Newport Manual on Arctic Security PREVIEW

NEWPORT MANUAL ON

ARCTIC SECURITY

Walter Berbrick, Gaëlle Rivard Piché, and Michael Zimmerman

NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND

EARLY PRAISE

“Newport Manual on Arctic Security is undoubtedly one of the most useful books ever written on Arctic security. This is essential reading for naval professionals around the world seeking to better understand how to apply and integrate seapower in the complex Arctic region. With emerging strategic competition in this global maritime crossroads, it is imperative that we are prepared for operations in the High North.”

—Adm. James G. Foggo III (Ret.), commander, United States Naval Forces Europe-Africa; commander, Allied Joint Force Command Naples United States

“As the likelihood of accidental conflict and miscalculation in the Arctic increases, the adoption of new practical measures to increase security dialogue and confidence between States becomes urgent. The principles set forth in this Manual are an important contribution to the ongoing discussion and are worth considering by the governments concerned.”

Dr. Andrei Zagorski, head of Department for Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Studies, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences; Member, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC)

“This important book moves beyond just articulating concepts and challenges, and proposes innovative and practical implementation measures to bolster regional security dialogue, stability, and cooperation. Given the breadth and depth of expertise showcased in this volume, this Manual is essential reading for academic researchers, practitioners, and policymakers grappling with how to engage responsibly in a rapidly changing Arctic security environment.”

—P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Trent University, North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network

Contents

List of Participants

Foreword by the Honorable Kenneth J. Braithwaite

INTRODUCTION

PA RT I. AWARENESS 20

Principle 1. Arctic Security 21

Principle 2. Access

Principle 3. Sea Power and Military Activity

Principle 4. Jurisdiction and Sovereignty

Principle 5. Freedom of the Seas

Principle 6. Cooperation and Governance

Principle

Economic Potential and Development

Principle 8. Non-Arctic States’ Interests in the Region

PART II. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

Principle 9. Notification of Military Exercises and Operations

Principle 10. Observers

Principle

Joint Scientific Research and Commitment to Arctic Council Agreements

Principle

P rinciple

Principle

Principle

Border and Boundary Tension Involving State Aircraft

Military Activity in Sensitive Areas

Facility Visits

Regional Security Mechanisms

Principle 16. Polar Code Enforcement 93

Principle 17. Illegal, Unregulated, Unreported Fishing

Principle 18. Live Exercises

Principle 19. Personnel Exchanges

Principle 20. Indigenous Community Engagement

Commentar y

PART III. CAPABILITIES

Principle 21. Current and Future Maritime Security Capabilities 123

Principle 22. Dual-Use Capabilities 133

Principle 23. Sustainability and Environmental Stewardship 139

Principle 24. Indigenous Knowledge 144

Principle 25. Information Sharing 150

Principle 26. Communications 156

Principle 27. Scientific Cooperation 162

Principle 28. Education and Training 168

Principle 29. Icebreaking Capabilities 174

Principle 30. Pooling Resources 182

Commentar y

CONCLUSION

Participants

PROJECT DIRECTOR

Dr. Walter A. Berbrick, U.S. Naval War College

PRIMARY AUTHORS

Dr. Walter A. Berbrick, U.S. Naval War College

Dr. Gaëlle Rivard Piché, Defence Research and Development Canada Lt. Col. Michael D. Zimmerman, U.S. Marine Corps, Judge Advocate

CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS

Rear Adm. Lars Saunes, Royal Norwegian Navy (Ret.), U.S. Naval War College

Professor Rebecca Pincus, U.S. Naval War College Cdr. Sean Fahey, U.S. Coast Guard Capt. Mary Ann Gworek, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Cdr. Johannes R. Nordby, Royal Danish Defense College

Ms. Cara J. Condit, U.S. Coast Guard, Center for Arctic Study and Policy Ms. Lillian Hussong, Rutgers University

INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS

Cdr. Michelle A. Tessier, Royal Canadian Navy

Cdr. Henrik A. Koefoed, Royal Danish Navy Cdr. Niels O. Markussen, Royal Danish Navy

Professor Valur Ingimundarson, University of Iceland

Cdr. Juha M. Torkkeli, Naval Academy of Finland

Cdr. Jens Hoeilund, Royal Norwegian Navy Cdr. Tor Ivar Strømmen, Royal Norwegian Naval Academy

Mr. Jeffrey L. Barker, U.S. Navy, OPNAV N3N5I

Participants

Capt. Blake J. Tornga, U.S. Navy, Naval Forces Europe / Sixth Fleet

Dr. Andrei Zagorski, Russian Academy of Sciences

Dr. Andrei Todorov, Russian Academy of Sciences

Dr. Niklas Granholm, Swedish Defense Research Agency

CONTRIBUTING EXPERTS

Ambassador Judy McLennan (Ret.), U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women

Thomas E. Mangold Jr., U.S. Naval War College

Thomas J. Culora, U.S. Naval War College

Lt. Cdr. Peter R. Barker, Royal Navy

Professor Nikolas Gvosdev, U.S. Naval War College

Ms. Anna B. Davis, U.S. Naval War College

Cdr. David Dubay, U.S. Coast Guard

Cdr. Rachael Gosnell, U.S. Navy

Professor Mary Thompson-Jones, U.S. Naval War College

Professor Peter Dombrowski, U.S. Naval War College

Mr. Michael D. McEleney, U.S. Department of Energy

Mr. David M. Slayton, Stanford University

Cdr. Andreas Hildenbrand, German Navy, George C. Marshall Center

Lt. Cdr. Richard Cobb, Royal Canadian Navy

Dr. Pia Hansson, University of Iceland

Mr. Alexey Knizhnikov, World Wildlife Fund

Dr. David Auerswald, National Defense University

OBSERVERS

Rear Adm. Jeffrey A. Harley, U.S. Naval War College

Capt. Garrett I. Campbell, U.S. Navy

Ms. Julia Gourley, U.S. Department of State

Ambassador Marie-Anne Coninsx, European Union

Ms. Rivta Hautanen, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland

Foreword

During my time serving as United States ambassador to Norway and as the seventy-seventh Secretary of the Navy, I probably spent more time learning from Walter Berbrick about Arctic security than anybody else. It’s why as Secretary of the Navy, I asked him to lead the development of the Department of the Navy’s Arctic Strategy, A Blue Arctic: A Strategic Blueprint for the Arctic. In fact, this Newport Manual on Arctic Security you have in your hands underpins the thinking behind this strategy.

I first learned about this project in 2018, when I met Walter, Gaëlle, and Mike at the George C. Marshall Center in Germany. They discussed and refined the work of this Manual with a wider group of government and academic leaders from around the world, including from Russia. Six months later, we crossed paths again in Bergen, Norway. I sat next to my good friend Admiral Jamie Foggo, who served as commander, Naval Forces Europe, at the time, along with heads of navy from Canada, Denmark, Ice land, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. We all walked away better informed and inspired by the extraordinary opportunities this Manual would pro vide for governments around the world as they develop and implement national Arctic policies and strategies.

Over the last decade, the challenges, opportunities, and responsibili ties facing people and governments in the Arctic region have grown more complex and more urgent. Our challenge is to apply naval power in a way that protects vital national interests and preserves regional security without undermining trust and triggering conflict. This Manual provides a blue print for doing just that.

To reflect on these issues and their implications for Arctic States and their maritime forces, the U.S. Naval War College launched the New port Arctic Scholars Initiative. I am not surprised that the journey of this

international group of experts began at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. From Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History to the countless war games that gave rise to the legend ary Rainbow Plans of World War II, no other educational institution has had a greater impact on the Navy and the nation than the U.S. Naval War College. I have no doubt this Newport Manual on Arctic Security, just like the timeless works before it, will become an important resource for world leaders and continue to play a central role in ongoing dialogue regard ing how to preserve peace and prosperity through persistent presence and partnerships.

At a time when the actions of some states continue to threaten peace and security in the Arctic, it is even more important that such actions are countered with a strong commitment to international norms and values. The creation of the Newport Manual has been unconstrained by politics and the book will serve as a blueprint for governments as they seek greater clarity regarding their development and employment of naval forces in the Arctic. The thirty principles discussed in this Manual reflect consen sus among this group of international experts in the areas of awareness, confidence-building measures, and capabilities. They are forward-thinking and aspirational. They apply in peacetime and to any nation or navy that operates in the Arctic region. Its ultimate and most important role lies in helping states reach common understanding. After all, only through persistent presence and partnerships can we ensure security in a free and open Arctic. This must be our objective, and it is one that the United States remains committed to achieving in the decades ahead.

Kenneth J. Braithwaite II Seventy-Seventh Secretary of the Navy

Introduction

The Arctic is heating up. Climate change is transforming the region, which raises important issues related to security and defense, access and navigation, energy, infrastructure, cooperation, and governance. As a result, states in and outside the region are turning their attention to the Northern pole, with important implications for the future of security and stability in the Arctic. To reflect on these issues and their implications for Arctic States and their maritime forces,1 the U.S. Naval War College launched the Newport Arctic Scholars Initiative in April 2018. Over eigh teen months, sailors, security practitioners, and scholars from Arctic States gathered to study and discuss these matters.2 This Manual presents the results of those conversations.

The Manual is designed to help researchers, practitioners, and policy makers better understand Arctic security challenges, common and diverg ing interests among Arctic stakeholders, and prospects for regional security dialogue and cooperation. Under the leadership of the main authors, the participants debated ideas, researched issues, and drafted principles per taining to awareness, confidence-building measures, and capabilities. These principles reflect consensus among participants and each accompanying commentary captures their discussions. The thirty principles enclosed in

this Manual cover a broad range of security matters that are becoming increasingly important as the Arctic’s physical environment and regional geopolitics continue to evolve. Each commentary provides important con text and concrete examples, discusses points of agreement and contention among Arctic States, and applies measures to foster Arctic security and stability. The principles reflected in this Manual provide a starting point for policy makers to engage and cooperate on Arctic security and defense issues. They do not set forth best practice or policy, nor do they reflect the official positions of governments.

Before diving into the principles and their commentaries, this introduc tion sets the table by presenting the concepts and assumptions that guided this joint effort. It starts by defining some of the key terms and considerations referred to across the Manual. It then discusses the factors that drive change in the Arctic and the rising geopolitical importance of the region in world politics. Most importantly, it sets the core assumption underlining this work: Like the rest of the international system, the Arctic is entering challenging times that could undermine regional security and stability. To prevent unin tended conflict,3 this Manual provides new, innovative ways to foster coop eration, peace, and stability in the region, focusing primarily on Arctic States and the maritime environment. It does not aim merely to reflect the cur rent state of world affairs, which has fluctuated significantly over the course of this project. Instead, it adopts an aspirational and optimistic perspective on the future of Arctic security and stability, perhaps best illustrated by the methodology underpinning this Manual: the development of principles and associated commentary through broad consultation and seeking consensus.

At the time of concluding the editing of this book in early 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin launched an unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, setting off the largest armed conflict in Europe since World War II. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine represents a direct attack on international law and established norms that undermines the international system. This, in turn, undermines regional governance fora and mechanisms, including the Arctic Council, which paused activities to ensure Russia could not use its Arctic Council chairmanship as a platform to message that the West is willing to continue “business as usual” while Russia wages war in Ukraine. At the same time, Arctic and non-Arctic states have increased military

activity. With dormant regional dialogue and increased military activity, the likelihood of accidents or miscalculation with Russian forces in the Arctic has never been higher. Taken together, the need for international principles on Arctic security has never been more critical to maintaining peace and stability in the region.

MAIN CONCEPTS

The Arctic and Its Subregions

Several definitions of the Arctic exist. Some scientists define the Arctic as north of the Arctic tree line, while others use temperature as the defin ing factor (shown on maps at arcticportal.org). For the purpose of this Manual, the Arctic consists of the region above the 66°34' N parallel (the Arctic Circle), the most commonly used definition (fig. 1, dashed line). Under this definition, eight states claim territory in the Arctic and are therefore recognized as Arctic States: Canada, Denmark (through Green land), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Russia, and the United States.4 The region, with the Arctic Ocean at its center, is bounded by five litto ral states: Canada, Denmark (through Greenland), Norway, Russia, and the United States. The Arctic Ocean connects to the Northern Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean through straits and chokepoints. From a strategic standpoint, the Bering Strait, between Russia and the United States, and the Greenland-Iceland–United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap,5 in the Northern Atlantic, are particularly important.

The Arctic is better understood as a set of subregions rather than a monolithic entity.6 Geography and climate vary widely across the Arctic, with important implications for access and human activity. In fact, the regional priorities of Arctic States are mainly shaped by the subregional geography and their immediate neighborhood. For instance, strategic con siderations in the Barents Sea differ from those in the North American Arctic. The remote, expansive, and bare Canadian Arctic stands in contrast to the reality of Nordic countries. Canada’s northern region represents 40 percent of the country’s landmass and 20 percent of the entire Arctic. Yet, it is inhabited by less than 0.5 percent of the Canadian population (35 mil lion), with 113,000 people living in the Canadian Arctic. In comparison, approximately a third of Finland’s landmass is located above the Arctic

Circle, and 180,000 people live in Northern Finland.7 The Russian Fed eration stands well above other Arctic States, claiming 40 percent of the entire region’s real estate. Approximately 2 million Russians live in the Arctic, which accounts for 50 percent of all Arctic inhabitants. Domes tically, these dynamics influence the importance of the region in creating national priorities, prioritizing investments, and mobilizing public opinion. Subregional geography and climate also affects access to the Arctic. Navigation in the Northwest Passage is treacherous, and activity at sea in the North American Arctic remains limited. Indeed, the mandate of the North American Aerospace Defense Command was only extended to the maritime environment in 2006.8 In contrast, the Northern Sea Route is progressively becoming a viable commercial sea route, and both Russia and Nordic countries are developing their Northern infrastructures.

The immediate neighborhood of each Arctic State also influences its regional priorities. Cordial diplomatic relations characterize interstate relations in the North American Arctic. While territorial disputes remain unsolved between the United States and Canada on the one hand, and Canada and Denmark on the other hand, the three states have so far set tled on agreeing to disagree. Indeed, good relations and overall lack of ten sion has led the three members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization mostly to ignore their territorial disputes.

In the Barents Sea, higher strategic stakes have forced Russia and Nor dic countries to adopt a more pragmatic approach. Over the years, the Nor wegian and Russian navies interact consistently at sea, developing well-used communications channels and settling territorial disputes at the national level. The implications of a military incident in the Baltic or Bering Seas have also forced Russia, Norway, Sweden, and Finland to develop diplo matic mechanisms to manage tensions and potential disputes. Overall, dis tinct strategic and geographical environments make for different priorities, explaining at times discrepancies and tension at the regional level.

Hard and Soft Security

In its traditional sense, the concept of security refers to the physical integ rity and the survival of the state, and the use of military force to threats against it. In the Arctic, however, the term security is often used to depict

other regional challenges, including environmental degradation, access to food, economic development or lack thereof, and so on. Language such as human security, environmental security, food security, health security, and energy security are also commonplace in the affairs of the Arctic Council, despite that traditional security falls outside its mandate.9

To reflect the discussions among participants, the terms hard security and soft security are used throughout the Manual. Hard security refers to traditional security matters managed by military forces. Soft security is loosely defined and bears two meanings. First, it refers to domestic safety and security, including search and rescue, as well as law and regulation enforcement, which usually fall under the mandate of other government organizations: law enforcement agencies, coast guards, border protection services, shipping regulators, environmental agencies, or even agricultural departments. At times in this volume, soft security also refers to nontradi tional security issues as described above.

The Manual focuses first and foremost on traditional security issues, reflecting on the role maritime forces can play in maintaining peace and security in the Arctic. However, as the physical environment continues to change due to climate change, maritime forces will likely be called to intervene in ways that go beyond strictly national security and defense. As such, the principles and commentaries address soft security issues when relevant and include considerations for actors beyond states, including multinational forums, transnational networks, and especially Northern communities and Indigenous peoples.

Northern Communities and Indigenous People

In all Arctic States, with perhaps the exception of Iceland, local commu nities and Indigenous peoples live above the Arctic Circle and often in remote areas where the presence of the central government has tradition ally been limited. They are the first to witness change, whether positive or negative, in the region and to be affected by it. Domestically, some Arctic States have started to redress their colonial history, recognizing the right to self-determination of Indigenous peoples and putting in place gover nance structures at the subnational level to recognize their authority and legitimacy. Internationally, Indigenous peoples are becoming increasingly

salient politically, as illustrated by their inclusion as permanent partici pants in the Arctic Council. However, Indigenous peoples and Northern communities are rarely taken into consideration on security and defense matters beyond providing localized situational awareness.

Yet, evidence demonstrates that Indigenous governments can engage with foreign governments and private actors to achieve political goals, which in turn can affect the interests of states.10 Indeed, “Indigenous gov ernments are negotiating new relationships with foreign and domestic governments, forming economic development corporations, hiring private firms to raise capital, funding trade missions, and even opening offices in key international locales such as Beijing to engage in trade promotion and push investment opportunities in projects such as resource extraction.”11

Activities such as these are not necessarily in sync with state interests and have important implications for national security and defense. Recognizing the importance of self-determination and Indigenous rights, it is important for Arctic States to take stock of the role and influence Indigenous actors and other nontraditional stakeholders can have on security and defense.

As such, while Indigenous peoples and Northern communities are not up front and center in each of the principles, the Manual recognizes them as crucial political actors on Arctic matters, proposing ways to better engage with them and integrate their knowledge on security and defense matters.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC

Large and multilayered governance architecture is in place in the Arctic to manage regional affairs. Given the focus of the Manual on maritime issues and international relations in the Arctic, two international docu ments are particularly important and referenced across the Manual: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the International Maritime Organization’s International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (the latter known as the Polar Code).

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

The Arctic is dominated by its ocean. Hence, the United Nations Conven tion on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the principal document regulat ing maritime law and order, is particularly important in the management

of regional interstate relations. UNCLOS codifies historic state practice regarding the sea rights of coastal states and prevents abuse of natural resources or territorial overreach so that freedom of navigation can be maintained.12 It provides a comprehensive set of rules and norms for the maritime domain with more than three hundred provisions detailing the rights and responsibilities of coastal states and the seafaring community. Some of the more notable provisions of UNCLOS are the establish ment of a twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea for coastal states, extend ing from the baseline measurement, and the creation of a new exclusive economic zone (EEZ), extending two hundred nautical miles from the baseline.13 The EEZ gives coastal states sole authority over all resources below the surface of the water within that area, including fishing, mining, and drilling rights. UNCLOS also includes provisions for how states can assert claims of sovereignty in the sea and adjudicate disputes when claims overlap. Thus, as Arctic policy makers and security practitioners consider the best method for maintaining peace and stability in the region, having a working knowledge of the principal body of rules applicable to the world’s oceans is critical to anticipating and shaping state action. All Arctic States but the United States have ratified the treaty.14

The International Maritime Organization’s Polar Code

The Polar Code sets standards for vessels operating in the harsh and remote Arctic.15 Effective in 2017, it is designed specifically for polar waters, and it addresses marine safety and environmental challenges for ships oper ating in remote and sometimes extreme conditions. The Polar Code is a set of amendments to three existing International Maritime Organization safety, environmental protection, and mariner competency documents: (1) the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea; (2) the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships; and (3) the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers. Coast guards, port authorities, and state shipping agencies are instrumental in ensuring that substandard vessels do not threaten Arctic populations and ecosystems. These organizations can enforce regulations and detain noncompliant vessels to ensure trade routes stay open and prevent the ecological devastation wrought by oil spills.

GEOPOLITICS OF THE ARCTIC

The Arctic has long stood at the periphery of world affairs. Its austere, remote, and largely inaccessible environment has traditionally made it irrelevant to most strategic considerations, with the notable exception of its role in strategic deterrence during the Cold War. Over the last decade, however, the region has increasingly attracted the attention of powers inside and outside the Arctic as a result of climate change, technological progress, and a return to great power competition.

Understanding the changes that generate growing state interest is a first essential step to manage peace and stability in the Arctic. Throughout the process leading to this Manual, participants discussed these transfor mations at length. The discussion centered on two main questions: (1) Is the Arctic experiencing a security dilemma, and (2) is the region at risk of military escalation? In a nutshell, the quick transformation of the Arctic environment and the return to great power politics are raising the geopo litical importance of the Arctic on the world stage. While great distances and an austere environment give defense the advantage in the region, antagonistic rhetoric and deepening mistrust between Arctic States could result in unwarranted military escalation.

This assessment sets the table for the rest of this Manual: Arctic secu rity and stability requires the development of a shared understanding among Arctic States of ongoing regional transformations and their implications, new and innovative measures to boost trust and confidence among the Arctic Eight, and guidelines to develop Arctic capabilities that support peace rather than enable war.

Climate Change

The Arctic is warming at a higher rate than the rest of the planet. Most sci entists agree that rising Arctic temperatures and environmental changes are the result of climate change, with substantial consequences for the region’s ecosystems, its population, and the rest of the planet.16 From a geopolitical standpoint, receding sea ice is the most important consequence of those transformations. A navigable Arctic presents tremendous potential for regional economic and social development, as well as global commerce. New sea routes promise to significantly reduce transit times between Europe,

Asia, and North America. For now, trans-Arctic commercial shipping remains sparse in comparison to that on southern sea routes. However, mar itime traffic increases year after year along the Northern Sea Route, mostly driven by hydrocarbon exploitation and transport. In the longer term, the Northwest Passage, the Transpolar Sea Route (TSR), and potentially the Arctic Sea Bridge (ASB) could also provide viable alternative routes.

Greater maritime access to littoral towns and cities also bears promises for the social and economic development of the North. Diminishing sea ice will increase access to energy and marine resources that have remained untouched or sparsely exploited until now. In 2008, the U.S. Geologi cal Survey estimated that the Arctic contains 30 percent of the world’s undiscovered natural gas and 13 percent of the planet’s oil, respectively.17

If logistical challenges remain important, China’s Polar Silk Road truly embodies the potential many states see in the region.

Yet, if untapped natural resources and new shipping routes are sources of excitement for the economic development of the region, a warmer Arctic implies fundamental changes to its ecosystems. Shrinking ice and thawing permafrost are altering the fauna and flora of the region with devastating consequences for dozens of species, including polar bears, walruses, rein deer, and caribou.18 An ice-free Arctic will also have serious consequences for southern regions through severe weather events, including extreme heat and drought, and rising sea levels.19 Finally, warming waters across world’s oceans have already triggered fish stock migration toward the Arc tic Ocean, with important implications for global food security.

Despite the dire implications, scientific evidence on climate change has often failed to directly shape policy,20 and some governments con tinue at times to express strong skepticism toward the causal links between severe weather events and climate change.21 Nonetheless, even if the cause of such changes continues to be debated, there is consensus on some of the changes witnessed in the Arctic: the polar ice cap is melting, sea ice is receding, and a new ocean is opening to surface navigation.

Technological Progress

New technologies directly contribute to increasing human activity above the Arctic Circle. They reduce barriers related to resources exploration and

exploitation, navigation, and communications. For instance, offshore drill ing technology now enables the extraction of oil and gas reserves from the Arctic seabed, something deemed impossible twenty years ago. Enhanced icebreaking capabilities are expanding the navigation season for both com mercial and military platforms in waters that otherwise remain treacherous. In the military domain, a wide array of new technologies, including unmanned systems, sensor and imagery systems, and highly elliptical orbit satellites are progressively enhancing the ability of armed forces to operate in polar conditions. As a result, Arctic States are more aware of the changes and activities taking place in the northernmost part of their territories.22 The emergence of new cyber and space warfare will only amplify these changes, which in turn will affect various aspects of operational capabili ties, including command and control as well as surveillance, in ways that are difficult to fully predict.

International Politics

Three decades after the end of the Cold War, the international system is returning to the logic of great power rivalry. U.S. hegemony on world affairs is weakening and isolationist discourse is gaining momentum at home.23

In the meantime, China is becoming increasingly assertive and appears willing to question the current rules-based international order. Russia, on its end, has acted to reassert its place in the international system, opting to use aggressive strategies to advance its interests in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Mounting evidence suggests that both states, still facing U.S. conventional military superiority, are adopting strategies and tactics to advance their interests globally while avoiding direct confrontation.24 The Arctic is not impermeable to these dynamics, which shape regional security and stability.25

Taken together, climate change, technological progress, and a mul tipolar international system are all contributing to the growing geopo

litical importance of the Arctic. The Arctic now attracts the attention of many states and organizations outside the region. China’s Arctic Policy generated a lot of chatter upon its release in 2018, but France, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the European Union have also all released strategies and policy documents pertaining to the Arctic.26 Arctic

exceptionalism, if there was ever such thing, no longer exists.27 According to the 2019 U.S. intelligence threat assessment, receding sea ice in the Arctic will increase access to sea routes and natural resources, potentially increasing interstate competition.28 In October 2018, for the first time, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu declared that tensions in the Arctic could lead to conflict.29 In all cases, ongoing changes raise concerns about the future of Arctic peace and stability.

The Future of Arctic Security

The growing geopolitical importance of the Arctic raises concern about future peace and security in the region. Militarily, a blue Arctic Ocean represents a new operating environment that is no longer solely limited to underwater and strategic strike capabilities. The shrinking polar ice cap will likely reduce stealth for submarines, increase access for surface combatants, and diminish the need for polar-class vessels year-round. The Arctic Ocean will nonetheless remain critical for strategic stability in the foreseeable future, especially for the conventional balance of power and strategic strikes.

According to these trends, some experts have suggested that a regional security dilemma might be emerging, where a State’s efforts to increase its own security only undermine the security of others.30 All Arctic States, and especially coastal ones, have announced major investments in the security and defense of the Arctic, including military capabilities. So far, most investments serve a defensive and sovereignty-assertion rationale, including the modernization of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), its expansion to the maritime domain by Canada and the United States, and the deployment of new radar systems by Mos cow, air defense, and search and rescue capabilities along Russia’s northern coastline.31

However, other investments can be perceived as offensive. For instance, with the exception of Sweden, all Nordic countries are part of the F-35 fighter jet program. In 2018, the United States reactivated its Second Fleet, which is responsible for the Northern Atlantic. Russia is investing in its Northern Fleet, including in its strategic strike capability. Moscow has also deployed capabilities to enable the defense of the Kola Peninsula

and access to the Northern Atlantic.32 Surface combatants with cruise mis siles have been deployed along the Northern Sea Route, and the Russian infantry is trained to operate in the Arctic.

The impact of these investments is magnified by current tension between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which counts five Arctic States as its members. Interactions between Rus sia and NATO countries have become more adversarial in the Arctic and the North Atlantic, a clear spillover from conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. In particular, Russia’s irredentist actions in East ern Europe in 2014, the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and harsh international sanctions against Russia have severed relations between the Arctic Eight. For now, it has significantly reduced any potential for for mal security dialogue and cooperation in the Arctic. In this context, any concerted action among Arctic States to exclude Russia from multilateral forums only further contributes to mistrust and aggravates tension.

For instance, Trident Juncture 2018, a NATO-led exercise based on a collective defense scenario, was the biggest exercise organized by the Alliance since the end of the Cold War in the Northern Atlantic. Russia responded with a large-scale exercise of its own and has become more asser tive in its actions against NATO countries. Russian fighters have resumed patrols over the North Pole after a thirty-year lapse. A Norwegian radar station was targeted by a mock air strike in 2018,33 and Russian strategic bombers periodically approach North American airspace.34 These actions have contributed to intensifying adversarial rhetoric between Russia and NATO. U.S. General Terrence O’Shaughnessy, commander of NORAD, made the following assessment in February 2019: “We face a more com petitive and dangerous international security environment today than we have in generations.”35 Without regular dialogue and trust between Arctic States, defensive and offensive measures are becoming increasingly hard to distinguish, and one’s attempt at increasing its own security ostensibly seems to decrease the security of others.36

Nonetheless, due to the sheer size of the region and its austere environ ment, defense outweighs offense in the Arctic. In 2009, the then–Canadian chief of defense staff, General Walter Natynczyk, stated, “If someone were to invade the Canadian Arctic, my first task would be to rescue them.”37 In

the North American portion of the Arctic, at least, mounting a large offen sive in the Arctic appears to be a costly and risky enterprise. Hence, the defensive advantage in the Arctic will help prevent conventional military escalation among Arctic countries. However, Arctic States may choose to compete through other means as adversarial rhetoric continues to under mine potential for interstate cooperation on security issues. In this context, it is urgent to find ways to facilitate dialogue and build trust among Arctic States before tensions escalate further, the core objective of this Manual.

BOOK OUTLINE

The Arctic is entering uncertain times. Combined, the effects of climate change, rapidly evolving technology, and great-power competition have already started influencing regional security and stability. To prevent unin tended conflict and promote regional peace, the three parts at the core of the Manual provide principles to build shared awareness among Arctic stakeholders about the regional challenges, design confidence-building measures reinforcing dialogue and cooperation, and develop maritime capabilities while avoiding unnecessary escalation.

Setting the table for the remainder of the Manual, part I (Awareness) looks at major changes and challenges shaping regional security and sta bility. Highlighting commonalities and discrepancies in the interests of Arctic States and other regional stakeholders, the part identifies potential areas of conflict and cooperation on regional matters. It first addresses the different definitions of Arctic security and the growing emphasis placed on security and defense issues, the implications of greater access to a region long forgotten by many governments in and outside the Arctic, and the growing role sea power is likely to play in managing regional security and stability. It also explores contentious issues pertaining to sovereignty and jurisdiction, as well as the application of the principle of freedom of the seas to the Arctic Ocean. Finally, principles on cooperation and gover nance, economic potential and development, and interests of non-Arctic states cover different dimensions of the rising geopolitical importance of the region in international relations. Better understanding of the simi larities and differences among the interests of Arctic stakeholders is an essential first step to identifying the way toward security and stability in

the Arctic through the development of appropriate confidence-building measures and capabilities.

Part II (Confidence-Building Measures) focuses on crafting an inte grated framework of rules and norms that Arctic and non-Arctic states should consider to mitigate tension in the region, despite increasing atten tion. This part reviews existing hard security, confidence-building measures that apply in other relevant areas, such as the Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe and the attendant Vienna Document 2011. It also considers creative measures, leveraging soft security pathways to address the unique aspects of the Arctic security environment and help prevent conflict. It ultimately provides achievable yet ambitious measures whereby accidental conflict and unintended escalation is prevented as receding ice allows for increased interaction in the Arctic. It presents a set of princi ples based on what were found to be the foundational pillars of confi dence building: communication, transparency, constraint, and verification. Each principle drafted discusses the uses of the above pillars to build trust among friends and competitors alike.

Finally, part III (Capabilities) identifies practical steps states can take, independently or together, to close capability gaps and build trust, while mitigating the risk of miscalculation and conflict in the Arctic. The part begins by highlighting the necessity and immediacy of Arctic States to develop capabilities. In doing so, it reinforces the need to maintain trans parency when developing capabilities, especially dual-use capabilities, in the region. Subsequent principles highlight the shared responsibility of states to develop capabilities efficiently while respecting the people and environment. Multinational planning and operations, information sharing, and critical enablers are proposed as ways that help states advance pragmatic cooperation in the region. The part concludes with practical ways states can consult with Indigenous peoples and leverage traditional knowledge. The principles and commentary drawn from this part are underpinned by the same three themes that appear throughout the entirety of the Newport Manual: transparency, cooperation, and communication. Taken as a whole, this part contends that the maritime forces of Arctic States are stronger when engaged and working together to address common security interests and challenges in the region.

NOTES

1. The Manual considers both navies and coast guards, given the various mandates of those organizations in each Arctic State. Furthermore, Iceland, which does not have an armed force, relies on its coast guard for matters of domestic and border security.

2. The initiative inc luded military and academic representatives from Canada, Den mark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States. Scholars from the Russian Federation were also consulted and provided insight and feedback on the content of the Manual as it developed.

3. Atle Staalesen, “A New Global Order Is Coming to the Arctic: Strong Voices Say It Must Be Met by an Overhaul in Regional Governance,” Barents Observer, January 29, 2020, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2020/01/new-global -order-coming-arctic-strong-voices-say-it-must-be-met-overhaul-regional (accessed January 31, 2020).

4. Hereinaf ter, the expression “Arctic Eight” refers to the eight states with territory above the Arctic Circle.

5. The GIUK Gap refers to the maritime strategic routes between Greenland, Ice land, and the United Kingdom. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The GIUK Gap’s Strategic Significance,” Strategic Comments 25, comment 29 (October 2019), https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2019/the -giuk-gaps-strategic-significance (accessed April 23, 2020).

6. Andreas Østhagen, Gregory Levy Sharp, and Paal Sigurd Hilde, “At Opposite Poles: Canada’s and Norway’s Approaches to Security in the Arctic,” Polar Jour nal 8 (2018): 172.

7. Arctic Economic Council, “Finland,” https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/coun tries/finland/ (accessed June 6, 2019).

8. Since 2006, “the North American Aerospace Defense Command conducts aerospace warning, aerospace control and maritime warning in the defense of North America.” NORAD, “About NORAD,” https://www.norad.mil/About -NORAD/ (accessed January 31, 2020).

9. Wilfrid Greaves and Daniel Pomerants, “‘Soft Securitization’: Unconventional Security Issues and the Arctic Council,” Politik 3, no. 20 (2017): 31–46.

10. Leah Sarson, “‘You Cannot Trade What Is Not Yours’: Indigenous Governance and the NAFTA Negotiations,” American Review of Canadian Studies 49, no. 2 (2019): 344–45.

11. Sarson, 332.

12. See United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, “The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A Historical Perspective),” http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical _perspective.htm#Historical Perspective.

13 See “The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, art. 2–5 and 55–57, December 10, 1982.

14. The United States participated in the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1974–82) and the following negotiations of modifications (1990–94). While it has not ratified UNCLOS, it recognizes it as a codification of customary international law.

15. See the International Maritime Organization, International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics /polar/Pages/default.aspx.

16. National Snow and Ice Data Center, “Climate Change in the Arctic,” All about Arctic Climatology and Meteorology, 2019, https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/arctic -meteorology/climate_change.html (accessed January 27, 2020).

17. U.S. Geological Survey, Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscov ered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle, U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet, July 2008, https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008–3049.pdf (accessed January 31, 2019).

18. Eric Niiler, “The Arctic Is Warming Much Faster Than the Rest of Earth,” Wired, April 12, 2019, https://www.wired.com/story/the-arctic-is-warming-much-faster -than-the-rest-of-earth/ (accessed January 28, 2020).

19. Eric Post, Richard B. Alley, Torben R. Christensen, Marc Macias-Fauria, Bruce C. Forbes, Michael N. Gooseff, Amy Iler, Jeffrey T. Kerby, Kristin L. Laidre, Michael E. Mann, Johan Olofsson, Julienne C. Stroeve, Fran Ulmer, Ross A. Virginia, and Muyin Wang, “The Polar Regions in a 2°C Warmer World,” Science Advances 5, no. 12 (2019): 1–12.

20. John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, and David Schlosberg, “Climate Change and Society: Approaches and Responses,” in The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society, ed. John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, and David Schlosberg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

21. See Jean-Daniel Collomb, “The Ideology of Climate Change Denial in the United States,” European Journal of American Studies 9, no. 1 (2014): 1–20; Riley E. Dunlap and Aaron M. McCright, “Organized Climate Change Denial,” in Dryzek, Norgaard, and Schlosberg, The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society

22. See, for instance, Canadian Spatial Agency, “RADARSAT-2 Helps Create Per manent Road Link to Arctic Ocean,” December 13, 2017, https://www.asc-csa .gc.ca/eng/blog/2017/12/13/radarsat-2-helps-create-permanent-road-link-to -arctic-ocean.asp (accessed January 28, 2020).

23. For a discussion on the end of the liberal hegemony under U.S. leadership, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Reali ties (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018).

24. See, for instance, Ben Connable, Jason H. Campbell, and Dan Madden, Stretching and Exploiting Thresholds for High-Order War: How Russia, China, and Iran Are Eroding American Influence Using Time-Tested Measures Short of War (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2016); James Goldbrick, “Grey Zone Operations

and the Maritime Domain,” Special Report, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, October 2018; Ben Connable, Stephanie Young, Stephanie Pezard, Andrew Radin, Raphael S. Cohen, Katya Migacheva, and James Sladden, Russia’s Hostile Measures: Combating Russian Gray Zone Aggression against NATO in the Contact, Blunt, and Surge Layers of Competition (Santa Monica: RAND Corpo ration, 2020); Stephanie Young and Brenna Allen, Appendix A: An Evolutionary History of Russia’s Hostile Measures (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2020); Stephanie Pezard, Katya Migacheva, and Brenna Allen, Appendix B: Detailed Case Studies of Russia’s Use of Hostile Measures (Santa Monica: RAND Corpora tion, 2020).

25. See John Schaus, Michael Matlaga, Kathleen H. Hicks, Heather A. Conley, and Jeff Rathke, “What Works: Countering Gray Zone Coercion,” CSIS Brief, July 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-works-countering-gray-zone-coercion (accessed January 29, 2020); Ben Connable, Stephanie Young, Stephanie Pezard, Andrew Radin, Raphael S. Cohen, Katya Migacheva, and James Sladden, Russia’s Hostile Measures: Combating Russian Gray Zone Aggression against NATO in the Contact, Blunt, and Surge Layers of Competition (Santa Monica: RAND Corpora tion, 2020); Rebecca Pincus and Walter A. Berbrick, “Gray Zones in a Blue Arctic: Grappling with China’s Growing Influence,” War on the Rocks, October 24, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/10/gray-zones-in-a-blue-arctic-grappling -with-chinas-growing-influence/ (accessed August 22, 2019).

26. The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, Chi na’s Arctic Policy, January 26, 2018; United Kingdom, Foreign and Common wealth Office, Polar Region Department, Beyond the Ice: UK Policy towards the Arctic, April 2018, 2; France, Ministère des armées, La France et les nouveaux enjeux stratégiques en Arctique, 2019. See also European Union, European External Action Service, “EU Arctic Policy: Overview,” February 20, 2017, https: //eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/20956/arctic-short -introduction_en (accessed August 21, 2019); http://library.arcticportal.org/1902 /1/Arctic_Policy_of_the_Republic_of_Korea.pdf; https://www.spf.org/en/_opri _media/docs/%E2%98%85WEB%E5%85%AC%E9%96%8B%E7%89%88 %EF%BC%88%E3%83%A1%E3%83%A2%E7%84%A1%E3%81%97%EF %BC%89_Japan%E2%80%99s%20Future%20Priority%20Areas%20of%20 Arctic%20Policy.pdf.

27. For a discussion on the limits of Arctic exceptionalism, see Juha Käpylä and Harri Mikkola, On Arctic Exceptionalism: Critical Reflections in the Light of the Arctic Sunrise Case and the Crisis in Ukraine, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Working Paper 87, April 7, 2015, 4–9.

28. Daniel R. Coats, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Commu nity, Statement for the Record, Senate Committee on Intelligence, January 29, 2019, 23.

29. TASS (2018), “Shoigu: Arktika stala tsentrom interesov ryada gosudarstv, chto mozhet privesti k konfliktam” [Shoigu: The Arctic has become a center of interest for a number of states, which could be leading to conflicts], August 31, 2018, https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/5509944 (accessed May 14, 2019) quoted and trans lated by Mathieu Boulègue, “Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic: Managing Hard Power in a ‘Low Tension’ Environment,” research paper, Russia and Eurasia Programme, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, June 2019, 7.

30. According to Robert Jervis, two key variables influence the intensity of the secu rity dilemma: the indistinguishability of offense and defense, and whether offense or defense has the advantage. The security dilemma will be particularly intense and lead to escalation when defensive and offensive measures cannot be distin guished, and when offense has the advantage. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 211; see also Kristian Åtland, “Interstate Relations in the Arctic: An Emerging Security Dilemma?,” Comparative Strategy 32, no. 2 (2014): 145–66.

31. See Siemon Wezeman, Military Capabilities in the Arctic, SIPRI Background Paper, March 2012, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/misc/SIPRIBP1203 .pdf (accessed December 20, 2019); Siemon Wezeman, Military Capabilities in the Arctic: A New Cold War in the High North?, SIPRI Background Paper, October 2016, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Military-capabilities-in-the-Arctic .pdf (accessed December 20, 2019).

32. Boulègue, “Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic,” 6–7.

33. Thomas Nilsen, “11 Russian Fighter Jets Made Mock Attack on Norwegian Arctic Radar,” Barents Observer, February 12, 2019, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en /security/2019/02/11-russian-fighter-jets-made-mock-attack-norwegian-arctic -radar?fbclid=IwAR1mBi3UyZNfvjOVmU25EVPCMP11vSMMA1kaBZ 0EoaPV_qhVPvuTEvFbHVc (accessed February 20, 2019).

CBC News, “Canada, U.S. Must Do More to Check Russia’s Military Moves in the Arctic, Says NORAD Chief,” CBC News, February 12, 2019, https://www.cbc .ca/news/politics/russia-arctic-norad-missiles-1.5016654 (accessed February 18, 2019).

CBC News.

Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” 169.

Statement made by General Natynczyk during the 2009 Halifax International Security Forum, quoted in Åtland, “Interstate Relations in the Arctic,” 156.