Implementing the Central Asia regional risk assessment: A framework for action

Implementing the Central Asia Regional Risk Assessment: A Framework for Action

International Coordination Meeting Almaty, Kazakhstan 20-21 July 2009

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LIST OF ABREVIATIONS

ADB – Asian Development Bank BCPR – Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP) CACDRMI – Central Asia and Caucasus Disaster Risk Management Institute CAREC – Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation CARRA – Central Asia Regional Risk Assessment CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States CoES – Committee of Emergency Situations CPD – Country Programme Document DFID – Department for International Development EC – European Commission EurAsEc – European Economic Community GEF – Global Environment Facility FAO – Food and Agriculture Organization GRIP – Global Risk Identification Programme GTZ – Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Cooperation) IFAD – International Fund for Agricultural Development ILO – International Labour Organization IMF – International Monetary Fund IOM – International Organization for Migration ISDR – International Strategy for Disaster Management JCSS – Joint Country Support Strategy KfW – Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (German Development Bank) OCHA – Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development PEI – Poverty and Environmental Initiative PRS – Poverty Reduction Strategy RCWG – Regional Coordination Working Group REACT – Rapid Emergency Assessment and Coordination Team SDC – Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation TIKA – Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency UNCT – United Nations Country Team UNDAF – United Nations Development Assistance Framework UNDP – National Nations Development Programme UNECE – United Nations Economic Commission for Europe UNEP – United Nations Environment Programme UNFPA – United Nations Population Fund UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund UNIFEM – United Nations Development Fund for Women UNRCCA – United Nations Regional Central for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia USAID – United States Agency for International Development WB – World Bank WFP – World Food Programme WHO – World Health Organization WMO – World Meteorological Organization

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary......................................................................................................................... 1 I.

Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 5

II. What Changed in 2009? What Have We Learned?.................................................................... 8 III. Crisis Prevention: Early Warning and Risk Monitoring ........................................................... 10 IV. Early Recovery Programming ................................................................................................. 13 V. Identifying Remaining Gaps ................................................................................................... 16 VI. Recommendations for Action .................................................................................................. 18 Annex 1: Proposed Short- and Medium-term Early Recovery Interventions ................................... 23

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Background This document is intended as a framework for implementing the January 2009 Central Asia Regional Risk Assessment (CARRA), which focused on the humanitarian and development implications of the inter-linked threats to water, energy and food security in the region, particularly in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. It also reviews developments in Central Asia over the past year in terms of these threats, and the response to the threats by the UN Country Teams (UNCTs) in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

The report is not meant to provide a comprehensive update of all regional risks in Central Asia, and the responses undertaken to address them. Nor is it meant to be a comprehensive action plan to address all these risks. Rather, the objective is to provide a framework for future action to guide UNCTs’ support to these countries, and to facilitate cooperation among UN agencies and other development partners. The report is, therefore, intended to serve as a concept note for the Almaty International Coordination Meeting scheduled for 20-21 July 2009, both in terms of “reporting back” a year after the Almaty meeting of July 2008, and in guiding the design and implementation of UN’s programmes in Central Asia. Beyond that, the objective of the document is to serve as a platform for enhanced coordination among development partners. As the report notes, much is being done by IFIs and other international partners in the critical water-energy-food nexus, which is critical both for humanitarian and longer term sustainability of Central Asia. However, there are gaps in the international coordination which need to be filled for better support to the countries of the region. In this sense, this report—and the forthcoming Almaty Meeting—is an invitation to development partners to aim for greater coordination in the delivery of our services to the Central Asian countries.

The document provides some details on the work of UN agencies and other partners in the specific area of early warning and risk management. This is meant to be an example of the type of coordination that can be put in place in other areas to lay the foundations for longer-term change in selected sectors related to water, energy and food security. There is also room for further collaboration in areas such as agriculture/rural development/food security, as well as protecting the vulnerable populations as utility tariffs are necessarily adjusted in response to fiscal pressures. The guidance of the international partners in such areas will be very fruitful.

Progress Report and Lessons Learned A relatively warm, wet winter, declining global food and energy prices, and stepped up responses from the international community and governments did not bring fundamental changes for the better in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan during the first half of 2009. Despite some favourable developments, serious electricity shortages continued in Tajikistan and—due to the effects of drought and legacies of mismanagement—spread to Kyrgyzstan. Hundreds of schools in Kyrgyzstan that heat with electricity closed during the winter of 2008-2009. Food and energy prices in these countries have continued to rise, even as world market prices for these products came down significantly. The impact of the global financial crisis has begun to make itself felt, particularly via reduced remittances, lower prices for key exports, and slowing growth in GDP and household incomes.

2 These developments strongly suggest that the slow-onset water, energy, and food insecurities that emerged in Tajikistan in the winter of 2007-2008 have taken root, have spread to Kyrgyzstan, and are now being exacerbated by the effects of the global economic crisis. While no significant increases in intra- and inter-state tensions are apparent, the possible socio-political consequences of these developments should not be ignored. This underscores the importance of effective responses to these insecurities, by both governments and the international community.

Neither the government nor the international community in Tajikistan was fully prepared for the “compound crisis” that took hold in the winter of 2007-2008. To some extent, this lack of preparation can be explained by the unusual, slow-onset nature of the crisis, reflecting the unexpected interactions of severe winter weather, drought, high global food and energy prices, and governance failures in the energy and water sectors. Moreover, the intervening 18 months have witnessed better use by the government and the international community of the coordination institutions and instruments at their disposal to respond to these challenges. Nonetheless, there is little doubt that in many respects inadequate preparation reflected inadequate coordination: among government/national stakeholders; within the United Nations system; within broader international community; and between the international community and the government. Details are provided in the document.

Recommendations for Action The forthcoming meeting in Almaty is a good opportunity to take stock of the lessons learned and to agree on the framework for improved coordination.

In the area of early warning/risk monitoring, it is recommended to: •

review the unresolved challenges facing early warning/risk monitoring efforts in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan;

•

designate regional experts/resource people (or working groups of such) to support thematic areas (e.g., precipitation/water levels, food price trends, energy, health, remittances, etc.), with representation from such institutions as OCHA, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, UNDP, UNECE the World Bank, IMF, and Asian Development Bank;

•

propose concrete steps to develop the regional component(s) of early warning/risk monitoring reports, taking appropriate advantage of the Global Risk Identification Programme (GRIP), OCHA’s and ISDR’s expertise and programming, and the resources at the disposal of other relevant institutions;

•

promote closer cooperation between GRIP, the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), and the World Bank in support of capacity development for national hydromet services.

•

move from monitoring risk data to creating a broader programmatic framework for assessing risk impact and mitigation, as circumstances permit.

In terms of early recovery and longer-term development issues, there is clearly a need to strengthen the link between early recovery and activities that would ensure greater sustainability in the food/water/energy nexus that help prevent natural disasters and protect the environment. Annex 1 to this document describes the ongoing and new early recovery and selected longer-term activities

3 that the UN agencies can design and implement, with support from the international partners. Some illustrative examples include: •

better monitoring of food security trends, especially in vulnerable communities; strengthening well-targeted food subsidies, and supporting agricultural, horticultural and livestock activities;

•

providing financing for maintaining and improving health care and education services and building infrastructure in vulnerable communities;

•

increasing financial support for energy efficient projects, public awareness campaigns to reduce energy and water use; and designing pro-poor tariff policies; and

•

designing, implementing and supporting projects to improve irrigation, water harvesting, and more generally aiming for better and more integrated water resource management.

Once again, the Almaty Meeting will serve as a useful opportunity for international partners to reach better understanding and agreement on these issues, and to join in supporting and/or expanding these sectoral and cross-cutting activities.

In terms of supporting analytical work and research for improved, evidence-based policymaking: •

funding should be provided for research that would more clearly illustrate linkages between income poverty and water, energy, and food insecurities (e.g., by providing updated, accurate data on the numbers of households that do not have access to reliable year-round water and electricity supplies);

•

The governments of both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have promised significant increases in household energy and water tariffs. Further analytical work needs to be undertaken to agree on the magnitude of energy and water tariffs needed, and equally importantly how to protect the vulnerable groups in the process.

•

Differing views on the commercial viability of small/micro/mini hydro power are closely linked to these questions. In early 2009, President Rakhmon called for the construction of 50 new small hydropower generating stations by the end of the year (in addition to the 100 or so already in operation) in Tajikistan; Kyrgyzstan’s National Energy Programme and the Development Strategy for the Fuel and Energy Complex Development likewise call for the construction of some 100 small hydro power plants. However, many small hydro projects are not commercially viable at the current electricity tariffs in these two countries; and the legal and regulatory frameworks are not in place for subsidisation of renewable energy sources via feed-in tariffs (or green certificates). Further research in this area would be very fruitful.

With regard to coordination, this could be improved at two levels:

•

Within the UN system, greater effort needs to be made to “deliver as one” in the early warning/risk monitoring and other areas. Additionally, the UN country teams should strive to make the UN Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs) less bureaucratic and further simplified in these countries coping with the slow-onset water, energy and food security crisis.

4 •

Within the broader international community, while progress has been made, there is room for further improvement between the UN system and the rest of the international partners on the basis of pre-agreed national divisions of labour to ensure better preparedness in the event of a full-blown humanitarian emergency. Likewise, cooperation within the Joint Country Support Strategy (JCSS) needs to be made more uniformly effective across the region.

Efforts should also be made to reach out to non-OECD/DAC donors, both by the UN system and other leading development partners. The international community should also work jointly to (i) restore the ministerial status of the Committee of Emergency Situations (CoES) in Tajikistan; (ii) strengthen sub-national coordinating bodies such as the oblast-level Rapid Emergency Assessment and Coordination Team (REACT) groups in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to ensure that early warning and early recovery activities reflect local demands, and that institutional capacity is developed at the local level. Finally, the international community should support the Regional Centre for Disaster Response and Risk Reduction in Almaty. Over time, this Centre could play a growing role in regional early warning/risk monitoring activities.

To provide the institutional back-bone for better coordination, this document proposes the establishment of a Regional Coordination Working Group (RCWG) to support the activities described in the report. The RCWG could consist of focal points from the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy (UNRCC) in Ashgabat, the Almaty regional offices of OCHA, World Bank, ADB, USAID, UNDP, ISDR and other relevant partners. The RCWG would serve as a networked/virtual information-analytical centre for the Central Asian countries, collecting, analyzing and disseminating early warning and other important information to various stakeholders in Central Asia and beyond.

As part of its own contribution to improve coordination and ensure greater complementarity in the work of international agencies, the UNDP is launching its Almaty sub-regional office to support better coordination, being guided by the programmes of other development partners.

UNDP’s Almaty Office would also work closely with the CAREC Unit of ADB and other international partners to provide administrative support services.

To conclude, more effective coordination among international development partners will promote our common objective of developing national capacity and strengthening intergovernmental cooperation. It will also ensure better support to specific activities of the international community in these countries, both at the national and regional levels.

5 I. Introduction The past 18 months have seen a variety of reports assessing various risks associated with water, energy, food, macroeconomic, and socio-political insecurities in Central Asia. 1 The Central Asia Regional Risk Assessment (CARRA), which was undertaken by UNDP at the behest and with the support of international organisations working in Central Asia during the second half of 2008, was one of these. The CARRA, work on which was initiated following decisions taken at the July 2008 meeting of the international community in Almaty and which was released in January 2009,2 sought to examine the: Ø nature of the “slow-onset” humanitarian crisis associated with the combination of severe cold, drought, and antiquated water and energy infrastructures that deprived millions of people in Tajikistan of access to reliable heat and electricity supplies during the past two winters. These shortages particularly affected urban households, for whom energy security had not been an issue since the end of Tajikistan’s civil war 10 years ago, and who (unlike rural residents) had not developed coping mechanisms in response to these insecurities; Ø spread of these water/energy insecurities during the winter of 2008-2009 to Kyrgyzstan, where large-scale shortfalls of heat and electricity also took hold, and where an emergency UN appeal was introduced to forestall a possible humanitarian crisis; Ø interactions of these water/energy tensions (which are themselves reflections of deeper development challenges in Central Asia) with the impact of the dramatic increases in global food prices during 2007-2008 (which heightened food security risks in Central Asia, and particularly in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and which benefitted from stepped-up food assistance activities delivered under the on-going humanitarian appeals), as well as with the initial impact of the global economic crisis (particularly in terms of much slower economic growth and sharply lower remittance inflows); and Ø difficulties facing governments and the international community in fashioning an appropriate response to these challenges. These difficulties were particularly pronounced in Tajikistan, where a decade of annual appeals for humanitarian assistance proved unable to resolve what are at bottom structural challenges, and where the “compound crisis” of 20072008 underscored the inadequacy of early warning, risk monitoring, and other disaster prevention mechanisms. These difficulties also reflect broader issues concerning the international community’s sometimes bifurcated “development versus humanitarian” programming mechanisms that can work against the appropriate integration of short-term emergency responses with longer-term development initiatives.

1

These include, for example, Central Asia: Key Issues to 2012, Oxford Analytica, 20 December 2007; Rahaman and Varis, eds., Central Asian Water: Social, Economics, Environmental and Governance Puzzle, Helsinki University of Technology, November, 2008; IFAS Executive Committee, Action Report for the Period of 2002-2008, Dushanbe; Regional Market Survey for the Central Asian Region, World Food Programme, June – August 2008; Barlow and Tippett, “Variability and Predictability of Central Asia River Flows: Antecedent Winter Precipitation and Large-Scale Teleconnections”, Journal of Hydrometeorology, December 2008; and Fumagalli, “The Food-Energy-Water Nexus in Central Asia: Regional Implications of and Responses to the Crises in Tajikistan”, EU-Central Asia Monitoring, October 2008.

2 See http://europeandcis.undp.org/home/show/60B55B69-F203-1EE9-B99CA6F9ED93A5B8.

6 In terms of policy reform, the CARRA emphasised the: Ø rapid expansion of small-scale renewable energy projects (e.g., mini-hydro, biofuels), as an immediate response to growing household energy insecurity; Ø accelerated introduction of energy efficiency and water saving technologies 3 and public information campaigns designed to reduce unnecessary energy and water use; and Ø adoption of more robust water, agricultural, and energy sector reforms, in order to better meter and measure actual energy consumption, reduce grid losses, improve cash flow, attract more investment into these sectors, increase food security, and strengthen social protection schemes for low-income households vulnerable to water and energy tariff hikes.

The CARRA also sought to provide an initial framework of action, to help governments and the international community to better respond to these risks in Central Asia. Particular emphasis was placed on: Ø improving coordination within the UN system and the international community, to strengthen government capacity to better respond to water, energy, and food insecurities; Ø strengthening institutional and programmatic linkages between disaster prevention (including via more effective early warning/risk monitoring systems), humanitarian response, early recovery, and longer term development activities, within and between governments and the international community; Ø improving the quality and quantity of official socio-economic (and hydrological) data, so that key development trends may be appropriately monitored and assessed, and the appropriate risk mitigation and early recovery responses designed and implemented;4 Ø further strengthening the UN’s emergency response mechanisms in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, particularly in terms of: (i) increasing the UN country teams’ staffing and expertise in emergency response; (ii) promoting the more flexible application of global humanitarian response processes that are designed for acute emergencies to the slow-onset water/energy/food crisis conditions facing Central Asia; and (iii) finding better ways of coordinating emergency response activities with the World Bank (which provided extremely important assistance to the governments of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan during the past two winters); Ø ensuring that such strategic frameworks for coordinated action as poverty reduction and country/national development strategies, joint country support strategies, and UN Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs) focus holistically on water, energy, and food insecurities and their underlying development drivers, inter alia by strengthening linkages between the disaster prevention, humanitarian response, early recovery, and development dimensions of these insecurities;

3

For example, EURO-standard circulator pumps (the introduction of which is supported in Central Asia by the World Bank, as well as by governments) use up to 80% less energy than traditional pumps, and can reduce an average household’s energy bill by 10% (see http://net.grundfos.com/doc/webnet/poweredby/gb/energy_facts.html).

4 Such improvements could also lay the basis for better reporting by UN agencies to donors concerning project outcomes, as well as more extensive codification and dissemination of lessons learned.

7 Ø promoting the more rapid expansion of early recovery programming (by governments and the international community), to bridge gaps between emergency-humanitarian response and development programming and to strengthen vulnerable households’ resilience to water/energy/food insecurities; and Ø strengthening national early warning/risk monitoring activities (by governments and the international community), and developing appropriate regional linkages between these activities.

The CARRA emphasised the breadth and supra-national dimensions of Central Asia’s water/energy/food insecurities, and called for regional solutions to these problems, where these are appropriate.

However, the CARRA did not attempt to assess all the short- and longer-term risks to sustainable development prospects facing the entirety of Central Asia; the focus was on water, energy, and food insecurities in the Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. This focus precluded thoroughly addressing such issues as national disaster risk management strategies, cross-border water resource management, mitigating and adapting to climate change, management of hazardous wastes/hot spots (e.g., uranium tailings), or the desirability of constructing large dams in the upper reaches of the Aral Sea Basin. Nor did the CARRA seek to provide a comprehensive inventory of all the responses undertaken by government agencies and the international community to address Central Asia’s water/energy/food insecurities.

This document is intended as a framework for implementing the CARRA, which focused on the humanitarian and development implications of the inter-linked threats to water, energy and food security in the region, particularly in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. It also reviews developments in Central Asia over the past year in terms of these threats, and the response to the threats by the UN Country Teams (UNCTs) in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

The report is not meant to provide a comprehensive update of all regional risks in Central Asia, and the responses undertaken to address them. Nor is it meant to be a comprehensive action plan to address all these risks. Rather, the objective is to provide a framework for future action to guide the international community’s support to these countries. The report is, therefore, intended to serve as a concept note for the Almaty International Coordination Meeting scheduled for 20-21 July 2009, both in terms of “reporting back” a year after the Almaty meeting of July 2008, and in guiding the design and implementation of UNDP’s programmes in Central Asia. Beyond that, the objective of the document is to serve as a platform for enhanced coordination among development partners. As the report notes, much is being done by IFIs and other international partners in the critical water-energy-food nexus, which is critical both for humanitarian and longer term sustainability of Central Asia. However, there are gaps in the international coordination which need to be filled for better support to the countries of the region. In this sense, this report—and the forthcoming Almaty Meeting—is an invitation to development partners to aim for greater coordination in the delivery of our services to the Central Asian countries.

The document provides some details on UNDP’s work with other UN agencies and other partners in the specific area of early warning and risk management. This is meant to be an example of the type of coordination that can be put in place in other areas to lay the foundations for longerterm change in selected sectors related to water, energy and food security. There is also room for further collaboration in areas such as agriculture/rural development/food security, as well as protecting the vulnerable populations as utility tariffs are necessarily adjusted in response to fiscal pressures. The guidance of the international partners in such areas will be very fruitful.

8 II. What Changed in 2009? What Have We Learned?

Since the CARRA’s publication in January 2009, the following developments—in the context of Central Asia’s water, energy, and food insecurities—seem particularly important.

A relatively warm, wet winter, declining global food prices, and stepped up responses from the international community and governments did not bring about fundamental change for the better in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Despite some favourable developments, serious electricity shortages continued in Tajikistan, and spread to Kyrgyzstan during the winter of 2008-2009.

Continuing high grid losses, an episode of acute regional non-cooperation between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in February 2009 (which stopped the cross-transmission of Turkmenistan electricity to Tajikistan), and rising prices for natural gas imports from Uzbekistan overwhelmed the impact of relatively favourable meteorological and hydrological trends. Hundreds of schools in Kyrgyzstan that heat with electricity closed during the winter of 2008-2009, transmitting energy insecurity into reductions in access to education for hundreds of thousands of children.

Fortunately, some of the conditions that led to the “compound crisis” in Tajikistan in the winter of 2007-2008 dissipated during the first half of 2009. This past winter in much of Central Asia was warmer and wetter than the previous year’s, and the collapse in global food and energy prices in the second half of 2008 removed significant potential inflationary pressures from these economies. According to national data provided by the Interstate Committee for Water Coordination’s Scientific Information Centre, above-average spring precipitation in much of Central Asia has significantly improved water balances in the region. In May, water volumes in Tajikistan’s Nurek reservoir and hydropower station were some 2% above their historical averages for that month.5 An even more pronounced improvement was apparent in Northern Tajikistan’s Kayrakkum reservoir: May water volumes there were some 8% above historical averages.6 Similar improvements were noted at a number of other reservoirs, including Chardara (in Kazakhstan) and Charvak (in Uzbekistan). These developments suggest that the intensity of the water shortages plaguing much of the region for the past 12-18 months has abated.

With the support of the World Bank, UN system (which sponsored emergency appeals in both countries) and bilateral donors, governments have brought new electricity generating capacity on line and sought to increase social assistance to the most vulnerable. The growing recognition of the potential importance of alternative energy sources was apparent in President Rakhmon’s January 2009 call for significant increases in small/mini/micro-hydro generation capacity, to be put in place in Tajikistan by the end of the year. Kyrgyzstan’s National Energy Programme (through 2010) and the Development Strategy for the Fuel and Energy Complex (through 2025) likewise call for the rapid expansion of renewables, inter alia by constructing some 100 additional small hydro power plants. New IMF programmes were concluded with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, providing additional macroeconomic support.7 On the other hand, significant improvements in water volumes through May had not been recorded in Kyrgyzstan’s Toktogul reservoir—which, along with Nurek, plays a critically important 5

Water volumes at Nurek during March were perilously close to hitting “dead levels”, below which electricity cannot be generated and significant damage to the station’s hydropower equipment may result.

6 That is, water volumes in May 2009 at Nurek and Kayrakkum exceeded average levels for this month during the 19912008 period by 2% and 8%, respectively—as well as running significantly above May 2008’s depressed levels (due to drought conditions).

7 A $100 million programme under the IMF’s Exogenous Shock Facility was approved for Kyrgyzstan in December 2008; a $116 million Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility was approved for Tajikistan in April 2009.

9 role in providing “summer” water for irrigated agriculture in downstream countries, as well as for “winter” electricity and thermal energy production in Kyrgyzstan. Water volumes in May at Toktogul were some 42% below historical averages for that month, as well as 5% below May 2008’s depressed levels. Shortfalls continued to be reported in May at reservoirs in Andijan, Kyrgyzstan (where volumes were 27% below historical averages), and in Tuyamuyun, Uzbekistan (where volumes were 11% below historical averages). Moreover, the rains that apparently removed the spectre of drought in Tajikistan brought with them heightened vulnerability to other natural disasters. In Tajikistan, some 50 natural disasters—flooding, avalanches, mudflows—had by been reported by early May 2009, causing 26 fatalities, damaging or destroying 2000 houses, and producing economic losses on the order of 1% of GDP. The suddenness and intensity of the shift from drought to deluge are suggestive of an increasing variability in weather patterns in Central Asia, which many observers regard as a manifestation of climate change. These developments have added to previous climate change concerns associated with the melting of Central Asia’s glaciers— concerns that have continued (if not been intensified) by recent press reports and government statements.

If concerns about water balances in Central Asia have lessened but not abated, similar conclusions can be drawn regarding food and energy security in the region. Official statistics show both food and energy prices in the region continuing to rise in 2009, even as world market prices for these products collapsed. Whereas global food prices in April 2009 were some 24% below their April 2008 levels (according to IMF data), in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan national data show that food prices were 9% and 8% higher, respectively, in these two countries. And whereas IMF data show that global energy prices in April 2009 had dropped 52% from their April 2008 levels, in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan national data show that prices for electricity, gas and heat grew 33% and 78%, respectively, during this time. These trends strongly suggest that vulnerable households in Central Asia have yet to benefit from declining world prices for food and energy. They also raise difficult questions about the causes and longevity of these diverging price trends. 8 Meanwhile, the impact of the global economic crisis has begun to make itself felt, primarily in the form of reduced remittances (preliminary data from the National Bank of Tajikistan show a 29% decline in the dollar value of remittances in the first quarter of 2009, relative to first quarter of 2008) and much lower prices for key exports like cotton and aluminium. The IMF’s revised World Economic Outlook released in April 2009 anticipates that the impact of the global crisis on Central Asia will be worst in Kazakhstan (for which a 2% decline in GDP is forecast); preliminary national data posted on the CIS Statistical Office web page suggest that Kazakhstan’s GDP dropped 4-5% in the first quarter of 2009. CIS Statistical Office data likewise indicate that GDP growth rate during the first quarter of 2009 dropped to about 3.5% in Tajikistan and 0.2% in Kyrgyzstan (from close to 8% in 2008). Industrial output during the first quarter declined by 8% and 19.5% respectively in these two countries, even relative to the depressed levels recorded in the first quarter of 2008. The IMF’s projections of weak growth for these two countries imply that living standards will stagnate (at best) in 2009. Recent World Bank research on the effectiveness of social protection systems highlighted Central Asia’s continuing social policy reform challenges. While not unsuccessful, the UN-led emergency appeals did not attract the resources needed to fully protect vulnerable households from these adverse trends.

8

Divergences in domestic and international energy prices would seem to be most easily explained by government attempts (strongly supported by the international community) to raise the former to long-run cost recovery levels, as well as by sharp increases in the prices of natural gas imports from Uzbekistan. Divergences in domestic and international food prices are more difficult to explain; the presence of monopolised or otherwise inflexible supply structures could be part of the problem. Better understanding the drivers of these divergences is one of the many areas in which further research, to strengthen the design and implementation of evidence-based policies, is much needed.

10 These developments strongly suggest that—not withstanding the hope presented in improving water balances—the water, energy, and food insecurities that took hold in Tajikistan in the winter of 2007-2008 have taken root, have spread to Kyrgyzstan, and are now being exacerbated by the effects of the global economic crisis. While no significant increases in intra- and inter-state tensions are apparent, the possible socio-political consequences of these developments should not be ignored. Such an assessment underscores the importance of the continued design and implementation of measures to respond to these insecurities, by both governments and the international community, particularly in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

As mentioned above, this document does not seek to provide a comprehensive inventory of responses to these difficulties that have been, or are now being, undertaken. It focuses instead on the changes that have been introduced by UNDP and the UN Country Teams (UNCTs) and, to a lesser extent, the international community more broadly in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Still, it seems clear that significant increases in UN engagement in/support for disaster prevention and early recovery activities—made possible by investments in UNCT capacities for programming in these areas (thanks in part to support provided by UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery)— have been an important result of the international community’s response to Central Asia’s growing water/energy/food insecurities. As these investments are on-going, and since their impact depends in part on the support and cooperation they elicit from governments and other development partners, most of the rest of this paper is devoted to the issues they raise.

III. Crisis Prevention: Early Warning and Risk Monitoring The CARRA places particular emphasis on improving the quality of early warning systems, as a lesson emerging from the international community’s slow response to the unfolding of Tajikistan’s compound crisis in the winter of 2007-2008.9 A number of early warning systems are in use in Central Asia, by the international community and government agencies.10 However, these systems were unable to correctly anticipate the compound crisis facing Tajikistan during the winter of 2008; nor could they effectively link the spectre of these water, energy, and food insecurities to appropriate preventive or early recovery responses. These gaps reflect inter alia differences between the data these systems would ideally track (via indicators) on the one hand, and what is publicly available on the other.

Nonetheless, a simple but tractable early warning system focusing broadly on five variables11 has been established by UNDP-Tajikistan, and has been in operation since September 2008. The CARRA calls for the “creation of a regional early warning system”, which would: (i) better address the early warning dimensions of these insecurities; (ii) improve the quality of those key systems that are in effect, by providing technical assistance and capacity development support to those engaged in their design and maintenance; and (iii) improve coordination between, or at least increase the mutual self-awareness of, these instruments; and where possible and desirable, look for simplification and harmonisation opportunities.

9

This emphasis does not imply less appreciation of the importance of other disaster prevention activities (such as the design and implementation of national disaster risk management strategies)—many of which have been conducted or supported by the Disaster Response Coordination Unit by UNDP-Kyrgyzstan, or by UNDP-Tajikistan’s Disaster Risk Management Programme. Because such activities focus on what might be called “traditional” disaster risk management issues, they have remained largely outside the focus of the CARRA exercise.

10 For more on UN approaches to early warning systems and disaster prevention, see http://www.unisdr.org/ppew/ppewindex.htm.

11 These variables are precipitation, remittances, food prices, electricity generation, and water levels at the Nurek hydropower station.

11 Attempts to move in this direction must answer a series of questions. These were taken up in Dushanbe in mid-April, 12 at a workshop attended by representatives of most of the UN agencies working in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The participants concentrated on providing concrete answers to eight questions that seem particularly relevant in improving the quality and use of early warning systems in Central Asia. With some simplification, these can be summarised as follows: Early warning, or risk monitoring? With the exception of some specialised early warning systems that are tailored to the needs of specific government partners (e.g., Ministry of Health) and are already ongoing, the emphasis should not be on early warning per se, but rather on the monitoring of risks to those development processes and beneficiaries that are of greatest immediate concern. This conclusion is based on a number of arguments: Ø Government partners often have higher comfort levels with “risk monitoring” than they do with “early warning—inter alia because of “self-fulfilling prophecy” issues. Ø To be effective, early warning reports must be produced on a rapid basis. The 2003 review of the UNDP early warning systems in Southeast Europe13 showed that ensuring timeliness can be difficult. By contrast, risk monitoring reports can be issued according to a regular production schedule, which is easier to reconcile with the sometimes deliberative nature of development programming. Ø The UNCTs in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are already engaged in risk monitoring, linked to the humanitarian appeals and the situation reports regularly generated by these offices.

Rather than seeking to create something new and different, representatives from Kyrgyzstan seemed to prefer expanding/building upon the risk management elements contained in the situation reports. In the case of Tajikistan, the argument that the existing early warning reports do not differ fundamentally from the situation reports seems broadly acceptable. Ø The choice of the “risk management” (rather than “early warning”) reporting paradigm need not preclude the periodic issuance of early warning reports, when such would be truly justified by the national development context. In this sense, the issue is not really “early warning OR risk monitoring”, but rather “early warning AND risk monitoring”.

Who’s the client? In the cases of specialised early warning systems that are tailored to the needs of government partners (e.g., Ministry of Health), the client is clearly the government. In general, and particularly in the longer term, early warning and risk monitoring activities are most useful when they are directly tied to government policy processes—and can therefore produce an “early response”. However, in most other cases, the client should be seen—at least in the short run—as the international community, and particularly the UN system, which in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan faces the task of monitoring the progress of, and risks to, the humanitarian appeals launched in 2008. Matters are further complicated by the fact that, in many cases, the appropriate state partner who would be interested in “capacity development for better risk management” cannot be identified. In such cases, the identification of other clients (e.g., the beneficiaries of the early warning/risk monitoring initiatives, or non-state implementers of early warning/risk monitoring projects) should perhaps also be sought.

12

Hosted by UNDP-Tajikistan and its Disaster Risk Management Programme, the Workshop brought together UN staff working on early warning systems in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as partners and resource people from UNDP’s Regional Centre in Bratislava, UNICEF’s Regional Office in Geneva, OCHA’s Regional Office in Almaty, the UNDP office in Kosovo, and ISDR’s regional office in Dushanbe.

13 Anna Cutter and Michi Ebata, “Southeast European Early Warning Systems: A Strategic Review”, April 2003, UNDP Bratislava Regional Centre.

12 What risks? To whom? The risks to be monitored, and the objects of this monitoring, should be those associated with vulnerable groups, communities, regions, and sectors—as defined by relevant policy and programming documents (e.g., national development or poverty reduction strategies, UNDAFs, appeals). Such an approach seems most likely to ensure that UN risk monitoring is aligned with on-going initiatives, while helping to raise comfort levels among government partners concerning risk monitoring /early warning activities. Focusing on risks to basic rights/access to education, water, health, energy—the denial of which could lead to humanitarian emergencies, crises, and conflict—is also important.

Should the indicators to be monitored be selected on the basis of feasibility or desirability?

This choice is to some extent misleading—risk monitoring/early warning indicators should be both feasible (i.e., easily tracked and monitored) and desirable (i.e., robustly connected to the underlying risk variables—inter alia by reflecting their inter-sectoral nature). In reality, however, use of the most desirable indicators in Central Asia is often precluded by the fact that the data on which they are based are not made available, either to the international community or to the general public, by the state or commercial structures (e.g., public utilities) that gather and maintain them. Negotiations to obtain these data can both reduce potential interest in the early warning/risk monitoring system among these structures (who could otherwise be important clients) and distract attention from or slow the analysis of those data and indicators that are publicly available. In the short run, then, emphasis should be on working with those data that are available. In the longer term, work with government partners should ideally focus on improving the quality and quantity of risk-related data, in order to expand the set of indicators that are feasible as well as desirable.

National or (sub-) regional risk monitoring/early warning reports? UN-associated risk monitoring/early warning activities in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan should retain a predominantly— but not exclusively—national character, for two key reasons. First, differences in the national development contexts in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and the difficulties in coordinating across two UNCTs, require at least some degree of “product differentiation” across risk monitoring activities in the two countries. Second, an emphasis on UNCT national risk monitoring could facilitate deeper cooperation and integration among the various UN agencies engaged in the production of these reports (“risk monitoring as one”). UN agencies in Tajikistan have agreed to explore prospects for further integration of the various agency risk-monitoring activities and publications, noting that such cooperation could be synergistically linked to UNCT risk monitoring of the on-going humanitarian appeals, as well as of activities to be conducted under the new UNDAF, now being developed. As the UNCT work on responding to water/energy/food insecurities in Kyrgyzstan is being led by the Resident Coordinator’s office, prospects for the creation of integrated UNCT risk monitoring reports, or managing the production of separate agency reports/activities within an integrated UNCT framework, seem promising.

On the other hand, some degree of pragmatic commonality across the two countries’ risk monitoring reports—particularly in such areas as indicators monitored, report format, publication schedule—would clearly be desirable. Such coordination would allow the two reports to capture benefits of form (branding) and content (substance) that would reflect those development commonalities that are present in the two countries. Some degree of standardisation might also facilitate external technical support for these reports, particularly from the UN agencies’ regional offices in Almaty and from other headquarters and regional centres, in part to help ensure the appropriate regional and global links.

Humanitarian crisis, or economic crisis? Both the Tajikistan Rapid Emergency Assessment and Coordination Team (REACT) early warning system and the situation reports in both countries

13 have their roots in the emergency situations that led to the humanitarian appeals launched in 2008.

Over time, however, socioeconomic indicators (e.g., food prices, energy tariffs, remittances, exchange rates)—many of which show the impact of the global economic crisis upon vulnerable households—have acquired a larger role in the Tajikistan REACT early warning system. Risk monitoring efforts should therefore track both “humanitarian” and “development” indicators, while maintaining the flexibility to focus on either or both, as circumstances might suggest.

Frequency of publication. Risk monitoring reports should be published as often as is possible and feasible, in light of such factors as report length, human and financial resource constraints, and the like. Different frequencies discussed included quarterly (which to some participants seemed too infrequent) and monthly (which to others seemed too ambitious). On balance, a publication regime emphasising: (i) the management of data bases to track relatively large numbers of indicators; that would (ii) make possible longer, more in-depth (but perhaps less frequent, i.e., quarterly) analyses of the trends being monitored;14 and (iii) the ability to quickly issue early warning reports when justified by the prevailing circumstances, may be the way to go.

Distribution mechanism. If technically possible, the two countries’ risk monitoring reports should be delivered via a common, user-friendly electronic subscription mechanism (e.g., from a common list-serve). Such an approach could maximise circulation/readership, strengthen the “common brand” (providing external network benefits for both publications), while minimising the administrative costs of distributing the reports to subscribers. On the other hand, the fact that some important (government) partners may not enjoy appropriately robust internet access underscores the need for delivery of hard copies. Likewise, the greater the significance assigned to government (and other national) partners as clients, the more important is the publication and distribution of the reports in Russian and/or other national/state languages.

IV. Early Recovery Programming The UN response at the national level to the water, energy, and food insecurities that have taken hold in Central Asia since 2007 has reflected the importance of the early recovery paradigm15 as a: (i) bridge between short-term humanitarian/emergency response and longer-term development programming; and (ii) programming approach that can help strengthen vulnerable households’ resilience in the face of these insecurities. Early recovery thus provides a conceptual framework within which emergency response programming (including projects designed and financed under the humanitarian appeals) can be more easily linked to longer-term development objectives (see section V). It can also serve as a mechanism for strengthening risk management elements in other programming areas (particularly energy and environment and local economic development), as well as for promoting social cohesion and conflict prevention. Perhaps most importantly, because smallscale rapid employment, public works/infrastructure, and labour-intensive energy and environment programming can have important employment- and income-generating effects, early recovery activities can help combat the socio-economic impact of the global economic crisis.16 14

This need not—indeed, should not—require descriptions of trends in all variables included in the data base in every issue.

15 For more on this, see Guidance Note on Early Recovery (Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery, April 2008), at http://www.humanitarianreform.org/humanitarianreform/Portals/1/cluster%20approach%20page/clusters%20pages/Earl y%20R/ER_Internet.pdf.

16 A broad definition of early recovery is intentionally applied in this paper; it is understood that such an approach may not be fully accepted by all development partners. However, this paper reflects the beliefs that the appropriate application of the early recovery paradigm in Central Asia requires pushing the paradigm’s conceptual envelope in order to help strengthen practical links between emergency response and development programming.

14 As a result, both bilateral donors and UNDP are now moving to more robustly support early warning programming, often in a coordinated manner.17 In Tajikistan, for example: Ø In early 2009, UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) approved a $3.1 million project on “Strengthening Early Recovery Capacities in Tajikistan”, to mainstream “compound crisis resilience” into UNDP-Tajikistan’s existing development programming portfolio. The BCPR initiative will build on the project implementation infrastructure developed in the Country Office’s Disaster Risk Management, Mine Action, and Communities Programmes, which has developed an extensive portfolio in energy and environment and local economic development. In 2008, for example, some 500 small infrastructure projects were completed under the Communities Programme alone; many of these focused on finding local solutions to growing threats to water, energy, and food security. Six regional micro loan foundations extended some $2 million in credits to some 106,000 beneficiaries (30% of whom were women) last year; recycled remittance incomes constituted nearly a third of these funds. As a result of these activities, some 500,000 rural residents had better access to safe drinking water, irrigation systems, electricity, medical and educational services. These programmes have also played important roles in mainstreaming disaster risk reduction and early recovery principles into local planning. Ø Some $1.2 million has been committed by UNDP-Tajikistan for work on renewable energy, especially small hydro and biogas. Emphasis will be on creating the policy and legal environment needed to attract private funds into alternative energy investments. Possible additional funding is expected via the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and the European Commission. On the demand side, small energy efficiency investments, especially in public buildings (with GEF funding), are expected to play an important role. Ø In March 2009, DFID and UNDP-Tajikistan developed a $470,000 early recovery programme, under which additional staff are being recruited to work on humanitarian and early recovery programming in the UN Resident Coordinator’s office and UNDP’s Disaster Risk Management Programme, in co-ordination with the Rapid Emergency Assessment and Coordination Team (REACT—Tajikistan’s joint government-humanitarian community coordination platform).18 Ø Funds of $400,000 have been earmarked by UNDP-Tajikistan and UNDP’s Bureau for Development Policy in support of measures to reduce the impact of energy sector reform, and higher tariffs, on vulnerable households.

In Kyrgyzstan: Ø Under UNDP auspices, pilot production of mini-hydro facilities (able to produce up to 5 kW of electricity, for household use) has been launched by local companies. Such mini-hydro plants generate enough electricity for full home lighting, heating, working on a computer, or

17

The below description of some UNDP and UN projects is meant to serve only as examples. It is not meant to describe the entirety of early recovery programming now on-going in these two Central Asian countries—much of which has been designed and implemented under the appeals processes. Nor is it intended to suggest that these are somehow more important than other projects—some of which (e.g., those associated with the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Commission, or USAID) are much larger than the projects described here. The intention is rather to provide partners with a description of how UNDP has moved to respond to Central Asia’s “slow-onset crisis” in the time elapsed since this exercise began in July 2008.

18 DFID also supports the production of UNDP-Tajikistan’s early warning reports, under UNDP’s national Disaster Risk Management Programme.

15 watching TV. As of early 2008 some 13 small hydro plants had been installed in nine villages of the Issyk-Kul region and local communities trained in their proper use.19 Ø The UNCT in 2009 created an Early Recovery Unit (located in the Resident Coordinator’s office), consisting of an early recovery advisor (funded by BCPR) and two early recovery specialists (funded by DFID). An early recovery document has been developed, and a needs assessment initiated, focusing on renewable energy, land and water management, agriculture and food security, small infrastructure development, social service provision (especially in rural areas), and risk reduction and mitigation. Ø UNDP-Kyrgyzstan’s peace and development initiative for conflict prevention in Kyrgyzstan has been in operation since April 2007 (with support from BCPR). Current activities include collection of national survey data on links between conflict potential and governance, natural resource management, food security, and gender.

In Uzbekistan: Ø As in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, UNDP has a portfolio of area-based development and environment projects to increase the resilience of vulnerable households and communities to water, food, and energy insecurities. EC-funded area-based development programming in the Karakalpakstan, Kashkadarya, and Ferghana regions is providing small farmers and poor households with access to improved water sources for drinking and irrigation, helping to increase incomes and improve food security. Cooperation with the World Bank’s Health II project, to improve energy efficiency and security for remote rural health clinics, is ongoing. Ø In the Kyzyl-Kum biodiversity preserve, UNDP is piloting the liberalisation of Uzbekistan’s land leasing regime, to encourage local households to invest in the cultivation of fruit and nut trees. In addition to increasing household incomes and modernising Uzbekistan’s legal framework, this project offers a blueprint for reducing short-term food insecurity by reversing deforestation, desertification, and unsustainable land management practices.20 Ø The UNCT has identified disaster preparedness as a key issue to be addressed under the 2010-2015 UNDAF. In collaboration with the Government and with support from OCHA regional office in Almaty, an inter-agency contingency plan has been drafted; UNDP is drafting a disaster management project together with the Ministry of Emergency Situations.

In addition to these national initiatives, new regional and cross-border UNDP programming is now being developed, with the potential to address many of these same issues from a supranational perspective. These include the: Ø Poverty and Environment Initiative (PEI),21 which is a UNDP-UNEP programme to strengthen the role of environmental criteria in national policy processes. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have been selected as PEI programme countries; anticipated funding for national initiatives in these countries during 2009-2011 is expected at some $1 million for each. PEI initiatives could strengthen linkages between disaster risk management, socio-economic policy design and implementation, and prospects for short-term reductions in water, energy, and food insecurities.

19

See http://www.developmentandtransition.net/index.cfm?module=ActiveWeb&page=WebPage&DocumentID=684.

See http://www.developmentandtransition.net/index.cfm?module=ActiveWeb&page=WebPage&DocumentID=674.

21 See http://www.unpei.org/programmes/europe-cis.asp.

20

16 Ø Promoting Integrated Water Resource Management and Transboundary Dialogue in Central Asia: This multi-donor project (led by UNDP and the European Commission) seeks to build national capacity for integrated water resource management, with a special emphasis on small/micro/mini hydro, irrigated agriculture, rural water supply and sanitation services, and bi- and multilateral river basin management. Preliminary pilot regions include the Zarafshan (in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) and Isfara (in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) river basins. Ø Cross-border activities are focusing primarily on communities straddling the TajikistanKyrgyzstan border. In addition to the possible extension of peace and development programming from Kyrgyzstan, these cross-border activities include a $120,000 crossborder environmental risk management project (financed by Germany and BCPR), under the Environment and Security Initiative (http://www.envsec.org/).

This is not intended to be an exhaustive list of early recovery activities now being undertaken. The emphasis here is instead on the expansion of programming that links employmentand income-generating activities for vulnerable communities and households to activities that help reduce environmental, conflict and disaster risks.

V. Identifying Remaining Gaps Neither the government nor international agencies in Tajikistan were fully prepared for the “compound crisis” that took hold in the winter of 2007-2008. To some extent, this lack of preparation can be explained by the unusual, slow-onset nature of the crisis, reflecting the unexpected interactions of severe winter weather, drought, high global food and energy prices, and governance failures in the energy and water sectors. In other respects, however, inadequate preparation reflected inadequate coordination: among government/national stakeholders (between such bodies as the Ministry of Economy and Trade, Committee of Emergency Situations, REACT); within the United Nations systems (the UNCT was not fully prepared for coordination internally, and with the government and NGOs, according to the logic of the global humanitarian reform; activities of non-resident UN agencies were not always fully coordinated with the UN Resident Coordinator); within the international community (e.g., the World Bank’s humanitarian food and energy assistance was not always coordinated with the UN system); and between the international community and the government.

The intervening 18 months have provided opportunities for the government and international community to better apply the coordination institutions and instruments at their disposal, to better respond to these issues (please see the below matrix). Within the UN system, the Resident Coordinator’s offices in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have been reinforced; and training of UN staff in both countries in humanitarian/emergency response has been improved. In Tajikistan, the new UNDAF (and subsequently the UNDP Country Programme Document) is being developed with an eye toward the lessons learned from the compound crisis; a new emphasis on disaster prevention is apparent in Uzbekistan’s UNDAF as well. Joint Country Support Strategies (JCSS) are now being designed in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan; work on new national/country development (and poverty reduction) strategies is on-going in both countries, involving cooperation between governments and the international community. In general, the challenge would be how to make the UNDAFs less bureaucratic and further simplified in countries facing slow-onset water, energy and food security crisis.

17 Matrix of coordination institutions, instruments (Central Asia) Geographic scope: - Regional (Central Asia) - National

International community CAREC JCSS, DCC

Organisational scope: Governments, other important national actors CAREC, EurAsEC, CIS, others NDS, CDS, PRS, REACT, CoES, MES, others

United Nations Regional Directors’ Team UNDAF, CPD

Improvements in coordination in several dimensions during the past 18 months notwithstanding, there are several important gaps that remain:

22

•

Within governments and between governments and the international community, regarding both emergency/disaster response and development strategies more generally. In both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, concerns remain regarding the PRS/CDS/NDS in terms of their linkages to the budgetary frameworks, integration with sectoral development strategies, or being subjected to rigorous monitoring and evaluation. In Tajikistan, stronger links between the State Commission on Emergency Situations and REACT, to ensure closer cooperation at all times (and especially during emergencies) is quite important;

•

Within the international community, although progress has been achieved, there is room for increased coordination between the World Bank and UN system, on the basis of pre-agreed divisions of labour.22 Likewise, cooperation within the JCSS framework does not seems to be of uniform effectiveness across the region; there may be lessons to be learned in this respect. Perhaps most importantly, key non-OECD/DAC donors (e.g., the Russian Federation, China, Saudi Arabia) remain outside the JCSS and related coordination frameworks.

•

So far, UN’s efforts to address Central Asia’s inter-woven water, energy, and food insecurities have focused primarily on Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and have emphasized the national (as opposed to supra-national) dimensions of these issues. There is, to date, little interest among official partners in other Central Asian countries in extending this exercise.

Likewise, the difficulties often facing regional initiatives in Central Asia are well-known.

Country-based interventions are unquestioningly important. However, the logic of the Poverty and Environment and the Integrated Water Resources Management initiatives demonstrate that regional initiatives can serve as chapeaux to more effectively coordinate national activities, via reduced transactions costs and more effective codification and dissemination of project results. The adoption of regional approaches can help extend the logic of CARRA follow up to new substantive areas (e.g., the regional components of UNCT early warning/risk monitoring systems) or possibly other Central Asian countries (e.g., under the logic of supporting expert networking or exchange of best practices/lessons learned).23 This underscores the potential importance of (i) exploring possibilities for expanding the exercise’s focus to other Central Asian countries; and (ii) strengthening support for capacity development and coordination within and between governments.

The UN-World Bank Partnership Framework for Crisis and Post-Crisis Situations, which was approved in October 2008, could be a test case in this respect. (For more on this, see http://www.undg.org/docs/9501/UNWB_statement__October_2008__FINAL.pdf 23 Such an approach might be useful, for example, in addressing concerns about deteriorating access to electricity supplies in rural areas in Uzbekistan.

18 VI. Recommendations for Action In terms of early warning/risk monitoring, it is recommended to: •

review the current status of, and unresolved challenges facing, early warning/risk monitoring efforts in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan;

•

designate regional experts/resource people (or working groups of such) to support thematic areas (e.g., precipitation/water levels, food price trends, energy, health, remittances, etc.), with representation from such institutions as OCHA, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, UNDP, UNECE the World Bank, IMF, and Asian Development Bank;24

•

propose concrete steps to develop the regional component(s) of early warning/risk monitoring reports, taking appropriate advantage of the Global Risk Identification Programme (GRIP),25 OCHA’s and ISDR’s expertise and programming, and the resources at the disposal of other relevant institutions;

•

promote closer cooperation between GRIP, the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), and the World Bank in support of capacity development for national hydromet services.

•

make effort to “deliver as one” in this area at the UN level; and

•

move from monitoring risk data to creating a broader programmatic framework for assessing risk impact and mitigation, as circumstances permit.

These topics can be discussed in a dedicated session at the July 2009 Almaty Meeting.

In terms of early recovery and longer-term development issues, there is clearly a need to strengthen the link between early recovery and activities that would ensure greater sustainability in the food/water/energy nexus that help prevent natural disasters and protect the environment. Annex 1 to this document describes the ongoing and new early recovery and selected longer-term activities that the UN agencies can design and implement, with support from the international partners. Some illustrative examples include:

24

•

better monitoring of food security trends, especially in vulnerable communities; strengthening well-targeted food subsidies, and supporting agricultural, horticultural and livestock activities;

•

providing financing for maintaining and improving health care and education services and building infrastructure in vulnerable communities;

•

increasing financial support for energy efficient projects, public awareness campaigns to reduce energy and water use; and designing pro-poor tariff policies; and

Partnership frameworks successfully employed in other national and regional coordination exercises—CAREC, the UN Regional Directors’ Team, JCSSs, UNDAFs, UNCTs, global cluster system, donor coordination councils, etc.— could be adapted to this undertaking.

25 For more on GRIP, which is now coming to Central Asia, see http://www.gripweb.org/grip.php?ido=1000.

•

19 designing, implementing and supporting projects to improve irrigation, water harvesting, and more generally aiming for better and more integrated water resource management.

Once again, the Almaty Meeting will serve as a useful opportunity for international partners to reach better understanding and agreement on these issues, and to join in supporting and/or expanding these sectoral and cross-cutting activities.

In terms of supporting analytical work, research and advocacy for improved, evidencebased policy-making:

26

•

Programming under the Poverty and Environment Initiative could address the weak links between development and poverty reduction strategies on the one hand and concrete measures to address short- and medium-term water, energy, and food insecurities on the other. Funding for research that would more clearly illustrate linkages between income poverty and water, energy, and food insecurities (e.g., by providing updated, accurate data on the numbers of households that do not have access to reliable year-round water and electricity supplies), is very much needed for evidence-based policy development.

•

The governments of both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have promised significant increases in household energy and water tariffs. 26 Opinions in both countries are sharply divided between those who believe that higher nominal tariffs either will not be paid (either because of inadequate metering and billing practices and the “culture of non-payment”), will be paid and reduce the welfare of vulnerable households for whom these services will become unaffordable, or will be paid and improve these households’ welfare, who will (re)gain access to these services at affordable prices (perhaps after the payment of compensating subsidies). Which argument is correct? How this question is answered can have a powerful impact on the pace and extent of tariff increases in these countries, on their implications for socio-economic vulnerability, and on prospects for early recovery programming (e.g., small hydro, or energy efficiency projects) to reduce water and energy insecurities in these countries. These issues can only be resolved by further discussion and research.

•

Differing views on the commercial viability of small/micro/mini hydro power are closely linked to these questions. In early 2009, President Rakhmon called for the construction of 50 new small hydropower generating stations by the end of the year (in addition to the 100 or so already in operation) in Tajikistan; Kyrgyzstan’s National Energy Programme and the Development Strategy for the Fuel and Energy Complex Development likewise call for the construction of some 100 small hydro power plants. However, many small hydro projects are not commercially viable at the effective electricity tariffs now present in these two countries; and the legal and regulatory frameworks are not in place for subsidisation of renewable energy sources via feed-in tariffs (or green certificates). Further complications came with the drought conditions that pushed water volumes below dead levels in many small hydropower stations in 2008. More generally, the extent to which Central Asia enjoys the hydrological and meteorological characteristics needed for small hydro to be feasible from an engineering perspective remains unclear. This too needs to be further researched.27

In Tajikistan, nominal electricity tariffs are to be unified into a single rate for all users; current plans call for this to be raised to $0.021 per kWh by 2010 and ultimately to cost-recovery levels, which are estimated by the World Bank to be in the range of $0.03 – $0.035 per kWh. (In 2002, they were some $0.005 per kWh.) In Kyrgyzstan, household electricity tariffs are to rise from $0.016 per kWh (pre-July 2008) to $0.037 per kWh by April 2012.

27 UNDP is to undertake a regional feasibility study on small/micro/mini hydro power in Central Asia later this year.

•

20 Central Asia’s high rates of water and energy consumption can be explained in part by very low (effective) tariff rates, and by the absence of effective metering and billing practices. But they also reflect wasteful water and energy usage practices, many of which remain from the Soviet period. While much of this waste is in the industrial and (especially) agricultural sectors, part of it also lies in such household habits as leaving taps open during periods of no water due to low water pressure (so as to be sure to actually get some water when the pressure is restored), lowering indoor temperatures during the fall and winter by opening windows, and the like. This suggests a need for broad public information campaigns, to underscore the importance of simple energy- and water-saving practices.

Public information campaigns can also help households to minimise their utility bills by transferring consumption from peak to off-peak hours, and the like.

28

In terms of coordination: Ø Efforts to reach out to non-OECD/DAC donors should be redoubled, both by the UN system and by the leading OECD/DAC donors active in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. By the same token, non-OECD/DAC donors should be willing to more robustly explore “traditional” donor coordination instruments.

28

•

Within the international community, while progress has been made, there is room for further improvement between the World Bank and UN system on the basis of pre-agreed national divisions of labour to ensure better preparedness in the event of a full-blown humanitarian emergency. Likewise, cooperation within the JCSS framework does not seem to be of uniform effectiveness across the region; there may be lessons to be learned in this respect.

•

At the UN level, UNDAFs are widely seen by participants as indispensible in principle, the processes associated with them are often seen as onerous excessively bureaucratic, and in need of simplification. In countries facing slow-onset water/energy/food security crises, these should be simplified.

•

In Tajikistan, the international community should make an effort to improve linkages between government responses to emergencies/disaster situations and the work of the humanitarian community could be improved by restoring the ministerial status of the Committee of Emergency Situations (CoES). In addition to bringing the government’s disaster management framework into line with those of neighbouring countries, reporting lines between various line ministries could be clarified as well. The REACT joint government-humanitarian community coordination platform should likewise be fully endorsed by the authorities in Tajikistan.

•

The international community should further strengthen existing sub-national coordinating bodies (like the oblast-level REACT groups in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) to ensure that early warning and early recovery activities reflect local demands, and that institutional capacity is developed among local authorities, civil society organisations (including think tanks), and (where relevant) the private sector (e.g., producers and sellers of energy-efficient pumps and light bulbs, or of mini-hydro or solar power equipment).

•

The governments of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan have finalised the agreements needed to establish the Regional Centre for Disaster Response and Risk Reduction in Almaty. Uzbekistan has also agreed to cooperate regionally in terms of information sharing,

On per-capita and per-dollar-of-GDP bases.

21 early warning, and joint planning. The international community should support this Centre, and foster close ties with the offices in Almaty of UNDP, OCHA, the World Bank, USAID and the European Commission. Over time, the Centre could play a growing role in regional early warning/risk monitoring activities.

•

Wherever possible, networks of national officials from Central Asian (and neighbouring) countries working in the relevant thematic areas should be supported, to ensure that Central Asian programming benefits from the exchange of lessons learned and best practices in early warning, early recovery and medium-term development measures. Secondments of national staff, and the creation of data bases of national experts and programmes, could be particularly important. Regional cooperation arrangements such as CAREC can play an important role in this respect.

•

Given the well-known difficulties of regional initiatives in Central Asia and the need for more effective capacity at that level, it is not surprising that there has been lukewarm support among official partners in other Central Asia countries to extend this exercise beyond Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. This strongly suggests the need for systematically building capacity and helping enhance ownership. Moreover, the experience from the Poverty and Environment and the Integrated Water Resource Management initiatives demonstrates that regional initiatives can serve as chapeaux for more effective coordination of national activities, via reduced transaction costs and more effective codification and dissemination of project results. The adoption of regional approaches can help extend the logic of CARRA follow up to new substantive areas (e.g., the regional components of UNCT early warning/risk monitoring systems) or possibly other Central Asian countries.

To provide the institutional back-bone for better coordination, this document proposes the establishment of a Regional Coordination Working Group (RCWG) to support the activities described in the report. The RCWG could consist of focal points from the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy (UNRCC) in Ashgabat, the Almaty regional offices of OCHA, World Bank, ADB, USAID, UNDP, ISDR and other relevant partners. The RCWG would serve as a networked/virtual information-analytical centre for the Central Asian countries, collecting, analyzing and disseminating early warning and other important information to various stakeholders in Central Asia and beyond.

Specific RCWG activities could include: •

Researching and recommending: o methodologies for national early warning systems; and o viable, appropriate uses of alternative energy sources;

•

Maintaining an active roster of qualified consultants able to meet national needs on short notice during emergency situations (to be placed within days rather than weeks/months);

•

Developing a SURGE list of qualified UN staff within and outside the region, to be fielded in Central Asia countries during emergency situations on short notice;

•

Exploring possibilities for including qualified government and NGO personnel on this SURGE list;

•

22 When requested, providing substantive, programmatic, and monitoring and evaluation support to UNCTs in Central Asia;

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Designing and conducting regional training programmes on such topics as early warning systems and humanitarian coordination for the benefit of Central Asian government officials and NGOs; and

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Identifying and when possible pre-selecting companies for the procurement of supplies that are most likely to be needed during emergencies in Central Asia.

As part of this effort to improve coordination and ensure greater complementarity in the work of international agencies, the UNDP is launching its Almaty Sub-regional office to support better coordination, being guided by the programmes of other development partners. UNDP’s Almaty Office would work closely with the CAREC Unit of ADB and other international partners in providing administrative support services.

To conclude, more effective coordination among international development partners will facilitate our joint efforts to develop national capacity and strengthen inter-governmental cooperation. It will also ensure better support to specific activities of the international community in these countries.

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Annex 1: Proposed Short- and Medium-term Early Recovery Interventions Thematic area Food security

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Basic social services, infrastructure

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Income- , employmentgeneration opportunities

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Energy efficiency, energy sector reform

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•

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Proposed activities Supporting expanded food and nutrition surveys, to better monitor food security trends, particularly in vulnerable communities; Strengthening targeted food safety nets in vulnerable areas (via topping off social benefits, school feeding programmes); Supporting horticulture, family greenhouses, school gardens, livestock financing schemes; seed distribution, seed vouchers, fertilizers, hand tools; micro-credits for traders; crop diversification; Protecting and rehabilitating farm assets (fodder production, animal health); and Providing targeted agricultural input subsidies (e.g., high yield seeds, fertilizers).

Increasing financial support for maintaining health care and education services and infrastructure in vulnerable communities; and Supporting public works projects for community infrastructure (e.g., bridges) to facilitate the movement of goods and people to markets, and to improve access to social services.

Increasing financial support for private sector development and access to credit for SMEs, vulnerable households (including microfinance, via non-collateralised, group-liability schemes); and Increasing financial support for labour-intensive public works/community projects for vulnerable communities and households (e.g., returning migrants, unemployed) in such areas as reforestation, introduction and maintenance of flood control infrastructure, small hydro stations, and disaster preparedness activities.

Conducting a study in the commercial and hydrological feasibility of significantly, rapidly expanding the role of small/micro/mini hydro power (and other renewable energy technologies, including solar and bio fuels) in Central Asia; Increasing financial support for energy efficiency projects, including for the introduction and maintenance of energy efficient equipment; Designing, implementing, and supporting public awareness campaigns to reduce energy and water use in households, schools, and public agencies, including via training of trainers programmes for NGOs; and Design, implement, and support projects to strengthen the evidentiary basis for pro-poor energy tariff policies and improved metering and bill collection.

Possible partners FAO, World Bank, ADB, UNDP, USAID

FAO, UNICEF, UNFPA

World Bank, ADB, UNDP, DFID, GTZ, KfW, ILO, IOM

World Bank, ADB, UNDP, KfW, DFID, UNEP, SDC

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Water

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Design, implement, and support projects to improve irrigation, water harvesting schemes for vulnerable communities, including via the introduction of innovative water management technologies (particularly in drought-affected areas); Support the restoration of greenbelt areas through the introduction of appropriate seedlings (e.g., community-based nursery programmes); and Design, implement, and support projects to strengthen the evidentiary basis for pro-poor water tariff policies and improved metering and bill collection.

Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) DFID, UNDP, UNEP, ILO