‘THE BOSCOMBE VALLEY MYSTERY’ & CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE LAW IN AUSTRALIA
‘THE BOSCOMBE VALLEY MYSTERY’ & CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE LAW IN AUSTRALIA C ALEB G AGGI I.
INTRODUCTION
Justice Kirby in De Gruchy v R (‘De Gruchy’) provides a poetic description of circumstantial evidence in that ‘circumstantial evidence necessarily calls upon processes of reasoning that involve the drawing of inferences from a jigsaw of established facts’.1 The relatability of this comment will soon become obvious in addressing the statements made by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle in that, ‘circumstantial evidence is a very tricky thing, it may point to one thing, if you shift your point of view a little, you may find it pointing in an equally uncompromising manner to something entirely different’ and that ‘there is nothing more deceptive than an obvious fact’.2 These statements will be discussed by examining the definition, elements and probative value of circumstantial evidence through an example provided by Justice Heydon as seen below. Although circumstantial evidence has its relevance in both civil and criminal matters, in relation to the two statements above, an approach addressed to criminal matters will be adopted. This is decided upon the differences between the standard of proof for civil and criminal matters regarding circumstantial evidence on either the balance of probabilities or beyond reasonable doubt.3 For criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence is used to ‘exclude reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence’ whereas in the former, ‘only circumstances raising a more probable inference in favour of what is alleged’ is sought.4
II.
DEFINITION
In understanding circumstantial evidence in light of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s statements, it must first be clearly defined. Firstly, circumstantial evidence ‘tends to prove a fact from which the existence of a fact in issue may be inferred’,5 meaning that it is evidence in which is drawn upon inferences of existing evidence that ‘assert facts that alone or in combination with others have a rational tendency to resolve a fact in issue’ and a ‘common course of events’ operating cumulatively.6 What is important to note is that there must be a conclusion that follows a rational inference, typically bearing no other reasonable explanation.7 This indirect evidence is typically considered by either inferences along ‘strands in a cable’ or ‘links in a chain [of Submitted for assessment in LAW3321. 1 De Gruchy v R (2002) 211 CLR 85, [48] (‘De Gruchy’). 2 Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes: The Boscombe Valley Mystery (George Newnes Ltd, 1892) ch 4. 3 Groeneveld Australia Pty Ltd v Nolton Vastogoed BV [2011] VSC 18, [76] (‘Groeneveld’). 4 Ibid; Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd (1951) 217 ALR 1, 5 (‘Bradshaw’). 5 Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593, [5] (Gleeson CJ). 6 Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367, 375 (Dixon J); Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573, 578 (Dawson J) (‘Shepherd’); DPP v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729, 756 (‘Kilbourne’). 7 Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367, 375 (Dixon J).
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