MV WAKASHIO: THE FALLOUT AND LESSONS TO BE LEARNED.

As a spill and pollution response trade association it has been fascinating to follow the MV Wakashio grounding and subsequent loss though social media and in the 4 webinars we have so far run.

The media coverage has been reasonably balanced with the exception of one journalist at Forbes who seems never to have seen a spill pad in his life or been to sea in anything other than the Manhattan ferry.

We have benefitted hugely from firsthand reports from those in Mauritius which have been honest and insightful. Whilst tinged with some frustration, all have commended the fortitude of the affected population and praised the way they have rallied together to do their bit to ‘save their island’ and the energy with which they approached the remedial works.

We hope we have delivered our webinars and coverage in a balanced manner. It is certainly not our position to judge. We would appreciate feedback on that point.

There is no doubt that this was one of the most significant incidents in shipping in 2020 as it was so surprising that a 300m bulk carrier should choose to be where she ended up, running aground on a reef with visible surf, in daylight.

So why did it happen?

I am not sure we will ever truly know what was happening on the bridge at the time of the grounding. It is down to the inquiry to find this out. To date it has failed to do so. However we have had confirmed some of what the media have reported. The Captain agreed to change the approved route to pass the Cape of Good Hope to allow the vessel to close the island so that the crew could connect to family and friends using their phones.

From the inquiry we have had confirmed that there was a birthday party on board and the Captain left the bridge to join that, leaving the First Officer in charge. When he came back to the bridge the First Officer was in charge of navigation and then, with the Chief Engineer also on the bridge, the vessel first struck the reef. The Captain has stated that the Chief Officer was in charge of maintaining safe navigation and the error was his. Not surprisingly the First Officer says otherwise. The Court of Inquiry has again refused the Captain and First Officer bail as it would appear to believe that both have responsibility for the errors. Ultimately the Captain is the man in charge so should have ensured, knowing that they were entering shallow waters, that the vessel was safely navigated.

There is no confirmation that the mapping software in use was inappropriate for the area they were navigating. However, the initial investigation by the Panama authorities indicated that it was not set at the right scale to show the hazards around the vessel and that the charts were not the current version.

We have also heard that the Mauritius Coastguard were slow in reacting to the MV Wakashio being off her filed course. Having entered territorial waters one would have expected the vessel to be challenged by the Coastguard, particularly as she was heading straight toward the coast and not tracking south west as would be expected if she was routed to pass south of Cape of Good Hope. Due to a lack of attention to the radar plot by the duty watchkeeper no contact was made until after much delay the deviation was noticed and the Mauritius radar station endeavoured to contact the vessel as it approached the shore but no calls to the vessel were answered.

We also know that two helicopters should have been available that could have intercepted the vessel. However, neither were actually available as one was under maintenance and spare parts for the other had not been delivered.

We also know that following the grounding the ballast pumps, used to move fuel and liquids around the vessel, were not working. This would have meant that there was no way the vessel could alter the trim of the vessel to lift the bow to enable it to go astern

The heavy weather, over the subsequent 5 days, saw the vessel move 500m around the reef eventually burying her stern on it and the bow being pushed around by the wind and the surf rebounding off the reef. Either in the original grounding or during this heavy weather the engine room flooded and the stern has never left the reef.

Its removal started in November and should have been completed by March. However unusually stormy weather has meant that work has stopped and will not recommence until late September at the earliest.

The result

With the stern flooded and sat on the reef and the rest of the vessel buoyant the continual movement of the vessel started to pull it apart.

The first leak of oil started to appear around the vessel on 6 August and was rapidly blown into the shore during subsequent days. In all 800-1000 tonnes of Very Low Sulphur Fuel Oil was lost off the vessel at this stage from the starboard side bunker tank. Tankers were alongside the vessel on 8 – 10 August pumping off the remaining fuel oil on board and also offloading the IBCs that were on the deck full of previously transferred fuel oil.

Cracks started to appear around Cargo Hold No. 8 on 9 August and on the 10 August the Prime Minister told the nation that the:

‘Wakashio is likely to break up and the worst case scenario is likely to happen as the boat will fall apart’ .

On 12 August the salvors stated that they had recovered as much bunker fuel as they could.

On 15 August the Mauritius National Crisis Committee, announced a crack in cargo hold No. 8 to the starboard side of the vessel worsened at 2 pm local time on 15 August 2020.

“At around 4:30 pm, a major detachment of the vessel’s forward section was observed,” the committee said in a statement. It estimated that 90 tonnes of fuel were still on board at the time of the separation. The bow section was taken under tow. This left the stern stuck on the reef and its presence further damaging it by the movement of the vessel against the reef. Oil slowly spread up to 30km from the point of loss along the southeast coast of Mauritius across protected areas, RAMSAR areas, and site of special scientific interest.

The Government closed off all fishing and sea based recreational areas; closed, albeit most temporarily, all aquaculture sites; threatened countless rare species and threatened the mangrove swamps.

The response

The Mauritius POLMAR plan was rigidly applied and was only initiated when product was lost from the vessel. This decision was no doubt based on the expectation that the vessel could be refloated off the reef with the assistance of SMIT Salvage who were appointed by the ship owners to recover the vessel.

We do not know what discussions took place in Government. Apart from protection of the Blue Bay Marine Park which utilised just about 45% of the national stockpile little concurrent action appears to have been taken prior to the breach of the vessel and the loss of fuel from it. However, this site was not downwind or down current from the Wakashio.

The rest of the stockpile was deployed to protect the Ile aux Aigrettes, Mahebourg Waterfront, Riviere des Creoles, Pointe d’Esny and directly astern of the Wakashio as show in this breakdown and the date by which they were deployed:

The stockpile of 3200m was surprisingly small. However once the POLMAR plan was initiated it was supplemented by spill equipment from the French stockpile in Reunion that arrived on 10 Aug, somewhat later than ideal.

However it must be borne in mind that on 31 July SMIT salvage stated publicly that they were confident of the vessel’s recovery. A week later the first fuel was lost and little was in its way to contain it so recovery could be undertaken.

Once the POLMAR Plan was initiated the stock held in Reunion, just 200 nm from Mauritius, was accessed there was a plentiful supply of booms and absorbents supplemented by supplies from Japan and India. It is surprising that, as a preventive measure, that this was not accessed earlier event if it was not eventually used!

In the apparent absence of any government leadership the members of the public, with encouragement from NGOs and environmental groups on the island, mobilised in their tens of thousand to use local resources to build booms. Bagasse booms, made of organic materials like leaves from sugar cane, straw, by products from other crops, wrapped in plastic sheeting and kept buoyant with plastic drums and marine floats, we produced in huge number over several days in early August. These booms, a recommendation in many POLMAR Plans, were deployed by fishing boats to catch pollution from the Wakashio at sea and prevent it from reaching the shore. In all 50km, yes, FIFTY kilometres, of boom were manufactured and deployed by local people. This compares with 3200m deployed by the Government.

There is no doubt that these booms protected much of the Mauritius coast from the fuel oil lost from the Wakashio and importantly held the product at seas as opposed to it washing on the shore where it is much harder to recover.

At this stage the response was being undertaken by Le Floch Pollution appointed by the ship owner and Polyeco appointed by the Government with separate areas of responsibility.

The clean up

We have covered the response and clear up in detail through webinars that may be viewed at:

However much of the shioreline clean up was undertaken by Polyeco employing nearly 300 local people, many being fishermen who could no longer fish as access to their waters was closed. The clean up proceeded under the supervision of the Ministry of the Environment and proceeded smoothly with

Not surprisingly, there was a lot of waste comprising the following waste streams

This continues to employ the following resource:

2 hazardous waste experts 4 waste management supervisors 6 foremen and 55 staff

Oily Sludge Contaminated Absorbents Empty Containers and IBCs Contaminated soils and sand Other contaminated materials (booms, PPE, plastics, debris, vegetation, plastic bottles, hair used in the bagasse booms) Hazardous materials 2714 tonnes of waste. 4045 big bags of waste. 241 IBCs containing waste. 5108 sealed 205 litre drums of waste.

By sea to Polyeco Greece

Booms Used Meters

Conventional oil spill booms from stockpile 3500

Bagasse booms made by local volunteer population with NGO support

56,600

Preparation and Planning

POLMAR plans should not be so rigid as to exclude preventive action. Had more extensive booming and deployment of skimmers and recovery vessel prior to the loss of product from the vessel, the impact on the shoreline may have been reduced.

POLMAR Plans need to be regularly practised, was the Mauritius plan exercised in anticipation of an incident like MV Wakashio and if so, why was the response delivered in such an unstructured manner until external agencies got involved.

Stock of in situ equipment need to be examined. Some 3500m of conventional boom were deployed, yet over 50km of citizen made bagasse booms were deployed. Whilst difficult to recover and dispose of bagasse booms did prevent a larger incident.

Any MARPOL incident should have a communication plan which should cover social media, press, TV to ensure local people are well informed. This incident demonstrates that when a vacuum of information exists its will be filled. In a major incident, which this became, the international reputation of a nation is under the spotlight. The lack of clear and regular government communication throughout has unified political dissent making it harder for them to manage the island’s recovery from COVID and Wakashio.

Effectiveness of external funding?

Two of the funding support packages that the Mauritius Government received was the creation and participation in MASE (Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar, Comoros, Djibouti) €37.5M and Marine Highway Development and Prevention Project $11M. What benefit did they have to the management and execution of this incident?

Regional capability

On such a busy shipping route (which is forecast to increase by 20% over the next decade) why is there not a regional stand by tug(s) able to handle very large vessels when they get into difficulty. Waiting a week is surely too long and contributed to the loss of the vessel.

Design

What secondary containment is there for fuel tanks inside the hulls of vessels other than tankers, like MV Wakashio.

Legal Authority

MV Wakashio is alleged to have ignored coastguard calls to confirm her intentions. How are nations to respond to ‘rogue vessels’ and can military intervention be taken in such incidents to prevent damage which ultimately resulted in loss of life (the crew of the tug MV Sir Gaetan Duval on 31 Aug 20).

International Support

The international support the island received was key to organising a coordinated response. However, it took weeks of valuable time to organise and deploy and with COVID restrictions over a month to be effective. With shipping posing a consistent risk why is there not a regional task force ready to go?

Insurance

Owner and charterer insurance seems to dictate the scale of response. Is this not an outdated tradition which slows effective and comprehensive response that need to be reviewed?