ANIMAL LAW I DROIT ANIMALIER I DERECHO ANIMAL
Sue Rumbaugh and Kanzi the Bonobo: Lighting the Path Forward and Creating the Predicates of Change Barbara J. Gislason Bien que l’objectif central de cet article soit l’inter-
view de Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, nous reviendrons d’abord sur certaines théories philosophiques et scientifiques sur la conscience. Nous examinerons ensuite, de diverses manières, les préjugés humains et les capacités supérieures des grands singes. À cette fin, nous verrons comment les humains ont évolué au sujet des autres animaux grâce aux contributions de Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, Lucy, Kanzi et Panbanisha – un humain, un chimpanzé et deux bonobos, respectivement. Dans ce contexte, d’autres questions émergent : y-a-t-il d’autres espèces intelligentes parmi nous ? Dans l’affirmative, comment l’État de droit devrait-il évoluer ? La conscience est à la fois tangible et intangible. Il y a des considérations à la fois philosophiques et biologiques. La meilleure compréhension de l’intelligence animale a engendré des débats juridiques sur la notion de conscience en termes de droits et d’obligations juridiques. Cet article plaide pour une réévaluation de la distinction entre conscience humaine et conscience animale.
“When I was young, I visited the great ape bonobo, Kanzi. When I asked him what he wanted, Kanzi used his symbol board to tell me to get a blue ball and yellow bird. When I returned from the store with only a blue ball, he rejected the ball and looked disappointed. Then, while Kanzi watched, I found a yellow marker and drew a picture of a bird on the blue ball. Kanzi then took the ball from me enthusiastically.” Cody Flaherty
Introduction In this article, in addition to the Sue Savage-Rumbaugh interview, we begin by first considering selected philosophical and scientific theories about consciousness. We then look, in various ways, at human bias and whether great apes have higher-order capabilities. To that end, we consider how humans have evolved in their ideas about other animals through the contributions of Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, Lucy, Kanzi, and Panbanisha – a human, chimpanzee, and two bonobos, respectively. In this context, ultimately, these questions emerge: Are there other intel-
Aunque el enfoque central de este artículo es la entrevista de Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, primero consideramos teorías filosóficas y científicas seleccionadas sobre la conciencia. Luego observamos, de varias maneras, el sesgo humano y si los grandes simios tienen capacidades de orden superior. Con ese fin, consideramos cómo los humanos han evolucionado en sus ideas sobre otros animales a través de las contribuciones de Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, Lucy, Kanzi y Panbanisha: un humano, un chimpancé y dos bonobos, respectivamente. En este contexto, en última instancia, surgen estas preguntas: ¿Hay otras especies inteligentes entre nosotros? Si es así, ¿cómo debería evolucionar el Estado de derecho? La conciencia es al mismo tiempo tangible e intangible. Hay consideraciones tanto filosóficas como biológicas. La comprensión cada vez mayor de la inteligencia animal ha generado una discusión sobre lo que significa conciencia en términos de derechos y obligaciones legales. Este artículo sostiene que la distinción entre la conciencia humana y la de « otros » animales debería revalorarse. ligent species among us? If so, how should the Rule of Law evolve?
Philosophy and Science Aristotle, the Greek philosopher, wrote an influential work, The History of Animals. He attributed a sensible soul of perception to “lower” animals. Humans also had a sensible soul, but humans alone were accorded a rational soul capable of rational thought. In the 17th century, the French philosopher René Descartes declared, “I think, therefore I am.” Accordingly, humans must exist to doubt their own existence. Descartes’ advanced ideas including the concept the universe was established by “the great clockmaker,” and humans possessed a mind and body, while other life forms were only matter, a theory now known to us as Cartesian Dualism. As volition, cognition, and reason were in the mind, which only humans had, other animals’ lives were relegated to an unconscious mechanistic trajectory, whereby their pain, if any, was not like humans’ pain. The implications of
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