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INTELLIGENCE AND THE

STATE ANALYSTS AND DECISION MAKERS

JONATHAN M. HOUSE

Naval Institute Press Annapolis, Maryland

Naval Institute Press 291 Wood Road Annapolis, MD 21402 © 2022 by the U.S. Naval Institute All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: House, Jonathan M. ( Jonathan Mallory), 1950- author. Title: Intelligence and the state : analysts and decision makers / Jonathan M. House. Description: Annapolis, Maryland : Naval Institute Press, [2022] | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2021045965 (print) | LCCN 2021045966 (ebook) | ISBN 9781682477724 (hardcover) | ISBN 9781682477748 (ebook) | ISBN 9781682477748 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Military intelligence—United States. | Intelligence service—United States. | Civil-military relations—United States. | National security—United States. | United States—Military policy. Classification: LCC UB251.U5 H68 2022 (print) | LCC UB251.U5 (ebook) | DDC 355.3/4320973—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021045965 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021045966 Print editions meet the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper). Printed in the United States of America. 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 First printing

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Dedicated to the memory of my parents, two wartime intelligence officers: Lt. Col. Albert V. House, U.S. Army Air Forces, and Lt. Laura M. (Griffin) House, U.S. Naval Reserve And to the memory of Col. Russell P. Vaughn, U.S. Army (Ret.) and GG-15, Defense Intelligence Agency

Contents Preface

Acronyms and Abbreviations

1. Professions and Professionalism

2. The Intelligence Process

3. The Operator-Analyst Interface

4. The European Precedents

5. The U.S. Intelligence Community, 1882–1961

xi 1 14 29 47 78

6. The U.S. Intelligence Community since 1961

109

138

The Paradox of Warning

8. Conclusions

162

Notes

169

Bibliography

201

Index

219

vii

Preface

n 1957, Samuel Huntington published The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. In this landmark study, he attempted to define the interrelationships between military professionals and the civilians who controlled military force in a democracy. Huntington was concerned by the manner in which the sustained partial mobilization of the Cold War seemed to endanger the traditional concept of civilian supremacy over the armed forces. Military proconsuls such as Douglas MacArthur had acquired both experience in and control over large portions of national security policy and strategy, subjects traditionally left to the civilian government. Senior military leaders understandably believed that they had both technical expertise and practical experience unmatched by most politicians. Indeed, the growing possibility of nuclear war seemed to give American generals and admirals overwhelming control over national policy. Huntington’s solutions were somewhat simplified and even unrealistic, attempting to apply hard and fast rules to a variety of nuanced relationships. Nonetheless, his prescriptions offered a useful framework for exploring those relationships. Fifty years later, Gen. David Petraeus, who had studied Huntington’s book while in graduate school, used the Harvard theorist’s principles as a starting point for discussions with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates about Petraeus’ new appointment to command forces in Iraq. The Cold War and the subsequent era of insurgency and terrorism placed stress not only on civil-military relations, but also on civil-intelligence relations. To a large extent, the U.S. intelligence community is a product of the post-1945 era, when policy makers had to rely constantly on the expertise of intelligence officers, whose education, motivation, and experience ix

Preface

differed markedly from those of politicians. Successive administrations have attempted to co-opt and politicize the senior leaders of both defense and the intelligence community, in each case to the detriment of national security. While I cannot pretend to the brilliance of Huntington, this study attempts to address a civil-intelligence interface that has become just as fraught with misunderstanding and error as civil-military relations have ever been. Civilian leaders often assume a political bias on the part of analysts, whereas most analysts attempt to exclude such factors from their considerations. The analysts in turn suspect that the decision makers are unable to overcome their own biases and partisan politics in order to understand foreign cultures and interests. Intelligence leaders are just as prone as others to make errors, but on balance those leaders are correct more often than they usually receive credit for, if only because their successes are classified while their failures, real or alleged, are trumpeted to the world. The most recent example of this was the alleged “intelligence failure” to warn of the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol, when the threat of such an attack was apparent weeks ahead of the event. In writing this book, I am indebted to a number of research facilities, most especially the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas; the Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and the Deryck Maughan Library of King’s College, London. I must also acknowledge the contributions of my colleague and retired intelligence officer John Kuehn, whose comments significantly improved this study. Like my father before me, I was liberally educated as an historian before becoming a working-level intelligence analyst in a wartime Pentagon. Other observers have greater experience with the intelligence community than do I, but I hope that my combination of education and practical service has equipped me to offer useful evaluations of a complex problem set. The views expressed in this study are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States, the U.S. intelligence community, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. government agency. Any assertions or errors are solely my responsibility. Leavenworth, Kansas June 2021

Acronyms and Abbreviations AEC BCRA CI CIA CIG COMINT COMINTERN CORDS CRITIC DCI DD/P DGER DGSE DIA DIRNSA DNI DST

Atomic Energy Commission Gaullist Bureau central de renseignements et d’action (Central Bureau of Information and Action, 1940–44) counterintelligence Central Intelligence Agency Central Intelligence Group (1946–47) Communications Intelligence Third or Communist International Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support address list of agencies to receive urgent indications and warning messages Director of Central Intelligence (1946–2004) CIA Deputy Director for Plans (later Deputy Director for Operations) French Direction générale des études et recherches (General Directorate for Studies and Research, 1944–46) French Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure (General Directorate for Foreign Security, post-1982) Defense Intelligence Agency Director, National Security Agency Director of National Intelligence French Direction de la surveillance du territoire (Directorate of Territorial Surveillance, 1944–2005) xi

xii

ELINT FBI FHO FISA FSB GCCS GCHQ GRU HUMINT I&W IAC IAEA IC IIC IMINT INR JCS JIC KGB MI5 MID MVD NSA NSA 47 NSC NSCID ODNI

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Noncommunications electronic intelligence Federal Bureau of Investigation Fremde Heere Ost (German Foreign Armies East) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Federal’naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, since 1995) UK Government Code and Cypher School (to 1946) UK Government Communications Headquarters (since 1946) Glavnoye razvedyvatel’noye upravleniye (Soviet/ Russian General Staff [Military] Intelligence Directorate) human intelligence indications and warning U.S. Intelligence Advisory Committee International Atomic Energy Agency intelligence community U.S. Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference Imagery Intelligence Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research Joint Chiefs of Staff UK Joint Intelligence Committee Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Soviet Committee for State Security) informal designation for UK Security Service U.S. Army Military Intelligence Division Russian/Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs National Security Agency or National Security Assistant/Advisor National Security Act of 1947 National Security Council National Security Council Intelligence Directive Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Okhrana ONI OPC OSO OSS PBCFIA PFIAB SD SDECE

SERE SIGINT SIS SVR USCIB USIB WMD

xiii

literally, Guard (Russian Department for Protecting the Public Security and Order, 1881–1917) U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence CIA Office of Policy Coordination CIA Office of Special Operations Office of Strategic Services (1942–45) President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (1956–61) President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Nazi Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service) French Service de documentation extérieure et de contre-espionnage (Service for Foreign Documentation and Counter-Espionage, 1946–82) survival, evasion, resistance, and escape training signals intelligence, including COMINT and ELINT UK Secret Intelligence Service Sluzhba vneshney razvedki Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, since 1991) U.S. Communications Intelligence Board U.S. Intelligence Board weapons of mass destruction

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Contact: Jacqline Barnes, (410) 295-1028, jbarnes@usni.org

A Timely Overview of the Intelligence Community Intelligence and the State Analysts and Decision Makers By Jonathan M. House

“An excellent overview of intelligence history and a perceptive analysis of the age-old intelligence officer dilemma: how to get the decision maker to accept intelligence that is not in sync with his perceptions or plans.” —Rear Adm. Tom Brooks, author, career intelligence officer, former Director of Naval Intelligence In the eighty years since Pearl Harbor, the United States has developed a professional intelligence community that is far more effective than most people acknowledge—in part because only intelligence failures see the light of day, while successful collection and analysis remain secret for decades. Intelligence and the State explores the relationship between the community tasked to research and assess intelligence and the national decision makers it serves. The book argues that to accept intelligence as a profession, it must be viewed as a nonpartisan resource to assist key players in understanding foreign societies and leaders. Those who review classified findings are sometimes so invested in their preferred policy outcomes that they refuse to accept information that conflicts with preconceived notions. Rather than demanding that intelligence evaluations conform to administration policies, a wise executive should welcome a source of information that has not “drunk the Kool-Aid” by supporting a specific policy decision. Jonathan M. House offers a brief overview of the nature of national intelligence, and especially of the potential for misperception and misunderstanding on the part of executives and analysts. Furthermore, House examines the rise of intelligence organizations first in Europe and then in the United States. In those regions, fear of domestic subversion and radicalism drove the need for foreign surveillance. This perception of a domestic threat tempted policy makers and intelligence officers alike to engage in covert action and other policy-based, partisan activities that colored their understanding of their adversaries. Such biases go far to explain the inability of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union to predict and deal effectively with their opponents. The development of American agencies and their efforts differed to some degree from these European precedents, but experienced some of the same problems as the Europeans, especially during the early decades of the Cold War. By now, however, the intelligence community has become a stable and effective part of the national security structure. House concludes with a historical examination of familiar

instances in which intelligence allegedly failed to warn national leaders of looming attacks, ranging from the 1941 German invasion of the USSR to the Arab surprise attack on Israel in 1973.

Jonathan M. House is a retired Army intelligence officer and military historian. He received his doctorate and his commission at the University of Michigan. House served as an intelligence analyst on the Joint Staff during both the 1991 and 2003 conflicts and is the author or coauthor of numerous military histories, most notably When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler and A Military History of the Cold War (2 vols.).

Additional Praise: “Jonathan House sheds new light and understanding on an important but little understood subject. Threats to national security are expanding and so are demands on the intelligence community. Intelligence and the State explains the essential elements of effective warning and decision at the nexus of senior intelligence professionals and government policy makers. It is a must-read for intelligence professionals and those who depend on or oversee them.” —H. R. McMaster, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and author of Battlegrounds and Dereliction of Duty

“With years of experience in the intelligence community to draw upon, Jonathan House provides a valuable overview of the complex processes and challenging organizational dynamics involved in this vital endeavor.” —Trent Hone, author of Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898-1945 and coauthor of Battle Line: The United States Navy, 1919-1939

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Publication date: April 15, 2022 ISBN: 9781682477724 Hardcover and eBook: $40.00 248 Pages | 6 x 9 in www.usni.org/books

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