A TRANSPARENT AND ACCOUNTABLE JUDICIARY TO DELIVER JUSTICE FOR ALL Equal access to justice, along with effective, accountable and transparent institutions, as well as reduction of corruption, are key targets in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. CORRUPTION IN THE JUDICIARY
Citizens who paid a bribe for public services Police
In the Asia-Pacific region the judiciary is perceived as the most corrupt institution in Afghanistan and Cambodia2.
31%
Judiciary
24%
Registry
21%
Land
21%
Medical
17% 16%
Education
15%
Tax
13%
Utilities
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%
In Bangladesh court users have to pay on average bribes of 108 USD per case (nearly a quarter of their annual income)3 to the lower tiers of courts.
Globally, 1 out of 4 citizens on average has paid a bribe to the judiciary in 2012.1
WHAT CAN YOU DO? Judges
Upgrade integrity mechanisms in your court based on peer learning with judiciaries from other countries 1
Academia
Conduct surveys on judicial integrity
Civil society
Citizens
Analyze open data and monitor courts
Report corruption
Citizens who reported to paid a bribe in the past 12 months according to the perception survey Global Corruption Barometer, Transparency International, 2013 http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/report 2 Global Corruption Barometer, Transparency International, 2013
3
Average bribe to courts per case
Total annual income
Development partners
Develop integrated programmes on rule of law and anti-corruption
http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/report Corruption in Bangladesh: A Household Survey, Transparency International Bangladesh, 2005 http://www.ti-bangladesh.org/HH%20Survey/ Household%20Survey%20-%202005.pdf
HOW CAN WE BREAK THE CORRUPTION CHAIN IN THE JUDICIARY? Reforms from around the globe are presented in the report A Transparent and Accountable Judiciary to Deliver Justice for All, produced jointly by UNDP and U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. Here are some highlights: SURVEYS
OPEN DATA
MONITORING OF TRIALS
NIGERIA
INDONESIA
AFGHANISTAN
VETTING
BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA
INVOLVING COURT-USERS IN DEVELOPING AND MONITORING JUDICIAL REFORM IN NIGERIA
OPENING COURT INFORMATION AND STATISTICS TO CITIZENS IN INDONESIA
• Collecting evidence through surveys with judicial officers, prosecutors, police, court personnel, lawyers, court users and prisoners awaiting trial • Setting up of public complaints committees consisting of lawyers, police, state security and NGOs
• From 2007 all court information made available to the public5 • Setting up an integrated dashboard in the Supreme Court to monitor the status of cases and their ongoing progress all over Indonesia
IMPACT: More accessible and equitable judiciary system over the years4
IMPACT: With the dashboard, the Supreme Court can monitor, exercise oversight, and conduct the necessary managerial interventions to avoid corrupt practices
COURT USERS REQUESTED TO PAY A BRIBE 43% in 2002 2% in 2007 0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
Online directory with +1 mln judgements http://putusan.mahkamahagung.go.id/
50%
AVERAGE TIME SPENT IN REMAND BY PRISONERS 30 Months in 2002
VETTING OF JUDGES IN BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA
12 Months in 2007 0
10
20
30
40
50
COMMUNITY MONITORING OF TRIALS IN AFGHANISTAN
Vetting (examining personnel to determine their suitability to a job) must be established only under exceptional circumstances7. It aims at excluding from public service persons with serious integrity deficits in order to re-establish civic trust and legitimize public institutions8.
• Community Based Monitoring of Trials6 directly engaging citizens with judicial authorities • Non-traditional actors able to report and comment on the decisions of the judiciary selected by the local community to bring changes in attitudes and behaviour of judicial officials
65%
* In the 4 provinces where the initiatives were piloted: Kapisa, Bamyan, Nangarhar and Balkh
IMPACT: Percentage of trials conducted openly in front of local monitors*, enhancing transparency, accountability and public confidence in the judiciary Administration of justice improved following the recommendations from local monitors, accepted by district and provincial courts
30%
In 2002-2004 the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils (made up by international and national members) reappointed judges and prosecutors, after a general competition for all posts.9
Percentage of former judges and prosecutors who were not reappointed after vetting Over 1,000 positions were filled with new candidates who passed the vetting process
For more information: UNDP Bangkok Regional Hub, Ms. Elodie Beth Seo (elodie.beth@undp.org); Liviana Zorzi (liviana.zorzi@undp.org) Website: http://www.asia-pacific.undp.org/content/rbap/anti-corruption 4 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Impact Assessment of Justice Sector Reform in Three Nigerian States 2002-2007: Report of a Progress Assessment Conducted by the Legal Defence and Assistance Project in 2007, Vienna, 2010 5 Chief Justice Decree No. 144/2007 on Transparency of Court Information, which was issued ahead of the Law on Public Information in 2008. 6 Implemented by Integrity Watch Afghanistan 7 A vetting process represents a risk of arbitrary interference in otherwise
independently operating sectors. It should be implemented only when the institution is fundamentally dysfunctional and by an independent body that follows fair procedures; and it should be put in place as early as possible to avoid protracted periods of legal uncertainty. 8 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States, Vetting: An Operational Framework, 2006 9 Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development. Vetting judges, police and prosecutors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Online Resource Library: OECD, 2015.