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2.5 Conclusions
Step 3 – Expansion of e-commerce market through the creation of a Super E-food app. Big data analytics can be used to monitor apps, allowing the user to obtain an alert if an app is selling counterfeit goods.
Step 4 – Creation of dedicated social network groups/pages to sell fraudulent products to final customers. Big data analytics can target social media as part of the constant monitoring of the e-commerce platforms. Groups and users selling fraudulent products can be eliminated or reported.
The agro-food mafia risk scenarios presented some of the threats that can affect the integrity of the supply chain. Thanks to research conducted by UNICRI and the submissions we received from technology experts; it has been possible to assess how technology solutions may contribute to increase the security of the supply chain of these products while limiting related criminal activities.
Existing technology solutions usually encompass one or several of these elements to protect the flow of products in the supply chain:
Authentication technology: This option is defined by specific characteristics that allow the differentiation of a product to help the different stakeholders of the supply chain, which could possibly include consumers, to identify original products and, consequently, the presence of counterfeits. To define what an original product is, it is possible to refer to certain intrinsic features of the product itself or to apply specific technology on the product, which will provide for the distinction between original and counterfeit (a hologram or a code, for instance). The solutions can be overt (using the sensorial capability of the individual) or covert (that require a device or an additional tool to be revealed) or a combination of both.
Track and trace systems: Frequently, authentication technology on the products is coupled with the implementation of track and trace systems that allow the monitoring of the authenticated goods throughout the different stages of the supply chain and secure the latter from infiltration of unauthorized products. This grants visibility to identify illicit activities related to the deviation of the products from the supply chain, including the use of expired or low-quality products that are repacked and relabelled with falsified dates, dosage and brand information. Traceability options can also use space technologies as a proof of origin as well as for monitoring purposes.
Blockchain technology: This solution has been integrated to traceability systems. It can connect the different parties in the supply chain that have not established trusted relationships with each other, by ensuring transparency. Blockchain stores every transaction or exchange of data that occurs in the network, reducing the need for intermediaries by providing a means by which all the actors in the network may share access to the same information, including what is added to the data, by whom, and the date and time of the submission.2
Forensics: A product resulting from the supply chain process can be seen as the culmination of certain contingencies (nodes in the supply chain) and continuities (production methods) intrinsic in its manufacture. Forensics can be used to analyse a product which has already reached the market to verify if it is counterfeit or not. This evidence can even be brought in court to support allegations of counterfeiting since it may also serve as a tool to trace back the origin of the incident and to compare other counterfeits to verify if they have the same origin. In the case of food fraud, the following techniques can be used: stable isotope
2 Accenture. (2019, January 15). Tracing the Supply Chain. Retrieved August 23, 2020, from https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/ pdf-93/accenture-tracing-supply-chain-blockchain-study-pov.p
analysis, Accelerator Mass Spectrometry, PIXE (Particle-Induced X-ray Emission), RBS (Rutherford Backscattering Spectrometry), Ion Microprobe and MeV-SIMS (Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometry with MeV ions), Fourier Transform InfraRed (FTIR) spectroscopy, O-PTIR (Optical- Photothermal InfraRed) spectroscopy, XRF (X-ray Fluorescence) spectroscopy, using PIXE (Proton induced X-rays emission) and SRIXE, portable NIR or RAMAN spectrometers.
The submissions analysed in the report use different types of technology that are applied following various approaches. Technology is frequently combined to provide multiple levels of security and to achieve a combination of objectives. The submissions might use similar approaches to mitigate risks, however, they offer unique features that focus on the use of specific technology tools. In the case of food fraud, the submissions offered the following approaches:
Use of package-based authentication mechanisms that are combined with traceability systems. They also combine the identification of the original product with a track and trace technology, in order to monitor goods throughout the supply chain. These systems are frequently secured with blockchain technology to protect the exchange of data between the different authorized stakeholders. This approach is taken by submission 3, which additionally proposes the use of data analytics in a platform to obtain relevant insights. Submission 1 provides the option of integrating track and trace technology and blockchain. Submission 2 also adopts this approach and incorporates a hidden code on the packaging and a smartphone app equipped with a specific algorithm for the digital decoding of the printed code, a web-based interface for the management of information connected with the production in the supply chain, and Information Communication Technology (ICT) communication infrastructure for product authentication. This approach is package-dependent; therefore, traceability begins at the first packaging point and is linked to the package, not the product. The content of the package is not directly linked to the authentication feature, which limits the protection against a possible manipulation of the content or a substitution of the product before the first packaging point. This element is relevant in those cases in which the criminal organizations control manufacturing companies
Use of package-based authentication mechanism to secure the various ingredients of food products, combined with a traceability system. This approach provides for a solution that secures the composition of the food and of all its ingredients throughout the supply chain. Submission 6 uses tamper-proof labelling solutions to create the digital identity of the product, which is adopted to secure the detailed information about such product and its composition from the harvest point in a traceability mechanism that is protected by blockchain technology. In this way, the solution protects not only the final processed food, but also all its ingredients along the supply chain before they are processed into the final product. This is also a package-dependent solution, but criminals should control the entire supply chain of all ingredients to realize some steps of the criminal plan.
Use of a multilayer approach that links the content of a product to the other security measures can be adopted. This approach adopts a combination of technologies to target the complex risks in an integral manner by using the unique identity of the product (by obtaining the specific composition and other characteristics to create a DNA fingerprint), a traceability system that connects the physical and digital identity of the product, blockchain technology to protect the data exchange and the mass balance equation, data analytics in a platform to have an overview of the supply chain and space technologies for proof of origin as well as for track and trace. In addition to the protection of the package, this approach adds securing the food itself together with end-to-end monitoring of the supply chain. The biometry of the product to create an inimitable identification reference of the product and the mass balance equation protection are essential to achieve this. Submission 4 provides this combination of technologies to protect the integrity of the supply chain. Submission 5 proposes a similar approach which, however, still has to fully develop and integrate the DNA analysis element in the actual technology portfolio. Cooperation with other stakeholders and technology providers may facilitate this integration.
Forensic and nuclear analytical techniques have a different approach, since they do not focus on preventing infiltration, but can be used to identify counterfeit products and their characteristics after the security breach occurs. The technology is capable of recognizing the geographical origin of food products as well as their composition, including the presence of toxic ingredients and if they have been diluted. These technologies will come into play once an incident occurs or once a suspicion arises. In the case of portable devices
using these technologies, they are a very interesting element since their widespread use and diffusion may allow for the possibility to conduct frequent analysis of the products during processing in the supply chain. Their continuous use over time might create a dissuasive effect on criminals and they can be used to unequivocally identify the adulteration of a product or the fraudulent behaviour of criminals involved in food fraud. Submissions 8, 10 and 11 use this approach to analyse the products. Submission 7 presents the concept of using a portable device to make routine checks without the need of using an external laboratory and submission 9 is currently in the process of developing a portable device.
Technology solutions for e-commerce centre on the commercialization of products in online markets, not on the entire supply chain. Big data analytics and artificial intelligence are used in this approach to analyse the large amount of data exchange in online transactions. Big data analytics can be used to systematically monitor search engines, social media, online marketplaces, customer reviews, instant messaging apps and web pages, mobile app stores, aggregators, domain names, contextual advertising, and in some cases, the deep web. Machine learning is adopted to analyse and classify information, as well as to identify the connections between websites and users in order to have integral insights of the online sale of counterfeit products. Technology option 1 and 2 adopt this approach to mitigate risks.
With specific reference to the risks that were highlighted by the risk scenarios, the following considerations can be made:
Criminal organizations are able to infiltrate the legitimate supply chain at various stages and by using complex techniques that include the exploitation of technology itself, taking advantage of corruption opportunities, obtaining resources from other illicit activities, theft, shark loans, package manipulation and imitation, procurement of low-quality products, creation of distribution channels, among others. As a consequence, the solutions adopted to secure the supply chain should consider the use of a multilayer security approach, bringing together multiple technologies to support stakeholders and authorities. This element has been confirmed by the majority of the submissions that we received, where multilayer security was at the core of many of them.
Some criminal activities highlighted by the scenarios cannot be limited by supply chain security technology. This has to be expected since the main purpose for which these technologies were developed is to protect the integrity of the supply chain and not to stop different kinds of criminal operations. This is the case, for instance, for the acquisition of legitimate businesses by criminal organizations or the gaining of control over their operations. The mitigation of these steps will necessarily require actions and strategies implemented by law enforcement agencies to better understand how crime operates and how to better understand and monitor organized crime strategies to prevent these criminal activities. It is for these reasons that some steps of the criminal plans in the risk scenarios were difficult to limit by supply chain technology solutions. This is the case, for instance, for some steps indicated in risk scenario 1, in particular: step 1) Control of the distribution market by owning or controlling legitimate operators, step 2) Control of the supply chain using the technology owned by the controlled legitimate operators and step 5) Distribution of the falsified goods via the criminal group through its comprehensive and well-structured network, which includes wholesalers and supermarkets controlled by its frontmen.
Following on from the previous point, an integrated approach between different technology typologies and options is needed to support at the same time investigators and law enforcement agencies on the one side as well as supply chain operators and consumers on the other.
Supply chain technology producers are constantly looking for ways to innovate the modality through which products’ integrity and security can be enhanced. The analysis of the submissions we received testifies to this element. Concrete examples include the attempt to go beyond the authentication of the simple packaging to try and implement modalities through which the food itself and its composition can be authenticated and progressively checked along the supply chain. Along the same line, the creation of a series of redundant checks which include the monitoring and reconciliation of the mass balance of products moving between intermediary points represents an interesting attempt to create additional layers of security.
This constant search for innovation can also be seen in attempts aimed at improving the primary authentication element itself: the code and the label containing it. The submissions we collected allowed us to
appreciate a wide array of technology options which could be used to improve the security of the label
and of the code themselves, including the possibility of integrating various security and authentication elements into the label.
Consumer education is essential in order to implement authentication solutions. The authentication codes used by different providers are frequently easy to scan through the use of smartphone cameras, however, the consumer needs to be aware of the existence of the verification mechanism and of the steps that need to be taken to corroborate the authenticity of the products.
Nuclear analytical techniques:
Forensic analysis through the use of nuclear analytical techniques comes at a different stage, when it is necessary to recognize if a breach of the supply chain happened. Even if these technologies cannot be used to prevent the criminal activity from happening, unless their continuous use over time creates a dissuasive effect on criminals, they play a very important role since they are capable of unequivocally identifying the geographical origin of the products as well as its components or possible adulteration.
The analysis of specific elements in the composition of a product enables the clear authentication of the products. Furthermore, by progressively analysing samples in the supply chain, it will also be able to trace back the source of the incident and present this evidence in court.
The development of portable devices will enable routine analysis, which will provide a highly beneficial tool that would eliminate the limitations that arise from the need to use an external laboratory to examine the samples.
E-commerce:
Monitoring of online markets, social media and e-commerce operators should be improved in order to
assess the evolution of the problem, map applied responses and support law enforcement authorities
in sharing data on suspect violations. This applies in complex situations, including in the case in which the e-commerce operator itself fell in the hands of organized crime and the case in which organized crime acquires control of an enterprise operating in the physical world.
Cooperation should also be enhanced between online payment service providers and law enforcement authorities, in particular to block money flows to illegitimate operators and/or recover money spent by consumers who are victims of fraudulent online practices.
Regarding e-commerce, other platforms should be considered when providing security solutions, including apps and dedicated social network groups and pages created by the criminal group to promote and sell their products.
CHAPTER 3
Illicit trafficking of precious metals
The illicit trafficking of precious metals, including counterfeiting operations, is an issue that affects the socio-economic development of producing countries and of local communities. This form of illicit trade also showed the capacity to evolve and adapt to different scenarios, as demonstrated, for instance, by what happened recently during the COVID-19 outbreak. In view of exploiting profit opportunities created by the pandemic, criminals adopted sophisticated online marketing techniques for the sale of fake gold and silver, significantly increasing the number of websites selling these products. The aim was clearly to take advantage of the uncertainty caused by the pandemic and the vulnerability of the population during the quarantine and stay-at-home measures.1
Prior UNICRI research has shown that the crimes most closely associated with precious metals are illicit trafficking, corruption, product theft and illegal mining, which consists in extractive activities being carried out in violation of environmental, fiscal, statutory and labour law.2
Illegal mining and product theft are attractive activities for criminals because of the ease with which one can process precious metals, as they can be easily reworked and placed into the legitimate market. Moreover, several studies have found a link between illegal gold mining and serious abuses of human rights, including human trafficking and child labour.3
Illegal mining, in fact, is often conducted in remote, abandoned and/or ownerless mines or mines which have been placed under liquidation, where law enforcement capability is limited. When these mines are directly controlled by criminal groups, there is a high risk of human trafficking for forced labour, rape, murder and vigilantism. The United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery reported that middlemen recruiting miners in least developed countries lure them in with advances of money, tools and transport service. Such treatment is then deducted from the salary, overestimating the goods provided and underestimating the quantity and quality of the gold handed over, thus preventing workers from leaving due to debt bondage.4
With respect to child labour, the International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that approximately one million children aged five to 17 are still working in mines worldwide.5 Children are commonly used to enter mine shafts too narrow for adults and/or are required to treat gold-bearing rocks with mercury – which is highly toxic to humans when they are exposed to it. Furthermore, illegal miners may also suffer from malnutrition as they lack adequate water and food supplies due to protracted periods underground in deep level mines.
Another prominent consequence of illegal mining is environmental degradation. The extraction of precious metals often results in deforestation, soil erosion, pollution of soil and water, while the dumping of processed gold bearing material is common to most illegal mining sites.6
1 Anti-Counterfeiting Educational Foundation (ACEF). (2020, April 30). Counterfeits Gone Viral: Online Sales of Fake Gold and Silver Cost Public Millions. Retrieved from https://acefonline.org/counterfeits-gone-viral-online-sales-of-fake-gold-and-silver-cost-publicmillions/ 2 See UNICRI, Strengthening the Security and Integrity of the Precious Metals Supply Chain (2016), available at: http://www.unicri.it/ in_focus/on/Precious_Metals_Supply_Chain_Report 3 See Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, Organized Crime and Illegally Mined Gold in Latin America (2016) available at: https://globalinitiative.net/organized-crime-and-illegally-mined-gold-in-latin-america/ See also OECD, Due Diligence in Colombia’s gold supply chain, overview, available at: https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/Colombia-gold-supply-chain-overview.pdf 4 See OHCHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences, 8 July 2015, available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/regularsessions/session30/documents/a_hrc_30_35_eng.docx 5 See ILO, International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour, Mining and quarrying, available at: https://www.ilo.org/ipec/ areas/Miningandquarrying/lang--en/index.htm 6 See Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, Organized Crime and Illegally Mined Gold in Latin America and UNICRI, Strengthening the Security and Integrity of the Precious Metals Supply Chain.