The Political Geography of Üsküdar

The Political Geography of Üsküdar Y R D .

D O Ç .

D R .

M I C H E L A N G E L O

G U I D A

Fatih University

The aim of this paper is to understand electoral behaviour in the district (ilçe) of Üsküdar.1 Despite the fact that it does not represent Turkey or Istanbul, thanks to its being a mosaic society, Üsküdar furnishes us with a very good case study for acquiring critical tools to identify the main factors influencing Turkish voters. After a first analysis of the district’s elections results, the paper will analyse four quarters (mahalle) to understand how far socio-economic factors influence voting attitudes. However, the paper will argue that socio-economic factors are insufficient for understanding party preferences. The study of regional and religious cleavages and their impact on voters will be used to further understand voters’ behaviour. In this study, official results2 will be accompanied by the results of a survey conducted in July 2008 with 611 interviews in six quarters of Üsküdar3 in proportion to their population. Üsküdar is an old area of the modern megalopolis of Istanbul. According to the 2000 census of the population it has 495,118 dwellers spread over 42 km_. In the previous ten years the population has grown with an average rate of 2.24 percent, which is very close to the 2.68 percent national growth rate for urban areas, but inferior to the Istanbul yearly average of 3.30 percent and of the neighbouring district of Ümraniye (until 1988 attached to Üsküdar), which grew in the decade 1990-2000 with an average rate of 6,69 percent.4 Üsküdar’s low rate is due to the fact that it does not have any more areas available to building speculation, and because of its high prices of estates, it is not open to immigration from Anatolia.

After the creation of the district of Ataflehir in 2007, which includes two of the southeast districts, Üsküdar increasingly became a mainly middle-class residential area. Finally, it is an integral part of Istanbul’s extended downtown area, despite the fact that it has only a very small business area: the Asian side of the first Bosphorus bridge is in Üsküdar; the motorway D100 that crosses Istanbul from side to side passes through Üsküdar; one of the two main ferry lines that

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unite the European and the Asian side operates from Üsküdar’s docks; the Asian coach station is in the district; and finally, the new underground line that will connect the two sides of Istanbul will cross Üsküdar as well.

General elections in Üsküdar (1983-2007) If we compare the results of the general elections in the district of Üsküdar since 1983 with the national results as in graph 1, it will appear evident that the voting preferences are similar.

Graph 1 – Compared results of the general elections (1983-2007) in Üsküdar and in Turkey Centre-right parties5 dominated the political elections from 1983 to 1995, and the last two elections. The percentage of votes obtained by the centre-right slightly varies in the 1987 elections, when the centre-left parties6 in Üsküdar obtained a higher percentage. This discrepancy between Üsküdar and Turkey’s results is probably due to the new and fast growing suburbs of Üsküdar and Sosyal Demokrat Halkç› Parti’s (SHP) success in the following 1989 administrative elections.

The results of the administrative elections are also behind the success in the general elections of Refah Partisi (RP), which both in 1995 and in 1999 gained a 332

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higher percentage compared with the same elections results nationally. In the 1994 and 1999 local elections, RP obtained a relative majority—respectively of 28.15 and 28.72 percent of the vote. The local administration that followed was particularly popular for its successes in providing better services to the population and a remarkable development of the district. A fragmented political scene and RP’s administration of Üsküdar certainly benefited the party also in the 1995 and 1999 general elections.

As graph 1 shows, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi’s (MHP) percentage of votes in Üsküdar has been inferior to the national percentage. An underperformance of MHP can be observed also in the pre-1980 elections, particularly in the 1977 elections where the party obtained only half of the votes that it obtained nationally. Üsküdar’s voters apparently preferred more moderate centre-left parties; this is observable in the district’s elections’ results, which show a better performance of the centre-left.

Even if voting results are similar to the national ones, Üsküdar cannot represent the country. Indeed, Üsküdar is part of a big megalopolis and does not have rural areas. However, the case study of this district can furnish new tools for understanding voting behaviour in Turkey, and particularly of voting behaviour in big urban areas, where 65 percent of Turkish population lives.7 Moreover, the study of an important district with all its socio-economic and demographic particularities—as previous studies demonstrate8—provides more valuable data for the understanding of voters’ behaviour and their profiles.

Regional Cleavages If Turkey has considerable regional diversity,9 the behaviour of Üsküdar’s voters also changes among quarters (mahalle). We can examine four different quarters as examples of different voting behaviour.

The first comparison can be made among Ac›badem and Yavuztürk. Ac›badem is an area of recent construction, which lies on the border with the wealthy Kad›köy with whom it shares a similar socio-economic structure. Indeed, generally Ac›badem is populated by an educated higher middle-class which inclines toward the centre-left parties. From 1987—the first elections after the creation of the quarter—, centre-left parties obtained more than 40 percent of the votes, and this percentage reached 49 and 48 percent respectively in the 1999 and 2007 elections. In 1991 and 1995, the centre-left parties obtained only 36 and 33 percent of the votes respectively, probably due to the very good performance of the centre-right Do¤ru Yol Partisi (DYP), which alone obtained 21 and 20 percent of the votes.

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Graph 2 – Results of the general elections (1987-2007) in Ac›badem quarter.

The Ac›badem case shows us that higher middle-class voters inclined to centreleft parties. The KONDA study of the 2007 elections shows that 33 percent of those earning between 1201 and 3000 TL and 50 percent of those earning more than 3001 TL monthly voted for Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP). Despite the fact that Adalet ve Kalk›nma Partisi (AKP) was the first party in 2007, its voters represented a mere 35 and 23 percent respectively.10 The survey that we conducted in July 2008 shows that 27 percent of Üsküdar’s CHP voters are selfemployed and 56 percent earn more than 1000 TL monthly.

Yavuztürk quarter, on the contrary, is a squatter area predominantly inhabited by immigrants, developed in the 1980s, and in many aspects it is similar in its voting behaviour to the neighbouring shanty area of Ümraniye. The minimum average house price per square metre here is the lowest of the quarters examined by our survey and nearly several times lower than the house prices of Ac›badem.11 This indicates that the socio-economic condition in this quarter is much lower than in the previous case. As the KONDA study shows, AKP voters are the majority in all categories earning between 0 and 1200 TL.12 According to our survey, 34 percent of AKP voters earn between 500 and 1000 TL and 19 percent have no earnings at all. Moreover, since 1991, squatter areas of Istanbul have been voting for Islamist parties because of their economic assistance and rooted social activists. Indeed, in the 1991, 1995, and 1999 elections RP-FP gained respectively 27, 33, and 28 percent of the votes always confirming itself as the first party in Yavuztürk. In 2002, mobilizing the RP-FP with the votes taken from the other centre-right parties’ votes and exploiting the rapid increase of registered voters,13 AKP obtained 47 percent of the votes, bettering its performance in the 2007 elections with 56 percent of the votes.

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Graph 3 - Results of the general elections (1983-2007) in Yavuztürk quarter.

Another interesting comparison can be drawn between the quarters of ‹cadiye and Ac›badem. The first is a middle-class area with an important presence of members of the Armenian community. However, the average house price is 671 TL per square metre, inferior to Ac›badem. If we draw a comparison with Ac›badem, centre-right parties (in this case only Anavatan Partisi [ANAP] and DYP) obtained a high percentage of votes in political elections between 1987 and 1991; a sudden switch to DSP followed. In ‹cadiye, ANAP and DYP gained 56 percent of the votes both in the 1987 and 1991 elections while in the 1983 and 1995 general elections they obtained respectively 53 and 51 percent of the votes. In this case, the switch to centre-left parties was softer and more moderate. In the 1999 elections, DSP under the leadership of Ecevit obtained 36 percent of the votes (in Ac›badem it gained 42 percent) partly thanks to the emotional pressure of the PKK leader’s capture in Kenya. CHP obtained 33 and 35 percent of the votes respectively in 2002 and 2007 (whereas in the same elections in Ac›badem percentages were 42 and 48). In ‹cadiye, independent candidates performed slightly better with 5.2 percent of the votes. Let us not forget that the only independent candidate elected in the first Istanbul constituency— to which Üsküdar belongs—was a representative of the leftist ÖDP. In the ‹cadiye quarter, Islamist parties obtained better results and this demonstrated that, with a diminution of the economic welfare, we have a slide toward the centre-right.

The Ac›badem and ‹cadiye examples also show us that while ANAP was able to be a real centre-party capable of uniting a wide spectrum of voters from the right and the left, it seems that it lost its capability with the 1999 elections. Namely, ANAP’s appeal on voters sharply decreased six years after the death of the 335

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charismatic party leader Turgut Özal and the shift toward the left under the presidency of Mesut Y›lmaz. A diminution in centre, centre-right votes came also after the 28 February process that imposed in Turkey a more radical contraposition between Islamic values and secular understanding. Despite its attempts, AKP has not been capable of replacing ANAP as a moderate centre party. It seems that its Islamist image rouses suspicions among leftist voters.

Graph 4 - Results of the general elections (1983-2007) in ‹cadiye quarter.

We can examine a fourth quarter that appears different: Emniyet. The Emniyet quarter is in many aspects similar to Yavuztürk because it is partly a recent squatter area disorderly developed by immigrants coming from different parts of Anatolia. However, the minimum house price per square metre here is much higher than that of Yavuztürk, thanks to the presence of many upper-class sites (housing estates). In this area, Prime Minister Erdo¤an has his Istanbul residence. His presence, however, cannot explain the very higher percentage of RP votes in the 1995 and 1999 elections and of AKP votes in the 2002 and 2007 elections. In Emniyet, in 1995 and 1999, RP obtained six more points than it did in Yavuztürk. AKP obtained in the 2002 general elections 52 percent of the votes whereas in Yavuztürk the percentage was only 46 percent. In the following elections, AKP won 60 percent of the votes in Emniyet against 56 percent in Yavuztürk.

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Graph 5 - Results of the general elections (1983-2007) in Emniyet quarter.

It is evident from this last comparison that the socio-economic factors are not enough to understand voting behaviour in full.

Kulturkampf among voters Indeed, behaviour seems to be influenced strongly by the Kulturkampf existing in Turkish society. The term—literally ‘cultural divide’—used by Ersin Kalayc›o¤lu to the Turkish case refers originally to German policies in relation to secularity and the influence of the Roman Catholic Church, enacted from 1871 to 1878 by the Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. In the Turkish case, the term can help us to indicate the cultural cleavages of Turkish society. During the nineteenth-century reform movements, two completely different and even irreconcilable images of ‘good society’ began to take root. One of those images was built around the conception of ‘science and progress’ as the core value that defines the substance of human existence, nature, society, and politics. In opposition to this camp, emerged the rival Kulturkampf of those who were attracted to the image of good society constructed around the preservation of traditional lifestyle, its corresponding values and understandings of morality, work, family, and other aspects of life.14 Cultural divides increased and deepened with the evolution of Turkish society.

Deeper cleavages emerged with the spread of literacy and the emergence of new ethnic and religious identities—previously marginal like the Kurdish and Alevi identities. Furthermore, rapid urbanization and the development of communication eliminated the geographical divide between the modern centre and the traditional periphery, increasing the contraposition even further.

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Regional cleavages are also part of a different and sometimes contrasting worldview, particularly when these regional differences were brought from the peripheries to the centre by immigration. Our survey shows that 44 percent of AKP voters in Üsküdar were born in the Black Sea region of Anatolia, and 56 percent of voters’ fathers were born in the Black Sea region (table 1). Only 26 percent of voters were born in Istanbul, and only 5 percent of voters’ fathers were born in Istanbul (table 2).

Region Istanbul Marmara Black Sea Aegean Sea Mediterranean Central Anatolian Eastern Anatolian South-eastern Anatolian Abroad

AKP 26 2 44 2 3 10 9 4 -

CHP 48 6 15 7 5 7 7 3 2

MHP 26 6 29 1 19 10 7 1 1

Table 1 - Voters place of birth. Figures in percentage.

Region Istanbul Marmara Black Sea Aegean Sea Mediterranean Central Anatolian Eastern Anatolian South-eastern Anatolian Abroad

AKP 5 3 56 3 4 11 11 6 1

CHP 19 5 23 9 6 15 15 3 5

MHP 4 5 40 1 20 12 11 5 2

Table 2 - Place of birth of voters’ fathers. Figures in percentage.

Istanbul is a city that rapidly grew with immigration from various regions of Anatolia. However, from another survey of Üsküdar’s mosaic conducted in 2002, it is evident that Black Sea voters are overrepresented in AKP. In fact, only 30 percent of Üsküdar townsmen were born in the Black Sea region and 33 per338

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cent were born in Istanbul.15 AKP appears to be representative of the new immigrant class, which is emerging as a new political and economic elite in the country. It is indicative that the actual mayor of Üsküdar—Mehmet Çak›r—was born in the Black Sea city of Trabzon. Prime Minister Erdo¤an was born in Istanbul but from a family that immigrated from Rize. Moreover, six out of 24 members of his cabinet are from the Black Sea region and 15 were born in the Turkish periphery.

On the other hand, among CHP voters, Istanbul as a place of birth is overrepresented yet CHP voters from the Black Sea region are 15 percent whereas Üsküdar population is composed by 30 percent of Black Sea dwellers. CHP, then, seems to represent the original Istanbul townsmen protecting their status and position in a hybrid megalopolis.

From our survey, it seems that MHP is the party that demonstrates itself to be capable of addressing voters from all over the country, even if it fails to address voters born in Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia among which the ethnic factor is particularly influential.

Another important aspect of the Kulturkampf is the divide among the conservative-religious components of the Turkish population and the more secular class.

In this case religious and cultural values inevitably influence the voters Weltanschauung and their voting behaviour. To measure religiosity among voters we asked participants in our survey how often they prayed the namaz (the five daily prayers). For male voters we also asked if they attend Friday prayer.

The former prayer is certainly a symbol of religiosity and can help us in understanding their rigour in Muslim practice. The latter is certainly a demonstration of belief, yet because it implies a more ritual practice and it is a social event, it represents willingness to participate in communal religious events (table 3).

Table 3 – Questions on religious practices. Figures in percentage.

AKP voters demonstrate to be more religious conferring to the party a more Islamic identity. 48 percent of them declare to regularly pray the namaz and 46 to occasionally pray. Only 6 percent never pray the namaz. 70 percent of AKP male voters regularly attend the Friday prayer and only 2 percent declares to never attend the prayer in the mosque. Among female AKP voters, 57 percent regularly wear the Islamic headscarf, and only 30 percent declares to never wear 339

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it. Wearing the veil cannot be assumed as a demonstration of religiosity. It has been adopted from both sides as a political symbol and not always is worn for religious purposes. However, analyzed together with namaz indicate a conservative worldview.

The responses to the same questions by CHP voters show a political movement generally composed by non-practicing Muslims. 50 percent of CHP voters declare to never pray the namaz and 47 occasionally pray it. Only 3 percent orderly pray the namaz. Just 11 percent of CHP male voters regularly attend the Friday prayer and 42 percent declares to never attend the prayer in the mosque refusing also the weekly communal ritual. Among female CHP voters, only 4 percent regularly wear the Islamic headscarf, and 84 percent declares to never wear it, well above the national average of 61.3 percent.16 Also in this case MHP is more moderate, showing that its members have a mixed approach to religion. 15 percent of MHP voters declare to never pray the namaz and 65 occasionally pray it. However, only 20 percent orderly pray the namaz, yet 59 percent of MHP male voters regularly attend the Friday prayer and a small minority of 3 percent declares to never attend the prayer in the mosque demonstrating a mild approach to religiosity and strong emphasis on the public aspects of religion, which keep on being a fundamental characteristic of Turkish nationalism. Among female MHP voters, 6 percent regularly wear the Islamic headscarf, and 63 percent declares to never wear it. However, we have to remember that, in 2007, MHP worked, together with AKP, to remove the prohibition to use of headscarf in universities.

Religious practices seem to be an important factor in party choice. This appear to be particularly true after the ‘28 February process’ that reintroduced in the country a polarization in views and a more radical divide among people of different degrees of religiosity. The ‘28 February process’ is the major event that imposed a complete revolution of ideas and partisanships. In 1996, the historic leader of political Islam in Turkey, the advocate of Millî Görüfl and leader of the Islamist Refah party, Necmettin Erbakan, became Prime Minister in a coalition government called Refahyol. The secular establishment feared that Erbakan was leading to a collapse of the Kemalist state and progressively took measures to contrast the bold Refah policy. Then, on February 28, 1997, it presented the cabinet with a long list of demands aimed at curbing the influence of the Islamists on the economy, on education and inside the state apparatus. The most conspicuous demand was about the introduction of compulsory eight-year primary education in state schools. The idea behind this was that this would put the allegedly bigoted schools for preachers and prayer leaders (‹mam-Hatip Okullar›) out of business at middle school level. These schools were very popular among the poorer sections of the population (because of the many opportunities for scholarships) and among conservatives. Graduates of these schools had access to college-level education and ultimately to the universities, and since the schools produced many times the number of graduates that could be 340

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employed in the religious establishment, most of these graduates found places in other branches of the state apparatus and civil society.

The cabinet officially accepted the recommendations on March 13, but did not do much about them. After six weeks the patience of the military had run out and in a nine-hour meeting of the National Security Council, the army top brass put forward its demands again, this time as an ultimatum. Trade unions and employers’ federations got together in a ‘front for secularism’ on May 21 and on the same day the secularist prosecutor at the Supreme Court in Ankara demanded the closure of Refah because of its anti-secular stands. Five days later, the army dismissed 161 officers and NCOs on suspicion of Islamist leanings. In June, the army started briefings for journalists and members of the judiciary on the fundamentalist threat. Under enormous pressure by the military and the withdrawal of his coalition partner, Erbakan eventually resigned and Refah was banned on January 16, 1998. Also the popular mayor of Istanbul and now Prime Minister, Erdo¤an, was banned from politics together with many other members of the Refah as well as MÜS‹AD, the society of Muslim businessmen.17 ‘Threat’ factor The ’28 February process’ widened the divide between parties and increased suspicions among voters. In fact, the divide between secularist and religious-conservatives is also evident in the ‘threat’ factor. The 2007 elections were very much concentrated on the issue of secularism and followed by the ambiguous verdict of the Constitutional Court on AKP, which punished the party for its offences against secularism but did not close it—as happened in the past in the case of RP and FP. Today, the political debate and polemics between AKP and the main opposition party CHP is still mainly on secularism and the abuse of religion. AKP affirms to be secular but would like to allow the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in universities and public offices, while seeing a more moderate approach to religion. On its side, CHP fears that AKP is threatening Mustafa Kemal’s secular reforms and is attempting to bring Turkey back to the dark years of the Middle Ages.

Table 4 – Is secularism under threat in Turkey? Figures in percentage.

MHP voters seem to be confused on the issue. 38 percent of MHP voters see secularism in Turkey under threat but 50 percent of the MHP voters interviewed preferred not to answer our question. This approach is probably due to the strong attacks against the AKP administration and its use of Islamic values and, on the other hand, a pragmatic approach to religion.

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CHP voters, though, have no doubts on the issue. A clear majority (79 percent) fear that secularism is under threat, and accordingly they approach AKP policies with suspicion. On the contrary, 81 percent of AKP voters clearly state that secularism is not under threat in the country led by their own party.

The ‘threat’ factor seems to increase in more wealthy areas. Secularism is not only an ideological issue. It also appears to be an issue between the old wealthy urban elite, generally centre-left and the new immigrants of the emerging new Turkish elites. Thus, secularism is also a symbol of social conservatism: CHP represents those who would like to avoid changes of the status quo, and of those who would like not to lose their socio-economic position.

Table 5 – Is secularism under threat in Turkey? Figures in percentage, selected quarters.

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Kulturkampf and party images From the survey, it appears that 12 percent of AKP voters and some Islamist Saadet Partisi (SP)’s voters (two out of 11), which stated that secularism is under threat actually interpret secularism differently. For instance, veiled women felt that secularism actually protects their right to dress as they please. This difference in understanding is pretty common because the Kulturkampf created different—and sometimes contrasting—understandings of the basic political concepts, such as nationalism, democracy, and obviously secularism.

To understand the variability of certain basic concepts used in the political discourse, we asked the people interviewed to evaluate on a scale from one to five the major political parties’ main characters. AKP voters see their party as a moderate centre-right party, religious but moderately secular (Graph 6). They see their party also as moderately Kemalist and mildly Islamist. At the same time they see their own party as moderately Turkish nationalist and a bit Kurdish nationalist. Finally, they see their party generally as a democratic organization.

On the other hand, AKP voters see CHP as a moderately secular party, areligious, moderately on the left side of the political spectrum. At the same time CHP is considered not as the champion of Kemalism or of Turkish nationalism, even if CHP was established by the founder of the Turkish Republic. At the same time they do not consider CHP as a democratic party (Graph 7).

Graph 6 – How AKP voters see their own party.

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Graph 7 – How AKP voters see CHP. CHP voters see their party as certainly secular, little or even non-religious. They also see their own party on the centre-left of the political spectrum, as a Turkish nationalist, and certainly as a Kemalist party. It is interesting that generally they do not see their party as democratic (Graph 8). CHP voters see AKP as their inverse image. AKP is seen as not at all secular or Kemalist, religious and usually on the right. A considerable majority of CHP voters see AKP as Islamist and not as representative of Turkish or Kurdish nationalism. Finally, AKP is also generally considerate as non-democratic (Graph 9).

Graph 8 – How CHP voters see their own party.

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Graph 9 – How CHP voters see AKP. Secularism and Kemalism are evidently interpreted in two different ways by AKP and CHP voters, precisely because they have a contrasting worldview. It is also interesting that both groups of voters do not recognize their own party as certainly democratic. This is probably due to the lack of democracy inside the party and the recognition by voters of the importance of charismatic party leadership. However, voters of MHP—which has many times been associated with fascist and chauvinist attitudes—consider their party as extremely democratic (the majority of answers were 4 and 5) as well as Kemalist and moderately religious (as appeared also from table 4).

Conclusions The results of our survey conducted in Üsküdar compared with the official statistics help us to understand voting behaviour in Istanbul and to may find some interpretation keys for possibly understand voter behaviour in Turkey. Besides the well known ‘regional’ and socio-economic factors, Kulturkampf appears as a crucial factor influencing citizens’ votes. This appeared very clearly in the different attitudes toward religious practices and in the different understanding of the same political concepts.

The relevance of the Kulturkampf as a dominant factor is worrying. Turkey’s main political parties fail to address voters horizontally, compromising their duty of uniting civil society. Indeed, political parties seem to be built on primordial ties (religion and place of origin) rather than on ideologies or policies, and consequently are polarizing society vertically.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY 2000 Genel Nüfus Say›m› (Ankara: D‹E, 2003).

A¤›rd›r, Bekir, “Sand›¤›n ‹çindekini ne Belirledi?,” Radikal (25-28 July 2007). Çarko¤lu, Ali and Binnaz Toprak, De¤iflen Türkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset (‹stanbul: TESEV, 2006).

Ifl›k, O¤uz and Mç Melih P›narc›o¤lu, “Ankara 2002 Genel Seçimleri Co¤rafyas›,” Tans› fienyap›l› (ed.), Cumhuriyet’in Ankara’s› (Ankara: ODTÜ, 2005).

Kalayc›o¤lu, Ersin, Turkish Dynamics, Bridge Across Troubled Land (New York: Palgrave, 2005).

Murat, Sedat, H. Yunus Ersöz, Sefer fiener, Y›lmaz Bayat, Dünden Bugüne Sosyo-Ekonomik Yönleriyle Üsküdar (‹stanbul: ‹flaret, 2006).

Secor, AJ., “Ideologies in Crisis: Political Cleavages and Electoral Politics in Turkey in the 1990s”.

Political Geography 20 (2001)

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Türkiye ‹statistik Y›ll›¤› 2007 (Ankara: TÜ‹K, 2008).

West, W. Jefferson, “Regional Cleavages in Turkish Politics: an Electoral Geography of the 1999 and 2002 National Elections”. Political Geography 24 (2005).

Zeynelo¤lu, Sinan, “‹stanbul’un Seçim Co¤rafyas›: 1999-2002,” Toplum ve Bilim, No. 107 (2006).

Zürcher, Erik J., Turkey: a Modern History (London-New York: IB Tauris, 2001).

FOOTNOTES 1

I would like to thank the Fatih University Research Fund that generously supported my field work research conducted together with Tülin Tuna, to whom I am immensely grateful for her hard work and organizational skills. I would also like to thank Ömer Çaha for his help and suggestions.

2

The official results used in the graphs 1 to 5 are those published on the TÜ‹K website

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http://www.tuik.gov.tr/secimdagitimapp/secim.zul, Milletvekili Genel Seçimi, ‹l ve ‹lçe Sonuçlar› (Ankara: TÜ‹K, 2008), Milletvekili Genel Seçimi Sonuçlar› (Ankara: D‹E, 1988), and Milletvekili Genel Seçimi Sonuçlar› (Ankara: D‹E, 1984).

3

Ac›badem, Emniyet, ‹cadiye, Kuzguncuk, Yavuztürk, and Emek.

4

2000 Genel Nüfus Say›m› (Ankara: D‹E, 2003).

5

AKP, DYP, MDP, and ANAP.

6

HP, SHP, CHP, and DSP.

7

According to the 2000 census of population: Türkiye ‹statistik Y›ll›¤› 2007 (Ankara: TÜ‹K, 2008), p. 31.

8 O¤uz Ifl›k and M. Melih P›narc›o¤lu, “Ankara 2002 Genel Seçimleri Co¤rafyas›,” Tans› fienyap›l› (ed.), Cumhuriyet’in Ankara’s› (Ankara: ODTÜ, 2005) and Sinan Zeynelo¤lu, “‹stanbul’un Seçim Co¤rafyas›: 1999-2002,” Toplum ve Bilim, No. 107 (2006) 9 See AJ. Secor, “Ideologies in Crisis: Political Cleavages and Electoral Politics in Turkey in the 1990s”.

Political Geography 20 (2001) and W. Jefferson West, “Regional Cleavages in Turkish Politics: an Electoral Geography of the 1999 and 2002 National Elections”. Political Geography 24 (2005).

10

Bekir A¤›rd›r, “Sand›¤›n ‹çindekini ne Belirledi?,” Radikal (25-28 July 2007).

11

The minimum square metre house price in Ac›badem is 825 TL whereas in Yavuztürk is 84 TL. The average was calculated with the prices indicated by Üsküdar municipality for the 2008 council tax and published on http://www.uskudar.bel.tr/. As Zeynelo¤lu shows, even if they not represent the real market prices, the prices indicated by municipalities are indicative of the socio-economic status of the area (Zeynelo¤lu (2006)). On the other hand, the Turkish Statistical Institute does not provide data on the quarter but only at the district level.

12

A¤›rd›r (2007).

13

In 1999, registered voters were 13.807 and the rate of participation was 85%. In 2002, this rate dropped to 78% but registered voters were 17.421. In 2007, AKP promoted in the district a campaign to awaken citizens and registered voters in Yavuztürk became 19.565 and participation was 82%.

14 Ersin Kalayc›o¤lu, Turkish Dynamics, Bridge Across Troubled Land (New York: Palgrave, 2005), pp.

50-51.

15 Sedat Murat, H. Yunus Ersöz, Sefer fiener, Y›lmaz Bayat, Dünden Bugüne Sosyo-Ekonomik Yönleriyle Üsküdar (‹stanbul: ‹flaret, 2006), Vol. 2, p. 10.

16 Ali Çarko¤lu and Binnaz Toprak, De¤iflen Türkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset (‹stanbul: TESEV, 2006), p. 58.

17

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Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey: a Modern History (London-New York: IB Tauris, 2001), pp. 300-1.