessary than ever. With both economies facing stagnation and sanctions, it is unlikely that these will be repaid, but also unlikely that Russia will go easy on a new Syria. The age of American predominance in trade and military power is slowly but surely coming to an end. China has already overtaken them as the world’s largest economy as measured in Purchasing Power Parity. Russia is again reasserting itself in Europe, in Central Asia, and the Middle East as energy and weapons exporter, specifically through initiatives such as the Eurasian Union, and more directly through its overt support of the Ba’athist regime. The Middle East is teeming with opportunities: its geographic location connects some of the world’s largest economies to one another, it is still the top energy producing region in the world, and the political systems there are still weak enough to not threaten the global powers in need of Middle East-

ern energy. For IS, this represents an opportunity to establish a caliphate where Muslims are said to be no longer oppressed. For China and Russia, this represents a challenge. They both want to extend their hard and soft power in the region, but are finding that their approach stands to upset domestic minorities, and pose a risk at home. What the future holds for Russian and Chinese interests, let alone the Middle East, depends on the survival of Al-Assad’s Ba’athist Syria. of the Ba’athist regime. The Middle East is filled with opportunities: its geographic location connects some of the world’s largest economies to each other, it is still the top energy producing region in the world, and the political systems are weak enough to not threaten the global powers that need Middle Eastern energy. For radical jihadi group IS, this represents an opportunity to establish a caliphate where Muslims are not oppressed. For China and Russia, this represents a challenge. They both want to extend their hard and soft power in the region due to its importance, but are now finding that their approach is creating problems domestically. What the future holds for Russian and Chinese interests, let alone the Middle East, depends on the survival of Ba’athist Syria.

“The age of American predominance in trade and military power is slowly but surely coming to an end”

Water Scarcity in Mumbai Clara van der Berg

Due an increase in rural-urban migration and a greatly globalised economy, the development of megacities has for decades been rising at an unprecedented speed. This has significantly influenced different aspects of what is often called ‘human security’, involving issues such as that of access to clean water. Whilst water remains a crucial resource for socio-economic development, access to water has become limited in many megacities and is only available to a small percentage of their inhabitants. Today, water scarcity is commonly recognised as a substantial concern for human security. Agreement on what should be considered security was heavily debated after the end of the Cold War when the newly emerged concept of human security challenged an otherwise hegemonic neorealist paradigm and its focus on traditional security politics. Recognising global social and environmental vulnerabilities, this broader concept of human security brought focus to the people rather than on national-states, and emphasised a more multidisciplinary understanding of security as an international political device for understanding development within states. First published in the publication of the Human Development Report of 1994 the underlying definition of human security has since involved economical security, as well as food, health and environmental security.   The growth of megacities in some regions is a phenomenon linked to the boom of industrialisation. Megacities do not only differ in size or regional location, but also by climate and political conditions. Hence, we see rather rich megacities (cities with more than ten million inhabitants) like London or New York having much larger settlement areas in contrast to Mumbai that has to organise infrastructure for an even larger population in a smaller area and with fewer resources at hand. Whilst rapid urbanisation of cities in the global south has led to problems for the well-being of most of its inhabitants, essential is the scarcity of water resources which has led to environmental as well as health problems. Fragmented administration and in-efficient coordination of political actors from an often centralised power in regions such as these in megacities along with their the rapidity of growth are only some of the reasons for the lack of basic resources like water, make facilitating a solution to this problem all the more unlikely. 22

As Mumbai’s population has increased by almost eight million since 1991, thus becoming one of the largest cities in the world, the city has substantial problems concerning the access to clean water. Water supply is unequally distributed and leans towards the higher income part of communities otherwise depend on the existing infrastructure. Conversely, sanitation services and access to water is very poor in slums meaning waterborne diseases tend to spread amongst the impoverished. Mumbai’s formal water supply, administered by the Municipal Corporation, for Greater Mumbai, is approximately a hundred years old, and its transfer networks are old and of low quality. This system provides portable water for around 88 per cent of Mumbai’s population. However, the supply is quite unreliable. Due to high costs of providing water access to homes there is a high financial and social barrier preventing widespread domestic supply. Whilst five million slum dwellers are not connected to the official water provider, at least three million have access to water through public taps. Over the past two decades migration from rural to urban areas has rapidly increased. This has led to a rapid growth of slum communities, especially in the western suburbs of Mumbai where people live, alongside piles of rubbish, highways and industrial smog. Mumbai approximately meets 63 per cent of its water demands. Access does not meet basic and in effect, in the slums, only around fourteen per cent of them actually have access to clean water. Most informal settlers and slum residents in Mumbai live in its western suburbs. In contrast to the few notified slums, where the local municipality provides access to clean water and sanitation, the dwellers of non-notified slums forming twenty percent of Mumbai’s slums collect water from manually created water systems. Whilst access to informal water is often ten times more expensive than that provided by the government it also suffers poor sanitation conditions. Women and children’s lives are especially characterized by a daily hunt for because they are often responsible for collecting water in their communities. Long lines of people waiting for water means women and children is considerably hampered, in a country already plagued with broad inequality both between castes as well as genders.

VILA AUTÓDROMO - photo by DANIELA LAZAROSKA

“TODAY, WATER SCARCITY IS COMMONLY RECOGNISED AS A SUBSTANTIAL CONCERN FOR HUMAN SECURITY”

World Bank estimates that 21 per cent of communicable diseases can be explained with a reference to unclean water, estimated to cause over 1,500 deaths daily. A study by the Harvard School of Public Health investigated the water quality in a slum in Mumbai over several seasons, aiming to find a link between the establishment of non-notified water distribution systems, and the increase of water-borne disease proliferation. The results showed that these slum residents did not only pay substantially more for the water in addition; 50 per cent of the water was contaminated with high rates of E.coli and other bacteria. Furthermore 90 per cent of residents had less access to than the minimum of what is recommended by the World Health Organisation. The relationship between water scarcity and its contamination correlates with these socio-economic conditions as bacteria often infected water after it had been stored in the household. Whilst advising slum residents have safe storage, the research team found that problems due to high water costs and the precarious scarcity of water as well as poor source quality could only be solved by connecting all informal slums in Mumbai to the public network, thus creating portable house line water for a majority. This, however, should not be read as something that is likely to gain any ground with the local government. Water scarcity and the access to water of proper quality, as we can see in Mumbai is not only a general problem of quantity, but rather a problem of social and economic inequality. Water scarcity can be seen as a threat to human security concerning health as well as to the ecological heart of India, which is being destroyed by the haste of urbanization.

Discontent in Zumaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s South Africa Love Ahlstrand

They were all there to see him off. President Jacob Zuma and his cabinet had congregated with the rest of the leaders of political and cultural South Africa on 10th December 2013, to say their goodbyes to the man who had led and inspired them. His final struggle had been long and hard, for he was not a man who yielded easily, but Nelson Mandela was now dead. For years he embodied South Africa’s struggle for freedom, and even after he stepped down from politics, his shadow lingered over his former party, the African National Congress (ANC), lending legitimacy to the then hard pressed government. Now he was gone, and the leaders of the country were left to fend for themselves. Whether their sombre mood was due to the passing of a great man, or, because of an uncertain future was difficult to say. For whilst Mandela’s walk to freedom was long indeed, South Africa’s journey toward peace and prosperity has been longer still. Discontent with the ANC-adminstration is growing, and when current President Jacob Zuma entered the stadium where the memorial service for Mandela was held, boos could be heard among the crowd. In many ways South Africa can be said to have prospered following the end of Apartheid. Whilst the world was impressed with the speed in which the country seemed to heal itself having been on the brink of civil war, a growing South African middleclass could take comfort in the fast growing economy and seemingly well-functioning institutions. The final proof of South Africa’s leap from darkness unto a brighter future came when the country was allowed to enter into the BRIC association in 2010, adding an S to the now rechristened BRICS. That very same year South Africa hosted the FIFA World Cup symbolising, to many, a celebration of African success. The ANC’s hold on political power seemed as consolidated as ever, despite internal struggles and controversies surrounding the successors of Mr Mandela. Under the surface however, important issues remained unsolved. One of the more pressing ones has been the issue of fertile land and its distribution. Despite it being one of Africa’s most urbanised countries, farming still plays an important part in South Africa, both economically and culturally. It was hunger for new land and the resources it promised, that made 26

Europeans come over the Seas to conquer vast tracts in the 1600’s, and it was on that land the natives were forced to toil under white masters. Access to and ownership of arable land has since then been key to power in the region, as was reflected in the laws of the apartheid state. The white government implemented laws that severely limited the amount of land black people could own. The most significant of these was introduced in 1913 in the Native Land Act that deprived 90 per cent of the black population of 93 per cent of their land, selling it off to white landowners. Tellingly, redistribution of land was one of the keystones in the ANC’s freedom charter of 1955, and remained one of the organisation’s main purposes throughout their struggle. When they finally came to power in 1994 one the first laws to be passed was the Restitution of Land Rights Act, allowing black South Africans to make claims as to their ancestral land, this with a deadline set four years ahead. But with two decades gone without much of the land changing hands it is now widely considered to have been a failure, and the country’s landless have begun asking themselves if the act did anything to change their situation at all. A recent land audit suggested it had not. Roughly 79 per cent is still in white hands. In a move to stem further discontent president Zuma signed the Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Bill in June last year. The legislation reopened the restitution claims process that had ended in 1998, giving claimants until the year 2020 to lodge fresh claims. Critics have been quick to point out that obstacles that have stood in the way of previous legislation are still there. First, much of the records showing what land was taken from whom are lost, in these cases there is no way of knowing what land should go to what family. Second, legal representation is far from available to all in South Africa, and without financial means, or a passable education, many would-be claimants cannot afford to or endure a lengthy battle with the law. In all likelihood the new deadline for claims will pass without much having changed. A radical solution has been proposed by the current Minister of Land Reform and Rural Development, Gugile Nkwinti. In an attempt to protect farmers from eviction, he is proposing a policy draft entitled

Strengthening Relative Rights of People Working on the Land. Under this policy, long-term farmworkers will assume ownership of half the land on which they are employed. The government will pay for this half, but instead of it going to the landowners, the money will go toward a development and investment trust to be owned jointly by both landowners and farmers. The idea is that mutual trust, generated by this joint-ownership, should serve to help farm workers ease into their new responsibilities as landowners. The deadline for feedback on the draft is in April 2015.

a more pragmatic and less radical tone, if South Africa’s disadvantaged are to reap any benefits, or simply witness a land transfer from entrenched interest to radical politicians.

Current landowners have, perhaps expectedly, taken a critical stance to what they see as losing half of their land to the state, but even within the ANC opinions have so far been divided. Zizi Kodwa, a party spokesman, said in an interview with the New African Magazine that there is no official ANC policy position on the scheme as yet, meaning the party is not yet openly backing the proposal: ”We are still awaiting an understanding of what exactly this means from the ministry that made the proposal,” he said. Nkwinti is determined that the legislation shall pass however, saying in a speech to the National Assembly last July that the situation was unsustainable and that black people would no longer be ”bending over backwards” on land reform and restitution. With only limited support from within the party, however, it seems unlikely that the proposal will pass. Whatever the outcome, it is clear to all parties that something has to be done. Sentiments from South Africa’s recent history still simmers beneath the surface, and whatever patience is left amongst the landless masses can only be stretched so far. The recession of recent years, and an unemployment rate of nearly 25 per cent certainly do not help with stemming public qualms. It would seem that the ANC still has a long way to go if they are at all to heal the wounds suffered during the apartheid era, and this time there is no one like Mandela to lead them. Today’s landowners will protest any change whatever. The land issue is one of several dimensions, historical, political, economical, and doubtless racial: it cannot go on being passed over for future governments to handle. These recent developments are a sign that it is again being taken seriously, but the debate needs to take on 27

Violence and Pacification Daniela Lazorska

Around me. the city decays bursting with opportunities. Artur da Távola

In the midst of the carnival, one sees Rio de Janeiro in all its splendour. Being a relatively new arrival to this city, I, as a writer and politician da Távola, am seduced by its beauty, its intensity, and its warmth. Nevertheless, its rougher edges are surely there to be seen. Or, as da Távola hinted, the city is bursting at the seams. Recent tensions and confrontations recently by forced removals, ubiquitous racism, and exclusion in a ‘racial democracy’: all within a fast-growing country and city, laden with extreme socio-economic inequalities. In an effort to transform the bleak reality of many of the citizens of Rio, a policing programme, often and henceforth called the ‘pacification’, was put into practice in 2008. It is to help the government and local police forces more effectively take control over territories otherwise under the control of armed drug traffickers. As the programme has unfolded, the citizens that it was meant to shield from violence; some from the general public, academics and several observers have since criticised the programme for perpetuating violence rather than redressing it. Take the Maré complex (in effect 16 favelas put together). It is located in the Northern Zone of Rio de Janeiro. The complex is skirted by three major highways, one of them leading to and from the international airport, Galeao. Approximately 130 000 people live here, making it one of the largest complexes in the city, containing a bustling commercial and social life. The favelas that make up Maré were constructed in the decades immediately following the Second World War. Having been built at different points in time, and with differing involvement by state actors, they are, as residents like to point out, visibly distinct from one another.

They also speak of differences between trafficking factions, depending on who is in control of the area. In Maré, territories are split between two major factions: a divide marked by the notorious street colloquially known as the ‘Gaza strip’. They regularly enter into conflict with police and military, as well as with on another, leaving many of the houses and commercial areas close to the street ridden with bullet holes, and bereft of business. With an influx of people during the 2014 FIFA World Cup, and the upcoming Summer Olympics, the issue of long standing government promise of grappling with Rio’s rampant crime and violence (which would require taking control over territories such as Maré ) was realised in this novel pacification program. Since 2008, around 250 areas have undergone this process. On the 30th of March last year, Maré was occupied by armed forces. First to put the plan into action were the Special Operations Police Battalion (or BOPE, who have been active in the north of Rio since 2011), who then handed over their patrol work to the military a month later. The military, numbering some 4 000 soldiers, are now expected to step aside for specifically trained pacification police units (abbreviated UPP. The UPP’s entering the stage is a matter of much speculation, it having been postponed four times already, and this “not knowing, but expecting”, as one local puts it, is a source of perpetual and great angst. Military vehicles roam the area in armoured vehicles, soldiers touting guns: there are patrol points, and indiscriminate searches have become commonplace for those who live, work or frequent Maré. Residents far from accept what the pacification and presence of a variety of armed forces implies for day-to-day life. As a result, residents and observers alike, have through various forms of protest opined on the processes and practices of persecuting the drug traffickers. Not least due to the violence that BOPE, the military and the police units have introduced to the already violent atmosphere. Early on during these manifestations, police pepper sprayed protesters. The events of this particular night escalated when armed state agents opened fire 29

at a group of teenagers wielding rocks. The crowd was dispersed, whilst gas bombs were still thrown towards peoples’ homes. One family was trapped in their home, and being too afraid to leave, were unable able to get help for their infant who suffered an asthma attack caused by the gas. In June 2013 alone, nine people were killed in Maré as a direct result of BOPE interference. Likewise, many of my sources complain about feeling racially discriminated, being stopped and searched by the military ‘simply because they are black’. Some do not frequent particular streets anymore, hoping to avoid these patrol points. In many of the more successfully ‘pacified’ areas soon housing speculation commences, making for a very lucrative realestate business, with prices rising dramatically following the promise of safe streets and a police presence. Pop singer Madonna, for example, has allegedly bought a home in Vidigal, a favela in the South Zone of Rio, close to the iconic Ipanema and Leblon beaches. There is already an explosion of ‘for rent’ and ‘for sale’ signs in Maré, with prices nearing those of many of the down-town areas. But, in many ways, the process of pacification is not serving its purported purposes, as the traffickers they were designed to replace and defeat either move to different areas, or simply go about their business, for example, without being visibly armed. In effect they place the people having to live and work around this process under constant threat of having their personal belongings searched and their mobility interfered with, all whilst the housing expenses are rising markedly. At worst, they find themselves in the line of fire, as a new area is ‘pacified’. As an alternative to this somewhat radical policy some of the people affected by it have put forward the general view that investing in healthcare, education, and sorting out the problem of irregular garbage collection and sanitation of the open sewage outlets are local problems where the money would be far better spent. Admittedly, these are more long-term goals, showing little immediate benefit or promising change compared to a presence of hundreds of patrolling military and police units. But long-term investment is arguably just what 30

these areas require. Extremes of violence, an area in flux, and a volatile house market only serve to further destabilise relations between those most disaffected, and with those sent in to intervene. Brazil has recently been shaken by corruption scandals in relation to costly stadium constructions, raised transportation prices, and a high-profile corruption scandal involving the state run oil company Petrobras, and the currently ruling Worker’s Party. As yet current president Dilma Rousseff is yet to be indicted. The situation in Rio looks admittedly dark, and for now the changes put in place has only served to increase its peoples’ marginalisation, upsetting an already tense relationship between the establishment and the poor. Societal change needs not to be thought of in the terms of radical transformations such as these. Difficult though it may be to implement in such a polarised place, substantial reform and progress can come only out of improving the opportunities for younger Maréans. Many view the political world as impenetrable and excluding. Residents and observers alike wonder when this city again will burst with opportunity.

Closing Remarks

Parisa Khosravi & Rebecca Lindqvist The Stockholm Association of International Affairs is happy to celebrate its 90-year anniversary! In 1925, we were known as the Stockholm Academic Association of the League of Nations whereas its current title was not adopted until 1934. As one of the oldest associations at Stockholm University with a remarkable history, we maintain a lively interest in foreign affairs. We have had the honour of hosting a multitude of talented and inspiring individuals, and strive to continue to spark curiosity amongst the young, on and off-campus. The board this year is eager to continue this work and to build on the legacy that we proudly display. In February, we were pleased to celebrate the Black History Month in collaboration with the US Embassy in Sweden, through an exclusive preview of the Oscar-nominated film Selma - a touching film of the civil rights march from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama. We are also delighted to welcome new mentors from the Swedish Red Cross, Stockholm Free World Forum, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) to our mentorship program this Spring. These mentors will meet with their respective students on at least three occasions and will function as a calming influence and inspiration as these students approach the final stages of their university degrees. The association has also had the pleasure of, together with the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hosting a group of young Ukrainian Members of Parliament during their official visit in Stockholm. Among them was Hanna Hopko, Head of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and Oksana Syroid, first ever Deputy Chairwoman of the Ukrainian Parliament. The large audience listened attentively as they shared their views on media and propaganda, reform, and dependency on imported oil and natural gas. Our diplocafĂŠs are held regularly affording students and members a rare opportunity to discuss various political issues with diplomats in an informal setting. In March, the Polish Ambassador to Sweden welcomed the association at the Embassy of Poland in Sweden where attendees participated in a convivial discussion on Polish history and the development of its foreign policy throughout the years. April will continue the focus on Europe with a seminar and panel discussion on Swedish culture and traditions borrowed from other countries. Subsequently, we will provide an overview of career opportunities within European intergovernmental organizations at the European Parliament Information Office and EU Commission Representation Office in Stockholm. Thank you for your interest and participation in the Stockholm Association of International Affairs. And, for those of you are new, we extend to you a warm Spring welcome!

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