the Le Tellier Catherine Charlton

Raising the Standard: An Examination of Louis XIV’s Army under the Le Tellier

Catherine Charlton

In April of 1643, one month and a day before the death of King Louis XIII, Cardinal Mazarin named Michel Le Tellier as France’s newest Secretary of State for War. 1 There could be no way of knowing that this marked the beginning of a fifty-eight-year familial control on the position that would last until the death of Le Tellier’s grandson in 1701. This paper will argue that the driving force and primary characteristic of the Le Tellier period was standardization. I will examine each Le Tellier’s headship of the Ministry for War, then concentrate on three domains which were increasingly regulated under their leadership: regimental organization, food distribution, and arms production and calibration.

The Le Tellier (an encompassing term for all three men) each held a variety of positions under Louis XIV, but it is their successive headship of the Ministry of War that best provides the thread which links the three. As such, it is worth devoting some time to explore the duties of a seventeenth-century Secretary of State for War, and the character of each Le Tellier holding this position. Each man brought unique strengths and shortcomings to the position, which influenced their impact on the army.

The Le Tellier and the Secretaryship

In the seventeenth century, France’s Ministry of War was a dominating and extensive power. It boasted the largest workforce of all the French ministries, and of this domain, the Secretary of State

53 for War was ruler. 2 During the reign of Louis XIV, the Secretary for War acquired increased authority and prestige. 3 The expanding nature of the position became most apparent after the King’s personal rule began in 1661. When Louis XIV assumed full control of his kingdom, he immediately made alterations to the structure of control; most influentially, dispensing with the position of Chief Minister of France. 4 This elimination gave the monarch direct control over the Secretary. Le Tellier benefitted immensely from this indirect promotion, and by the year’s end he had become the King’s most intimate advisor regarding domestic and military matters. 5

The scope of the position was incredible. Thierry Sarmant and Mathieu Stoll observe that “les ministres de Louis XIV moururent littéralement à leur table de travail: ainsi Colbert, ainsi Louvois, ainsi Barbezieux.” 6 The job was extraordinarily demanding and required a detailed knowledge of the intricacies of the military machine. Troops had to be raised so regiments could be completed and organized. These soldiers needed to be paid, fed, and lodged. 7 Intendants (high-ranking administrative officials) had to be appointed and supervised, and strategies developed. 8 This responsibility required men of incredible ability, with personalities that commanded respect and obedience. Such men were the Le Tellier.

Michel Le Tellier became the Secretary for War in 1643 and remained in the position until 1677. 9 His son, François-Michel Le Tellier, marquis de Louvois (hereafter referred to as Louvois) was closely mentored by Le Tellier, and assumed his father’s station by degrees. Louvois held the position jointly with his father from 1664 to 1677, after which he continued single-handedly until his death in 1691. 10 Louvois’ son, Louis-François-Marie Le Tellier, marquis de Barbezieux (hereafter Barbezieux), inherited the position, which he held until his death in 1701. 11

I would suggest that the Le Tellier emphasis on standardization and stability is fittingly exemplified by the family’s hold on power. Louis XIV was cognisant that the authority generated by a position could be strengthened by administrative and political conti-

nuity. 12 He produced this in the Ministry for War by keeping the Secretaryship in the hands of one family. This was also a concern of Le Tellier and Louvois, who both managed to secure survivances for their sons. 13 Continuity was maintained by mentorship from father to son, which ensured that each successor was well-trained and competent. 14

To better understand each Le Tellier’s impact on Louis XIV’s army, one must examine their characters. Michel Le Tellier was a prudent man, a loyal and diligent worker with a vast knowledge of his field. 15 Before becoming Secretary, he had trained as a lawyer,

and served as an intendant in the Army of Italy. 16 Le Tellier was an extremely competent administrator, and immediately began standardizing military practice upon his appointment to the position. 17 Le Tellier’s system of reform was methodical: when considering change to military procedure, he looked to historical precedent by searching for relevant ordinances. These he adopted as the starting point for his endeavours. Once he enacted legislations himself, he would make note of criticisms, and was not averse to making modifications if he deemed it beneficial. 18 He favoured compromise and believed in making concessions when appropriate. However, when it came to reform, it was the heavy-handed, bullish personality of his son which produced the most widespread and lasting results. 19

Sarmant and Stoll describe Louvois as having the “presence d’un caractère de fer, d’une âme de roc.” 20 Examining Louvois’ military correspondence shows his distinct style, which in turn illuminates his character. Above all, he was concise and efficient. He frequently used violent language, especially when his orders were undermined. He was often rude, and he effectively employed threats as weapons. 21 His authority was clear, and those under his command yielded entirely to him. 22 Unlike his father, Louvois was not inclined to conciliation or peace, having a proud and sometimes cruel nature. 23 This pride, and the excessive confidence in his own ability sometimes made him unwilling to admit mistakes to the King. 24 However, Louvois was attentive to the most minute of details and

55 had a vast knowledge of the administration. His temperament, which brooked no opposition, often allowed him to steamroll ahead with his plans. John Lynn best encapsulates this, writing, “Louvois dominated the army through sheer force of personality.” 25

Louvois’ son, the marquis de Barbezieux, did not have power equal to his father or grandfather. Unlike them, he had not received a position on the influential Conseil d’en haut. 26 Barbezieux had a good understanding of the position of Secretary, and a strong grasp of state affairs. However, like his father, he tended to be overconfident in his own judgement, and was somewhat prone in the later

years of his Secretaryship to seek pleasure at the expense of his work. 27 Indeed, considering the legacies of his predecessors, his tenyear hold of the position has been labelled by historians as mediocre, and he will not be a focus of this paper. 28 In 1701, Barbezieux died suddenly, thus ending the Le Tellier rule in the Ministry for War.

Regimental Order under the Le Tellier

When Le Tellier became Secretary in 1643, Louis XIV’s army was not well organized. Resources were not easily accessible, and standardization of arms, food supply, and regimental order was inadequate. 29 Additionally, the army was rapidly becoming the largest European military force to date, with a theoretical strength of 400,000 by Louvois’ death. 30 A complete reinvention of the army’s administrative procedures was required to accommodate its expanding numbers. 31 The Le Tellier needed to transform the disorganised parts of the French Army by standardizing them into a coherent and well-ordered whole.

During the Thirty Years War, the French army functioned as a set of rather disorganized groups. 32 From the 1620s to the 1650s, army regiments were ever-fluctuating, and tended to last only one campaign. 33 Le Tellier and Louvois, under Louis XIV, sought to remedy this by creating a systematized and more permanently main-

tainable regimental system. 34

By 1651, it was evident to Le Tellier that modifications to infantry and cavalry regiment sizes were necessary. The average company within an infantry regiment had between seventy-five and one hundred men. 35 Gradually, Le Tellier lowered company size to a more manageable thirty-five to fifty men, a number which finally settled at an average of fifty men per company by the 1670s. 36 This total was deemed the best suited to wartime. Le Tellier and Louvois also took the cavalry companies in hand, and during the Dutch War company sizes were lowered from one hundred to a more practical

forty. By Louvois’ death, forty men per cavalry company had become standard. 37

In addition to standardizing the size of infantry and cavalry companies, in 1654 Le Tellier established a regulated hierarchy of control. 38 He appointed officers and placed the colonel firmly at the head of the regiment. For royal regiments, this responsibility went to the lieutenant-colonel. 39 Additionally, a clear outline of numbers in individual companies was developed, and by Louvois’ death, the exact numbers of officers and sergeants per company were standardized. Moreover, a 1679 ordinance divided the infantry into field and garrison battalions. 40 Each of these had specific numbers of troops, according to rank. Louvois then standardized the number of field battalions for the entire infantry. 41 Thus, the Secretary and King always knew the exact numbers of men involved in military operations, which helped improve military precision.

When Barbezieux assumed the role of Secretary, a maintainable regimental system was in place. 42 Louis XIV’s infantry boasted one hundred and sixty-one organized regiments, ninety-two of which were French. 43 By 1691 the infantry could put eighty-seven field battalions on the line, and Louvois was overseeing 331,732 infantrymen. 44 The infantry was categorized into three groups: the French Infantry of the King’s House, the Artillery Regiments, and the Infantry Regiments. Within these, there were one hundred and three free companies, twenty-three local militia battalions, and fif-

57 teen small militia. 45 These had standardized numbers of ranked positions, which enabled Barbezieux to inherit a meticulously organized army.

Food Distribution under the Le Tellier

An expanding army necessitated increased food production, and when Le Tellier assumed the position of Secretary it was clear to him that an ordered food supply system was vital. Accordingly, Le Tellier ordered food storage magazines to be built, rejuvenating

an existing storage and supply system. 46 In 1643, he appointed six men to act as Commissary Generals for Food. 47 Their role was to inspect the existing food supply, as well as to organize wagons which would distribute provisions to the army on campaign. 48 Here, Le Tellier drew on his experience with food supply as an intendant, and took pains to ensure that food was properly packaged to prevent spoilage. 49 There were, however, financial barriers to further expanding his distribution plan, and it would be his son who was able to further develop and standardize the food distribution system.

Louvois took the existing system of food supply (including that which preceded Le Tellier) and harnessed it into a more efficient, standardized entity, capable of supporting a massive and hungry army. Much of his plan came from his father’s own drafts, and with this guidance Louvois succeeded in creating a greater number of food storage magazines, and ones of a more permanent nature than those of Le Tellier. 50 Food (specifically grain) needed to be collected and stocked in the magazines, a responsibility Louvois gave to army intendants and commissaires des vivres. 51 By 1672, in only seven of his magazines, Louvois was able to store grain to last 200,000 men six months. 52 Louvois and Le Tellier’s efforts served to create a standardized system of food storage and distribution, thereby further regulating the upkeep of Louis XIV’s troops.

Arms Calibration and Production under the Le Tellier

A large, well-ordered, and well-fed army was ineffective if inadequately armed. Le Tellier and Louvois understood this only too well. Louvois was especially cognisant of the situation; in a letter from 1664, he writes: “Il ne suffit pas d’avoir beaucoup d’hommes. Il faut qu’ils soient bien faits, bien vêtus et bien armés.” 53 To get an optimized performance from Louis XIV’s army, Louvois needed to equip its troops with standardized and effective arms.

When Le Tellier became Secretary, the system for arming troops with handheld weapons lacked coherence. Normally, the King sent money to captains, who in turn were personally responsible for arming their troops. These captains often turned to privatized weapon suppliers to accomplish this. 54 During wartime, arms were frequently bought from cities outside France. 55 This caused problems with the speed of delivery, and necessitated greater expenditures, as well as increasing the possibility of having arms seized by the enemy.

Le Tellier began the process of arms regulation in 1643, a process which would later be more fully developed by his son. He ordered officers who had not used the King’s money to arm troops to return it immediately, threatening disciplinary action to noncompliers. 56 Additionally, during the Fronde, he required certain weapons merchants to receive authoritative permission to sell their wares. 57 However, these regulations were mere drops of water in the ocean that was arming the French army.

To outfit a swiftly growing army, Louvois had to increase weapon production. This he accomplished by centralizing and regulating the production system. When Louis XIV began his personal reign, he was eager to reform the weapon manufacturing system. He needed production to be centralized, and to accomplish this, he had to remove himself from subordination to foreign and privatized arms sellers. 58 Louis wanted complete control. Le Tellier and Louvois addressed this in 1665 by establishing a centralized system for

59 arms distribution. 59 Le Tellier placed a man named Maximilien Titon in charge of the operation, under the watchful command of Louvois. 60

Under the new system, weapons were manufactured, tested, then sent to a centralized store in Paris. There, the arms were tested a second time, and distributed to regiments under Louvois’ direction. 61 Over time, more of these Royal Arm Stores were created, which increased the speed at which arms could be distributed. Louvois ensured that these were logically distributed geographically, usually placing them close to theatres of war so that heavy materials

could be transported with less risk of damage. 62 In 1668, Louvois gave Titon a monopoly on the production of arms, and introduced an ordinance abolishing privatized arms dealers. 63 These measures proved to be extremely effective at centralizing and standardizing weapon distribution.

Having curtailed the unauthorized distribution of weapons, Louvois turned to arms production. Beginning in 1668, Louvois oversaw the building of factories for weapon production; the first one established in Nouzon. 64 By 1688, Louvois’ factories had an annual production of fusils and muskets of approximately 60,000. 65 In 1690, Nouzon’s factory alone had produced 15,879 portable arms in thirteen months. 66 By standardizing and centralizing weapon production and distribution, Louvois had freed France and Louis XIV’s army from privatized and foreign suppliers, thus rendering it feasible to adequately arm their giant of an army.

While focused on weapon production, Louvois was also eager to ensure that the weapons produced adhered to a standard criterion. When Louis XIV reached his majority in 1661, there was no proper system of calibre standardization for muskets. 67 Calibres of muskets were disparate, which caused a general poor performance. 68 In 1666, Louvois introduced a significant ordinance addressing this issue. The ordinance acknowledged that the army’s muskets had a wide variety of calibres, before proceeding to ban the sale of muskets with barrels for ball sizes smaller than twenty to a pound. 69

By 1668, Louvois had created a standard for the length measurements of all artillery, and he sent copies of this standard to the weapon production factories. 70 In 1680, he extended the process by assigning a fixed equivalency between weights and diameters of ball calibres. 71 Following this, he produced a standardized series of calibres, comprising calibres four, eight, twelve, sixteen, and twentyfour. 72 This scale furthered the standardization process by regulating the types of calibres which would be accepted in the army.

Standardized Systems of Enforcement under the Le Tellier

Having highlighted three domains of reform under Le Tellier and Louvois, it is worthwhile to briefly examine how both men standardized the enforcement of these and other military standards. To enforce army procedure, Le Tellier began to regulate disciplinary procedure, while Louvois followed suit by developing a comprehensive inspection system.

Before Le Tellier, disciplinary measures in the French army were extremely individualized. It was officers themselves who determined punishments for soldiers under their command. 73 The unsystematic nature of this was distasteful to Le Tellier, who favoured removing this authority from individuals, and placing it more comprehensively under the state. Le Tellier envisioned infractions being judged within the setting of a formal trial, done by a military court and adhering to a regulation code. 74 So, Le Tellier set about improving the somewhat disorganized conseil de guerre.

The conseil de guerre had attended to military discipline before Le Tellier, but in such an irregular manner that disciplinary decisions still often were left to individual opinion. 75 Le Tellier began to reform the system, with a primary focus on membership and procedure. In 1646, he produced an ordinance requiring the conseil to meet every two weeks to deal with discipline. 76 The judges were to be garrison officers, and a minimum requirement of seven officers was established. Officers were commanded to follow specific regu-

61 lations set forth by the ordinance. 77 By transferring disciplinary enforcement from private individuals to the Ministry for War, Le Tellier was able to take an unregulated entity and transform it into a normalized and consistent body.

Louvois’ character did not allow him to leave his reform efforts unmonitored. A man with incredible attention to detail, Louvois was wholly involved in overseeing the army. However, despite this careful involvement, it was clear that Louis XIV’s expanding army needed a more cultivated and extensive system of scrutiny. In 1668, Louvois began creating a standardized system to monitor and

inspect the French army, with the goal of producing an all-seeing, all -knowing supervisory system. 78

In October of that year, Louvois initiated his plans for a comprehensive system of inspection by commissioning a lieutenantcolonel from the King’s Regiment to travel around France and inspect the kingdom’s fortresses. 79 The inspector would examine the infantry stationed at each fortress and report back to Louvois. Central to his task would be the winnowing out of old or infirm officers, to ensure that the King’s army was in prime physical condition. By 1688, the lieutenant-colonel was responsible for certifying that infantry personnel knew the correct methods of handling weapons, as by this time there had been a shift from muskets to the betterhandling fusils. In addition, he needed to ensure that the weapons being used were in proper condition. 80

In 1675, Louvois created the position of Inspector-General for Cavalry, further ensuring that troop regiments were being reviewed and accounted for. 81 While not as thorough as the infantry’s inspection system, the increased scope of inspection ensured that Louvois always knew the condition of France’s forces. Louvois’ inspection system was further improved under Barbezieux, and these reforms would last for the remainder of the ancien regime. 82 Thus, Louvois’ inspection system gave the Secretary for War greater knowledge of the state of the army, while ensuring that new standards of organization and weaponry were being enforced.

Conclusion

Louis XIV’s army underwent significant reform during the Le Tellier period. I have highlighted three areas of military administration in which Le Tellier and Louvois used their position as Secretary of State for War to significantly restructure army procedures, helping to make Louis XIV’s army an increasingly standardized entity. The Le Tellier period produced more regulated regimental order, food production, and system of arms outfitting. Changes were enforced by an improved system of military supervision, including disciplinary procedures and standardized inspection. The transformation of military administration under the Le Tellier shaped the French military system into a more cohesive, better regulated entity, thus making France’s defense system more efficient and operational. Though these reforms comprise only a few of Le Tellier and Louvois’ initiatives for the French Army, the comprehensive efforts of these men would imprint the Le Tellier stamp onto French military history, leaving a legacy which endures to this day.

1 Cénat (J-P) Le Roi Stratège: Louis XIV et la direction de la guerre, 1661-1715 (Rennes, France: 2010), p. 43. 2 Rowlands (G) The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661-1701 (Cambridge & New York: 2002), p. 27. 3 Rowlands, The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV, p. 32. 4 Ibid., p. 33. 5 Ibid., p. 35. 6 Sarmant (T) & Stoll (M) “Le style de Louvois: Formulaire administratif et expression personnelle dans la correspondance du Secrétaire d'État de la Guerre de Louis XIV,” Annuaire-bulletin de la société de l'histoire de France, 1997, pp. 57–77. “The ministers of Louis XIV died literally at their worktable: so Colbert, so Louvois, so Barbezieux.” 7 Cénat, Le Roi Stratège, p. 41. 8 Rowlands, The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV, p. 36. 9 Ibid., p. 27. 10 Rowlands, The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV, p. 27. 11 Ibid., p. 28.

12 Ibid., p. 37. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid., p. 38. 15 Bérenger (J) “Louvois Ministre d’État (1672-1691),” Histoire, Économie et Société, 15, 1996, pp. 37–46. 16 Rowlands, The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV, p. 33. 17 Lynn (JA) Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army, 1610-1715 (Cambridge & New York: 1997), p. 68. 18 André (L) Michel Le Tellier et Louvois (Genève: 1974), p. 312. 19 Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, p. 83. 20 Sarmant & Stoll, “Le style de Louvois.” “[The] presence of a character of iron, of a soul of rock.” 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Ekberg (C) “From Dutch to European War: Louis XIV and Louvois Are Tested,” French Historical Studies, 8, 1974, pp. 393-408. 24 Ekberg, “From Dutch to European War”. 25 Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, p. 82. 26 Rowlands, The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV, p. 63. 27 Ibid. 28 Bérenger, “Louvois Ministre d’État.” 29 Rowlands, The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV, p. 33. 30 Ibid., p. 1. 31 Ibid., p. 162. 32 André, Michel Le Tellier et Louvois, p. 427. 33 Rowlands, The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV, p. 199. 34 Carles (P) “L'Infanterie du Roi de France à la mort de Louvois,” Économie et Société, 15, 1996, pp. 57–73. 35 Rowlands, The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV, p. 173. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid., p. 175. Histoire,

38 Carles, “L'Infanterie du Roi de France à la mort de Louvois.” 39 Ibid. 40 Carles, “L'Infanterie du Roi de France à la mort de Louvois.” 41 Ibid. 42 Rowlands, The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV, p. 166. 43 Carles, “L'Infanterie du Roi de France à la mort de Louvois.” 45 Ibid. 46 Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, p. 111. 47 André, Michel Le Tellier et Louvois, p. 372. 48 André, Michel Le Tellier et Louvois, p. 372.

49 Ibid. 50 Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, p. 125. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 Quoted in Bonnefoy (F) “Louvois et la politique d’armement des troupes,” Histoire, Économie et Société, 15, 1996, pp. 95–103. “It is not enough to have a lot of men. They need to be well made, well dressed and well armed.” 54 Bonnefoy, “Louvois et la politique d’armement des troupes.” 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Bonnefoy, “Louvois et la politique d’armement des troupes.” 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Decker (M) “Louvois, l’artillerie et les sièges,” Histoire, Économie et Société, 15, 1996, pp. 75–94. 63 Bonnefoy, “Louvois et la politique d’armement des troupes.” 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Decker, “Louvois, l’artillerie et les sièges.” 68 Ibid. 69 André, Michel Le Tellier et Louvois, p. 356. 70 Decker, “Louvois, l’artillerie et les sièges.” 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle, p. 403. 74 Ibid., p. 404. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid., p. 403. 78 Rowlands, The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV, p. 192. 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid., p. 193. 82 Ibid., p. 195.

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