Graham O’Brien

Engaging with Kant’s Ethical and Political Philosophy in Light of His Early Racial Theory

Graham O’Brien

Content warning: This essay contains discussions of racism and racist philosophies

Immanuel Kant, in the Groundwork For the Metaphysics of Morals and his other works of ethical philosophy, takes a universalist and egalitarian approach to humanity and morality. These philosophical claims, however, conflict with racist and inegalitarian views he upheld in some of his earlier theory; particularly, his essay “Of the Different Human Races”. Because of this conflict, scholarship has taken two notable positions on Kant’s racial theory and its conflict with his more influential ethical and political philosophy. As Pauline Kleingeld claims, in her essay “Kant’s Second Thoughts on Race”, these two positions read Kant as either an “inconsistent universalist” or a “consistent inegalitarian.” 1 Before I can adequately explain my argument, however, I ought to give substance to these two positions, which will inform this essay immensely.

Beginning with the “inconsistent universalist” approach, Kleingeld writes: “The most common view is that Kant’s racism is a regrettable and appalling fact, but that it lies at the periphery of his philosophy, and that one can quite easily isolate it from the more important core of his Critical philosophy.” 2 This view, as this passage suggests, seeks to divorce his earlier racial theory from his more influential Critical and post-Critical works. In particular, these scholars see such works as more relevant because they contradict with his racial theory. 3 This view is, regrettably, not without issue, as

29 in 1788 Kant published both the Critique of Practical Reason and On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy. 4 The former, published first, stands as his first notable foray into ethics, and the second of his three Critiques. The latter is the latest point at which Kant maintained his hierarchical views on race. 5 On the opposite side of the spectrum, scholars such as Charles Mills have “argued that Kant’s moral and legal theory is not universalist at all.” 6 According to Kleingeld, Mills argues the following position: “He claims that Kant intends to apply the Categorical Imperative and the Principle of Right to whites only: when Kant speaks of ‘everyone’, he means in

reality ‘all whites’, not ‘all humans’. Therefore, Mills argues, [Kant’s] so-called universalism is in reality no more than white egalitarianism.” 7 In this manner, Mills takes the position that Kant is a “consistent inegalitarian” and that his views did not change throughout his life’s work. My position on the consistency between Kant’s texts, with regards to race, is that his later work leaves racial theory out of the equation entirely. Moreover, throughout this process I will look to Kant’s categorical opposition to slavery and European colonialism. However, because we cannot know if, at the end of his life, Kant still harboured racist views privately or not, I will not be arguing (as Kleingeld does) that Kant’s personal views moved away from racism. Before explaining the relevant portions of Kant’s ethical and political thought, however, I ought to give an account of Kant’s racial theory.

From here, I will reconstruct the groundwork of Kant’s racial theory in order to cover his thinking chronologically. First and foremost, Kant viewed race hierarchically, as E. Chukwudi Eze, as cited by Williams, writes:

STEM GENUS: white brunette.

First race, very blond (northern Europe).

Second race, Copper-Red (America).

Third race, Black (Senegambia).

Fourth race, Olive-Yellow (Indians). [...] the assumption behind this arrangement and this

order is precisely skin color: white, black, red, yellow; and the ideal skin tone is the “white” - the white brunette - to which others are superior or inferior as they approximate the “white.” 8 As this passage shows, Kant viewed different races hierarchically based on skin colour, with the white race at the top. Eze explains Kant’s claims further, noting that Kant thought of each race as different in terms “‘of rational (and therefore, human) capacity - or the lack of it.’” 9 Of these capacities, Kleingeld writes: “In 1788 [...] he claimed that people from Africa and India lack a ‘drive to activity’,

and hence lack the mental capacities to be self-motivated and successful in northern climates.” 10 Kant’s thought, at this point, ascribed human capacity to race, with all races in an “inferior” position to the “ideal” white race. Taking this further, Kleingeld writes: “[Kant] also added comments, such as that blacks are lazy and that Native Americans have a ‘half-extinguished vital energy’(DHR 2:438), and remarked on their respective usefulness as slaves.” 11 In this sense, Kant not only claims that one’s race defines their intellect, but that a race’s capacity for intellect and agency determines their fitness for slavery. 12 As Kleingeld and Williams argue, Kant seems to distance himself from these views in his later ethical and political theory, to which, we will now turn.

Kant’s conception of property, in terms of land, will eventually lead us to discussing his concept of a state. Of property, Kant claims there is an original right to land. As Williams writes: “For Kant there is, as with Locke, an original right of the common possession of the ‘earth’s surface’, which because it is a globe or a sphere requires that human beings must ‘finally put up with being near one another’ and cannot ‘disperse indefinitely.’” 13 In this sense, every human is entitled to possession of the earth’s land. This did not mean that one person could claim a piece of nature as privately theirs; rather, private property requires civil society. 14 Furthermore, the creation of a state allows for the ownership of private property (for our discussion, property refers to land or territory). Jimmy

31 Casas Klausen explains why individuals form into states, as he writes:

Kant introduced his axiom of “unsocial sociability” and notes that each person “encounters in himself the unsociable property of willing to direct everything so as to get his own way.” Obviously, such a situation [...] would lead to violent disorder, which, Kant argues, individuals need not experience physically to understand they must leave it. 15 From unsocial sociability, Kant recognizes that humans have a

“propensity to enter into society” 16 which is most efficiently achieved by entering into a state. In this sense, entering into a state curbs our unsociability.

So, what does Kant consider a state? Of this, he writes: “A state (civitas) is a union of the multitude of human beings under laws of right.” 17 In this sense, the state is a large group of people brought together in a commonwealth (a legal authority). These states, as Kant describes them, are large communities with rightful possession of land that they make use of, and have property in. 18 As such, a state is a territorial entity that groups people together under a single legal body. Moreover, Kant considers them to be analogous to individuals, or moral persons. 19 As Kant explains in “Perpetual Peace”, states are: “Peoples who have grouped themselves into nation states may be judged in the same way as individual men living in a state of nature.” 20 In this sense, each state ought to be considered the same way as any single human, and every state is obligated to respect the autonomy of another. Autonomy, in Kantian terms, refers to the freedom to self-legislate and not have to “submit to any external legal constraint.” 21 In this way, state autonomy bears resemblance to Kant’s moral theory of autonomy, which pertains to individual persons. Of autonomy, Christine Korsgaard writes: “we should so act that we may think of ourselves as legislating universal laws through our maxims.” 22 States, in a similar manner, demand this respect from other states accordingly. In fact, one might say they have a right to that respect. Right, however, is a larger concept in Kant’s theory, and requires its own explanation.

Firstly, to Kant, rights fall under a universal principle, as Chad

Kautzer writes: “Kant’s Universal Principle of Right, which holds that ‘an action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law.’” 23 As such, all formulations of right, under this principle, must respect the freedom of choice for all persons. Moreover, right is an a-priori concept, meaning it is not derived from experience, and any rational being can have knowledge of it. 24 In “Perpetual Peace”, Kant outlines three forms of right, namely: “civil [...], international, and cosmopolitan (public) right.” 25 These three formulations of right are all designed to maintain autonomy within, and between, nation states.

Of civil right, Kant claims that a state must be republican, and that its constitution follows three principles, as he writes: “the principle of freedom for all members of a society [...] the principle of dependence of everyone upon a single common legislation [...] the principle of legal equality for everyone (as citizens).” 26 These principles ensure that citizens play a role in the decisions of “juridical law”, 27 or, the legislation of a state. Subsequently, juridical laws prevent conflict between citizens of a given state. Civil right, in effect, maintains the autonomy of citizens.

Civil right, however, secures nothing on the level at which states interact with each other, for this, Kant has international right. A constitution between states secures international right; or, in Kant’s words, “a Federation of Free States.” 28 This federation, like a civil constitution, ought to secure the autonomy of a state, insofar as states are analogous to moral persons. As Kant writes: “Each nation, for the sake of its own security, can and ought to demand of others that they should enter along with it into a constitution, similar to the civil one, within which the rights of each could be secured.” 29 In this manner, international right demands that the states form a federation that places external legal constraints on them, just as a civil constitution would do for the citizens of a given state. This legal constraint, as Kant implies, is “likely to prevent war” between member states. 30 In joining this federation, the participating states will, just as in civil right, secure their autonomy. 31 Furthermore, autonomy is just as essential to a nation as it is to an individual person. In other words, the federation is an external legal constraint, but one that each state has, in choosing to join, self-legislated.

33

As such, the federation protects state autonomy through a series of essential provisions. Kant calls these provisions “the Preliminary Articles of a Perpetual Peace Between States.” 32 Specifically, three of these provisions secure the autonomy of a state. These are articles 2, 5, and 6 (however, one can make an argument that all six articles secure autonomy). 33 The second article claims the following: “2. ‘No independently existing state, whether it be large or small, may be acquired by another state by inheritance, exchange, purchase or gift.’” 34 This is to say that the territory of another state cannot be claimed by another. Moreover, the fifth article claims that “‘[no] state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state.” 35 This article, essentially, ensures that the selflegislation of the state, as individual, is not tampered with by another state. This is to the extent that one state cannot step in to help cure the “internal ills” of another state. 36 Following this, the sixth article also prevents states that are at war from interfering with the internal affairs of another state. As Kant writes: “6. ‘No state at war with another shall permit such acts of hostility as would make mutual confidence impossible during a future time of peace. Such acts would include the employment of assassins [...], breach of agreements, the instigation of treason [...] etc.’” 37 These rules, in effect, prevent one state from disrespecting the autonomy of another, be that through conquering territory, or other means. In short, these articles, as parts of an international federation between states, guarantee the autonomy of its member states.

Finally, we come to the third form of right, which Kant calls cosmopolitan. According to him, the cosmopolitan right compliments “the unwritten code of [civil] and international right.” 38 What does cosmopolitan right entail, exactly? Kant explains that the cosmopolitan right affords “Universal Hospitality” to members of the international federation. 39 Hospitality, in this case, refers to a citizen’s right to non-hostile treatment when visiting the territory of another state. 40 This right, however, does not permit a citizen of another state to take up residence or claim property in the host state. 41 Moreover, this right, allows foreign citizens “to attempt to enter into relations with the native inhabitants” on the provision of non-hostile treatment. 42 Hospitality, as Kant notes, is a “universal right of humanity”, which is to say, that this extends to all persons, regardless of their participation in the federation. 43 Because hospital-

ity is a right, it conforms to the universal principle mentioned earlier. As Otfried Höffe explains, such rights are moral, which is to say “‘natural’” and “‘immutable.’” 44 Moreover, these moral rights serve as the ground for all state (civil) laws by establishing “‘the authority of the lawgiver’”; in other words, the constitution of a state. 45 In effect, this grants legal authority to states and moves us closer to cementing Kant’s state-person analogy

It is from natural right that a state ought to be treated with the same moral consideration as any human. Of this, in regard to persons, Kant writes:

But a human being regarded as a person, that is the subject of a morally practical reason, is exalted above any price; for as a person he is not to be valued merely as a means to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but as an end in himself, that is, he possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings in the world. 46 This passage, when looked at in the light of Kant’s analogy of the state as a moral person, takes on an added implication. From this, we can infer that a state, as a person, has a certain level of dignity. Moreover, this passage, in concert with the second preliminary article of perpetual peace, affords the state a value beyond “a price as of a commodity of exchange.” 47 Furthermore, in “Perpetual Peace” Kant views the state in a similar manner, as he claims: “Like a tree, it has its own roots, and to graft it onto another state [...] is to terminate its existence as a moral personality and make it into a commodity.” 48 In effect, these passages serve to both link The Metaphysics of Morals and “Perpetual Peace” as companion pieces that complete the states-as-moral-persons analogy. Following this, states ought to afford each other respect as autonomous entities that ought to treat each other as ends-in-themselves, and “never merely as a means [to an end].” 49

So, bearing in mind Kant’s concepts of right and the state, how, in abstract terms, is he anti-colonialist? Of this, Williams explains that Kant’s devotes some political work to developing his own views on European colonialism. 50 Referring to “Perpetual Peace”, Williams writes: “he speaks of [...] the way in which Asian, African, American and Australasian people should be approached

35 by the European visitor. Here Kant makes it patently clear that this approach should not be one of superiority but that of equal inhabitants [...] governed by right or law.” 51 This is consistent with his approach to interactions with foreign peoples in The Metaphysics of Morals. Moreover, Williams explains that Kant does not have a high opinion of European colonialism, and offers a new model with higher standards for interacting with non-European peoples. 52 According to Williams, Kant values “limitation and regulation” in these interactions, which conflicts with his earlier views on race. 53 Of these earlier writings, Williams says: “for Kleingeld it represents an episode in Kant’s intellectual development which he leaves behind him in his final political writings.” 54 In accordance with this claim, however, it is worth bearing in mind that, regardless of his racial views, Kant maintains a political “Eurocentrism.” 55 This, perhaps, is something that we could forgive, as he never left his home, the city of Königsburg in (then) East Prussia. 56

The best point of comparison, in order to illustrate the anticolonialist sentiment in Kant’s philosophy, is to look at the work of John Locke. Kautzer and Williams concur that Locke’s political theory, as he presents it in his Two Treatises on Government, intentionally justifies colonialism and its interests. 57 To expand on this, however, Williams writes:

Locke appears to have expressed few qualms about the European peoples imposing their will upon the non-white world. Locke’s labour theory of property fully endorses the industrious white settlers who bring into cultivation previously neglected territories and add to nature’s endowments by cultivating skillfully the previous untilled land. As I have put it elsewhere “colonialism and the expansion of European market society need not be added to Locke’s theory of property - they are already an integral part of his doctrine.” Locke considers colonialism “a practice that increases the ‘common stock of mankind’ by developing and exploiting the productive capacity of the earth.” 58 According to this passage, Locke views colonialism as acceptable, and even good, so long as humanity makes greater use of the land. Moreover, Europeans all have an equal right to the earth’s surface

and thus can lay claim to any unlaboured land. 59 To Locke, it does not matter whether anyone inhabits the land or not. To him, so long as that land goes untilled, European powers are welcome to claim it as their own property through labour. To him, colonialism is more productive and ethically permissible, as it serves the greater good of humanity. Locke further justifies colonialism by claiming that invading and conquering this unused land is acceptable. Regarding colonisation, Wayne Glausser writes: “where there being more Land, than the Inhabitants possess, and make use of, any one has liberty to make use of the waste [...] [Thus, if a native population should] resist conquest of their waste land, they become aggressors in war, [and the developers may justly kill them].” 60 Locke, in this “just war” theory of colonialism (and slavery) further justifies European violence against non-white inhabitants of non-European lands.

So, how does Kant’s philosophy differ from Locke? Thinking back to Kant’s “Preliminary Articles of a Perpetual Peace Between States” he claims that no state, according to his meaning of the term, may take the territory of another, so as to protect their autonomy. 61 This, however, seems to only extend to states in the Eurocentric federation that Kant proposes. Yet, this does not disqualify other nonEuropean peoples from receiving the same treatment. Thinking of Kant’s Universal Principle of Right, actions taken by the state must coexist with the freedom (autonomy) of all other states, and by extension other peoples. 62 Williams writes: “[Kant] does not accept a right to acquire what we can usefully exploit or take over territories that may appear empty or under-populated simply because we have expanded our labour on them.” 63 In this sense, Kant’s view is the direct opposite of Locke’s as states cannot simply colonize land, work on it, and then call it theirs. This is the case, for Kant, because it would violate the right of the native inhabitants, and subsequently, infringe upon their autonomy. Moreover, the claim to property is not legitimate for a visitor to a foreign state, as Kant’s theory of property suggests. 64 Rather, Kant suggests that foreign newcomers do “‘not extend beyond the conditions which make it possible to seek commerce with the old inhabitants.’” 65 In this sense, foreign visitors may only attempt to seek commerce. This is in accordance with the cosmopolitan right of hospitality. According to that principle, as I explained it earlier, the only thing a foreign visitor may do is seek to create a relationship with native citizens. 66 Furthermore, the

37 visitor can only rightly expect non-hostile treatment. 67 Because this right is universal, it follows that it must apply to all human beings. For Kant, the end of cosmopolitan right is to bring all of humanity under a constitution. Moreover, states ought to accomplish this without force; rather, each state must autonomously consent to the external legal constraint of an international constitution. 68 As Williams clarifies: “A perspective that Kant adds that arguably has an European tinge is that these journeys and contacts should ultimately be regulated by law, and do not rule out commerce. Unavoidably Kant is Eurocentric in his outlook but not in a way that wholly disregards the merits of other cultures and races.” 69 As this passage indicates, commerce, for the sake of bringing humanity closer together, is Kant’s objective. Moreover, this passage allows for a return to Kant’s discussion of race, which (for some) shows considerable change from his work in 1788 and before.

Perhaps the most obvious potential change in Kant’s racial views is his stance on slavery. In “Perpetual Peace” he outright opposes slavery as “gruesome.” 70 Kleingeld, citing Kant, writes: “The principles underlying the supposed lawfulness of appropriating newly discovered [...] lands, as goods belonging to no one, without the consent of the inhabitants and even subjugating them as well, are absolutely contrary to cosmopolitan right.” 71 Moreover, slavery is unquestionably impermissible in Kant’s ethical and political system, as it debases the dignity of a person’s humanity. Furthermore, slavery contradicts the second formulation of the categorical imperative, as it makes humans mere means to another’s end. As he writes: “So act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.” 72 In accordance with this principle, Kant must reject slavery, or risk selfcontradiction, because slavery does not treat human beings as endsin-themselves.

The claim that Kant’s ethical and political philosophy are not racially inflected is further supported by his comments on other non -white nations. Moreover, his judgements of these states are not predicated on his earlier racial theory, rather, Kant’s aim in these passages is to condemn European colonialism. Of Kant’s comments on European colonialism, Williams writes: “‘If one compares with this the inhospitable behaviour of civilized, especially commercial,

states of our part of the world, [the] injustice they show in visiting foreign lands and peoples (which with them is tantamount to conquering them) goes to horrifying lengths.” 73 To Kant, the treatment of foreign lands by Europeans is unacceptable. Moreover, Williams suggests that Kant thought that foreign lands ought to “be treated with respect” and that Europeans had “no justification for sweeping away their rights.” 74 This passage, as it should be clear, suggests that, regardless of his racial views, Kant was unwilling to deny states of people of other races their innate dignity. Doubling down on this, Kant thinks that European colonization only brings “‘the whole lita

ny of troubles that oppresses the human race.’” 75 With these remarks, Kant praises Asian states for setting limits on European access to their land, and sees resistance, by native peoples, to European incursion “as the path toward maintaining civilization.” 76 Once more, Kant’s work categorically opposes colonialism and implies that Europeans (in colonizing other lands) are the people acting uncivilized.

Taking everything we have encountered in mind, it appears that Kant, at least for the sake of consistency with his major philosophical works, has moved away from his (earlier) racist views. This, however, is not to claim that Immanuel Kant did not privately hold racist beliefs when writing his later works. To claim this, without explicitly conclusive evidence is impossible and irresponsible. Rather, Kant’s philosophy seems to have left his racial theory at the door in his critical period. To some authors, like Kleingeld, this stance suggests that Kant, by his later life, seems to respect human plurality more than ever, as Williams writes: “Their independence and difference have to be respected. Here Kant accepts without reservation the plurality of the human race.” 77 Kant, rebuking colonialism and slavery in his ethical and political philosophy, seems to look upon the peoples of the world in a new light to commentators like Kleingeld and Williams. However, I remain unconvinced that Immanuel Kant, the man, actually changed his racial views over the course of his life. I am not convinced precisely because we cannot

39 know for certain what Kant, beyond what he wrote, believed. Moreover, I am also unconvinced that racial theory at all plays a role in Kant’s ethics or political theory. Because we cannot know Kant’s private beliefs, I would argue that those of us working with Kant’s philosophy, or teaching it, ought to always keep in mind Kant’s racist views. Beyond this, I urge that those of us immersed in Kant should endeavour to separate the man from his system in order to repair the foul implications his racial theory has on Kantianism; this, I would say, is a duty we have to ourselves regarding the Kantian philosophical system.

1 Kleingeld, "Kant's Second Thoughts on Race", 583. 2 Kleingeld, 582. 3 Kleingeld, 582. 4 Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, xxxviii. 5 Kleingeld,"Kant's Second Thoughts on Race”, 580. 6 Williams, "Colonialism in Kant's Political Philosophy", 583. 7 Williams, 583. 8 Williams, 158.

9 Williams, 158. 10 Kleingeld, "Kant's Second Thoughts on Race”, 573. 11 Kleingeld, 576. 12 Kleingeld, 574. 13 Williams, “Colonialism in Kant’s Political Philosophy”, 167. 14 Williams, 172. 15 Klausen, "Jeremy Waldron's Partial Kant: Indigenous Proximity, Colonial Injustice, Cultural Particularism”, 40. 16 Klausen, 40. 17 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 90 [6:313].

18 Kant, 121 [6:352]. 19 Keum, "Kant II: Towards Perpetual Peace or, The Dutch Innkeeper's Joke”, 2. 20 Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, 23. 21 Kant, 24. 22 Korsgaard, “Introduction”, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, xxv. 23 Kautzer, “Kant, Perpetual Peace, and the Colonial Origins of Modern Subjectivity”, 61. 24 Kautzer, 61. 25 Kautzer, 62.

26 Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, 20. 27 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 14 [6:220]. 28 Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, 23. 29 Kant, 23-24. 30 Kant, 28. 31 Kant, 27. 32 Kant, 12. 33 Kant, 13-18. 34 Kant, 14. 35 Kant, 16. 36 Kant, 17. 37 Kant, 18. 38 Kant, 31. 39 Kant, 28. 40 Kant, 28-29. 41 Kant, 29. 42 Kant, 29-30. 43 Kant, 31. 44 Höffe, "Kant's Innate Right as a Rational Criterion for Human Rights”, 73. 45 Höffe, 75. 46 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 186 [6:434-5]. 47 Kant, 186 [6:434]. 48 Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, 14. 49 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 41 [4:429]. 50 Williams, “Colonialism in Kant’s Political Philosophy”, 156. 51 Williams, 156. 52 Williams, 156-157. 53 Williams, 157. 54 Williams, 157. 55 Williams, 157. 56 WIlliams, 167. 57 See Kautzer, “Kant, Perpetual Peace, and the Colonial Origins of Modern Subjectivity”, 64 and Williams, “Colonialism in Kant’s Political Philosophy”, 166. 58 Williams, “Colonialism in Kant’s Political Philosophy”, 166. 59 Williams, 167. 60 Glausser, "Three Approaches to Locke and the Slave Trade”, 208. 61 Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, 14. 62 Kautzer, “Kant, Perpetual Peace, and the Colonial Origins of Modern Subjectivity”, 61. 63 Williams, “Colonialism in Kant’s Political Philosophy”, 167-168. 64 Williams, 171-172.

65 Williams, 168. 66 Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, 29-30. 67 Kant, 28-29. 68 Williams, “Colonialism in Kant’s Political Philosophy”, 168. 69 Williams, 168. 70 Kleingeld, “Kant’s Second Thoughts on Race”, 588. 71 Kleingeld, 588. 72 Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, 41 [4:429]. 73 Williams, “Colonialism in Kant’s Political Philosophy”, 168. 74 Williams, 169. 75 Williams, 169. 76 Williams, 169. 77 Williams, 169.

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