UP Forum January-February 2016

FORUM UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES

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JANUARY - FEBRUARY 2016

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VOLUME 17 NUMBER 1

Exercising the Right to Vote Unhindered

The contents of this issue are taken from the UP sa Halalan 2016 website http://halalan.up.edu.ph/

The Implication of Not Voting in May | 2

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side from a sense of duty and love of country, more Filipinos should vote on May 9, 2016. The reason is tied to the very essence of democracy.

Statistical analysis indicates that because there are only two effective candidates in local elections, nonvoting will make one’s least preferred candidate win.

Here are the details of my argument: Elections are no doubt stressful for candidates and the Comelec, but such stress is healthy for our democracy. Democracy is often measured through the regularity of electoral exercises and the extent to which these exercises are competitive.

So what if one cannot vote? What has voting got to do with competitive elections? Let us consider what election data in 81 provinces in the Philippines from

Presidential Elections Open Sesame: What and the Country’s We Learned from National Election Data Foreign Policy | 4 n the run-up to the May presidential elections, (1992-2013) | 3

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he Philippines is a signatory to the Open Government initiative; one of the eight original signatories.

While Filipinos have long clamored for freedom of information, the government has complained that no one is using the data that they have made public.

So the objective of this column is to promote open government data use. The column is called OPEN SESAME, in that our articles make use of open data, and “sesame”to refer to the TV show that enabled many of my generation to learn the basics of reading, writing and counting. In other words, this column aims to pro-

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candidates will be held to close scrutiny by the thinking members of the electorate. How well have they thought out the major problems of the country and the potential solutions that can best serve the long-term interests of the Filipino people, instead of the expedient solutions or promises that can merely help get them elected?

Among the myriad issues that will demand attention—perhaps not necessarily the one closest to the needs of Juan dela Cruz but nonetheless of vital strategic importance—is the question of how to handle relations with China. China is a major power

2 UP FORUM Volume 17 No. 1 January - February 2016

Alicor Panao

Photo from Wikicommons

The Implication of Not Voting... continued from page 1

1998 to 2013 tell us.

Let us assume that the proportion of people who did not, or were not able to vote, corresponds to the quotient when the difference between registered voters and actual voters is divided by total votes cast in the gubernatorial race. For simplicity, we allow this proportion ([registered voters – actual voters]/total voters) to represent crudely all those who by sheer pessimism did not choose to vote, as well as those who were disenfranchised by reasons such as, but not limited to, violence, intimidation, force, and fraud.

An election is presumably more competitive if there are more candidates competing effectively.1 An effective candidate, in this case, is one who can mount a campaign credible enough to drive supporters to go to the polls (without necessarily winning it).

Table 1 summarizes the regression estimates showing the relationship between not voting and the competitiveness of elections. The estimates are based on a fixed effect model treating each gubernatorial election for all 81 provinces from 1998 to 2013 as panel. Here, poverty incidence is added as a crude proxy controlling for socioeconomic conditions. Politicians, after all, are known to exploit socioeconomic inequalities to mobilize or demobilize voters.

The estimates suggest the strong relationship between not voting and the competitiveness of the electoral exercise. This implies that elections become less competitive when people skip— or for some reason, were prevented from going to—the polls.

On average, one in three (33.7 percent) registered voters

Table 1. The relationship between voting and competitive elections2

will not likely, or will never be able to vote. Overall voter turnout in the Philippines, however, is considered high. The national mean voter turnout for the Philippines from 1967 to 2013, according to the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), is 78.49 percent. The first post-Marcos congressional election in 1987 saw the highest voter turnout at 90 percent. The national election during Arroyo’s succession presidency, on the other hand, had the most dismal (63.68 percent). The national figures, however, do not reflect the political exclusions that take place in the countryside.

Curiously, for gubernatorial elections held between 1998 and 2013, the average number of effective candidates in the Philippines is only two. The provinces listed in Table 2 had incumbents who competed for the gubernatorial seat virtually unopposed during these election years. Interestingly, most3 of the unopposed, winning candidates in these provinces happen to have previously occupied the gubernatorial seat as incumbents or succeeded a relative.4 The fact that many of these candidates belong to well-entrenched political families is arguably incidental. We certainly do not intend to imply anything about competitive elections and political families. Furthermore, the estimates are crude and admittedly needs more refinements.

What is apparent is that it is the voters who ultimately bear the brunt of their electoral choices, as well as the lack of it. In many instances, votes are not waived but robbed from the people using violence or fraud. For those who can exercise the right unhindered, the data hints that we are doing our least preferred candidate a favor whenever we waive our franchise.

In the absence of quality candidates, some may be of the impression it is better to boycott than choose between lesser evils. And that may just be what the least preferred candidate wants.

Table 2. Gubernatorial candidates wh

-------------------Rogelio Alicor L. Panao is an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman. He holds an MA in Industrial Relations from UPD and an MA in Public Administration and PhD in Political Science from the International Christian University, Tokyo. His research interests include quantitative analysis and quantitative research methods.

This article can be accessed at the UP sa Halalan website (http://halalan.up.edu.ph/viewpoints/by-experts/238implications-of-not-voting-in-may?highlight=WyJhbGljb3IiXQ==).

Notes:

1 Adopting Golosov’s formula for computing effective number of parties, we can derive a similar index equal to Σ(pi/(pi + p12 – pi2)), where pi is the candidate’s vote share (votes received out of the total votes), p12 is the square of the share of the candidate with the highest vote, and pi2 is the square of the each candidate’s vote share.

2 Those interested to run their own estimates may request the dataset compiled by the Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG).

3 Except for Saranggani in 2013, Dinagat Island in 2007, Apayao in 1998, and Tawi Tawi in 2004.

4 A relative here is one who is related to the winning candidate by consanguinity or affinity up to the third degree.

UP FORUM Volume 17 No. 1 January - February 2016 3

Open Sesame...continued from page 1

Erwin A. Alampay Figure 1: National Election Voting mote the beginner’s appreciation of open data and a more open government.

This of course comes with a caveat, as the data that is open is, as yet, narrow and limited in scope and depth. Perhaps by using the data, government will be encouraged to make more of it accessible so that we can have better analytics.

This piece will focus on elections, and we make use of available data that is open in the COMELEC website. Perusing the data, two questions come to mind: 1. How relevant is the NCR vote in the national elections?

2. What is the proportion of females who run for electoral positions,vis-à-vis the proportion who are elected?

The NCR Vote Much of our political and media life is concentrated in Metro Manila. Hence, much of the political ‘noise’ tends to reflect Metro Manila issues. How does this translate to actual votes during elections?

Figure 1 shows the actual number of votes cast over the last eight national elections. It illustrates that the proportion of NCR votes cast has declined in proportion to the overall total. In the 1992 and 1998 elections, the proportion was Figure 2. NCR Voting Population and Actual Number of Voters

ho won virtually unopposed, 1998-2013

approximately 14 percent. By 2010, this decreased to 11.2 percent, and in 2013, 10.5 percent. In other words, the impact of NCR on national election results has been in decline. (See Figure 2.)

Consistent with this decline is the data showing that constituents in NCR are not voting as much as those inother regions. The average turnout in NCR in the past eight years has only been 68 percent.

The next lowest turnout is Region XII, at 72 percent. Contrast this with the Ilocanos in Region I who are 83 percent strong in their votes! (See Figure 3.)

Figure 3

Breaking the glass ceiling?

Why are there fewer females than males in elected posts? Are they less likely to win an election? Data from the COMELEC from the 2013 elections shown in Figure 4.

For almost every position where there were female candidates, the proportion of females elected was higher than the proportion of those who ran for candidacy. This pattern can be concretely illustrated as follows: that given 12 senatorial slots and 50 candidates, let’s say only 10 are female (i.e., 20%). However, the proportion of females who are elected is higher, for instance 3 of the 12 slots or 25% of those elected are female.

Thus, the available data suggests that one reason there are less females relative to males in political positions is because not enough of them are running for office.

Lessons There are two implications from this data set that might be relevant to the upcoming election. In a likely tight election, the mobilization of eligible voters is key and the decline of NCR votes is worth investigating and understanding . The ‘noise’ we hear would not matter in the end (especially the noise in social media), if people do not or are unable to vote.

As for getting more females in elected positions, the data imply that this begins with getting more of them nominated. The data suggest that they are “winnable”, and in fact have won a larger share than their proportion of candidates.

This year, two of the five Presidential candidates are female, as is one of the five Vice Preisdential candidates. Whether they will win the office is, unfortunately, not revealed in the current open data.

-------------------Erwin A. Alampay. PhD, is an associate professor at the National College of Public Administration and Governance (NCPAG) at the University of the Figure 4 Philippines, and director of the Center for Local and Regional Governance (CLRG) He is currently a senior research fellow at LirneAsia, an Asian regional ICT policy and regulation think-tank.

This article can be accessed at the UP sa Halalan website (http://halalan.up.edu.ph/ viewpoints/by-experts/195-open-sesame-whatwe-learned-from-national-election-data-from1992-to-2013?highlight=WyJhbGFtcGF5IiwiY WxhbXBheSdzIl0=).

4 UP FORUM Volume 17 No. 1 January - February 2016

Photo from Wikicommons

Presidential Elections and the Country’s Foreign Policy... continued from page 1

Aileen S.P. Baviera with still growing regional and global influence, whether on questions of global financial stability, international security, energy, climate change, and more. It also happens to be a key protagonist and our major adversary in the single most challenging external security concern of the country at present—the territorial and maritime disputes in the West Philippine Sea. Thus far, the disputes have not led to armed confrontation, but the trends point toward increased militarization, expansion of occupation and presence, and the hardening of positions of the various states concerned. Finding a political solution based on law and diplomacy will be no easy task. The alternative—not finding one—could be tragic. How will the next president deal with this matter?

On the other hand, managing our relations with the United States and updating the defense alliance in response to a changing regional environment will be equally challenging.

This comes at a sensitive crossroads in US history when it is economically weak, with its internal politics in disarray, and when it is arguably losing its claim to leadership even over some traditional allies and friends. The U.S. remains the most formidable military force on the planet indeed, and it is still believed to be the most credible guarantor of regional stability in our part of the world. But it is grappling with the right approach to simultaneous challenge—including domestic ones, the Islamic State, a resurgent Russia, and an ambitious and assertive China. What role we want the U.S. to play in our own region and with re-

spect to our own national aspirations, is something the next President would do well to consider.

The Philippines is a developing country that now finds itself sandwiched between these two big powers.

Having the twelfth largest population in the world and situated in its most dynamic region, we are by no means a small country. Yet in our foreign policy, we have tended to behave as if we were, looking inward or only a short distance beyond our shores, or where our migrant communities and overseas workers seem to need government help.We have also tended to rely too much on partners and allies to do the heavy lifting for us.

The Philippine presidency in fact has a very powerful role in shaping the contours of Philippine diplomacy.

Often referred to as the chief architect of foreign relations, a Philippine president can redefine priorities, dictate the tone and posture, and even personally manage diplomacy with selected countries if he or she so wishes, subject to some structural constraints.

Such constraints include the Constitution, treaties that our previous governments have committed to, and obligations under international law.

The biggest constraint of all, however, is the lack of power and wealth the Philippines is faced with relative to other members of the international community, as these can determine how much influence we can actually wield, or not.

Even if we have faith in international norms, principles, and legal institutions, or in being on the side of “right” against “might,” and even if there are

allies and other countries with whom some of our interests may converge, ultimately the Filipino nation—like any other—is left to fend for itself.

It must defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity, mitigate threats from outside our borders, and ensure an external environment that allows us to prosper and our best values and beliefs (i.e., our identity as a people) to thrive. And the highest responsibilty for that sits with the President.

Moreover, the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces holds that most hallowed and grave authority (albeit needing concurrence

by Congress) to determine when and why Filipinos must go to war. This is notwithstanding the fact that in our Constitution, the people have renounced the use of war as an instrument of national policy.

Both by law and tradition and because of our political culture, the Philippine President enjoys much leeway to put his or her personal stamp on the nation’s foreign policy. We can speak, for instance, of a Marcos foreign policy, a Ramos foreign policy, a Macapagal-Arroyo foreign policy, and even an Aquino III foreign policy.

However, when one tries to conceptualize and explain “Philippine foreign policy” (other than in the broadest generalities such as the much-touted “three pillars” of national security, economic diplomacy and assistance to nationals), many of us will draw a blank. In fact, one feature of our foreign policy across presidencies has been the lack of consistency and continuity, which does not help build confidence in government whether

among our own people, our allies or adversaries.

In practice, we have also seen the downside of having presidents who lacked an understanding of statecraft, and we have been in situations where the institutions or individuals tasked with foreign policy management (the Cabinet, DFA, DND, among others) lacked the capability, the courage or the élan to step up and provide vision or leadership when presidents failed to do so. In such instances, we end up with a foreign policy of “muddling through.” This is something we can no longer afford to do.

By no means do we expect our presidents to be great statesmen in the likes of Zhou Enlai, Gandhi and Mandela. However, we do deserve leaders who will know how to interact with other leaders and governments in order to serve the best interests of the nation, without getting us deeper into conflict or injecting major uncertainties into already complex regional relations. Who among the candidates for the highest office can best understand how challenging this is?

-------------------Aileen S.P. Baviera is professor at the Asian Center, University of the Philippines, editor in chief of the international journal Asian Politics & Policy, and president of Asia Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation, Inc. This brief commentary was written for APPFI and UP’s Halalan project. It first appeared in <appfi.ph>.

This article can be accessed at the UP sa Halalan website (http://halalan.up.edu. ph/viewpoints/by-experts/192-presidentialelections-and-the-country-s-foreign-policy ?highlight=WyJiYXZpZXJhIl0=).

UP FORUM Volume 17 No. 1 January - February 2016 5

What kind of laws does our Congress legislate?

Table 1

Alicor Panao

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t must have been a shock for health officials and public health advocates to have learned that about a billion pesos was slashed from the Department of Health’s budget.

The amount, allocated for the purchase of reproductive health commodities, was reportedly stricken out surreptitiously during the bicameral conference for the 2016 budget bill.

Reproductive health is among the issues considered priority by majority of Filipinos. Pulsa Asia’s 2007 survey on family planning, for instance, showed that an overwhelming majority of Filipinos believe in the importance of family planning and in government’s duty to provide budgetary support for it. Its 2010 survey, on the other hand, indicated that about seven out of 10 Filipinos agree with the reproductive health provisions of what would become the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012. The more recent 2015 Ulat ng Bayan, meanwhile, reveals that controlling the burgeoning population is among the ten most urgent concerns (although less pressing compared to the need to control inflation and increasing workers’ pay).

If legislators are supposed to champion the aspirations of their constituents, then those who orchestrated the slash betrayed their mandate. Could this be an isolated case of one or two legislators reneging on their duty? Unfortunately, the pattern of legislative output in the past two decades suggests such inadvertence is collective.

Table 1 lists the top 10 issues Filipinos consider urgent, based on Pulse Asia’s 2001 Ulat ng Bayan national survey.

We expect our representatives to respond to these issues and work for more laws to address them. However, since the restoration of democracy in 1987, Congress has been pretty much consistent in what it regards as policy priorities. The tables show the most common areas of legislation from the 8th to the 14th Congress. These bills

Table 2

Photo from Wikipedia

passed the third reading at the House of Representatives during the post-Marcos administrations, except that of Benigno Aquino III. With the types of laws passed since 1987 it can be observed that there is a particular tendency toward local and private laws—in particular, laws that provide local infrastructure projects such as the construction of school buildings, hospitals, and other public works. This should not come as a surprise because constituencies expect representatives to bring home as much of the bacon (or “pork” when it was still warranted prior to Belgica v. Executive Secretary). In theory, reelection-conscious politicians eager to make a maximal reputational impression on prospective voters will try to deliver projects into their districts to bolster their reelection bid, according to Shepsle, Van Houweling, Abrams and Hanson. Constituencies, in turn, are no stranger to large billboards in front of school buildings or by the roadside publicizing how these edifices were made possible through their representatives. Moreover, these types of legislation are issue neutral, non-controversial, and unlikely to spark debate among colleagues in Congress. It may only be incidental that it is also in such local infrastructure projects that many unexplained disbursements take place.

Interestingly, even on laws considered to be of national significance, the most frequent areas of legislation are still “low risk.” (See table on page 15.) Obviously, the grant of legislative franchises to corporations to operate a business or to exploit natural resources is a favorite area of legislation, even on laws of national significance. Franchises invite investments and create jobs but must they take precedence over more salient legislation such as taxation or public health?

Representatives, by definition, are supposed to advocate for the collective aspirations of the public. Ideally, therefore, legislative enactments must also reflect the continued on page 15

Table 3

Table 4

6 UP FORUM Volume 17 No. 1 January - February 2016

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he Philippines is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. As a State Party, the Philippines is subject to review by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child and feedback on its progress in ensuring that the rights of Filipino children are being met. The Council on the Welfare of Children (CWC) is the mandated institutional mechanism of the Philippine government responsible for the coordination, implementation and monitoring of the State party‘s international and national commitments or obligations to its children.

To date, the Philippines has submitted three reports to the UNCRC. The last was a consolidated report for the third and fourth reporting period which covered the period between 2000-2008.

In 2009, the Philippine NGO Coalition submitted its Alternative Report to the UNCRC and concluded that Filipino children were marginalized as a result of then President Arroyo’s development agenda.

This essay aims to track what the Philippine government has done in the succeeding years, with a special focus on the Aquino administration (2010-2016). Data that pertains to three aspects of children’s rights monitoring were sought out and examined: (1) the Philippines’ response to previous UNCRC recommendations; (2) promotion of children’s right to life, survival and development; and (3) the safeguarding of children’s right to protection.

Responding to UNCRC’s previous recommendations While the UNCRC cited the Philippines for providing an adequate legal framework for the promotion of children’s rights, there were some issues that called for a legislative response: minimum age of sexual consent; discrimination against children born out of wedlock; child pornography; prohibition of corporal punishment in all settings; and prohibition of torture.

Three laws were passed in 2009 as the Philippines’ response to these recommendations: RA 9858 recognizes the legitimacy of children born out of wedlock; RA 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act and RA 9745 or the Anti-Torture Act. However, two other issues, raising the minimum age of sexual consent and the prohibition of corporal punishment, have bills still pending in Congress.

Promoting children’s right to life, survival and development Poverty poses the most serious threat to children’s right to life, survival and development. The Aquino administration has been harping about the significant increase in the country’s GDP compared to that in the Arroyo years (6.22 vs. 3.9). While data show a slight decrease in poverty incidence (from 28.7 percent to 26.8 percent), no data on child poverty is available after 2009. In 2009, around 13.4 million, or 36 percent of all children below 18, are considered income poor.

The Philippines has also shown significant strides in its battle against malnutrition. The 2013 data showed a significant decline in the prevalence of underweight children since 1990 (from 27.3 to 19.9).

But this trend was not enough to meet the 2015 Millennium Development Goals' (MDG) target of 13.6. The country also has managed to reduce under-5 mortality (from 64.2 in 1990 to 30) and infant mortality rates (from 33.6 in 1990 to 22)

Are Filipino Children Still at the Margins?

Photo from Wikicommons

Children’s Rights Implementation under the Aquino Administration Jay A. Yacat based on 2013 data.

Children’s right to education is promoted through universal access to basic education. Available data show that while net enrolment rate in elementary education has significantly increased (from 83.2 percent in 2006 to 95.2 percent in 2012); cohort survival rates and completion rates registered only minimal increases. However, data on secondary education were modest at best. While net enrolment rate increased (60.46 percent to 64.61 percent), cohort survival rates and completion rates slightly decreased.

The Aquino administration’s centerpiece program, the Pantawid ng Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps), aims to keep more Filipino children by providing families with small monetary incentives depending on the number of children kept in school. Given more emphasis in this term, school participation registered slight increases, especially for children age 6-15 years (range of 90- 98.4 percent) in 2011 compared to 2007. In 2012, it was recommended that the period of assistance to existing children-beneficiaries go beyond five years and cover families with children aged 15-18.

On June 2014, the DSWD started with the Modified Conditional Cash Transfer (MCCT) - Expanded Age Coverage (EAC) of the 4Ps. As of 31 July 2014, there are 888,350 households with children 15-18 and 924,066 children aged 15-18 included in the program. No data has yet been released

that would allow an examination of the impact of this change.

Safeguarding children’s right to protection If there is one aspect that the Aquino administration is not giving as much emphasis, it is in the safeguarding of children’s right to protection from abuse and exploitation.

A bill banning corporal punishment in all settings has been pending in Congress since 2007. The bill was passed by the House of Representatives but has languished in the Senate for some time now. In 2013, Congress passed RA 10627: Anti-Bullying Act of 2013, which outlines mechanisms to deal with bullying incidents in both public and private schools. The law covers basic and secondary education.

Children still fall victims to rape. In 2013, the Philippine National Police recorded a total of 5,493 rape incidents involving women and child victims.

Meanwhile, data from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) show that most victims are girls aged 14-18.

With the new law on child pornography, DSWD has reportedly served a total of 150 cases of child pornography and cyber pornography from 2010 to 2013. However, online child sex tourism is reported to be flourishing. No data on prosecution of perpetuators or details about the rehabilitation of chil-

dren victim-survivors are available.

Another protection issue is child trafficking. The Philippines is primarily a source country for children subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor. In February 2013, Republic Act No. 10364 or the Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act effectively amended RA 9208 to include sanctions for attempted trafficking and accomplices. Authorities have convicted 53 sex traffickers, an increase from 31 in 2013, and acquitted three individuals. It obtained one conviction for labor trafficking.

Meanwhile, majority of the children victims of trafficking were subjected to forced labor. However, only five of the 26 facilities had the capacity to shelter male victims, and some boy victims were placed in shelters for children in conflict with the law. Protective services for male victims remained scarce, and the DSWD prematurely discharged them without investigating for trafficking indicators.

On a related concern, about three million children work in hazardous conditions based on 2011 data from the National Statistics Office (NSO).

Children are one of the most vulnerable sectors at the time of disasters. An estimated 5.9 million children were affected by Typhoon Yolanda. A myriad of problems confront children after a natural disaster. Conditions were poor in evacuation centers, negatively impacting children’s health and survival. Many continued on page 7

UP FORUM Volume 17 No. 1 January - February 2016 7

Are Filipino Children Still at the Margins?... continued from page 6

Concluding observations and recommendations Mechanisms for monitoring and documentation remain lacking: Data still not disaggregated based on age; and children's data are almost always lumped together with adult data. Despite clamor from the international community, child protection systems are still not fully in place or integrated in the different levels of governance.

Are Filipino children still at the margins? Not as much as before but they are still not yet front and center of the development agenda. The legislative framework is already in place and to a certain extent the necessary financial resources are already allocated. Compared to his predecessor, Aquino has poured in more resources for social services yet can do a lot more if funds are efficiently used. The challenge is how the government can be more responsive, coordinated and efficient in the implementation.

-------------------Jay A. Yacat is an associate professor of the Department of Psychology, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines, Diliman.

This article can be accessed at the UP sa Halalan website (http://halalan. up.edu.ph/viewpoints/by-experts/270are-filipino-children-still-at-the-margi ns?highlight=WyJ5YWNhdCJd).

The Challenge of Informed Decision-Making on International Migration Jorge V. Tigno

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ince the 1970s, millions of Filipinos have gone abroad in search of better job opportunities. For a growing number of Filipino families, overseas labor migration has become the only option to escape poverty. A substantial portion of these overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) are women who take on jobs primarily in the services sector as factory workers, entertainers, nurses, and so on.

These OFWs are celebrated as modern-day heroes (bagong bayani) in recognition of all the sacrifices

of overseas labor migration does not even exist.

The need for evidence-based decision-making on migration, however, is not entirely lost on our development planners. The Migrant Workers Act of 1995 (RA 8042) provides for the establishment of a Shared Government Information System for Migration (SGISM) to be initially composed of the harmonized databases of over a dozen different government agencies.

But over the last 20 years the country

they have made and endured for the sake of their families. They have also made tremendous contributions to the Philippine economy through their income remittances.The instrumental role of the national government in managing international migration has become more and more evident and institutionalized over the last four and a half decades. The Philippines has been acknowledged globally as a laborsending country par excellence with its highly developed and specialized labor migration management system. Yet, ironically, international migration does not seem to be on the minds of our development planners and policy-makers.

Information is a basic requirement to effective policy-making. Any decision made by government must be based on hard evidence. Informed decisionmaking is no longer just a principle to pay lip-service to but a real prerequisite for good government. Sadly, while much is known about migration in the popular discourse, very little is acknowledged on the development planning side. While our Philippine Development Plans (PDPs) have made passing mention of migration from time to time, there is no substantial and decisive treatment of the role that international migration plays in development planning precisely because no significant information about migration is conveyed. This is not to say that migration ought to play a central role in the country’s development plans.

Rather, our development planners must stop pretending that the phenomenon

has yet to have a real (much less, functional) shared government information system on migration.

The updated 2011-2016 Philippine Development Plan makes a passing mention (once again) of the importance of generating and consolidating migration information when it stated that “administrative and field data of various government agencies on international migration will be harmonized for evidence-based policymaking and planning” and “the Shared Government Information System on Migration (SGISM) will be operationalized in response to the challenges and opportunities of migration” (p. 162). Unfortunately, there is no further discussion on a specific timeline for the establishment of such a shared information system or of how this is to be achieved in concrete terms. Is this simply a pipe

dream?

The next political administration must be sensitive to this glaring need.

The next president must be mindful of the necessity to get this information system off the ground. Understandably, a major challenge is for those different government agencies to overcome their sense of turf. This strong sense of bureaucratic selfishness can undermine any effort to share and consolidate migration data for sound development decision-making purposes. Any political capital that the next president will acquire can be utilized to overcome this turfing problem.

The next administration would do well to tap the resources already at its disposal willing to contribute its fair share to national development. One such resource is the country’s academic institutions. In many cases, information is generated, consolidated, analyzed by universities and other similar academic institutions or intelligence agencies. Universities represent the think-tanks for the larger society and polity. These universities can be mandated to

Photo from the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration website

of the school infrastructure are destroyed and those that remained standing were converted into evacuation centers. Children had to stop schooling or were sent to other places to continue their schooling. Children became vulnerable to sexual abuse and exploitation as well.

Children in situations of armed conflict also face parallel problems. For example, an estimated 71,000 children were affected by the Zamboanga siege in 2013.

Whole villages were evacuated to avoid civilian casualties but the evacuation sites posed severely poor living conditions. Another serious issue is the use of children as combatants. A 2012 UN report revealed there were 11 recorded incidents of recruitment and use of children in conflict in the Philippines. These involved 23 boys and two girls aged 12 to 17 years old.

Children in conflict with the law are another sensitive matter.

No updated statistics on CICL are available beyond 2009. In 2012, RA 10630 amended the earlier law (RA 9344) and required local government units (LGUs) to manage juvenile intervention and support centers called “Bahay Pag-asa” (House of Hope) As of 2014, there are 21 such houses nationwide. A 2014 UNICEF evaluation of 15 programs that cater to CICL found that the programs provided a suitable environment for the rehabilitation and reintegration of CICL. However, there are still calls by some sectors to amend the law by lowering the age of criminal responsibility.

Impossible Mission?

provide the impetus for the systematic and comprehensive study of migration and its impact on development. As its only national university, UP can play a role in making sure that a shared government information system on migration does not remain a pipe dream for long.

-------------------Jorge Villamor Tigno is currently the chairperson of the Department of Political Science and secretary-general of the Philippine Migration Research Network (PMRN).

He has a doctorate in public administration from the UP National College of Public Administration and Governance (NCPAG).

This article can be accessed at the UP sa Halalan website (http://halalan.up.edu. ph/viewpoints/by-experts/187-impossiblemission-the-challenge-of-informeddecision-making-on-internationalmigration?highlight=WyJ0aWdubyJd).migr ation?highlight=WyJ0aWdubyJd).

8 UP FORUM Volume 17 No. 1 January - February 2016

Entertaining Politics and Politicizing Entertainment John Andrew G. Evangelista

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ilipinos have been fascinated with entertainment even before colonization.

From traditional public recitations of our epics to the contemporary forms of storytelling in kalyeseryes, we always find ways to entertain ourselves. Perhaps, our fascination with entertainment has been reinforced throughout our history of suffering. We treat entertainment as a way to ‘escape’ our daily troubles. In effect, we anoint entertainers as ‘heroes’ who save us from our melancholic lives.

Electoral campaigns deploy celebrity endorsers to capture the attention of the voting public. This strategy plays around with both our fascination with entertainment and our adoration of entertainers. Celebrities are perceived as effective tools to draw and mobilize crowds into campaign rallies.

Not to mention, the recent decades have also shown a substantial number of celebrities elected in various national and local positions. This indicates the currency of celebrities in Philippine electoral politics.

‘Smoke Screen’ Celebrities Entertainers are trained continued on page 9

The Crises of Representation in the Philipp and the Role of Charter Change Aries A. Arugay

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he Aquino Administration would like to believe that it has made strides in improving transparency and accountability. While there is empirical support for this, corruption is not the only gripping problem of Philippine democracy. There is also a need to improve government responsiveness, political inclusion, and popular participation. There is reason to believe that current political leadership has not paid attention to these dimensions of democracy. With this in mind, the 2016 elections should be an opportunity for the new administration to explore instituting political reforms by amending the 1987 Constitution.

Existing assessments of Philippine democracy reveal a current state of stagnation. Democratization, a process that was rebooted in 1986, seemed to be trapped in suspended animation. One study attributed this to the inability of the democratic regime to integrate different groups within society to the electoral process as well as policy-making. The long-list of identified challenges relates to dynastic politics, costly elections, clientelism, weak political parties, and the absence of meaningful public participation. The deficits, if not addressed, could worsen into a full-blown crisis of representation as seen in other countries, some of which descended into a downward spiral of polarization and instability.

Many of the progressive provisions of the 1987 Constitution, a document

that will turn 30 years old next year, remain only on paper. Bills related to the prohibition of political dynasties, freedom of information, campaign finance, popular initiative, and local sectoral representation languished in Congress that only wanted to tinker with the charter if it will lift their term limits, or remove the protectionist provisions in the country’s economy.

Some presidents have pushed for a shift to a parliamentary system. As the constitution that was borne out of a brutal and corrupt dictatorship, it is particularly interesting that oligarchic interests predominate in charter change debates, rather than a desire for popular empowerment and political institutionalization. Unsurprisingly, such moves in the past were met with opposition from civil society and the public at large. Even the Benigno Simeon Aquino Administration entertained the idea but quickly backtracked given overwhelming negative public opinion.

If the next administration is sincere in implementing political reforms, amending the 1987 Constitution should figure prominently in the 2016 Presidential Elections. So far, only one candidate has espoused a grand redesign of the political system by advocating for federalism. Other candidates have hinted to an openness to changing the charter’s economic provisions.

But what is to be done to remove the scourge on charter change. The answer

could be in framing it toward institutional and electoral reform aimed at improving political representation.

In the institutional design scholarly literature, political scientists believe that changing rules and institution alter the incentives of politicians and the public in their electoral choices.

However, political culture, historical legacies, and other factors, can muddle the pure effects of institutional change as well as generate unintended consequences. It is, therefore, important to adopt reforms that are calibrated in nature rather than seek grand redesign of the political system without regard for contextual conditions.

What are some institutions and rules that could be subject to constitutional change?

1) The Presidency and the VicePresidency. One proposal is to have two-round elections for the president. Ifno candidate can get the majority vote in the run-off, there will be a second round where only the top two candidates will be allowed to run. This is aimed at providing a strong and popular mandate to the chief executive for effective governance. Another change should be the adoption of a straight-ticket rule in choosing the president and the vice-president.

The current rules that allow votesplitting undermine cohesion and loyalty between the two. Also important is to discuss whether to

allow presidents to run again but not immediately after their term, a rule observed in Latin American democracies.

2) The Senate. Compared to its counterparts around the world, the Philippine Senate is unusual given its national-level constituency and equal powers with the other chamber of the legislature.

Bicameralism is often adopted in federal systems to ensure all the regions or states are equally represented in one house of the legislature. The change could be oriented toward having regionallevel representation, increasing its number, and diminishing some of its powers related to the House of Representatives 3) Supreme Court. Several countries have created a Constitutional Court to settle issues related to constitutionality. This court is separate from the Supreme Court and will exclusively interpret disputes between interpretations of the charter. This can de-clog the judicial dockets as well as temper the powers of the Supreme Court.

4) Campaign Finance. To date, only individual candidates rather than parties are required to report campaign expenditures to the Commission on Elections. Also, there is no state funding or contributions to election campaigns of parties whether in the form of

UP FORUM Volume 17 No. 1 January - February 2016 9

Entertaining Politics...continued from page 8 to perform. They are expected to make us believe in something that is not there.

Differently put, their job is to make us see substance in something hollow. They are able to make us fall in love when there is no love. A heartthrob (if he is a good actor) can convincingly say ‘I love you’ to his leading lady in a kalyeserye even without actual feelings. He needs to tell the love narrative so he can entertain the audience.

This is not to say that entertainers are liars. Good performers can convincingly perform because the scenario becomes true to them.

They use their real experiences to create make-believe moments relatable to the audience.

The ability to substantiate something hollow is what many politicians count on celebrities during elections.

The ability of entertainers to say “Mapagmahal si Candidate X!” with conviction and charisma is what makes them marketable during elections. This same ability can act as the smoke screen veiling social issues from the voting public.

Most celebrities,when they endorse candidates, stress ‘good’ personal qualities oftheir personal bets. They use statements like “Mabait po siya,” “May puso sa mahihirap,” “Mapagmahal sa bayan,” and “May malasakit.” These statements seem to redirect the discussion from social issues to personal traits. The discourse becomes one of personal morality. It contributes to the creation of standards where candidates are assessed based on personal traits.

These statements or standards seem fair or benign in the surface.

They become dangerous when they tend to highlight personal moral qualities and overlook other important qualities like competence, efficiency, experience, and track record in governance. The tendency is to provide absolute judgment based on one factor alone. The tendency also is to portray these personal moral standards as ideal standards since they came from the mouth of our ‘celebrity heroes.’

Reconfiguring the Use of Celebrities Entertainers’ abilities to tell stories using their personal truths provide the possibility to transform their role during elections. Without taking the right of celebrities to endorse, I think their role should include tackling social issues affecting them and their admirers. Instead of just highlighting personal qualities of the candidates, they can help deepen the discussion by providing a way for the voting public to reflect on their stories and figure out what issues they deem relevant to them.

In an interview by Rappler published online on August 10, 2015, Lea Salonga was asked different issue-based questions about reproductive health, gay marriage, social network and the state of the arts.

Without endorsing a particular candidate, Salonga used her personal experiences as an artist to grapple with her support for reproductive health and marriage equality.

Salonga’s interview showcased self-reflection. By using her personal experiences with gays and lesbians, she was able to understand why she supports marriage equality.

Instead of setting a standard of judging candidates, this self-reflection provided an example of how each of us can reflect on our experiences and figure out what issues are important to us. This will enrich our way of assessing candidates come May 2016.

-------------------John Andrew G. Evangelista finished his bachelor’s degree in Social Sciences from the University of the Philippines Baguio in 2010.

He currently teaches sociology in Diliman where he is also taking up his master’s degree in sociology. He is interested in gender and sexuality studies, particularly in the history of LGBT activism in the Philippines.

This article can be accessed at the UP sa Halalan website (http://halalan.up.edu. ph/viewpoints/by-experts/249-entertaining-politics-and-politicizing-entertainment?hi ghlight=WyJldmFuZ2VsaXN0YSJd).

ines

finances or free air time to media outfits. Reforming campaign finance can address the costliness of the elections and limit the ability of powerful economic interests to fill a politician’s electoral war chest.

5) Popular Initiative. There is no current law to give substance to the 1987 Constitution’s provisions on popular initiative and other mechanisms of direct democracy.

This is despite the fact that it is considered as a mode of constitutional change and policy formulation. Also, while there is a law that allows for the electoral recall of local politicians through popular initiative, none exists at the national level.

The proposals in this five institutions are only some of the possible reforms to improve the quality of democratic representation in the Philippines. Extensive research and debate is necessary to fully appreciate the consequences and limitations of these proposals.

However, a critical caveat is in order. The chosen means of changing the 1987 Constitution is of pivotal importance. Any attempt for members of Congress to lead this initiative will sow doubt and be deprived of public legitimacy. It is time for the country to have a genuinely popular, inclusive, and meaningful process of constitutional change as seen in several

Members of the House of Representatives pose for posterity following a five-hour orientation on the intricacies and art of being effective legislators, held in July 2013. Photos by G. Engay and P. Camero, Media Relations Service, House of Representatives.

Latin American countries. An elected constitutional convention that ensures representation from different regions as well as under-represented sectors of society will allow ordinary Filipinos to own the process and, therefore, the outcome. To quote one ex-civil society leader, “We must take away reform from those who needs to be reformed”.

The 2016 presidential elections is a great opportunity to pressure politicians to make a stand on the need for political reforms to make Philippine democracy representative but also to

pave the way for ordinary Filipinos to be part of this process. After all, what other great presidWential legacy could there be than to have a genuine people’s constitution enacted during one’s term?

-------------------Aries Arugay is associate professor at the Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines. He is also executive director of the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Inc., a nongovernmental policy research organization on security,

democracy, and developments issues in the Asia-Pacific.

This essay was drawn from the lecture titled “Institutions Matter! Redesigning Representation and Philippine Democratization delivered at the Third World Studies Public Forum Series on February 18, 2016, at the University of the Philippines-Diliman.

This article can be accessed at the UP sa Halalan website (http://halalan. up.edu.ph/viewpoints/by-experts/246the-crises-of-representation-in-thephilippines-and-the-role-of-charter-cha nge?highlight=WyJhcnVnYXkiXQ==).

10 UP FORUM Volume 17 No. 1 January - February 2016

Choosing leaders with clear environment platforms Weena Gera

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rban growth and environment experts called on voters to evaluate the development and ecological agenda of candidates as they choose who to vote in the Philippine national elections on May 9.

The country needs leaders who are sensitive to the need for better urban growth management and sustainable practices in the face of climate change, the experts said at the public forum called Sayran, Barugan! on 20 March 2016.

The event co-hosted by University of the Philippines Cebu and TV 5 at the school's main campus in Cebu City served as a prelude to the second leg of 2016 presidential debates organized by the Commission on Elections. The event was part of UP’s aim to facilitate intelligent discourse for a broad audience and shape an informed electorate.

Incoming leaders should promote climate smart development, said Atty. Gloria Estenzo Ramos, Vice President of Oceana Philippines and a UP Diliman alumna.

Voters must choose leaders with a sustainability mindset, Ramos said, noting that the presidential candidates—Mayor Rodrigo Duterte, Vice President Jejomar Binay, Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Sen. Grace Poe and former Interior Secretary Manuel Roxas II—were vague in their statements on the environment.

In her presentation dubbed The Agenda of Climate, Environment and Disaster Preparedness for the Philippines amidst its Acute Vulnerability, Ramos cited the government's failure to enforce “world-class environmental laws,” to end abusive practices such as illegal commercial fishing and “fossil fuel-obsessed lifestyles.” continued on page 11

Dealing with Criminal (In)Justice in the Philippines Justin Keith Baquisal

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entral American countries have a term for repressive policing strategies on crime: “Mano Dura” (Iron Fist). The tough rhetoric on crime policy in a region marked by high homicide rates and gang violence has propelled candidates into the presidencies of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Perhaps we are heading in that direction too.

In the other side of the Pacific Ocean, the Duterte-Cayetano tandem has brought the crime problem front and center in the 2016 national elections. Their law and order platform aims to eliminate criminality within three to six months. Presidential debates have talked about the reintroduction of death penalty and the power of the police to ‘shoot to kill’ criminals who resist enforcement officers.

The heavy-handed approach to law enforcement has been presented as a necessary precondition for national development. The amount of faith poured into this platform is astonishing, to say the least: Duterte and Cayetano have promised to increase the salaries of policemen to a range of 75,000 to 100,000 pesos each—a radical increase from a Police Officer I’s pay grade of 14, 834 pesos monthly.

In a country where the law is of little significance, whether to the corrupt politician who plunders the public coffers or to the petty car driver who can’t

even follow traffic lights, it appears that getting tough on crime is an idea whose time has come.

The terms of the debate Discussions on more authoritative solutions to the crime problem have to be understood within the climate of heightened collective fear, and could play a crucial role in short-run policy preferences. Indeed, crimes are higher than official statistics suggest. Government data rests on complaints to the police which is underestimated given that not all victims of crimes go to make reports in police stations.

In any case, another way to measure crime levels is through “victimization surveys” or public opinion polls which are administered annually by asking households if they were victimized by crimes to account for unreported criminal activities. Locally, the Social Weather Stations (SWS) has asked on a per-household basis annually since 1989 if families experienced (A) property crimes (robbery, break-in, carnap) and (B) physical violence (such as physical assault) and if they (c) fear that they will be a victim of certain types of crimes in the near future.

The graph below plots the yearly aggregate level (“any crime”) and reflects that 7.5 percent of households (out of the total 22 million household) in 2014 continued on page 11

UP FORUM Volume 17 No. 1 January - February 2016 11

Choosing Leaders with Clear Environmental Platforms... continued from page 10 She lamented that while the Philippines is a global center of marine biodiversity it has food security issues and the world's poorest fisherfolk.

Ramos urged voters to study the discourse taking place in elections and look where local and national candidates stand on the environment.

In addition, the next administration needs to create a Metro Development Authority for Metro Cebu to deal with multi-growth center development control and land use planning, said Dr. Primitivo Cal, executive director of UP PLANADES and former dean of both UP College Cebu and the UP School of Urban and Regional Planning (SURP).

Institutional and investment requirements would even the distribution of urban growth outside Metro Manila, he said.

In his presentation titled The Urban Resilience Agenda: Urban Planning and Infrastructure, Cal highlighted water shortage, saltwater intrusion, and flooding from poor drainage, septage, sewerage and solid waste management systems in Metro Cebu.

Three other experts also shared insights in the open forum: Dr. Edna Co, executive director of UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP CIDS) and former dean of UP National College of Public Administration and Governance (UP NCPAG); Dr. Kristoffer Berse faculty member at the UP NCPAG and policy consultant to the Climate Change Commission, and Prof. Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya an award-winning author and noted geopolitical analyst from the Centre for Research on Globalization, and currently visiting professor at the Social Science Cluster of UP Cebu.

Issues discussed included: • Building flyovers as part of the urban planning solution; • Implications of the country’s existing mining law and the viability of the proposed Alternative Mining Bill on protected areas and ancestral domains; • Exploitation of the lumads; • Proposed sea park at SM Seaside in Cebu and the status of the Cordova Reclamation project on the sustainable use of resources, as well as the pervasive illegal sand mining activity going on in Leyte.

The speakers and panelists exhorted voters to pay attention to the following considerations in voting for a president: • On urban development: choose a president who looks for progressive solutions,

Dealing with Criminal (In)Justice... continued from page 10 were victimized by a crime six months before the survey. Note that for this year the number of reported crimes was 1,161,188 according to the Philippine Statistics Authority. Despite the fact that the SWS victimization survey records only “common crimes” and even under the assumption that each household experienced only one crime for 2014, the victimization survey would

give us a total of 1.65 million crime incidences. This means that more than one-third of crimes are not reflected in government statistics.

Looking at a longer time horizon, crime levels today are lower than other periods of Philippine history as shown in the chart below wherein disaggregated property crimes are experienced, at most, by 5 percent of all households: The general decline in the estimates of the number of crimes per household is particularly interesting when

including urban planning beyond only building flyovers or widening roads.

Such a leader would also even out development in urban and rural areas, redistribute land, and invest in rural infrastructure.

• On project implementation: choose a leader who can translate their promises into reality; leaders who can implement and inspire others to be better at implementing.

• On natural resources: choose government leaders who are accountable for sustainably managing agricultural and marine resources, and who have a heart for the welfare of fisherfolk, while scrutinizing fishing companies and commercial fishermen.

• On climate change: choose leaders who partner with citizens to enforce the law.

• On legislation: choose leaders who are capable of resolving conflicting laws— not those who would generate jobs today and bring profit to a few, but threaten the future generations.

The talk ended with a call for the audience to do their share in promoting good governance: • Be familiar with laws that support citizens. There are many remedies, but there are few environmental lawyers and few are aware of these laws.

• If you ask for public information and encounter evasions, refer to the AntiRed Tape Act. • Know the Citizens Charter (RA9485) that details government contact persons and how long they should reply.

• Get involved in the Environmental Impact Assessment System, which requires projects for public consultations.

• Stand against the reclamation of coastal areas, habitats, and environment.

• Individuals are jailed for violating this but some government officials who earn from the projects are not.

• Reclamation is illegal. To alter the boundaries of a locality, a national law and a plebiscite are required before implementation, yet some local government officials have railroaded such projects.

• Local governments want reclamation to increase their internal revenue allotment, which is based on land area. Reclamation, however, destroys the environment.

-------------------The talk was attended by top officials of the UP System and UP Cebu led by President Alfredo E. Pascual and Dean Liza Corro in an audience of around a thousand.

This article can be accessed at the UP sa Halalan website (http://halalan.up.edu. ph/viewpoints/by-experts/278-experts-choose-leaders-with-clear-environmentplatforms?highlight=WyJ3ZWVuYSJd).

compared to the dramatic decline in net public satisfaction with how the Aquino administration has handled the crime problem over the course of his administration as shown below. Hence security, as a state of mind, may not necessarily follow objective improvements in crime statistics as evidenced in the accompanying graph.

Moreover, an important component of the victimization survey by SWS is the segment which measures the fear of crime. The figure below shows us that the Aquino administration would end its term with levels of fear about certain crimes which are 10 percent higher than the levels of fear when he assumed office. Although there are fluctuations within each term, all Post-EDSA presidents left office with roughly the same level of public fear for crimes as when they took office.

Heightened public paranoia may incentivize curtailment of freedoms for public security as (i) politicians need to capture this market of voters by adjusting to their preferences and (ii) there may be less opposition to law enforcement measures.

Campaigns which rest on the problem of crime are dangerous because they thrive in the amplification of the sense of insecurity among the people.

Institutions like the media may have also aggravated public insecurity given financial incentives to rake in corporate profit by over reporting dramatic, violent crimes.

Bounded Innovation It is at this critical juncture that we must be vigilant. The Philippine criminal justice system is composed of five pillars: (i) law enforcement, (ii) prosecution, (iii) the courts, (iv) the corrections system, and (v) the community. The clarion call for public safety at the expense of procedural fairness, for instance, has led to vitriolic attacks against the necessity for a Commis-

sion on Human Rights (CHR) and how the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) perpetuates public powerlessness against juvenile delinquents.

In dealing with criminal justice, have we been as eager to talk about the speed of disposition of cases, the integrity of the courts against bribes, or the inhumane situation inside our jails and prisons?

The sudden public willingness to fund the police is intriguing. In 2013, 69 percent of Filipinos believed that our policemen are highly corrupt according to the Global Corruption Barometer of Transparency International. For that year, the Philippine National Police was the most distrusted agency in the country. This is a country where 21 policemen are accused to be complicit in the massacre of 57 victims in the Maguindanao Massacre, where major operational blunders like Mamasapano make national headlines, and where drunk policemen annually fire bullets in the air during New Year’s Eve. Any political reform is “bounded” in the sense that new types of policies would have to make use of the institutional materials at hand. The Philippine National Police will not change overnight and any president, regardless of how well intentioned, will not be able to micromanage officers all the time.

Innovation is bounded because (i) we have not talked about addressing the other pillars of the criminal justice system and (ii) we are yet to examine the quality of the very institutions we seek to empower. Should we strengthen the police? Let us take in mind Alma Moreno’s now proverbial line “yes, with reservations.”

Caveats A brand of politics which capitalizes on a “just do it” mantra that downplays public deliberation and participation continued on page 14

12 UP FORUM Volume 17 No. 1 January - February 2016

The Enduring Curse of Patronage Politics Michael Magcamit

Why Filipinos Should Not Elect a Patrimonial President in the 2016 Elections politics was the replacement of the old oligarchy with a new one by creating opportunities and public positions for the latter group, while simultaneously discriminating against the former group (See, Manacsa & Tan 2012). Notwithstanding his anti-oligarch rhetoric, Marcos developed his own personalized patronage system by sequestering the powers and possessions of his elite enemies and transferring them to his own cronies. In other words, the authoritarian regime had simply reversed the position through which the new oligarchy could pillage the state from the inside rather than from the outside.

A

ll throughout Philippine history, a small number of extremely influential families possessing vast lands and huge corporations have ruled our government. The notoriety of patronage system and oligarchic culture in the country has inspired numerous experts and scholars to coin equally notorious terms to describe the severity of conditions underpinning Philippine politics—anarchy of families, booty capitalism, non-substantive democracy, ersatz capitalism and cacique democracy, among others.

When the U.S. colonial regime transplanted its brand of representative democracy into our oligarch-infested economy, it virtually cleared the pathway for the systematic subjugation of the country’s democratic institutions and procedures by the ruling patrons and oligarchs. The policy of attraction introduced by then U.S. governorgeneral, William Howard Taft (which was originally intended to convince the landlord class to collaborate with the American forces instead of joining the revolutionary factions) had transformed the economic elites of the Spanish-colonial era into political elites. Considering that the representative institutions emerged prior to the development of a strong republic, the political parties in the Philippines according to Nathan Quimpo (2005, pp.

4-5) have become ‘convenient vehicles of patronage that can be set up, merged with others, split, reconstituted, regurgitated, resurrected, renamed, repackaged, recycled, refurbished, buffed up or flushed down the toilet anytime.’

This strategy that was adopted by the Americans for consolidating their rule over the entire archipelago enabled the elites to exponentially expand their capital and influence through political appointments. Consequently, by the time the Americans were finally ready to erect political institutions that would facilitate electoral contestations in the Philippines, a national oligarchy— rather than a national government— had already been born. This oligarchic system has now become the playing ground of the so-called trapos. The dominance of these trapos in Philippine politics has resulted in what Rogelio Manacsa and Alexander Tan (2012) refer to as reverse accountability or the condition in which individual voters are compelled to elect their respective patrons into power in exchange for personal favors that are either provided in the past or promised to be delivered once elected. In the words of Juan Linz (1975, p. 260), the voters’ support for their patrons is largely a function of the latter’s ‘own interests, rewards for loyalty and the fear of vengeance.’

As my analysis of the past and present patrimonial administrations in the succeeding sections reveal, neither regime change nor democratization has helped curb the oligarchs’ influence over our political and economic affairs.

The astounding indifference of patronage-backed presidents to inoculate themselves from oligarchic manipulation has further aggravated our existing political, economic and socio-cultural maladies. Policy reforms that had the potential to transform Philippine

polity into a more level playing field were conveniently side-tracked, as the oligarchs maneuvered to consolidate their wealth and power. Regrettably, the re-democratization process of the post-Martial Law era had simply led to the reinstallation of pre-Marcos arrangements. Notwithstanding the implementation of various democratic institutional reforms, the oligarchic forces in the Philippines have already become too embedded within the system to the extent of surmounting even the state power.

The Marcos administration (1965-1986) Even the infamous episode of authoritarianism in the Philippines courtesy of Ferdinand Marcos failed to quash the elites’ vice-like grip of the state. Instead of freeing the state from the shackles of oligarchic control, Marcos had simply regrouped the existing personal-clientelist networks in the country, and made himself the supreme patron.

Through the establishment of political frameworks, the access to power at all levels became contingent on the patronage of the autocracy, which led to the elimination of antagonistic and unserviceable sections. Patrimonialism under the Marcos era had taken a new face by evolving into a highly personalistic, sultanistic regime. Consequently, the goal of creating a strong state that had the capacity to put an end to oligarchic predation had once again been side-tracked. A critical part of Marcos’ version of patronage

The Aquino administration (1986-1992) The institution of a new Charter under Corazon Aquino’s administration still failed to develop a strong, visionary state. Ironically, the re-democratization of the Philippine bureaucracy had simply led to the renaissance of the pre-Marcos patronage system. Manacsa and Tan (2012) cited two critical features of the post-People Power system that prevented the genesis of a developmental state in the Philippines.

First, the first-past-the-post approach to selecting the new president made it difficult to achieve a significant level of voters’ support. Obtaining a mandate for vital national policies became unnecessarily strenuous and confounding. Second, the 1987 Constitution did not stimulate the establishment of ideology-based political parties with clear-cut programs designed to achieve a specific long-term vision for the Philippines. Instead, the new Constitution simply laid the groundwork for the bourgeoning of disposable political parties stripped of any moral aspirations to serve the interests of their respective constituencies.

Hence, the end of the Marcos dictatorship signalled not the beginning of a new Philippine political economy, but the refurbishing of the old oligarchy’s apparatuses for bureaucratic exploitation. The reopening of political offices in the country’s capital led to the manufacturing of parties that were designed to secure the dynastic interests of few oligarchic families. Not surprisingly, these newly developed parties showed the usual symptoms of old patronage politics: ‘reliance on coalitions of local elite, non-ideological character and shifting membership’ (see, Hutchcroft & Rocamora 2003, p. 278). Access to patronage has become the primary impetus for forming a party, thereby making the political process a mere bargaining tool for negotiating coalitions based on individual and/or group identities. Such a system reinforces that all-too-familiar balimbing attitude that has come to characterize the culture buttressing Philippine politics. continued on page 13

UP FORUM Volume 17 No. 1 January - February 2016 13

The Enduring Curse ... continued from page 12

Furthermore, Aquino’s administration also failed to enact two crucial laws that could have helped repair the Philippine political economy: the land reform program and the anti-dynasty law. On the one hand, traditional landed elites who were able to access the legislature had significantly delayed the progress on land reform issues due to the ‘uneven application, slow adjudication of cases and the government’s inability to finance the compensation to landlords as stipulated in law’ (see, de Dios & Hutchcroft 2003, p. 52). On the other hand, influential political clans had also succeeded in blocking the bills that proposed the constitutional banning of political dynasties, which led to further exploitation of national and local electoral posts. Thus, it can be surmised that Aquino’s ultimate legacy was, for better or worse, the replication of the pre-Martial Law Philippines.

That said, the most jarring concern with such a myopic thinking was the utter disregard for behaviours and practices that gave birth to crushing patronage politics.

These problems explain why the elections since Marcos’ demise have not resulted in the creation of a definitive electoral mandate that is necessary for institutionalizing and legitimizing a coherent and viable national agenda.

The Ramos administration (1992-1998) Fidel Ramos initiated the ‘Strong Republic’ agenda to address the problems generated by political elitism. Ramos understood how the oligarchs’ excessive control of political power had engendered an economic order that enabled a very few influential families to extract wealth from the national economy with little or no limits. Unlike the government underpinned by a neo-patrimonial culture, Ramos’ idea of a strong state was supposed to independently pursue national interests that were not solely contingent on the demands of a specific class or group.

Under the former arrangement, there was no incentive to develop frameworks that promoted accountability and fair competition given that the loyalty of the ruling politicians was devoted to their own patronage. From Ramos’ standpoint, a country that was attempting to build a strong state did not have to be authoritarian as long as the bureaucracy was professional, accountable, transparent and dedicated to securing the long-term national vision rather than short-term economic interests (see, Villacorta 1994).

Central to the rise of this strong Philippine republic was the emergence of revisionist political leaders that had strong resolves for keeping the markets free from oligarch predation. However, as politicians often discover, the adaptation to democratic practices is much easier than the transition to free market policies. As Seymour Lipset (1959) puts it, it is more problematic to organize markets than to organize elections. Politicians are compelled to rely

on patron-client relationships which invariably lead to larger public deficits and higher levels of corruption. Since the country’s decision-makers themselves are guided by their ideas of public good, the state cannot be expected to accommodate and transform polarizing social demands into public policies (see, Skocpol 1979; 1985). Put bluntly, inclusive growth and development can only occur if the ruling elites want it, or more accurately, if it endows them with greater power, otherwise, they will oppose it.

In the end, Ramos, just like his own patron Aquino, had failed to initiate key reforms that could have made the bureaucracy more resilient against patrimonialism. Left without a choice, he embraced the traditional political customs and practices in order to put forward his own political agenda.

Indeed, Ramos maneuvered his Strong Republic vessel where the currents of neo-patrimonialism flowed. And by doing so, the government had once again failed to bring the state back in and salvage its bastardized democracy due to

the absence of any critical institutional change in the system.

The Estrada administration (1998-2001) The conditions surrounding the Philippine political economy deteriorated even further under the leadership of Joseph Estrada after winning the 1998 presidential elections. With 40.0 percent of the voters casting their ballots in his favour, Estrada’s pseudopopulist government had convincingly denounced the culture of oligarchic politics using his highly popular slo-

gan, Erap para sa Mahirap. Estrada vowed that under his leadership, no influential social entity—be it kinfolk or friends—would be given special privileges. Indeed, Estrada had been very successful in making the poor and marginalized sectors in the country believe that the ‘president of the masses’ had finally arrived, from their favourite local movie theatres to the Malacañang Palace.

Nonetheless, Estrada’s huge popularity could neither cover up nor compensate for the country’s terrible economic shape. Despite the administration’s initial proclamations regarding the supposed insulation of decision-making processes from peripheral influences, Estrada had fallen prey to the excessiveness and recklessness of oligarchic predators. Some of the peripheral actors that yielded considerable power over government affairs during Estrada’s presidency were called the padrinos. In the Philippine context, the padrinos were outsiders with close personal connections with the president either by blood or by social relations,

and whose assistance and opinion had been discreetly sought. Their primary role (albeit unofficial) was to direct the president’s attention to the needs of certain political actors in order to ensure that necessary actions were undertaken. Not surprisingly, Estrada’s padrino system was heavily comprised of blood relatives and close friends who supported him during his campaigns. Thus, despite the presence of institutionalized gatekeepers such as the Offices of the Executive Secretary (OES) and the Presidential Management Staff (PMS), the padrinos were

able to successfully circumvent the government’s policymaking procedures (see, Manacsa & Tan 2012).

The padrino system was complemented by the so-called kumpadres, comprised of Estrada’s closest friends and allies. Aside from his official cabinet members, Estrada’s kumpadres served as his de facto advisers. This set up had opened yet another backdoor entry for peripheral actors that enabled them to access government resources.

Whereas the department secretaries comprised the official axis of power; the kumpadres constituted the informal bloc of political control over several aspects of the economy (e.g., business, infrastructures and even legislative bills). This allowed some of the kumpadres who had no official function or role in the government to become the primary chiefs of certain policy areas.

The practice had become so pervasive that at one point Estrada’s off-the-record advisers and consultants reached two hundred (see, Laquian & Laquian 2002).

This rather furtive policymaking environment inevitably ignited a clash between Estrada’s formal and informal advisers. As Manacsa and Tan (2012) have noted, one-upmanship became the rule of the game in which the ‘winners’ were decided in terms of who succeeded at persuading or even bypassing the president. Such a clandestine approach to decision-making perfectly complemented the culture of corruption that ultimately defined the Estrada administration. The structure of Estrada’s policy regime made it virtually impossible to trace both the initiators of questionable transactions, and the officials accountable for their flawed executions. In 2000 Estrada was impeached by the House of Representatives and was tried in the Senate for charges relating to state plunder, corruption and involvement in an illegal numbers game. Ironically, these allegations came from one of Estrada’s former kumpadres who accused him of the malversation of public funds.

The Arroyo administration (2001-2010) Gloria MacapagalArroyo’s regime was no more than a continuation of traditional clientelism in the Philippines characterized by the methodical looting of government resources and rapid deterioration of public institutions. However, hers was not merely a trip back to the prowling years of the Marcos family. It was a period, according to Quimpo (2009, p. 347) that was ‘marked by the adjustment of predatory forces to global economic and political liberalization.’ In the era of globalization, underhanded government transactions were pursued within the context of market economy logic ‘to produce private goods for officials, their families and their cronies’ (see, Diamond 2008, p. 42). Despite her promise to transform personality-based Philippine politics into a politics of party programs and sincere dialogues with ordinary citizens, continued on page 14

14 UP FORUM Volume 17 No. 1 January - February 2016

Dealing with Criminal (In)Justice... continued from page 11 may, like Goethe’s sorcerer's apprentice, unleash spells it knows not how to control. There are several things we have to keep in mind.

First, under the Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, city and municipal mayors have operational supervision over the Philippine National Police (PNP) in their localities.

Especially in the peripheries, segments of the police personnel function as commissars of ruling dynasts. The battle lines for genuine change in law enforcement extend to the local level, especially for a country where state institutions are captured by elites. Even if a reform-oriented president is elected in 2016, the entrenchment of the affluent and the corrupt at the local level would ensure the institutional subordination of the police to special interests. Granting more discretion to the police in the context of a society that increasingly justifies brutal suppression may provide an expansion of social control methods on the part of local elites who command uniformed officers.

Second, it appears from surveys that we do not trust our policemen. Whenever we talk of empowering the state to make war on criminals with only broad philosophies like “criminals deserve to die,” we license the same organization we persistently rate as one of the most corrupt agencies in the government.

Throwing money at the problem, name-

The Enduring Curse ... continued from page 13 Arroyo still ended up with the distinction of being one of the most corrupt Philippine presidents. In fact, according to a 2007 survey conducted by Pulse Asia, 42.0 percent of Filipinos believed that Arroyo was the most corrupt president in the history of the Philippines next to Marcos.

Just a few years into her presidency, a litany of corruption charges had been hurled against Arroyo, alongside family members, relatives and close friends.

Astonishingly, Arroyo had survived the imbroglio through her skilful exploitation of the country’s patronage culture.

Arroyo was able to adeptly consolidate the existing webs of patron-client relationships with the help of her executive powers. This gave rise to a predatory regime that further undermined the country’s democratic institutions, which in turn, resulted in rigged elections; heightened repression; enfeebled rule of law; influx of unqualified political appointees; and enlarged military influence (see, Hutchcroft 2008; Quimpo 2009). Through the ideological homogenization of political parties, the politicians were able to switch alliances whenever it suited them.

Although such an arrangement may be perceived as a problem, nevertheless, for many traditional politicians, it was this particular character of Philippine party system that nurtured and protected their predatory objectives.

Indeed, government institutions were the first casualties of Arroyo’s destructive presidency. The justice system was reduced to a mechanism that suppressed popular dissent, while the military and the police acted like private armies of a mobster regime. Similarly, the Commission on Elections

ly increasing the salary of uniformed officers, is not enough. Noticeably absent from discussions are mechanisms of institutionalized accountability to prevent injustice on the part of state agents like torture and abuse of authority.

For instance, the National Peace and Order Council which coordinates crime policies remains an enclave of government officials. Representation of ordinary citizens is nominally better at the provincial, city, and municipal councils; however, local chief executives, have the discretion to appoint other members. Although deliberative bodies are good in theory, we have to be critical on whether or not they increase representation and combat unilateralism by mayors and governors.

We should also strive to improve the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB), which is a civilian review board that hears complaints about the police.

A population which hopes to establish an effective police force must also make one that is “limited” in the sense that personnel respect rights of citizens and where, in cases they do not, can be made accountable to civilian authority.

Third, the resurgence of authoritarian nostalgia in the minds of our people obscures some of the policy innovations we have made on policing the country.

Community-based policing is a strategy already used in many local government units in the Philippines, especially under the “Barangay Ronda System”. This approach to policing emphasizes the

use of civilian volunteers in conjunction with police officers to perform minor law enforcement duties in a locality and the formation of crime prevention plans at the lowest possible level.

Top-down approaches to crime policy formulation may not be as responsive to criminality. Quezon City, for instance, has implemented a Citizen's’ Arrest ordinance and constructed Citizen’s Posts which are visible along Commonwealth Avenue. Although not perfect, these are less costly to maintain because they can tap on causeoriented groups to supplement police forces. Encouraging the community’s role in co-producing security together with the police (i) increases vertical accountability to a clear constituency and (ii) ensures representation by groups and individuals in drafting policies which would affect them the most.

Finally, although it is possible to expand the budget for the other pillars of the criminal justice system, the policy discourse in its current form seems obsessed only with the Philippine National Police. The technocratic appeal of leaving crime policy to police chiefs, the president, and several experts is dangerous especially because it fosters a culture of uncritical support for armed personnel. If we do not enhance bureaucratic capacities of prosecutorial agencies for the public officials like the Office of the Ombudsman or prevent money from interfering with the disposition of cases, then a

war on crime would do little to correct the injustices in our justice system.

A holistic approach to the crime policy would recognize the culpability of society in producing poverty that predisposes individuals to commit common crimes. We have to recognize as well the violence in “white collar” crimes such as sponsoring inhumane working conditions, the destruction of the country’s natural resources, and dangers of unfettered financial markets.

These are the types of crimes done by the few wherein the costs are borne by all regarding public spending on healthcare, environmental restoration, and bailouts. It would take regulatory agencies, far more than the police, to protect us from these crimes that have equal, if not greater, social, moral, and economic costs to national development.

-------------------Justin Keith Baquisal is a political science student in the University of the Philippines Diliman.

This article can be accessed at the UP sa Halalan website (http://halalan.up.edu. ph/fact-check/271-dealing-with-criminalin-justice-in-the-philippines).

(Comelec) became the playground for fixers, while bureaucracy in general became the schoolyard for politically inept state managers cheered on by the House of Representatives and the Senate. Predictably, the ‘political termites’ behind Arroyo’s predatory regime were able to escape public accountability by chewing away at the government’s check-and-balance mechanisms in order to erase all traces of improprieties and indiscretions.

to court high-ranking public officials (e.g., a former president, a chief justice and an ombudsman) involved in anomalous government transactions, and filed criminal charges against.

However, despite his initial triumphs, the scandal over the misuse of public funds by some of the country’s top officials and lawmakers has suddenly become the most crucial crisis that is now confronting Aquino III’s government.

The Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scandal, considered by many as the biggest fraud involving public funds in Philippine history, saw billions of pesos worth of government funds stolen by certain members of both the Senate and Congress. The scam involved the funding of ghost projects of implicated legislators and officials using the PDAF money.

But while Aquino III may have been uncompromising in his crackdown of corrupt officials, however, patronage politics has continued to wield an overwhelming influence on his administration. The taming of oligarchic powers still seems far-fetched even under the Aquino III presidency. Despite the president’s decision to abolish the PDAF amid strong public indignation over the scandal, however, he did not cut the amount of funds held at his discretion.

This led critics to label this patronageprone reserves as the ‘President’s pork barrel.’ By doing so, the opposition is able to divert public outrage away from corrupt officials to the administration by depicting the president as the principal distributor of the pork barrel, and therefore, the one who is most guilty for perpetuating a rotten system.

If the May 2016 elections were to serve as any indication, the corruption of political dynasties in the country is bound to continue in the foreseeable future. While some of these political

dynasties have contracted, nonetheless, as Quimpo (2009) points out, others have expanded as more family members come to the fore of Philippine politics. As such, Aquino III’s reforms cannot be expected to have any long-term impact since they do not genuinely confront the very order that breeds and propagates oligarchic wealth and power. In the end, it may just be another hiccup in the seemingly eternal life cycle of patrimonialism and oligarchism in the Philippines.

The Aquino III administration (2010-2016) Then came the incumbent President Benigno Simeon Aquino III. Prior to his election to office in 2010, many Filipinos doubted his capacity to lead the nation, let alone fulfil his campaign promise to end corruption. This cynicism had a strong basis considering his lacklustre performance both as a senator and as a three-term district representative. Considering the context which led to his presidential victory (i.e., death of his mother, Corazon Aquino), many observers see him as a symbolic leader rather than a ‘genuine’ politician with the fervent desire and interest to run the country. Nevertheless, in his six years in the Palace, Aquino III has been able to pull off some surprises that only a few had seen coming.

Many of these surprises relate to the country’s economic performance from the moment he was sworn to office.

Since 2010, GDP growth under Aquino III averaged at 6.2 percent—a stunning achievement for a country that has for many years been considered the ‘sick man of Asia.’ More importantly, Aquino III has been largely credited for his efforts in addressing the issues of widespread corruption and political violence. His administration has chased

SOURCES:

Fourth quarter 2015 Social Weather Survey: Net satisfaction with national administration at "good" +39. (2016, January 25). Social Weather Stations. Retrieved from https://www.sws.org.ph/ pr20160125.htm Fourth quarter 2014 Social Weather Survey: 6.2% of families lose property, 0.7% suffer physical violence, in the past 6 months. (2015, March 11).

Social Weather Stations. Retrieved from https:// www.sws.org.ph/pr20150311.htm

Final words Where political institutions are frail, differences in leadership styles and methods can have enormous effects on the political outcomes. The five presidents that came after Marcos revealed significant variations with respect to the image and quality of their respective administrations. Aquino was, for better or worse, a ‘throwback’ president whose primary agenda was the regeneration of the old oligarchy to restore elite-driven institutions that were sabotaged by her despotic predecessor. Ramos was military royalty who bowed down to his patrons to negotiate for his watered-down reforms that only further entrenched the status quo. Estrada was a charismatic actor who misread the role of Robin Hood as he went on to pillage the nation’s coffers only to redistribute his loot among his kinfolk and friends. Arroyo was the willful presidential daughter whose mastery of economic philosophy enabled her to efficiently plunder the government resources. Lastly, Aquino III is the acquiescent son whose unforeseen rise to the presidency has inspired dreams for a new belle époque in the Philippines, if only he could compromise his oligarchic roots and privileges.

The upcoming election in May ofcontinued on page 15

UP FORUM Volume 17 No. 1 January - February 2016 15

The Enduring Curse ... continued from page 14

fers us an opportunity to gradually reclaim our freedom from the curse of patronage politics. Let us carefully scrutinize the platforms, backgrounds and all the pertinent information about the presidential aspirants as they hold important clues as to how each candidate will respond to the enormous pressures exerted by powerful patrons and oligarchs that have long bastardized our democracy. Patrimonial presidents are never the ‘safe’ choice. On the contrary, they are like cancer cells that systematically destroy the immune system of the nation. It is high time to finally confront this disease by electing a president who will act as an antidote to the widespread albeit curable cancer of patronage politics.

-------------------Michael Magcamit received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Canterbury, New Zealand.

He is the author of the forthcoming book, Small Powers and Trading Security by Palgrave Macmillan.

This article can be accessed at the UP sa Halalan website (http://halalan. up.edu.ph/viewpoints/by-alumni/281the-enduring-curse-of-patronagepolitics-why-filipinos-should-notelect-a-patrimonial-president-in-the2016-elections?highlight=WyJtYWdjYW1pdCJd).

What Kind of Laws Does Our Congress Legislate?... continued from page 5 policy demands of the people. But legislators are also rational, and they assume that constituents will reward them with reelection in return for the program benefits they bring home.

Is there an alternative? If it is any consolation, Stein and Bickers (1994)

found that only the electorally “vulnerable” politicians benefit from distributive spending, which they pursue to address their thinning reelection prospects. We cannot expect politicians in the Philippines to change anytime soon, however, unless the voters them-

selves take on a major paradigm shift.

-------------------This article can be accessed at the UP sa Halalan website (http://halalan. up.edu.ph/viewpoints/by-experts/222what-kinds-of-laws-do-our-congress-leg islate?highlight=WyJhbGljb3IiXQ==).

1 Meralco’s power purchase adjustment

Local and National Bills Passed on 3rd Reading by the Philippine House of Reprsentatives, 1987-2010

FURTHER READINGS:

Anderson, B. (1998). Cacique democracy and the Philippines. New Left Review, 169(1), 3-33. de Dios, E., & Hutchcroft, P. (2003) Political economy. In A Balisacan & H Hill (eds.), The Philippine economy: Development, policies, and challenges. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 45-73.

Diamond, L. (2008). The democratic rollback: The resurgence of the predatory state.

Foreign Affairs, 87(2), 36–48.

Hutchcroft, P. (1998). Booty capitalism: The politics of banking in the Philippines. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Hutchcroft, P., & Rocamora, J. (2003). Strong demands and weak institutions: Addressing the democratic deficit in the Philippines.

Journal of East Asian Studies, 3(1), 259–92.

Hutchcroft, P. (2008). The Arroyo imbroglio in the Philippines. Journal of Democracy, 19(1), 141-55.

Laquian, A., & Laquian, E. (2002). The Erap tragedy: Tales from the snake pit. Manila: Anvil.

Lipset, S. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. American Political Science Review, 5(1), 69-105.

Manacsa, R., & Tan, A. (2012). Strong republic sidetracked: Oligarch dynamics, democratization, and economic development in the Philippines. Korea Observer, 43(1), 47-87.

Quimpo, N. (2005). Oligarchic patrimonialism, bossism, electoral clientelism, and contested democracy in the Philippines. Comparative Politics, 37(2), 229-250.

Quimpo, N. (2009). The Philippines: Predatory regime, growing authoritarian features. The Pacific Review, 22(3), 335-353.

Skocpol, T. (1979). States and social revolutions.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Skocpol, T. (1985). Bringing the state back in.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Villacorta, W. (1994). The curse of the weak state: Leadership imperatives for the Ramos Government. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 16(1), 67-32.

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Let the True Will of the People Prevail Alfredo E. Pascual

T

hree years ago, in the run-up to the 2013 elections,UP broke new ground as the first Philippine university to build a website for the elections.

We organized the UP sa Halalan 2013 to help promote an informed, clean, and honest election. This project had pioneering and novel features, such as fact-checking.

Our experts verified the candidate’s claims and propaganda, thereby helping voters make intelligent decisions.

We fielded our professors on various media platforms to help enlighten voters on electoral issues.

For the 2016 elections,we are expanding our horizons as we engage more members of the UP community.

This time, aside from our own faculty members, UP alumni from other universities and organizations here and abroad are on board.

Using media and other communication platforms, our experts will tackle issues such as the environment and climate change, agriculture and food security, poverty, migration, and many others, that are deemed relevant to our nation’s future, and thus, to the candidates’ program of government.

Our other campuses, such as, UP Los Banos, UP Baguio, UP Visayas, UP Cebu, and UP Mindanao, are embarking on their own activities related to the election.

We have signed Memoranda of Agreement with the country’s top media networks, including ABS-CBN and GMA, to extend our reach to voters nationwide.

Our students will also have quality participation through partnerships with us in helping young people achieve critical involvement in the elections.

To facilitate comparative assessment of competing candidates, we are working to host one presidential debate in a UP campus.

This is apart from the various fora that we are lining up.

With our mantra, Mapanuring Mamamayan sa Halalang Tapat at Makabuluhan, we are one with the Filipino people in their quest for meaningful elections.

Let us work together to hold our candidates accountable for what they say and help our voters make an informed choice in the 2016 electoral exercise.

Let the true will of the people prevail.

Mabuhay!