Let 'Em Holler: A Political Biography of J. Bracken Lee by Dennis L. Lythgoe

LET 'EM HOLLER A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF J. BRACKEN LEE

Dennis L. Lythgoe

Utah State Historical Society Salt Lake City, Utah

FIRST EDITION

© Copyright 1982 by Dennis L. Lythgoe

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

ISBN 0-913738-33-6 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 82-060039 Manufactured in the United States of America

To Marti

Contents 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

Acknowledgments ix Introduction 1 Mayor of Price, "A Wide Open City" 5 Morals and the Mayor 23 Election as Governor 33 Liquor Reform 41 Economy in Government I 53 Economy in Government II 67 Hatred for Lawyers: Parnell Black and the Taylor Case 83 Mormon Church Influence 91 Battle with Bateman 109 Education I 117 Education II 135 Reelection, 1952 147 The United Nations 159 McCarthyism and Justice Wolfe 171 Snoopers and Looters 177 Don Jesse Neal and Capital Punishment 191 The Third-Term Bid 203 Other Election Campaigns 225 Mayor of Salt Lake City 247 The Firing of W. Cleon Skousen 265 Problems of City Government 295 The Last Campaign 311 Vice and Prostitution 317 "Sick and Tired of Politics" 325 Index 335

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Acknowledgments When J. Bracken Lee announced his retirement from public life in September 1971, I decided to research his fascinating career and write a political biography. Accordingly, I brought my family back to Utah for the summer of 1972; then I returned for additional research in 1975 and 1976. I spent several delightful hours with the intellectually acute and spirited Governor Lee, who not only willingly cooperated in answering a myriad of questions about his career but never requested to approve the finished product or to control it in any way. He responded candidly to all questions, making the oral history contribution to this work immeasurable.

In 1977 I was invited by Charles S. Peterson, professor of history at Utah State University, to present a paper on Lee's career as mayor of Price, Utah, as part of a lecture series funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities. Lee responded publicly to the paper in a formal critique in the Price City Hall Auditorium and demonstrated an unusual ability to accept criticism and to view his career with perspective. Therefore, I would like to extend special gratitude to the former governor, who imbued this project with a credibility and excitement that would have been impossible otherwise. I would also like to thank his most gracious wife, Margaret, for many personal kindnesses.

I had the pleasure of interviewing numerous contemporaries of the governor and would like to thank them for their willing contributions and expertise, especially those who furnished personal papers and documents: J. D. Williams, professor of political science at the University of Utah, furnished me with his own personal file on Lee; J. W. Pace, former liquor commissioner under Governor Lee, loaned me a thick and informative scrapbook covering his tenure; W. Cleon Skousen, former Salt Lake IX

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

City police chief, allowed me to borrow his personal file concerning his tenure as chief and the clash with Lee that led to his dismissal. The file contained primary sources indispensable to this work. Skousen also spent several hours with me in analytical discussion of the events surrounding his dismissal. Finally, Wayne L. Black, attorney and former Democratic party official, provided me with an important speech, unavailable elsewhere, made by his politically prominent father, Parnell Black. He also contributed unusually perceptive opinions and background on Utah politics.

I am grateful to the Utah State Archives, where the Lee gubernatorial papers are housed; to T. Harold Jacobsen, archivist; Forrest Terry, deputy archivist; and especially, Merle V. Budd, secretary, who was most gracious and expert in securing the materials I needed. Similarly, I would like to extend thanks to Everett L. Cooley and the Special Collections, Marriott Library, University of Utah, where Lee's mayoralty papers from Salt Lake City are held; P. Hampton McArthur, Price city recorder, and his staff for assistance in securing important documents relating to Lee's tenure as mayor of Price; O. N. Malmquist and M. DeMar Teuscher, former political editors, respectively, of the Salt Lake Tribune and the Deseret News, who offered perceptive insights into Utah politics gained from long, firsthand experience.

I am grateful to several other key figures in Utah's past and present who willingly and knowledgeably answered my questions: former governors Calvin L. Rampton and Herbert B. Maw, and former senators Arthur V. Watkins, Wallace F. Bennett, and Frank E. Moss, all of whom shared intimate knowledge of Lee's style and substance; former representatives Reva Beck Bosone, William A. Dawson, and Sherman P. Lloyd; Sen. E. J. (Jake) Garn; former Salt Lake City commissioners Jennings Phillips, Conrad Harrison, and James L. Barker; D. James Cannon, who opposed Lee in his final campaign for mayor; Calvin W. Rawlings, prominent attorney and former Democratic party official; Roland V. Wise, former director of the Internal Revenue Service in Utah; M. Lynn Bennion, former Salt Lake City superintendent

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

of schools; Richard A. Bateman, son of former state superintendent of public instruction, E. Allen Bateman, who provided his father's viewpoint on important issues; Roy W. Simmons, banker and former liquor commissioner; William Smart, editor and general manager of the Deseret News; Ezra Taft Benson and LeGrand Richards, apostles of the Mormon church, both of whom discussed the church and politics; and Judge Fred W. Keller of Price, who knew more about the problems of Price than anyone except Lee himself.

Special gratitude must go to the following employees of the Utah State Historical Society: Stanford J. Layton, coordinator of publications and public information, Miriam B. Murphy, associate editor, and Melvin T. Smith, director, for demonstrating constant interest and faith in this project from its inception until its publication by their agency. All read the manuscript carefully and made valuable suggestions. The Society donated tapes for use in my interviews, and these will be returned for inclusion in an oral history collection.

Gratitude is also due the scholarly support committee of Bridgewater State College for awarding me financial aid in the fall of 1976 to help pay travel expenses to Utah for research purposes, and the History Department and the administration of the college for allowing me a reduced teaching load in the spring of 1975, and a sabbatical in the fall of 1976, so that I could pursue this work.

Finally, I would like to recognize the unique contribution of my wife, Marti, whose intellectual acumen and sense of balance have been indispensable in polishing the manuscript, and whose criticism and suggestions have improved it immeasurably. Her loving support has given this task a glow of excitement. Yet, for whatever errors of fact or judgment may be evident, for the approach, the method of considering the evidence, and the conclusions drawn, only I can take responsibility. It has been a fruitful experience.

Dennis L. Lythgoe Abington, Massachusetts xi

Introduction In a vigorous defense of his fiscal conservatism as governor of Utah, J. Bracken Lee once advised, "Do it honestly, do the best you know how, and let 'em holler!" That statement accurately portrays not only Lee's unique, forceful personality but the entire philosophy of government that made him one of the few genuine mavericks in American political history.

From his earliest days in politics he was charismatic, independent, supremely self-confident, and candid. As a result, he became the most colorful and controversial politician in Utah history with, probably, a greater impact on the state and the nation than any Utah figure since Brigham Young. Moreover, in his enduring career as mayor of Price for twelve years, Utah governor for eight years, mayor of Salt Lake City for twelve years, perennial candidate for governor and senator, frequently mentioned candidate for president or vice-president, and forceful spokesman for conservatism, his impact was felt longer and was more effective than that of any other Utah politician.

He was one of the few Utah governors to be nationally known, especially for his fiscal conservatism and his vociferous opposition to income tax, foreign aid, and the United Nations.

His candor and gift for self-expression are immediately reminiscent of Harry S Truman, although because of his opposing political philosophy Lee would never accept such a comparison.

Due to a penchant for invective and personal confrontation, Lee probably made more enemies than any other Utah politician; and some Utahns grew embarrassed and uncomfortable with his national reputation.

Although his record as mayor of Price was in some ways laudable, it was also morally questionable to the typically religious Utah voter. But as governor, he gained immediate respecta1

INTRODUCTION

bility for his emphasis on integrity and economy. His principal target for economy was education, however, and he soon made an enemy of almost every educator in the state (a fact that would haunt his political career). On balance, his healthy relationship with the Mormon church probably saved him from the educators' wrath. When, toward the end of his second term, his candor turned in the direction of the national administration, in the person of the popular Dwight D. Eisenhower, his political career suffered. With church leaders, educators, and politicians of his own party firmly opposed to him, his third-term hopes were dashed. Yet, as an independent for governor in 1956 and for senator in 1958, he exercised startling influence over Utah politics.

Lee proved his resiliency by his three-time election as mayor of Utah's largest city, retaining an almost uncanny popularity with voters until his retirement in 1972. Finally, as an ex-mayor in his seventies, he demonstrated a continuing ability to influence the election or defeat of other politicians. Undoubtedly, he remained a respected, though controversial, figure because he seemed always to retain "the courage of his convictions."

J. Bracken Lee was born in Price, Utah, on January 7, 1899.

His grandfather, Edwin C. Lee, came to Utah as a Mormon convert from England in 1855, and all of Edwin's sons were active in the church except Arthur, J. Bracken Lee's father.

Lee's maternal ancestors were also Mormon converts who arrived in Utah in 1849. When Lee's great-grandmother rejected her husband's plural marriage, she was kept in Utah by the personal intervention of Brigham Young (or so Lee claimed). She accordingly raised Lee's grandmother outside the church. Lee's grandmother told him that her "own father patted her on the head at the age of ten and asked her whose little girl she was."

She naturally reared Lee's mother outside the church.

The Arthur Lees raised six children, three boys and three girls, with Bracken being the oldest boy and the second oldest of the family. His father died in 1934, but his mother, Ida May Leiter Lee, lived on enthusiastically as one of Utah's oldest citizens until her death in 1980.

INTRODUCTION

The Lee family moved to Fruita, Colorado, when Bracken was five years old. He attended school there, completing the eighth grade before the family returned to Price. His father entered politics, first as mayor of Fruita and finally as town board president in Price. Bracken attended Carbon County High School but did not graduate; instead, he enlisted in the army when World War I broke out in April 1917, two months prior to graduation. He served until March 1919, emerging with the rank of sergeant. After the service he worked for several months as a postal clerk before joining his father in the insurance and real estate business, eventually becoming manager and owner of the agency.

In 1920 Lee married a Mormon girl, Nellie Pace, and they became the parents of a daughter, Helen. After two years of marriage his wife became seriously ill with pneumonia, then subsequently developed Hodgkin's disease, which took her life four years later. To cope with the hospital bills, Lee built a garage behind his house and lived in it as cheaply as he could on a hamburger and a quart of milk a day while he rented out the house. Laying the groundwork for his political philosophy, he paid off his bills in two years and vowed that he would never go into debt again.

In 1927 he met Margaret Draper from Wellington, Utah, and they were married in Price the following year. They became the parents of three children, a daughter, Jon, and sons James and Richard. Lee's wife, Margaret, is an active Mormon but, according to Lee, has never tried to convert him. On the other hand, daughter Jon, whom Lee calls a "devout Mormon," tried very hard to convert him. "I told her, 'now you believe your religion but you leave me alone!' And she has never talked to me about it since."

As Lee's insurance business prospered, he had time to devote to outside interests, becoming a registered Republican, a 32nd degree Mason, an Elk, and a Legionnaire. By 1931 he had become so involved in the politics of Price that he ran for mayor but was swamped. After sitting out the 1933 election he was

J . BRACKEN LEE

ready to try again in 1935, and this time won by two votes. Lee's fascinating political career had begun.

1 Mayor of Price, "A Wide Open City' J. Bracken Lee's political career began in 1935 when he was narrowly elected mayor of Price, an eastern Utah coal mining community of less than 5,000 people. It cost him $800 in court fees before he was finally declared the official victor. Subsequently, he was elected to five additional two-year terms for a total of twelve years in office. Although the position was considered part-time and paid only $50 per month, Lee attacked the city's problems with enthusiasm. Feeling that the people were "getting gypped" with a 34 mill levy, he promised reduced taxation.

I intended to give them their money's worth, and I did\ . . .

Every year I was in office, I reduced taxes. Every year! The last three years we didn't have one penny of tax on property.

Tax free—the only city in the state. Of course, this raised the question, "where'd you get the money to operate?"1 Lee explained that since Price had its own electrical distributing plant, the city purchased electricity wholesale from Utah Power and Light Company and then sold it to the people at an increased rate.2 He maintained that Price was paying an exorbitant rate to the power company, and so he applied pressure to reduce it. Incredibly, he discovered that stealing electricity was a common town practice.

They'd wire a couple of nails on the back porch, and when they would hang a tub over it, it would short the meter out. Other people would wrap little wires around the meter, and then they'd let it run for a little while and disconnect it.

And we found that we were buying a lot more kilowatts than we were selling. A terrific amount. And you'd be amazed at the people who were stealing electricity. The big thieves were the rich! When I say the rich—the people that could afford to pay were doing the most stealing. And when I found the

J. BRACKEN LEE

names on this list, why we'd a had a scandal—they'd a probably run me outa Price! I concluded it was better not to expose it, and I got the city council together and we decided we'd put in theft-proof meters. . . and we created so much profit in the electricity that we could replace all the property tax.3 Total receipts in 1934 from the sale of electricity amounted to $57,542.59, while in 1943 the figure had jumped to $111,229.33.

By 1944 Ben Ward, city recorder, announced that the profit to the city from the sale of electricity totaled $266,078.43.* The sale of culinary water marked another significant source of revenue for the city, producing an income of $60,958.94 in 1943, with expenses amounting only to $33,000.00.5 In the summer of 1943 Lee enthusiastically recommended to the city council that the property tax be entirely eliminated.

Lee realized that Price was carrying a bonded debt, but he saw no advantage in paying it off in a lump sum because interest would have to be paid on the entire amount. He also opposed the continuation of property tax in order to build up a surplus because such a practice would create a temptation to spend money too freely and was contrary to law." When the city council accepted Lee's recommendation, Price became the only municipality in Utah without city taxes.7 However, the experiment was over by 1946 when city taxes were restored at a levy of 10 mills, with $21,500.00 collected.

The levy was increased to 15.5 mills in 1947, with $42,723.35 collected.8 A tax-free city was a notable achievement for the period, but it was only a reality for three years out of Lee's tenure of twelve years.

Effusive in praise of his own record in Price, Lee said: During my time in office we had the greatest number of improvements—civic improvements—of any like period in the city before or since! All you've gotta do is go down and look at the record!"

The most notable achievements were these: The water supply line from mountain springs high in the Wasatch range was completely rebuilt with metal pipe during 1935-37 at a cost of

MAYOR OF PRICE

$250,000. In 1939 a 750,000-gallon steel water tank was built for $13,000. In 1938 a municipal building, comprising a civic auditorium and city hall, considered to be the best in the state, was built with WPA help at a cost of $250,000. In 1940 a storage garage valued at $30,000 was purchased and rebuilt and a $15,000 park was constructed. Prior to Lee's mayoralty only Price's main street was paved; but during his tenure most of the city's streets were paved and a street lighting system was installed.10 Lee forgot his antipathy for federal funding long enough to float a bond of $180,000 to build the municipal building, which, according to him, was completely paid off when he left office in 1948: "The December before I left office, I paid off the last dollar of bonded indebtedness the city had. They didn't owe a dollar when I left office!"11 In fact, Price city records show a bonded indebtedness of $187,000 in 1945, climbing to $317,000 by the end of 1948 when Lee left office. Moreover, it remained high in the two years following, $288,000 in 1949 and $303,000 in 1950.12 LIQUOR CONTROL

As mayor, Lee unleashed a barrage of attacks on the state liquor system. It adversely affected Price city finances, he declared, causing an annual loss of $20,000 in revenue. He suggested that the system ^be revamped to provide a more equitable distribution of revenue to cities and towns. In addition, Carbon County beer vendors complained to him that the liquor law did not provide protection against bootleggers. Lee asserted that "open drinking" was not allowed under the old act, but the new one encouraged individuals to "spend their last cent for a bottle, drink it, then end up in respectable places to cause trouble."

He insisted that the old system of open saloons was superior to the present system of liquor stores. Finally, he expressed great concern about enforcement, which he thought was impossible without additional men or funds from the state.13 Soon afterward, agents of the state liquor commission arrested three persons in Price without warning for violations of the state

J . BRACKEN LEE

liquor law. Approximately twenty-seven officials participated in the raid, which culminated in the arrest of Steve Cafe, George Pappas, and A. Aramaki. Since local officials were not notified of the raid, they had no knowledge of it until the arrested people appeared in the sheriff's office with the evidence—sixteen gallons of illegal liquor." Incensed at the episode, Lee complained that officials had raided a private home (that of Pappas) in plain clothes without a search warrant. Claiming that the incident occurred without due process of law, Lee consulted with Marl Gibson, Democratic county attorney, and then drew up a law for Price, instituting a $299 fine or six months in jail or both for entering a private domicile without a warrant. The city council subsequently passed the ordinance.10 The most controversial incident of Lee's mayoralty occurred in January 1938 at the Jones Club on Carbon Avenue. Mayor Lee personally supervised the arrest of two state liquor enforcement officials, Chester Dowse and Henry Bell, on charges of alleged drunkenness and resisting a Price police officer. After a preliminary hearing Dowse was bound over to district court with bail set at $1,000 and Bell was released. Lee claimed that state officials used "high-handed" techniques and failed to cooperate with local authorities.

The fracas occurred at 2:30 A.M. on January 25, nearly six hours after the club had been raided and closed by state liquor inspectors who objected to the sale of liquor by the drink. Inspector Bell reported that whiskey had been purchased in the Jones Club at least ten times between September 24 and January 24 in specific violation of the state Liquor Control Act. Merlyn Jones, the owner, said that he approached the establishment after the raid and saw two men drinking beer, but that he was refused admission. He called night patrolman William Mclntyre to assist him, but they were still denied entry. Finally, Jones called Mayor Lee, who left his bed and joined the patrolman in seeking entry to the club. But the two liquor agents, who had been left in the building to map it and take an inventory, also refused to let them in. Lee then instructed Mclntyre to open the door with Jones's key. When that failed, they obtained the assistance of

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passers-by to force the door open. Lee said that he had deputized those who helped him, including club employees, bartenders Arthur Camomile and Robert E. Lee, the mayor's brother.

In the melee that followed, Lee charged that Dowse struck Jones on the head with a gun, inflicting several lacerations. With the help of additional police, the mayor arrested the agents and hauled them into jail, contending that they had refused to reveal their identities and their right to be in the building. "When they send men down," said Lee, "they most certainly should contact local police. There is nothing to keep anyone from entering a place, closing the doors and pilfering."

Parnell Black, chief counsel for the liquor commission, defended the agents at the hearing the next day, while Marl Gibson, county attorney, acted for the prosecution. Lee testified that when he sought admission to the club, Chester Dowse refused him entrance and asked, "Who the Iiell are you?" When Lee introduced himself, Dowse reportedly remained unimpressed.

Lee claimed that Dowse's "eyes were bloodshot, and he talked in a thick voice."

When Dowse took the stand he admitted to taking one glass of beer but insisted he had drunk only part of it because it was "not particularly palative." He said that he consumed about two-thirds of a six-ounce glass, "chiefly foam." When Lee had knocked on the door, Dowse had answered and said, "I'm sorry but I can't let anyone in here." Parley Salmon, his superior, had instructed him to let no one enter. When Dowse saw that the men intended forced entry, he told Bell to obtain a rifle from the other room and used it as a weapon in the fight that ensued, in which he was knocked down and kicked in the jaw. Bell testified that the only reason that he and Dowse had been unwilling to admit Price officials was their failure to recognize Lee as the mayor.

When Black asked Lee if it was true that he had told the liquor agents that "the state liquor commission is corrupt from top to bottom," Lee replied affirmatively. Black then lectured Lee, citing section 174 of the state liquor law, that "if any officer shall fail or refuse to do or perform any duty required by this act,

Upper left: A 1928 photograph of Lee taken for the Masonic Lodge in Price just before his marriage.

Upper right: Lee congratulates his successor as mayor of Price, A.D.Keller.

Above: On Scofield Lake, seated, left to right, State Sen. Marl D. Gibson (D-Price), I. Allen Browne of Utah State Fish and Game Department, Mrs. Gibson, and Mrs. Browne; standing, Margaret and J. Bracken Lee. Lee made the boat. Right: Lee in 1942 when he ran unsuccessfully for Congress.

J. Bracken Lee photographs.

Above: Gov. Herbert B. Maw with Mayor Lee of Price. In 1948 Lee would successfully challenge Maw for the governorship.

Deseret News photograph.

Below left: Lee, in white, played shortstop for the Price baseball team, ca. 1925. I. Bracken Lee photograph. Below right: Lee in the 1920s. Deseret News photograph.

J. BRACKEN LEE

he shall be removed from office." He also quoted section 165 saying that if the arresting officer believed a liquor violation had occurred, he should "seize all tangible personal property in said premises."

As a result of the hearing, an official complaint was filed before a justice of the peace charging Merlyn Jones, proprietor, and Arthur Camomile and Robert E. Lee, bartenders, with maintaining a common nuisance in violation of section 195 of the state act. It was generally understood that the commission had evidence against practically every liquor-vending establishment in Price.16 Lee believed that bootlegging was not the issue ("I'm not saying they weren't guilty of bootlegging") but that the principles of private property and due process of law were at stake.

Although he asserted that the ordinance passed by the city council, mentioned earlier, was the basis upon which the agents were arrested,17 that ordinance was actually not passed until December 1942.18 Lee's recollection of the incident is more colorful than contemporary accounts. He remembered a late night telephone call informing him that there were two liquor agents in the Jones Club with the blinds pulled down.

But they don't know that you can peek through the edge of the blinds and see what's going on. And he says, "There's a gang down watching them and they've got a couple of girls in there, and they're playing the juke box and drinkin' Jones' liquor." And so I thought this'd be interesting, and so I got dressed and went down there and I watched them for awhile.

I finally called the Chief of Police, and they were havin' a hell of a time—makin' a lot of noise. . . . I would guess there must have been close to 100 people standin' around there at midnight on the outside!19 Lee recalled that Dowse was unemotional when he opened the door, and probably did not recognize him as the mayor.

"I said, 'Arrest them both!'" and the chief allegedly did so.20 Lee is wrong about who made those arrests, for all other accounts of the episode name Patrolman Mclntyre. The contradiction is probably attributable to the passage of years.

12

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Lee's recollection of the outcome is also faulty. He claimed that both agents were found guilty and that one was sentenced to sixty days in jail while Dowse was given a suspended sentence because he came from "a good family."21 Actually, Bell was released immediately after his arrest, following a preliminary hearing before justice of the peace J. W. Hammond. Dowse was represented at his hearing almost two months after the event by attorney Burton Musser, who argued that Dowse had a perfect right to use even more force than he did to keep out city officials.

He said that Patrolman Mclntyre, in failing to aid the agent as required by law, was hindering Dowse in the performance of his duty of making an inventory of the Jones Club and therefore was more vulnerable to a charge of resisting an officer than Dowse. Judge George Christensen ruled in favor of Dowse and freed him, explaining that the club was not a public place at the time of the arrest, meaning that Dowse could not be held for drunkenness.22 Undoubtedly, the Jones Club incident was terribly embarrassing to Lee and his administration. However, he used it as a springboard for his private investigation of the liquor commission and the state land board. When the Price Chamber of Commerce offered to help finance the study, Lee promised to produce evidence so damaging that it would lead to a grand jury. He had studied the 2,600-page transcript of testimony given to an investigating committee of the 1937 legislature and found evidence that big monthly retainers had been paid to the commission for long periods after service had been ordered terminated. Lee hired a private investigator, formerly employed by the liquor commission, to help him resurrect the data. Moreover, Lee personally paid part of his salary.23 Lee claimed that the liquor commission never turned into the courts the same amount of money agents confiscated during a raid. The commission, he said, would insist that the money was put in the safe and that it must have rolled out of the drawer.

"They had the damnedest excuses! But they kept stealing!"24 Lee wrote an angry letter to James Funk, then chairman of the Liquor Control Commission, attacking him for what Lee 13

J . BRACKEN LEE

characterized as "misstatements" credited to Funk by newspapers about the Jones Club incident. Lee strongly objected to a rumor that he was personally interested in the Jones Club, and he held Funk responsible. He also took exception to the undue emphasis that Funk allegedly placed on the involvement of Lee's bartender brother. It had nothing to do with the liquor agents' decision to violate the law, asserted Lee, but it did indicate the "contemptible methods" a "political machine" would take to mislead the public.

Lee quickly added that he held no sympathy for a bootlegger and would never offer any assistance to a liquor law violator.25 Lee also charged that the liquor commission had paid a prominent Salt Lake attorney $15,000.00 obtained from state funds to defend the commissioners against possible grand jury indictments.20 Although he did not mention him by name, the attorney Lee was referring to was the commission's chief counsel, Parnell Black, a highly successful attorney. Black angrily denied the charge and labeled the liquor investigation as Lee's "great campaign as the modern savior of depleted Republican hopes."

Black also accused Lee of libel and pointed out that no audit had ever revealed even a trace of "such misappropriation."27 Black reacted to Lee's charge that Corby's whiskey was not for sale in the stores or package agencies of Utah because the liquor commissioners had refused to sell it unless they received a payoff from representatives of the company. Actually, Corby's liquor had been removed from the market in the United States and could not be purchased.28 Lee made a number of other charges, among them that the land board had caused the state to lose $2 million through corrupt practices. After going over records at the State Capitol personally, he announced, "I don't believe there are half a dozen departments that are not implicated." He suggested that state officials were trying to "hush things up" and predicted that the public would be shocked at the findings. Finally, Lee wrote a scathing letter to Gov. Henry H. Blood, a Democrat, calling his attention to "irregularities, various forms of graft and downright pilfering of public funds" and challenging him to "return the government of Utah back to the people." No pun intended, Lee 14

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insisted that the governor choose between the people of the state and "the political rats who are sucking the very life blood from our State Government."20 Lee's charges were never substantiated. A grand jury was convened on April 4, 1938, to consider the charges and even called Lee as a witness. According to Black, Lee was "unable to produce one single vestige or scintilla of evidence or testimony to support the charges" that he had "so recklessly made."30 So the huge scandal Lee had prophesied never came to pass. When Blood completed two terms in 1940 he was replaced by another Democrat, Herbert B. Maw. TROUBLE AT HOME

While Lee was taking liquor reform to the state, church leaders and school officials in Price were becoming more incensed by the perceived moral problems. The Jones Club incident aroused some of them to action. A delegation of eighteen men and women approached the city council to urge adoption of measures designed to "clean up" Price. School superintendent G. J. Reeves outlined three policies: (1) keep slot machines out, (2) keep minors out of pool halls and drinking establishments and off the streets at late hours, and (3) require that amusement halls be closed at the time specified by law. George Rowley, a juvenile judge, declared that juvenile delinquency was increasing and the chief cause was beer and liquor: "I find two or three places where no restrictions have been made. I tell you, gentlemen, it is a disgrace to this community."31 Orson H. Guymon, president of the Carbon District School Board and bishop of the Price Ward of the Mormon church, complained of the damaging publicity Price was receiving and feared it would harm Carbon Junior College. Noting that many people were convinced that Price was not a proper place to send college students, Guymon demanded that the city fathers create a new atmosphere. Lee expressed regret that the Jones Club incident had occurred but defended his own role in it: "If I had it to do over, I should do the same thing again." He claimed that 15

J . BRACKEN LEE

many statements made about the event were "gross lies" which would eventually be proved. With respect to the group's proposals, Lee assured them that the police would do everything possible to keep children off the streets and out of trouble. Slot machines, however, came under county rather than city jurisdiction.32 School coordinator D. E. Williams made a plea for more rigid enforcement of laws prohibiting the sale of liquor to minors and estimated that most of his problem cases resulted from such laxity. Rowley cited instances in which boys and girls only thirteen years of age had been allowed beer. But Frank Hanson, city attorney, blamed the state liquor commission for overselling liquor. "We have a wholesale establishment for every bootleg place in the state in our liquor set up. Do not hold Price responsible for this." Hanson complimented Lee for being the only man with enough "backbone" to fight a strong political clique.33 During 1938-40 little progress was made in eliminating slot machines. Years later, Calvin L. Rampton, a Democrat and former governor, asserted that Price was without question "more loose" than the rest of the state and recalled that while he was serving as assistant attorney general in 1940 numerous Price citizens complained to his office that slot machines were openly operating against state law. Accordingly, he went to Price with two other deputy attorneys general and destroyed approximately 150 slot machines.

Rampton also recalled the unusual case of highway patrolman Joe Arnold who was arrested on Lee's direct order while speeding through Price to take an injured man to a hospital.

Rampton tried the case for the state, with Lee the chief prosecution witness and an argumentative one at that.34 For his part, Lee believed that Rampton in his capacity as assistant attorney general was "a member of the Maw machine" and that the arrest of the highway patrolman was actually less important than the arrest of an ambulance driver.

I'd had trouble with a fella that had an ambulance. He was one of these fellas that just loved to put on the whistle 16

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and go like the dickens, see. And it scared me, because we had a lot of traffic in Price. You took all these coal miners on a Saturday—just filled the streets with cars. He'd come down there and I don't know how he ever kept from murdering people. But two or three times I warned him—I says, "/ don't want you to exceed the speed limit, to run a red light, or do anything in violation of the law with that ambulance of yours, because I'm gonna have to do something." He paid no attention to me.

So one day I took him out to the edge of town in his car, and I said . . . "I want you to drive me just as fast as you can go. Put your siren on, I want to run the red light, and get to the hospital." So he did, and I timed him. I says, "We'll go back and do it over, and you'll obey the ordinances. Stop for the red light, you won't blow your horn, and see how much time you save." It was only about a minute! 'Cause the city's only a mile square, see. Amazing! It was a far shorter time than / thought it'd be. I says, "ya see—you run the risk of killin' and injurin' a lot of people, just to blow that damn horn and drive fast." I said, "Next time you do it, I'm gonna have you arrested."

Well, it wasn't two or three weeks, Saturday afternoon, and God! I heard these sirens in my office—it was about half a block from the intersection, and I stepped out and I saw these two cars flash by. . . . I called the police and told them "I want those two men arrested."35 According to Lee, the ambulance driver was found guilty and fined and the patrolman was found not guilty with Rampton's help. The court concluded that the highway patrolman had a right to speed when he thought it necessary, a practice Lee regarded as despicable. Immediately afterward, Rampton brought suit against Lee for $10,000 for false arrest of Arnold, but the case never reached conclusion.36 PROSTITUTION AND GAMBLING

Lee readily admitted to the presence of prostitution in Price during his regime, noting that there were at least six or seven houses within a four-block area, including at least two on Main Street. However, he accepted such establishments as a normal 17

J. BRACKEN LEE

result of urban living. "There's whore houses in Salt Lake.

There's whore houses in every town in somewhere! So when people try to say that their town's clean—they're not so clean.

I never could lie about it."37 Although the Mormon church was strong in Price, it was not dominant. Accordingly, a mayor could never achieve reelection in Price, "because he would either try to close it (prostitution) down, or he would open it up." If it was opened up, church interests opposed the mayor, ensuring the election of someone else next time. If it was closed down, payoff conditions were created and prostitution continued although in a covert, illegal manner. Lee claimed that prior to his tenure, the job of city physician was a very lucrative one. Every prostitute had to be examined by the physician once a week and obtain a certificate of health at a cost of $25.00 per exam. In Lee's opinion, it was a shakedown—"a racket with 30 whores, at least." He insisted that prostitutes be protected by changing the provision to allow them to get the certificate from any licensed physician. "Immediately the price went down to five dollars."38 After election to his first term, Lee called together Catholic priests, Mormon bishops and stake presidents, and other community and church leaders and outlined a moderate policy toward prostitution and gambling. He said that he did not want either to "get out of hand" and sought to convince community leaders that each would always exist regardless of the method of control adopted. He proposed that prostitutes not be permitted to solicit on the street and promised they would be arrested should they do so.

If they act like ladies when they're downtown, and they keep their places and they run 'em in a decent manner, and they don't roll anybody . . . then all we'll require is the physician's certificate. No payoffs to anybody. Now, I said, we know that you're gonna always have gambling. You can't stop that, because these people like to gamble. What we will do—we will require . . . no back room gambling. They can play cards. They cannot, for all intents and purposes, play for money. Cause if they play for money, I'm gonna have to 18

MAYOR O F PRICE

ask the police to confiscate it. Now, I know that you will undoubtedly play with chips and they'll be redeemed with money. I can't stop that. If you take anything away from a man, other than what he can afford to lose, and I have any reports of it—of cheating, you're going to be up against it.

There'll be no roulette tables—there'll be nothing like that permitted.39 Lee recalled only one incident in which a man offered him a payoff, and he immediately returned it without counting the money. He denied that any money from gambling, prostitution, or liquor went into city coffers: "I don't ever want to get in a position where somebody else is my boss. And I can honestly say that nobody can honestly say that I took one dime of graft in any way, shape, or form from anyone!"40 It can be concluded that Lee believed in stopping solicitation by prostitutes but not in closing down the houses. Some corroboration came from a former district judge and Democrat, Fred W. Keller of Price, who recalled that he ordered the police to close down a specific house on Main Street. When Keller sent an officer to accomplish the purpose, Lee personally stopped him from entering the building. Keller said that he witnessed the incident and that it was the beginning of a continuing feud between him and the mayor.41 Although Lee conceded that he feuded with the feisty, square-jawed Keller, he denied that any such incident ever occurred.42 Keller entertained "no tender feelings" for Lee because of his failure to stop prostitution, but he conceded that civic improvements and the elimination of the property tax would rate as Lee's positive accomplishments.43 In spite of his problems, Lee was a very popular mayor as his six consecutive terms attest. His civic improvements were lauded by the citizens of Price, and his liquor publicity propelled him into contention for statewide office. Rather than being politically ruined, he became an attractive candidate for governor.

Probably most people knew few details of the liquor controversy, but they knew that J. Bracken Lee's name frequently appeared in the news. Lee himself later asserted that the liquor issue brought him to the attention of the public and that the Democrats had 19

J . BRACKEN LEE

unwittingly elected him governor.44 Ironically, the mayor of an open city was destined to become governor of a state especially known for a religion that eschews liquor and vice.

20

MAYOR OF PRICE interviews with J. Bracken Lee, Salt Lake City. Author began interviewing Lee in 1972. ^Sun-Advocate (Price), January 6, 1944, reported that Price paid Utah Power and Light Company $47,000 a year for electricity that retailed for $103,000, making a gross profit of $56,000. Yet, rates to consumers were still lower than in all but four Utah cities.

3 Lee interview. i Sun-Advocate, March 9, 1944. See also Price City Electric Reports between January 1, 1942, and July 31, 1949, Price City Hall.

1 'Sun-Advocate, June 15, 1944. See also Price City Culinary Water Reports between January 1, 1942, and July 31, 1949, Price City Hall. ^Sun-Advocate, July 15, 1943.

1 Sun-Advocate, July 29, 1943.

8 Price City Financial Statements for years 1943-48, Price City Hall.

9 Lee interview. w Sun-Advocate, January 6, 1944. Information supported by Lee interview and the following articles: Joe Alex Morris, "The Stubbornest Man in Utah," Saturday Evening Post, May 6, 1950; Don Eddy, "Lone Wolf of Utah," American Magazine, May 1950; and Richard L. Williams, "Politician without a Future," Life, May 1, 1950. xl Lee interview.

12 Price City Financial Statements, Bond and Interest Chart, for years 1945-50.

13 Sun-Advocate, April 16, 1936. Lee's letter to Hugh B. Brown, administrator of the Utah Liquor Control Commission in Salt Lake City, was quoted in full.

The Liquor Control Act passed by the legislature in March 1935 eliminated open saloons and established state liquor stores or package agencies where bottled liquor was sold under controlled circumstances. The stores were administered by a Liquor Control Commission consisting of three commissioners appointed by the governor. Persons over twenty-one who held a legal permit could purchase liquor at a state store, providing they did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol. The liquor could be taken home for consumption or to a restaurant where set-ups could be purchased. Thus, all liquor was purchased from the state, and no business was allowed to provide patrons with liquor by the drink. The state organized its own enforcement agency to implement the new law. u Sun-Advocate, July 9, 1936.

15 Lee interview. lc 'Salt Lake Tribune, January 26, 1938; Sun-Advocate, January 27, 1938.

17 Lee interview. ^Sun-Advocate, April 1, 1943. Liquor agents A. H. Jaynes and George H. Lunt were charged with violation of that ordinance for allegedly making an illegal search of the room of P. B. Aguirre at the French Hotel and taking two sealed bottles of whiskey and other items. The case was finally dropped when witnesses against the two men failed to appear. See Sun-Advocate, March 4 and July 8, 1943.

19 Lee interview.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid. ^Sun-Advocate, March 17, 1938. ^Sun-Advocate, February 17, 1938.

24 Lee interview.

21

J. BRACKEN LEE

^Sun-Advocate, February 17, 1938 ^Sun-Advocate, February 24, 1938.

"Radio speech by Parnell Black, September 1950, p. 4, MS obtained from Black's son, Wayne L. Black, former Democratic national committeeman from Utah. ssibid. ^Sun-Advocate, February 24, 1938. Full text of letter to Blood printed.

30 Black speech.

31 Sun-Advocate, February 17, 1938; Salt Lake Tribune, February 15, 1938.

Others included in the delegation were: George Jorgensen, president of the Mormon church's Carbon Stake; Rev. T. H. Evans, pastor of Price Community Church; Melvin C. Wilson, principal of Carbon High School; Ace Boulter, superintendent of the Price Ward Sunday School, Mormon church; Milton Jones and Mrs. Wallace Grange, MIA representatives of the Mormon church; John Pettit, patriarch of Carbon Stake; R. R. Higgins, former superintendent of Price Ward Sunday School; Mrs. C. J. Reeves, president of Ladies Aid; Mrs. L. R. Eldridge and Mrs. Darrell Leonard, representatives of Notre Dame PTA; Mrs. Orson Guymon, president of Price Ward Relief Society; and Mrs. John Chapman, president of Southside Primary Association.

32 lbid.

33 Ibid.

34 Interview with Gov. Calvin L. Rampton, Salt Lake City, August 3, 1972.

35 Lee interview.

3 ÂŤIbid.

"Ibid. ssibid.

39 Ibid.

4 °Ibid.

"Interview with Judge Fred W. Keller, Price, Utah, July 9, 1975. Keller subsequently drove the author around Price and pointed out the building to which he was referring, which now houses the Montgomery Ward store, as well as several other former houses of prostitution on Main Street and in the immediate downtown area. He believed that the existence of the houses was very well known. Keller died September 19, 1976, at age eighty-four.

42 Lee interview.

43 Keller interview.

44 Lee interview. People in Price remain proud of Lee's accomplishments.

When the author talked with various Price residents he became convinced that Lee is fondly remembered.

22

2 Morals and the Mayor While still mayor of Price, Lee attempted to secure the Republican nomination for governor in 1940 but was defeated by Don B. Colton, former congressman and a prominent Mormon. Lee obtained the Republican nomination for congressman in 1942 only to be defeated by Democratic incumbent Walter K. Granger by a mere 269 votes. Since he ran ahead of his party in a Democratic year his name became more formidable among party ticket makers. In 1944 he was nominated for governor to run against Democratic incumbent Herbert B. Maw, former University of Utah professor and a prominent attorney. Maw was also a member of the LDS Sunday School General Board and, therefore, could be expected to draw Mormon support against Lee. Maw was, unfortunately, not a favorite of Mormon authorities. In 1937, as president of the state senate, he sponsored legislation striking at powerful utilities that were allied with general authorities of the church through directorships. It was common knowledge that Maw's actions were not popular with Mormon leaders.1 In 1940 church opposition to Maw focused on his decision not to reappoint Apostle Stephen L. Richards and David O. McKay of the First Presidency to the governing boards of the University of Utah and Utah State Agricultural College, respectively. Maw believed that church leaders dominated boards and therefore should not serve on them. It was clear, he said, that both McKay and Richards resented that decision.2 Presumably, church opposition to Maw also crystallized on moral grounds, due to his alleged connections as a private lawyer with wholesale liquor firms supplying Utah's state-controlled liquor stores.3 Maw himself believed that church authorities had no good reason to oppose him, except that many of them were Republicans by conviction, "unless they believed the propa23

J . BRACKEN LEE

ganda" about him. Maw was proud of his church membership and said he was under the impression that many church leaders supported him.4 Some church leaders, however, were convinced that Maw's church credentials were less than perfect and that his political performance did not qualify him for support. For instance, Ezra Taft Benson, president of the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles, declared that the church supported Lee for governor. He reported that they considered him a man of convictions and integrity and preferred him to Maw "who was known to equivocate on some issues. Generally, the Church prefers a non-Mormon with high principles to a Jack Mormon." In contrast to Maw, "Brack had a deep spirituality," though it did not show on the surface.5 In light of Benson's known conservative Republican biases, it must be wondered how fairly he, and perhaps other leaders with Republican leanings, judged Maw's church credentials. That Maw never sought church support6 may partially account for the coolness of Mormon leaders toward him.

The election of 1944 vibrated with moral overtones. At Maw's behest, in a slow-moving campaign, Gordon Taylor Hyde, a former Mormon bishop, and Joseph J. Cannon, former editor of the Deseret News, prepared a seven-page pamphlet, Morals and the Mayor, that made numerous moral allegations against Lee's administration in Price. After making a personal investigation in Price, Francis W. Kirkham, a Mormon educator, agreed to allow his name to be used as the sole author.'

Desiring to consider financial matters first because they were deemed less important than morals, the authors observed that in spite of the elimination of property tax, Price maintained a substantial bonded indebtedness of $316,000.00. 8 In fact, city records list the slightly smaller figure of $279,418.13.° The authors also charged Lee with increasing the cost of living of Price residents by purchasing electricity and water and reselling them to the people at a profit. Other questionable methods of acquiring revenue, such as licenses, fines, and forfeitures, allowed large financial interests to escape a legitimate tax at the expense of the people.10 24

MORALS AND THE MAYOR

Even more important, in the author's view, was the practice of condoning vice by collecting money for it from the underworld: "Fines have a legitimate place in restraining crime, but permitting it by collecting periodical fines or forfeitures violates the statutes, is anti-social and is palpably immoral." The authors argued that Lee operated a "wide open town where gambling houses and houses of prostitution operate on the main street and liquor is readily available even to 13 year old boys."11 Mayor Lee allegedly hindered state officials from stamping out these conditions. For instance, when state officers tried to stop the illegal sale of liquor in Price, Lee had an ordinance passed prohibiting the search of buildings. "This subterfuge offered the Mayor an opportunity to molest the state's representatives," according to the pamphlet. An establishment alleged to be disorderly was raided by representatives of the state liquor commission, and the landlady and others were arrested. They pleaded guilty, and the building was closed until a $500 bond was posted.

The landlady refused to comply with that agreement on advice of the mayor, and instead, officers of the liquor commission were served with a criminal complaint under city ordinances. After several trips to Price by state representatives, the charge was finally dismissed.12 Recounting the Jones Club incident, the authors concluded that Lee had "led a mob to overthrow the rule of law," which was "repulsive to moral concepts." Lee was guilty, they said, of violating his obligations as a 32nd degree Mason, his oath of office as mayor, and all Christian ideals. Finally, in a blatantly religious appeal, the authors insisted that it would be "unfortunate," especially "for our young people," if the governorship was attained by a man who entertained different morals from the majority of the state.

The pioneers came here for a great spiritual purpose. They left all that they had, they buried their loved ones on the plains, they met the desert and the savages, in order to satisfy the highest demands of their souls. It would betray their great purpose to place in the office of chief executive a man who has proved . . . that he feels it profitable and fitting for gov25

J. BRACKEN LEE

ernment to be intimately connected with gambling and prostitution and disregard for law of the state.13 Some political analysts to the contrary,14 it is impossible to ascribe to the pamphlet a definitive role in Lee's narrow defeat that year. Although most Democrats won election by as much as a 3-2 margin, Maw received 123,907 votes to Lee's 122,851, a difference of only 1,056. It would seem, rather, that Lee's popularity held up remarkably well in a Democratic year in which Roosevelt carried over 60 percent of the Utah vote. Had Lee been a Democrat suffering the only ignominious defeat, the effect of the pamphlet as a political "dirty trick" would have been dramatized. However, to assign it paramount importance, it must be assumed that prior to the pamphlet's appearance, Lee's popularity was so overwhelming that he most certainly would have been elected as the only Republican in a Democratic year. Due to the lack of effective polling, that assumption cannot be made.

Convinced that he was robbed, Lee went to court in an unsuccessful attempt to reverse the election results. He claimed that 8,000 ballots marked for him had been thrown out. These voters had marked a straight Democratic ticket and then indicated Lee for governor without crossing out Maw's name in the Democratic column. According to Lee, his court test failed because an earlier election had been contested by Republicans and a woman Democratic candidate for county recorder defeated under similar circumstances. The Republican-dominated Utah State Supreme Court insisted that the voter cross out the name of the opposing candidate to produce a valid ballot. In Lee's opinion, they "robbed the woman of her office" and set a dangerous precedent that could be applied later against him.15 Some irate Price citizens staged a protest visit to the capitol to label the pamphlet "an infamous smear on Price, overlooking its virtues and exaggerating its vices."10 They purchased space in the state's newspapers to argue that Price was progressive in its schools, churches, and people and should not be held up for ridicule and "its name dragged in the mud." They charged that the pamphlet was mailed to Utah citizens with the use of taxpayers' name plates on record in the state tax commission.

26

MORALS AND THE MAYOR

Allegedly, when J. Lambert Gibson, chairman of the tax commission, was asked about it, he answered, "It's none of your business." The Price group also attacked the influential Francis Kirkham for conducting a secret investigation of Price without ever bringing his findings to the attention of city officials. If Kirkham was really interested in improving the moral climate, "why did he not pick out his home city to investigate, or any number of other communities?"17 In a major editorial entitled "An Uncalled For Attack," the Price Sun-Advocate echoed this sentiment. The editors asserted that the pamphlet had "no place in a political campaign" and interpreted it as a direct attack on the city of Price, which they claimed "stands highly rated, and with good reason, among cities of the intermountain district."18 Even the Mormon-owned Deseret News dismissed it as "a political ploy to destroy J. Bracken Lee as a candidate for governor." In spite of its usual interest in moral issues in political campaigns, the Mormon church wanted no responsibility for the pamphlet. The News issued a signed, front-page editorial by David Robinson just before the election. The author claimed to have made an investigation into the "origin and aims of the pamphlet" but actually did not examine the city of Price to corroborate or defeat the argument. Rather, Robinson effectively reduced the moral argument by essentially ignoring Cannon and Kirkham, who were Republicans, and blaming the project entirely on Gordon Hyde, a Democrat and chairman of Maw's state finance commission. Allegedly, Hyde's job hinged on Maw's reelection.19 Although Robinson was right in assessing the political nature of the project, only the most naive would assume it was anything else, coming as it did at election time. The issues raised by the pamphlet were still important, and Robinson failed to confront them. The pamphlet's real authors were especially vulnerable to criticism for placing it under the name of Kirkham, when in fact he did not write it. But Robinson's clumsy attempt to make Kirkham appear nervous and edgy when interviewed about it was political. According to Robinson's account, Kirkham admitted 27

J . BRACKEN LEE

that he did not write it and then promised to tell the "full story" after consultation with his associates in the project. But when he returned he "guardedly reported that he was under arrest, that he had hired an attorney, and that he had been advised by his attorney not to talk."20 Robinson argued that the writers had failed to investigate any other important Utah city. He admitted that Price was not free of vice, "but neither are Salt Lake, Ogden, Provo, Bingham, Helper, or most any other city of any size."21 Since one does not expose corruption in a specific place by exposing it everywhere, Robinson's argument is not valid. Exposing corruption in one city might lead to its exposure in other cities; but no sincere observer would refuse to consider it in one city on the grounds that it exists everywhere. A similar argument is often employed by politicians accused of graft who argue that other politicians are doing it, too; therefore, their graft is justified. Robinson was guilty of at least as much partisanship as the pamphlet writers.

That he would write the editorial, however, suggests the church's strong desire to dissociate itself from the pamphlet, which could be interpreted as tacit approval of J. Bracken Lee. In this election, the church was not interested in crusading for morals.

The white-haired Kirkham suffered as much misery over the pamphlet as Lee. Judge S. J. Sweetring of Price, especially sensitive to personal criticism, interpreted it as a personal affront because he believed it implied that he had "conspired to break the law" and was therefore "guilty of a criminal offense." Accordingly, Sweetring charged Kirkham with contempt of court and ordered him to appear in Price. Attorneys for Kirkham replied that if a judge could haul someone into his court for making a comment derogatory toward him, "what becomes of the right to freely communicate opinions?" The Utah State Supreme Court issued a restraining order, and Kirkham never appeared.22 Finally, Attorney General Grover Giles announced an opinion of the pamphlet after a request by J. Bracken Lee. Lee had contended that criminal action should be taken against the authors, but Giles found no grounds for criminal libel. First, he observed that a political candidate is subject to criticism as a 28

MORALS AND THE MAYOR

natural part of seeking office; and, second, he saw no evidence of "malicious defamation" or falsity of publication. The burden was on the prosecution to prove that the pamphlet was false, and he did not think Lee had done that.23 Clearly, the basic charges of the pamphlet were true. Judge Fred W. Keller, a realist about Price and its problems, made this comment in 1948: As I recall there have been few, if any, of these cases that have failed for lack of evidence and competent action on the part of liquor agents. In a number of these cases Mayor Lee tried by all means at his command to obstruct the liquor agents in the performance of their duty.24 The cases to which Keller referred were those in violation of state liquor laws tried in his court during 1940-48. Interviewed years later, the judge was read the above statement to test its veracity. Keller listened intently and replied, "That's right.

I made that statement, and that statement's true!" He also declared that Price's reputation as a "wide open town" was accurate and contributed to the excessive amount of crime in those years: "While I was District Attorney in the late 1930's, I prosecuted four more homicide cases than were prosecuted in all the rest of the state!"25 W. Cleon Skousen, former Salt Lake City police chief, related that shortly after Lee was elected mayor of Salt Lake in 1960, he attended a meeting of ex-FBI agents. Lee stood to speak and saw Bryant Croft, then an attorney, who later became a judge. Croft had been asked during the 1960 election to report on conditions in Price while Lee was mayor, and Croft had indicated from his personal knowledge that "the town was more or less wide open." Croft had been anxious to know if Lee would govern Salt Lake in a similar manner. According to Skousen, when Lee looked at Croft, "he sort of smiled and said to the audience, You know, I didn't know exactly what to say to Mr. Croft, because many of the things that he said were true.'" 26 Lee believed that Croft was "one of the snoopers who got the dope" for the pamphlet.27 29

J . BRACKEN LEE

No one interviewed for the purposes of this work has denied the basic allegations of Morals and the Mayor.2* With the exception of the charge of accepting payoffs from the underworld, Lee conceded its basic validity, though not its spirit or conclusions.

He said that it was cleverly done and "captured the imagination with the first paragraph." He did not pretend to have an answer for it, because prostitution and other problems did exist in Price, although not to the extreme claimed in the pamphlet. He considered it significant that even though wrongdoing was "implied," neither the Democratic district attorney nor the county attorney chose to prosecute. " But I can say one thing: no one ever caught me stealing, and nobody ever caught me taking a payoff! And don't think they didn't spend a lot of money trying to find out!"

Lee regarded the project as a political smear and claimed that "church people" in Price came to his immediate defense, including Catholic priests and Mormon bishops.29 There is no evidence, however, to support such a claim.

It must be concluded that the pamphlet's least reliable assertions are those alleging the existence of payoffs from the underworld. Even the highly principled Judge Keller, who was in a better position to know than most and who was frank in his criticism of Lee, knew of no evidence to support such a charge.30 Moreover, the most that can be said for the pamphlet's long-term effect on Lee's lengthy and illustrious career is that it may have slowed his race for the governorship—but not by much, for 1948 was the charm.

30

MORALS AND THE MAYOR 1 Frank Jonas, "J. Bracken Lee and the Mormon Church," Proceedings of the Utah Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters 34 (1957): 111. interview with Herbert B. Maw, Salt Lake City, August 1, 1972. Jonas reported that Maw wrote him a letter, April 21, 1955, saying that Heber J. Grant, LDS church president, had publicly denounced Maw for this action.

See above article, p. 112.

3 Jonas, "J. Bracken Lee," p. 111.

4 Maw interview.

5 Interview with Ezra Taft Benson, Salt Lake City, August 15, 1972. Benson recalled visiting Lee in his home when Lee had a severe case of flu. Benson told Lee he had been "praying for him. It touched him—you could tell." Apostle LeGrand Richards, also a Republican, expressed similar feelings about both Lee and Maw. Interview with Richards, Salt Lake City, July 2, 1972.

6 Maw interview.

'Francis W. Kirkham, Morals and the Mayor (n.p., 1944). sibid., p. 2.

9 Price City Minute Book, 1944^15, Price City Hall.

10 Kirkham, Morals, p. 2.

"Ibid., pp. 3-5.

12 Ibid., p. 6. Lee remembered this incident: "I'll be damned if the liquor commissioner and another guy come down and they do this same thing all over again [enter a private house] and by God, I charged 'em! Arrested 'em. They took that to the Supreme Court and you got a Supreme Court ruling up here now that permits a liquor agent to enter your home without a search warrant.

Isn't that a hell of a note?" Lee interview.

13 Kirkham, Morals, p. 7.

"Unaccountably, Frank Jonas claimed that the pamphlet "had a decided effect on the election outcome and was generally credited with having been responsible for Lee's defeat in 1944." Jonas, "J. Bracken Lee," p. 113.

15 Lee interview. See also Sun-Advocate, January 11, 1945. Lee predicted a 4,000-vote plurality for himself following the recount, while Calvin Rawlings, attorney for Maw, predicted an increase of 3,000 votes for Maw. 16 Deseret News, November 2, 1944.

15 Sun-Advocate, November 2, 1944, advertisement paid for by "Popular Subscription by the Citizens of Price." Lee remembered an ad signed by LDS stake presidents and bishops and by Catholic priests in his support. (Lee interview.) No such ad exists; he was undoubtedly thinking of this ad by Price citizens in which no names were mentioned.

18 Sun-Advocate, November 2, 1944, editorial.

19 Deseret News, November 2, 1944, editorial.

20 Ibid.

"Ibid.

22 Sun-Advocate, December 21, 1944. ^Sun-Advocate, February 1, 1945.

24 Judge Keller to Frank Jonas, October 8, 1948, quoted in Jonas, "J. Bracken Lee," p. 113.

25 Keller interview. Keller remembered being so "hostile" toward Lee in that period that he assembled a mass of evidence to use against him when he ran for reelection, consisting of questions about liquor, gambling, and prostitution cases with appropriate supporting materials. He decided not to use it.

Several years later he was unable to locate it. ^Deseret News, March 23, 1960.

27 Lee interview.

31

J. BRACKEN LEE 28 Reva Beck Bosone, former Democratic congresswoman, did not deny the specific allegations, although she suggested in a general sense that charges of "corruption" against Lee in Price were "hogwash." (Bosone to author, January 20, 1974.) Three-time opponent of Bosone, William Dawson, former Republican representative and staunch friend and supporter of Lee, admitted to the tenor of the charges against Lee. Although he believed the pamphlet was not justified in a political campaign, he agreed that Lee did have an open town in Price. He noted that Lee had the reputation of being involved with the underworld, but "there is no underworld in this state, as we know it in Chicago and other places." Of course, Lee did have the support of the pool halls, drinking establishments, and "that caliber of people," said Dawson, but there was "not a more moral man anywhere than Bracken Lee." (Interview with Dawson, Salt Lake City, August 7, 1972.)

Wayne L. Black, son of Parnell Black and former Democratic national committeeman for Utah, characterized Price and Helper as "rough and tumble towns" where liquor was sold openly and "prostitution was rampant." Black was philosophical in his evaluation, believing that Lee simply thought that was what the people wanted. (Interview with Black, Salt Lake City, July 28, 1972.)

Former Utah governor and Democrat Calvin L. Rampton noted that although Price was without question "more loose" than the rest of the state, he did not believe that Lee took kickbacks. (Rampton interview.)

On the other hand, O. N. Malmquist, for many years political editor of the Salt Lake Tribune, declared, "I think he did run a wide open town" but believed that most of the "payoffs" were siphoned back to city coffers. Malmquist noted that some of Lee's associates were "not exactly models of virtue." (Interview with Malmquist, Salt Lake City, August 7, 1972.)

29 Lee interview.

30 Keller interview.

32

3 Election as Governor Since Lee had come so close to victory in 1944, he sought the governorship again in 1948 when liquor was a crucial issue.

In the past Lee had created the impression that he favored the sale of liquor by the drink and had supported a plan to place the issue on the ballot for referendum in 1946. By 1948, however, he was saying that he was primarily against the corruption that had surrounded the state liquor commission and that sale by the drink was an issue for the people to decide.1 Practical politics dictated that Lee tread gently on the liquor question because of the Mormon church's position. Apostle Joseph F. Merrill chaired a meeting with Lee and nine LDS general authorities to discuss it. The influential and assertive Merrill recalled an hour-and-twenty-minute discussion during which it was made clear to Lee that the church was unalterably opposed to liquor by the drink, "gambling in any form, and to the loosening of the Utah moral laws relative to youth." After Lee left they decided that "there were insufficient reasons why any church committee should oppose the election of Mr. Lee."2 Lee's version of this meeting is different from Merrill's and outlines a role in Lee's political future for J. Reuben Clark, Jr., counselor in the First Presidency.

When I ran for governor the Church was most interested in liquor. They wanted to know my stand on liquor. I was called up to the church offices one day, and there must have been 100 men there—General Authorities, bishops, stake presidents—all to question me on liquor. I couldn't quite get my point across. I said that I didn't approve of the present law, that I thought it was corrupt and unenforceable, and I wanted a better one, but I wasn't necessarily for liquor by the drink.

33

J . BRACKEN LEE

Well, they wanted me to sign a statement saying that I would veto a liquor-by-the-drink law if it came across my desk. I wouldn't do it. Apostle Merrill read me the riot act.

I said if that's what I have to do to be governor, then I don't want to be governor. . . . Well, I told him if I became governor, and I probably wouldn't now, if he ever came to my office and I talked to him like he talked to me just now, I would consider myself insulted. And I walked out.

And I told my campaign manager that I'd just lost the election because I'd lost church support. He said I'd better call Clark. So I called Clark. I went up to see him. I asked him if he knew about the meeting, and he did—he knew all about it. I asked him if he knew about Merrill telling me I wouldn't get church support. He didn't know that. He said, "Don't you worry." And that was the end of it. I got church support and was elected governor. If Merrill had had his way, he would have hurt me with that.3 Since Merrill was known to be a Democrat, he would have been more wary of Lee than Clark. If Lee's account is accurate the meeting with church authorities could have spelled his doom as a candidate instead of propelling him into the governor's chair.

It would seem that Lee's friendship with President Clark overrode other considerations. Lee went so far as to conclude: I never could have been governor without J. Reuben Clark.

They can say all they want to, but I am convinced that church leaders do talk over politics and that they do in most instances decide who they're gonna support.4 Lee remembered that his treatment from many delegates had been cool before Clark's endorsement but that afterward support was "amazing." After a meeting with Clark, one delegate, a stake president in the church who had withheld support, put his arm around Lee and said, "I've been in and talked to President Clark.

You're all right." Before the election and numerous times afterward, Lee sought what he always regarded as the best advice from Clark, whom he considered "one of the brightest men who ever lived in the whole country."5 Charges of liquor corruption in the Maw administration provided fuel for the campaign. After a grand jury investigated a liquor monopoly, Robert Harries, chief enforcement officer of 34

ELECTION AS GOVERNOR

the liquor commission, was convicted of accepting a bribe and sentenced to jail.0 In another scandal the Brigham Street Pharmacy liquor package agency was charged with selling liquor improperly.7 Both episodes caused Maw great embarrassment and subsequent loss of credibility.

In a radio debate devoted to the liquor issue on October 27, Lee spoke for twelve minutes over KVNU in Logan; Maw replied for twelve minutes over KLO in Ogden; and each candidate took two minutes for rebuttal. Since he had preferred an old-fashioned platform debate with give and take, allowing an opportunity to discuss Lee's charges, Maw was disappointed with the format.

Lee, on the offensive, had preferred the more structured format that allowed him to remain on the attack; so he had refused the platform debate. Maw suggested such a debate for the future, but Lee failed to respond to the challenge.8 Lee charged that Maw knew of irregularities in the liquor commission as early as 1945 but had purposely chosen to ignore them. Maw countered that he had first heard of the corruption when "two drunken people from Carbon County" came to his office charging a "hook-up" between Robert Harries and Cyrus V. Lack, operator of the Brigham Street Pharmacy package agency. Maw said that he immediately instructed the commission to investigate, and that Lack's business "collapsed" and he announced a "fake robbery." In response to Lee's assertion that liquor could be better controlled locally, Maw claimed that the division had obtained 3,873 convictions where there were local officers and that state agents had confiscated the property of sixteen "dives" in Price during Lee's term as mayor. Instead of answering Maw's charges Lee complained that Maw had not answered his.9 Unfortunately, neither candidate effectively replied to the other's accusations or spoke clearly about his own record.

Although Maw remembered the Harries and Lack incidents, he believed these two cases alone were insufficient to label his administration as corrupt.10 Lee considered Maw to be likable, fine looking, and a "wonderful speaker," but with one weakness: "In fact, I think he would have been presidential material if he'd have been honest." Lee assumed that to be a key reason that 35

J . BRACKEN LEE

Maw failed to receive church support—because the church could not rely on his word.11 Certainly the most explosive facet of the campaign was Governor Maw's famous "Dear Brother Letter" which he sent to fellow Mormons. In a direct plea for votes Maw insisted that he was not writing as governor of the state but "as an active and devoted member of our Church." To prove his activity he cited his service as a teacher, member of a ward bishopric, member of a stake high council, and various other positions. Equally important, he said, "I am still active in the church and speak in some ward nearly every Sunday night." Maw accused the "underworld" of opposing his reelection by launching a concerted effort to make Utah an "open state." Liquor by the drink would be obtained, he said, by "electing a governor who will eliminate the State Liquor Police Force and close his eyes to law enforcement." He implored fellow Mormons to oppose Lee and "sustain" Maw in this moral effort and signed the letter, "Sincerely Your Brother."12 Criticizing Maw for so blatantly using the church for votes, Lee said he did not believe that the church "endorses the solicitation of its membership for political purposes."13 He also promised to enforce all state laws, "including the liquor laws and those safeguarding the morals of the people."14 The GOP state chairman, Vernon Romney, also an active Mormon, blasted Maw for "an act of desperation by one who realized the hopelessness of his cause and is willing to throw caution and discretion to the winds." Noting that the church had refrained from entering politics in the past, Romney predicted that most Mormons would resent this "smear" of a "splendid gentleman."15 Although he was heavily criticized, Maw stood by the letter, denying that it was intended for Mormons only. "Thousands of copies will be sent to members of all faiths, Democratic or Republican."10 But the careful choice of words used in the letter belied Maw's claim.

The most important repercussion began with an editorial in the Mount Pleasant Pyramid written by Tom Judd, grandson of a former church president, Heber J. Grant. Judd said that Maw had reached "the lowest level of bigotry" by waving a banner of 36

ELECTION AS GOVERNOR

virtue" in an obvious attempt to obscure the dirty hem of his own garment, soiled by his scandalous fumbling of proven bribery in the Maw-controlled state liquor commission." He concluded that "Governor Maw's record doesn't jibe with Brother Maw's letter."

The editorial proved to be a political coup, since Ab Jenkins, a Mormon and noted speed driver, reproduced it as an advertisement and placed it in newspapers all over the state.17 Republicans also tried to use the Mormon church through a newspaper advertisement purportedly from the "Law Observance Committee" of the church in Salt Lake County. The committee had allegedly studied the positions of the candidates with respect to liquor by the drink, horse racing, slot machines, gambling, and "other vices." They gave their "approval" to Lee because his positions were consistent with the "ideals of Utah citizenry."18 The Republican technique was actually similar to Maw's, and it was followed by a hasty Democratic retort, "Don't be Fooled!

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints has at no time endorsed J. Bracken Lee." Of course, that was technically true.

The Democratic ad quoted a spokesman for President George Albert Smith: "No one can speak for the Church except over the signature of the First Presidency, and an action by a committee of Church membership does not even imply action by the Church itself." The Democrats accused the Republicans of "sinking to a new low" in misleading the "saints" and "whitewashing" the record of Lee, who as recently as March 9, 1946, had headed a committee advocating liquor by the drink.19 It was even more misleading than most people realized.

The law enforcement and observance committee had not really endorsed any candidate. They listed only those whose positions on liquor, horse racing, and so on appeared acceptable, including both Lee and Maw as well as candidates for other offices from both political parties.20 A negative endorsement at best, the listing merely suggested that there was no evidence to warrant opposition. The Republican ad was not only inaccurate, it was an unconscionable distortion.

In his final speech of the campaign, Lee accused Maw of excessive taxation and failure to provide adequate highways.

37

J. BRACKEN LEE

He expressed dissatisfaction that "an expensive grand jury investigation" had been necessary to prove charges of bribery and abuses in the administration of liquor laws. He was sure that an efficient executive could have corrected the "deplorable conditions" earlier without a grand jury. He charged that these conditions had been "tacitly condoned" by inaction, proof of which was the fact that no one to date had been dismissed. In his own final speech, Maw invited voters to make a serious economic comparison between his administration and Lee's record in Price, stressing the fact that Utah was free of bonded indebtedness while Price was not. Finally, he charged Lee with resisting the enforcement of the state's liquor laws.21 Although Lee was the clear favorite, so was Thomas E. Dewey in his race for the presidency. News accounts indicated strong sentiment throughout the state for Lee, even in Democratic areas such as Utah County. The predictions proved accurate, for Lee was elected governor with 151,253 votes to Maw's 123,814, a plurality of 27,439. Conversely, Truman defeated Dewey in Utah, 149,046 to 124,359, a difference of 24,687 votes. Not only did Lee run ahead of Truman in Utah, but he was the only Republican elected to state office and the first Republican governor in twenty-four years. In fact, the only other Republican governor to win election that year was Arthur Langlie of Washington. A Democratic House of Representatives was elected, and the Utah State Senate was composed of twelve Democrats and eleven Republicans. In an otherwise Democratic year, voters had been careful to discriminate and choose Lee for the governorship in preference to the unpopular Maw. Conceding that a governor makes many enemies in two terms, Maw claimed that he was pressured into the third-term bid.

State employees were allegedly so insecure in their jobs because of the spoils system that they desperately wanted him to run.

Actually, he felt that he had accomplished what he set out to do in bringing industry to the state, breaking the power of the large interests such as Utah Power and Light Company, and freeing the state of debt.22 Reluctant to take credit, Lee believed that he was simply the "beneficiary of an unpopular man."23 38

ELECTION AS GOVERNOR

The Deseret News made a more positive appraisal and lauded Lee as one who "demonstrated a great ability to get along with people," a quality they termed "his own great personal popularity." In a year when the common qualities of Truman were popular, it was not surprising that Lee would find a niche.

According to the News, Lee was no orator and his English was not reminiscent of Oxford, but he could "hold an audience as few men can." He was not seen as a polished statesman but a "hard worker, a good student and a man gifted with quite a share of that uncommon thing called 'common sense'!" He was even praised as a successful "family man" and "just about as good a neighbor."24 Lee's success was also observed with interest by the national press, as exemplified by Newsweek's splash story asserting that he looked like "what he is—a small-town insurance and real estate man." There was said to be "nothing outstanding about his gray stetson, or his graying thatch of close-cropped hair, or his rimless glasses, and nobody would notice him in a Salt Lake City crowd." Remembering his "businesslike though hardly bluenosed administration in Price," the editors quoted his campaign promise that he intended to run Utah "just like my own business, on a sound basis, for the benefit of all the people."25 Though not by official endorsement, the Mormon church undoubtedly helped to elect Lee governor in 1948. Moreover, in the ensuing eight years, he and the church would establish a mutually beneficial relationship that was essential to the success of his governorship.

39

J. BRACKEN LEE J In discussing a proposed debate with Maw on the liquor issue, Lee promised to confine it "to the true issues of the campaign, and I do not consider the sale of liquor over the bar as a major issue. I do not necessarily advocate such sale. My opposition is primarily to the way the present liquor laws are administered." (Salt Lake Tribune, October 20, 1948.) Another statement was much more direct: "I do not, nor did I four years ago, advocate sale by the drink.

I do not do so for the reason that I feel this is a matter that should be submitted to a vote of the people and should never be left to the thoughts of any one individual." (Lee to Jonas, October 3, 1948, quoted in "J. Bracken Lee," p. 117.)

2 Joseph F. Merrill to Jonas, November 6, 1948, quoted in ibid.

3 Lee interview.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid. a New York Times, October 24, 1948.

7 Maw interview. ^Deseret News, October 28, 1948. The debate was also carried over KALL in Salt Lake City, KOVO in Provo, and KOAL in Price.

"Ibid.

10 Maw interview. In Maw's opinion of his own administration, "There wasn't any corruption."

11 Lee interview.

Ironically, corroboration for this charge came from a long-time Lee opponent and well-known Democrat, former Sen. Frank E. Moss, who considered Maw "an affable but weak governor." Further, he commented: "I don't believe that Maw was dishonest, in the sense that he tried to feather his own nest or reward his friends illegally or improperly. I think Maw's biggest failure was his lack as an administrator and failing to keep his word. In an attempt to please people with whom he was dealing, he gave them favorable answers, or at least left the impression that his answer was favorable, and then he very often did something different. And, of course, those who felt he had misled them were very upset and charged him with being dishonest." Moss to author, September 13, 1972.

12 Salt Lake Tribune, November 1, 1948. ls Salt Lake Tribune, October 15, 1948. ^Deseret News, October 15, 1948.

15 Salt Lake Tribune, October 14, 1948. ln Salt Lake Tribune, October 15, 1948.

"Mount Pleasant Pyramid, October 15, 1948. ls Deseret News, November 1, 1948.

19 Salt Lake Tribune, November 2, 1948.

2a Salt Lake Tribune, October 30, 1948.

21 Deseret News, October 31, 1948.

22 Maw interview.

23 Lee interview. Moss agreed that Lee's election was due to Maw's unpopularity. Maw's scandals caused Lee to "back into the governorship." Moss to author.

-^Deseret News, January 4, 1949, editorial.

2r,"GoP: The Utah Strong Man," Newsweek, January 3, 1949, pp. 19, 20.

"Lee, a 32nd degree Mason, was a 'Gentile' himself. Quite a few Utahns plumped for Lee 'because he's not against folks who smoke or take a nip.' Lee made no secret that he did both occasionally—although he refused to be photographed doing either."

40

4 Liquor Reform On January 3, 1949, Lee took the oath of office as Utah's ninth governor. His inaugural address suited the predominantly Mormon audience of several thousand. He accepted the task of governing almost 700,000 people "in all humility. . . . God willing, and with your aid and guidance, I shall never betray that confidence." Borrowing from John Marshall, Lee affirmed that "the power to tax is the power to destroy." Enunciating a theme that would mark his governorship, he said that "Government, like business or the home, has an income within which it must live.

In truth, more economy must be practiced in government." He committed himself without reservation to the two-party system, calling it "the best yet devised by man," and offered his cooperaion to his Democratic colleagues in serving the best interests of the people. Finally, Lee reminded his audience that they must be watchdogs of government: "You must be vigilant in helping me at all times to keep on the right track. . . . I am anxious to give you an honorable, fair and efficient administration. With this, I ask your blessing."1 His address was received enthusiastically by both major newspapers, the Deseret News calling it "outstanding for simplicity, sincerity and downright good common sense" and the Tribune comparing Lee to "the fighting president of the United States," Harry S Truman.2 Not the least of Lee's immediate concerns were departmental budget requests exceeding $81,000,000, a sum he believed to be $32,000,000 in excess of anticipated revenues. It was a fitting task for an economizer. As a partial solution, he expressed his desire to place the highway and welfare departments under the direction of nonsalaried commissions with full-time directors, divorce the welfare program from politics, and abolish the Pub41

J . BRACKEN LEE

licity and Industrial Development Commission.3 He would see all of those desires achieved.

However, a more compelling need was a solution to the liquor controversy that had dominated the campaign. After naming a twenty-member legislative committee to study the problem, Lee promptly recommended an unpaid advisory commission and a state director to replace the liquor commission.4 During his first full day in office Lee requested and then accepted the resignations of the three members of the Liquor Control Commission, appointed two new commissioners, and ordered all liquor stores closed while a three-day audit was conducted. He named Roy W. Simmons, a thirty-three-year-old Layton banker and important figure in the Lee campaign, as chairman of the commission, and J. W. Pace, forty-eight, of Delta, a former state legislator and businessman as well as chairman of the Millard County Democratic Committee, as the second commissioner. The temporary two-man bipartisan commission would administer the liquor business after the audit. The resigning commissioners were Democrats Lawrence A. Johnson, chairman, and Orlando S. Peterson, and George H. Lunt, a Republican.5 The Tribune commended Lee's prompt action to correct "flagrant negligence, if not culpable carelessness" in the liquor operation.0 The inventory failed to confirm either Lee's or the Tribune's suspicions; it indicated no major discrepancies between liquor on hand in stores, package agencies, and warehouses and quantities found on records of the commission. The "examination disclosed no deliberate nor willful mislabeling, concealment, substitutions, nor fraudulent or dishonest disposition of stocks."7 Lee also favored abolition of the system of requiring distillers and distributors to maintain agents or salesmen in Utah. Under his plan the firms would do business in Utah but would not be forced to employ local sales agents.

The two new commissioners announced the abolition of the enforcement division, resulting in termination of twenty employees and eliminating a budget of over $108,000. This action was consistent with Lee's campaign promise to return Utah to 42

LIQUOR REFORM

liquor law enforcement by regular local law enforcement agencies. Simmons and Pace planned a liaison department of two or three members to provide a means of close cooperation among local enforcement officers. They also sent letters to law enforcement officers around the state asking for their cooperation.8 In Simmons's opinion enforcement under the enforcement division had been very spotty. When enforcement was turned over to local officials, they were told that a grand jury would investigate any failure or refusal to enforce the liquor law.

Simmons believed that "The immediate effect was good. I must admit that as time went on, however, the enforcement again became spotty."9 Pace agreed that the change greatly improved liquor law enforcement. Allegedly, political appointments to the enforcement division under Maw had resulted in officers who were "doing very little enforcing."10 Simmons and Pace informed distillers that the sale of their products in Utah would depend wholly on customer demand and not political influence: "It will not be necessary for you to urge the commission to purchase your individual product as we will be guided entirely by the relative quantity resold through our retail outlets." The commission would not permit representatives of manufacturers to influence employees either in the main warehouse or at retail stores with respect to a particular brand. Their intention was to distribute liquor in Utah "on a strictly nonpartisan business basis." Any who practiced unethical conduct to promote sale of products would be barred from doing business in Utah. Pricing was to become equitable between products and based on cost to the state plus a markup on each product.11 Simmons was disturbed over the "petty corruption" exemplified by the granting of special favors to various agents. He discovered that the state was overpaying wineries, and so he went after refunds and received "quite a large amount of money back."12 One winery representative's certification was revoked when Simmons and Pace found that he was charging Utah approximately 50 cents per case more than was being charged other states. When the overcharge was traced back to May 1, 1947, it amounted to $13,495."

43

J . BRACKEN LEE

After a month of investigation, Lee's twenty-member liquor study committee recommended several improvements, perhaps the most important being a bipartisan board of control to replace the commission. The representation would come from all parts of the state, members serving on a part-time salary basis. A fulltime manager would be named, and the board would be enlarged and given full authority over him. Theoretically, the liquor control board would become an independent governmental unit instead of a "creature of the governor."14 Typical of the recommendations of so many governmental studies, this one went on the shelf, and a three-man commission continued to handle Utah's liquor problems. The law required that a third commissioner be appointed to serve with Simmons and Pace, and so William Seegmiller, a Republican, was chosen.

(Simmons served only ninety days before being named state bank commissioner.15) Instead of urging the abandonment of package agencies the committee recommended tightening up bonding and auditing practices. Members or employees of the commission were to be barred from any participation in a business associated with the liquor industry. Finally, the committee suggested the elimination of all "pressure" liquor agents by refusing to place orders with any firm whose representative operated on a commission basis rather than a salary basis.10 Responding quickly to this advice, Lee ordered the commission to notify liquor companies that their local representatives were no longer needed. He asked that the companies be requested to turn back to the state commissions paid to their local salesmen.

It was estimated that in 1948 thirty-one liquor companies paid local agents nearly $170,000 in commissions. According to W. S. Adamson, executive assistant to the governor, fees paid by liquor companies to local salesmen ranged from $1,000 to $15,000 per year. One salesman represented two companies, each of which paid him $12,000 per year. Actually, Utah's law made it illegal for a representative to push the sale of his brand by pressure or the granting of favors.17 According to Pace, "All orders were placed direct with the companies and a representative 44

LIQUOR REFORM

had nothing to do except draw his check each month and play a little politics on the side."18 Lee decided to try to influence the other seventeen states practicing the same type liquor control system. In letters to the governors he suggested that they remove the liquor salesmen and their "seemingly unlimited expense accounts," eliminating the major threat of corruption in liquor control. He noted that when he took office most agents in Utah received appointments with "strings attached" through the political party in control of the state. The administration would simply refuse to purchase from liquor suppliers until they appointed a representative of the administration's choice. In turn, the agents would contribute to the political campaign chest.19 Lee insisted on the need to ban resident agents and to ask the suppliers to return the savings to the states through lower prices. He made a distinction between resident agents, hired allegedly because of their political connections, and regular agents, hired for their ability as salesmen. Although he had no objection to the regular agents, he thought resident agents were a great source of corruption.20 The Deseret News expressed the hope that everyone concerned with liquor buying would "jump at the chance to go along with this set up," for it would take away the graft and "the important political plum."21 Simmons agreed that regular salesmen hired on a merit basis would be far more likely to aid in preventing corruption.22 In February 1950 the Utah Foundation issued a favorable research report on the condition of liquor in Utah. It seemed clear that Lee's innovative plan to abolish liquor representatives had borne fruit: "Under the old system the prominence of individuals with political connections in the list of agents suggests that such connections may have been their principal qualification for their appointment as representatives for the liquor firms."

According to the report, the abolition of the enforcement arm had not damaged law enforcement. Liquor laws were being enforced as efficiently as they had been under the former system and at a much lower cost. The Tribune called the report an 45

J. BRACKEN LEE

"impressive document" in support of Lee's progress in liquor reform.23 The new system was not without its impurities, especially in its early stages, as Democrats were quick to point out. In early 1949 Lorenzo Elggren, Democratic state senator from Salt Lake City, claimed that Utah actually had sale of liquor by the drink and would continue to have it as long as liquor law enforcement was designated to local officials. He alleged that four establishments in Salt Lake and seventeen in Ogden were selling liquor by the drink, a practice encouraged by the "so-called economy program." He was convinced that local officials were already overworked and that liquor enforcement required specially trained officers. Elggren claimed that in the first three months of 1949 arrests for violation of the liquor act in Weber and Salt Lake counties were "practically nil," whereas they had numbered seventy-five to eighty each month under the former system. He charged that liquor violations existed "right under the nose of the state liquor control commission."24 Elggren's contentions were supported by Mac Wade, sheriff of Weber County, who claimed that liquor was being sold by the drink in most Ogden taverns. In a letter to Blaine Peterson, Weber County attorney, Wade requested an opinion about the proper procedure for obtaining evidence against violators of the law. Peterson forwarded a copy of the letter to Clinton Vernon, attorney general, for an opinion. Since Elggren, an aggressive and ambitious man, knew that certain assertions had been made, the attorney general decided to make the contents of the letter public. In his letter, Peterson told of making an investigation of his own and concluding that the sheriff was right about conditions in Ogden: Liquor is being sold by the drink in most all beer halls and taverns. I am not sure that in all cases the proprietors are aware of existing conditions. Liquor is allowed and being consumed in all taverns and eating houses, or night clubs throughout the county. Taxicabs are carrying liquor. Liquor is being sold in all houses of prostitution; some of these drinks are spiked.25 46

LIQUOR REFORM

The evidence seemed clear that the liquor law was not being explicitly adhered to or enforced. Simmons immediately declared that if such conditions existed in Ogden, the sheriff and county attorney should take action. Their instructions from the liquor commission were clear.20 Nevertheless, it was obvious that the sheriff was not sure of his responsibilities or he would not have made an official inquiry. This controversy suggests that the transition to local law enforcement was anything but smooth.

Simmons and Pace promptly held a special meeting with Ogden City and Weber County commissioners to acquaint them with the accusations and to request an investigation.27 Afterward, Simmons wrote Elggren a letter in which he placed the onus for liquor violations upon him, noting that as a state senator he had a "double obligation" to perform. Quoting Section 46-0-206 of the Liquor Control Act, the conservative Republican told Elggren that it was his duty under the law to supply any specific information in his possession to authorities so that charges could be brought against violators.28 However, Democrat Elggren thought that the responsibility rested on the shoulders of the liquor commission; he refused to be specific because of his position as a legislator and claimed senatorial immunity. Parnell Black, Elggren's attorney, advised him not to testify unless there was a specific matter that could be identified. When Simmons asked the senator to name any public official who had withheld information about liquor violations, Elggren refused.29 Although Elggren wanted to publicize the matter, he preferred not to accuse public officials directly. He was concerned partly with protecting his sources and partly that Simmons was after political mileage. Undeniably, the astute Simmons made a political coup by requesting Elggren to be specific about evidence. To the public it appeared that there was no evidence, even though the sheriff of Weber County and the county attorney had clearly indicated otherwise. Even the Deseret News editorially supported Simmons, claiming that the commission had "rather neatly turned the tables" on Elggren, and that he was duty bound to provide information under oath. "If Senator Elggren fails to do so, he is either himself guilty of violating the 47

J . BRACKEN LEE

law or he confesses that he didn't know what he was talking about on the floor of the senate. How about it, senator?"30 It was a cheap shot, since Elggren had been supported in his charges by others; but his claim of senatorial immunity had made him vulnerable to criticism. The controversy sparked determination by law enforcement officers to enforce the law strictly.

Golden Haight, the new head of the Salt Lake City Police Department's antivice squad said, "There will be no ice served, no 'mixers,' no liquor sold or consumed on the premises in taverns in Salt Lake City under my administration." He promised to arrest tavern proprietors as well as liquor law violators.31 By 1952 the results were evident. In the twelve-month period ending June 30, 1952, local peace officers successfully prosecuted 11,187 transgressions of liquor laws, compared with 5,850 in the fiscal year 1951 and 8,067 the previous year. It was the third year in which city and county law officials handled all liquor prosecutions. Public intoxication was the most significant category, followed by drunken driving and illegal sales convictions.32 Pace claimed that commission controls were so rigid that it was possible to trace every case and every bottle that was shipped into the state and to identify each purchaser of whatever brand.33 Increased liquor profits were part of the reason for optimism about the new system. In 1952 the commission announced that greater efficiency had been responsible for increasing profits some $1,250,000 in the three-year period from 1949 to 1951 over the 1946-48 period. According to Pace, liquor sales increased only $31,000, underlining the "relative degree of efficiency of operation" between the old and new commissions. Increased profits were attributed to a $1,000,000 decrease in wholesale costs, freight, and handling charges, together with trimmed expenses of $328,000 in retailing costs. The largest saving was effected on freight costs by taking advantage of rate reductions on excess over minimum carload weights. The most important retailing savings was the 30 percent reduction in personnel through the elimination of duplication in jobs. The total payroll was reported to have been slashed more than $50,000 per year 48

LIQUOR REFORM

on the average, despite blanket pay increases. Even with this curtailment of expenses, Pace reported that they spent "$30,000 in store improvements, bringing them up to a standard never previously attained." Another large saving was attributed to the abolition of the enforcement division, estimated to have cost the state $260,000 in the previous three-year period.34 By the end of Lee's second term the liquor business had became a very profitable one, offering a substantial saving in taxes that otherwise would have been imposed on Utahns. In its annual report the commission noted that out of gross revenues of $14,886,000, a clear profit of $4,237,000 was evident, representing a $71,000 increase over the previous year. The Tribune comcommended the commission for operating smoothly without even a "hint of scandal."35 Pace maintained that the commission had accumulated through economies an unspent $98,000 that was turned back to the general fund, an "unheard of" practice.

According to Pace, each department of government was determined to spend the full allotment, fearing that if it did not, the legislature would reduce the budget for the next biennium.30 Despite these successes, Lee had problems with the liquor system. Deficits turned up in individual stores,37 and some liquor commission employees were accused of illegal sales.38 He also had administrative problems when Roy Simmons resigned.

Kenneth M. Doan, appointed in his place, became a subject of controversy because of his frequent absences. He ignored public pressure and called rumors that he was contemplating resignation "a lot of hooey." But after a meeting in the capitol, the governor announced that Doan had resigned "on account of press of private business." Lee could never abide an absentee public official. Doan had also been at odds with the other two members of the commission, Seegmiller and Pace. Rumors circulated that Doan was speaking for the governor, but Lee effectively dispelled that notion with the ouster. He replaced Doan with Terry McGowan, and, later, he replaced Seegmiller with Charles Foote. Both were Republicans.39 When McGowan died, Pace was appointed chairman of the commission, the first and only Democrat to be so honored by 49

J . BRACKEN LEE

Lee.40 Amiable and loyal, Pace served into the administration of Gov. Calvin L. Rampton before voluntarily retiring. Pace held Lee in high regard, calling him "one in a million," and a "very special kind of man."41 Lee claimed that his own record in office "could not have been achieved" without Pace's "splendid cooperation."42 Simmons's statement that the commission worked closely together without partisan politics43 could be uttered because Pace was so close to GOP ranks that he almost became a Republican. Perhaps it was his amiability that allowed him to serve so long among Republicans without an accusation of partisanship.

During the latter part of Lee's administration, the liquor controversy faded from public view. By 1954, despite Lee's efforts to eliminate the middlemen, there were still ten agents registered in the state, although their activities were drastically limited. With exaggerated optimism Lee announced that politics had been completely eliminated from the administration of the liquor commission, because there were no longer appointments of men with "political pull" to represent major firms. The agents no longer did any promotional work, and Lee claimed that the state's policy of buying directly from the firms was the major reason that scandal had disappeared.44 It is ironic not only that the administrator of a "wide open town" would seek the governorship on a promise of liquor reform but, especially, that he would achieve that reform. Since Lee had managed to make the issue work for him, he no longer needed to worry about any lasting damage from Morals and the Mayor.

50

LIQUOR REFORM ^-Deseret News, January 6, 1949.

2 Ibid. and 5a// Lake Tribune, January 5, 1949.

3 Salt Lake Tribune, January 3, 1949.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid. See also letters to author from J. W. Pace, September 3, 1975, and from Roy W. Simmons, September 22, 1975. a Salt Lake Tribune, January 6, 1949. ''Salt Lake Tribune, February 1949. Exact date unknown but verified by scrapbook belonging to J. W. Pace. e Salt Lake Tribune, January 7, 1949.

9 Simmons to author.

10 Pace to author.

"Salt Lake Tribune, January 6, 1949.

12 Simmons to author.

13 Salt Lake Tribune, January 23, 1949.

"Salt Lake Tribune, February 17, 1949.

15 Simmons to author. ls Salt Lake Tribune, February 17, 1949.

"Salt Lake Tribune, March 31, 1949. ispace to author. ^Deseret News, November 1, 1949. The seventeen states were: Oregon, Washington, Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Alabama, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Maryland.

20 J. Bracken Lee to Gov. Sherman Adams of New Hampshire, January 4, 1950, Lee Gubernatorial Papers, Utah State Archives, Salt Lake City.

21 Deseret News, January 9, 1950, editorial.

22 Simmons to author.

23 Salt Lake Tribune, February 21, 1950.

"During the last half of fiscal 1949 the commission began cutting operation costs and by the beginning of fiscal 1950 a substantial reduction in current operating expenses had been accomplished. For the three months July 1 to September 30, 1949, operating costs of the commission amounted to $214,799, compared to $244,320 for the same three months the year previous. This represents a reduction of 12 per cent.

"The reduction resulted from the elimination of the enforcement division, a reduction in the number of other employees of the commission and the general tightening of administration procedures. Salaries and wages for the three-month period, July 1 to Sept. 30, dropped from $115,460 in fiscal 1949 to $96,264 for the first quarter of fiscal 1950."

Furthermore, there were 676 violations reported of the liquor act in fiscal 1949 compared with 615 arrests made by the old enforcement division.

2i Salt Lake Tribune, March 11, 1949.

"Ibid.

26 Ibid. ^Deseret News, March 10, 1949. ™Salt Lake Tribune, March 10, 1949.

29 Salt Lake Telegram, Salt Lake Tribune, Deseret News, March 14, 1949.

30 Deseret News, March 15, 1949.

31 Salt Lake Tribune, March 14, 1949.

32 Salt Lake Tribune, September 20, 1952.

51

J. BRACKEN LEE 33

"Utahns Imbibe Less than Most States . . . Still, Revenue Soars into High Millions!" Utah Magazine, Winter 1955, in Pace scrapbook.

3i Salt Lake Telegram, January 23, 1952.

35 Salt Lake Tribune, August 1, 1957, editorial.

3G Pace to author.

37 Salt Lake Tribune, July 19, 1951. An irregularity at the 175 East 200 South liquor store was discovered by store manager Brownie L. Bolin when he went to the Utah First National Bank to unlock money bags containing receipts for the previous three business days. The cash was $2,500 short of the amount shown on deposit slips. Pace reported the shortage to the police.

3S Deseret News, October 29, 1956. Pace promised stern action against employees found guilty of selling whiskey to minors. Pearl Dalton, cashier at the Sixth Avenue and E Street agency, and Versa Lambourne of the Sugar House agency, were named in complaints. The News reported that a minor without a liquor license had purchased seven pints of whiskey in less than an hour. Only one of the city's eight stores had refused to sell the minor whiskey.

39 Deseret News, January 2, 1953. i0 Deseret News, October 19, 1953.

"Pace to author.

42 Lee to Pace, January 4, 1957, in Pace scrapbook.

43 Simmons to author.

"Salt Lake Tribune, January 4, 1954.

52

ft

Economy in Government I Before the 1949 inauguration the Deseret News began encouraging Lee in his economy program, claiming that appropriation requests would exceed anticipated revenues by several million dollars. Expressing confidence that the new governor was "fully aware of the need of economy and a balanced budget," the News suggested that he review department requests with a critical eye.

Presumably, the taxpayers would not stand still for huge increases in levies to support a large building program.1 In his budget message to the legislature Lee called for a "sound economy, a businesslike administration, and an efficiency in government." Warning that the state might "wreck itself financially," he insisted that the "legislature and the Governor must have the courage and the ability to say 'No'." He recommended the curtailment or elimination of many programs in the hope of establishing a reserve to cushion the state against recession in prices or employment. He criticized the earmarking of funds—the practice of setting aside tax receipts from designated sources and using the money only for a predetermined service to the state. According to Lee, departments of government were known to waste unused earmarked funds for fear that failure to spend would suggest lack of need to the legislature, resulting in future loss of funds.2 Although promises to welfare recipients were not a part of Lee's campaign for governor, his comments about them were not unfriendly. He claimed that certain abuses in the welfare system needed correction and that partisan politics had crept into its administration. He suggested that the aged and needy had been threatened with withdrawal of deserved benefits and that such exploitation was "cruel and inhuman." He wanted a program that would "divorce relief from politics."3 53

J . BRACKEN LEE

Supposedly, there was nothing more important than an intelligent, efficiently planned highway program. However, Lee recommended that the highway commission be abolished and replaced with an appointive one directed by the governor.

Then, aiming his first blow at education, he argued that the law by which colleges obtained their money gave them excessive amounts and should be repealed.4 Dating back to the 1947 legislature, Title 79 suggested a budget formula that gave the institutions exclusive control of their collections and required the governor to recommend one lump sum for institutions of higher learning.5 In criticism of Utah's public schools, Lee pointed vaguely to a "tendency" to "depart from basic principles of public education" by experimenting in new fields. He feared that "these so-called special school plans" might use a greater portion of the tax dollar.6 The new governor's suggestions involved nearly every department. Noting that the Publicity and Industrial Development Department had requested $1,186,000 for the next biennium, Lee recommended that the entire department be abolished and a much smaller appropriation of $100,000 be administered by the governor. He also suggested reducing the number of commissioners in departments, retaining a three-member commission only where essential.7 He proposed cutting off all new construction except for the new state prison, which he deemed of "primary importance." With the tax burden already excessive, he recommended that no new taxes be imposed. He criticized the state juvenile court system as expensive and inefficient and suggested that it be studied. But Lee was not miserly with state employees.

He claimed that it was "false economy to underpay those who serve the State."8 Impressed by a message "refreshingly free from 'pussyfooting' and 'double talk,'" the Salt Lake Tribune called it "admirable,"9 while the Deseret News labeled it "heartening."10 Apparently, the idea of economy was attractive to many Utahns, even though specifics would not be as easily accepted. Lee suggested that the legislature trim $38,000,000 from state department requests of $81,520,000 in order to balance the biennial budget. Receiving 54

ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT I

the biggest axe was higher education, cut from a request of $10,580,000 to $5,700,000," followed by the Department of Public Instruction, slashed by more than half from a request of $690,796, arousing the ire of Superintendent E. Allen Bateman.

Although Bateman hotly denied it, Lee claimed that the department had a $20,000 carry-over of funds from the previous year.12 The battle lines between Lee and educators were well drawn.

President A. Ray Olpin of the University of Utah estimated that the amount budgeted for higher education was approximately the amount required by his institution alone.13 Unperturbed by criticism, Lee slashed the expenditures of every branch of government except welfare, which escaped only because its request was the same as the previous biennium. The juvenile courts and the vocational schools were left out of the budget entirely. While the legislature grappled with the figures, Lee vetoed expensive measures such as a bill to expand Weber Junior College at Ogden to a four-year institution. Blaine Peterson, Weber County Democratic chairman, sent Lee a cynical telegram prior to the veto, warning, "Veto Weber College bill and kill yourself politically in Utah. You supply the ammunition.

We will do the rest."14 Soon afterward Lee vetoed a bill to appropriate $40,000 to meet a deficit for the Utah Symphony Orchestra.15 Finally, the legislature produced an appropriation of $52,256,278, a figure $9,000,000 above the governor's recommended budget, but still representing a trimming of some $29,000,000 from the department requests. To justify its spending, the joint appropriations committee cited evidence from the legislative council and the tax commission that Utah would gain $55,000,000 during the next biennium. Besides, Utah had no bonded indebtedness, with $5,000,000 in reserves and $4,000,000 in unexpended building funds.

Although it was clear that the state's financial condition was not unhealthy, Lee claimed that the appropriation was "illegal," because it exceeded anticipated revenues; then he methodically eliminated twenty-five items from the budget, totaling $3,843,800. In the process, he administered the death knell to the Salt 55

J . BRACKEN LEE

Lake Area Vocational School ($500,000); he eliminated the $750,000 appropriation for the Utah Water and Power Board, which built dams and worked to preserve water; he removed the $375,000 requested by the Department of Health for hospital construction; he cut the $328,350 appropriation for the operation of the children's crippling disease hospital out of the budget; he removed $400,000 for airport construction; he vetoed all special funds for education; and he eliminated $400,000 in funds for soil conservation, bovine tuberculosis, and Bang's disease control requested by Utah State Agricultural College, as well as $495,000 for the University of Utah's Stewart Training School.

Under Utah law, Lee could not simply reduce individual items; he could either approve of the entire budget or eliminate entire items.

More careful in its praise this time, the Tribune said Lee was "conscientious" but warned against a recession caused by "undue pessimism, too narrow a view, holding too tightly to the purse strings."10 The Telegram called Lee's action "commendable," since there would have been no great cushion of excess revenue if the bill had been accepted when it reached his desk; yet it was "difficult to applaud the specific item vetoes because they hit so many worth-while activities."17 Although Lee's niggardly attitude staggered most observers, the state was in the mood for economy.

The spirit of his program was accepted, even though he immediately made significant enemies, the number of which would increase as his term wore on.

Lee's unfortunate decision to single out education for scorn indicated a profound bias destined to plague his political career.

For instance, in a speech to the Utah Junior Chamber of Commerce, he accused the University of Utah president of allowing a "poorly managed and extravagant maintenance staff," consisting of sixty-six workers and twenty-two bosses. As an example of unnecessary waste, the governor said that "when a new professor comes to the University, he is given an office. If he doesn't like the plumbing on one side, it is moved to the other side. Then when another professor comes, it is moved back."18 President Olpin called the charges groundless and declared that the university was being operated efficiently and economically. Agitated, 56

ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT I

Olpin chided Lee for not finding time to visit the campus and for gathering his information secondhand.19 Not satisfied to carp at higher education alone, Lee accused the elementary schools of being substandard. Since the governor had not requested any information from his office regarding the schools, Superintendent Bateman, an idealistic but combative man, countered that such charges could not be considered valid. Lee went on to propose that the state department of education be discontinued.20 Unfortunately, the press failed to provide an effective check against Lee's bias. Any criticism of these important economic decisions remained guarded at best, giving Lee the climate he wanted. For instance, the Tribune bemoaned how hard the economy axe had fallen on education, specifically on the Utah State Agricultural College and the University of Utah, but predicted that they would "find a way to keep going all 'essential' programs by borrowing from basic appropriations. Institutions of this kind can always retrench—like a housewife can get by on a $10 weekly grocery budget," even though "the family may not be happy or healthy as a result."21 The Deseret News provided its own weak commentary in a special editorial on the legislature and the schools, tracing the history of higher education in the Salt Lake Valley. Utah's early promoters of education had "learned that you can't buy learning with money," even though money was admittedly necessary to provide tools for progress. The News did not want a crippled school system, but it conceded that "there is a point at which expansion must be slowed up to accommodate itself to the available resources."22 To prove his efficiency as a businessman-governor, Lee implored the legislature to recognize the need for exhaustive audits of state agencies. Studies had proved, he said, that the state engineering commission paid architect fees for buildings that had never been built and, in one case, never authorized by the legislature. He claimed that the state was obligated for $584,000 in such fees and had paid out $284,280 for projects never passing the "drawing board stage." In a similar vein, Truman Curtis, state purchasing agent, reported that the state 57

J . BRACKEN LEE

had been overcharged for automobile tires and tire work in the amount of $10,000.23 Lee then revamped the system under which state employees used state vehicles by instituting a motor pool and charging each department six cents a mile for auto use, which Finance Commissioner P. H. Mulcahy claimed resulted in a profit to provide for future automobile replacement. Lee also trimmed travel expenses from approximately $262,000 to $221,000 in a four-month period. Finally, he reduced the payroll of the governor's staff by $1,000 per month and realized a $29,000 per month savings in various departmental payrolls.24 PUBLIC REACTION TO LEE'S ECONOMY DRIVE

A popular joke told locally reveals much about public reaction to Lee's economy drive: Lee was dreaming that he was dead and attending his own funeral. In the middle of the proceedings, he sat up in his coffin and asked, "Who are these six guys following me?"

"They're pallbearers," someone replied.

"Well," Lee responded, "fire three of them and let's get on with it."25 In 1950 the national periodicals discovered the highly quotable Lee and analyzed him through several articles that focused primarily on his economy drive. Time claimed that Washington bureaucrats had been troubled because Utah was not spending enough money or taking full advantage of federal grants. "The trouble turned out to be sinewy, easy-smiling J. (for Joseph) Bracken Lee. . . ." To a young federal budget man who called on him, Lee reportedly said, "It's too bad you never lived in a free country." When the young man got redfaced and claimed he did live in a free country, Lee said, "Well, I remember when the paycheck I got was my own and I could spend it as I liked.

Can you spend yours as you like?" A few minutes later, the governor showed the "bewildered budget man the door." Lee also liked to deemphasize patronage and supposedly hired only the competent: "I'm fed up with most politicians anyway, and that goes for Republicans as well as Democrats." Time claimed 58

ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT I

that his "trail was littered with the bones of sacred cows."

Although a veteran himself, Lee had refused state funds to hire more help for veterans' affairs. In his view veterans who returned uninjured should be grateful for having had the privilege of serving their country. Nor did he favor support for farmers, claiming that "the price of freedom is the same to you as it is to everyone else—a little hardship when times are adverse."20 On his educational economies, Time quoted Lee as saying, "If it's necessary to close every school in the U.S. for a year to save the government, close them." Elated by the millions of dollars saved in budget cuts, he was said to be grieved that he had no such control over the national government: "I sometimes think that I am more afraid of the spenders in Washington than I am of the Russians." Time noted that he had two more years of his term, and despite politicians' and newsmen's doubts, "he thinks his kind of small businessmen's government will get him re-elected. If it does, after he has alienated just about every pressure group in the state, politicians will be flocking to Salt Lake for lessons." If he were to lose, the magazine opined, "he knows that at least his methods work in the real estate business back in Price."27 An article by Joe Morris in the Saturday Evening Post, entitled "The Stubbornest Man in Utah," suggested that Lee's favorite question was "How much?" and his favorite answer was "No!" "Thus has Governor J. Bracken Lee made thrifty Mormons happy, patronage-conscious politicos furious, and Utah an experiment in economy." Even though he pictured Lee as a political eccentric, the author seemed to offer an endorsement of his administration. He told the story of some visitors to Lee's office who proposed two designs for floats to be sponsored by Utah for the inauguration of President Truman. When Lee was told the cost ($5,000 for one and $3,500 for the second), he offered a resounding "no" that was to become as "well known in Utah as Gromyko's 'niets' in the United Nations." Lee was thought by his critics to be practicing "government by impulse" —a false economy that would prove more costly in the long run.

One Democrat told Morris about the typical Mormon faith in 59

J. BRACKEN LEE

thrift and concluded that the governor had made the most of it, but "in practice he's saving peanuts."28 Morris characterized Lee as a "good-looking man with neat, rimless glasses shielding his blue eyes, graying hair that is cropped close to his head every fifth day, a deceptively mild manner and an almost gaudy necktie in contrast to his conservative business suit." Supposedly, he bore a close resemblance to President Truman "from a certain angle" but was unlike him in other ways, except that "Lee is a man who loves a fight and never knows when he's licked."29 An even more favorable article appeared in the American Magazine, titled "Lone Wolf of Utah," by Don Eddy, who called Lee "pretty remarkable" in his attempt to "restore financial stability to government through plain, old fashioned, shirt sleeved Americanism." Lee had managed to antagonize "clergymen, bankers, benevolent societies, lawyers, musicians, do-gooders, farmers, veterans, old-age pensioners, sachems of school boards," and "a formidable horde of grafters and chiselers." Yet, by 1950, with the budget balanced and the fiscal condition of the state impressive, many people were changing their minds. The author found people who had been directly deprived by Lee's economy drive supporting him, such as David B. Romney, managing director of the Utah Symphony Orchestra, and a flying fanner who was intially disturbed over the lack of an airport appropriation. A taxi driver and veteran said, "We can't spend what we ain't got; anybody understands that."30 Eddy called Lee a man of "impetuous bluntness" and "bullheaded determination" but "an atrocious politician" unable to make extravagant promises or shy away from controversial issues.

He was also "an average American" who could "think clearly, analyze critically, and act with the fearless tenacity of a pit bull."

Nevertheless, "politics being what they are, this may be about the last you'll hear of Joseph Bracken Lee, the lone wolf from Castle Valley. But, honestly, now, ain't it a shame?"31 In the author's opinion, Lee's honesty and economy were destroying his political future.

60

ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT I

An almost identical approach was employed by Richard L. Williams in a Life article entitled "Politician without a Future."

He pictured Lee as "willing to commit political hara-kari" ever since his election by displaying integrity and insistently saving money. In spite of offending many groups Lee continued his program because he was "driven by a belligerent contempt for expediency" and had no choice but to vigorously pursue the right course. Wiliams gave an inaccurate version of Morals and the Mayor, quickly dismissing it as a "desperate" Democratic tactic.

He was impressed with Lee's political philosophy: "Do it honestly, do the best you know how, and let 'em holler!"32 Unimpressed by the favorable publicity accorded the governor, Utah Democrats inspired an anti-Lee article in the New Leader, written by Salt Lake public relations consultant Gail Martin. Entitled "Lee of Utah: Champ or Scamp?" the article's subheading was even more direct: "The Salt Lake State's Coverboy Governor isn't quite the angel he's made out to be." Martin claimed that "discerning students of public affairs" were disturbed that "an inexperienced, poorly informed and frequently bungling politician" such as Lee had been catapulted to national fame. He speculated that a grand political strategy of the Republican party was responsible for Lee's sudden publicity kick.33 Severely criticizing Lee's economy program, Martin correctly argued that when Lee took office, Utah had no bonded indebtedness and had $5,000,000 in reserves and $4,000,000 in the building fund.34 In a lengthy letter to the editor of the New Leader, Lee's press secretary, Harold Simpson, tried unsuccessfully to refute the article. He attacked Martin for some errors and for belonging to a firm that handled advertising for the Democratic State Committee. Simpson was indignant that a picture of Lee in some issues of the magazine was actually a photo of Adam S. Bennion, a member of the University of Utah Board of Regents. Further, he noted that a picture caption reading "Salt Lake City's Mormon Tabernacle" was actually the temple with the tabernacle in the background and that Utah was incorrectly reported as having achieved statehood in 1897 instead of 1896. These mistakes provided Simpson's evidence for his over61

J. BRACKEN LEE

drawn claim that the article was "filled with inaccuracies, halftruths, and unwarranted insinuations."35 Unaccountably, Simpson made no comment about Utah's debt-free status, certainly Martin's most telling point.36 If the state was in excellent financial condition in 1949, why was an economy drive necessary? Martin claimed that Lee was getting credit undeservedly for removing $27,000 from his gubernatorial mansion budget, when in fact he had requested the full $32,500.

Although the legislature had reduced that amount by $2,500, Martin was convinced that Lee was not operating the mansion out of his own pocket.37 Simpson denied that Lee had ever recommended a reduction in the mansion budget; instead, he had suggested a cut of $15,480 in appropriations to his office. The legislature then cut that an additional $14,520, meaning that Lee was literally running his office on his own.38 Martin said that Lee volunteered to drive his own car and suggested selling the governor's 1946 Cadillac so as not to burden taxpayers. The car was sold for $1,500, which Democrats claimed was about $1,500 under its market value. Soon afterward Lee changed his mind and requisitioned the finance commission for a new Cadillac; this request was refused due to insufficient funds. When Lee's own "economy minded" finance commission took office, Lee purchased his Cadillac.39 Without denying that story, Simpson insisted that Lee had saved the state the car expenses for a seven-month period, and when he received the new Cadillac he sold his own car at a "$500 personal loss."40 Martin also chided Lee for paying an attorney in the governor's office a $500 fee during the legislative session, when previous governors had had no special attorney. Lee also employed an executive assistant at $500 per month for work that had customarily been done by a secretary for $333. Simpson did not deny these facts either but claimed that Lee had spent $1,500 less per month to operate his office than his predecessor, mainly because he had only three employees on his office staff, compared with the six utilized by Maw.41 Years later Lee remembered two women and a press secretary who were regularly employed in his office; and he admitted 62

ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT I

paying an attorney $500 during the legislative session because he lacked confidence in the particularly partisan opinions of Attorney General Clinton Vernon, a Democrat. Lee denied that he was operating the Governor's Mansion "on his own," although he was convinced that he ran it for less. On the subject of housing for the chief executive, he recommended that the state divest itself of the Governor's Mansion because of expense as well as lack of privacy: "You could walk in any time of the day or night.

You'd be amazed. They'd come right into your private bedroom and then spend the afternoon in there if you didn't keep everything locked." On the car matter, he said he drove his own car for the first six months and never had a chauffeur because he did not think a "governor should be like a god." However, Lee conceded that he did requisition the state for a new Cadillac after the first six months in office.42 Lee freely acknowledged Utah's lack of bonded indebtedness when he took office, and even credited the previous governor and legislature for providing him with a debt-free system: "I would admit frankly the state was in good shape." His reply when challenged about the need for economy under such conditions is revealing: When you look back and say the country was on a big spending spree, and everybody was borrowing, and this in itself was creating inflation, I would agree with you that what I did made no difference. I don't think it made any difference. What I was trying to do actually, was to set an example, because I had begun to see the growth of these bureaus, which I was very much opposed to, and the power that the state was handing over to the bureau, which later I discovered was a form of human nature, and I don't know how you could have stopped it. But when you stop to think about it, we could have borrowed money at that time for I guess 2Vi or 3 % . State bonds, see, were tax exempt. But I contend that when you start dishing unlimited sums out and you give people everything they want, that the waste becomes terrific.43 Economy in government represented his essential political philosophy. "I'd even do it today. . . . I think people are a little bit better off when they don't get all the money they need."44 63

J . BRACKEN LEE

The Salt Lake Telegram took note of the national attention being given to Lee as "a kind of maverick among state governors —the chap who, for example, astounded Washington officialdom by failing to spend all the money Uncle Sam wanted to dump into his lap." Whether Lee was right or not the Telegram concluded that "at least we have had a kind of state administration which is unique enough these days to warrant national attention. Good or bad, neither Utah nor the nation can ignore J. Bracken Lee."45 Lee's own reaction was self-righteous: "This publicity rather scares me. I wonder what is so unique in what I'm trying to do.

All my life I've been taught that this was the thing to do. I don't know why suddenly when a man attempts to do what he's been taught to believe, that it is considered unique."40 Several people sent letters and telegrams advancing his candidacy for the presidency of the United States, but Lee was unmoved: "All I want is to do a good job for Utah."47 Even an Iowa newspaper editorially praised his accomplishments, suggesting that "in Governor Lee's independent spirit lies the type of ability the United States needs so desperately in Washington, D.C." There seemed to be special appeal in such Lee logic as "Any man who believes he can spend himself rich is a plain darned fool," and "Too many of us are thinking more about our own jobs, our wants, our own pleasures, than about the wellbeing of our country. If we don't wake up, we'll have no country to save and no selfish wishes to think about." The editors thought that Lee's unselfish devotion to his country and his "courage to take unpleasant steps for our own good" were refreshing. "It wouldn't be bad strategy for both political parties to keep an eye on Joseph Bracken Lee for 1952."48 Writing in the Los Angeles Times, Raymond Moley praised Lee's record of economy toward schools, for "these institutions are not only the cherished favorites of the people, but they are backed by a tremendously powerful lobby." According to Moley, Lee was more than "just another Governor. He embodies principles to which a distracted nation may turn next year."49

64

ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT I ^Deseret News, December 6, 1948, editorial. On January 10, 1949, the News observed that if the legislature could cut expenditures to meet income without new taxes, "it will go down in history as one of the most successful lawmaking bodies since Utah achieved statehood."

2 Budget Message of Gov. J. Bracken Lee to the 28th Legislature of the State of Utah, January 12, 1949, pp. 5, 6, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

3 Ibid., p. 8.

4 Ibid., pp. 9-11.

5 Senate Journal, 28th Legislature, as quoted in Floyd S. Wilcox, "The Major Financial Policies of Governor J. Bracken Lee of Utah, 1949-1957" (Master's thesis, University of Utah, 1969), pp. 16, 17.

6 Budget Message, pp. 9-11.

7 Lee's opinion that state government was unwieldy with its proliferation of commissions turned out to be a forerunner of reform. In the mid-1960s the Little Hoover Commission recommended wholesale reform through more streamlined government. It concluded that Utah governors had the machinery to "be little more than governors in name only." The governor had to implement his policies "through persuasion, the prestige of his office, and the force of his personality." The latter point was the obvious key to Lee's success. The Little Hoover Commission made state government less complex and its management more dynamic. See Little Hoover Commission Report, 1966, pp. 13, 19, Utah State Archives.

8 Budget Message, pp. 13-17.

Lee said the money for the prison project should come from the $2.5 million reserve building fund, providing tax collections continued at the present level. Deseret News, July 13, 1949.

9 'Salt Lake Tribune, January 13, 1949.

10 Deseret News, January 13, 1949.

"Salt Lake Tribune, February 3, 1949.

"Salt Lake Telegram, January 25, 1949.

"Salt Lake Tribune, January 27, 1949.

"Salt Lake Telegram, February 10, 1949.

15 Salt Lake Tribune, February 14, 1949. ™Salt Lake Tribune, March 22, 1949.

"Salt Lake Telegram, March 22, 1949. ls Salt Lake Tribune, February 27, 1949.

"Salt Lake Tribune, February 28, 1949.

20 Salt Lake Telegram and Deseret News, February 28, 1949.

21 Salt Lake Tribune, March 22, 1949.

22 Deseret News, February 22, 1949.

23 Salt Lake Tribune, February 22, 1949.

"Joe Alex Morris, "The Stubbornest Man in Utah," Saturday Evening Post, May 6, 1950, pp. 124-26.

2 5Ibid., p. 26.

26 "The Man at the Wheel," Time, April 24, 1950, p. 28.

"Ibid.

28 Morris, "The Stubbornest Man," pp. 26, 27.

There are numerous examples to support such a charge. In August 1949 Lee decided to cut back on operations of the State Historical Society. In a terse letter, he claimed that the number of employees had ballooned from nine in December 1948 to twelve by June 1949, causing combined salaries to rise from $1,397.00 to $1,865.18. He insisted that the payroll be "reduced substantially below the number of employees as of December, 1948." (Lee to Mrs. E. J. Lauchnor, State Historical Society, August 2, 1949, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.)

Next, he became irritated over the society's practice of sending out letters with "meter-stamped return envelopes enclosed." Worried that some of the

65

J . BRACKEN LEE

envelopes would be wasted, he suggested that the practice be discontinued and "have those who are interested in writing your department purchase their own stamps." (Lee to Mrs. Lauchnor, secretary-manager, Historical Society, September 11, 1950.)

A similar nitpicking attitude could be discerned in his approach to travel requests. In December 1949 Lee considered requests of two employees of the Department of Public Instruction to attend meetings of the American Vocational Association in Atlantic City, New Jersey. Addressing the Board of Examiners, Lee said "these requests are unjustified and should be denied by the Board." However, the attorney general and the secretary of state, both Democrats, had approved them. Lee claimed that at most one trip could be justified, even though one trip was actually being financed by federal funds and the other by Weber College, "since the taxpayers—in one way or another— still must pay the bill." (Lee to State Board of Examiners, Heber Bennion, Jr., Secretary of State, and Clinton Vernon, Attorney General, December 2, 1949, Lee Gubernatorial Papers).

Lee had a long quarrel with State Health Commissioner John Spies over travel expenses and department economy which finally resulted in his ouster.

(Extensive correspondence between Lee and Spies, Lee Gubernatorial Papers, 1950). Lee claimed that Spies ran up huge telephone bills, one month alone totaling $1,200. When questioned about it, Spies said he had telephoned the Los Angeles Hospital on health business. Since Lee was not satisfied with his answers, he asked the finance commission to investigate. They discovered that every call had been to a woman—a nurse at the hospital. "He was carrying on a love affair with her by telephone. . . . I think he had a screw loose, to tell you the truth." As a postscript on the medical profession, Lee asserted that "doctors sometimes get so wrapped up in medicine that they don't know anything about anything else." He had known several doctors who were "highly intelligent in medicine and dumber'n hell on pretty near everything else you talk to them about." (Lee interview.)

29 Morris, "The Stubbornest Man," p. 30.

30 Don Eddy, "Lone Wolf of Utah," American Magazine, May 1950, pp.

24, 25.

31 Ibid., pp. 94, 99.

32 Richard L. Williams, "Politician without a Future," Life, May 1, 1950, pp. 109, 110, 113-16.

33 Gail Martin, "Lee of Utah: Champ or Scamp?" New Leader (New York), July 8, 1950, p. 16.

34 Ibid., p. 17.

35 Harold Simpson to W. E. Bohn, editor, New Leader, undated, pp. 1, 2, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

36 Ibid., pp. 2, 3.

"Martin, "Lee of Utah," p. 18.

38 Simpson to Bohn, p. 5.

39 Martin, "Lee of Utah."

40 Simpson to Bohn, p. 6.

"Martin, "Lee of Utah," p. 18; Simpson to Bohn, pp. 6, 7. " L e e interview.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid. i!i Salt Lake Telegram, April 22, 1950. ia Deseret News, April 28, 1950.

"Deseret News, May 1, 1950. ^Deseret News, December 13, 1950, quoting editorial in Sioux City (Iowa) Journal. ""Raymond Moley, "Utah's Governor Shows Road to Economy," Los Angeles Times, August 4, 1951.

66

6 Economy in Government II Lee preached economy in 1949 when first elected governor, in 1956 at the end of his tenure, and again in 1960 as mayor of Salt Lake City. He would have argued for economy whatever the international scene offered, but the Korean War provided a convenient rationale. When he addressed the 1951 legislature he spoke of a "national emergency" and the "possibility of a third world war." He expressed grief over casualties Utah suffered in Korea and argued that Utahns at home must intensify steps already taken to gear the economy to the war effort. He recommended the elimination of nonessential services and unnecessary spending as well as the reduction of payrolls and capital improvements. In his words, "Every conceivable effort must be made which in any way will accelerate and promote the defense of our country—for the struggle at hand is one of survival."1 Stressing the need to sacrifice, Lee asserted that government, the family, the corner drugstore, and the large corporation all must live within their incomes or face bankruptcy. He claimed that the first two years of his administration had proved that costs could be cut without impairment of services. For instance, the Public Service and Business Regulation Commission was operating more efficiently with nine fewer employees, thus saving the state $37,700. The Liquor Control Commission was returning a greater profit, even though liquor sales had declined. He estimated the savings in liquor administration for a two-year period at $400,000, partly due to the abolition of the enforcement division. These examples, he said, were typical of almost all departments under his control.2 He strongly recommended that appropriations coincide with anticipated revenue and that taxes be reduced. He proposed to increase exemptions from $600 for an adult to $750, from 67

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$1,200 for married couples to $1,500, and from $300 for each dependent to $500. Under the existing system a man and wife with two children were allowed an exemption of $1,800, while the same family in California was allowed $4,300. According to Lee, such an example was convincing evidence that Utah's tax system needed reform. In addition, he recommended the simplification of tax forms and procedures to cut red tape and administrative costs. An alternative plan proposed by the State Tax Commission would have eliminated the income tax altogether in favor of a 3 percent (instead of 2 percent) sales tax on all items except groceries and prescription medicine.3 In a request for repeal of the 1947 act creating a state park on the old prison site in Sugar House, he contended that city parks should be the city's responsibility. However, he favored more funds in some selected cases to provide upgrading of state hospital and welfare institutions, a higher salary for the state health commissioner, expansion of the highway patrol, and for the organizing of a civil defense program with local communities assuming the expense and responsibility. He recommended termination of the public employees' retirement system in favor of Social Security.4 With the Korean War as a backdrop the message assumed dramatic importance. The press again supported his proposal, the Tribune labeling it a "rigid economy plan" but one in "keeping with the times." The editors applauded the emphasis on sacrifice in a time of national emergency and predicted the support of the public even though the details, especially the sales tax, might be debated.5 The Deseret News said that Lee's strict economy was "not only wise," but in light of the national problem "it is essential, it is mandatory."0 Similar encouragement came from the Telegram. Remembering that Lee had followed economy from the beginning, "sometimes ruthlessly," the Telegram nevertheless believed that most Utahns would approve the broad idea, since retrenchment had paid off with a state surplus of some $3,000,000.7 Budget requests in 1949 totaling over $81,000,000 had caused such intense conflict with the governor that state agencies 68

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scaled down their requests for the 1951 biennium, submitting a total budget of $61,900,000. Although this figure was considerably lower than the previous biennium, Lee still recommended that the figure be cut by $12,600,000. 8 However, lawmakers killed bills designed to satisfy Lee's desire to reform the income tax structure and created a budget figure of $56,400,000.9 Lee, in turn, vetoed all the funds the legislature recommended be spent on higher education, amounting to $13,333,000.10 He also vetoed two bills providing for a refund of gasoline taxes paid by those who used gasoline for off-highway purposes. The Telegram lauded him for "political courage," suggesting that much of the gasoline supposedly purchased for use in tractors and similar vehicles found its way into the gas tanks of trucks and cars.11 By the end of the session Lee was embroiled in controversy because of vetoes so numerous that a special session was scheduled for June. In spite of heavy pressure to increase salaries of state and local officials to conform to the cost of living, he continued his economy bent, even vetoing bills designed to increase his own salary. Only legislators and court reporters received raises. In the special session Lee decided to be conciliatory and allow legislators to do their work for the most part without obstructive vetoes. Most of the successful bills involved the schools and cost the state more money than if they had been enacted in the regular session.12 Nevertheless, Lee's political image remained positive, as evidenced by a Los Angeles Times article congratulating him for courage in his vetoes and calling the special session a compromise that cost him "none of his public support."13 Lee declared that his vetoes had not destroyed any of the state's services, all of which were "very much alive and improved."1* But two state senators, Lorenzo Elggren and Edward Watson, disagreed. They issued a bitter attack on the governor for his failure to fund a $550,000 hospital for poliomyelitis and other crippling diseases. Although the act authorizing the hospital was created in 1945 and the building erected for it was virtually completed, Lee had recommended repeal of the legislation on the grounds that the facility was unnecessary. Elggren and 69

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Watson accused him of "ruthlessly" and "viciously" killing a project that would have helped to alleviate the polio epidemic then in progress. They could not forgive him for trifling with the health of Utah children to save money. They sarcastically asked, "Are parents whose children have died still grateful to you for your economy?"10 Lee reacted to the criticism in a typically forthright, selfrighteous manner. In a lecture to the Utah Foundation, a business-financed governmental research and tax study organization, he complained of their lack of courage in fighting for sound fiscal policies: When bankers are afraid to expose this fraud of inflation, because they might lose some deposits; when you insurance men are afraid to tell people what is happening to their policies for fear of losing some sales; when newspapers write editorials to keep from losing subscriptions, don't come up and try to tell me politicians are cowardly for doing the same thing.10 Instead of accusing him of rigidity in the face of serious criticism, the press continued to respect him for speaking frankly.

The Telegram admitted that some would call it "stubbornness rather than courage," but the editors believed it was an example of his unflinching stand on governmental economy "regardless of who got hurt."17 In 1951 Lee spoke equally frankly at the National Governors Conference, threatening to walk out unless the governors took a stand on high taxes, inflation, the Korean War, the national debt, and integrity in government. During a discussion of mental institutions and senility, Lee exploded, accusing the other governors of worrying about "incidental" problems. "I believe I'm right and every man in this room knows I'm right."18 He made such a splash nationally that local newspapers speculated about a favorite son candidacy at the national Republican convention in 1952. The Tribune rhetorically asked what state official besides Adlai Stevenson had been given so much space in national magazines and was in so much demand as a public speaker. There would be no "iffiness" or "metooism" 70

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in a delegation headed by Lee; "and a definite program, appealing to big and little fellows alike, would be spelled out thus, E-C-O-N-O-M-Y." Lee's campaign slogans were said to be ready-made—Lee to rhyme with "economee" and "honestee" and campaign buttons saying, "Vote for Brack, set spending back," or "We'll go with Brack to give rascals the sack." Lee was considered a potential running mate for Sen. Robert A. Taft because of similar views, and if General Eisenhower were to get the nomination, "our Brack" could be a healing element in the party.19 By the end of May 1952 it was necessary to call another special session, chiefly to upgrade the state retirement system.

Other funding matters considered were the completion of industrial buildings at the state prison and improving flood control, following the unprecedented floods in Utah that spring. An appropriation of $30,000 was made for the cost of the special session.20 Lee put intensive effort into tax reduction. He succeeded in reducing the state school equalization levy from 6.3 mills in 1951 to 0 mills in 1952 and reducing the property tax in 1951, mostly through vetoes. Another reason for the decline in property tax was the increase in sales tax collections. In the 1949-51 biennium the state had collected $30,357,999 in sales tax; two years later collections had jumped to $34,084,265.21 Actually, the special interest groups saved the most on property tax relief, as exemplified by the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad's saving of $127,261.47.22 1953

LEGISLATURE

In his address to the 1953 legislature Lee reaffirmed the need for economy, attributing the "substantial surplus" to the increase in tax revenues and "the fight to hold down appropriations."

Departments that had economized, he said, had proved that expenditures could be curtailed without the impairment of services. Although taxes had been reduced since he assumed office, he was still convinced that they were excessive. He urged that 71

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the income tax be reduced, that returns be simplified, and that the property tax be eliminated.23 The Tribune lauded his program as "economical, yet progressive" government; but the Deseret News predicted that citizens would complain of the austerity, especially in education. The News correctly noted that the overall reduction recommended by Lee was about 20 percent but was not evenly distributed among departments. Some budgets he reduced slightly, others drastically, with higher education, as usual, bearing the brunt. Yet, economy in government offered positive benefits, the News asserted, not the least of which was "an aggressive free enterprise economy generally credited with having made this nation the great producer that it is."24 In his budget message Lee recommended that income taxes be reduced by $3,000,000 because of a surplus of $3,124,000 in the General Fund. Since the income tax and property tax were earmarked for the Uniform School Fund, he proposed the transfer of $3,000,000 from the General Fund surplus to the Uniform School Fund. The Emergency Relief Fund was supplied by the sales tax and contained a balance of approximately $8,608,900.

Since $5,000,000 was to remain in reserve by law and the anticipated revenue in the coming biennuim for the ERF was $35,000,000, he recommended that $23,000,000 be budgeted to pay for the operation of the public welfare department. As a result, the state property tax could be eliminated. If $4,800,000 was transferred annually from sales tax revenues and $3,000,000 from the ERF, the Uniform School Fund would be adequately financed without placing a levy on property.25 Predictably, Lee argued that the figure requested for the next biennium of $72,971,000 in appropriations far exceeded anticipated state income. As a result, he vetoed funding for projects he thought superfluous, such as $50,000 for an evaluation of rain-making experiments by the University of Utah Department of Meteorology and another $50,000 for purchase of a Pony Express sculpture for the State Capitol grounds.20 The Deseret News called the latter veto an example of "domestic courage."

"Knowing how strongly Mrs. J. Bracken Lee has worked on 72

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behalf of the statue project, one suspects that it is just as well that the Governor's mansion, while old, is roomy enough that Mr. Lee can stay out of the First Lady's way for a few days."27 The legislature generally followed Lee's recommendations.

The income tax process was streamlined by the addition of a new short form; income tax exemptions were raised from $300 to $600; $1,750,000 from the General Fund surplus was transferred to the Uniform School Fund, and $1,750,000 from sales tax receipts was also transferred to make up for reduced income taxes. An attempt to increase the motor fuel tax from 5 to 6 cents per gallon was vetoed by Lee. Although he vetoed an educational TV station appropriation of $250,000, he signed a bill to appropriate $44,380 to improve and maintain This Is the Place Monument and $79,000 for building at the Utah School for the Deaf and Blind.28 Nevertheless, because of the tax reduction, Utah lost about $13,000,000 during the biennium.

Enthusiastic about selling his economic philosophy nationally, Lee made a forum of the National Governors Conference in 1953. He said that many people who "worked their hearts out" for a change in Washington had become convinced that the Eisenhower administration would never reverse New Deal policies. Lee disturbed the "pro-Eisenhower glow" at the conference, since most Republican governors supported Ike's go slow policy on tax reduction and an increase on the $275 billion federal debt limit. However, Lee claimed that the attempt to raise the debt ceiling to $290 billion was one of the best examples of what he called the failure of the new administration to reverse the big spending trend of its Democratic predecessors. He said the best way to cut government expenses was to cut taxes so that there would be less money to spend.29 If Lee failed to impress the governors, he managed to win over the press. The political writers who covered the national governors conferences rated him one of the nation's seventeen outstanding governors. They rated him behind such notables as Thomas Dewey of New York, Earl Warren of California, Alfred Driscoll of New Jersey, Allan Shivers of Texas, and Frank Lausche of Ohio, who were called the five best.30 73

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In 1955 Lee aroused more national recognition and criticism by suggesting a third party as a possible solution to the country's problems. Attacking his speech in Chicago in which he made the suggestion, the Washington Post charged that his "general bungling in the gubernatorial office" made him unworthy to lead a third party and concluded that the speech was an attempt "to divert attention from his own shabby record." The Deseret News agreed that mention of a third party was intemperate but resented the criticism of Lee's record: "The harshest critic of the Governor would be hard put to substantiate a charge of 'general bungling' or a 'shabby record.'" The editors praised him for operating the statehouse more efficiently and openly than any governor of recent memory. They were impressed with his handling of liquor and welfare, his improvement of roads, his resistance to tax increases, his "stern pay-as-we-go policy," and the lack of scandal or corruption.31 1955-56 BIENNIUM In his message to the legislature Lee claimed that some expenditures had gone beyond his control, especially in education. As a result of the transfer of surplus funds to the Uniform School Fund in 1953, the legislature had reduced the property tax by 6.5 mills. Lee did not see such a bright picture for the new biennium, mainly because the surplus had almost all been spent.

An increase in the property tax for school purposes seemed a foregone conclusion. Lee expected reserves at the end of the 1953-54 biennium to be $911,000 in the General Fund, $5.7 million in the Emergency Relief Fund, and nothing at all in the Reserve Building Fund, making anticipated surpluses $6.6 million lower than those of the previous two years.32 A tax increase had not been necessary in 1953 because $13.1 million was transferred from the Emergency Relief Fund to the Uniform School Fund. This so depleted the ERF that nothing could be siphoned off into the Reserve Building Fund, causing most construction programs to be eliminated. Lee called this a mistake; in order to resume construction he recommended that 74

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the first $3 million to $5 million surplus in the ERF—over the $5 million statutory reserve—be diverted to the Reserve Building Fund, with the remaining surplus going to the Uniform School Fund. If general spending could be curbed, more money would be available for the school fund, eventually resulting in a lowering of the property tax.33 Again, conflict arose between the governor and the legislature. Lee signed bills designed to close loopholes in individual income taxes, and the lawmakers agreed with his suggestion that money raised from the local uniform levy in excess of the basic minimum school program be transferred to the Uniform School Fund. However, Lee vetoed many revenue bills, three of which were overridden by the legislature: one bill permitted Salt Lake City to levy a 4 mill property tax for water and sewage purposes; one raised the corporation franchise tax rate from 3 percent to 4 percent of net income; and another extended state aid to the emergency school building program with an appropriation of $2.13 million.34 He also vetoed a bill that would have extended the sales tax to cigarettes, beer, and oleomargarine, items already taxed in other ways. Before the lawmaking body completed its work, a discouraged Lee warned that because it had appropriated about $1 million more than the estimated revenue, the state might face a $2 million deficit.35 As a revealing sign of his economic extremism, this prophecy failed to materialize; at the end of the fiscal year, June 30, 1957, Lee's last year in office, there was a working surplus of over $8.35 million in state funds.30 ECONOMY: FOR WHAT?

Without question, Lee's eight years were most known for economy, especially in education, and for tax reductions. Yet, when he assumed office Utah's economy was healthy, and state funds included a working surplus. Moreover, the evidence suggests that most people approved of the tax system as it had been revised in the 1940s and would have been content to leave it alone. On the other hand, Utah's tendency to political conservatism, combined with its Mormon traditions, provided the natural 75

J. BRACKEN LEE

support Lee needed for his economy drive. Having been continually admonished by their church leaders to be frugal and avoid debt, Utah's Mormon citizens could enthusiastically, even religiously, support the same admonition from an elected official.

But the issue was considerably more complicated than most people realized. Although small property owners felt a kinship to Lee because he saved them small amounts of money, it was really the large property owner, or more particularly, the corporation that received the greatest benefit. For instance, in 1948 the estimated property tax paid to the Uniform School Fund in Salt Lake County by Kennecott Copper Company was $897,847; by 1952, when the mill levy had been eliminated, Kennecott paid nothing at all. If that levy had been sustained at 8 mills Kennecott would have paid $1,079,516 in 1952 and by 1957, $1,992,634.37 In 1952 the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad estimated that Lee had saved the company $127,261.47, compared with its 1951 assessment. Over a period of five years this figure ballooned to $763,568.35, without even considering increased assessed valuation.

Additional revenue was lost because of Lee's changes in individual income tax laws: increasing exemptions for dependents from $300 to $600 and new, simplified tax forms. The changes were retroactive to 1952 tax figures, meaning that a tax reduction of $6.5 milion per year was given Utah's taxpayers. The total reduction over four years was approximately $26,000,000.

In his study of Lee's financial policies Floyd Wilcox estimated that $47,000,000, a figure he regarded as conservative, was lost in revenue to the state from all sources during 1951-56.38 In later years Lee conceded the loss of revenue but viewed it from a different perspective: My contention is, and I can prove my point and he (Wilcox) can't prove his, that a corporation doesn't pay one dollar of tax—to anybody! The corporations collect it from the consumer! Remember that! The only thing that makes a corporation be fair with the public is competition. That's the only thing. You can have all the rules and regulations that 76

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you want, but competition is the lifeblood of saving people money.39 In Lee's opinion, taxes control people while competition protects them: "The federal government is taxing the corporations so much now that most of them are getting subsidies. The consumer pays every dollar of tax." Therefore, Lee concluded, Wilcox was right when he spoke of lost revenue to government, "but it wasn't the corporations that benefited, it was the people that benefited!"40 What Lee failed to consider is this: if government is receiving decreased revenue from the corporations, it is also dispensing fewer services to the people. In the meantime, the corporations grow richer at the expense of the consumer and with the encouragement of the government. Lee's economy program must be viewed as a boon to the corporation rather than to the individual taxpayer.

Wilcox also concluded that Lee's prime purpose was "to keep the cost of government down even if it meant sacrificing the quality of services which citizens demand of their government."

Wilcox was convinced that more building construction during the Lee years would have saved the state money. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, prices of materials and hourly earnings in building construction nearly tripled between 1940 and 1958, increasing at a rate of almost 6 percent per year.41 The buildings completed after Lee left office cost the state nearly triple the amount they would have had they been constructed earlier, a fact that Lee afterward realized: "But who's to know that? See, I didn't know the government would actually keep cheapening our money until it became valueless."42 In 1952 DeMar Teuscher, Desert News politicial editor, analyzed Lee's contribution to Utah politics with ambivalence; he was a political paradox who stepped on more toes in a shorter time than any other political figure in the state's history. Lee's administration was marked each year by a surplus in state funds, gained, according to critics, by a "ruthless disregard for the needs of the state agencies." Lee's supporters argued that the surpluses came "as a result of an efficient, sound administration." Teuscher concluded that "Time alone will tell who is right."43 77

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Later, from a perspective of twenty-two years, Teuscher declared that Lee was "not really a good governor," for he kept such a tight rein on spending that the postwar boom did not even occur in Utah.44 On the other hand, O. N. Malmquist, former Tribune political editor, viewed Lee's economizing favorably: "A tightwad for awhile is a good thing—and then you loosen up."

According to Malmquist, when George Clyde followed Lee in office he loosened up and made a creditable record—but only because of Lee's surpluses.45 In Lee's own opinion he accomplished more in his time as mayor of Price, mayor of Salt Lake City, and governor than any other official: All you gotta do is look at the record. What was done while I was in? Take Price. In all the years since I left office they've never had as many improvements in that city as when I was in for 12 years. And you can't name a 12 year period in all the history of Salt Lake City when they've had as much advancement as they had during that period. And of course, up until the time I left office as Governor, they've never had a governor who had as many improvements in a 25 year period as we had in an 8 year period. Now, how much advancement do you need! I don't take credit for all of it, but I think you had good times.40 Lee vetoed an increase in his own salary his first year in office; but in 1953 the legislature tied a salary hike for state employees to a raise for the governor. He felt compelled to allow it to become law, or all state employees would suffer while he was fighting for a principle. That is the only time he voted for his own pay raise—from $7,500 to $10,000 ("$7,500 is not very much for a governor"). Nevertheless, Lee always believed it wrong for an official to raise his own salary, unless the law became effective after the next election. He refused to raise his own salary and refused to use a $2,000 yearly expense account in his twelve years as mayor of Salt Lake City—a savings to the city of $24,000. He believed that an official could not ask people to sacrifice unless he intended to do so himself. "You can't tell a child not to smoke— and then smoke—or tell him not to swear —and then swear."47 78

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Lee was consistent in his battle for economy and successful in his effort to attain it. Much of his national recognition resulted from that record. Utah newspapers supported his cause, and economically minded Utahns found it difficult to criticize him even when he exasperated them. Lee set the example by trying to economize himself—on his office expenses, his home, his style of living, his salary. The public knew that he was not living in luxury or getting rich off the public trough while he was insisting that they sacrifice.

But the gnawing suspicion remains that most of the public failed to realize that Utah's economy was healthy without sacrifices and probably would have remained so. Economy may be a good practice, but in this instance it was not dictated by the exigencies of the moment. Besides, Lee's brand of economy proved detrimental to the progress of the state and to state services, especially education. Economy cost the state time and money and led to an effort to catch up during the administrations of George D. Clyde and Calvin L. Rampton. It engendered unnecessary conflicts in state agencies from which reverberations are still heard. Economy in this case was divisive, holding the state back in crucial ways that could never be justified by appeals to sacrifice or patriotism.

79

J. BRACKEN LEE !J. Bracken Lee's Address to the Legislature, January 12, 1951, complete text as published in Deseret News.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid. r >SaltLake Tribune, January 13, 1951, editorial. ^Deseret News, January 14, 1951.

'Salt Lake Telegram, January 13, 1951. *Senate Journal, 29th Legislature, as quoted in Wilcox, "The Major Financial Policies," p. 28.

9 "Education to Leeward," Newsweek, March 12, 1951, p. 45.

10 House Journal, 29th Legislature, pp. 1061-68.

"Salt Lake Telegram, March 14, 1951.

12 Wilcox, "The Major Financial Policies," p. 34.

13 Moley, "Utah's Governor Shows Road to Economy."

"Lee to State Sen. Lorenzo E. Elggren, July 28, 1951, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

15 Elggren and State Sen. Edward Watson to Lee, August 28, 1951, ibid.

"Salt Lake Telegram, April 23, 1951.

"Ibid. ^Deseret News, October 2, 1951.

"Salt Lake Tribune, February 7, 1952, editorial.

20 Senate Journal, 29th Legislature, as quoted in Wilcox, "The Major Financial Policies," pp. 35, 36.

21 Utah Foundation, "Utah State Government Financial Summary," Research Report no. 51, as quoted in Wilcox, "The Major Financial Policies," p. 37.

22 R. K. Bradford, vice-president, Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad, to Lee, November 17, 1952, Lee Letter File, Utah State Archives.

23 J. Bracken Lee's Address to the Legislature, January 13, 1953, complete text as published in Deseret News-Telegram, January 13, 1953.

2i Salt Lake Tribune, January 14, 1953; Deseret News-Telegram, January 28, 1953.

25 House Journal, 30th Legislature, as quoted in Wilcox, "The Major Financial Policies," pp. 42, 43.

26 Ibid., p. 45.

27 Deseret News-Telegram, March 27, 1953.

28 House Journal, 30th Legislature, as quoted in Wilcox, "The Major Financial Policies," pp. 45, 46.

29 Deseret News-Telegram, August 3, 1953.

30 Deseret News-Telegram, November 9, 1953. sl Deseret News-Telegram, February 18, 1955, editorial.

32 House Journal, 31st Legislature, as quoted in Wilcox, "The Major Financial Policies," pp. 54-57.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid., pp. 57, 58.

35 Deseret News, March 17, 1955.

36 Former State Treasurer Sharp M. Larsen to Floyd Wilcox, August 13, 1968, as quoted in Wilcox, "The Major Financial Policies," p. 69. Lee said he left a surplus of $21 million and over $50 million in special funds that were

80

ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT II untouched. He recalled that some people thought the surplus was only $17 million, meaning they did not count the $4 million won in back taxes from a suit against Kennecott Copper. Lee interview.

37 Wilcox, "The Major Financial Policies," p. 92.

38 Ibid., pp. 91-93.

39 Lee interview.

4 ÂťIbid.

"Wilcox, "The Major Financial Policies," pp. 90, 91.

42 Lee interview.

43 M. DeMar Teuscher, "The Political Paradox," Intermountain Industry, March 1952, p. 33.

"Telephone interview with M. DeMar Teuscher, Washington, D.C., April 19, 1974.

45 Malmquist interview.

Significantly, former Democratic National Committeeman Wayne L. Black agreed with Malmquist, claiming that "Every county, state, and city needs a Brack Lee once in a while—this state and city needed Bracken Lee." Yet, Black recognized problems, noting that "Brack was against everything" and made budget decisions with a "broad brush," applying the red pencil freely. In fact, it was a "fetish with him to attempt to be fiscally sound." Black called Democratic Gov. Calvin Rampton the fiscal champion of Utah because he had economic and financial knowledge that Lee did not have. Thus, Rampton was a "great governor," while Lee was "a very good governor." In Black's opinion, Lee would rank sscond to Rampton in fiscal affairs because Rampton considered each program intimately, individually, and in balance while Lee simply cut across the board. Black interview.

46 Lee interview.

47 Ibid. An article in the Ogden Standard-Examiner, November 5, 1954, supports Lee's contention that his salary was raised from $7,500 to $10,000, effective January 1954.

81

7

Hatred for Lawyers: Parnell Black and the Taylor Case Shortly after his election Lee tried to force out several holdover appointees from the Maw administration, the most prominent examples being J. Fred Pingree and Milton B. Taylor, members of the Finance Commission. In requesting their resignations Lee said, "They have one viewpoint, I have another." Pingree, whose term was slated to expire in 1951, chose not to contest it because he believed that he served at the governor's pleasure. However, the law provided only that a commissioner could be removed "for cause." Taylor, whose term ran until March 1953, claimed that he first heard of the resignation request in the newspapers and angrily refused to submit it.1 On January 3, 1950, Lee fired him and appointed George Mason in his place. Taylor, an idealistic, liberal Democrat, took court action to force Lee to prove wrongdoing, which he was confident was impossible. In an effort to make the dismissal stick Lee made a list of alleged "irregularities" in bond transactions and public investments made over Taylor's signature, claiming these "were not in the best interests of the state."2 Insisting that the charges were ridiculous, Taylor hired Parnell Black as his attorney, and they met with Lee and his attorneys in a pretrial hearing. Cliff Ashton, attorney for Lee, described Taylor's suit as "political quackery and clap-trap," and Black accused the governor of "despotic action."3 Lee's counsel let it be known that Lee intended to make the ouster stick no matter what the court decided,4 which seemed a virtual admission of a weak case. Predictably, District Court Judge Will L. Hoyt ruled that Lee lacked sufficient cause to oust Taylor, ordered him reinstated as a member of the commission, and ruled that the appointment of George Mason was null and void. Black prepared writs providing for Taylor's return to the state payroll, 83

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for back salaries, and for enjoining Lee and the other two commissioners from interfering with Taylor in the performance of his duties."

Refusing to give up, Lee appealed to the Utah State Supreme Court, which, in January 1951, unanimously upheld the district court order. Justice George Latimer said that the high court was unable to find evidence in the record to sustain Lee's conclusion that Taylor "should be removed for cause." The court was not persuaded by charges that Taylor had acted inappropriately in approving purchases of bonds from a private firm at premium charges.0 The high court also observed that Taylor had been appointed only eight and a half months before the change in administration and was placed on a commission where a pattern was fully developed. Therefore, he was performing his duties in a way that was acceptable to the commission. The justices declared that "fraud, dishonesty or a plain violation of a statutory provision" were not involved.7 The decision of the supreme court effectively ended the case, and Taylor served out the remainder of his term. With surprising candor, Lee later concluded that the court was right in saying there was insufficient cause. "I thought I had it. But I found that cause has to be more than just disliking a man." When he was reinstated, Taylor "just sat there for two years and didn't do anything but read the newspaper" because Lee refused to give him anything to do.8 The Taylor case accurately reflected Lee's penchant for personal confrontation that led to numerous dismissals and feuds during his political career, and it accentuated the continuing feud between Lee and Parnell Black dating back to Price and the liquor problem. After Black won the Taylor case he decided to challenge the power of Lee's governorship through a race for the state senate. As Salt Lake County Democratic chairman he was responsible for finding capable Democrats to run for available positions. Unfortunately, in 1950, he was unable to produce a candidate for the Salt Lake County seat, and so he decided to run himself "to fill out the ticket."9 Since he wanted a referendum on Lee's performance in office more than he wanted the 84

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senate seat, he purchased radio time to attack Lee's leadership.

Lee characterized his platform as being "I'm against everything that Lee is for,"10 but Black phrased it more positively—"A vote for me is a vote against the governor.'"1 Convinced that Black was "pledged to destroy" his economy program, Lee worked tirelessly for his defeat.12 In fact, he became so disturbed that he bought air time to tell "the truth" about Black.

I called him Pemell—his name was Parnell. I used his name two or three times—and I found out the next day he was madder'n hell, cause I mispronounced his name. So from then on, I mispronounced it deliberately] I didn't know any better the first time.13 Lee told his listeners that he would like to answer Black at least once each week if his supporters would help defray the cost.

"I got so much money it was amazing!" He charged that while Black pretended to help the laboring man through his law practice, "I wanna tell ya how he skins the laboring man in his law firm!"14 They proceeded to argue on radio about some of Black's personal injury cases, Lee claiming that Black had not charged fair fees while Black presented witnesses who testified to the opposite. "It was really a show! I think everybody in the state was listening to it," asserted Lee. He accused Black of accepting a retainer from the liquor commission without earning it and accepting a Smith and Wesson pistol for services he had never rendered. According to Lee, critics began calling Black "Pistol Packin' Pete."15 Black defended his role as chief counsel for the Liquor Control Commission, saying that he had resigned when he became state Democratic chairman in 1940. Rejecting Lee's charge that he was on "a gravy train," Black added, "My practice professionally is as completely independent of the wishes, and whims, needs and desires of the corporate wealth of this state as are my politics." After accusing Lee of sending representatives to examine court records at state expense to obtain information about supposed irregularities, he invited him to his office to examine 85

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records. Black insisted that his own record as a lawyer for the poor and disadvantaged was "unequaled" by any other lawyer in Utah.10 Admitting that he charged fees for his services, he maintained that they had always been reasonable. Black charged that the taste of "political gravy" could not be "entirely unfamiliar" to Lee, especially in the form of bonds and insurance while he was mayor of Price and in the form of a mansion and a Cadillac while he was governor.17 When a verdict was rendered in the Taylor case, Lee expressed frustration at being unable to stop such dishonesty in government. He spoke of the ease with which he could have enriched himself as governor: "But if that is the kind of governor you want, count me out."18 Black referred to this statement as a "classic in hypocrisy" and reminded his listeners that Lee's loss of the Taylor case had proved that the courts would "protect the ordinary citizen against oppression and despotism." He interpreted Lee's decision to debate him on radio and engage in "personal vilification" as a compliment.10 Lee charged in the debates that Black's law firm, Wallace, Rawlings, and Black, had acquired wealth through politics.

On the other hand, Calvin Rawlings freely admitted that the firm enjoyed notable success, especially through personal injury cases against the railroad and through antitrust cases; but he firmly denied that politics played a role.20 According to Lee, all three partners were heavily involved in Democratic politics; in fact, if one wanted the state or county chairman or national committeeman of either political party, one could contact him by calling Wasatch 2100: "They were all out of the same law firm."

Lee frequently told his version of "The Three Little Pigs": "If you put Wallace, Rawlings, and Black in a barrel and you rolled 'em down a hill, there'd be a son of a bitch on top all the time!"21 One of Lee's principal goals in debating Black was to convince the voters of the importance of electing a cooperative legislature to enable him to reduce taxes. But Black's response to Lee's promise of tax reduction was heated; he asked Lee to tell "the ordinary wage earner" how much he would save in taxes.

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While you tell him what he will gain, why don't you reveal how much your program of tax reduction would save for the Kennecott Copper, the American Smelting and Refining Company, the railroads, the banks, and the other great corporations of this state, and how much tax savings would find their way into the pockets of those whose incomes are in excess of $25,000 per year?22 He contended that taxpayers' money should not be saved at the expense of "human needs" nor at the "expense of a sound and adequate educational system." Finally, he accused Lee of smear tactics and compared him to the war horse described in Job: "The Glory of his nostrils is terrible, his neck is clothed with thunder, and he swalloweth the ground with fierceness and rage." He called Lee a dirty politician and the only man he had ever known who had "reached the heights of political preferment on a program of character assassination, vilification, and misrepresentation."23 Black, an idealist, regarded Lee as a demagogue, full of hate and contempt for the established order and for the law itself.24 Lee managed to drop his obsession with Black long enough to criticize national and local leaders as well as the national Democratic party. Speaking over a seven-station state network, he called Sen. Elbert D. Thomas "a stooge, who has been too long associated with the reds, the pinks, and the fellow travelers" and then accused the "Democratic bosses" of rendering "lip service to Russia to the point where we are threatened with encirclement by the same Communist forces."25 Lee watched Black deliver his final radio speech of the campaign the night before the election through a studio glass partition. Black began the speech facing Lee, then he turned his back and according to Lee, "he never said one word about me—he spent all his time quotin' the Bible, and prayin' to God—and he got beat too."20 Black was defeated, even though he had led his ticket in the October primaries. In the final election he trailed the other two Democratic candidates for the state senate, and the Republicans almost made a clean sweep of Salt Lake County.

Lee's energetic campaign had paid off at the polls.27 87

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It was a major risk for an incumbent governor to spend so much of his time debating a single candidate for the state senate, for had Black been elected, Lee might have suffered personal humiliation. That Black would be complimented by Lee's barrages is understandable, for they indicated that his candidacy seriously worried Lee. They also indicated that Lee's anger against Black was still fueled by legal battles dating back to the Price years.

In a reasoned analysis of Lee's feud with his father, Wayne L. Black asserted that Lee's hatred of lawyers originated with the Taylor case and other attempts he made to "clean out Democrats." According to Black, when his father successfully defended Taylor, Lee finally realized that he could not confront the judiciary in a head-on fashion. Afterward, he blamed lawyers for his own inability to eliminate employees he had wanted to fire, and he launched his now familiar tirades against the legal profession.28 Perhaps Lee made such a gigantic effort to bury Black at the polls because he could not defeat him in the courts. His feud with Taylor and Black was symbolic of his bitterness and distrust of the legal profession, which intensified in later years.

Lee addressed an Institute of Government seminar at the University of Utah in 1972 and concluded that "the foundation for the breakdown of the constitutional form of government is being laid down by the law profession." Claiming that "there are many good lawyers, but the good ones are busy making a living," he charged that attorneys in public office did not have records of good management while they were in private practice. Because he thought lawyers were lacking in integrity, he suggested a constitutional amendment requiring them to abandon their membership in the bar before holding public office. He contended that the large numbers of lawyers serving in the nation's legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government had produced a form of government "in which we have only one branch of government—the bar association."20 When he retired as mayor of Salt Lake City, Lee promised that one of his principal targets would continue to be the legal 88

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profession: "My son's a lawyer, but I believe the law profession must bear much of the blame for dragging this country down."30 His famous characterization of an attorney's license as "a license to steal" effectively sums up his bias.

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J. BRACKEN LEE l

Salt Lake Tribune, April 7, 1949.

Deseret News, January 22, 1950.

3 Deseret News, February 2, 1950.

Weseret News, February 24, 1950. *Salt Lake Tribune, March 14, 1950. '^Deseret News, January 14, 1951.

7 See p. 16 of the copy of the decision of the supreme court in the Taylor case in Lee's Gubernatorial Papers.

8 Lee interview.

9 Black interview.

10 Lee interview.

"Salt Lake Tribune, November 8, 1950.

12 Ibid.

13 Lee interview.

"Ibid.

15 Ibid.

"Radio speech of Parnell Black given sometime during October-November 1950, MS in possession of Wayne L. Black.

"Ibid.

"Salt Lake Tribune, March 14, 1950.

19 Black speech.

20 Interview with Calvin W. Rawlings, attorney and former Democratic national committeeman for Utah, July 23, 1972, Salt Lake City. Rawlings called Black "one of the finest trial lawyers in the history of the state" and claimed that his major reason for opposing Lee so vigorously was his conviction that "the common ordinary fella wasn't getting a break" under Lee's administration. "He disliked Bracken Lee with a vengeance." According to Rawlings, when Black began attacking him, Lee became unnerved because he "knew that if Black got up there that he would be a thorn in his side and cause him a lot of trouble. So he took it upon himself to debate Black and destroy his chances of being elected, and this turned into one of the big debates of the campaign."

21 Lee interview. Lee claimed that the law firm was deeply involved in state politics, especially Democratic politics, but that important GOP officials were also associated with the firm.

22 Black speech.

23 Ibid.

24 Black interview.

2 '-Deseret News, September 27, 1950.

2G Lee interview.

21 Salt Lake Tribune, November 8, 1950.

28 Black interview. Parnell Black defended Taylor free of charge.

29 Salt Lake Tribune, June 8, 1972.

30 Deseret News, August 11, 1971.

2

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8 Mormon Church Influence In spite of his key role in Lee's election, J. Reuben Clark, Jr., became much less visible in the day-to-day affairs of the governorship. The church official who communicated most with Governor Lee was a lower-echelon figure, Thorpe B. Isaacson, a member of the LDS Presiding Bishopric.1 Isaacson was a natural choice for the role because of his innate interest in politics. He made numerous attempts to exercise influence, beginning with a letter of congratulations upon Lee's election.

Writing on church stationery, he predicted that Lee would be one of Utah's great governors. Then, he expressed support for Lee's plan to reform the liquor system and with the loaded phrase, "a number of us have discussed it," implied that the General Authorities supported it too. The evidence does not show that Isaacson was acting on behalf of the church when he wrote to Lee, but he seemed to want Lee to believe that he was.2 Lee remembered it as "the most beautiful letter that you could imagine. I prized it, see. I took it home and showed it to my wife. He was a big Church man. Very flattering!" But two months later, Lee found a letter stuck to the top of one of his desk drawers. It had been written by Isaacson to Maw upon his election to the governorship eight years earlier, and "it was almost identical to the one he sent to me." The discovery naturally decreased the value of his own letter, and although Lee became friendly with the politically aware Isaacson, he regarded him with considerably less respect.3 Throughout Lee's two terms, Isaacson's letters continued to be frequent and partisan. Sometimes he spoke in his coveted role as chairman of the Board of Trustees at Utah State Agricultural College. His personal biases against the teaching profession were stronger than Lee's. He opposed teacher salary increases because, 91

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he said, many were already getting more money than they deserved. He did not object to increases for teachers or professors who were outstanding, but he was opposed to flat, acrossthe-board raises because they encouraged "misfit individuals in the profession."4 When a bill to increase teacher salaries reached the legislature, Isaacson wrote a letter to State Sen. Elias Day, urging him to defeat it: "I have just sought counsel this morning, and I believe it is the opinion that now would be a very bad time to raise the taxes of our people. . . "n Isaacson sent a copy of the letter to Lee with an accompanying explanation that he had "talked to authority here this morning, and certainly House Bill 75 should be defeated. . . ."° On the same day, the self-serving Isaacson sent a similar letter to Sen. Marl Gibson in which the phrase was slightly different: "I have just come from a meeting where I asked for counsel and advice from some who I feel can give good counsel." He was allegedly told that it was time to say "no to these school teachers."7 In the note to Lee, Isaacson added, "I sought counsel this morning, and I again can tell you that it is the feeling here that now would be a bad time to raise this tax levy in order to get more money for school teachers' salaries."8 Although the wording was purposefully obscure, the natural assumption was that the First Presidency or others of the General Authorities gave the counsel.

Lee evidently believed that Isaacson was speaking for the church: "I actually don't believe that Thorpe ever did anything without consulting Clark." When Isaacson talked of consulting higher authority or seeking counsel, Lee interpreted it to mean J. Reuben Clark, Jr.0 That explains why Lee could cultivate a relationship with Isaacson even though he did not respect him as highly as he did Clark.

At the 1952 annual convention of the Utah Education Association, Edgar Fuller, executive secretary of the National Council of Chief State School Officers and a graduate of Brigham Young University, called for Lee's defeat in the November elections.

He branded Lee as "the worst enemy of schools among all the governors of the United States."10 Shortly afterward, Fuller 92

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received a letter from the Presiding Bishopric of the church reprimanding him for making a political speech critical of the governor of the state in a church building—the Assembly Hall on Temple Square. Since he believed that Lee's record was well known throughout the nation, Fuller was surprised that the bishopric would be "embarrassed" by his comments. He pointed out that the Assembly Hall had been used before for meetings of a controversial nature and that the Salt Lake Tabernacle had been used only hours after that meeting for a political gathering.11 As a member of the Presiding Bishopric, Isaacson had again used leverage in the name of the church for a political issue and for Lee's protection.

Isaacson frequently requested Lee to make key appointments by sending him grandiose letters, such as one requesting that Lee select a replacement for USAC trustee Matthew Cowley, a deceased apostle. Using his standard request style, Isaacson effusively praised Lee's leadership, claiming that never in the state's history had there been "such an honest government, free from graft or scandal, efficient, better roads, more money for schools," that Lee would always be admired and respected, and that he (Isaacson) was proud of his leadership. Finally, he got to the request; he wanted Cowley replaced with another apostle: "I don't believe anybody would object to such procedure, and I know no one would object to the appointment of Apostle LeGrand Richards." Richards, he said, had supported Lee loyally and had been a Republican all his life.

I do hope we can have him appointed right away. We need him. He will enjoy it. He will be grateful to you, and I know many others will be grateful. As I spoke to you about it before, I sought the counsel of President McKay, and he concurred in this appointment.12 Such an obvious approach irritated Lee, and in this case he chose to defy Isaacson. In a terse reply he expressed confidence in Richards but explained that there were numerous other applications for the vacancy: "I do not believe I will be able to appoint Mr. Richards to this particular vacancy but I will certainly keep 93

Above: Governor Lee's inaugural address, 1949, with Secretary of State Heber Bennion, Jr., and Mrs. Bennion in background. Right: Margaret and J. Bracken Lee with their sons, Richard, seated, and James, and daughter Jon in the Governor's Mansion, 1951.

Left: Lee, George Hansen, Republican National Committee member from Utah, and Herbert Hoover at the 1950 state Republican convenvention. J. Bracken Lee photographs.

Above: Left to right, Edith Garner of the Utah State Welfare Commission, Mrs. Dewey, Mrs. Lee, Lee, Thomas E. Dewey, and Dave Wilson, state Republican chairman, at a Salt Lake railroad station during the 1948 campaign.

Above: Lee and son Richard on vacation in Colorado, 1950. Right: Lee at the 1950 National Governors' Conference in West Virginia.

J. Bracken Lee photographs.

J . BRACKEN LEE

him in mind for the future."13 More than two years later, Lee did appoint Richards to the USAC board.14 Isaacson had been explicit enough to invoke the name of President McKay, something he had carefully avoided in the past. Perhaps a more subtle approach would have been more effective in dealing with Lee. It was obvious that Lee accepted Isaacson as a messenger from the brethren with reluctance, but he did succumb to Isaacson's wishes about other appointments and named several church authorities to governing boards.15 He was not averse to such appointments, as Maw had been.

In fact, Harold Simpson, Lee's press secretary, remembered heavy criticism because university boards were dominated by Mormon appointees. In 1955 he counted an apostle, a member of the Presiding Bishopric, a stake president, and a bishop, all concurrently serving on the Utah State Agricultural College Board of Trustees.10 Ironically, some critics accused Lee of being "anti-Mormon" in his appointments. Lee remembered rumors that "church people" were disturbed because there were not enough Mormons in appointive positions. Through personal research, he discovered that two-thirds of his appointments had gone to Mormons, although he had never asked anyone what his religion was prior to appointment. Lee claimed that he compiled a list of people with their religions and took it to Clark, who disclaimed any interest in such a list and advised, "Don't you hire anybody anywhere unless you trust them."17 The mere compiling of such a list aptly illustrates Lee's desire to please the church.

Although Lee maintained that attempts by General Authorities to influence his appointments and decisions were rare,18 there is considerable evidence to the contrary. During his tenure Apostles Delbert L. Stapley, Henry D. Moyle, and Joseph F. Merrill; Presiding Bishop Joseph L. Wirthlin; and many bishops and stake presidents wrote to him frequently about appointments and political issues. Although some of the letters were written in an assertive style on church stationery, none of them purported to represent the whole church. Others were careful to draw the line between church and state by writing the letter on personal stationery and expressing personal motives.

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For instance, when Wirthlin wrote Lee recommending an appointment,19 he did it on personal stationery and made no reference to higher authority. Since Wirthlin was Isaacson's superior in the church hierarchy, this seems especially significant.

Lee responded in standard fashion, as if he were writing to any other citizen.20 Delbert L. Stapley wrote on church stationery to recommend Earl Hunsaker, a friend, to become superintendent of the highway patrol.21 Lee was apparently unimpressed, for he wrote a standard letter to Stapley20 and eventually appointed Joseph Dudler, a former Carbon County sheriff under Lee in Price, to the post.23 Henry D. Moyle wrote to Lee on personal stationery recommending the appointment of Homer Holmgren to the Utah State Supreme Court and concluding that he was also "politically all right."24 Lee responded in noncommital fashion, assuring Moyle that "the number of applicants for this vacancy is considerable,"25 and Holmgren was not appointed. One of the more obvious attempts to influence came from Franklin J. Murdock, president of the Highland Stake and head of Murdock Travel, the firm most readily identifiable with church travel accommodations.

He recommended Judge Leland G. Larsen for the Third Judicial District, saying he had worked closely with him on the stake high council. Murdock promised Lee he would always be "at peace with his conscience" if he did the right thing and said he would watch the appointment with "keen interest."20 It was evidently the wrong approach; Lee failed to comply. J. Leonard Love, a bishop, seemed to have more political clout through his business and social connections than some General Authorities. He complained to Lee about the dismissal of Judge Rulon Clark from the juvenile court, saying he had known him for twenty-five years and it was impossible to place a value on his services.27 Clark was reinstated, and apparently Love's action on his behalf played a heavy role in the decision.

Lee recognized the important difference between persons with high church positions and church leaders who were delegated to speak for the church. He was amenable to requests he interpreted as emanating from the church but resented requests 97

J. BRACKEN LEE

from persons using their church positions to wield personal influence.

Lee believed that President McKay "didn't know anything about politics" and rarely interfered, but he gave great weight to McKay's letters. When members of the Hillside Stake complained about the presence of a liquor store in their neighborhood, McKay requested that the store be moved to another part of the city. Lee discussed the matter with K. M. Doan, chairman of the liquor commission, who became irritated and, according to Lee, "bowed his neck against the church."28 McKay, however, was tolerant of the delay, and when the store was moved,29 he complimented Lee for acting "wisely and well"30 and expressed pleasure at Lee's contributions in office, especially in solving the "very perplexing liquor problem." McKay believed that Lee had "won the confidence of every clear-thinking person in the state."31 The liquor store issue was the predictable case of the church injecting itself into politics because of a moral issue so clear that intermediaries were unnecessary. Lee had no need to doubt that this was the church itself making the request, with David O. McKay as spokesman, even though many individual church leaders voiced strong feelings.32 In 1953 Lee was forced to deal with the controversial issue of Sunday closing. A bill was introduced in the legislature providing for the closing on Sunday of all places of business except those that dispensed services or provided activities necessary to health and life. Its intent was approved by the Utah Council of Churches and the Salt Lake Ministerial Association, meaning that Protestants as well as Mormons strongly supported it. The bill was passed by the legislature, six to one in the house and nearly two to one in the senate.33 In spite of such convincing support, Lee vetoed it, arguing that such legislation must be "beneficial to all the people, without prejudice or discrimination to the few." He believed that Seventh Day Adventists, Jewish groups, and others whose views of the Sabbath were markedly different from other Christian denominations, as well as the neighborhood grocer and other merchants who had to depend on Sunday employment, would be 98

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discriminated against. "Social legislation is necessary in some cases," he asserted, "but there is truth in the axiom that you cannot legislate the morals of the people."34 The Deseret News attacked Lee for offending "the great majority of Utah's citizens." The editors said that most states had Sunday closing laws (thirty-one plus the District of Columbia) and that Utah, "of all states," must "remain one of the very few places in America where a man has to work on Sunday unnecessarily in order to hold his job." The News concluded that Lee had made a mistake and urged the legislature to override the veto.3" But the legislators were influenced by the governor and the veto was sustained. Lee had offended the Mormon church on what its leaders interpreted as a clear moral issue.

The veto marked the first decline in his church support.

The following year, in an effort to mend church fences and support his economy drive, Lee tried to transfer Weber, Snow and Dixie junior colleges to the church, which had formerly owned and operated them but had deeded them to the state in the 1930s. Saying that a transfer would take a heavy burden off the state educational system, Lee praised the church's record in education and suggested the change would be beneficial to the colleges themselves. President McKay reluctantly agreed, promising that the church would take them rather than see them close.

He said that acceptance of the obligation to operate the colleges (amounting to $1,000,000 per year) was sufficient and valid consideration and price for the transfer but that the church would still pay an amount considered to be fair and equitable. He promised that the colleges would be operated just as they had been in the past, with salaries, sabbaticals, tuition, and so on remaining the same to avoid interference with normal operations and individual students. McKay pledged, in answer to critics, that they would not be transformed into "religious seminaries."30 Accused by some people of suggesting the transfer "merely for votes," an angry Lee pointed out that he had vetoed the Sunday closing bill, even though it was desired by the church, and a bill to grant Brigham Young University power of eminent domain.37 He was so disturbed by the charge that he sent a copy 99

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of a critical letter he had received to President McKay with his own answer enclosed. He wanted to be sure that McKay did not think he was pushing the transfer for political reasons. McKay replied that he too resented the insinuation that Lee had selfish or ulterior motives.

Whenever a person makes such an accusation, even by innuendo, as that made . . . against you, I cannot help but doubt his own integrity. I should put him in the class with the man who said, "There isn't an honest man in the World."

Unthinkingly, he makes an admission that he, himself, is dishonest.38 The transfer never took place. Although the bill was approved by the legislature and signed by the governor, it was tied to a referendum ballot, and Utah voters rejected it.39 The result fully illustrates the independence of Utah voters, even when the president of the church may be involved. Yet, Lee no doubt believed that he had successfully patched a sagging relationship with the church in the wake of his Sunday closing veto.

From time to time Lee received communications from a number of General Authorities on other, less important topics.

Bishop Wirthlin wrote in praise of a speech Lee delivered in Washington, D.C., while presenting a statue of Brigham Young to the nation. Wirthlin was impressed with Lee's reference to Young standing for individualism rather than collectivism in the presence of the vice-president and Sen. Elbert D. Thomas, a Democrat.40 Lee said that he believed every word he had uttered, even though it "did not sit well with some of the Washington New Dealers."41 Henry D. Moyle expressed his feelings about various bills of reapportionment, none of which he supported, on the grounds that they would give Salt Lake County ultimate control of the legislature. However, he painstakingly identified these as his own personal views, presented in an unofficial capacity, and specifically requested Lee to refrain from publicizing them.42 Thorpe Isaacson was not Lee's lone supporter on educational policy. Himself an educator. Apostle Joseph F. Merrill wrote a private letter to Lee on church letterhead, expressing detailed 100

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views and support. Merrill believed that the state institutions of higher learning were already spending more money than was necessary to educate effectively. He praised former University of Utah President George Thomas but criticized President A. Ray Olpin for his ambitious desire to make the school one of the country's outstanding universities. He thought it was economically impossible for Utah to gratify Olpin's ambition. Merrill insisted that there were a far greater number of courses offered in the state universities than were necessary to meet the requirements of 98 percent of the students. It was, he said, unreasonable to ask economically small Utah to do what Harvard, Chicago, Columbia, and other great universities were doing. He also expressed sympathy for Lee in his conflict with Superintendent of Public Instruction E. Allen Bateman but noted that he was writing a personal letter: "My position does not permit me to indulge in a public discussion of the question."43 While Lee enjoyed church support in 1944, 1948, and again in 1952, he definitely lost it in 1956. He became critical of Eisenhower, who was revered by many Mormons, and much of the support faded. The veto of the Sunday closing law was indeed damaging, and by 1955 his relationship with church authorities was tenuous. In 1956 church support went to Republican George Dewey Clyde for the governorship instead of to Lee, and Clyde was elected. Lee believed that the erosion of support actually began when McKay became president of the church and made Stephen L. Richards his first counselor. That choice meant that Clark would be moved from first to second counselor. According to Lee, "When McKay demoted Clark and put in a man named Richards, a life-long Democrat, I noticed a difference.

The support started to fade. When I didn't get that support for the Senate, I went to Clark, and asked him what happened.

He said he couldn't tell me. He said, T don't have any influence in the Church any more.' "44 J. Reuben Clark, Jr., did have a reciprocal respect for Lee, as evidenced by a letter he wrote to him upon his election as mayor of Salt Lake City. He began by saluting him as "Mr. Mayor," complaining that he must abandon the former address 101

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of governor. Lee had just sent him a handwritten Christmas letter of appreciation, and apparently Clark was moved by its contents because he expressed deep appreciation for a very great friendship, which included Lee's wife and children for whom Clark had "deep affection." Hoping he could refer to Lee familiarly as "Bracken," Clark requested a favor concerning a piece of property on First South Street in Salt Lake City that the church wanted to purchase from the city. Applying some gentle pressure, Clark said he always kept Lee's confidences, "but I did tell the Brethren that you had assured me orally that you would do whatever you might do for us within the law."45 In spite of Lee's statement, "Clark never once asked me for anything," Clark was clearly exacting a price for the help he had offered Lee in past years. Then he closed with more niceties: Again for all of your kindly protestations which I know are honest, of friendship and affection for me, I am most grateful, and mine come to you in return, and I assure you that the friendship which I have for you has never dimmed and I shall hope never to do anything that will make it dim and I receive with great joy your promise that the same situation is true of yourself.

God bless you Brother Lee, with every blessing He has that is necessary for you to possess and enjoy in this great responsibility which now comes to you.40 Hoping that Clark would continue to "honor" him by addressing him as "Bracken," Lee claimed that he had too much respect for him to address him as anything but "President Clark." He conscientiously explained that he was doing everything possible to meet Clark's request about the land sale and promised to expedite the matter.47 In this instance, Lee wanted very much to assist the church. Clark's request was clearly golden; since 1948 Clark and Lee had successfully maintained a "special relationship." Lee managed to make all the necessary arrangements for the sale within one month from the date he had received the letter from Clark.48 Lee was criticized for advertising the property only one week.

He claimed that he had done so on advice from the city attorney and a number of other Salt Lake attorneys in whom he had 102

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confidence. He was also criticized for assigning the police department temporary quarters for almost one year instead of retaining the property while the new building was being constructed. He hurried the sale arrangements to please the church, even though he admitted to some "misgivings about being rushed." There was one consolation: the new court and police buildings could be built out of present funds, without additional taxes.49 Lee cultivated church support while he was Salt Lake's mayor, even though he believed that it was less crucial in governing the city. It was easier, Lee thought, for a non-Mormon to be elected to office in Salt Lake City than to be elected to a state office.50 As mayor he seemed braver at initiating action with Mormon authorities. He discovered that the church was not proceeding with original plans to build a junior college on the property of Forest Dale Golf Course, which the church had earlier purchased from the city. Lee thought that the property should revert to the city at the same price the church paid for it but with reasonable interest. He even suggested to President McKay that if he did not intend to comply, that a clause be inserted into the deed saying that a junior college must be built on the land or it would automatically revert to the city.51 His strong stand was ultimately rewarded. The repurchase was accomplished, Lee winning his point, and the church authorities agreeing to return the land to the city without profit but with a reasonable interest.52 When asked about the importance of the church in his political career, Lee wryly commented that it was about as important as the Catholic church in Boston or the Baptist church in Texas.

He said that an antichurch candidate could not get elected to any office. According to Lee, church officials often prefer nonMormons to Mormons, and non-Mormon governors have generally treated the church more kindly.53 The latter statement may be an exaggeration, but the evidence suggests that church leaders do prefer politicians who clearly recognize the role of the LDS church as Utah's most important interest group. Some Mormon politicians, such as Maw, have had difficulty maintaining an effective working rela103

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tionship because they have been afraid of being perceived as puppets of the church. Lee had no such problem. He not only understood the role of the church in politics, but he recognized the vital need to cultivate the relationship.

Lee's experience suggests that church influence in politics is an unquestioned reality, even though its form varies. When the First Presidency exerts pressure on a political leader because of a moral issue, the influence is overt and unmistakable. The brethren clearly represent the institution. Sometimes the First Presidency exerts quiet influence intended to protect the church or promote its growth, such as in land sales and ordinances.

Often there are educational, economic, or social issues about which the First Presidency takes no overt stand and about which other church leaders disagree. On these, the First Presidency purposely remains silent but allows other church leaders to make private, personal efforts to influence politicians. Some of these personal efforts may be sanctioned by higher church authority or a higher church authority may have even suggested that the letter or phone call be made, but great care is exercised by church authorities to avoid the appearance of intentional influence. The church does not wish to be regarded as such a dominant political force in Utah that church and state will be regarded as one.

Although there are interesting pieces of evidence, it is impossible to prove, for instance, that Thorpe Isaacson exerted pressure on Governor Lee under direct authority from the First Presidency. Isaacson undoubtedly requested opinions or "counsel" from other church authorities to carry to the governor. It seems undeniable that he wished to leave the impression that he was speaking for the church. Governor Lee accepted that, and the product was church influence. In this case, Isaacson was interpreted by Lee to be the emissary of J. Reuben Clark, Jr., and, hence, the institution. Lee took the influence seriously, even though he occasionally chafed under it and sometimes rejected it.

His enormous success in Utah politics must be equated with his ability to create that special relationship between church officials and himself.

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MORMON CHURCH INFLUENCE 1 Isaacson was later made an assistant to the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles (1964) and finally a counselor in the First Presidency (1965). He was the fourth counselor and Joseph Fielding Smith the third counselor, both called due to David O. McKay's failing health.

2 Thorpe B. Isaacson to Lee, November 3, 1948, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

3 Lee interview. Maw did not have any recollection of the letter. Maw interview.

4 Isaacson to Lee, January 11, 1951, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

5 Isaacson to State Sen. Elias L. Day, February 2, 1951, ibid.

"Isaacson to Lee, February 2, 1951, ibid. In a postscript he requested that "if it isn't too much trouble, Bracken," would Lee accompany him to the office of Apostle Joseph F. Merrill sometime to discuss education and the problems of the University of Utah. He assured Lee that it would do his "heart good."

'Isaacson to State Sen. Marl D. Gibson, February 2, 1951, ibid.

8 Isaacson to Lee, February 2, 1951, ibid.

9 Lee interview.

"Logan Herald-Journal, October 12, 1952.

"Edgar Fuller to Presiding Bishopric, October 20, 1952, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

12 Isaacson to Lee, December 23, 1953, ibid.

13 Lee to Isaacson, December 29, 1953, ibid.

"Appointment Document, February 26, 1956, to July 1, 1957, ibid.

15 For instance, Lee named Alma Sonne, assistant to the Twelve, to the Board of Trustees at Utah State almost immediately after Isaacson's request.

(Isaacson to Lee, January 20, 1955; Lee to Isaacson, January 25, 1955, ibid.)

He had also appointed Matthew Cowley to the same board. (Lee to Quayle Cannon, Jr., secretary of the Utah State Senate, March 11, 1953, ibid.) Lee appointed Richard L. Evans, an apostle, to the University of Utah Board of Regents. (Lee to Cannon, March 16, 1955, ibid.) Additional Lee appointments included: J. Reuben Clark, Jr., as chairman of This Is the Place Monument Commission; Apostle John A. Widtsoe, as member of the Utah Water and Power Board; Apostle Harold B. Lee, as member of the Utah Civil Defense Council; Levi Edgar Young, president of the First Council of Seventy, as board member of the Utah State Historical Society; David L. McKay, son of David O. McKay, as board member of the Utah State Institute of Fine Arts: Albert R. Bowen, son of Apostle Albert E. Bowen, to the University of Utah Board of Regents: Selvoy J. Boyer, former president of the LDS British Mission, as member of the Utah State Tax Commission; O. J. Wilkinson, president of Murray LDS Stake, as member of the Utah State Highway Patrol Civil Service Commission. (See Lee to Raymond Taylor, April 22, 1952, ibid.)

10

Harold W. Simpson to Frank Jonas, March 15, 1955, ibid.

Lee interview. Lee told Ray Taylor that eighteen of his commissioners were Mormons and eleven were not. He hoped this would end the "whispering campaign" that he was anti-Mormon; he expressed his great admiration for the Mormon people and the church. Lee to Taylor.

18 Lee interview.

19 LDS Presiding Bishop Joseph L. Wirthlin to Lee, February 5, 1953, Lee Gubernatorial Papers. Wirthlin recommended the appointment of D. G. Nelson, Jr., to the Utah State Highway Commission, saying that anything Lee could do would be appreciated by him personally. He also commended Lee for the "fine work" he had done.

20 Since Isaacson was a counselor to Wirthlin in the Presiding Bishopric, it could be supposed that Wirthlin would carry more weight with Lee than Isaacson. Obviously, such was not the case.

17

105

J. BRACKEN LEE 21

Delbert L. Stapley to Lee, June 30, 1952, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

Lee to Stapley, July 14, 1952, ibid.

23 Logan Herald-Journal, November 21, 1952.

24 Henry D. Moyle to Lee, November 6, 1953, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

25 Lee to Moyle, November 9, 1953, ibid.

2G Franklin J. Murdock to Lee, July 2, 1956, ibid.

27 J. Leonard Love to Lee, June 24, 1949, ibid.

28 Lee interview.

29 Lee to David O. McKay, October 13, 1949, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

Lee claimed that several prominent Mormons were frequenting liquor stores and that Doan had obtained cards on a stake president and a bishop and members of the bishopric of the area who had allegedly been buying liquor on the west side of the city. Lee concluded that it was "embarrassing as hell," because Doan accused these people of being too cowardly to buy liquor from a nearby store so their neighbors could witness it. Lee interview.

30 McKay to Lee, October 31, 1949, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

31 McKay to Lee, December 7, 1949, ibid. McKay said that Lee's integrity was unquestioned and commended him on his instruction that no liquor be served at Christmas parties in the Utah State Capitol. Lee agreed that the use of liquor at such gatherings not only degraded the capitol but the officeholder as well. Lee to McKay, December 8, 1949, ibid.

32 Lee was commended by members of the bishopric of the Mountain View Ward, speaking "as members and property owners." They were grateful to Lee for support in their desire to maintain high standards for their community and family life. (Paul Newmeyer, Homer Holmgren, and Ralph E. Smith to Lee, May 20, 1950, ibid.)

C. H. Parker, president of the Hillside LDS Stake, followed suit, saying he had made it known to the people that Lee had supported them in moving the store. The people, he said, appreciated his integrity and would support him because of adherence to principle. (Parker to Lee, May 21, 1950, ibid.)

Lee also received several other letters relating to various phases of liquor sales from church leaders. For instance, the Sharon LDS Stake presidency wrote concerning their unhappiness with the liquor commission's granting of a permit for a liquor agency in Orem. (Stake presidency to Lee, April 11, 1949, ibid.) The presidency of the North Davis LDS Stake protested efforts to liberalize the liquor law and the locker practice in private clubs by permitting the dispensing of liquor over the bar at such clubs. (Stake presidency to Lee, February 21, 1949, ibid.)

33 Deseret News, February 17, 1953.

3i Deseret News, February 16, 1953.

35 Deseret News, February 17, 1953, editorial.

3C David O. Mckay, Stephen L. Richards, and J. Reuben Clark, Jr., First Presidency, to Lee, May 21, 1954, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

"Lee to Clyde S. Johnson, attorney, Vernal, Utah, November 4, 1954, ibid.

38 McKay to Lee, November 9, 1954, ibid.

39 State of Utah, Secretary of State, "Abstract of Elections," November 2, 1954, Election File, ibid; Deseret News, November 2, 1954.

40 Wirthlin to Lee, June 2, 1950, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

"Lee to Wirthlin, June 6, 1950, ibid.

42 Henry D. Moyle to Lee, May 25, 1954, ibid. Letter was on Council of the Twelve letterhead.

"Joseph F. Merrill to Lee, June 6, 1951, ibid.

44 Lee interview.

22

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MORMON CHURCH INFLUENCE Jennings Phillips, Lee's campaign manager in 1956, said that Clark told him, "I've been told to keep my hands out of politics, and as much as I admire the governor—and I'm going to vote for him—I'll do anything for him in private that I can as a citizen, but I cannot interfere in any way. I've been told that I must keep out of this political race." Interview with Jennings Phillips, August 14, 1972, Salt Lake City.

45 J. Reuben Clark Jr., to Lee, January 5, 1960, Lee Mayoralty Papers, Special Collections, Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City.

4C Ibid.

47 Lee to Clark, January 15, 1960, ibid.

48 Taylor H. Merrill, Zion's Securities Corp. (LDS church holding company), to Salt Lake City Commissioners, December 14, 1960, ibid.

49 Lee to John H. Henderson, February 15, 1960, ibid.

50 Lee interview.

51 Lee to McKay, April 20, 1966, Lee Mayoralty Papers.

52 Homer Holmgren, city attorney for Salt Lake City, to Salt Lake City Commission, June 9, 1967, ibid.

53 Lee interview. Lee believed that N. Eldon Tanner of the First Presidency, a Democrat, was the most influential general authority in Utah politics in the early 1970s, giving Democratic candidates an edge. Ezra Taft Benson, Lee maintained, was influential, but the average Latter-day Saint would pay more careful attention to Tanner than to Benson in political matters. If Lee was correct in his assessment, it would probably have been because of Tanner's position in the First Presidency rather than the political party involved. As an example of Tanner's influence, Lee suggested that Democrat Calvin L. Rampton was the "church candidate" in 1972 and that Tanner gave an unmistakable message to Republican opponent Nicholas Strike by presenting Rampton with an award at Brigham Young University before the election.

107

9 Battle with Bateman E. Allen Bateman, a Democrat, became Utah state superintendent of public instruction in 1944, when the post was elective, and was reelected in 1948. He had always contended that the position should not be elective, even campaigning on that platform in 1944; but it was not removed from politics until after the 1948 election. The first major conflict between Bateman and Lee occurred when Lee, as mayor of Price, suggested that the president of Carbon College be dismissed. Since the college was under the jurisdiction of the Department of Public Instruction, Bateman conducted an investigation and found no cause for dismissal. There is reason to believe that when dismissal did not occur, Lee decided that his position as mayor had been circumvented.1 Early in Lee's first term as governor, the two had another serious clash over a $20,000 research fund request. Bateman wanted $10,000 per year allocated for two years to the Research Division of the Department of Public Instruction, but Lee vetoed it. In a test case, a district court held the veto to be invalid; and Clinton Vernon, the attorney general, agreed. When Bateman requested the money from the Finance Commission, Lee refused to allow the commission to make payment. Even though he admitted that Bateman's department was entitled to the funds, Lee was convinced that they could operate effectively without the $20,000 through wise and efficient use of current funds. He tried to pressure Bateman by emphasizing the need to save the taxpayers' money.2 Bateman refused to submit. The issue as he saw it was whether the governor or the legislature had the constitutional authority to make appropriations. If the money was legally available, insisted Bateman, the governor must allow the appropria109

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tion to be made regardless of his own opinion about its wisdom.

Bateman threatened further court action,3 but Lee remained adamant. He argued that the money was not legally available because the opinion of the court was not binding. He rejected Bateman's conclusion that inconvenience or suspension of state services was the responsibility of the governor in case of court action; rather, he believed that it was the responsibility of the department of government that initiated the action.4 But Lee lost the battle. Five months later, the state supreme court upheld a lower court ruling that Bateman was entitled to the $20,000."

A specialist at diversion politics, Lee called for an investigation of the Department of Public Instruction, questioning its efficiency for thinking an additional $20,000 was needed. Even though he recognized its motivation, Bateman welcomed an investigation providing it was impartial and carried out by professionally trained and experienced public school educators.0 Lee proceeded to choose the committee with blatant disregard for the superintendent's suggestion, designating instead people like Thorpe Isaacson, whose extreme views on education paralleled his own, and Marl Gibson of Price, a political crony with no experience in the field and biases similar to Lee's. Three more citizens with no special expertise in education completed the committee: Karl Hopkins of Ogden, Melvin Wilson of Payson, and W. J. O'Connor of Salt Lake City.7 Finally, Lee accused Bateman of unethical conduct and illegal procedure for openly promoting two constitutional amendments with the purpose of removing the superintendent from the political ballot. Bateman believed this was an educational problem rather than a partisan political issue. He admitted having actively worked for adoption of the amendments with the full support of the Utah State Board of Education, and he quoted several portions of the Utah Code to support the ethics of his stand.8 The Lee-Bateman feud was moving toward a major confrontation.

In 1950 Bateman spent six weeks teaching courses in educational administration during the summer session of the University of Southern California. This angered Lee, who thought it unethi110

BATTLE WITH BATEMAN

cal for Bateman to accept a salary in California while continuing to receive his Utah salary. Bateman compared it to a sabbatical taken by university professors and said that the state school staff had a policy allowing directors and supervisors six weeks off with pay every three years in order to teach or attend school. The process enabled administrators to keep abreast of developments in their fields. It had been five and one-half years since he had assumed office, and he had not yet taken advantage of that provision.9 When Lee accused him of spending too much time out of state, Bateman offered to compare his record with the governor's and have them published.10 Bateman attacked Lee for allowing an inefficient and dangerous state car pool system. He claimed that paying employees at the rate of six cents per mile for driving their own cars would be cheaper than the method employed by the state, because it would be paid on a destination-to-destination basis instead of total mileage. However, P. H. Mulcahy, Utah State Finance Commission chairman, claimed that the rate paid was actually four cents and that in two years there had not been a single accident charged to mechanical defects in state-owned cars.11 In 1951 Lee began a series of attacks on the "school lobby" which was trying to convince the legislature of the importance of raising teacher salaries. Lee was opposed to an increase in the state school finance program for economic reasons, contending, in a startling example of overkill, that if it was necessary to choose between the destruction of the schools and the destruction of democracy, he would choose the schools. In his counterattack, Bateman charged that the governor had impugned the motives of educators. Bateman claimed that it was unrealistic to charge the schools with vicious lobbying and ignore the great pressures exerted by the governor's office, by paid professional lobbyists, and other opponents of the schools.

It is especially regretted that the governor is including school board members and members of the Parent-Teacher Associations in his so-called "vicious school lobby". . . . To impugn their motives can serve no worthy purpose and to call them minority groups is a misnomer.12 Ill

J . BRACKEN LEE

Bateman attacked Lee's suggestion that the Board of Examiners direct the Salt Lake Area Vocational School on the grounds that it would be unconstitutional for an educational institution to be controlled by anyone other than the state Department of Education.13 Lee never believed in vocational schools, maintaining that educators made a serious mistake in arguing that arts and science were "better" than bricklaying, carpentry, mechanics, etc. According to Lee, high schools and colleges should train students for the vocations just as they do for the professions and issue a diploma equal to the arts and sciences.

He vetoed the vocational education bills because he honestly thought it would put them out of business. Federal funds kept them going, confirming his suspicion that they did not need all the money Bateman had claimed.14 Bateman was critical of the governor's request for a $10,000 job evaluation study in Utah's institutions of higher learning, calling it "an attempt at dictatorship."15 Lee charged Bateman with the desire to establish his office as a fourth branch of government with funds guaranteed, not appropriated, and with freedom to spend them without legislative or executive check or supervision. According to Lee, the fact that Bateman had taken a position against the job survey was "recommendation in itself that the survey be made." Referring to the successful referendum removing the office of superintendent from the ballot, Lee claimed that the people had voted "to take politics out of education but they did not succeed in taking the Superintendent of Public Instruction out of politics." He alleged that people whose livelihood depended on public funds would gain from an increase in taxes. Such motivation he attributed to Bateman.10 After he had signed the bill providing for popular election of school board members with the authority to name the state superintendent and set his salary, Lee launched an open effort to eliminate Bateman. Although he promised not to interfere with the board, he wrote a letter to each board member asserting that the people did not want this appointment to go to anyone who had been active in partisan politics or who might be in the future.17 112

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Ignoring Lee's advice, the school board appointed Bateman and raised his salary from $6,000 to $10,000 per year. Flabbergasted, Lee called a special meeting of the Board of Examiners to review the salary hike and bitterly remarked that his suspicions were confirmed that "Bateman was more interested in getting a raise in salary than in helping the schools when he supported the change in the law." Lee objected to the raise because Bateman had been elected to a job that paid only $6,000. Actually, there was another more important reason. Bateman's raise placed him well above the salary bracket of all other elected officials in the state, Lee's salary at the time being only $7,500.18 Lee opposed both the appointment and the salary and declared, "I will never approve the salary, and if there is any possible grounds on which to challenge his right to the position, I will seek a court decision."19 The Board of Examiners, consisting of the governor, the attorney general, and the secretary of state, approved the salary raise two to one, with the two Democrats voting against the governor. However, the Finance Commission rejected the new salary by a two to one vote on grounds that it was not consistent with salaries of other state appointive and elective officers.20 In turn, the Board of Education held up Bateman's first paycheck under the new salary but refused to reconsider their decision.21 According to a survey, Bateman had become the second highest paid superintendent in the eleven western states, with only California paying more at $15,000.22 Meanwhile, Bateman threatened court action to get his salary. Although he was entitled to receive his old salary, he refused to accept it, pending court action. To him it was a matter of principle whether the governor or the Board of Education had the power to control his position and salary.23 He rejected his checks for over eight months, going completely without salary.

According to one news account he was forced to refinance his home and borrow money from friends in order to eat and have a place to live.24 But Bateman's son Richard said that his bank volunteered to put him on an "open loan" basis and continued to honor his personal checks with the understanding that he 113

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would pay them back with minimum interest when the matter was resolved. A group of local superintendents also offered to finance him, but Bateman decided to accept the bank's arrangement.25 In 1952 the Utah State Supreme Court ruled that the salary could be legally determined by the Board of Education, thereby upholding Bateman's position, and awarded him $8,750 in back pay.20 Unaccountably, the Board of Examiners ignored the action and officially cut his salary back to the old $6,000 per year.

Finally, the Utah legislature passed a bill putting a ceiling on his salary at $8,000, a measure Lee said he would sign into law.

Weary of the controversy, the Board of Education also backed down by recommending that Bateman's salary be set at $8,000, virtually relinquishing their right to set his salary,27 and the matter was finally resolved. With the legislature on Lee's side and the courts on Bateman's, the result could be construed as a draw.

Claiming no animosity for Bateman, Lee maintained that he respected him and considered him a "good man." Oversimplifying their controversy, he said, "I liked Bateman, at first. But I wanted to cut down on travel and everybody cut down except Bateman."28 The differences between liberal Democrat Bateman and the highly conservative Lee were far more severe. Bateman considered education a nonpolitical issue, whereas Lee believed that the chief executive should be able to control educational policy. Bateman thought that Lee was harmful to education because his economy measures retarded the building program and cultural programs such as music, art, and foreign languages.29 Since most educators sympathized with the latter view, the Lee-Bateman feud came to symbolize Lee's intensive battle with educators.30

114

BATTLE WITH BATEMAN iRichard A. Bateman, son of E. Allen Bateman, to author, October 5, 1972.

2 Lee to E. Allen Bateman, September 28, 1949, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

3 Bateman to Lee, November 4, 1949, ibid.

4 Lee to Bateman, November 14, 1949, ibid. ^Deseret News, March 8, 1950.

G Bateman to Lee, November 4, 1949.

T Lee to Marl D. Gibson, December 9, 1949, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

8 Bateman to Lee, November 8, 1950, ibid. ^Deseret News, August 8, 1950.

"Deseret News, August 13, 1950.

"Deseret News, November 23, 1950.

"Deseret News, April 21, 1951.

"Deseret News, June 6, 1951.

"Lee interview.

"Deseret News, June 6, 1951.

1G Ibid. See also Lee's press release dated June 5, 1951, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

"Salt Lake Tribune, June 20, 1951.

"Deseret News, October 1, 1951.

"Salt Lake Tribune, October 20, 1951.

20 Deseret News, October 27, 1951.

21 Deseret News, November 3, 1951.

22 Logan Herald-Journal, October 27, 1951.

23 Bateman to author.

24 Logan Herald-Journal, July 15, 1952.

25 Bateman to author.

26 Salt Lake Tribune, September 1, 1952.

"Deseret News, March 7, 1953.

28 Lee interview.

29 Bateman to author.

30 This view was supported by M. Lynn Bennion, former superintendent of the Salt Lake City School District. Bennion called Bateman "a dedicated and capable administrator." He said that "the school people generally sided with Bateman and tended to develop at the outset of Lee's term as Governor a very great dislike for him." Bennion to author, January 13, 1973.

115

10 Education I When educators introduced a bill in the 1951 legislature to increase the minimum school program cost from $3,300 to $3,800 per classroom unit, Lee gave no assurance that he would support it. He sympathized with educators that more funds were "desperately needed" but insisted that all state departments were facing shortages due to inflation. The bill was designed to increase transportation allowances by $325,000 and liberalize the local leeway levies, authorizing local districts to levy up to 8 mills or 40 percent of the district's minimum program for operation and maintenance. A levy of 4 mills or 20 percent of the district minimum program would be allowed for building purposes.1 Eventually, Lee came out in direct opposition to the bill and began making his case in radio addresses. He quoted from a 1947 governmental research association survey that claimed that "the public education crisis is a hardy and hungry perennial," springing up every year with the same problems—inadequacy of the program with the resulting need for more money, the cost of education not equitably distributed among all taxpayers, the basis for school support in need of broadening, and underpaid schoolteachers. Lee concluded that "crisis" was not a suitable word and advised all Utahns to worry less about educational needs. Warning that Senate Bill 75 would cost $6,500,000 per biennium, he declared that the only way to obtain that money would be to increase taxes, principally on property."

Lee correctly asserted that Utah was not a wealthy state, ranking thirty-fifth among states in average income per school child.

Nevertheless, Utah ranked second among states in percentage of revenues devoted to schools.3 Lee's claim was supported by M. Lynn Bennion, former superintendent of Salt Lake City 117

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schools, who maintained that Utah consistently ranged near the top in percentage of personal income spent for education, even though the expenditure per pupil was near the bottom.

In Bennion's view, teacher salaries were the major factor in school budgets.4 The theme for Lee's battle with educators could be taken from his memorable speech to national educators early in his first term. He said that many of Utah's chief public officials, including some in the field of education, were "not worth a raise in salary" because they were "mediocre individuals." He claimed that some of these mediocre individuals had "injured the schools.""' In a ten-year period, according to Lee, school costs had tripled while welfare costs had only doubled. He was unsympathetic with the argument that teachers had not had an increase in salary in four years and were underpaid. Lee told a radio audience: Some teachers, particularly the younger ones who have families, no doubt have a difficult time making ends meet. But 98% of the teachers receive over $2,400 per year and many of them can look to a guaranteed salary increase after every year of teaching up to an average of 16 years. Compared with teachers in most other states, Utah teachers also are doing right well. In 1941-42, when the average salary for Utah teachers was $1,431, the national average was only $1,223. Utah ranked 16th among the states. For 1947 and 48, the last period for which comparative figures were available, Utah ranked 13th among the states, with an average teacher's salary of $2,916, compared with the national average of $2,440. Thus in 8 years' time, Utah climbed 3 notches on the salary ladder, while every teacher's salary more than doubled. And the salaries in many instances are still increasing.0 Lee quoted the average salary of teachers at $3,100, and said it was bound to increase every year at about 6 percent, the rate of increase in the cost of living.7 However, Allan M. West, executive secretary of the Utah Education Association disagreed.

In a radio address, West said the average salary quoted by Lee included the salaries of principals and supervisors but that Lee 118

EDUCATION I

had not included the earnings of physicians in computing nurses' salaries. "But if nurses are underpaid, does it follow that teachers should be also?"8 Nevertheless, Lee continued to strike out at "special interests" and "greedy minorities," claiming that further expenditures would lead to socialism.9 Senate Bill 75 was passed by unanimous vote in the Senate, then sent to the House where it was amended from $3,800 to $3,600 per classroom unit. Claiming that even the lower figure would raise tax bills some $1,500,000, Lee vetoed it. A substitute bill was introduced to raise the classroom unit to $3,500 which was passed by both houses, but Lee vetoed it, too. The veto was overridden in the Senate but sustained by the House.

Incredibly, Lee had succeeded in expunging virtually every proposed educational expenditure from the budget. He remarked that the time had come when the public, the legislature, and educators themselves must realize that school costs had "increased out of proportion with the state's ability to foot the bill."10 He was also distressed that the educational lobby had "used every possible means to influence legislation," even "permitting school children to serve as carriers for messages to the homes." He called it "one of the most disgraceful displays of power politics in the state's history.11 The Utah Educational Review, organ of the UEA, complained that although eighty-two of eighty-three legislators had voted favorably at least once in the course of the bill's history, the 1947 figure of $3,300 per classroom unit would remain unchanged. The editors blamed Lee's assertion that Utahns were faced with a choice between lower school taxes or "the loss of our democratic freedoms." They rejected his claim that educators constituted a "vicious lobby" and supported the right of every citizen to actively participate in the affairs of representative government.12 The Review asserted that Lee's warnings about socialism and excessive government spending bordered on demagoguery, since Utah's income had tripled, increasing from $265 million in 1940 to $825 million in 1949. Moreover, Senate Bill 75 would have been 1.3 mills less expensive than the previous year, due to 119

J . BRACKEN LEE

increased assessed values and increased income tax revenues.13 Although he did not claim to be misquoted, Lee accused educators of twisting his words to suit their own purposes. He maintained that he had never used the word "vicious" to describe educational lobbyists but only the word "disgraceful."14 The Review admitted mistakes in lobbying but insisted that they were "honest, innocent, and harmless," to which Lee took exception, saying there was great danger in using school children. He also claimed that the "deliberate misrepresentations and obvious dishonesty" of the Review's editorial spoke for themselves. To support his belief that Utah had been extravagant in education, he quoted figures showing expenditures had increased 250 percent during a ten-year period while costs of the remaining functions of government had increased only 118 percent.15 Additionally, Utah devoted a higher percentage of its total income for educational purposes than all other states except one.10 Acknowledging that Utah's income had tripled from 1940 to 1949, Lee reminded his detractors that there were multiple uses for that money. Finally, he insisted that since Utah was exceeding the national average in educational expenditures even though it ranked thirty-seventh in ability to pay, its expenditures were exceptional.17 Lee had preferred that legislators cut taxes first and then gauge appropriations accordingly. When they refused he felt compelled to cut away at those appropriations. He cut $710,000 for the two vocational schools, $1,000,000 for teacher retirement, and $124,000 for the school for the blind. He line-vetoed all of the $11,623,000 for higher education, necessitating a special session in June.18 At the special session Lee presented the legislature with a mandate for economy, quoting Thomas Jefferson to support his case: I place economy among the first and most important virtues, and public debt as the greatest of dangers to be feared. To preserve our independence, we must not let rulers load us with perpetual debt. We must make our choice between economy and liberty, or profusion and servitude.19 120

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Promising that he had no intention of "crippling" state institutions, he declared the necessity to be realistic in appraising financial needs. He reminded legislators of a law passed over his veto that permitted institutions of higher learning to "retain any surplus funds on hand at the end of any budget period for subsequent use." Lee estimated those surpluses at between $847,000 and $955,000, either figure being in excess of reductions he had made in educational budget figures. He recommended a reduction for the experiment station at Utah State Agricultural College, claiming the appropriation was seven times what it was eight years earlier. Lee requested that a $10,000 "job evaluation survey" be conducted at the state's major educational institutions and recommended reductions in appropriations to the two vocational schools; however, he wanted to purchase the property of the Salt Lake school at a price of $312,000. He called the appropriation for the teachers' retirement fund a token amount and suggested that a permanent financing plan be devised.20 Refusing to accept the latest economy edict, the legislators failed to reduce any of the eighteen items Lee had line-vetoed and gave the colleges and universities their full budgets. On the question of Senate Bill 75 they claimed that the increase per classroom unit from $3,300 to $3,600 would necessitate a property tax levy increase in every school district of 2.18 mills and even then would not produce the desired results. Therefore, they proposed a bill designed as a stopgap measure until a long-range study could be completed. Only funds urgently needed to equalize the tax burden among school districts and to provide state aid primarily to those districts unable to finance their own program were to be supplied. They gave $1,500,000 to poorer school districts and granted wealthier ones the authority to increase taxes if necessary. The state's portion of the program was provided by the sales tax surplus, as Lee had recommended. This temporary solution realized the need for a more comprehensive study of the schools to be made by a sixty-member commission composed of individuals from every county, representing various occupations.21 121

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The legislature appropriated $312,000 for the purchase of the vocational school property, reinserted $1,000,000 for the teachers' retirement fund, and denied Lee the $10,000 he had requested for his educational "job survey." The legislators succeeded in increasing the total outlay by $3,300,000 over that appropriated by the regular session. In other words, Lee's economy program suffered more with the special session than it would have had he not vetoed the original package. To his credit, he observed the costs of the special session and the legislative vote count and decided against vetoing any of the bills. He did take a nominal swing at what he called "Democratic politicians" who were allegedly responsible for "excessive appropriations." Actually, the House was split 30-30 between Democrats and Republicans, and the Senate was nominally Democratic but tending toward the conservative.22 Most significant for economy purposes, the special session cost the state $50,000.23 At the 1952 Governors' Conference, Lee made it clear that his views had not changed: Now, I cannot see the sense of building a school system that we can't afford to operate. If building a school system is going to destroy the economy of this country, what good is the school system? I think we've got to get back to this, that the people of this nation can afford to spend only so much money. Now, if we want to put all our money into schools, and let the highways go, all right, but we've got to balance this thing; we've got to balance our income with our outgo.24 In a national television interview he was asked if any Utah groups had been especially active in opposing his economy program. He replied that schoolteachers had been the most vehement in opposition and that although most were "fine, loyal Americans," there was "a small, selfish minority" who had opposed him "for their own selfish ends."""'

Since it was an election year, Lee boasted of his own record in education both on television and in a campaign tract entitled, "The Lee Record." He noted that expenditures for education had increased 42 percent, with the major share going into new 122

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construction, which, he said, was up 390 percent. Even though enrollment had declined, appropriations for higher education had increased 40 percent, producing the most impressive statefinanced building program institutions of higher learning had ever experienced, according to Lee. For instance, Weber College was building a completely new campus on Ogden's southeast bench at a cost of more than $1,200,000, the University of Utah's building allocations totaled almost $2,000,000, and Utah State was given $1,000,000. He claimed that if the federal government made a comparable effort to economize, the savings "in the vast, sprawling bureaucracy" would "stagger and defy the imagination."20 The UEA felt obliged to publish a special newsletter to answer Governor Lee's alleged achievements. They claimed that the 42 percent increase was misleading because school operating expenditures had increased only 17 percent while building expenditures had increased 247 percent; the average for the two was 42 percent. Furthermore, the number of children in daily attendance had increased by 12 percent and the cost of living by 7 percent, figures that more than offset the 17 percent increase in operating expenses. Educators thought it important to separate operating and building expenses since no state money had been spent for building construction.27 The UEA claimed that the war and postwar years had created a demand for new buildings because of depression, wartime restrictions, and an increased birthrate. All construction was financed from local funds. Therefore, educators believed that any credit Lee took for increased expenditures during his administration should be ignored, because any increase was made possible and controlled by a formula written into state law by the 1947 legislature—two years before Lee took office. Even the special session's appropriation for the poorest school districts was designed for the relief of emergency conditions and as of October 1952 had not been used to construct a single school building. Moreover, Lee had recommended against increased expenditures to higher education as well as against expenditures for building to both the 1949 and 1951 legislatures. Finally, the 123

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supplemental appropriations bill from the special session became law without his signature.28 Lee said that salaries for all instructional personnel had reached an all-time high average of $3,250 per year. But as educators pointed out, when Lee took office teachers' salaries were $277 above the national average; by 1951 they had dropped to $40 below the national average, in spite of the fact that Utah teachers ranked among the top four states in the amount of professional training completed.29 Continuing his economy program into the second term, Lee announced his firm intention to "give first consideration to the long abused and forgotten taxpayers." His proposed budget of $58,156,900 was almost a half-million dollars less than appropriations for the previous biennium and nearly $15,000,000 less than the total of departmental requests. Operating on a budget of $5,869,480 during 1951-53, the University of Utah requested $7,107,561 for the 1953-55 biennium, and Lee recommended a cut to $5,360,000. In support of his action he cited a survey of the university made by a specially engaged firm of management consultants who predicted an enrollment decline. He made similar cuts in requests of the Utah State Board of Education, Utah State Agricultural College, Branch Agricultural College (now Southern Utah State College), and Central Utah Vocational School. Lee cut requests totaling $15,026,268 for higher learning to $10,926,000, more than $1,000,000 below the 1951-53 appropriation.30 Presumably, Lee considered the education requests to be padded, believing it axiomatic in budget-making to ask for more than was expected or needed, knowing that requests would be cut. The Deseret News raised the question of "whether other departments whose requests were not so drastically cut might also have submitted padded requests." The governor's statement of intent to study higher education and to devise a more satisfactory method of fixing institutional budgets was considered a significant clue to his thinking. The News pleaded with the legislature to prevent economies from jeopardizing "the state's nation124

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ally recognized leadership in education," even if that should make necessary an increase in educational appropriations.31 In Lee's opinion every college padded its budget: I knew it! Because I'd seen what had happened down in Carbon County. I was in a sporting goods store one day.

The athletic director of Carbon College came in and said he had to get rid of $30,000 in 15 days. I says, "Why?" He says, "We've got it in the budget and if we don't spend it, the legislature'll reduce the budget. So my orders are to spend it." I says, "Do you need it?" He says, "I don't need anything, but I've got to spend it." Now this is human nature, see?32 Lee said he called the college presidents in 1953 and asked, "Why don't you just once give me an honest budget—what you actually need—let's see what happens." The legislature was short of money and cut everyone's budget by 20 percent. According to Lee, college administrators were aware of that possibility, and thus padded their budgets about 20 percent. Since Utah State's president was the only one to present an "honest budget," he was the only one to be short of money that year.

Well, do you think I could get that president next time to cut his own throat? I gave him the money through the Board of Examiners. But I didn't have the heart next time to say, "Don't you pad your budget." Because he became the sucker!33 The college president who was not affected by the budget limitations, ultraconservative Ernest L. Wilkinson of Brigham Young University, commended Lee for his "courage in slashing the new budget." His only regret was that Lee was not slashing the national budget, where the need was greatest.34 When the sixty-member school survey commission was appointed in 1951 Lee agreed to abide by its findings and to call a special session if necessary to implement them.3r' In February 1953 the commission completed its work and presented a threehundred-page report to Lee. H. Grant Vest, executive secretary of the commission, recommended the upgrading of teacher salaries, noting that the average teacher salary in Utah was $200 125

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per year lower than the average for the western states. Because of that, the commission suggested an increase in the classroom unit allowance from $3,300 to $3,500. To augment the salary recommendation the commission suggested that teachers be placed on a merit system so that they could be rewarded with incentive pay for superior work. These recommendations would cost the state an estimated $3,000,000 or more.30 Unfortunately for the schools, the legislature found it necessary to defer action because of a logjam of bills and the lateness of the report relative to the legislative calendar. It was presented on the thirty-ninth day of the sixty-day session.

In a conference with the legislative council, Lee claimed that a $200 per year increase would not solve the problem for teachers suffering the most: teachers with wives and dependent children. This bias was shared by the Deseret News, which had earlier suggested that married teachers with families to support be given special salary considerations on the grounds that they were being forced out of education into more lucrative positions.

The News asserted that the single person was in good shape, especially with three months off in the summer. A differential for male teachers would supposedly upgrade education without curtailing services or raising property taxes.37 The commission had considered and rejected the differential for male teachers, believing that a merit system would be more fair and equitable.38 PRESSURE FOR A SPECIAL SESSION

Although several interested individuals and groups reminded him of his promise to implement the commission's report, Lee balked at calling a special session of the legislature.39 He insisted that he also promised the people that he would reduce taxes.

However, he pledged to call a special session if he could be assured that additional funds requested for education would be obtained by reducing appropriations to other departments of government.10 Both the Deseret News and the Tribune strongly urged a special session and an emergency appropriation in the interest of good administration and good schools.11 As the teacher crisis 126

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became more serious, Lee grew more and more unpopular. By April, teacher contracts in thirty-five out of Utah's forty school districts had been withheld pending the possibility of financial assistance from the state to improve salary schedules. School boards adopted a "watch and wait" attitude in the hope that Lee would call a special session.42 Even though Utah faced a teacher shortage, a $200 raise would, in the view of administrators, enable the system to retain most of its best teachers rather than lose them to other states with higher salaries. The threat to the teacher supply could be seen clearly: in 1947-48 Utah trained 773 teachers, with 82 percent of them taking jobs in Utah schools. In 1954 the state trained 802 teachers, with only 37 percent taking jobs in Utah schools.43 Lee remained adamant. He also suggested that school districts in financial difficulty should tax to their local limits and raise those limits if necessary. State financing should only come as a last resort, he said, after local entities had exhausted their resources. Furthermore, he told a special committee of educators that if a special session were called it should provide a referendum on higher taxes and better schools so that the people could directly choose.44 Attacking the governor for suggesting that legislators might be "pressured" into higher taxes when they were against them, the Tribune asserted that they were the people's direct representatives and thus more responsive to the people's will than the governor. Any "pressures" applied might well be the voice of the people arguing for a solution to the school problem. The Tribune urged that the people's representatives be given "a free hand in attacking the school problem—and soon."45 The Deseret News echoed that sentiment, claiming the school problem was "startlingly simple." There was an obvious, compelling need for "more money particularly for teacher salaries and for school finances." According to the News, the survey commission had done a creditable job which deserved a full hearing from the legislature.40 Lee responded ominously by predicting that if he was "forced by pressures from organized groups and newspapers" to call a 127

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special session, it would be "wide open" for increased expenditures and tax increases. He claimed to be "standing alone" in his opposition to increased taxes and would regard the calling of a special session a surrender of his economy program. In that event, he facetiously suggested, he might advocate more funds for health, highways, and "a fine state park on the shores of the Great Salt Lake."47 The situation was serious, because other Intermountain states slated to make increases ranging from $100 to $500 would widen the already noticeable $200 gap between their teacher salaries and Utah's.48 Finally, the legislative council agreed to study the school survey and make a report of its findings. In turn, Lee agreed to call a special session if the council suggested a "program that would provide for something more than just an increase in taxes." Since the survey was conducted under the auspices of the council, he maintained that no action could be taken until the council made a recommendation.49 The council recommended a special session, with only one of its members, Senate President Mark Paxton of Fillmore, dissenting—on the same grounds as the governor—that local boards had not yet exhausted their own revenue possibilities. Citing the need for "further study," Lee avoided a commitment and agreed to meet with the council at a later date.50 Severely criticizing Lee for ignoring the emergency, the Deseret News insisted that not only the council but a majority of Utah's citizens wanted full legislative consideration. The rejection of the council's recommendation indicated a lack of confidence in that body, just as Lee had previously demonstrated his mistrust of the legislature. As the News editorialized, "Apparently on the matter of school finances he has his neck bowed, and it is doubtful that any amount of 'further-study' will alter his position."51 This was only the warm-up in a continuing feud. Lee repeated his refusal to call the session: The greatest emergency is high taxes. Anything else is very minor. I would rather have a son with only an elementary 128

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school education than a son with a college degree and no freedom.52 In a scathing editorial entitled "Utah's One-Man Government," the Deseret News called for an end to "stubborn, autocratic government" and cited a placard behind Lee's desk quoting Oliver Cromwell: "In the bowels of the Lord, I beseech you, brethren, consider it possible that you may be mistaken." The News suggested that this governor "turn around and read it."

Lee had established a commission to study the problem, but when its findings disagreed with his personal views he rejected them. He asked the legislative council to review the commission's findings, and when their recommendation disagreed with his he rejected it. "All of the best judgment of fine, intelligent people is thus discarded by the man who asked for their judgment in the first place." This, said the News, is "government unworthy of Governor Lee and unworthy of the State of Utah."53 The News objected to Lee's penchant to "blame" the school people and suggested that there be less talk of blame and more of the "welfare of our children." The editors complained that there would be fewer qualified teachers when school opened again in the fall; there would be curtailed classes and an "undercurrent of resentment" that would be transmitted to the children. Since Lee was not elected to be a lawmaker but to carry out the will of the lawmakers, the News implored him to realize that he was mistaken.54 In the Tribune's opinion, Lee's refusal to follow the advice of the council was a "breach of faith," placing on Lee "mountainous responsibilities," with Utah's future citizens the obvious victims. The Tribune questioned Lee's political acumen in delaying the matter until 1954 when an untried legislature would face the issue. He would, the Tribune believed, be more likely to influence the 1953 legislature since it was dominated by his own party.55 In spite of Lee's claim that his mail was running 10 to 1 against a special session, the Deseret News opinion poll reported that 81.9 percent of Utah's citizenry favored it.50 Finally, at the end of July, Lee changed his mind. He agreed to call a special 129

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session but unreasonably stipulated that educators agree to support all of the recommendations of the survey commission.

E. Allen Bateman cautioned educators against making presession agreements with the governor.57 Lee thrived on being recalcitrant with educators, and at times he seemed determined to prevent a resolution to the problem.

In August a subcommittee of the legislative council was organized to work out a proposal for school financing acceptable to the governor, the legislators, and the educators.58 A few days later the legislative council as a whole approved their proposal and presented it to the governor, who was pleased enough with it that he announced that a special session would probably be called within a few months. Later, he announced that it would definitely not be called before the start of school in September, but it would likely be before January l.59 Lee further complicated the issue by threatening to withhold state aid to schools that shortened classes, a direct reference to the Salt Lake City School District's announced intention to cut second grade classes to a half-day. Superintendent M. Lynn Bennion said that there were 1,800 more children than the previous year, which suggested a need for three new schools.

The answer could come only from the legislature.00 Bennion maintained that second grade had to be cut in order to open doors and make room for the additional schoolchildren.

Still blinded by his philosophy, Lee blamed educators for being "shortsighted" and failing to take the issue to local taxpayers instead of continually relying on state aid.01 Nevertheless, he finally agreed to recommend to the special session a plan providing about $1,000,000 in additional funds to school districts throughout the state. These funds would be allocated on the basis of current enrollment rather than on the previous year's enrollment.02 Formal announcement of the special session, to convene in December, did not come until November.03 Unaccountably, Lee called attention to some of the nonfinancial matters recommended by the survey commission and refused to put financing on the agenda until four days after the session had convened.

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He seemed especially interested in providing uniform textbooks for the state, in forbidding teachers to engage in politics while under contract, and in putting teacher salary raises on a merit basis. He accused the Utah Education Association of being a pressure group and said the state PTA was nothing but its "echo."04 Finally, in a surprise move, Lee recommended that the state close Carbon Junior College in his home town of Price and that it transfer three other junior colleges, serving 2,250 students, back to the Mormon church. He estimated that it would cost $1,400,000 to operate the colleges during the next biennium.

Taxpayers were aghast, for there had been a popular joke about Utah's educational morass: save the entire education expenditure by giving the junior colleges to the Mormons, the universities to the Unitarians, the high schools to the Catholics, and the grade schools to the Protestants.05 But Lee was not joking; he favored returning the colleges to the Mormon church to enable state funds appropriated to them to be applied to elementary schools.00 The session considered two finance programs, one prepared by the legislative council and one by Lee. The difference lay more in the methods of obtaining funds than in the amount proposed. Lee would have required school boards to obtain a taxpayer vote of approval if school expenditures exceeded $4,617 per classroom unit, while the council would have required the vote at $5,000. The legislature enacted the council program, which included a $340 increase in classroom unit over what Lee had recommended. Lee promptly vetoed the plan, and the legislature failed to override. A compromise plan was worked out in which a $200 increase over what Lee wanted was implemented. Actually, the program was set at $4,050 per classroom unit, with a supplemental program raising the figure to $4,535.

It became law without the signature of the governor.07 The same was true of a two-cent addition to the cigarette tax to be turned over to the schools. The legislature enacted a 70 percent teacher retirement plan, vetoed by Lee but overridden by the lawmakers.08 Merit raises were postponed, and Utah's teachers were scheduled for a blanket increase of $200. Lee's only apparent victory 131

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was the junior college recommendation, which brought bitter reactions from the colleges and their communities.09 Since the transfer was tied to a referendum ballot, Utah voters went to the polls on November 2, 1954, and rejected it.70 Lee saw no inconsistency in his earlier role in helping to establish Carbon College and his later desire to abandon it. He had shared local high hopes for the college but thought it had failed to live up to expectations. Therefore, the state's general welfare could best be served by writing the college off as a failure.

The people of Price were unimpressed with his reasoning and claimed that the college not only had justified itself but would continue to get bigger and better.71 The obvious victors in the special session were the survey commission, the legislature, and the educators. Although education would receive some long-awaited relief, the problems were hardly resolved. Education was destined to remain underfinanced as long as Lee remained governor.

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Salt Lake Telegram, January 23, 1951.

Radio address by Gov. J. Bracken Lee, KSL, February 9, 1951, p. 1, MS in Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

3 Ibid„ p. 2.

4 Bennion to author.

5 Salt Lake Telegram, February 8, 1950.

6 Lee radio address, February 9, 1951.

'Ibid. s Salt Lake Tribune, February 16, 1951.

9 E. L. Hess, "Utah's Angry Man," Frontier, August 1951, p. 9.

10 "Education to Leeward." See also "The Strange Story of Senate Bill 75," Utah Educational Review, March 1951, pp. 6, 7.

"Radio address by Gov. J. Bracken Lee, KSL, February 23, 1951, MS in Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

12 "The Strange Story of Senate Bill 75," p. 6.

13 Ibid., p. 7.

"Lee to Allan M. West, executive secretary, UEA, April 12, 1951, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

15 Ibid. Lee used as his source Utah Foundation, Facts and Figures on Government in Utah: An Encyclopedia of Taxes and Public Expenditures in Utah (Salt Lake City: Utah Foundation, 1950 [?]), table 30, pp. 54-58.

16 Lee to West.

"Ibid.

18 Hess, "Utah's Angry Man," p. 8; "Education to Leeward."

"Message of Gov. J. Bracken Lee to Special Session of 29th Legislature of State of Utah, June 4, 1955, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

2 °Ibid.

21 Hess, "Utah's Angry Man," p. 9; J. Bracken Lee, television and radio address, aired September 18, 1952, MS in Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

22 Hess, "Utah's Angry Man," pp. 9, 10; Wilcox, "The Major Financial Policies," p. 34.

23 Wilcox, "The Major Financial Policies," p. 36.

24 J. Bracken Lee, speech at 1952 National Governors Conference, MS in Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

25 Salt Lake Tribune, June 9,1952. Lee was questioned on national television by correspondents Huey and Hazlitt.

26 Lee address, September 18, 1952.

"Utah Education Association Newsletter, October 1952.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Wilcox, "The Major Financial Policies," p. 43, quoting House Journal, 30th Legislature.

31 Deseret News and Telegram, January 28, 1953, editorial.

32 Lee interview.

33 Ibid.

34 Ernest L. Wilkinson, president, Brigham Young University, to Lee, January 28, 1953, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

35 Rep. Simeon A. Dunn (Hyrum, Utah) to Lee, May 12, 1953; Lee to Dunn, May 21, 1953, ibid.

3s Ogden Standard-Examiner, Deseret News, Salt Lake Tribune, February 20, 1953.

2

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Deseret News, April 8, 1952, editorial.

0. N. Malmquist, "Money Alone Won't Solve Teacher Problem," Salt Lake Tribune, May 3, 1953.

39 Dunn to Lee. 40 Lee to Dunn. ^Deseret News, February 20, 1953, editorial. See also Salt Lake Tribune editorial same day.

"Salt Lake Tribune, April 8, 1953.

43 Statistics from U.S. Office of Education.

"Salt Lake Tribune, May 11, 1953.

45 Ibid., editorial.

"Deseret News, May 11, 1953, editorial.

"Salt Lake Tribune, May 29, 1953.

48 0. N. Malmquist, "Teacher's Pay and Quality Seen as Urgent Issues," Salt Lake Tribune, May 12, 1953.

49 Lee to Maurice Lyon, teacher, Grandview Elementary School, Provo, June 9, 1953, Lee Gubernatorial Papers. ™Deseret News, June 22, 1953.

51 Ibid., editorial. ^Deseret News, July 3, 1953. '^Deseret News, July 4, 1953.

S4 Ibid.

55 Salt Lake Tribune, July 5, 1953. The Richfield Reaper, July 16, 1953, also aggressively encouraged a special session. ^Deseret News, July 22, 1953, editorial.

55 Salt Lake Tribune, July 29, 1953.

5S Deseret News, August 3, 1953. ™Salt Lake Tribune, August 18, 1953; Deseret News, August 18, 1953.

00 Logan Herald-Journal, August 26, 1953.

"Ibid.

S2 Salt Lake Tribune, August 28, 1953. *3Deseret News, November 17, 1953.

04 "The Governor and the Schools," Time, January 11, 1954, p. 47; Lee to Time, January 9, 1954; Lee to Roy Alexander, managing editor, Time, March 4, 1954, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

05 "Education to Leeward." ^Deseret News, February 20, 1954.

C7 "The Governor and the Schools"; House Journal, 30th Legislature, special sess., as quoted in Wilcox, "The Major Financial Policies," pp. 50, 51.

68 Ibid.

69 "The Governor and the Schools."

70 State of Utah, "Abstract of Elections," November 2, 1954, Secretary of State's Election File, Utah State Archives.

71 Salt Lake Tribune, October 2, 1954.

38

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11 Education II Even though he had made himself peculiarly vulnerable to journalistic criticism for his treatment of education, Lee was nevertheless easily angered by it. He was especially incensed by a 1954 Time magazine article, "The Governor and the Schools," taking him to task because his "passion for economy" had inflicted "definite signs of malnutrition" on Utah's schools. Time traced the history of the special session, concluding that "one thing was certain: J. Bracken Lee's political troubles are not yet through."1 Furious, Lee wrote a lengthy letter, only part of which appeared in the magazine in edited form. He accused the editors of inaccuracy and lack of objectivity. He correctly noted that he was charged with slashing a social security program that did not exist; he berated Time for referring to the number of teachers graduating from the state's "teachers colleges" when none existed; he objected to the assertion that the merit system and uniform textbooks were his outlandish proposals, instead of survey commission recommendations; he objected to Time's omission of the fact that he had helped establish Carbon College and that the junior colleges formerly belonged to the Mormon church; finally, he thought Time's estimate of 400 teachers quitting their jobs in disgust was exaggerated and erroneous.2 Utah educators also wrote letters to the editor lauding the effectiveness and accuracy of the article.

Two months later Lee was still smarting, declaring it "incredible" that Time had not recanted the story and accusing the editors of trying to discredit him.3 Although he was right about the inaccuracies, none of them changed the substance of the article. The editors had correctly pictured the most important facets of his serious battle with education, with Lee coming out 135

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on the short end. He had lost an important battle with the legislature and the schools, and it had far-reaching effects on his governorship.

Lee had made one glaring mistake: he claimed in his letter to Time that Utah paid its teachers a higher salary than the average of the surrounding states and higher than the national average.

This was not true and was a direct contradiction of the findings of the survey commission. He said he based his claim on findings published in a state Department of Public Instruction pamphlet.4 Actually, the table prepared by the department suggested the opposite: all of the surrounding states except two, Idaho and Wyoming, paid teachers more than Utah. The average of the states was $3,633, while Utah's figure was recorded at $3,500.

New Mexico's was $4,150, Arizona paid as much as $3,950, while Idaho was as low as $3,382.5 Allan M. West immediately refuted Lee's claims, saying that the most recent NEA figures indicated that the average Utah teacher's pay was below the national average, below the average of the eleven western states, and below the average of the Intermountain states.0 Lee's carping at schoolteachers was continuous. In a letter to a constituent he discussed his belief that many other public employees received salaries much lower than those of teachers.

Government, he said, should not '"increase those already at the top of the ladder" but "bring salaries of others up to a somewhat comparable level."7 Such a statement reflected Lee's conviction that teachers were not in fact professionals but, rather, hired help. He had little respect for the teacher as a necessary, contributing member of society. This feeling was evident in his desire to remove the teacher's right to serve in the legislature.

As early as 1950 Lee had quoted the state constitution as prohibiting a person from being a legislator if he held "an office of public profit or trust." When he asked the attorney general for an opinion, Clinton Vernon ruled that the prohibition was circumvented by another constitutional provision stating that the "legislature shall be the judge of its own members." Lee suggested that an alien could even be elected and serve unless the legislature itself refused to seat him. He saw this as unfair and 136

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recommended a constitutional amendment to correct the inequality. The constitutional bar was sound, Lee said, because it "prevents me or any other state official, if his organization was strong enough, from packing the legislature with its own paid employees."8 Lee's interpretation of the constitution was questionable. He was attempting to restructure the system to facilitate the acceptance of his own program. Just as President Franklin Roosevelt had tried to pack the U.S. Supreme Court to facilitate his New Deal legislation, Lee was trying to unpack the legislature by removing teachers so that they could not oppose him on legislation vital to them. He wanted to eliminate the interest group that opposed him the most. His argument was specious, for one could argue similarly about any number of interest groups. Lee fell victim to the accoutrements and temptations of power, hardly admirable in a democratic society. Fortunately, the attempt failed.

Another piece of evidence revealing the low esteem Lee held for teachers showed up in the solutions he proposed for the teacher shortage and for salaries. He maintained that administrators were perpetuating the teacher shortage as a lever for higher salaries. He proposed a five-point plan to solve the shortage: (1) Revise the requirements for teacher certification, permitting any person with two years' college education or its equivalent to take a comprehensive intelligence and aptitude test, the successful completion of which would entitle him to teach in the elementary grades and in exceptional cases, the secondary grades. Lee quoted a Tribune editorial that asked, Do we employ instructors for their ability to teach and inspire young people to learn, or on the basis of the letters after their names and their membership in high-sounding professional organizations?9 Believing it was the latter, Lee challenged the college degree as the "only measuring device of a person's intelligence or ability to teach."

Benjamin Franklin did not have a college degree, but he was one of our greatest scientists. Despite all his knowledge, his 137

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inventive genius and his keen intellect, however, he could not be certified to teach in our schools if he were alive today.10 It cannot be assumed that colonial society was superior to our own. Franklin lived in an underdeveloped, experimental society that emphasized learning by doing as opposed to formal education. He achieved in spite of severe handicaps in methods of learning and limited access to scholarly materials. Nor does it follow that Franklin, no matter what his accomplishments in science and politics, should be expected to be a successful teacher.

But Lee thought anyone with minimal intelligence should be able to teach.

He suggested these additional points: (2) Establish a salary schedule based on ability, education or degrees, dependency, and tenure. (3) Abolish the regulations in certain districts prohibiting the employment of new teachers over the age of forty. (4) Shift kindergarten to the summer months when the services of regularly employed teachers, who otherwise would be on vacation, could be utilized without shortening other classes. (5) Institute a teacher recruitment program to sell teaching as a career instead of emphasizing its negative aspects.11 Lee's five-point program gave ample proof of his disdain for the teaching profession. Implicit in it lay his conviction that teachers were overpaid, that their abilities were inferior, that hiring standards were too high for the truly talented person to be accepted, that teachers did not work hard enough to deserve a summer vacation, and that any negative reputation of the profession must be blamed on teachers themselves. It came as no surprise that this philosophy generated increased bitterness on the part of educators.12 FEDERAL AID

Lee's opposition to federal aid to education became wholly clear in the beginning of his governorship. He called it morally dishonest for educators to accept federal funds for the building of new schools and predicted that spending money to nationalize schools would actually cause them to deteriorate.13 He clashed 138

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with Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Oveta Culp Hobby, even though Mrs. Hobby claimed that she did not favor nationalization of schools.14 Soon afterward, he became embroiled in a controversy with William Carr, executive secretary of NEA. Carr tried to convince him that it was possible to have federal aid to schools without federal control. The NEA, he insisted, was seeking to preserve and strengthen local and state control. He pointed out that Ohio Sen. Robert A. Taft had once entertained similar views to Lee's on federal aid but had later become convinced of its value and even sponsored legislation for it in the Senate.15 Lee countered by pointing out the fallacy of asking for federal aid when the federal government was in debt and unable to balance its budget. Since the states were in better financial condition than the federal government, he said, they should handle their own problems. He feared that a "callous disregard" for the national debt, high taxes, and inflation would cause the "ruination" of the country.10 Later, when Utah was invited to send a representative to Washington for hearings on federal aid in public school construction, Lee refused to send one. He noted that the school survey commission had opposed such aid. He declared that Utah was building its own schools and suggested that other states "be made to do the same."17 Lee was a true advocate of local control, for he did not believe that the state was responsible for local building either.

This resulted in another feud with E. Allen Bateman, the idealistic and aggressive state school superintendent, over local construction financing. Lee wanted to end the program of state aid to local districts, whereas Bateman wanted to make it permanent.

In a nineteen-page report, Bateman declared, "Utah cannot afford to refuse general federal aid for school buildings and at the same time fail to continue its responsibility for emergency school building aid." He said that the state was charged by the constitution with the responsibility of providing a uniform system of education. He recalled that a number of districts qualified for help under the 1951 and 1953 laws, which provided $4,157,000 139

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for emergency school construction. Some districts received help, while others did not. To discontinue the law, in Bateman's opinion, would be unfair to districts that had qualified for state aid but had not yet received funds. He urged that the section of the law permitting districts to levy a 10 or 12 mill tax for school building purposes be made permanent.18 Just such a bill was introduced in the legislature the following year, heavily supported by educators. To meet the needs of an increasing school population, the Salt Lake City Board of Education planned a five-year building program, including modernization of thirty-four schools and the addition of four elementary schools and one new high school on the old state prison site.

Educators believed that such a building program needed at least a five-year extension of the 12 mill levy. Therefore, LeGrand Backman and M. Lynn Bennion strongly urged Lee to sign House Bill 154, which provided an extension of the levy for eight years.19 Of course, Lee vetoed it. Besides the fact that it contradicted his philosophy, he believed it duplicated a portion of House Bill 54, which extended emergency school building acts for another two years.20 However, the legislature overrode the veto, the Senate 23-0 and the House by 51-4. 21 The legislature also tried to enact legislation permitting Utah to qualify for federal aid for school construction and maintenance, but Lee vetoed that measure.22 Lee's position remained unchanged. In his last year in office he cited a move by Congress to spend federal money for local schools as an illustration of the attempts of government to "enslave the^ people." He concluded, "Behind all this is the idea of an all-powerful central government by people who think we ought to have two classes—the rulers and the peons."23 CONCLUSIONS

Traditionally, three departments of state government have accounted for the greatest expenditures—highways, public welfare, and education. For instance, in 1957 education accounted for 38.1 percent of state expenditures, highways 24.1 percent, 140

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and welfare. 13.5 percent.24 In spite of that, Lee's administration witnessed a genuine decline in school expenditures. In 1948 the average national expenditure per child was $179.43, while Utah's was $179.40 and therefore competitive. But in 1957, at the end of Lee's two terms, the national average had increased to $300 while Utah's lagged far behind at $258. Utah ranked thirtieth among the states in 1948 but had dropped to thirty-third by 1957. The regional figures demonstrated an even wider gap: the mountain states average increased from $202.02 in 1948 to $336.75 in 1957 and the western states from $208.10 to $338.42.

School building projects suffered significantly due to Lee's reduction of the school equalization mill levy which was used for building purposes.25 This is a view well supported by influential contemporaries who viewed the retarded building program as the most detrimental factor of Lee's governorship. M. Lynn Bennion said that Lee "did effectively block the financing of needed school buildings which had to be erected years later at higher costs."20 Richard Bateman, son of E. Allen Bateman, affirmed that Lee, in his father's opinion, was harmful to education in two ways: 1) His policies of economy set the state's school building program back by many years at a time when it was already in trouble because of the war years' moratorium on building.

By the time Lee was out of office and accelerated building was resumed, we were desperately trying to catch up during a building boom time and inflated prices which cost the taxpayers in Utah almost double what a well-planned, on-going building program would have entailed. 2) Lee's economy measures forced Utah school districts to cut back or eliminate many of the cultural and associated programs such as music, art, foreign languages, etc. In Dad's opinion, this was destructive to the educational well being of Utah school children.27 Lee's political contemporaries were divided over the issue.

Democrat Wayne L. Black, son of Lee's old enemy Parnell Black, thought that Lee carried on a "terrific vendetta" against education with "his penny-wise-pound-foolish attitude." Lee refused "violently to support building programs that educators 141

J . BRACKEN LEE

thought necessary at both the elementary and high school level, and in the meantime the cost of lumber, and brick and mortar had gone up and up and up," Black asserted. At the end of Lee's tenure "it fell the lot of George Dewey Clyde to commence the building—estimated at two or three times" what it would have been earlier. Since Black's overall view of Lee's governorship was complimentary, even in economics, his criticism seems valid.

Black ranked Lee as one of Utah's great governors.28 A later governor, Democrat Calvin L. Rampton, was popular with educators and perhaps the most popular governor Utah has ever had. He believed that education was harmed under Lee because it was "underfunded." Lee's continual battles with educators had an "adverse effect on the morale of education," meaning in Rampton's opinion that Lee did a "disservice." Since Utah fell behind in educational building during both Lee's and Clyde's administrations, Rampton floated a $65,000,000 bond issue to erect university buildings. Utah had not had a bonded indebtedness for several years, and he was severely criticized for it. Fortunately for the state, however, the bond was taken out "just before interest rates started escalating"; and while the buildings were being planned Rampton reinvested the money at a higher rate of interest than the state was paying for it. The interest of 1.4 percent represented a great saving to the state and was certainly preferable to building over a period of years.20 Rampton's suggestion that there is wisdom in spending money to save money is germane. It was no wiser for Lee to procrastinate on state building projects than for a prospective home buyer to wait until the prices go down.

On the other hand, former Republican Congressman William A. Dawson supported Lee's stand. Educators, he said, were a powerful lobby and there were many of them in the legislature.

Opposing them was "like opposing motherhood or the PTA." Dawson admired Lee because he was one of the few politicians who had "the guts" to oppose educators.'"

Salt Lake City's journalists were divided over the severity of the problem. The Tribune's astute former political editor, O. N. Malmquist, admitted that educational expenditures would have 142

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been higher if someone else had been governor, but he contended that any damage Lee did to education by his economy measures has been exaggerated. He argued that it was difficult to obtain materials and labor because they were siphoned off by the Korean War. "It was good policy not to spend money because you couldn't spend it effectively at that time." He admitted that some construction could have been done more cheaply had it been done in Lee's time, yet, "I doubt that we would have been better off had we spent up to our full income." Without hesitation, Malmquist regarded Lee as "a good governor."31 Conversely, the Deseret News's incisive former political editor, DeMar Teuscher, believed that penny-pinching in education unquestionably cost the state more later, creating a serious flaw in Lee's contribution.32 William B. Smart, editor of the Deseret News, declared that Lee caused the state to accumulate "monstrous building needs that had to be met later through the bond program at much higher construction costs." Smart blamed Lee for creating a damaging divisiveness in education and contended that his educational record was one of the most important reasons that the Deseret News opposed him for reelection in 1956.33 Even in later years J. Bracken Lee thought "school teachers were too greedy," but his feelings mellowed slightly: "I think that I was rather harsh with the school system—more than I should have been." Yet, he considered it politically impossible to retain the support of educators. For instance, Lee considered Herbert B. Maw to be "a school man and elected by them," yet educators supported Lee after Maw's second term: They turned against me the second term. But what did they do to poor Clyde? They hated his guts! He was more unpopular than / was for a period. I said Rampton [would] be unpopular the second term too, but he [wasn't]. Rampton's a smart politician.34 Lee insisted that he harbored no bitterness toward educators, citing as an example his high respect for the University of Utah's president, A. Ray Olpin, even though they had many disagreements. Arguing that a person harms only himself if he retains 143

J . BRACKEN LEE

animosity, Lee said he "wouldn't waste five minutes" on such things. In an introspective mood, Lee concluded, "I'm inclined to get irritated and say things I wish I hadn't said—that's one of my weaknesses."35 Lee's record in education is mixed. Some have argued that it was his strongest asset, while others have regarded it as clear evidence that he was not fit to be governor. Based on all available evidence, one must conclude that Lee's unfortunate treatment of education and educators was his most serious flaw both as a public servant and as a politician. He made unnecessary enemies who haunted him throughout the remainder of his career, contributing to several subsequent election defeats. Even given his rigid economics, he could have prevented such an albatross through the employment of finesse. Since he freely courted the Mormon church as an interest group when he was not a member, he surely could have established a respectable relationship with educators. Perhaps the fact that many church leaders shared his educational biases partially explains his failure to do so.

His constant battling reduced the quality of education in Utah and did irreparable harm to teacher morale. Yet, it also demonstrated unequivocally Lee's candor, his straightforward approach, his determination to plod ahead with his principles no matter what the political consequences—what most of his admirers proudly called "the courage of his convictions." Such varying reactions to Lee reinforce his image as not only the controversial politician but the charismatic one as well.

144

EDUCATION II

ll

'The Governor and the Schools."

Lee to Time.

3 Lee to Alexander.

4 Six Democratic legislators challenged his claim in a telegram to Time.

5 Utah State Department of Public Instruction, Status of Teacher Personnel in Utah, 1954-55 (Salt Lake City, 1954), p. 156. See table listing salaries paid teachers, principals, and supervisors in the various states. Average teacher salary in Nevada was $3,836; Wyoming, $3,400; Colorado, $3,600; New Mexico, $4,150.

2

c Logan Herald-Journal and Ogden Standard-Examiner, January 18, 1954.

West claimed Lee was using figures more than a year old and inaccurate at that.

7 Lee to Mrs. Madeleine Dale, Salt Lake City, December 17, 1953, Lee Gubernatorial Papers. tSalt Lake Tribune, March 7, 1950.

9 Lee to Merrill K. Davis, chairman, Utah Legislative Council, May 13, 1954, Lee Gubernatorial Papers. (See also Lee's address to the Salt Lake Advertising Club, April 7, 1954, MS, ibid.) Lee explained that the Tribune editorial was inspired by the story of a man without academic degrees who was brilliant enough to teach nuclear physics at the university: "He was released from his teaching position, not because he lacked ability, but because he was using another's name. The University characterizes him as a 'genius' as did other institutions at which he taught. And he was teaching a most difficult subject, nuclear physics, not beginning Arithmetic or the ABC's. This man had no college degree, but he was gifted in other ways. Said the Tribune, and I quote: 'His real crime was that though he was denied a college education, he had the drive to learn on his own and compulsion to teach. With some voids he achieved unusual mastery of a most difficult subject matter. We have only one question: Was he a good teacher? We do not go all the way with the "cult of the Ph.D." in believing professional qualifications can be fully measured by academic degrees. Teaching takes an extra something that cannot be obtained in books or laboratories.' " 10

Ibid.

"Ibid.

12 Lee received national reactions, many emotionally charged, such as the school superintendent from Georgia who said, "I have heard a lot of dumb governors and a lot of dumb speeches from dumb governors, but you take the cake." (R. E. Hood, Brunswick, Ga., to Lee, March 15, 1954, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.) The letter reinforced Lee's prejudices against educators. He accused Hood of being educated without being intelligent and suggested that he collect a little, "since it should be helpful to you in your work." (Lee to Hood, March 23, 1954, ibid). Lee complained to Gov. Herman Talmadge of Georgia who, though, a Democrat, shared Lee's biases toward educators. Talmadge apologized profusely for "such a disrespectful letter to one of the finest Governors of our Sovereign States." He claimed that Georgia teachers had received a 125 percent increase in salaries during his administration and were still unsatisfied. (Talmadge to Lee, April 1, 1954, ibid.)

"Salt Lake Telegram, March 4, 1950.

"Deseret News, April 28, 1954.

"William G. Carr, executive secretary, NEA, Washington, D.C., to Lee, May 24, 1954, Lee Gubernatorial Papers. lc Lee to Carr, June 9, 1954, ibid.

"Deseret News, September 20, 1954.

"Deseret News, November 20, 1954.

145

J. BRACKEN LEE 19 LeGrand P. Backman, president, Salt Lake City Board of Education, and M. Lynn Bennion, superintendent of schools, to Lee, March 11, 1955, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

20 Lee to Backman and Bennion, March 17, 1955, ibid.

21 Deseret News, March 4, 1955.

22 House Journal, 31st Legislature, as quoted by Wilcox, "The Major Financial Policies," p. 59.

23 Salt Lake Tribune, January 20, 1956.

2i Utah Foundation, Condition of Utah State Finances—1957, Research Report no. 146 (Salt Lake City, 1957), p. 89, as quoted by Wilcox, 'The Major Financial Policies," p. 76.

2r, Ibid. During a thirteen-year period the school equalization mill levy rose and fell as follows: 1948, 8.9 mills; 1949, 8.28 mills; 1950, 8.05 mills; 1951, 6.3 mills; 1952, 0.0 mills; 1953, 3.6 mills; 1954, 0.0 mills; 1955, 4.6 mills; 1956, 2.1 mills; 1957, 1.0 mills; 1958, 1.0 mills; 1959, 6.10 mills; 1960, 5.90 mills.

26 Bennion to author.

27 Bateman to author.

28 Black interview.

Calvin Rawlings added that a "penurious attitude doesn't make a good governor." Rawlings interview.

29 Rampton interview.

In Lee's opinion, Rampton's $65 million bond was a mistake and definitely not necessary. Lee interview.

30 Dawson interview.

31 Malmquist interview.

32 Teuscher interview.

33 Interview with William B. Smart, executive editor, Deseret News, July 3, 1972, Salt Lake City.

34 Lee interview.

3 5Ibid.

146

13 Reelection, 1952 In contrast to 1948 when he was the underdog in a Democratic year, Lee was protected in 1952 by incumbency and the immense popularity of Dwight Eisenhower. In the official announcement of his intention to seek a second term he dragged out of the closet the ghost of the Maw administration, emphasizing the lack of scandal in his first term and contrasting that record with Maw's liquor problems. He asserted that despite inflation virtually every department of government had reduced costs. As highlights of his administration he cited a building program, clean-up of the state's liquor system, elimination of politics from welfare, revamping of purchasing policies, and an accelerated roadbuilding program.1 A conspicuous and revealing omission from his list of achievements was education which, predictably, became the Democratic party's chief issue. Lee's Democratic opponent, Earl J. Glade, mayor of Salt Lake City, received the enthusiastic support of the Utah Education Association. The Democrats freely quoted Dr. Edgar Fuller's famous statement that Lee was the "worst enemy of schools among the governors of the United States." In campaign advertising the Democrats assured voters that they placed the child's education above the saving of dollars.2 Lee consistently sidestepped the issue. In a newspaper ad asking "Is Education a Political Football?" Lee supporters claimed "cold statistics," which they never produced, proved that the schools were in "good condition," that "enormous progress" had been made, and that problems were being met "through realistic studies." They accused the Democrats of fabricating issues "to divert public attention from the truly outstanding record of Governor Lee" and "away from the 'do-nothing' record of Mayor Glade."3 In fact, the Lee forces were using propa147

J . BRACKEN LEE

ganda to divert attention from the education issue, without ever meeting its implications.

In the meantime, Glade placed heavy emphasis on it, asserting that Lee had forced "school people" to rise up in defense of Utah's education. In an address to teachers he criticized Lee for slashing appropriations and for his relentless verbal attacks on educators. He claimed that the restoration of confidence in education and educators should be a major priority, and he proposed a six-point program to accomplish it: A school finance program that would guarantee adequate educational opportunities for every child.

An effort to publicly recognize the importance of education in unburdening the welfare program.

An effort to publicly acknowledge teachers as a group of loyal American citizens.

A determination to support the State Department of Education as a useful and respectable part of government.

A vow to permit school boards to perform their legal responsibilities without interference and pressure from elected officials in state government.

A promise to prevent partisan politics from affecting school policy.4 Glade charged that "retrenchment in education" was "hollow economy" and that an urgent need for building throughout Utah's forty school districts could cost approximately $80,000,000 by 1957. Unfortunately, said Glade, "the present governor is content to believe that education costs too much."5 Milton L. Weilenmann, Democratic state chairman, also criticized Lee for showing "his lack of intelligence to the point that he once said he thought too many people are receiving an education."0 Lee emphasized his own record of economy and lower taxes, claiming that Glade's record in Salt Lake City was one of "new and higher taxes despite increased assessed valuation." He quite correctly boasted that he had reduced property taxes every year of his administration and completely eliminated them the last year. Of course, such reductions were not good news for edu148

REELECTION, 1952

cators, since the property tax acted as a supplement to the minimum school program. Even so, using misleading political rhetoric, he insisted that the public schools were receiving more money than at any time in history.7 He also said that economy measures had enabled Utah to use sales tax surpluses for a construction program. He proudly noted that the prison had been virtually completed during his first term and that every welfare institution and institution of higher learning had received a substantial portion of the funds. Finally, he took credit for amassing the greatest surplus the state had ever known.8 Lee claimed that a "government which eliminates waste, balances the budget, and reduces taxes is the real friend of the workingman." He felt that his record of a balanced budget and "enormous surpluses for building purposes" served as a complete contrast to the "do-nothing record" of Glade: The Mayor has advocated city income tax, has increased property taxes to the maximum allowable under the law and has added franchise taxes to city utilities which consumers must bear. With all this, he has failed to carry out the construction program he promised nine years ago.9 In a heated response, Glade maintained that Salt Lake City was never in better financial condition and its financial rating was the highest in the nation. The figures suggested that it would be debt-free in one year—despite investments in a water system, airport, and storm sewer.10 Glade called Lee's economy program "arbitrary" and singled out law enforcement as an example. He said that prison parole violators, escaped prisoners, and those charged with felonies fled to other states and then scoffed at Lee. They knew he considered it uneconomical to pursue them.11 Glade had touched a vulnerable area—Lee's known failure to seek extraditions. Peace officers realized that no matter how serious the case appeared it was useless to ask Lee to pursue it.12 Lee angrily replied that Glade's interest in law enforcement would be more credible if he had a record to back it up. He criticized Glade's enforcement division for the way it had handled the kidnapping case of Ricky Henricksen. According to Lee, "it was only by accident they stumbled onto the culprit."13 149

J . BRACKEN LEE

Glade estimated that Utah's losses from year-round tourist business totaled $3,000,000 because of Lee's "peanut" economy in destroying the state publicity department. New Mexico had spent $271,000, Arizona $180,000, and Montana $50,000 on the tourist trade and all were enjoying much larger tourist business than Utah. This, said Glade, was an example of "Lee for me Economy." While Lee had saved the state a "few paltry dollars," it seemed that he had also deprived the tradespeople and the state of hundreds of millions of dollars.14 In response, Lee called the defunct Publicity and Industrial Development Department "a bankrupt program" that had spent $350,000 annually while Utah still ranked at the bottom of the states as a tourist destination. In contrast, he claimed his highway program had aided tourism and that a record number of tourists had visited during the past year in spite of Salt Lake City spring floods, which gave "the entire state a black eye." He charged that the city's flood damage resulted from Glade's "donothing" administration which had failed to build adequate storm sewers or clean out existing ones.15 Glade called these charges unfair and maintained that Salt Lake City had met the flood emergency quickly and efficiently.10 With tongue in cheek he reminded Lee that he had not accused him of being responsible for the floods in seventeen counties of the state that year simply because he was governor.17 Lee was deservedly proud of the accomplishments of his liquor system. He argued that its honest and efficient operation had eliminated scandal, assured cities and counties of their full share of liquor profits, and cut expenses by $2,000,000 in three and a half years.18 But Glade questioned the savings and contended that the abolition of the enforcement division, when the local peace officer was already overburdened, had turned the liquor commission into a sales promotion agency rather than a control body as the law had intended. Glade incorrectly declared that the "brash action" had cost more than $600,000, plus an additional $175,000 in fines and penalties that would have accrued to the state treasury under effective enforcement.19 Finally, he noted that liquor consumption had increased and, 150

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with it, auto fatalities and accidents due to intoxication. Reminding Lee of his 1948 campaign pledge to end carnage on the highways, Glade pointed to Lee's four-year average of 200 fatalities annually and accused him of setting an all-time high.20 Lee said the assertion was a "low blow." He characterized 1948 as the worst traffic year, even with the enforcement division still in effect. Since Salt Lake City received $250,000 annually from the profits of the Liquor Control Commission, Lee suggested that Glade employ an enforcement division of his own.21 Then Lee offered a curious interpretation of the highway statistics. He said that when the death rate was measured against the increased number of vehicles and the miles traveled on the highways, there was a marked decrease during the preceding four years. Lee insisted that the state road system presented a bright contrast to Salt Lake City's "deteriorated streets."22 In an ingenious effort to turn Lee's campaign theme to his own advantage, Glade claimed that "Lee for me" interpreted was "Lee for Lee" rather than "Lee for the Public." Utah, Glade asserted, was bored with Lee's bickering and fighting and his "continuous and unwarranted barrage attacking the integrity and intelligence of Utah's public servants." He cited Lee's conflict with Dr. Herbert Wagner, medical director of the Utah Crippled Children's Hospital, and accused Lee of gambling with a polio epidemic and destroying the children's hospital program. In another instance, Lee's interference with the highway patrol had allegedly caused Commissioner Hugh O'Neil to quit in disgust.

When he antagonized the Department of Public Health, there were more resignations.23 After Lee fired Warden John Harris, he meddled constantly in prison administration. In Glade's opinion, the prison should be administered without gubernatorial interference or dictatorship.24 Glade described his plan for government as "wise investment and careful spending" and pledged that he would work for water and soil conservation, promotion of the tourist trade with access roads to the state's scenic attractions, a highway program using federal aid, and restoration of harmony and cooperation among state employees, department heads, and the legislature.25 151

J . BRACKEN LEE

Lee sneered at Glade's program, calling it a means to "restore harmony to state government by saying 'yes' to everyone."2 As for himself, his only pledge was to continue to operate government honestly, efficiently, and economically and to ensure fair and equitable treatment without special favors.27 Probably the most detrimental issue to the Glade campaign was the controversy over elevating Weber College to a four-year institution. Glade was believed to favor such a proposition; but well into the campaign A. D. Allen, Cache County Democratic chairman, inserted in the Ogden Standard-Examiner an advertisement claiming that Glade had not promised Weber a fouryear college because the economy would not permit it. Allegedly, the institution would cost the state several million dollars, and the people should not be asked to "shoulder additional tax burdens."28 The Ogden community became agitated, and the StandardExaminer responded with a caustic editorial accusing Glade of distortion: "Earl J. Glade knows the real facts about Weber College." The editors affirmed that the Weber College bill asked for only $94,000 for the first two years as a four-year institution.

The editors urged those who had formerly supported Glade to realize "who is the snake in the grass" and vote for Lee instead.

Perhaps, they suggested Mayor Glade's promises were "coming home to roost. What will he repudiate tomorrow?" Leaping at the political advantage, Lee accused Glade of "vacillation, fence straddling, and indecision" and declared resolutely, "Earl J. Glade has played the people of Weber County for saps and suckers."29 Unfortunately, the Ogden advertisement was a misunderstanding. Glade maintained that it had been run without his knowledge or authorization and insisted that his position on Weber College remained unchanged—he strongly favored fouryear status. Democratic State Chairman Weilenmann denied that he had authorized the ad and theorized that Allen had done it in an effort to carry Cache County for the Democrats, because some of them had opposed Glade's position. Although they were charged for the ad, the state committee had not paid for it.30 152

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Whatever the explanation, the damage was done. Glade appeared to be indecisive and untrustworthy, while Lee as the more experienced politician capitalized on it. Lee claimed that the surprise of the campaign was Glade's "willingness to abandon his former character" and resort to desperate tactics. He asserted that numerous charges "had been made without basis in fact," that promises of a contradictory nature had appeared, and it was probable that "still further campaign tricks" would be exposed.31 Angered by Lee's response, Glade bemoaned the attempt to convince people to close their eyes to his years of honest service and to believe that he was suddenly dishonest, extravagant, and capable of promising everything to everyone in "a wild orgy of vote-getting."32 But Lee would not relent. On the eve of the election he ran a newspaper ad alleging that Glade had promised strike funds in return for the labor vote and that he planned to ask for a law granting unemployment compensation to employees of a struck plant after a certain number of days. Lee wondered if Glade would raise taxes to get the money. Then, self-consciously, he berated Glade for the Weber fiasco by asking, "Would you continue to promise a four-year Weber College?"33 The prevalent assertion that Glade was "out of character" in his race for the governorship became the essence of the Lee campaign. As one advertisement said: Let's keep them both in the jobs where their know how born of experience will pay off in service to the public. Glade an experienced Mayor, Lee an experienced Governor.34 Another asked, "If Glade were elected Governor, who would become Mayor of Salt Lake City?"35 as if it were ridiculous or irresponsible for Glade to seek the office. Yet, Lee supporters claimed Glade should remain as mayor even though they believed that he lacked the experience to be governor. The paradox that was never answered was this: if Glade was not fit to be governor, why was he fit to be mayor?

Milton Weilenmann bitterly objected to the direction of the campaign and charged Lee with distorting Glade's views because he feared him as a credible candidate. Glade was regarded as a 153

J . BRACKEN LEE

man who personified decency and honesty and therefore would be difficult to defeat, according to Weilenmann. He reasoned that because there was no hint of wrongdoing or dishonesty in Glade's record, Lee's forces grasped at straws, resulting in an unfair and "dirty" campaign. "If you would believe the hysterical rantings of the governor," said Weilenmann, Glade was "a poor, spineless man captured by a bunch of crooks and nothing more than their dupe." Weilenmann argued that such a tactic was "more than foul," it was an "insult to every Utah voter."30 Lee handily defeated Glade, 180,043 to 147,207, receiving 55.1 percent of the vote and running significantly ahead of the rest of the state ticket.37 In a clean sweep, Republicans were also elected to the other four state offices—secretary of state, attorney general, auditor, and treasurer. It was a complete reversal of 1948, capped by the election of a Republican legislature. Although Lee shared in the Eisenhower national sweep, the Tribune claimed the victory was an "endorsement of the man himself." In a statement suggestive of campaign folders, the editors said: The voters recognized Governor Lee as a man of courage and honesty and remembered that he had fulfilled his previous pledges of economy in government. The Governor campaigned with the forthrightness which has marked his whole official life. His opponent, on the other hand, was completely out of character. It was a question of the voice of Jacob and the hands of Esau.38 Lee had succeeded in neutralizing the potentially dangerous education issue and capitalized on Glade's mistakes. Even the Tribune took the Republican party line against Glade. Yet, Glade was a devout Mormon, a man of spotless reputation, almost universally respected, presenting a startling contrast to Lee. He had founded the church-owned and -operated radio station KSL and acted as its president prior to election as mayor.

Like Maw before him, he was a member of the LDS church's Sunday School General Board. Also like Maw, he failed to get church support for his drive to be governor even though church leaders held him in greater respect than they did Maw. There is 154

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no doubt that the church supported Lee in 1952—not Glade— in spite of Glade's exemplary life. For instance, the Deseret News revealed its Republican bias in this observation after the election: The re-election of Governor J. Bracken Lee must be viewed as a solid endorsement of his political philosophy of government by practical common sense. Probably no chief executive in the State's history has been so consistently under fire from one group after another because of his economics and policy decisions, made without fear or favor, but in what he considered the best interests of the state as a whole. He has stood firmly on his record, and he campaigned on a platform of four more years of the same. . . .

Salt Lake City may feel a certain sense of double victory in the governor's re-election, in that his opponent, Earl J. Glade, will now resume his duties as Mayor, a position he has occupied with dignity and administrative accomplishment for the past 9 years.39 Lee's description of the day after the election provides additional insight. President and Mrs. David O. McKay attended a luncheon in honor of the Lees and the Glades. Lee recalled that the Glades were standing next to the McKays when he and his wife entered the room. President McKay said to Lee "with a rather loud voice, "Am I glad you won that election!'" Lee was embarrassed because of Glade's presence, but he reasoned that McKay preferred him to Glade because he had no use for Rennie [L. C ] Romney—he hated Romney with a passion—and Romney controlled Glade. Everybody knew it, see. Romney'd pull the strings and Glade'd jump. And I think that's how he got the nomination for governor. Romney got him in the party.40 Convinced that Glade was "told what to say," Lee believed that Glade was a weak candidate for governor: Earl was always a sort of a conservative, good talker . . . never offend anyone, and he let some of these Democrats get a hold of him and he changed his whole position and he was out of character. I think he would have been a strong candidate if he'd a just stayed Earl Glade. But when he got out of character, he was lost.41 155

J . BRACKEN LEE

Recalling that Glade was elected mayor of Salt Lake City on a nonpartisan ballot and had never had to prove his party affiliation, Lee insisted that Glade was a lifelong Republican from a Republican family.42 Through the course of the campaign, Glade had denied these accusations, and Mrs. Glade had reaffirmed those denials.43 It is commonly believed that Glade did not campaign aggressively enough. That he was somewhat inexperienced politically is borne out by his postelection letter to political scientist Frank Jonas: "Actually, I know nothing about politics and have no political contacts . . . during the campaign for governor, nearly all the monetary support I received came from Republicans."44 These comments tend to reinforce Lee's interpretation of Glade's political expertise and his affiliation.

With all of the forces working against Glade—his church, Salt Lake's two major newspapers, and his own ineffectual campaigning, not to mention an incredibly popular Republican president—his impeccable credentials meant virtually nothing.

Besides, he was running against a man who had by 1952 become a seasoned politician with a bonafide conservative record. Utah was comfortable with J. Bracken Lee.

156

REELECTION, 1952 ^Deseret News, June 29, 1952.

2 Salt Lake Tribune, November 1, 1952. Ad paid for by Oscar W. McConkie, a Democrat, former judge, and mission president for the Mormon church.

3 Frank Jonas, "The 1952 Elections in Utah," Proceedings of the Utah Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters 45, part 1 (1968) :51. i Salt Lake Tribune, October 16, 1952. ^Salt Lake Tribune, October 18, 1952.

G Salt Lake Tribune, October 16, 1952. See "Battle Corner," a regular campaign column for Republican and Democratic state chairmen before the election. ''Salt Lake Tribune, October 16, 1952. s Salt Lake Tribune, October 17, 1952. s Salt Lake Tribune, October 21, 1952.

"Salt Lake Tribune, October 29, 1952.

"Salt Lake Tribune, October 17, 1952.

12 Ibid.

"Salt Lake Tribune, October 18, 1952.

"Salt Lake Tribune, October 23, 1952.

"Salt Lake Tribune, October 25, 1952.

"Salt Lake Tribune, October 29, 1952.

"Salt Lake Tribune, October 26, 1952.

"Salt Lake Tribune, October 18, 1952.

"Salt Lake Tribune, October 19, 1952.

20 Salt Lake Tribune, October 24, 1952.

21 Salt Lake Tribune, October 23, 1952.

22 Salt Lake Tribune, October 26, 1952.

23 Salt Lake Tribune, October 21, 1952.

2i Salt Lake Tribune, October 22, 1952.

25 Salt Lake Tribune, October 28, 1952.

26 Salt Lake Tribune, October 24, 1952. Lee also said that Glade told every spending group, "If you will vote for us we will give you a blank check." See Salt Lake Tribune, October 22, 1952.

"Salt Lake Tribune, October 28, 1952.

2S Salt Lake Tribune, October 30, 1952.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Salt Lake Tribune, October 31, 1952.

32 Salt Lake Tribune, November 1, 1952.

33 Salt Lake Tribune, November 2, 1952.

3i Salt Lake Tribune, October 24, 1952. Paid political ad by C. C. Cotton.

35 Salt Lake Tribune, November 1, 1952. The idea expressed in this ad was prevalent in other advertising throughout the campaign.

3a Salt Lake Tribune, October 17, 1952.

"Salt Lake Tribune, November 6, 1952.

38 Ibid.

39 Deseret News, November 5, 1952, editorial.

40 Lee interview.

Mrs.. Earl J. Glade asserted that she never heard President David O. McKay make that statement. Sarah R. Glade to author, September 5, 1975.

157

J. BRACKEN LEE L. C. ("Rennie") Romney was a prominent Democrat who became a Salt Lake City commissioner and was a candidate for governor on the Democratic ticket in 1956 when Lee sought a third term. Unfortunately, Romney declined to comment to the author on Lee's assertions.

"Lee interview.

42 Ibid.

43 Glade to author.

"Earl J. Glade to Frank Jonas, quoted in Jonas, "The 1952 Elections," p. 55.

158

13 The United Nations At the 1953 Governors' Conference, Lee made national headlines by offering some controversial resolutions about the United Nations. He called upon the president and Congress to insist that member nations contribute military personnel in direct proportion to each member nation's population. Lee complained that the United States and South Korea had borne almost the entire burden of battle in Korea. His second resolution called for appointment of a presidential commission to study all phases of U.S. membership in the United Nations "to the end that our people may be apprised fully as to our liabilities and privileges in the organization."1 To his chagrin he received no support for either resolution from the other governors. However, ultraconservative William Loeb, editor and publisher of the Manchester Union Leader, lauded Lee's proposals and optimistically estimated that 80 percent of the American people would favor them because they were designed to force a showdown on "the whole nonsense in connection with the United Nations." Arguing for more strong and assertive leaders like Lee, Loeb bellowed, "Governor Lee is in step; the others aren't."2 In a related matter Lee supported congressional conservatives led by Sen. John Bricker of Ohio who proposed a constitutional amendment that would have required a treaty made by the president with a foreign country to be sanctioned by a majority vote of both houses of Congress to become effective. Treaties, then, would become subject to the legislative process. Critics suggested that the amendment would make the U.S. system the most cumbersome in the world, imposing delays and seriously weakening our bargaining position with other nations. The amendment also would have confined the government's power 159

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to make treaties to those subjects on which Congress could legislate under the powers delegated to it by the Constitution. State legislatures would have had to acquiesce in agreements that involved subjects ordinarily thought not to be so delegated, such as narcotics control and atomic energy. Finally, the amendment would have given Congress the right to regulate executive and other international agreements, thus trimming considerably the emergency power of the president. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles thought it would be "calamitous" for the country, and President Eisenhower said he was unalterably opposed to it because it "would hamper the President in his Constitutional authority to conduct foreign affairs."3 As a conservative, Lee favored the amendment as a necessary means of defending the Constitution from being subordinated to treaties that jeopardized the system of government; therefore, he proposed it to the Utah legislature, which passed a resolution of support and forwarded it to Congress.4 Congress rejected it. Lee also proposed it to the 1953 Governors' Conference which also rejected it.

Lee remained undeterred. In a radio interview he took a more radical turn and proposed U.S. withdrawal from the United Nations unless his desired changes took place. He asserted that the people would demand withdrawal unless the UN were founded on moral standards.5 Brigham Young University Professor Richard D. Poll rebuked Lee for suggesting that the UN be "junked," thus restoring the isolationism of the 1920s and 1930s. Poll admitted that the UN had "not brought the Millennium," but he reminded Lee that the people of Utah were unusually cosmopolitan and entertained a philosophy emphasizing the brotherhood of man. Perhaps, he said, there were greater virtues for Lee to cultivate than candor.0 In a defensive reply Lee insisted that he was not suggesting "junking" the UN unless it could not stand up under investigation.

He maintained that its chief defect was the voice given to the Soviet Union in all affairs, "knowing all the while that the objectives of Communism include world enslavement" and the violation of any agreement if that would further her aims.7 160

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Soon afterward he enthusiastically endorsed a letter and petition to the president from some prominent Americans denouncing the admission of Red China to the UN.8 In justification of his support Lee argued that Communist China's membership would have made the UN "that much worse."9 He noted that even John Foster Dulles had criticized the UN as inadequate because its "effective functioning depends upon cooperation with a nation which is dominated by an international party seeking world domination."10 Since the alleged purpose of the UN was prevention of war, Lee called it ridiculous to include in its inner circle a power that practiced war and aggression. It was, he said, like putting "the top criminal on the Police Commission."11 But his most radical statements were still to come. In a network radio debate with Palmer Hoyt, editor and publisher of the Denver Post, Lee argued that the UN had cost the U.S. "millions of dollars, and when we run out of money we won't have any friends left." It was his opinion that the country was "just one Supreme Court justice away from being controlled by the United Nations," because there were already court decisions suggesting that the UN charter superseded the Constitution. Lee believed that to be justification enough for passing the Bricker Amendment.12 If we stay in the United Nations, this is what will happen.

We will slowly but surely have our Constitutional rights taken away from us. . . . We are slowly going to turn this nation Communist.13 In a symbolic gesture of his opposition, Lee refused to declare United Nations Day in Utah. He was immediately congratulated for his "courageous position" by John Bricker, who personally supported the UN but opposed "setting aside one day a year for the purpose of holding a UN propaganda festival."14 Lee explained to Bricker that he had refused to declare UN Day because of the arbitrary refusal of the Governors' Conference a year earlier to take action on his UN proposals. When those resolutions failed, he could "no longer give wholehearted support to the UN."15 161

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The White House found Lee's action regrettable, and Sherman Adams, assistant to the president, disputed Lee's claim that the UN was not an effective instrument. Adams referred to Eisenhower's statement designating UN Day in which he affirmed that the UN was "man's most determined and promising effort to save humanity from the scourge of war and to promote conditions of peace and well-being for all nations." In a personal letter, Adams tried to convince Lee that the UN had demonstrated its ability to stop armed conflicts that might have erupted into world wars, had struck at the root causes of international unrest, and had helped to transform colonialism into self-government. Even Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold admitted that the UN was imperfect but that the concept of world community to move from barbarism to civilization would produce a more abundant life for all. Lee remained unimpressed and announced his intention to declare United States Day in Utah the day before UN Day.16 In a letter to Morehead Patterson, chairman of the U.S. Committee for UN Day, Lee called it incredible that the people were being asked to "continue to pay blind tribute to the United Nations." He suggested that if the UN were really effective, a NATO-type alliance of Far Eastern nations to meet the threat of Red imperialism in that sector would not be necessary.

As for the plan to "stress the spiritual significance of the United Nations concept" because October 24 this year falls on a Sunday, I wonder if your committee has forgotten that the Communist doctrine is atheistic and that Communist nations have long records of religious persecution. Reference to God in the United Nations charter was omitted because of Communist objections, as I recall. In these circumstances, it is sheer mockery to plan the type of observance you intend.17 Lee may have hoped to appeal to the Mormon population of his state by suggesting a sacrilegious intent in UN Day. Of course, the comparison was overdrawn.

Lee expressed much greater antagonism in his private letter to Sherman Adams. Explaining that he had not intended to reply at all, he claimed that the recent testimony of Gen. Mark Clark 162

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had changed his mind. Clark said he did not respect the UN and that it "should be reorganized as a United Nations against the Soviet Union." According to Lee, "even the most backward schoolboy certainly must be aware of the Communist conspiracy master-minded in the Soviet Union to overthrow the world."

As General Clark put it, the UN found an asset in having "their spies and saboteurs spawning around over here." With tongue in cheek, Lee then suggested that the president include a gangster or two in his cabinet to make it a forum for the presentation of different points of view.18 While Lee's supporters considered his UN stand courageous, he nevertheless offended many citizens. Some thought that he was forcing his views on the entire population of the state. Some thought that his loss in the primary election of 1956, during his third-term bid, was directly attributable to his UN stand. UN supporters prevailed upon him to repent and declare UN Day in his last year in office as a symbolic gesture to the people. Unmoved, Lee insisted that his stand was more beneficial than harmful and was done absolutely without political considerations.19 In ensuing years Lee continued to assess the UN as the "biggest phony thing that ever happened," built on a foundation of sand and filled with injustice. He saw no honesty in European politics and cited George Washington as one who warned against entangling alliances. But Lee mellowed on China. He came to feel that China's admittance into the UN was inevitable, simply because it was impossible to ignore such a huge nation. Speculating that world government would only bring world dictatorship, Lee concluded, "These people who are dreaming of world government are completely nuts!"20 Lee's stand on the UN represents the best example of his traditional right-wing philosophy, completely unmarred by time and history. He never conceded any benefit from the UN and over the years continued to interpret world politics and Communism in the framework of the 1950s. The same is true with respect to his analysis of Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy, who came almost universally to be considered detrimental to American 163

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society and foreign affairs. In a 1953 radio broadcast Lee made this statement in support of McCarthy: People say that he's destroying the reputation and characters of people; I want somebody in all of America to write me a letter and give me the name of one individual whose character has been hurt. Now, supposing I fool around with Communists and I'm called before that committee. Now, I can say that McCarthy hurt my reputation but who hurt it?

I hurt it myself because I was fooling around with bad company. Now, what has he done besides try to root traitors out of government? Maybe we could knock the edges off, and polish the edges up, on Senator McCarthy but when you did, I don't think he'd be able to root Communists out.21 One of the most effective letters Lee received to challenge his claims came from Richard Poll, who named UN delegate and law professor Philip C. Jessup, Dean Acheson, and George Marshall as persons whose reputations had been hurt. Poll accurately explained that no administrative or judicial tribunal had supported McCarthy's charges that Jessup was a fellow traveler.

Further, said Poll, the Eisenhower administration had adopted 95 percent of the Acheson foreign policy, suggesting little basis for the McCarthy charge of incompetence. No evidence existed that Acheson had committed treason or that George Marshall had entertained ties with the Communists. Poll quoted Eisenhower, who said, "The right to question a man's judgment carries with it no right to question his honor." Finally, Poll ventured the prediction that Lee's philosophy about the UN and McCarthy would go down in history with the rejected philosophies of Fisher Ames, John C. Calhoun, William Graham Sumner, and the American Liberty League.22 Lee weakly replied that he may have overstated the case for McCarthy but only because too many people were inclined to criticize him and defend those he had exposed: I contend, however, that in rooting out subversives from government he is doing far more good than harm. His recent activities have merited the praise of the Deseret News and Telegram, as I recall.23 164

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In 1954 Lee went so far as to share a Chicago rostrum with McCarthy, whom he had praised and defended against censure.

In a telegram to Rabbi Benjamin Schultz, coordinator of the National Rally for Joe McCarthy, he said, "the move to censure Sen. McCarthy will be a serious mistake—he should be commended."24 Lee's opposition to censure put him in direct conflict with Utah's two Republican senators, Wallace F. Bennett and Arthur V. Watkins, who were strongly backing censure in the Senate. Lee announced that he intended to make a speech to the nation in support of McCarthy during a giant rally for him in Madison Square Garden.25 He endorsed McCarthy as a "real American" and said that he could not agree that he was a headline-seeker. "I know what he's up against," Lee sympathized, "I've had a little of it myself." Then, in the strongest statement of all, Lee concluded, "God bless him as far as I am concerned. I think we are making a terrible mistake if we don't follow the goal of Senator McCarthy."20 Over the years Lee's views remained unchanged. He continued to think that McCarthy was "crucified" and that Watkins in his role as chairman of the committee was the "tool of Eisenhower" in the act of censure. Allegedly, McCarthy did the country no harm: I think that there's ample evidence that [for] everyone he ever mentioned he was right on. Not only that . . . — I felt sorry for the poor devil, because I knew something that very few people knew—that this list of names was furnished to him by the FBI—that this was an absolute record. And he was in a position where he could not betray the trust. And when they accused him of not having any records—he had the records, but he couldn't use them!27 Probably, Lee never did understand the depth of the problem. Assuming that anyone McCarthy accused was either guilty or had been "in bad company," Lee seemed not to have considered the possibility that some of the accused were not guilty at all. McCarthy's blacklisting technique kept thousands of people from finding work in their professions, ample evidence that he did the country harm. It took at least twenty years to 165

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effect a recovery process. While the young grew up with an inflated impression of Communism, Americans as a whole sustained an exaggerated fear of what Communists might do to the country. Unquestionably, McCarthy's effect on a whole generation was profoundly negative. By the same token, although the UN was not successful in eliminating war it proved to be an effective instrument for negotiation, communication, and cultural exchange. Richard Poll was right in predicting that Lee's views of the UN and of McCarthy would be rejected by history.

However, Lee's attitudes toward war are not so easily dismissed. After the 1954 Governors' Conference, he returned home calling for a reassessment of American foreign policy.

Visibly disturbed, Lee made the ominous prediction that the country was "getting ready to go to war" and that the administration was "trying to prepare the American people for the worst."

He feared that the people were so immersed in what he regarded as the excessive press coverage of the McCarthy hearings that they would "wake up and find themselves in a war we don't want." He urged those who did not want a "shooting war in Indo-China" to "sit right down and let their congressmen and senators know where they stand."28 Sounding strangely modern in an isolationist stand that would soon be embraced by Democrats, Lee said he was "not in sympathy with sending any more American troops to any more foreign countries to fight any more foreign wars." He was firmly convinced that intervention in past wars had been a mistake, and that "we had better stay home and attend to our own business."2" But war became a more acceptable alternative the following year when Lee discovered that the State Department still listed 500 Americans held by the Communists as a result of the Korean War. It was his opinion that the U.S. had a moral obligation to those prisoners and should serve notice on Communist China to release them: "And if the Reds do not comply within a reasonable amount of time, such action as necessary should be taken to gain their release, even though it meant war."30 Similarly, once involved in war the country must expend every effort to win it. For instance, when the Vietnam conflict 166

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reached a crucial stage in 1965 Lee called on the administration to withdraw from South Vietnam or win the war by "any means, including use of nuclear weapons." Supposedly, the "real reason for war" was the U.S. failure to support Chiang Kai-shek years earlier, thus delivering Asia to the Communists.31 In the aftermath, Lee was not sure that either Korea or Vietnam was "worthwhile," and he blamed the United States for each mistake. He recalled being disturbed enough over the Korean War that he wired every governor, imploring each one to refuse to relinquish control of his national guard unless Congress formally declared war: "I got one favorable answer. The Governor of Wyoming agreed with me." Because of the lack of response he pursued the matter no further, but he regretted not doing so. Nevertheless, he held the deep conviction that he should support his national leaders: I have the right as a citizen, and every other citizen does, to expect that when your government has decided that they're going to war, that they and everybody in this country must put everything they've got into winning it as fast as they can.

And I say if a country and its leadership is not willing to do that, then we should never go to war. So I say, either go in there for the purpose of winnin' this thing and no foolin' around about it, or get outl"32 According to Lee, the country fought a "half-hearted no win war" in Korea and Vietnam. If he had been in Nixon's position after the election of 1968 he would have called in all his military leaders and asked what was necessary and said, "All right, and I'm holding you responsible. I'm giving you so much to do it, and if you don't do it, or look like you're gonna fail, you're through! 'Cause I'm gonna win it!" Then he would have instructed the people to give up dessert and help pay for it, because "I inherited it, but I'm not gonna back out." If, on the other hand, the military had said, " 'We can't win it; we're just wasting lives,' then I'd a said, then get outV™ Especially with respect to Korea and Vietnam, there was great sympathy in the United States for that typically conservative philosophy embraced by many Republicans and conforming 167

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to traditional military strategy. In later years Lee seemed far less radical in its espousal than earlier when he had praised McCarthy or attacked the UN. Yet, there was a certain consistency to his foreign policy beliefs which seethed hostility toward alliances and war but embraced patriotism and militarism once war was chosen.

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THE UNITED NATIONS Manchester (N.H.) Union Leader, August 21, 1953.

2 Ibid. Loeb sent a copy of the pro-Lee editorial to Lee with a note saying, "Congratulations!" (Loeb to Lee, August 23, 1953.) Lee agreed with Loeb's estimate that 80 percent of the American people would support his stand and thanked him heartily. (Lee to Loeb, September 2, 1953.) Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

3 Committee for Defense of the Constitution, Position Statement on the Bricker Amendment, ibid.

4 Lee to Lucius D. Clay, Edward Corwin, John W. Davis, December 28, 1953, ibid.

5 Facts Forum, State of the Nation, transcript of radio broadcast, August 1953, with Dan Smoot, moderator; J. Bracken Lee, guest; and O. N. Malmquist and M. DeMar Teuscher interviews, ibid.

6 Richard D. Poll to Lee, September 2, 1953, ibid. Poll was then an associate professor of history at Brigham Young University and secretary of Republican District 36 in Provo, Utah; he was a delegate to the Republican State Convention in 1952.

7 Lee to Poll, September 30, 1953, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

8 Charles Edison, Walter H. Judd, Joseph Grew, Herbert Hoover, John McCormick, John Sparkman, and H. Alexander Smith to Lee, October 2, 1953, ibid.

9 Lee to Dr. F. A. Harper, Hudson, N.Y., November 30, 1953, ibid.

10 J. Bracken Lee, "Should UN Remain a Major Plank in US Policy?"

Foreign Policy Bulletin, October 15, 1953, p. 4.

"The Freeman (Irvington, N.Y.), September 21, 1953.

"Ogden Standard-Examiner, December 20, 1954.

"Deseret News, December 20, 1954.

14 John Bricker to Lee, June 30, 1954, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

15 Lee to Bricker, July 7, 1954, ibid.

"New York Times, October 22, 1954.

17 Lee to Morehead Patterson, chairman, U.S. Committee for UN Day, Washington, D.C., May 21, 1954, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

18 Lee to Sherman Adams, assistant to President Eisenhower, August 12, 1954,19ibid.

Lee to L. H. Kirkpatrick, librarian, University of Utah, September 23, 1956, ibid.

20 Lee interview.

21 Facts Forum radio broadcast.

22 Poll to Lee. 23 Lee to Poll.

2i Salt Lake Tribune, November 5, 1954.

25 Deseret News, November 29, 1954.

26 Salt Lake Tribune, March 25, 1954.

"Lee interview.

2S Deseret News, April 30, 1954.

2S Deseret News, June 12, 1954.

30 Deseret News, April 18, 1955.

31 Deseret News, August 18, 1955.

32 Lee interview.

33 Ibid.

169

14 McCarthyism and Justice Wolfe With the help of J. Bracken Lee the wave of McCarthyism claimed as a victim James H. Wolfe, chief justice of the Utah State Supreme Court. A member of the court since 1935, he had been chief justice during 1943-45 and succeeded to the post again in 1951. In February 1953 he was criticized by Counterattack, a conservative publication purporting to combat communism. The publication accused Wolfe of a "fifteen-year front record" based on the following information: He had written to President Eisenhower urging the commutation of the death sentences of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. During the time of the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact, Wolfe allegedly condemned the "war hysteria" of FDR and defended the Communist party veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. In 1942 he wrote to President Roosevelt urging the release of Communist party leader Earl Browder who was in prison for passport fraud. Allegedly, he supported "such obvious fronts as the Civil Rights Congress, the National Council of Arts, Sciences and Professions, and the National Conferences on American Policy in China and the Far East."1 In short, Wolfe was thought to be "one of the most prominent 'peace' fronters in the U.S.," allying himself to various peace organizations suspected of Communist ties. He was accused of signing a statement denouncing the prosecution of U.S. politburo members under the Smith Act and was written up in the Daily Worker with the headline, "Chief Justice of Utah Rips Trial of '12.'" He was criticized for denouncing the anti-Communist film "The Iron Curtain," based on exposure of a Canadian atomic espionage ring, and for sponsoring a 1951 testimonial dinner for W. E. B. Du Bois, prominent Black historian, who was accused of having Communist ties. Finally, Wolfe "plugged the 171

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party's line on a truce in Korea" by signing a letter to Truman urging him to bring the war to an end "at the height of Moscow's 'cease fire' propaganda offensive in the summer of 1951." 2 Many conservative people took the advice of Counterattack and wrote to Governor Lee to complain about a "Communist front man" as chief justice. Even George Romney, ostensibly a moderate Republican, became involved. Romney, then vicepresident of Nash-Kelvinator, told Lee that a number of people had called his attention "to the communist front record of Chief Justice James H. Wolfe."

As a former Utahan, it is increditable that the Chief Justice of the Utah Supreme Court should have a record of extensive support and endorsement of communistic activities.

According to the information others have brought to my attention, he has intervened in the Rosenberg case, supported the Stalin-Hitler pact, criticized the trial of the twelve communistic leaders, denounced anti-communist films and plugged the party's line of a truce in Korea.3 It is not difficult to tell that Romney was a reader of Counterattack and had become caught up in the spirit of the witch hunt.

Happily, a few of the publication's readers decided to write Wolfe directly, instead of the governor, and ask if the charges were true. Wolfe replied candidly concerning the charges, admitting, for instance, that he wrote to Eisenhower requesting clemency for the Rosenbergs; but he defended it as a right of an American citizen. He said he had joined a petition for the release of Earl Browder because he had served an unusually long time for passport fraud. Wolfe claimed no knowledge of some of the charges. He could not recall ever seeing a copy of the Daily Worker and was astonished that an "invented" story would be devoted to him.4 He declared that he had not given authorization for use of his name or position. Finally, he asserted categorically that he was not a Communist, had never been a Communist, and was not a sympathizer: "In fact, I am very much opposed to it."

He suspected that the purpose of the campaign against him was to frighten people from joining any organization designed to protect civil liberties or promote peace.5 172

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The famous House Un-American Activities Committee held a file on Wolfe listing the supposed front organizations with which he had been associated.0 Governor Lee made a point of obtaining a copy of that file. Reacting to the information it contained, he wrote the president of the Utah State Senate, enclosed copies of the file from the House committee as well as copies of Counterattack, and requested an investigation. He also referred to complaints that Justice Wolfe was not a "bonafide resident of Utah" and spent only a minimum amount of time in the state.7 Incensed, Wolfe immediately requested that the governor retain the "considerable mail," which, Lee claimed, had caused him to take action, "with the stamped date of receipt" in case it should become important to the investigation. Showing his legal mind at its best, Wolfe requested the date, "if not the exact hour" in which Lee provided the local newspapers with the information contained in Counterattack* To the press, Wolfe asserted that no one could prove him a sympathizer—"all they can do is to try to blacken and smear me." Although he freely admitted that he had always been a "liberal," he claimed never to have had anything to do with communism and hence had no fear of the investigation. As to his residency, Wolfe accused the governor of being out of the state more than he and said that his wife had inherited a fruit ranch in California, requiring her to spend a great deal of time there during the planting season. However, he emphasized that she was "merely a sojourner in California" and paid taxes in Utah, as he himself did. He denied that he had ever been out of the state for more than ninety days at a time but justified his right to do some of his work in California.9 At the conclusion of the investigation, conducted by a special committee of the House of Representatives, a report was submitted to the governor. The committee addressed itself first to the matter of residence, noting that Utah law provided that any judicial officer absent for more than ninety days automatically forfeited his office. However, they found no evidence that Wolfe had been absent for such a period, nor that he was not a legal resident of the state. More significant, the report stated: 173

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Second, the evidence further indicates that Chief Justice Wolfe is not a communist and has never been a communist and that he is not a communist sympathizer and that he has never been a communist sympathizer.10 With regard to the use of his name by certain organizations, the report quoted Wolfe at a public hearing conducted by the committee: "I should have perhaps been more cautious and prudent in permitting the use of my name." He realized that a chief justice should be more cautious "than the ordinary person" in permitting the use of his name and that some organizations did "use names beyond the purview for which they were authorized."

Satisfied with the results, the committee recommended that no further action be taken.11 It was an encouraging victory for Wolfe in light of the destruction of reputations throughout the country. Unquestionably, the legislature acted fairly and prudently in a highly emotional climate. Ostensibly, Lee considered the matter closed, and yet he subsequently monitored Wolfe's activities very closely.

Unfortunately, before the end of the year, Wolfe became ill, necessitating a leave of absence from his official duties, finally totaling 122 days in convalescence. Disturbed at the lengthy absence, Lee began pressing Wolfe for a resignation, reminding him that at the onset of his illness he had announced an intention to resign. Lee extended the leave of absence for an additional thirty days, for which Wolfe was grateful, to provide time for him to make a decision. Wolfe insisted that he had not promised resignation but only expressed an "intention," based on his health and his ability to complete his work in the present term. He objected to Lee's implication to the public that he had been insincere in discussing resignation.12 Wolfe claimed that he had not been totally inactive during his lengthy leave: "A judge of the Appellate Court, differing from a trial judge, may take the record of the case out of the State and do his research there." He reminded Lee that Chief Justice Cherry had recovered from a prolonged illness in Arizona, and Judge Frick had recuperated from a severe illness in California. Wolfe was also disturbed by Lee's inference that 174

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other members of the court were carrying his burden in his absence. He argued that thirty years in service of the state should entitle him to a period of recovery and claimed that he had gladly carried the workload of others in times of illness or stress.13 The thirty-day extension was not adequate for recovery, and Wolfe formally resigned on March 6, 1954, when he was almost seventy years old. Although he had made "considerable recovery," he still lacked the strength to do the demanding work of the chief justice, and thus he was advised by physicians to retire.

He expressed high admiration for others who had served with him in the judiciary but purposely omitted any expression of gratitude to the governor.14 Likewise, Lee tersely accepted the letter of resignation, saying nothing about Wolfe's long service to the state.1" Wolfe recovered from the episode remarkably well, considering the blacklists of the 1950s, but the incident was nothing in which Utahns could take pride. Although the legislative committee fully exonerated Wolfe, Lee seemed unable to forgive him and the matter cast a shadow over the career of the chief justice.

It is impossible to know to what extent, if any, his illness was precipitated by the embarrassing charges and subsequent investigation. The episode demonstrated how deeply Utahns were mired in McCarthyism and how fervently the governor subscribed to anti-Communist hysteria. Utah was not immune to the witch hunts.

175

J. BRACKEN LEE Counterattack, Facts to Combat Communism (New York), February 27, 1953, p. 2.

2 Ibid.

3 George Romney to Lee, March 17, 1953, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

Romney was executive vice-president, Nash-Kelvinator (later American Motors), Detroit. Eventually he became president of the corporation and then governor of Michigan.

4 James H. Wolfe to George E. Stringfellow, East Orange, N.J., March 9, 1953, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

5 Ibid.

6 U.S., Congress, House, Un-American Activities Committee, copy of file dated February 11, 1953, concerning James H. Wolfe, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

7 Lee to Mark Paxton, president, Utah State Senate, March 7, 1953, ibid.

8 Wolfe to Lee, March 9, 1953, ibid. ^Deseret News, March 9, 1953.

10 Utah, Legislature, House, Report of Special Committee Concerning Chief Justice James H. Wolfe, March 12, 1953, Lee Gubernatorial Papers. The committee included Ralph Sheffield (R-Salt Lake), chairman, Clair R. Hopkins, Richard C. Howe, Wayne C. Durham, Wendell Grover, Orville Gunther, Haven J. Barlow, L. Frank Redd, W. G. Larson, G. Douglas Taylor, and William E. Anderson.

"Ibid.

12 Wolfe to Lee, February 6, 1954, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

13 Ibid.

14 Wolfe to Lee, March 6, 1954, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

15 Lee to Wolfe, March 11, 1954, ibid. Lee's notation on the letter from Wolfe said, "I suppose we should reply in some way." Lee later claimed that the Communist sympathizer charges had nothing to do with his seeking an investigation of Wolfe. Rather, he was concerned solely with Wolfe's absences from court and from Utah: "Every 90 days he'd come back. He wasn't doin' a thing! He'd stay a couple of days and go back to California." Lee said Wolfe offered to resign if he could name his own replacement. Lee said he would gladly accept several names as recommendations but that he would insist on actually naming Wolfe's replacement. Wolfe did not resign after that discussion. Lee interview.

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15 Snoopers and Looters Throughout his political career Lee demonstrated a deep concern about the federal income tax and its implications for American democracy. He considered the Sixteenth Amendment the "worst thing that's ever happened to this country" and believed that its repeal could have helped to avert both world wars as well as the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. He angrily labeled the IRS a Gestapo, far worse than that which existed in either Germany or Russia: At least they'd come and knock on your door and take ya out and kill ya or they'd put ya in jail. Your troubles were over.

But these people will hound you from the day you file your first return and they'll hound your heirs after you're dead.

And I can prove it. I've been audited every year since 1934 —without exception.1 Lee's first encounter with the Internal Revenue Service came in 1934 when they audited his insurance business. When the auditor arrived Lee resolutely refused to allow him access to his books without a court order. Promptly, the auditor pulled from his pocket a court order, already signed by the judiciary, and coolly placed Lee's name on the appropriate line. Of course, he had no choice but to allow the audit to proceed, but when the auditor announced that he owed an additional $800 Lee was furious. "I said, 'You know that isn't right!' I had a hell of a row with him." Because he doubted the validity of the results, Lee refused to pay and maintained a steady correspondence with the IRS until they finally wrote him a letter of apology. They admitted making a mistake and announced that the sum he actually owed was $80. Still unconvinced, he felt compelled to pay it on the grounds that it would cost more to contest it. Subsequently, he addressed all correspondence with the IRS to 177

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"Snoopers and Looters," and it was always delivered "right to their door."2 It was no surprise, then, that by the 1950s, Lee was taking a public stand on income tax, which led to his authoring the foreword to a book by Frank Chodorov, The Income Tax, Root of All Evil. In it Lee claimed that the Sixteenth Amendment enabled the federal government to put its hands into the pockets of the people and draw their allegiance away from their local governments. He admonished those who stood for freedom to "concentrate on the correction of the mistake of 1913. The 16th Amendment must be repealed. Nothing else will do."3 Following publication Lee mounted an intensive campaign to interest other politicians in the book's thesis. As a prelude to the 1954 Governors' Conference he wrote letters to several governors and sent them copies of the book. Although a few expressed sympathy for the thesis, they worried about several related problems, such as how federal spending would be apportioned among the states without the income tax, how the government would meet the probability of a state's defaulting on its share,4 and how the government would deal with large national corporations if the states were collecting all the money.5 Lee brushed off these objections impatiently, arguing that they were only minor details that could be worked out later.0 At the Governors' Conference he tried to persuade his colleagues to go on record in favor of repeal of the Sixteenth Amendment. Lee argued that the states had exclusive rights to the income tax field. In his opinion the federal government should present the states with an annual tax bill; in turn, the states should levy within their boundaries and remit to Washington. Unfortunately, Gov. Arthur Langlie of Washington, who was acting as discussion chairman, pounded the gavel on Lee before he finished making his proposal. Afterward, Lee complained that it was an "attempt to muzzle" him, and he demanded a public apology. In spite of the stir at the head table his fiery presentation received a warm round of applause.7 Later, he explained that his motivation was the fear of the consequences 178

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of big government, such as had occurred in various totalitarian nations, when power became concentrated in the hands of a few.8 A national sensation overnight, Lee received an avalanche of mostly favorable, laudatory mail, suggesting that he run for president and declaring that he stood out "like a lighthouse" because of his "valiant efforts in behalf of the American way of life" and his concern for problems outside his own statehouse.9 Then, in October 1955 Lee dropped a bombshell. He formally announced his intention to withhold that portion of his federal income tax not already collected or withheld from salary in order to contest the right of the government to use taxpayers' money in foreign aid.10 He placed the money in a trust account at Walker Bank in Salt Lake City with instructions that it was to be paid only on a court order. Although he did not say so at the time, he thought that his position as governor might help him to receive consideration by the courts.11 The next day, officials of the Democratic party in Utah accused him of defying national laws and demanded that he either retract his statement or resign.12 He assured them that he had not assumed the governorship to "please the Democratic State Committee."13 Soon the governor's office reported a flood of letters and telegrams from all over the country commending Lee's decision.

By December his office reported that 1,500 letters had been received with 99 percent favoring his stand; by May 1956 the number had grown to 3,000.14 But criticism surfaced in other ways. Vandals decorated the governor's mansion with signs painted on the front steps: "We pay you, you pay too," "Pay Up, Brack," and "Grow up, Gov." Lee reacted calmly, calling it "a very good paint job—well above average."15 Almost uniformly the press was critical. The Deseret News observed that there was more than a "trace of suspicion" that Lee was after headlines, and the editors judged those headlines to be detrimental to Utah's dignity. On the other hand, the News did not agree with the "patently ridiculous" claim of his political opponents that he was an outlaw and should resign, for his tax money was set aside in a local bank ready for collection should the courts rule against him.10 179

Left: Lee's running feud with the IRS led to this "very good paint fob" in 1956.

Left: Presidential candidate Eisenhower is greeted by Governor Lee during the 1952 GOP campaign. Both men scored resounding victories in the general election. Deseret News photographs.

Left: Before his inauguration Lee visited State Capitol offices with Utah Supreme Court Justice Lester A. Wade, left, and Secretary of State Heber Bennion, Jr., right.

Right: Lee's economy drive made national news in Life, Time, and American magazines in 1950 during his first term as governor.

Left: In 1955 Lee signed Utah's open meeting law. Deseret News photographs.

J . BRACKEN LEE

In a biting editorial the Washington Post called Lee "an intentional tax dodger," unfamiliar with the fact that the founding fathers left to Congress the decision as to what is necessary to our national defense. They did not authorize individual citizens to withhold their taxes because they might disagree with some policies of the administration: "Even so ardent a foe of education as Governor Lee must have encountered these basic principles at some time in his career." Sarcastically, the Post suggested that Lee had burned his political bridges and that Utah Republicans, disturbed at the blight Lee placed on the party, were probably holding their breath for fear he would not go through with it.17 Equally sarcastic in its editorial, the Milwaukee Journal called Lee a "neanderthal politician" who should be dragged "screaming and kicking out of the past and into the 20th Century."18 However, David Lawrence, nationally syndicated columnist, noted that it was necessary to violate the law and run the risk of penalty to get a court test of constitutionality. He thought Lee was being abused.19 Similar support came from the conservative Arizona Republic, which congratulated him for being brave enough to speak his mind about all issues. Approvingly, the Republic predicted that Lee would run for the Senate, the vice-presidency, or even the presidency in 1956.20 Not surprisingly, the most glowing tribute came from Frank Chodorov's right-wing publication, The Freeman, which extolled Lee's stand as one of rare courage. Disdainful of the press for picturing Lee as "some kind of maniac," Chodorov compared him to Henry David Thoreau who went to jail for refusing to pay his taxes in Massachusetts.21 In spite of overwhelming public response, Lee expressed increasing doubt that a favorable interpretation would emanate from the courts.22 He insisted that he would still encourage any taxpayer who believed that either state or national appropriations or expenditures were unconstitutional or illegal to instigate court action.23 In a far-ranging speech in Chicago, he said he was "bloodying" his head against a brick wall to test the income tax 182

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question in the hope that he could get Americans thinking a little.24 Reaction from Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey was terse: "We will sue for the money."25 But he later advised Lee by letter that the Supreme Court in the case of Frothingham v. Meldon (1923) had "rejected a taxpayer's attempt to object to congressional appropriations on the ground that tax payments were being used for purposes claimed by the taxpayer to be unconstitutional." Using that precedent, Humphrey warned Lee if he did not pay by April 16 the IRS would proceed to collect it in the "customary and usual manner."20 Lee still refused to pay.

True to Humphrey's promise the government attached his bank account in the amount of $1,203.10 without a court order27 and placed a lien on his possessions.28 Although Lee advised bank officials that he would not give his consent to release the funds,20 they replied that they had "no other alternative" than to pay the government from his personal account.30 Lee said that he could have sued the bank, "but what good would it do? Then I'm suing my friends. So I went to the Supreme Court."31 Roland V. Wise, director of the IRS office in Utah, was highly critical of Lee and accused him of publicity-seeking: The constitutionality of the tax had been tested many times before. He did not have a good case or any new issue and, in my opinion, if he wanted to test the law again this was not a very practical or sensible way to do it. He very well knew, and was so informed, that he could file a claim for refund on a Form 843 on any taxes paid during the prior three years.

Then after IRS' rejection of the claim, or after six months from filing same, he could proceed with appeal rights up through all court levels, District, Circuit, and the Supreme Court. This procedure is open to anyone who wants to test the IRS Code. We have a self-assessment system, and when a return is filed the IRS must collect the tax so assessed— no delays for court action are permitted. Also, of course, it is against criminal tax law to intentionally not file when a return is due or to intentionally file a false or fraudulent return.32 Wise was unreasonably harsh, especially in his implication that Lee was guilty of violating criminal tax law. David Lawrence 183

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persuasively argued that no criminal action was involved if the taxpayer made his return and fully disclosed his income, which Lee did.33 Wise thought that the IRS "had bent over backward to deal fairly, carefully, and circumspectly with J. Bracken Lee."34 Of course, Lee recognized the potential for publicity. But political stardom notwithstanding, he sincerely hoped that his position as governor would enhance the case and force a change in the law. He acted on the assumption that a governor might be able to accomplish what a private citizen could not. He assumed that the press would force the government's hand, a realistic view of the role of publicity in advancing a cause. It did not happen that way. Ironically, the press treated Lee so caustically that it was easier for the government to treat him in summary fashion.

Perhaps even worse, some journalists were tempted to make him appear the fool. For instance, satirical columnist Art Hoppe described Lee at an amusing imaginary press conference at Conservative Republican headquarters in San Francisco. Besides newspaper reporters, the following were in attendance: the editor of "Economic Liberty," which claimed income taxes were "hysterically forced on our American people by Politicians and Banking Racketeers," Willie Carto, young executive director of Liberty and Property, an organization favoring U.S. withdrawal from the "impotent and subversive United Nations," and a dozen ladies "who could be distinguished from each other by the color of their hats." Lee reported on his refusal to pay income tax and his plan to appeal to the Supreme Court: "When you refused to pay your taxes did they put you in jail?" asked a lady in a militant blue toque.

"No," said the Governor, smiling.

"Well, they put my husband in jail," she said, beaming proudly.

"Wonderful," chorused the other ladies.35 Nevertheless, Lee was genuinely pleased by much of the publicity, thinking it had helped to diminish sentiment for foreign aid around the country.3'1 The attachment of his bank account quickened his desire to do battle; he and his attorneys filed an 184

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original action in the U.S. Supreme Court to restrain the secretary of the treasury from making further foreign aid payments.37 The request for a hearing from the court was originally filed in July 1956; in November the court threw out the tax action, refusing to hear the case. Lee replied, "It's my conclusion now that the federal government can violate all parts of the constitution with complete immunity."38 He claimed that it was the only time in American history that the Supreme Court failed to act on a request for a writ of prohibition in ten days or less.3" A new flood of letters poured in, encouraging Lee to continue the battle, but he was discouraged and called it "the end of the line."40 Indeed, it was, at least for his formal battle with the IRS; still, it had unquestionably made him a national figure.

He had received numerous letters and telegrams from all over the country, many of them seriously proposing him as a presidential candidate. The publicity unsettled Utahns accustomed to low profile governors who were never considered for national office. State Republican leaders began drawing battle lines for his reelection attempt; 1956 would be the year of decision on Lee's national reputation.

His private battle with the IRS continued unabated. In 1960 he mailed his 1040 form early, predicting that it would get closer federal scrutiny than any of the other 60 million tax returns.

His earlier publicity had made him an obvious target. He said he had purposely overpaid "to see if they're as aggressive in getting my money back to me as they are trying to take it." He claimed that the IRS had started to harass his friends, too.

Belatedly, he concluded that they had no power to dig into his private records.41 As mayor of Salt Lake City Lee continued his campaign against the IRS in speeches around the country and in interviews; but he did not attempt court action again. The IRS continued to audit Lee's returns, providing him with adequate fuel for his tirades. In 1969 he started another huge battle over his return when he refused to spend any time with the auditor. Following the audit he received notice that he owed $16,000 in back taxes and was ordered to pay it in ten days. Lee thought that it was a 185

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false claim, and it made him "so damned mad" that he sought the advice of a district judge. Unhappily, Judge Willis Ritter informed him that there was nothing that could be done about a false claim—a person could not sue. He contested the bill anyway, and the Treasury Department sent an investigator from the fraud division, a "hell of a nice fella," who told him that he knew no fraud had been perpetrated.42 Lee sent a letter of protest to Roland Wise, complaining of harassment. He sent copies to several congressmen and senators, some of whom replied, but "Wise didn't even answer my letter."

After an investigation, Lee's attorney reported that according to the government, Lee owed approximately $200 for 1968 and $20 for 1969 and was entitled to a small refund for 1970.

"Now," said the attorney, "Can't you think of anything else, so we can make those bastards pay youT' Lee remembered that his mother was a dependent, but he had not claimed her for his returns because he and his brothers and sisters shared the responsibility for her support. The attorney informed Lee that since his brothers and sisters had not claimed her as a dependent he could legally do so. According to Lee, when that claim was processed into the entire audit he received a refund for all the years named.

This ironic tale was a persuasive example to him of the good citizen being penalized: "Now you tell me that you have freedom when you've got a Gestapo like this? Do you believe in the Bill of Rights? How the hell can you believe in the income tax?"43 In an expression of anger over that investigation, Lee wrote to Wilbur Mills, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, calling the IRS "detrimental and un-American." He suggested that Congress give consideration to the "decent people of this nation" by allowing them the right to sue for "any injury to reputation or financial loss incurred due to the unlawful and unreasonable harassing" carried out by the IRS.44 The Deseret News enthusiastically supported his proposal with a quotation from a member of the Senate Finance Committee who said, "The average citizen often pays a tax he doesn't owe because he's afraid to resist." The News argued that when the IRS makes a mistake the government should pay for it—not the innocent tax186

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payer. Allowing the taxpayer to sue for losses as a result of harassment would accomplish that aim and would also help to maintain confidence in the administration of the nation's tax laws.45 In light of IRS abuses revealed under the Nixon administration—punishment of political enemies through the use of the audit—the Lee story is especially significant. Many respected people have questioned the income tax system because of those abuses, frequently referring to it, in David Brinkley's words, as "an instrument of police-state mentality."40 Since the IRS audited Lee almost every year, it could be assumed that no national administration had the crusty, talkative politician on any approved lists. Rather, the evidence indicates that he was harassed and punished through numerous audits and summary treatment of appeals. Ironically, in attacking the IRS, the Lee that his critics pictured as a neanderthal politician was actually ahead of his time; and in denouncing income tax in the 1970s, his voice no longer sounded unique.47

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*Lee interview.

2 Ibid. When he ran for mayor of Price, Lee had a minor altercation with the Treasury Department over campaign handbills on which the dollar had been printed with Lee's photograph superimposed to imply that he would save tax dollars According to Lee, a treasury agent came to see him mad as hell and told him it was illegal to produce such a handbill because it was too much like a dollar Incredulous, Lee replied, "You mean there are people so damned dumb they'd think this was real money?" He withdrew the handbills, but as a protest he claimed that he paid a $26.00 installment of his income tax with the handbills to see if the IRS would be "dumb enough" to accept them. Needless to say, they were not.

3 Foreword to Frank Chodorov, The Income Tax, Root of All Evil (New York: Devin-Adair, 1954).

"Gov. Len Jordan of Idaho to Lee, June 14, 1954, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

5 Gov. Paul Patterson of Oregon to Lee, June 14, 1954, ibid.

G Lee to Jordan, June 23, 1954, ibid.

Weseret News, July 13, 1954.

8 Lee to Guy L. Deano, August 11, 1954. Lee expressed the same thought in a letter to Dr. M. K. Blanchard, Mount Olive, 111., August 11, 1954, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

9 J. S. Kimmel, Sr., president, Davenport, la., Chamber of Commerce, to Lee, October 13, 1954, and William R. Todd, Jr., Cincinnati, O., to Lee, July 29, 1954, ibid.

"Deseret News, October 7, 1955. n L e e interview.

"Deseret News, October 8, 1955.

"Salt Lake Tribune, October 8, 1955.

14 Lee to Prof. William H. Peterson, New York University, December 13, 1955, and Lee to Col. Slavko Trifkovick, Winchester, Eng., May 23, 1956, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

"Deseret News, May 31, 1956.

"Deseret News, October 10, 1955.

"Washington Post, October 9, 1955.

"Milwaukee Journal, October 12, 1955.

"Lawrence's column appeared October 10, 1955, in the Milwaukee Journal and October 12, 1955, in the 5a/; Lake Tribune. Lawrence pointed out that if Lee lost his court case the federal government might even "make some money on him" by levying a 6 percent interest charge on the overdue tax bill.

20 Arizona Republic, October 16, 1955.

The Oregon Journal, October 13, 1955, characterized Lee as something of a hero with a refreshing record in Utah. However, the editors strongly disagreed with his tax stand and feared that his judgment and sense of proportion had been damaged: "If some of his own constituents followed his example by going on a tax strike, where would that leave Utah government?" The Worcester (Mass.) Telegram, October 12, 1955, accused Lee of evading taxes and suggested that if all citizens did similarly the country would be reduced to anarchy in short order. The Los Angeles Minor-News.

October 11, 1955, called his action "strange reasoning" and added that he was playing with fiscal fire on the state level should his own citizens also refuse to pay state taxes.

-iThe Freeman (Irvington, N.Y.), October 22, 1955.

22 J. Bracken Lee to Fellow American, form letter sent to all those who wrote to him about income taxes, October 1955, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

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SNOOPERS AND LOOTERS 23

Lee to Dr. Mai Rumph, Fort Worth, Tex., January 13, 1956, ibid.

J. Bracken Lee, "An Executive's Responsibility in Government-Political Misappropriation of Tax Money," speech delivered to Executives' Club of Chicago, January 6, 1956.

2S Deseret News, January 16, 1956.

2,i Salt Lake Tribune, April 14, 1956.

"Deseret News, May 7, 1956.

2 *Deseret News, April 30, 1956.

29 Salt Lake Tribune, May 3, 1956.

30 Salt Lake Tribune, May 4, 1956.

31 Lee interview.

32 Roland V. Wise, district director, IRS, to author, November 20, 1975.

The procedure Wise referred to was outlined in an IRS pamphlet, The Collection Process, p. 6, produced in January 1974.

Following the government's action critics pounced on Lee with renewed vigor. Salt Lake County Attorney Frank E. Moss accused him of using a "political gimmick" and asserted that any first-year law student knew the clear avenue to test the law: "If the governor had paid his tax under protest at the time he filed his return, he could have filed an action in the U.S. tax court and had a hearing on the tax legality." (Deseret News, May 5, 1956.) Later, as a U.S. senator, Moss remained convinced that publicity surrounding the case was detrimental to Utah: "I'm often asked whatever happened to that crazy fellow who wouldn't pay his income tax." In Moss's view, "Lee was really an anachronism —an angry, unreasoning voice out of the past." (Moss to author.)

33 Lawrence column.

In a letter to Eisenhower, January 13, 1956, Lee said, "I am not attempting to avoid payment of taxes, but am simply using this means to bring a constitutional question before a federal court." Lee Gubernatorial Papers. See also Salt Lake Tribune, January 14, 1956.

34 Wise to author. Although Wise refused to comment on the specific cases described by Lee (because he was forbidden to do so as a tax official), he did not deny Lee's story. Asked about Lee's refunds, Wise said: "To my recollection, Mr. Lee has stated to the public and the press that he has received refunds on occasions from the IRS." 35 Art Hoppe, "Gov. Lee vs. the Income Tax: Lost His Sugar in Salt Lake City," San Francisco Chronicle, August 24, 1956.

36 Lee to Mrs. Louise Davis, San Antonio, Tex., May 21, 1956, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

37 Lee to Gus Reynolds, Pueblo, Colo., May 25, 1956, ibid. See also Salt Lake Tribune, May 8, 1956.

3S Deseret News, November 13, 1956.

39 Lee interview.

4 °Lee to Harold J. Olson, Milwaukee, Wis., November 19, 1956, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

41 Arkansas Gazette, May 1, 1960.

42 Lee interview.

43 Ibid. Lee was so incensed by the investigation that he wrote the U.S. attorney general and requested an investigation of the IRS. He received "the snottiest damn letter from Henry Peterson," assistant attorney general under Nixon, implying that Lee was a troublemaker. Lee sent copies of the letter to some twenty congressmen and senators as an example of a bureaucrat's treatment of a citizen. He suggested that Peterson should be fired. Lee quoted Barry Goldwater as expressing surprise that a person of Lee's experience would 24

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J. BRACKEN LEE think that Congress was running the country: "You know the Bureaucrats are running the country!"

Roland Wise refused to comment on this case. Wise to author.

"Deseret News, March 25, 1971.

"Deseret News, April 15, 1971, editorial.

40 David Brinkley, NBC Nightly News, July 16, 1974.

47 In an ironical twist, Lee decided to endorse a computerized tax service called Taxman. Beginning in 1975 ads in Salt Lake City newspapers pictured Lee speaking about taxes. The heading stated: "Finally. Brack Lee has a good word to say about income taxes . . TAXMAN." Then Lee was quoted: "Don't get me wrong, I still think the income tax is unconstitutional.

"But I do have to pay my taxes, so I want to make sure I get every legal deduction I'm entitled to. And I want that return to be accurate, because I don't want any more hassles with the IRS. If you feel the same way, you ought to find out about Taxman.

"Taxman is a new computerized income tax service. They'll help you search out every possible legal deduction. They're fast, accurate and inexpensive. And they'll tell you in advance what the cost will be.

"Now that I'm retired, I can use a tax break. And Taxman is a tax break EVERYONE can use." Deseret News, February 10, 1975.

190

le Don Jesse Neal and Capital Punishment On May 23, 1951, Sgt. Owen T. Farley of the Salt Lake City Police arrested Don Jesse Neal and a woman companion, Wilma Tully, for questioning in connection with a stolen automobile and an Ogden robbery. Farley put handcuffs on Neal and placed him in the center of the front seat, with the woman on the right side. The officer then slid into the driver's seat and headed for the police station; but before the trip was completed Farley was shot, and he died an hour later in a Salt Lake hospital. The following day Neal was charged with the murder. Preliminary hearings were held in June, and the trial in October lasted only three days before the jury returned a verdict of guilty in the first degree. Judge Arthur Ellett sentenced Neal to die before a firing squad on December 13, 1951. However, a series of appeals and four separate stays delayed the execution until July 1, 1955.

This case assumed importance because the appeals took a great deal of time and involved Lee directly in the decisionmaking process. In many ways the Neal case was to Governor Lee what Joe Hill was to Gov. William Spry. National publicity, much of it negative, centered on Utah, and Lee was frequently called to account for his approach to the case.

When Neal appealed to the Utah State Supreme Court, Lee granted a stay of execution pending the result. Subsequently, the court ruled against Neal, who promptly appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which in turn denied the petition. Ellett then sentenced Neal a second time to die on June 19, 1954, but U.S. District Judge Willis W. Ritter agreed to hear an appeal for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that Neal was denied his constitutional rights during the trial. Ritter subsequently denied 191

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the appeal as well as the stay of execution. However, Judge Orie L. Phillips of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Denver agreed to investigate the charge that Neal was denied his constitutional rights. As frequently happens in cases of this sort, Neal changed attorneys midway, releasing R. Verne McCullough and retaining Billy Hulsey. After the presentation of evidence by the American Civil Liberties Union, Judge Phillips granted a stay of execution; but when arguments were heard Phillips, too, denied the writ. The counsel for the ACLU sought a stay from Chief Justice Earl Warren of the U.S. Supreme Court and Associate Justices Tom C. Clark and Hugo L. Black, all of whom refused to issue the order.

Judge Ellett sentenced Neal a third time to die at sunrise on August 3, 1954. In July the Utah State Board of Pardons turned down Neal's appeal for a pardon or commutation of sentence.

The decision came at the end of a day-long hearing in which Neal claimed his woman companion had actually done the shooting. As the execution date approached, ACLU lawyer Monte Levy sought a stay from the U.S. Supreme Court but could not locate any of the justices. Levy then called Governor Lee to request a stay, but he refused to grant it. Finally, Levy succeeded in contacting Justice Tom Clark in Dallas, Texas, and he agreed to study the records in the case.

On July 31 Clark informed the Supreme Court that he would sign the stay of execution, and the clerk of the court accordingly sent telegrams to Lee and Warden Marcell Graham of the Utah State Prison. But the question arose as to whether the telegrams were sufficient to grant the stay, and Sheriff George Beckstead, who was charged with carrying out the execution, arrived at the prison with a firing squad and requested that the warden turn Neal over to him. Finally, E. R. Callister, Utah attorney general, ruled that telegraphic confirmation of the stay was sufficient and ordered the warden to retain Neal in custody. The execution was literally stopped at the last minute.

After the U.S. Supreme Court acted negatively on the case Judge Ellett sentenced Neal to die a fourth time—May 9, 1955.

The appeals continued nevertheless. Judge Ritter refused a peti192

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tion for a writ of habeas corpus but signed a stay of execution anyway, because of the illness of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Chief Judge Phillips in Denver, where the appeal was designed to be heard. The parties disagreed as to whether Ritter had the authority to grant the stay in lieu of the Denver court's action, and the Denver court granted a stay while hearings were held to decide whether Ritter's order should be superseded. The court of appeals finally refused the writ and upheld Judge Ritter's denial, continuing the stay until June 15, 1955. For a fifth time Judge Ellett gave Neal an execution date—July 1, 1955.

For one month there followed a series of last ditch attempts to get another stay, with the U.S. Supreme Court again refusing, the Utah Board of Pardons listening to Neal and then refusing to pardon or commute, Judge Ellett denying a motion for a new trial on grounds of new evidence, and the Utah Supreme Court upholding Ellett's final ruling. Such a litany of appeals suggests that Neal and his attorneys used every possible legal recourse and that the state and federal governments granted every reasonable legal request over an incredible period of time. Finally, the execution by firing squad took place on July 1, 1955, with Neal maintaining his innocence to the end.1 NEAL'S OWN STORY

Working feverishly for almost four years to save himself from death, Neal studied legal precedents, hired and fired attorneys, and placed ads in newspapers. To a California girl he had never met Neal wrote a lengthy letter in 1953, explaining his side of the story. He promised her that he was telling the truth and predicted that she would come to believe in his innocence. He recounted the story of the arrest, emphasizing the fact that he was handcuffed with his hands behind his back and placed in the center of the front seat. While driving through an intersection, the officer allegedly glanced to the right and saw the woman take a gun from her purse. Neal claimed that Farley then lunged across Neal's body in a futile attempt to get the gun, which fired just as the car struck a parked car. After the crash, the woman opened her door and jumped out. In his struggle to stop her, the 193

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policeman lunged out the same door to Neal's right. Neal said that the officer hit his head on a parked car and was rendered unconscious.2 Neal panicked and his first reaction was to flee.

He said he twisted his arms around, burst open the left door, and ran to a bus, pulling his hands and the gun under his coattail.

Once on the bus he could not get the fare from his pocket; so he told the driver that he had injured his arms and begged him to reach in his pocket for the money. Although the driver testified at the trial that Neal told him he had just killed a man, Neal insisted that was not true. Instead, Neal thought the driver could not hear what he was saying and just kept "snarling" for his fare, so Neal got off after two blocks and was recaptured "almost immediately."3 At the trial Neal's companion, Wilma Tully, testified that she saw Neal turn his back to the officer and then heard a shot. Neal called her story ridiculous. He pointed out that the autopsy proved that the bullet entered Officer Farley's stomach two inches above the navel and passed straight through the center of the body, slightly downward through the spine and into the seat cushion. He claimed that he could not have fired the shot unless he had been sitting on the hood of the car with the officer slumped down halfway under the steering wheel before him. Neal also disputed Tully's statement that he had forced the officer out the right side of the car, insisting that it would have been more logical to shove him out the driver's side. He claimed that the officer "lunged" to the right, toward Tully, which would have been ridiculous had Neal fired the shot. Neal asserted that none of these things had ever been mentioned at his trial, and yet they could not be denied. He said he had no motive for the killing since the officer was only investigating "an overdue rented automobile." He complained that the woman's drunkenness and her past criminal record never came out at the trial and that she was coached on testimony and paid $798 after he was sentenced to death. Allegedly, the handbag, which he claimed contained the gun, was never used as evidence, and the gun was not hidden in the crack between the car seat and the back rest, because two officers had thoroughly searched it before the killing.4 194

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A postman had testified at the trial that Neal had asked the unconscious officer, "Do you want one more?" and that the officer said, "He shot me." Neal claimed that neither statement had been uttered and that furthermore the postman was hard of hearing. He also claimed a discrepancy in the postman's testimony based on a newspaper account in which the postman quoted the officer as saying, "I've been shot." Neal insisted that the dying man was unconscious and therefore said nothing. When faced with contradictions in his testimony after the trial, the postman had allegedly told a businessman, "It doesn't make any difference. He isn't any good anyway."5 Judge Ellett said that if the woman had fired the gun across Neal's body there would be no powder burns, but the determined Neal disagreed because the officer had "lunged." He said he had requested laboratory tests, but the court and the state attorney general had refused, Ellett adding that it would make no difference, even if tests showed that the gun was "fired from the moon." Concluding his account emotionally, Neal wrote, "I swear to you before God that I am innocent, and earnestly and prayerfully seek your help to prove it."0 The letter had a forceful impact on Constance Keehn, the twenty-one-year-old California girl who read it. She had been attracted to the case by an ad in the Los Angeles Times, saying, "California boy in serious trouble. God knows I am innocent."

Keehn demonstrated a flair for the dramatic in her magazine story of the events: This one ad, this faint SOS, was about to lead me along a desperate trail, across an ocean, and over deserts. Before I was through, I would smell clues like a detective and know law like a prosecuting attorney. I would see the cowardice of people who prefer their own personal security to freedom and justice for somebody else. I would see my picture printed in newspapers all over the country, and I would know the heartbreak that comes from the too frequent cynicism of officials.

I would do it all again, if I had to go back. I'd clip out that little ad, just as I did that warm day in April, 1953. I'd retrace my steps across the living room to daddy's desk, and address the envelope that held my reply.7 195

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After a year of searching and analyzing, Keehn became convinced that Neal could not have committed the murder. Her investigation proved to her that he had been beaten by police officers in retaliation for Farley's death, that authorities possessed photographs of the bullet hole in the car seat but withheld the evidence from the trial, and that reenactment of the crime in the courtroom had been a mockery because it was done with folding chairs and nothing representing the steering wheel. Keehn believed that Neal was a patsy and that the woman with him should have been prosecuted but was not, largely because "a woman has never been executed in Utah."8 Keehn said she had talked with all the people who had known Neal, among them Father Boileau, a Catholic priest in Alaska who had converted him, and a prison chaplain, neither of whom could imagine Neal taking anyone's life. She sent Neal pin-ups and books "to help break the monotony of his days in the death cell" and tried to drum up money and support for his cause, culminating in an article for Inside Detective. She wrote: When I decided to visit Salt Lake City, see some of the witnesses in Don's trial, and visit Don in the death house, I hit the headlines. It was last March. Reporters interviewed me, cameramen begged me to cross my legs, then snapped the pictures from the floor. I thought, if my looks will bring public attention to Don's plight, fine. I'll pose for the cheesecake if it will help him. But some of the stories weren't the kind that would help Don.9 Keehn insisted that press reports that she was in love with him were ridiculous, because she had seen him for only fifteen minutes in prison.10 Finally, in desperation, she wrote a letter to Eleanor Roosevelt in hope that she would be able to help because of her national prestige. She explained to Mrs. Roosevelt that state officials were selfish and simply did not care. She even claimed that mystery writer Erie Stanley Gardner had told her that Neal could not have committed the crime: Mr. Gardner said that the Governor of Utah believes an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, and refuses to let anything 196

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sway him. They executed one young man there not too long ago that had saved the life of a Warden in a prison riot, and Mr. Gardner says in almost any other state that he knows of the sentence would have been commuted. He says that the Court of Last Resorts couldn't help in a case where the governor and officials feel as they do in Utah. Just about everyone I have talked to about Utah (and I have spoken to many who are in a position to know, including ex-officials from there) say that it is a completely impossible state. They live almost as if they were not a part of the United States.11 Additionally, she said, an effective publicity battle could not be waged because both newspapers in Salt Lake City and all radio and TV stations except one were "under the direct control of the Governor and the Republican Party."12 Mrs. Roosevelt forwarded the information by airmail to Lee with a note explaining that she did not know either Constance Keehn or Neal but thought Lee should have an opportunity to read the material.

She said that she knew how difficult such decisions were and that any governor would want to consider very carefully all available evidence before a man was actually executed.13 The letter could hardly be called an attempt by Mrs. Roosevelt to intercede on Neal's behalf. She made no appeal but rather served as an intermediary to supply information. The execution was stayed but not because of Mrs. Roosevelt, for her letter did not arrive until two days after the scheduled date of execution.

In spite of all the efforts to save Neal, Lee remained unconvinced of his innocence. On one occasion he met Neal alone in his office and told him that he wanted to do everything in his power to help. Six men were executed during Lee's tenure, and he claimed to have approached each one in the same way. He told Neal that there was only one way he could help him—"and that is, you've got to tell me the absolute truth." But, concluded Lee sadly, "He couldn't tell you anything that was the truth!"

Lee had no recollection of Constance Keehn but remembered another benefactor: He had some kindly, wealthy woman from Texas that took an interest in him, and she bothered the hell out of me. And she used to go out there and visit him. And she wanted his 197

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body after it was shot. And she wanted to witness the execution. And she just knew he was innocent and she pled with me—and that lying son of a bitch fooled her. But right at the last minute where he'd been playing up to her and getting her sympathy and had her working for him and had her spend money for everything on earth—he run her out and cursed her and told her he never wanted to see her again.

Whew! When all hope was gone, he ditched her like nobody's business, and the warden told me he never heard anybody talk as mean as he talked to that poor old lady. He was a mean man—mean all his life. Look at his record—he was a killer from way back. Cold blooded.14 Lee conceded that the case had been widely publicized and that many people suspected that it was physically impossible for Neal to commit the crime, since his hands were handcuffed behind him. But Lee insisted that he was handcuffed so loosely that after the shooting "he was able to work his body and legs through his hands so that his hands were in front of him."15 In rejecting the appeal the Utah Supreme Court essentially agreed with Lee. Neal's attorneys argued that Neal could not have fired the shot with his hands cuffed behind him and that he could not have formed a deliberate and premeditated intention to kill, since the shooting occurred during a scuffle. But the justices believed that the evidence suggested that "the defendant formed a cold, deliberate and premeditated intention to kill the officer." The court found that Neal deliberately reached between the seat cushions and got the gun, then maneuvered himself into position to shoot the officer. Then he shot Farley without giving him a chance to comply with his wishes. The justices further noted that after fleeing the murder scene, Neal had managed to work his body and legs through his hands so that the pistol was in front of him, enabling him to threaten an employee of a repair shop. They concluded that it would have been physically impossible for the officer to have leaped in the fashion described by Neal, and that his police training would have taught him not to expose the whole front of his body to gunfire. Rather, he would have kept the defendant between him and the woman.10 198

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Judge Ellett was disturbed enough about the publicity surrounding the case, especially Keehn's article in Inside Detective, that he wrote Lee a lengthy letter disputing the "numerous erroneous statements" made in it. In the first place, Keehn claimed to have verified Neal's story personally by examining the records of the case. According to Leland Cummings, clerk of the Utah Supreme Court, she at no time saw the records of the case. Ellett disputed Neal's claim that Officer Farley saw the woman remove a gun from her purse, for at the trial Neal had denied that he had ever seen a gun. Actually, the purse was placed in evidence, and the jury watched the district attorney place the gun inside the purse: "It was very difficult to close the purse if nothing was in it except the gun. If a handkerchief and lipstick and compact are placed in, it is impossible to close the purse."17 According to Ellett, Neal's story of his encounter with the bus driver, in which he "begged" him to reach in his pocket for the fare, was suspect. In fact, the bus permitted no fare because it was a company bus operated as a courtesy of Sears Roebuck.

As for the hard-of-hearing postman, Ellett noted that he gave no evidence of being hard of hearing at the trial, answering all questions put to him in an ordinary tone of voice. With respect to powder burns, Ellett commented that the coat of the officer was doubled over at the time the shot was fired, and therefore the powder burns were on the inside of the coat. The powder bums surrounding the hole were small, indicating that the muzzle of the gun was very near the cloth. The hole in the cloth where the powder burns were located was ruptured, indicating that it was torn by the force of the explosion.18 Ellett denied that Neal begged for a lie detector test. The judge suggested that the search of the car conducted prior to the shooting may not have been adequate. Officer Farley probably did not make a thorough search of Neal either, for he had eighteen shells in his pocket when arrested. Finally, Ellett claimed to be certain in his own mind that Neal had fired the shot that killed Farley, and he felt that Neal had "compounded his crime of murder in the first degree with deliberate attempts to gain sympathy by misstatements of fact."19 199

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Neal maintained his innocence to the end and continued his fight for appeals until only hours before the execution. The Deseret News noted editorially that justice had been done because Neal had had every opportunity to be heard. Just prior to the execution, Neal said, "I've already died four times."20 In spite of expected criticism, Governor Lee handled a difficult case admirably, always demonstrating his desire for justice.

Although he believed that Neal had been given a fair trial, he fully supported his right to appeal the conviction. By the time the execution occurred Lee was convinced that in the absence of new evidence everything possible had been done to protect Neal's rights. To his critics he explained that Utah law did not grant the governor the right to commute a sentence but only to stay an execution—which could only extend until the next meeting of the Board of Pardons, the body that could rule on the validity of the action.21 As further evidence of his sincerity it should be noted that Lee held genuine reservations about capital punishment. He did not consider it completely effective as a deterrent to crime, especially since most murders were committed in the heat of passion.

He thought that the only alternative to the death penalty was life imprisonment.22 Lee modified his views over the years, as can be seen by his statements about later occupants of Utah's death row, Myron Lance and Walter Kelbach, who were analyzed and interviewed in a 1972 network television documentary. Disturbed that they had not indicated feelings of repentance or sorrow, though they freely admitted and even described what they had done, Lee favored execution for Lance and Kelbach. Although he still doubted that execution acts as a deterrent, he argued that a person who kills in a premeditated fashion "will dominate the guards at the prison, the other prisoners, and everybody—he doesn't have anything to lose." In such a case, the only solution Lee saw was to "put him out of his misery."23

200

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT !News accounts of the Neal case were numerous. The chronology of events is outlined clearly and minutely in Deseret News, April 5 and June 30, 1955.

The July 2, 1955, issue contains the account of the execution.

2 Neal letter as quoted by Constance Keehn, "I'll Never Believe He's Guilty," Inside Detective, June 1954, p. 19.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., pp. 20, 21.

"Ibid.

"Ibid., p. 62.

'Ibid., pp. 17, 18. sibid.

"Ibid.

10 Ibid., pp. 62, 63.

"Constance Keehn to Eleanor Roosevelt, June 14, 1954, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

12 Ibid.

"Eleanor Roosevelt to Lee, June 17, 1954, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

14 Lee interview. lr, Lee to Don Parsons, executive director, Super Market Institute, Inc., April 20, 1955, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

"Decision from the Supreme Court of the State of Utah vs. Don Jesse Neal, No. 7813, by Justices James H. Wolfe, Chief Justice, Roger I. McDonough, and J. Allan Crockett, J. Henriod not participating, ibid.

17 Judge Arthur Ellett, Third Judicial District, Utah, to Lee, July 21, 1954, ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Deseret News, July 2, 1955, editorial.

21 Lee to Parsons.

22 Lee to Robert Castagnola, Boston, Mass., May 24, 1951, in response to a questionnaire regarding capital punishment, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

23 Lee interview. The next most famous case of capital punishment during Lee's administration was that of Vern Braasch and Melvin Sullivan, accused of murdering a service station attendant in Beaver, Utah, in 1949. A serious controversy arose over questionable police tactics and the absence of counsel.

After their conviction they were sentenced to die by firing squad, but a lengthy appeal process took the case to the Utah State Supreme Court four times, to the Board of Pardons twice, to the U.S. Supreme Court three times, and to the U.S. District Court twice. The two men were finally executed in 1956. Again, Lee and the courts were circumspect in granting appeals and stays to ensure that justice was done. Charles Larrowe wrote a caustic article about it entitled "Notches on a Chair: Utah Firing Squad," Nation, April 14, 1956, in which he labeled Utah's judicial system as outmoded.

201

17 The Third-Term Bid In spite of his earlier statement, "No honest man would want more than one term as governor," Lee announced in April 1956 that he would seek a third term, at that time an unprecedented accomplishment in Utah's political history.1 Although Time magazine asserted that Utahns admired his "bodaciousness" and considered him one of the best governors they had ever had,2 many voters were ready for a change. Educators, still smarting from his economy measures, were intent on defeating him, and Republican party regulars were angered by his attacks on the Eisenhower administration.

As early as 1953 Lee had charged that many people who had "worked their hearts out" for a change in Washington were becoming convinced that Ike would never reverse New Deal policies. However, most Republicans were happy with Eisenhower's policies, and a strong segment of Republican governors were supporting him in urging a go-slow policy on tax reduction and an increase of the $275 billion federal debt limit. But plainspeaking Lee said the desire to raise the debt limit to $290 billion was one of the best examples of the failure of the administration to reverse the big spending trend of its Democratic predecessors. He believed that the best way to cut government expenses was to cut taxes so there would be less money to spend.3 Early in 1955 Lee's criticism became more intense. He attacked the loyalty of the president to the Republican party and said that unless conservative Republicans and "good Democrats" could "recapture" their respective parties, they should form their own political alliance. Lee accused the president of moving the country farther to the left than in any previous two-year period in American history.4 203

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A few days later, he suggested at a Lincoln Day rally in Chicago that conservative elements in both political parties join forces to create a third party." The usually mild-mannered Sen. Wallace F. Bennett immediately counterattacked, denouncing the speech and warning that it would have "real and immediate" repercussions on the Utah Republican party, possibly damaging the Utah congressional delegation's efforts to get authorization for the Echo Dam and Upper Colorado River Storage Project.

He also believed that Lee's speech indirectly repudiated Utahns Ezra Taft Benson as secretary of agriculture and Ivy Baker Priest as treasurer of the United States. Moreover, Bennett bluntly charged that Lee's real desire was to become the presidential candidate of a third party.0 Utah's solidly Republican congressional delegation disagreed with Lee's statements, and Sen. Arthur V. Watkins echoed Bennett's conviction that Lee's speech would disastrously affect the Colorado River project.7 Lee replied that he had not deserted the Republican party; rather, the administration had: I am not a candidate for President. I wouldn't accept it under any conditions. It is not important. The thing that is important to me is the way this country is heading. I think it is a tragic thing when men are condemned because they won't follow a leader blindly. This country is founded on the belief that we can all express our opinions.8 Lee scoffed at the suggestion that his comments would jeopardize Echo Dam, saying, "If we have depreciated to such a point in government that we destroy good things simply because of disagreement, then we are in a bad way."9 Nevertheless, by alienating Utah's entire congressional delegation he seriously damaged his gubernatorial future.

He continued his barrage, declaring in a speech at Hunter College in New York that "We have in Washington today what to my mind amounts to a dictatorship." There is no difference, he claimed, between the government in Russia and in an allpowerful central government in Washington. He appealed to those who agreed with him to "speak up now." When a voice from the audience asked "How?" Lee replied, "If you feel that 204

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McCarthy is on our side, say so." When the blatant reference to Senator McCarthy and his techniques of Communist-hunting evoked applause, cheers, and whistles, Lee again called for the organization of a third party.10 The press was almost as disturbed as the congressional delegation. The Tribune defended Eisenhower, claiming that he had inherited a left-leaning government following twenty years of Democratic presidents. The editors believed that he had made significant progress toward more stable government by reducing expenditures, eliminating waste, and establishing greater internal security.11 The Deseret News also disagreed with Lee's statement but supported his right to say it. The News especially criticized Bennett's claim that Lee's attack endangered the Colorado River project, which implied that Ike was a man of small stature who might abandon a needed reclamation project because of petty politics or the criticism of one man.12 In April 1955 Myron Fagan, right-wing author of The Eisenhower Myth, suggested at a Congress of Freedom convention in San Francisco that Ike be impeached. Governor Lee and Sen. William F. Knowland of California were said to be among the best men to succeed him, but Lee promptly disavowed any interest in doing so.13 However, following a series of speaking engagements in Ohio and Texas, Lee was convinced that "Republican dissatisfaction with the Administration is strong and growing stronger." Reactions encountered on the trip indicated that many people did not approve of the "New Deal under the Republican label any more than they like it under the Democratic label."14 At the forty-seventh annual Governors' Conference, Lee was severely criticized by other Republican governors, among them Fred Hall of Kansas, who took Lee to task for his threat to launch a third-party movement, and Washington's Arthur Langlie, who castigated Lee for arguing that the state should handle everything while willingly accepting all the money the federal government was willing to give."

Lee stood firm for his right to speak against what he thought was wrong, adding that he would bolt the Republican party to 205

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support the "right kind of Democrat—one who doesn't believe in giving the country away"—and suggested Frank Lausche of Ohio or Harry F. Byrd of Virginia. O. J. Wilkinson, Utah State Republican chairman, angrily replied that the governor was speaking for himself and not for the party, and representatives of several Republican groups promptly drafted a resolution of support for the Eisenhower administration.10 As late as November, Lee was still making speeches on the subject, criticizing Eisenhower's foreign and domestic policies in Davenport, Iowa, and endorsing Senator Knowland for the presidency.17 Lee could not help but realize that his high national visibility and his controversial stands were affecting his political strength.

He was making life very uncomfortable for Utah Republicans who felt the need to dissociate themselves from his views in order to remain in the president's good graces. So Lee attempted to placate his critics, arguing that there was no threat of presidential recrimination: "President Eisenhower is a man of too much character and principle to entertain even the thought of discrimination against a state or an individual on any grounds."18 It was evident that he was making a splash of national proportions when famed conservative columnist William F. Buckley requested that he write an article for his National Review.

Buckley suggested two possible topics: "What it's like to be a right-wing Republican politician" or "Why I endorsed Dwight Eisenhower." Buckley predicted that both articles would be a "sensation," since most of the magazine's large readership were ardent Lee admirers.19 Unfortunately for both his reputation and his campaign, Lee declined, giving as his reasons the urgency of the primary campaign.20 Such exposure could have given him important national support at a critical time for his political fortunes. That he had national potential was borne out by a conservative coalition's attempts to form a new party dedicated to conservative principles.

The preconvention list of potential presidential nominees included General MacArthur, Sen. William Jenner, Sen. Harry F. Bird, Sen. Strom Thurmond, and Lee.21 206

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The final straw for his Utah critics came in a speech Lee made in New York in which he indiscreetly commented on Ike's intention to seek reelection. He predicted that Ike would not run again. Supposedly, Ike announced his candidacy following his heart attack because he did not want to lose control of Congress and so he could choose his own successor.22 Senator Watkins was so incensed that he made a speech on the Senate floor, accusing Lee of impugning the honor of the president. Watkins said that Lee had charged Ike with "deviousness, or in fact, fraud" and that such comments were "unjustified and unworthy of a man holding the high office of governor."

Therefore, Watkins felt that it was his duty to "make it clear to the President, the Congress and the American people" that Lee's statement in no way represented the views of the people of Utah, "regardless of party."23 Since Watkins's speech was made only three weeks before the Utah State Republican Convention, political analysts thought Lee would lose. State Sen. Rendell N. Mabey was predicted as the winner, with Lee coming in second and George D. Clyde third. Demonstrating his amazing resiliency, however, Lee managed to field 348 delegates to emerge victorious, while George Clyde was second with 318. Jennings Phillips, Lee's politically perceptive campaign manager, asserted that Watkins, a native of Utah County, had persuaded that delegation to swing from Mabey to Clyde, "and that is the vote that put Clyde in as Lee's opponent rather than Mabey. We all thought it was going to be Ren Mabey."24 The primary campaign was reminiscent of 1952 in one respect: in the final election that year Lee had accused Earl J. Glade of being a Republican instead of a Democrat; in 1956 he claimed that his primary opponent, George Clyde, was a "new Republican." One campaign leaflet tried to identify Clyde with Herbert B. Maw in the minds of the voters by reminding them that he was a Maw appointee and had "faithfully served that scandal-ridden, wasteful regime" all the time that "true Republicans" were opposing it. Not once, said Lee, had Clyde raised his 207

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voice against Maw. "Is George Dewey Clyde a TRUE Republican or just a 'new' Republican?"2" Lee lieutenants also alleged that Clyde had a personal friendship with Calvin W. Rawlings, Democratic national committeeman, as if that were a sin, and had written a letter praising Rawlings to help him get reelected to his political position. They even berated Clyde for allowing his brother, a Democrat, to carry a banner for him on the floor of the state convention.20 For a man who had aroused suspicions himself for a period of three years by criticizing a Republican president and advocating a third party composed of conservative Republicans and disgruntled Democrats, the use of such tactics appears ironic. Perhaps it was a diversionary thrust designed to make voters forget Lee's controversial stands. If so, it did not work; Lee paid the price for those stands and lost the primary to political newcomer Clyde by 62,294 to 54,282 votes. Clyde's victory surprised the oddsmakers, who favored Lee in spite of his problems within the party. After all, it had been the familiar, colorful Lee vs. the bland Clyde, who had trouble exciting an audience and was known to grope for words on the platform. Clyde, fifty-eight, was former commissioner of the Utah Water and Power Board and had successfully campaigned for passage of the Upper Colorado River bill.

Lee tried to be gallant in defeat, but he could not hide his true feelings: "I wish him well. I hope he carries through and wins in November." Then, with a slight touch of sour grapes, he added that he was "better off," for the governorship was "not an easy job." When asked about his future plans he said he "did not have the slightest idea" what he would do. "I've got to find a job. I hope that will not be too hard. If I had a degree, maybe I could try school teaching. That's the best profession."27 It was evident that he blamed educators for his defeat, along with Senator Watkins, who had called him "the most disruptive influence in the whole Republican Party."28 Although he denied it, Ezra Taft Benson was thought to have aided Watkins in engineering Lee's defeat;20 certainly as a member of the national administration under attack by Lee, he 208

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had reason to do so. Some political analysts believed that the approximately 8,000-vote loss was explained by Democrats purposely crossing party lines to defeat Lee. There were an estimated 10,000 more votes in the gubernatorial race than in the other Republican primary races. The crossover vote may have also helped to defeat John S. Boyden, the favorite in the Democratic gubernatorial primary, who unaccountably lost to L. C. Romney.30 Senator Watkins had decided to throw his formal support to Clyde before the primary. In a television speech he asserted that Utah was on the verge of a golden era of expansion that would see it eventually double in population. Without referring to Lee by name, he declared that Clyde could do more than the other candidates to help secure that future. Lee claimed not to be concerned, for it was common knowledge that Watkins had been instrumental in persuading Clyde to run for governor and had actively supported his candidacy.31 Watkins's overt support of Clyde is persuasive evidence that Lee's denunciations of Eisenhower hurt him irreparably in his bid for reelection. Other factors were his rigid opposition to federal and foreign aid programs, income tax, and the UN. Lee was erroneously perceived by many as being hesitant in his support of the Colorado River reclamation projects, a natural road for George Clyde and his supporters.32 Actually, Lee gave vigorous support to the project, especially as evidenced by an article he intended for Harper's magazine. The editors finally rejected the piece because they found it inconsistent with his previous criticisms of federal programs.33 Lee thought the project was "an excellent one" that would "pave the way for industrial expansion and economic progress in a great and growing Mountain West." He thought every adult citizen in the country should understand it because it would aid national defense.

He said it would pay for itself and return a profit of several million dollars a year.34 In a letter sent to every member of Congress, he urged its passage because the future of the West depended on it: "Our primary interest in this project, however, 209

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is simply to secure for our future growth that one resource which is in short supply in the West—water."35 Lee was often criticized for fighting handouts on a national level but favoring them when they affected his own state. He accepted this cricitism as fair on the grounds that his actions exemplified the defects of the system: "There isn't any question but I was in a very inconsistent position. Because how could I complain about the federal government doing everything, and then turn around and ask for this?"30 As late as 1972 Watkins still thought Lee had jeopardized the Colorado River project and characterized him as the "most expensive public man in the state." Watkins unabashedly considered himself the outstanding Republican leader in Utah. But he thought Lee was expendable: "FDR or anyone else shouldn't be in three terms." He thought that to be especially true of governors because of their enormous power over appointments.37 Senator Bennett agreed that the "Republican Party respected the traditional two term limit." Bennett believed that Clyde was "an effective and energetic replacement for Lee in 1956." Clyde's training and experience in reclamation made him a likely leader only two years after the passage of the Upper Colorado River Storage Act. In Bennett's opinion, Clyde's interest in the project was "infinitely greater and more effective than Lee's would have been."38 i Lee incurred the wrath of labor when he signed the right-towork law and that of the Mormon church when he vetoed the 1953 Sunday closing bill.39 But he had come to believe so much in the strength of his own charisma at the polls that he failed to realize fully the risks he was taking: "The biggest fault was my own—overconfidence. It's a disease, and / had it. I just couldn't convince myself that Clyde could beat me." However, Lee did not believe that the election results hinged on his criticism of Eisenhower,10 in spite of the fact that political analysts and politicians of both parties considered that to be the crucial issue.

Even campaign manager Jennings Phillips had pleaded with Lee to soften his attacks and concluded that if he "had not been so 210

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outspoken in his criticism of Eisenhower, he would have been elected without question as a third term governor."41 CITIZENS FOR L E E

In spite of his previous statement wishing Clyde well, Lee announced on October 13 that he would launch an independent drive for reelection because he believed his administration to have been honest, efficient, economical, and scandal-free; and he was proud of his public service. The ballot designation would be "Citizens for Lee" to indicate that he was running because of hundreds of telephone calls, letters, and wires urging that he do so. He admitted there had also been numerous messages urging him not to run. In making the decision he said he had "prayed for wisdom to do the right thing."42 He accused the irascible Senator Watkins of engineering his defeat in the primary and threatened to expose him. He claimed that "one man—hungry for power, ruthlessly determined to rule or ruin—decided that I must go. That man is the senior senator from Utah." Using exaggeration, Lee accused Watkins of fraud in representing Clyde as a Republican and of machine politics in splitting the party through a "hate Lee" campaign. Finally, he compared Watkins to Hague and Pendergast as a political boss with his eye on the 1958 election.43 An angered Clyde said Lee had shown his "true colors," valuing "his vanity and hope for revenge above the Republican party and the state." He resented the "malicious inference that he was the candidate of Watkins alone. The Republican State Executive Committee called Lee's decision divisive and dangerous to the two-party system: furthermore, it disregarded the results of the primary election, which was an expression of the will of the people.44 In a heated television reply Senator Watkins demanded an apology and retraction of Lee's charges, which he called slanderous and tantamount to accusing him of a criminal offense.

Watkins said he had waited thirteen days for Lee to make good his threat to expose him and "so far the mountain has labored mightily and come up with a very puny and comic mouse." Lee 211

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himself had the true political machine, Watkins alleged, because of his enormous power over appointments—4,300 state employees. The charge that Clyde was not a Republican was "utterly false"; Watkins quoted letters from various Republican chairmen, as well as Ezra Taft Benson, attesting to his Republican credentials. Benson called Clyde a "man of integrity, high moral character, an excellent administrator and a Republican."

Moreover, Watkins himself had known Clyde as a Republican for ten years.45 On the other hand, Democrats hailed Lee's decision as a boon to their hopes of ending the eight-year reign of Republicans in the statehouse. The Deseret News characterized it as a political bombshell,40 while the Tribune thought it would be a sensation because of the burning zeal of his followers versus the deep hatred of those who opposed him. The editors welcomed the independent candidacy as a way to perk up a lethargic campaign.47 Political pundits immediately forecast one of three eventualities: (1) Lee would split enough support from Romney and Clyde to turn the race for the governorship into a "three man donnybrook" with anyone likely to win but with Clyde slightly favored; (2) Lee would draw enough support from independents, dissatisfied Republicans, and discontented Democrats to "turn history upside down" and win an unprecedented third term; (3) The Lee candidacy would split the Republican party so badly that Democrat L. C. Romney would win over both Lee and Clyde.48 In a curious full-page ad in the Deseret News, Albert R. Bowen, prominent Republican and son of Apostle Albert E. Bowen, used his name and church credentials to blast Lee's decision to run. Bowen said he had previously supported Lee three times but could not support a campaign built on revenge.

Claiming that Lee was responsible for his own defeat, not Watkins, he detailed six reasons: (1) the third-term issue, (2) Lee's opposition to Eisenhower, (3) Lee's habit of being "brutally frank," (4) Democrats crossing party lines to defeat him, (5) voters' disapproval of Lee's refusal to pay his income tax, 212

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(6) Lee's battle with educators. He further charged Lee with using "violent language," such as "fraud, dishonesty, and corruption," with "reckless abandon." In a surprisingly accurate prophecy he accused Lee of using the governor's race as a warm up for a 1958 attempt to unseat Senator Watkins.49 Though unabashedly partisan, the ad represented a lucid analysis of Lee's problems.

As the campaign moved into high gear Lee attacked both of his opponents, accusing the Democrat Romney of "doubletalk" and of trying to be all things to all people and Clyde, the "so-called Republican," of wanting to raise taxes. Without mentioning Lee's fiscal record Clyde warned against a return to the spending policies of the New Deal and the Maw regime. Recognizing Lee's vulnerability in education he promised to upgrade it, specifically teacher morale, physical plants, salaries, and curriculum. Romney chose to snipe at both his opponents, calling Clyde's program "overbalanced" on the side of reclamation and Lee's "an effort to extend eight long years of governmental tension based on one man's personal prejudices and individual hates."50 An early Tribune poll gave Romney 32 percent, Clyde 30 percent, and Lee 28 percent,51 meaning that the election was too close to call and well within the margin of error claimed by pollsters. In a television speech following the poll Lee claimed overwhelming support and promised, "We will win this election!"

He charged that those who were buying full-page newspaper ads and television spots against him were spreading propaganda.

They would not be spending money if they did not fear his candidacy. In a blunt appeal to the voters Lee said, "Don't be deceived. I can be your Governor again if you want me. It is the people, not the few political bosses who will decide the outcome of this campaign." Then, in an effort to make his independent candidacy respectable, he referred to Richard Nixon's advice to the nation to "vote for the man—not the party," capping it with a quotation from "the courageous Church leader who was Utah's first territorial governor—Brigham Young": 213

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Are we a political people? Yes, very political indeed.

But what party do you belong to or would you vote for?

I will tell you whom we will vote for. We will vote for the man who will sustain the principle of civil and religious liberty, the man who knows the most and who has the best heart and brain for a statesman, and we do not care a farthing whether he is a whig, a democrat, a barnburner, a republican, a new light, or anything else. These are our politics.52 Since Lee ran without LDS church support in 1956, it is not surprising that he would grasp at this straw to identify with the church.

He attacked Clyde as a man with no record of service to the party who had been nominated "as a result of a conspiracy of machine politics in both parties." He blamed the "Clyde-Watkins combine" for defeating him in the primary by programming 10,000 Democratic crossover votes. Lee referred to an advertisement placed in the Tribune by Clyde's campaign manager, urging voters "regardless of political affiliation" to cast their ballots for Clyde because that was the "one sure way of replacing Gov. Lee." Lee characterized his own accomplishments in eight years as unique in an era of "tax and tax—spend and spend."

Moreover, he had done it all without "a breath of scandal or hint of wrong doing." He said that the people were best governed when they were least governed.53 His temper aroused, Clyde felt compelled to defend himself against Lee's attacks, saying, "One who has no regard for the truth, intellectually, morally or physically, is not fit to hold public office and his mouthy harangues should not be dignified by rebuttal."54 He then engaged in rebuttal, accusing Lee of using a "Hitler-like technique of the big lie." Clyde called himself a life-long Republican and invited those who disbelieved him to inspect the records of his Republican precinct chairman in Logan as well as the county and state Republican chairmen.55 While Lee continued to warn voters that either of the other candidates would be spendthrifts, Clyde assured them that "a vote for the third party is merely a way of voting for the Democrats."50 Understandably convinced that the Republican ran the risk of being hurt most by the Lee candidacy, Clyde was running scared.

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On the other hand, Romney tended to be the forgotten man of the campaign, with most of the charges and countercharges passing between Lee and Clyde. Perhaps Lee's greatest challenge was to combat effectively the prevailing view of the public that a vote for a third party was wasted.57 Senator Watkins managed the most effective barb of the campaign. Appearing on a television panel composed of Republicans, Watkins called attention to Lee's claim that Clyde was really a Democrat. He said that Lee's support for his charge was a statement of Harry Truman's that Clyde had worked for his agriculture secretary, and therefore he (Truman) had always considered him a Democrat. Watkins suggested that Lee's acceptance of Truman as a responsible source of information about Clyde made Truman a responsible source of information on Lee. According to Watkins, Truman had labeled Lee "the most obnoxious governor in the nation."58 In an awkward effort to improve his bad press in education, Lee applauded a statement by Clint Pace, director of the White House Conference on Education, who informed the UEA convention that Utah led the nation in the percentage of its income spent on education.59 Recognizing the weakness of that argument, L. C. Romney suggested that Utah needed a school financing program that would "recognize school teaching as a profession and return dignity to our educational system." Speaking to Salt Lake City schoolteachers, Romney blamed rigid policies for degrading Utah's position in the educational rankings. He correctly claimed that neither Lee nor Clyde favored education and that the only way to change the policies was to elect a Democratic governor.00 On election eve there were complaints of partisan politicking in the Salt Lake City schools, eliciting a protest from Lee and resulting in an investigation by Superintendent M. Lynn Bennion.

According to reports from Lee headquarters, several students and parents had complained that a teacher at Roosevelt Junior High had told students that Lee was against public education and the two-party system; also, anti-Lee pressure was being applied to students at Uintah Elementary School when the parents were 215

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actually pro-Lee. After an investigation Bennion defended the teachers for using the election campaign for the discussion of political issues and reported that the students were merely studying civics in a productive way. He was convinced that the teachers took no position, but since students came to class with partisan convictions obtained from parents it was a challenge to keep discussions nonpartisan. Nevertheless, he invited parents and the press to visit both schools to satisfy any remaining doubts.

Lee doubted Bennion's conclusions and believed the original reports. They reminded him of an incident four years earlier when a teacher had spent an hour of classroom time berating Lee in the presence of Lee's daughter. He thought it was frightening that the schools could be used as a vehicle to promote or degrade a candidate.01 The closest the campaign came to charges of scandal was Clyde's exaggerated attack on Lee's road commission chairman, Herbert Vance, who had allegedly given orders to state road shop employees to distribute campaign literature. When it became publicly known, Lee approved the firing of two road shop employees for political activity. However, Clyde accused Lee of attempting to "hush up" Vance's part of the episode and firing Vance's underlings instead. Clyde claimed that the people of the state would not tolerate such action and suggested that the two employees were the "goats" putting the "integrity and good faith of the Lee administration" on the line.62 Unruffled, Lee blamed the "Watkins-Clyde machine" for instigating the story and correctly claimed that he had never permitted state employees to practice politics on state time or at state expense. He had even followed the policy of asking employees to resign or take leaves of absence while campaigning for office. He said he had approved of the firing of two employees who had "admitted taking part in politics on state time." He thought that Watkins and Clyde were desperate for an issue.03 The Republicans invoked the power of the Mormon church by association through an ad in the Deseret News emphasizing David Lawrence McKay's support of George Clyde. McKay, a son of David O. McKay, called special attention to Clyde's 216

THE THIRD-TERM BID

abilities in water and reclamation and attacked Lee for selfishness and a desire for revenge when there was no chance of being elected himself. McKay argued that Utah needed a leader who supported Eisenhower "with all his heart."04 As the election approached Lee claimed the Republicans were having a difficult time since they were running on a state platform built from the record of his own administration.65 If Utahns wanted a continuation of the policies that "brought Utah its greatest era of progress," they should vote for him. On the other hand, if they preferred "bossism, spendthrift policies, higher taxes, and machine politics," they should vote for one of the other candidates.00 Noting that all polls were showing a trend in favor of his candidacy, Clyde said that he was "deeply impressed" by polls taken at the universities and high schools indicating that he would win, with Romney second, and Lee a weak third. He refused to recognize Lee by name and claimed that "the independent" had "no chance to win" and that his effort was not enough to throw the election to the "Democratic machine."07 Meanwhile, Romney labeled as ridiculous charges by both Lee and Clyde that he was involved in machine politics in the Salt Lake City Commission. He asserted that he had never discharged any employee for political reasons; in contrast, Lee had fired virtually all of the thousands of state employees when he was elected.08 Romney promised to "return dignity to the governor's office" and to remove "the rigid prejudices" of the previous eight years.09 Expressing gratitude to his supporters for monetary aid, Lee claimed that no contributions came from any pressure group or corporation. This he regarded as proof that the people saw him as a symbol of good government—honest, economical, and efficient.70 A late campaign ad claimed Lee was the best governor Utah had ever had and quoted a Deseret News editorial praising him for operating government efficiently and openly: "There has been no breath of scandal in any state department in two terms."

Herbert Hoover was quoted as saying, "If we had governors like yours in every state they could save the nation."71 217

J . BRACKEN LEI

On the eve of the election Lee revived an old letter (Julj 1956) from Eisenhower as evidence that he would not hold s grudge. Lee said it proved that "honest men can disagree and still work together" effectively. Actually, he overrated its importance; the identical letter had been sent to all Republican governors thanking them for a joint declaration of support at the Governors' Conference. In it the president expressed pleasure with the teamwork he thought necessary for a "dynamic Republican organization" and closed with, "Together we have already accomplished much. I am confident that we shall work together to an even greater record in the future."72 Of course, Clyde's forces lost no time in reproducing a recent telegram from Eisenhower to Clyde: To you as the Republican nominee for Governor of Utah, I send every good wish for your success in the election tomorrow. Your particular experience and interest in water development and conservation make it all the more imperative that the voters of your state give you a resounding victory.

Your support of the Upper Colorado River project, among other things, make it clear that you will have the best interests of your state and region at all times uppermost in your mind.

I am looking forward to cooperating with you as the chief executive of Utah during the next four years.73 Republicans claimed that they reproduced it only because Lee had "had the audacity" to reproduce the old Eisenhower letter "in a desperate attempt to show that he and Ike are on the same team."74 Evidently, the use of the telegram caught Lee operatives by surprise. Jennings Phillips had been given every assurance that Eisenhower would not endorse Clyde, but Senator Watkins's influence had prevailed. He finally persuaded Eisenhower to do so.75 Although Clyde appealed to voters on election eve to judge issues and candidates "calmly and intelligently" and "forget rancor," Senator Watkins purchased a full-page advertisement thai concentrated on rancor. In an open letter to Utah citizens he answered Lee's charges against him. He claimed no intention ol 218

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"running the state from Washington" should Clyde be elected.

He rejected the label of "Lee hater," pointing out that he had enthusiastically supported Lee for two terms and had even appointed his son Jimmy to West Point. He angrily denied that Clyde was his own hand-picked candidate: "The truth, I regret to say, is that I can claim no credit for 'discovering' George D. Clyde as a gubernatorial candidate." Watkins insisted that Clyde's name had been urged on him by Utah Republicans who thought him especially qualified, and who feared Lee could not win reelection because of anti-third-term sentiment, his opposition to Ike, and his many enemies made during a "turbulent administration."76 The Republicans made a clean sweep of state and national offices, with the ever popular Eisenhower leading the ticket.

He garnered 64.6 percent of the vote in Utah or 215,631 of the total votes cast, compared with 118,364 for Stevenson. Clyde coasted in on Ike's coattails with 127,164 votes (38.2 percent), while Romney followed with 111,297 (33.4 percent) and Lee was a strong third place with 94,428 (28.3 percent). Utah had elected a'minority governor, and Lee had demonstrated surprising vitality with the electorate in a very unorthodox campaign.

The Deseret News declared that Lee's anti-Eisenhower posture was a crucial factor in his defeat and labeled Clyde an "amazing newcomer to politics who leaped from the successful Colorado River fight directly into the Governor's chair." The News concluded that Lee's reelection effort was wholesome, for it removed any doubts about the validity of Clyde's candidacy.77 Stung by the defeat, Lee forced himself to make a charitable concession statement: I'm no worse off than a couple of months ago. At this stage it appears that Mr. Clyde will be elected. I feel good about the results. We did very well. The overwhelming vote for President Eisenhower created the obstacle we couldn't overcome. It put Mr. Clyde in. I hope the people of Utah will benefit by Mr. Clyde's election.78 In later years he expressed the bitterness he really felt: "I don't figure I owe the Republicans anything; they didn't have 219

J . BRACKEN LEE

any party when I ran. I made their party, and as soon as I made it, they dumped me." Nevertheless, he considered Clyde a "good man" who showed "courage in a number of cases." He did not regard Clyde as "governor material to begin with," but he thought that he tried to govern in a manner consistent with Lee's philosophy. "I don't think he had such a bad record!"79 The withdrawal of Mormon support must be considered a critical factor in Lee's loss, dramatized by the presence in the president's cabinet of Ezra Taft Benson. Lee's criticism of Eisenhower was by inference a criticism of Benson, too, and Mormons tended to be very proud of Benson's role in government. It was common knowledge that cabinet meetings were routinely begun with prayer, seemingly due to Benson's influence.

Moreover, a church-sponsored poster series initiated in December 1956 revealed profound Mormon respect for the president.

The theme of all the posters displayed in Mormon chapels was "Be Honest With Yourself." One showed Eisenhower next to George Washington and Abraham Lincoln with head bowed, eyes closed, and the inscription "Great Men Pray." Lee's adamant stand against Ike and his policies had been political suicide in Mormon circles.

Lee's governorship had ended but not his political career or his influence. Numerous election campaigns lay ahead.

220

THE THIRD-TERM BID iBefore Lee's bid, three governors failed to secure a third term. Two Republicans, Heber M. Wells in 1904 and William Spry in 1916, failed to get their party's nomination. In 1948 Herbert B. Maw received the Democratic nomination for a third term but lost the election to Lee. In 1972 Democrat Calvin L. Rampton became the first third-term governor in Utah's history.

2 "See How They Run," Time, April 23, 1956, p. 27.

3 Deseret News, August 3, 1953. ^Deseret News, February 12, 1955.

-'Salt Lake Tribune, February 16, 1955. ^Deseret News, February 14, 1955.

7 Salt Lake Tribune, February 15, 1955. s Deseret News, February 14, 1955.

9 Ibid.

"Salt Lake Tribune, February 18, 1955.

"Salt Lake Tribune, February 16, 1955.

"Deseret News, February 16, 1955.

"Deseret News, April 27, 1955.

"Salt Lake Tribune, May 13, 1955.

"Deseret News, August 9, 1955.

"Deseret News, August 11, 1955.

"Deseret News, November 17, 1955.

"Orem-Geneva Times, August 2, 1956.

19 William F. Buckley to Lee, August 23, 1956, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

20 Lee to Buckley, August 30, 1956, ibid.

21 Deseret News, August 23, 1956.

22 Salt Lake Tribune, July 6, 1956.

23 Ibid.

24 PhilIips interview.

25 Campaign Letter, September 6, 1956, signed by nine prominent Utah Republican women, as quoted in George B. Russell, J. Bracken Lee: The Taxpayer's Champion (New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1961), pp. 136, 137.

See also Frank Jonas, "The 1956 Election in Utah," Western Political Quarterly 10 (1957):151.

Jennings Phillips claimed that Clyde had never attended a GOP district meeting "nor contributed a dime to the party." He said this information was provided him by Clyde's GOP district chairmen. Phillips interview.

2e Russell, 7. Bracken Lee, pp. 137, 138.

"Deseret News, September 12, 1956.

28 "Lee's Defeat," Time, September 24, 1956, p. 14.

29 Benson interview.

Jennings Phillips, who was employed by Benson prior to his direction of Lee's 1956 campaign, said that Benson was unequivocally against Lee's thirdterm bid. Phillips interview.

30 "The Odds Were Wrong," Newsweek, September 24, 1956, p. 36. See also Salt Lake Tribune, October 16, 1956, for additional support for the prevalence of cross-over voting. Democratic politicians agreed that it was an important factor in the election.

31 Ogden Standard-Examiner, September 7, 1956.

32 Jonas, for instance, said that Lee "blew hot and cold" on the Colorado River reclamation projects. "The 1956 Election," p. 156.

33 John Fischer of Harper's to Lee, April 7, 1955, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

221

J. BRACKEN LEE 3 'J. Bracken Lee, "The Colorado River Storage Project," April 1955, pp. 1, 2, unpublished article written for Harper's, ibid.

"Lee to members of U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, February 21, 1956, ibid.

3C Lee interview.

"Interviews with Arthur V. Watkins, July 18 and August 7, 1972, Salt Lake City.

38 Wallace F. Bennett to author, August 22, 1975.

39 Deseret News, February 16, 1953.

40 Lee interview.

"Phillips interview.

In the opinion of Democrat Frank E. Moss, who succeeded Watkins in the Senate, had Lee been willing to support Eisenhower "he might very well have been a third-term Governor. In '56 Eisenhower was sweeping everything."

(Moss to author.) Calvin L. Rampton agreed that criticism of Ike caused Lee's defeat. (Rampton interview.) Wayne L. Black suggested that a governor must be a good leader of his party to be a good governor. He believed that Lee failed in that facet of leadership when he put the other leaders of his party in a difficult position. (Black interview.) Even William Dawson, who won reelection to Congress that year, believed there was no question about Lee's criticism of Ike being crucial: "I was as aggravated as Watkins was." Although Dawson had been good friends with Lee and had worked for his administration, he supported Clyde after the primary election. (Dawson interview.)

42 Sall Lake Tribune, October 14, 1956. ÂŤIbid.

"Ibid.

The Republican State Committee made a strong endorsement of Clyde through a resolution that made the following points: their support for Clyde was unanimous; Clyde was the party's only candidate for governor; the Republican party was more important than any one individual; loyalty to the ticket was essential for the victory of Republican principles. Deseret News, October 16, 1956. i5 Salt Lake Tribune, October 27, 1956.

Benson delivered a single speech on agriculture during the campaign in Richfield in which he stated that Clyde was "a good man." Provo Daily Herald, October 9, 1956. Many interpreted Benson's comments as church approval of Clyde's candidacy. See also Deseret News, October 8, 1956. In recalling the speech, Benson admitted to supporting Clyde in the speech and that he knew him "a little." Benson interview. i6 Deseret News, October 15, 1956, editorial.

"Salt Lake Tribune, October 16, 1956, editorial. ^Deseret News, October 15, 1956. i9 Deseret News, October 19, 1956. ^Deseret News, October 20, 1956.

51 Salt Lake Tribune, October 21, 1956.

52 Television Speech by Lee, October 22, 1956, reprinted in an advertisement by Citizens for Lee in Deseret News, October 24, 1956.

53 Ibid.

5i Deseret News, October 23, 1956. ^Deseret News, October 24, 1956. ^Deseret News, October 26, 1956.

"Deseret News, October 27, 1956.

222

THE THIRD-TERM BID ™Salt Lake Tribune, October 27, 1956. Other members of the panel were Jaren L. Jones, Republican national committeeman, and attorney Albert R. Bowen. ™Deseret News, October 29, 1956. ^Deseret News, October 30, 1956. ^Deseret News, November 1, 1956. ^Deseret News, November 2, 1956. ^Deseret News, October 31, 1956. ^Deseret News, November 2, 1956. The ad was entitled "Two Prominent Utahns Tell Why They Support George D. Clyde for Governor." James F. Keyser explained that he had supported someone else for the nomination but was behind Clyde now because he won it fairly through the system. He referred to Romney as Clyde's "legitimate opponent." ^Deseret News, November 3, 1956. ^Deseret News, November 5, 1956. e7 Deseret News, November 3, 1956. c8 Ibid. e9 Deseret News, November 5, 1956.

70 "To the People of Utah," ad paid for by Citizens for Lee, Deseret News, November 3, 1956.

71 "Re-elect Gov. Lee," ad, Deseret News, November 5, 1956.

72 "Who Will You Believe . . . President Eisenhower or the Local Political Bosses, ad, Deseret News, November 5, 1956.

73 "Ike Sets the Record Straight," Deseret News, November 5, 1956. ™Ibid.

"Phillips interview.

76 Deseret News, November 5, 1956.

77 Deseret News, November 7, 1956, editorial.

78 Ibid.

79 Lee interview.

It should be noted that Clyde's relationship with educators was almost as strained and hostile as Lee's had been.

Jennings Phillips remembered Lee's being angry enough about Clyde's original decision to run against him that he referred to him privately as "that God damned Clyde." For convenience he finally shortened it to "G. D. Clyde."

Phillips interview.

223

18 Other Election Campaigns Encouraged by the results of his independent candidacy for governor, Lee announced his intention in 1958 to run as an independent for the United States Senate. His decision was prompted by a conviction that both political parties had repudiated their platforms and that the country had "government by misrepresentation under the Republican Party, as well as the Democratic Party." Claiming that both parties stood for the "same policy of big tax, waste and give-away programs," he pledged to reduce the size and cost of government, fight foreign aid, and work for repeal of the income tax: I solemnly promise to vote, as a senator, to restore the independence of the U.S., to reestablish a sound and stable dollar, to maintain peace with honor, to recover the constitutional rights of 49 states and of the people, and to eradicate socialism and communism in America.1 The announcement thrust Lee into a race against Republican incumbent Arthur V. Watkins and Salt Lake County Attorney Frank E. Moss, a Democrat. It was not an impossible task, for after twelve years in office Watkins had become vulnerable.

He had angered retail service station operators, druggists, and grocers by his opposition to a bill designed to strengthen antitrust laws; he had also angered some eastern and central Utahns by remaining aloof from a controversy over reclamation. Carbon County officials thought he favored water users in Sanpete County, and Sanpete County residents were in turn irritated because he had eliminated them from the Colorado River project.2 Watkins had sown the seeds for his own defeat when he overtly supported Clyde for the governorship in 1956. Many observers interpreted Lee's entrance into the Senate race as a revenge run against Watkins. Lee denied it, insisting that he 225

J . BRACKEN LEE

had never been that sort of person.3 Although Moss was convinced that revenge was the principal motive because "Lee hated Watkins with a passion," he conceded that there were other considerations: "Lee wanted to stay in political life. He enjoyed it and thought it would be great to sit in the United States Senate and make his pronouncements."4 Jennings Phillips asserted that Lee entertained a sincere desire to serve in the Senate but conceded that "revenge played a role, because . . . he doesn't forgive very easily. And I don't blame him." According to Phillips, Watkins "coldly calculated" Lee's 1956 defeat.5 Well aware of the potential hazards of an intraparty struggle, Watkins emphasized his achievements and his seniority, noting that he would be next in line for a seat on the Senate Appropriations Committee. But Lee remembered that Abe Murdock had served on that committee during his first and only term in the Senate, and Moss argued that Watkins's seniority would mean little in a Democratic Congress."

In a tactical error both Lee and Watkins appeared frequently in three-way debate with Moss who, because he was younger and more vigorous, became the obvious benefactor.7 Moreover, Lee and Watkins spent most of their campaign time attacking and answering each other, also to the direct benefit of Moss who observed that they "got to slugging one another so much that they sort of left me alone and forgot I was running hard, too."8 On the other hand, Moss directed an inordinate amount of his energies against the former governor, illustrating his fear of the Lee candidacy. For instance, one of his political campaign folders used the Webster definition of a demagogue as its heading —a person who attempts to gain political influence by misrepresenting the facts. Then, Moss mercilessly attacked Lee as an ex-Republican and "purple people eater" because of the damage he did to education: "Lee never passed up a chance to clobber our school teachers." He also accused Lee of financial mismanagement "with his penny-wise and pound foolish schemes" that became a "scandal of national proportions." He criticized Lee for using campaign contributions from sources outside Utah, a serious sin in his view, because Utahns had run their "own 226

OTHER ELECTION CAMPAIGNS

affairs for over 100 years" and should continue to do so. Moss claimed that Lee's argument for a national sales tax was a "fraudulent misrepresentation of the facts," appealing to the "uninformed and the selfish." Finally, indulging in some demagoguery of his own, Moss compared Lee to a well-known dictator: Don't we all remember the little man of Germany with the big moustache—his technique was to tell a big, big lie and the bigger the lie the more people would fall for it. Isn't there a strange similarity to both Lee's and Hitler demagogic tactics?9 Supposedly, Watkins was his principal opponent, yet Moss chose to devote two and one-half pages of the circular to Lee and only one-half page to Watkins, who, he noted, had voted against increased old age assistance, reduction of interest rates on federal loans to cities and states, and extending state unemployment benefits to unemployed workers in Utah. Moss appeared little concerned with Watkins, whom he treated almost offhandedly.

Rather than "going backwards with Brack" or "standing still with Watkins," he urged voters to choose a man "with the courage of his convictions."10 Reflecting on the campaign years later, Moss thought Lee would have made "a very poor United States Senator." Moss, a liberal Democrat, believed Lee would have used the Senate as a forum for his unorthodox views, making Utah a "laughing stock."11 Moss, critical of Lee's out-of-state backers, received a good deal of outside help himself through campaign visits by Sens.

Lyndon Johnson, George Smathers, and Warren Magnuson, as well as Reps. Stewart Udall and John Moss. Nevertheless, the Tribune poll taken early in the campaign showed Lee in front, Watkins second, and Moss a poor third. It was no surprise then that Moss focused on Lee, requesting that he explain his obligations to the For America millionaires who were allegedly "pouring money into Utah to buy his Senate seat." After losing the governorship, Lee had become closely allied with a conservative organization called For America. Moss asked, "Will this discredited Republican represent us or the interests who put up his 227

J . BRACKEN LEE

money? Doesn't it seem a little odd that everyone is corrupt and dishonest but Brack?"12 Watkins echoed Moss's argument, and implied that For America was against the Colorado River project. He unearthed an old Lee statement in which he referred to reclamations appropriations as "loot" and asked, "Is California money going to be the deciding factor in Utah's senatorial election?"13 Although Lee admitted that he was receiving money from California, Texas, "and from all states" from "fine Americans," he denied that any group controlled him. He correctly claimed that neither Watkins nor Moss could deny that they were receiving help from other states, too. The only difference, he said, between his out-of-state money and that of the two political parties was that the latter came from organized minorities who expected special favors. He insisted that the important issue was not where the money originated but what the funds stood for.14 Watkins criticized Lee's income tax philosophy, pointing out that much of Utah's personal income derived from the federal government and that the government payroll was the largest in the state. He predicted that cutting federal spending and revenues would make Utah the first casualty in a rigorous economy wave. Watkins insisted that "you don't prune a tree by chopping it down to a stump."15 Income tax remained one of Lee's favorite topics, and he pledged to work toward granting the people a right to vote on repeal if elected. He claimed that half of every dollar spent by the federal government was "wasted or given away or used to buy votes with."16 He thought that $33 billion could be put into the hands of the people if the government was administered efficiently, leaving $40 billion to run the necessary services of government, approximately "$6 billion more than Harry Truman spent in his highest peacetime budget."17 In rebuttal, Watkins warned voters that Lee would "turn the clock back half a century." He suggested that they avoid the "rabble rousing of extremists of the left and of the right."18 In a cogent analysis of the campaign, journalist DeMar Teuscher observed that the laws of politics dictated that both 228

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party candidates ignore the independent and concentrate on each other. Yet, in this case both Watkins and Moss were bringing "their heaviest political guns to bear squarely" on Lee who was showing an amazing strength that few people believed possible when he announced his candidacy. Teuscher thought Lee had succeeded in capturing dissatisfied Republicans as well as cutting into the normally Democratic prolabor vote. As a result, both Watkins and Moss were running scared. Watkins wanted help from the president and vice-president, and Moss planned on former President Truman and Gov. Edmund Muskie of Maine.

Unfortunately for Lee, his independent candidacy did not allow for the use of big names.19 In his appearance for Moss, Muskie spoke to the biggest rally of the campaign year, which included several other speakers who made Lee their target, as signs of "Let's Sack Brack" were held high. Rep. John Moss (D-Calif.), a native Utahn, declared that it would be "tragic to saddle the people of the United States with your very interesting former governor—an utterly fantastic person." Moss called Lee's income tax repeal program an "insult to the intelligence of his audience" and "a pie-in-the-sky promise of something for nothing."20 Lee continued to place heavy emphasis on the tax question, challenging the people to check their state tax notices, home and property taxes, and paycheck deductions, and then discover what politicians were doing with the money. He claimed that it was going to "kings, potentates and other rulers for automobiles and new palaces."21 Lee thought it unusual that both parties concentrated their efforts against him as indicated by the presence of top national campaigners. On the one hand, they claimed that Lee was unimportant and would be worthless in the Senate; and on the other hand, they worried that he "would have the power to repeal laws." If he was so unimportant, asked Lee, why did both parties bring in big guns to silence him?22 He observed that the Democrats had written a song with the theme of "sack Brack," and the Republicans were "singing the same tune." He concluded that the song was the best publicity he had had in years but 229

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predicted that the parties would be "left holding the sack."23 Although a third-party candidacy is always tenuous, Watkins and Moss increased Lee's visability, almost bringing to fruition the Lee slogan, "Let's bring Brack back."

Lee's right-wing tendencies became more pronounced as the campaign wore on. He declared that the U.S. was supporting Communist policy. For years Communists had predicted that the U.S. would spend itself "into bankruptcy and simply by waiting they would be able to take over."24 He claimed that he would feel neglected if there was not "some sort of smear type advertisement used against" him in the final days. He thought such techniques increased his vote tally and hoped his opponents were desperate enough to resort to it. If they did he was confident that he would be elected.25 When another poll showed Watkins taking the lead with 35 percent of the vote, Lee second with 29 percent, and Moss third with 27 percent, with 9 percent undecided, Watkins trumpeted the figures in his newspaper advertisements.26 Then, taking aim at Lee, he said, "A demagogue always deals in half-truths, glittering generalities, and destructive personal attacks."27 Deseret News political editor DeMar Teuscher called Watkins the slim favorite, while Moss ran the risk of finishing third. Support for that argument came from Washington, when Sen. George Smathers of Florida, chairman of the Senate campaign committee, expressed pessimism at the chances of picking up a Senate seat for the Democrats because Moss was in trouble and Lee was "getting too many of our votes."28 Moss made an effort to appear the coolest head, advocating debate about "vital issues, not personalities and emotional matters,"29 even though he had failed to follow such a course himself.

Disturbed by the results of the poll placing him third, Moss commissioned a new poll, sponsored by the Political Science Department of the University of Utah and KALL Radio. In the final week of the campaign, this survey showed Moss moving barely ahead of his two opponents.30 Instead of conceding the election to Moss, most political analysts interpreted this to mean that the three-way race was 230

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especially volatile. Five days before the election, Teuscher still placed Watkins in the lead, with Lee second and Moss third; but he quoted an aged mountaineer saying, "Whenever you have three critters runnin' in a two-critter race, keep your hands— and your money—in your pockets." Teuscher freely acknowledged that "any substantial shift in public sentiment" could change the outcome. An especially interesting facet of this race was the unusually clear choice it offered on issues and personalities.31 Four days before the election the Deseret News continued to rate Watkins "a very slight favorite" but thought that the "slashing attack" by Lee on both candidates and both parties had "startled the entire country and put some sort of a spotlight upon the state." The News gave Lee a chance to win, even though when he announced his candidacy he was expected to finish last.

Moss was said to be "in trouble," although he was waging a strong battle to pull Democrats away from Lee.32 On election eve Moss spoke like a winner, referring jubilantly to the latest polls as "heart warming evidence that all of the efforts of Democrats throughout Utah have not been in vain."

He noted that in all the polls he was running first or second with a very thin lead, meaning that "one of the two Republicans is defeated." Reports from the largest counties of the state seemed to indicate that the Democratic tide was even stronger than the polls predicted, and that voters were "switching to the Democratic Party so fast that no method of taking polls could keep up with it."33 Apparently, he was right. On November 4, 1958, Moss was elected, receiving 112,827 (38 percent) to Watkins's 101,471 (34.8 percent) and Lee's 77,013 (26.4 percent). 34 Although garnering a smaller percentage than he did in 1956, Lee again demonstrated his impressive drawing power as a candidate. That strength had been evident even in his opening rally in a downtown dance hall when he attracted a larger audience than Vice-president Nixon who addressed a Republican rally later in the same location.35 Since Lee's decision to run was unorthodox in Utah politics, he did as well as could be expected.

Yet, the evidence suggests that he started stronger than he 231

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finished. An immensely popular personality, Lee nevertheless incurred considerable resentment because of his third-party candidacy; many voters who were initially attracted to him were psychologically unable to remain with him all the way to the ballot box.

Lee divided the Republican party, making it appear that had he not been in the race Watkins could have easily defeated Moss.

Political scientist Frank Jonas viewed it differently, believing that Lee attracted a large protest vote and that many of those who objected to incumbent Watkins realized that Lee could not win and voted for Moss instead. In other words, Moss would have trounced Watkins whether Lee was in the race or not. Much of Lee's backing in 1958 seemed to come from lower income groups, middle-aged and older citizens, and those who had been laid off by Kennecott Copper, Union Pacific, and Geneva Steel.36 Since the Democratic party normally attracted those people, they would have been expected to support Moss not Watkins.

Predictably, Moss agreed with Jonas's analysis: I would have defeated Arthur Watkins anyway if Bracken Lee had not come into the 1958 Senate race. But his presence there enhanced my chances, so I've always considered it a factor in that election. I have never believed that it handed the election to me, but it made it easier.37 The Deseret News characterized the results of the election as "split government for Utah" with one Republican senator and one Democratic senator, one Republican congressman and one Democratic congressman. It also marked a "dramatic rebirth" of the Democratic party in Utah, partly ignited by Lee's candidacy. The News thought it ironic that Watkins and Rep. William A. Dawson, both of whom worked so hard on the Colorado River project, "should be retired from Congress even as the cement is poured in the dams they largely fathered."38 Referring to himself as "one political writer who apparently cannot recognize a political 'tide' until the water laps around his neck," Teuscher called the effect of Lee's candidacy on Watkins and Dawson catastrophic. He claimed that Moss's effort to keep Democrats in the party was much more successful than anyone 232

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dreamed, probably because of an undercurrent of protest against those in power. Nevertheless, Teuscher thought there were two winners in the Senate race: Moss won the seat, and Lee defeated Watkins. Apparently, Lee hit his peak about ten days too soon, with strong support from Democrats who then turned their backs on Lee because of Moss's solicitation for Democratic support.

At the same time, many normally Republican voters stuck with Lee rather than Watkins, and Watkins lost heavily. Democrats who returned to the fold tended to vote a straight ticket, while many Republicans voted "single-shot" for Lee—and no one else, costing Dawson a heavy loss of votes in his congressional race.

Watkins and Dawson may have lost anyway, of course, because of the heavy protest vote.39 The opposite view was later expressed by Sen. Wallace F. Bennett who called Lee's decision to enter the race disastrous— "after all the party had done for him." According to Bennett, Lee "split what had obviously been a healthy Republican majority for Watkins, and elected Senator Moss," thereby depriving Utah of "senior representation on the Interior Committee" and of Watkins's "resourcefulness . . . [that] would have pushed the Upper-Colorado River Storage Project ahead faster than has been the case."40 Embittered by defeat, Watkins called Lee "the most expensive public man in the state" because he cost Utah Watkins's seniority and the completion of the storage project.41 In 1972, fourteen years after his defeat, Watkins claimed that he would still be in the Senate had it not been for Lee: "I might not be alive —but I'd be there!" Making no effort to feign humility, Watkins forthrightly characterized himself as Utah's outstanding Republican leader, whose defeat represented an irretrievable loss. He recalled that Lee had once written him a letter in which he asserted that Watkins had done more for him than any other political leader, "yet he ran against me."12 He feared that he had done too much for Lee without receiving an expression of gratitude, such as the appointment of his son to West Point.

Watkins said, "The trouble with Brack is that he isn't very edu233

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cated—he has very limited education—and it affects his decision making."43 Lee recalled healthy relations with Watkins during most of his governorship, and he regarded him as a good senator until he "sold his principles out" to the Eisenhower administration: "I'm convinced that he made a deal with Eisenhower to do anyming Eisenhower asked him to do, provided Eisenhower'd let him name the appointments out of Utah." Lee's relationship with Watkins began to cool after Watkins invited him to listen to a speech he was delivering in the Senate against public housing.

During the course of Watkins's one-hour speech, two of the four senators present went to sleep, and a third read a newspaper.

As the only spectator present, Lee was disillusioned with Congress. A few weeks later, when the issue Watkins spoke against came to a vote, he startled Lee by voting for it: "Can you imagine that?" Lee called Watkins and asked, "Why the hell did you vote for that bill?" His reply disgusted Lee even more: he had traded his vote for the housing bill in order to get support for the Colorado River project.44 In spite of his critics, Lee maintained that revenge had no role in his 1958 run for the Senate: If I had no other purpose than revenge, I wouldn't waste one minute! See, I'm not that kind of a fella! I wouldn't do that! What good's revenge to you? That's silly! In fact, it's hard for me to understand how anybody would waste the energy just simply for revenge. I can't understand revenge.

I figure that a man'll get what's comin' to him, because I believe in the law of retribution. Nobody's done anything wrong that he isn't going to pay for it. And I think I'll pay for it too.

So I've heard that, but I wouldn't even think of wastin' that time and that energy for that silly thing, because I don't think Moss or Watkins, either one, are worth shootin' when it comes to runnin' the government. Far as I'm concerned, you got too many nitwits like them back there. Both failures —all their damn life they were failures, both Moss and Watkins—couldn't make a livin' practicing law, couldn't pay their bills, and end up runnin' the world!45 234

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Lee did not regard the Senate as the pinnacle of his political ambition, although he admitted that he would have liked to have gone to the Senate in 1958, adding, "But you couldn't give it to me now! You couldn't pay me ten times what they're gettin' to go back there and go through what you have to go through."

Lee was certain of one thing: if elected, he would not have relinquished his principles.46 Lee played the typical spoiler role in the 1958 election, but he was much more important than most third-party candidates.

He was almost as important to the Utah election as Theodore Roosevelt had been in the three-way race for the presidency in 1912 when he was responsible for the defeat of William Howard Taft. Roosevelt's candidacy elected Woodrow Wilson by dividing the Republican vote. He did slightly better than Lee, for he came in second while Taft finished third, an especially embarrassing defeat for an incumbent president. Although Watkins managed to finish ahead of Lee, Lee clearly controlled the election. Whether he did it for revenge or ambition, he was certainly angry with Watkins and the whole Republican party. He sincerely disagreed with the philosophies and practices of both Moss and Watkins and acted as an effective advocate for his position.

In his second independent run Lee demonstrated that his constituency was still strong but that it would probably never be strong enough to elect him in a three-way race.

1962 SENATE RACE

Although the 1958 defeat did not remove Lee's desire to represent Utah in the Senate, it did convince him of the futility of an independent candidacy. Therefore, in 1962, when he was serving as mayor of Salt Lake City, he announced that he would challenge Senator Bennett in the Republican primary.47 To prevent a bitter primary battle some Republican leaders had discussed nominating a third candidate who would represent no serious threat to Bennett but would have enough support in the convention to defeat Lee.48 The plan did not materialize, but it proved that Bennett had no intention of underestimating the Lee 235

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threat. In a reversal of his 1958 announcement Lee said he had decided to run "because I believe that the Republican Party offers the best opportunity for a conservative like myself to fight most effectively for the principles in which I believe."49 Since Bennett was widely known as a conservative himself, this primary did not offer voters the broad choice of other Lee races. As a result, emphasis was placed on personality differences and the question of party loyalty. In the course of the campaign some suspected that Lee was holding back his usual vigorous criticism so that in the event of a loss he could more easily support Bennett and be considered for the Senate again in 1964 as a regular Republican.50 DeMar Teuscher supported that contention, noting that Republicans were hoping that the race would "stay out of the realm of personal bitterness."

Bennett's people feared that if Lee sensed victory, he would stage his usual free-swinging campaign and leave scars on the party reminiscent of 1958.51 Deliberately avoiding personal criticism of Bennett, Lee emphasized many of his familiar campaign themes, asserting, for instance, that "every congressman and every senator who has voted for foreign aid has violated his oath of office."52 Insisting that too many congressmen and senators contributed to the robbery of working people "to enrich the rich" all over the world, he suggested the need to stop "this legalized stealing."53 He called it unbelievable that any member of the Senate could "cost the taxpayers $275,000 per year in order to have extra plush headquarters, free telephone service, hidden salary payments to relatives and many non-essential services free of charge." '4 In reference to deficit financing, he claimed that $10 billion per year interest paid on a $300 billion national debt would "pay all the costs of our entire school system in all of the 50 states" as well as provide "a decided increase in teacher salaries,"55 ironic words from the perennial enemy of education.

Pundits waited in vain for the campaign to heat up with Lee making serious charges against Bennett. Teuscher astutely observed that Lee's chances of defeating Bennett were slight "unless he staged a slam-bang anti-Bennett campaign. This he 236

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has not done. In fact, the usually voluble mayor has been unusually quiet. So Bennett rates the favorite role."56 Lee's campaign chairman, Daniel H. Meyer, promptly took exception to Teuscher's claim, insisting that Lee was waging an effective campaign and would win in November. He predicted "a huge groundswell" for Lee because he had outworked Bennett in every county. Private polls indicated a Lee victory in the primary.

Meyer said there was no question that "Lee, with his strong Independent and Democratic backing, coupled with all the Republicans who are disappointed with our weak Washington representation, will carry the election."57 In the meantime Bennett played it cool, refusing to make the same mistake Watkins had made in 1958 when he centered his entire campaign on Lee. As a matter of fact, Bennett barely acknowledged Lee's presence. His speeches treated issues, criticized Kennedy administration policies, and purposely omitted any mention of Lee's political philosophy. The closest Bennett came to attack was in an ad, "Why I won't attack my opponent in the Primary Election," run three days before the primary.

He claimed that dozens of people had implored him to expose his "off-and-on Republican opponent." Even though Lee supporters had pictured him as "a wasteful money shoveler for the Kennedy Administration," Bennett said he would not "retaliate in kind with a caustic attack" on Lee because he was a "team fighter, not a lone wolf," and had "never deserted the Republican Party."

He contended that reliable polls, his "opponent's brash, groundless claims to the contrary—favor my nomination by long odds."

Apparently, he was convinced, as were other thoughtful Utahns, that he was the only conservative who could win.58 Lee lost the primary, pulling a respectable 48,542 votes to Bennett's 71,701.5D The Deseret News suggested that Lee's 40 percent showing proved the strength of the conservative wing of the Republican party. The editors speculated that his "surprisingly big vote" against a strong incumbent indicated some success in his effort to reestablish himself as a Republican. They implored him to further show his reformation by supporting the party in the general election.60 Remarking on his comeback 237

J . BRACKEN LEE

as a Republican after two straight defeats as an independent, Teuscher observed that Lee had some Republican support but not from key party leaders. Evidently, much of his backing came from "hard-core Lee supporters," the Republican right wing, and Democrats.61 Acting the part of the good loser, Lee pledged he "would do everything possible to re-elect Wallace Bennett to the Senate."62 Not surprisingly, even that decision was greeted with suspicion by some Republican skeptics who wondered whether his support would help or hinder Bennett.63 Suffering some of the same feelings of bitterness that had afflicted Watkins in 1958, Bennett later lamented Lee's decision to challenge him, recalling that he "ran out on the party in 1958" but "thought he could be forgiven." Bennett's mood was not one of forgiveness. He felt that Lee had broken the unwritten rule of party politics by challenging an incumbent of the same party. Even though Bennett won by a respectable margin, he was disappointed that 48,000 Republicans had rejected him in favor of Lee, "a turncoat."64 Bennett went on to win his third consecutive term in the Senate, by defeating Rep. David S. King, 166,755 to 151,656.

Lee realized the unfavorable odds he faced in a race against Bennett. Bennett was stronger in 1962 than ever before and was, moreover, on exceptionally good terms with the Mormon church. Lee remained convinced that Utah would have benefited from a Bennett defeat: "My opinion of Wallace Bennett is that he never did anything in his life for anybody but Wallace Bennett.

I think he's the most selfish man I've ever known."65 A FINAL R U N FOR THE GOVERNORSHIP

With Governor Clyde almost certain to step down after eight years in office in 1964, the gubernatorial race became fluid in both parties. By March 1 Calvin Rampton and Ernest Dean had declared for the Democratic nomination, Mitchell Melich and Lamont Toronto for the Republicans; and friends of Lee began circulating petitions for a prospective Lee candidacy.66 His supporters felt that he retained enough popularity that if he could once get on the primary ballot he could win. If Utah had a direct 238

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primary instead of a convention system, they reasoned, Lee would easily get the nod and would enter the race without hesitation.

But the complexities of the convention worried him in light of his controversial career, and so his supporters wrote letters to potential delegates to assess his strength.67 In a move criticized for its tardiness, Governor Clyde formally announced that he would not seek reelection only thirty hours prior to the March 31 filing deadline.68 He supposedly made the announcement to remove any doubt as to his intentions in the minds of any possible candidates who may have been postponing their plans until the governor had spoken. Implying a message for Lee, Clyde declared that two four-year terms as governor were a "reasonable limit" and that no man was indispensable.69 The next day, Lee ended speculation by filing his candidacy three hours before the 5 P.M. deadline.70 The final Republican candidate was D. James Cannon, who filed after Lee, to bring the list of candidates to five, in addition to Melich, Toronto, and Kleon Kerr.71 Very early, Lee's old problems with educators surfaced as his biggest roadblock to the nomination. In a speech to delegates he warned that the outcome of the election would be greatly influenced by financial contributions from teachers. He noted that the UEA had organized a campaign fund to support candidates of their choice and claimed it was an "example of organized minorities which exert pressures for their own advancement at the expense of the average taxpayer."72 The battle lines were drawn, and Lee was in no mood to placate his former foes. In a huge advertisement directed to Republican delegates Lee traced his record, claiming that "only one man of the five" could lead Utah to "progress and growth."

He was proud of his record of economy as governor. He noted that educational expenditures had been raised, with teacher salaries increasing 40 percent. He also called attention to a debtfree Salt Lake City under his leadership as mayor.73 Acknowledging that predictions about the race were not easy, newsman Teuscher went out on a limb and called Cannon and Melich the winners, with Lee, Toronto, and Kerr following in 239

J . BRACKEN LEE

that order. Lee's presence in the race made prognostications difficult, since he was regarded as a "political enigma." "Count him out, and he pulls support from enough places you haven't considered to make you look foolish," Teuscher wrote. He speculated that Goldwater's commanding lead in the race for the Republican nomination for president might help Lee, since they shared similar philosophies. However, he conceded that Lee's record of bolting the party could still cost him heavily in the delegate counts.74 Teuscher was right on target. Lee was unable to muster the necessary convention support, and Melich led the field with 399 votes, followed by Cannon with 376, to qualify as the primary candidates. Lee ran a distant third with 307, followed by Toronto with 216. Kerr withdrew his candidacy before the vote and threw his support to Melich. As Lee had feared, the most important single bloc of votes represented educators who openly adopted a strategy to prevent Lee from qualifying for the primary.

The strength of the school block was estimated at anywhere from 100 to 300 votes, most of them favoring Melich, with Cannon a close second. Results indicated that Melich and Cannon ran very close in Salt Lake and Weber counties; on the other hand, Box Elder and Cache were strong for Lee and Weber especially weak for Lee.75 Blaming his defeat on teachers, Lee claimed that they "controlled the convention" and that they had issued pamphlets all over the state urging people to work at mass meetings to become delegates "for the purpose of defeating the number one enemy of education, Bracken Lee." Nevertheless, he believed that he could have won if the convention had voted in the morning— "I lost it during the noon hour." Lamont Toronto had gone into the convention as the favorite of the John Birch Society members, who supported him until Lee's convention address. At that point they began to realize that Toronto's chances were limited and that Lee's views coincided with their own. However, during the noon hour someone convinced them that they could nominate both Toronto and Lee, and either way have a candidate they could support.70 240

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Lee was correct in assessing the importance of educators at the convention. Recalling his gubernatorial record, they were genuinely frightened by his candidacy and organized carefully to defeat him. It is also reasonable to assume that a very significant proportion of Toronto's support would have gone to Lee had Toronto dropped out. Whether it would have been enough to qualify Lee for the primary can only be conjectured, but Melich and Cannon were much more liberal candidates than either Toronto or Lee. Lee made no effort to camouflage his consistently antieducation philosophy prior to the convention, freely condemning the UEA for excessive spending and then wanting "more money to waste." He cared not how many votes he might lose by such a stand: "At least I will not lose my own self respect," which meant more to him than what "members of the UEA might think."77 He accused educators of "featherbedding" and used M. Lynn Bennion as a prime example. According to Lee, Bennion earned more than $20,000 from the Salt Lake City school system for nine months of work and then received another thousand dollars a month for three months from Utah State University.78 After his convention defeat Lee continued to carp, saying that educators were "not as interested in better schools as they pretend to be." If they were, they would favor merit pay, reduction in overhead, and improvement in educational methods. He lamented their role in his defeat, predicting that they would have more control over state government in the years ahead than ever before.79 This was Lee's final run for statewide office. But later in the year he announced that in 1966 he would run for a U.S. Senate seat from the state of Montana, following the precedent of Robert F. Kennedy of Massachusetts who was elected to the Senate from New York. Lee said he had done some research and discovered that the only requirement was that he be in Montana on election day: "Of course, I'll still be a citizen of Utah, and I won't be able to vote for myself." Claiming to have many friends in Montana, he projected a two-week vacation from the mayor's job to go to Montana and campaign. Asked if there were enough friends 241

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there to win an election, Lee replied, "We'll see in 1966." He would have been seeking the seat of Lee Metcalf, a Democrat.

Engaging in irony, Lee said, "The reason I chose Montana is so that I can run against a Democrat. I wouldn't run against another Republican." Besides, he liked the idea of setting a precedent: "I'll be the first Republican carpetbagger."80 Although most observers interpreted these comments as tongue-in-cheek, one could never be sure about J. Bracken Lee. Montana nervously reacted by pushing a bill through the legislature known as the "Lee Bill," making it impossible for a nonresident to run for the U.S. Senate. One could suspect Lee of consciously working for electoral reform, but asked about his intentions later, he actually hedged. Were his comments tonguein-cheek? "Well, pretty much," he replied. He did it "more to point out how ridiculous" it was for Kennedy to run in New York and Pierre Salinger to run in California when neither was a resident of those states. Was he serious about such a candidacy of his own in Montana? "Not that serious," he said.81

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OTHER ELECTION CAMPAIGNS ^Salt Lake Tribune and Deseret News, July 7, 1958. See also "The Machines Have Broken Down—Put a MAN on the job!" Political pamphlet circulated by Citizens for Lee. On the back of the pamphlet were instructions on how to vote for Lee; the other two choices were called "Republicrat" and "Demopublican."

2 Frank Jonas, "The 1958 Election in Utah," Western Political Quarterly 12 (1959):347.

3 Deseret News, November 7, 1958. *Moss to author.

5 Phillips interview.

"Jonas, "The 1958 Election."

7 Ibid., p. 348.

8 Moss to author.

9 Frank E. Moss Campaign Brochure, sponsored by Utah Unity Council, 1958. The cover of this 4-page brochure stated: "Webster's Dictionary says: A Demagogue is a speaker who seeks to make capital of social discontent and gain political influence. A demagogue does this by misrepresenting the facts."

"Ibid.

"Moss to author.

"Deseret News, October 15, 1958.

13 Arthur V. Watkins ad, "Should Utah Give Away One of Its Two Seats in the U.S. Senate?" Deseret News, October 16, 1958.

"Deseret News, October 18, 1958.

"Deseret News, October 11, 1958.

16 Ibid.

"Deseret News, October 13, 1958.

18 Arthur V. Watkins ad, "What Is It Worth to Utah?" Deseret News, October 15, 1958.

19 DeMar Teuscher, "Speaking of Politics," Deseret News, October 15, 1958.

20 Deseret News, October 16, 1958.

21 Desert News, October 23, 1958.

22 J. Bracken Lee ad, "Parties Close Ranks, Unite against Lee," Deseret News, October 16, 1958.

23 Deseret News, October 17, 1958.

2i Deseret News, October 30, 1958.

25 Deseret News, October 28, 1958.

2G Arthur V. Watkins ad, "All Utah Wins With Watkins," Deseret News, October 20, 1958.

27 Arthur V. Watkins ad, "Watkins Practices Economy While His Opponents Talk about It!" Deseret News, October 22, 1958.

28 Teuscher, "Speaking of Politics," Deseret News, October 23, 1958.

2S Deseret News, October 24, 1958.

30 Jonas, "The 1958 Election," p. 349.

31 Teuscher, "Speaking of Politics," Deseret News, October 30, 1958.

32 Deseret News, October 31, 1958.

33 Deseret News, November 3, 1958.

3i Deseret News, November 5, 1958.

35 Jonas, "The 1958 Election," p. 354.

3 6Ibid., pp. 352, 353.

243

J. BRACKEN LEE 37

Moss to author.

Deseret News, November 5, 1958, editorial.

39 Teuscher, Deseret News, November 6, 1958.

"Bennett to author.

41 Watkins interview.

"Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Lee interview. Lee also had "a big fight with Watkins in 1954 over whether Rep. Douglas Stringfellow, who had lied about his war record for years, should be kept on the Republican ticket. Watkins wanted him on the ticket, while Lee argued that the "fella's a self-admitted liar, and I just don't think you should keep him on." Watkins argued that Mayor Curley of Boston had been in jail and was still elected to office afterward. Lee said, "You need a better argument than 'the Democrats do it.' " At that moment the telephone rang; it was Ezra Taft Benson who allegedly told Watkins that the president wanted Stringfellow off the ticket. According to Lee, when Watkins hung up he said, "He's off the ticket."

Benson recalled the telephone conversation with Watkins and admitted that he preferred that Stringfellow be dropped. Eisenhower thought so, too, but he had not instructed Benson to order him off the ticket. Benson said he made the call of his own volition. Benson interview.

45 Lee interview.

46 Ibid.

"Deseret News, July 9, 1962.

"Frank Jonas, "The 1962 Election in Utah," Western Political Quarterly 16 (1963):461. i9 Deseret News, July 9, 1962.

50 Jonas, "The 1962 Election."

"Teuscher, "Speaking of Politics," Deseret News, August 1, 1962. ^Deseret News, August 8, 1962. ^Deseret News, September 3, 1962. ^Deseret News, September 8, 1962.

55 Deseret News, September 7, 1962.

56 Teuscher, "Speaking of Politics," Deseret News, August 29, 1962.

"Deseret News, September 5, 1962. ^Deseret News, September 8, 1962.

59 Deseret News, September 12, 1962. ^Deseret News, September 12, 1962, editorial.

"Teuscher, "Speaking of Politics," Deseret News, September 12, 1962. ^Deseret News, October 16, 1962. ^Deseret News, October 17, 1962.

"Bennett to author.

G5 Lee interview. ""Deseret News, March 1, 1964. •"Teuscher, "Speaking of Politics," Deseret News, March 5, 1964. Under Utah law a convention ballot is required whenever more than one candidate seeks the party nomination for any office. If one candidate gets 80 percent or more of the delegate votes he becomes the nominee without a primary election.

If not, the two highest vote-getters go on the primary ballot.

6a Deseret News, March 30, 1964.

38

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OTHER ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 69 Clyde's delay in making his announcement suggested that he feared a Lee candidacy and thought Lee might not run if he (Clyde) decided to seek a third term. His comments about a "reasonable limit" for a governor were also directed at Lee. 70 Deseret News, March 31, 1964.

71 Deseret News, April 1, 1964.

72 Deseret News, June 4, 1964. ""Republican Delegates, Utah Is Now at the Crossroads of Crisis!" Ad, Deseret News, June 12, 1964.

74 Teuscher, "Speaking of Politics," Deseret News, June 11, 1964.

75 Salt Lake Tribune, June 14, 1964.

76 Lee interview. Although members of the Birch Society often identified with Lee's brand of conservatism, he was never a member of the society. He said: "I do not believe that you can fight a dictatorship—and that's all Communism is—by setting up another dictatorship. Now the whole theory behind the John Birch Society as I understand it is the only way to whip Communism is adopt their tactics. . . . I'm not a very good joiner anyway, to tell you the truth. I'm too much of an individual."

77 Lee to J. F. Faux, June 22, 1964, Lee Mayoralty Papers.

78 Lee to Mrs. Roger Bailey, June 19, 1964, ibid.

79 Lee to Max Powell, June 30, 1964, ibid.

S0 Deseret News, December 17, 1964.

81 Lee interview.

245

19 Mayor of Salt Lake City Following his first losing battles for the governorship and the U.S. Senate, Lee announced his intention to run for mayor of Salt Lake City, a shrewd decision that rejuvenated his political career. Since the race was nonpartisan he was able to cast aside the tainted political image of maverick Republican and independent. Six candidates filed for the 1959 primary, including the unpopular incumbent, Adiel F. Stewart. In a smashing victory Lee swept 197 of 202 districts with 22,840 votes, or 51 percent of the total. Bruce Jenkins polled 9,354 for a distant second place finish, and Mayor Stewart made an extremely poor showing in third place with 6,749. Not only did Lee manage to defeat Stewart two to one in his own district, but Stewart lost to Lee every other district except for the University of Utah.1 Lee seemed destined for an impressive victory over Jenkins in the run-off election to follow.

In an active campaign both candidates agreed that a mayorcouncil form of government was superior to Salt Lake's five-man commission system. Jenkins promised to work for a change under permissive legislation from the last legislature, but Lee feared that the bill gave the mayor too much power. He argued that ultimate control of government should be held by the people.

Jenkins countered that the mayor-council form would separate the appropriating and administering powers, making it superior to the commission system which allowed one body the power to make the budget, appropriate the money, and administer it: "We should have someone who has a hand on the rudder and who is responsible to the people for the operating of government." Lee promised not to approve any tax increase. Condescendingly, he called Jenkins "a fine young man" who belonged to the "taxing and spending school." Exercising unusual candor, 247

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Jenkins responded that he had voted against the local sales tax as a member of the Utah State Senate but now wondered if he had been mistaken, since that levy was "the key to the capital improvements program."2 Accusing Lee of leaving a "backlog of needed improvements" when he left the governor's chair, Jenkins warned that Lee's election would seriously jeopardize capital improvements.3 A citizens' group composed of Democrats, Republicans, and independents agreed with Jenkins and issued a warning letter to their neighbors, advising them to reject Lee because he indicated no interest in the civic building program recommended by a bipartisan citizens' committee. They stressed the need for more fire stations, sewer trunk lines and a sewage treatment plant, a new library, and a civic auditorium. Understandably, they also believed Lee intended to be a "part-time mayor" who would leave office "in search of higher posts."4 In his defense, Lee said he was running on his past record as a "proven administrator" and as an advocate of honest and efficient government.5 He claimed that enough money had been wasted by the city government in the previous twenty years to have completed all the projected capital improvements. He thought the people should have an opportunity to vote on any improvements, but he also felt that some improvements could be financed through simple economy in government.6 He would willingly submit a bond issue for a new civic auditorium, a new sewage treatment plant, and the Redwood Road sewage trunk line, if the people knew the price tag and approved it. In addition he maintained that city workers needed a living wage, the city needed a new library, and fire and police departments needed new facilities. "I believe all this can be done without raising taxes one cent," he asserted, suggesting that there would never be such a wide difference between the philosophies of mayoral candidates as existed in this election. Jenkins rejected that argument, insisting that he too believed that capital improvements could be made on existing revenue: "We need no tax increase to pay for them." He maintained that the city sales tax enacted earlier was intended for capital improvements.7 248

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Jenkins accused Lee of "playing for bigger stakes than maydr" and using Salt Lake City voters to promote those ambitions, specifiically the governorship in 1960 and the U.S. Senate in 1962. Sensing the truth of the charge, Lee hedged, saying that he had never left any office until his term was finished and saw "no reason to change now."8 In campaign literature, Jenkins asked rhetorically, "Can Salt Lake afford Lee as Mayor?"— an ironic approach in view of Lee's reputation for economy.

The handbill stated: "Candidate Lee talks a good game of economy. The record tells another story." Then Jenkins examined Lee's tenure as governor which saw state disbursements rise from $70.1 million to $112.7 million, an increase of 58 percent, when the cost of living rose only 17 percent. He attacked Lee's record in education, noting that in his first year as governor, 82 percent of the men and women trained in teaching in Utah took positions in Utah schools, while in 1954 only 37 percent did so. "This is Lee 'economy': of every 100 teaching graduates of 1954, many trained on Utah tax dollars, 63 went to other states." Jenkins concluded that "Lee's PRICE is too high!"9 Jenkins frequently expressed concern over Lee's law enforcement record in Price. When he asked Lee if his enforcement policies in Salt Lake City would be similar to those in Price, Lee proudly defended his policies.10 But Jenkins thought he had trapped Lee with a sensitive issue and kept hammering him with it. Since Mayor Stewart headed public safety, Jenkins suspected that the new mayor would also be charged with law enforcement.

Therefore, he considered the rumor that Lee planned to fire Cleon Skousen as police chief a "vital issue." He praised Skousen's three and a half years of accomplishments in improved enforcement and better utilization of manpower. Police morale was higher under Skousen than "in any other period in the city's post war history." Jenkins pledged that he would retain Skousen as chief if elected and called upon Lee to state his position.11 Lee refused to make a commitment to hire or fire anyone before the election. He would do what was best for the city, keeping those who were doing a good job and firing those who were not.12 In Lee's opinion the people were voting for a mayor 249

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—not a police chief: "If I go into office and find the police department and Chief Skousen are doing a good job, I would want to keep him."13 The week of the election the Deseret News posed several questions to all candidates for municipal office because "voters want to know exactly where candidates stand on important issues." The questions concerned the mayor-council form of government, a merit system for city employees, a new library, a civic center, and the tax burden. Jenkins responded fully, but Lee declined to answer the questions individually and instead issued a general statement saying that he intended to administer Salt Lake City in the same way he had administered the state as governor. He spoke in general terms of the tax burden and wasteful spending.14 Jenkins was positive and unequivocal in his answers to each question. He favored the mayor-council form of government; he fully supported the police administration; he favored the $10 million bond issue for capital improvements; he believed in a merit system; he favored the "immediate construction of a new library" but also saw the need for sewage facilities and a civic center; and he believed the tax burden should be adjusted, based on the ability to pay.15 His straightforward manner provided an impressive contrast to Lee's dodging the issues. It would have been tempting to predict that any voter reading the accounts would unhesitatingly prefer Jenkins. Such a prediction would underestimate the polling power of J. Bracken Lee. Lee's more conservative approach and his colorful personality appealed to the voters. He garnered almost 54 percent of the vote, 33,301 to Jenkins's 27,395. When analyzed, the victory looked more impressive, for Lee swept 154 districts to Jenkins's meager 47. Nevertheless, based on the size of his primary victory, Lee admitted that it was not as large a majority as he had hoped.16 This campaign was probably the most lackluster of Lee's career. The issues were relatively few, and toward the end of the campaign it became more difficult for the voters to distinguish the positions of the candidates. Lee's stance evolved from one 250

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in which economy in government was stressed and capital improvements all but ignored to one that seemed to embrace capital improvements. Lee's ear was to the ground, and it told him that Salt Lake City residents favored capital improvements.

Given that, his earlier emphasis on economy may have narrowed the gap in the final election. Still, it was a respectable victory for a durable politician.

The Price Chamber of Commerce reacted to the campaign with a resolution protesting the derogatory remarks made about vice in their town. Boyd Marsing, chamber president, said: "Certainly, any family closet holds skeletons that might rattle, if shaken. But Price has no monopoly upon vice, and residents are tiring of being singled out for political expedience." Noting that all religious denominations were represented in the city, Marsing hoped that Utahns would not believe that Price was "undermined by gangsterism and indecency" or "beset by sin and evil."17 Praising the Price community, Lee claimed that because he had disagreed with certain features of the liquor control law the state enforcement agency tried to punish the entire community. But he doubted that he would have advanced politically beyond Price had it not been for his efforts against policies with which he disagreed.18 Quoting Lee, who called it his "most important political victory," U.S. News and World Report characterized him as "Utah's militant conservative" and hailed his impressive comeback at the age of sixty.19 The New York Times complimented the "peppery foe of income tax and big government" for "handily capturing the Mayor's post." The newspaper saw an immediate threat to Governor Clyde as Utah's political leaders were asking, "What next for J. Bracken Lee?" But Utah's Republicans were reportedly uncertain whether Lee wanted to be governor again or whether he preferred a Senate seat to give his conservative For America organization a national forum. Some enemies and supporters thought that Lee could probably defeat Wallace Bennett in a Republican primary if he made some gesture of reconciliation toward the Republican party.20 251

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Pledging to hold open meetings because the people were "entitled to know what is going on," Lee drew a capacity audience to his swearing-in ceremony. He expressed confidence that he could "get along" with the other commissioners because they wanted to "do the right thing." Then he maladroitly added, "Maybe they have not always done the right thing, but there is good in everyone. I'm sure there is good in them."21 As if realizing his mistake he shifted the focus to himself: "If I do anything wrong I want them to tell me. I want what's the best for the people and this is going to be my policy. I will do my best to live up to it."22 Theoretically, the city commission was designed to sit as a board of directors and jointly run all departments, with the mayor as chairman. In practice, each commissioner and the mayor supervised specific departments; and since each had an equal vote, the mayor exercised no more power over other commission members than the strength of his personality would allow.

Lee wanted every member to be responsible for the whole city government in spite of his departmental assignment. "You may blame me, as mayor," he offered, "for any department which is not operating right."23 Commissioner Joseph L. Christensen agreed with the mayor that each commisisoner should be interested in every department. At the first commission meeting Lee expressed his philosophy and suggested that public safety be placed under the control of the entire commission; but L. C. Romney strongly disagreed, believing it would be administratively inefficient. They then proceeded to assign departments.

"If you are interested in knowing which one I prefer, it is the Department of Public Affairs and Finance," said Lee. It was not an unexpected request from one who had made his political reputation on economy in government. Commissioner J. Knowles Piercey moved that the mayor be so assigned, but Commissioner Theodore I. Geurts, who headed finance, fiercely objected, claiming seniority. When a vote was taken on Piercey's motion, Romney, Christensen, and Geurts aligned against it, while Piercey and Lee voted for it. With the motion defeated, Geurts moved that Romney be assigned to parks, Christensen to streets, Piercey 252

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to water, himself to finance, and Lee to public safety. The motion carried, with Lee and Piercey again voting together.24 Although he accepted the decision, a discouraged Lee tried to reassert his authority, saying he was still "chairman of all the departments." He lectured the commissioners about "spending too much money needlessly and wastefully." He wanted a survey taken to determine how many employees were unnecessary and promised to set the example in the police department. In his first suggested budget cut Lee asked the commission to eliminate the $8,400 a year public relations post: "I'm suspicious of a government that hires a man to tell everyone how good they are." All the commissioners except Geurts, who was still resentful, voted with Lee to release Paul F. Royal from his position.25 The next day Lee received the entire commission's support in revoking controversial salary increases of $100 a month or more previously granted by the commission until a study could be made. Said Lee, "I don't think anyone is going to quit." He noted that a citizens' committee had recommended release of city employees past retirement age. The report showed 76 employees who were 70 or more years of age, receiving a total of $243,212 and 161 employees 65 years old and older receiving $556,944. Pointing out the availability of Social Security and other retirement programs, Lee said, "I can't believe that carrying these older persons on the payroll is a good thing." He also questioned the use of new sales tax revenues designed for capital improvements to cover routine department expenditures. Lee was confident that these reforms would help in balancing the 1960 budget.26 Bestowing resounding approval on Lee's first days in office, the Deseret News claimed he was "off and running—and at a very lively pace."27 Continuing his economy theme in an inaugural address at the University of Utah Union Building, Lee projected the end of his term as a time when people might not see beautiful city buildings but they would have a city government with a high level of morality. He criticized the city planning commission for proposing buildings for which there were no funds. Sardonically, he 253

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recommended a planning commission to teach public officials "how to save a little money," adding: It doesn't take any intelligence to spend money. A 10 year old child can spend all the money you give him. But I say it does take intelligence to spend wisely. And I do not believe that it is fair to our children or grandchildren to pile up debts for them to pay. If we leave it to the planners they will come up with some scheme to bankrupt this nation.28 Claiming that he had inherited more liabilities than assets, Lee told of his visit to a decrepit city building. He had advocated that it be either maintained or abandoned, but the employees there were fond of the commissioner responsible for the deplorable conditions: "I guess this just proves that when you smile at the people while you are skinning them, they love it."29 Conceding serious disagreements with the commissioners earlier in the day, Lee insisted that he did not expect them to be "yes men." "I want them to do what they think is right and I am sure that after a time they will be in agreement with me," he unabashedly claimed. He was confident that even if people disagreed with him, they would respect his philosophy of government. In his typically assertive style, he concluded: "I can't straighten out the whole city government tomorrow morning.

But with the help of the commission and of the citizens, in time I can do it."30 The following day, his third in office, he voiced the opinion that the city payroll could be reduced "more than a million dollars a year." Decrying the unfortunate financial condition of the city, he claimed that the federal government was "the only one that could be worse." The city had been drifting into this condition for a long time and "almost everything, including vehicles and equipment of city departments—even city hall, is in bad shape."31 Lee was essentially correct in his assessment of city finances, for later in the month the auditor announced that at Lee's behest budget-trimming in various departments had reduced the 1959 deficit by $400,000, meaning that the city would be in the red only $250,000 instead of the estimated $650,000.32 Since the budget for the calendar year 1960 had been formulated in 254

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December 1959 by the city commission, Lee had had no say in its contents. Nevertheless, after assuming office in January 1960 he determined that the city would not escape a deficit at the end of the year unless expenditures were curtailed. He believed that the logical procedure was to remove all luxury items first, then trim remaining expenditures "to the bone," and, finally, bring topbracket salaries closer to those of rank-and-file city employees.33 Basically, his procedure was sound; but some so-called luxury items were debatable, such as the completion of the Parley's Canyon golf course above Mountain Dell Reservoir. Although $215,000 had already been spent in construction, Lee favored refusing the final $35,000 needed to complete it. In voting against the appropriation, he claimed that there were already too many golf courses and that the city had more important priorities. City money should be spent for the "general welfare of the people" rather than for a select group, and the golf course did not meet that criterion.34 In criticism of the mayor, the Tribune astutely asked, Should the city build no more tennis courts because not all people play tennis? Or no more playgrounds because not all families have children? Or no more parks because not everyone likes to picnic?35 The Tribune claimed that the golf courses were actually the only city-owned recreation facilities that paid their own way, having shown a net profit of $40,000 the previous year. The editors concluded that to abandon a project nearly completed and leave "an ugly, useless scar across the canyon floor" was senseless.

Fortunately, the rest of the commission agreed, for they defeated Lee's proposal four to one.36 It was an excellent example of the extremes Lee sometimes took to economize.

Following his controversial dismissal of Police Chief W. Cleon Skousen in March 1960, the public furor was so intense that Lee suggested a shift of departmental responsibilities as a conciliatory gesture. Again he requested the department he had originally wanted—finance—for which he claimed to be "better qualified." By this time, the commission was convinced that his 255

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interests lay in finance; besides, there was an urgent need to diffuse controversy in public safety. The commission approved the change unanimously, with Piercey moving to public safety and Geurts to water. Relieved, the Deseret News lauded the move as a "heartening and reasonable response to the public wishes."3' In spite of Lee's efforts, his first year in office saw continuing confusion in Salt Lake City's finances. The mayor foresaw a year-end deficit of approximately $250,000, but the situation became so uncertain by July that the commission named a special committee to try to determine the true financial picture.

Further confusion resulted when the committee reported a financial squeeze at the same time the commission was voting a halfmill tax cut to save the taxpayers $125,000. By August the deficit was estimated at $383,000. Since the Water Department was responsible for most of the deficit, newly appointed Commissioner Conrad B. Harrison agreed to whittle his share from $263,000 to $243,000.JS Still not satisfied, Lee threatened to cut employees' salaries if necessary to balance the budget. He insisted that each department contribute some funds to offset the anticipated deficit. Piercey agreed to contribute $1,800, Romney chipped in $10,000, and Lee managed $5,000, but the financial picture remained grim.30 Lee's insistence on reform and the unhealthy financial climate combined to produce tension-filled commission meetings. For instance, Lee and Harrison clashed over morale among city workers. Harrison suggested improving morale by granting raises to which some members of the police force were entitled. Lee replied that the raises were held up because "the money wasn't there" and the law prevented the spending of unavailable money.

Harrison maintained that money was legally available to pay for any deficit. Lee countered that the commission should not obligate the city if it did not have the money, and that, furthermore, the commission had a duty to balance the budget. When Harrison claimed that the employees were not responsible for the deficit and therefore should not be punished, Lee angrily suggested that the commissioners were responsible: "Maybe the commissioners should stop their own pay?"40 256

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The commission unwisely chose to reject Lee's argument.

The next day they approved raises for city employees even though they realized such an action would increase the projected deficit.

They suggested that any capital improvement funds used to pay off the deficit be reappropriated in the 1961 budget. Lee thought the commission had a moral obligation to reimburse the capital improvements fund. He angrily accused Harrison of spending more money per month to operate his department than any of the other commissioners: "I made a mistake when I voted for you." Incensed, Harrison claimed he was running his department as well or better than Lee was running his and invited him to look over his operation. Composing himself, Lee declined to do so.41 Such verbal jousting was typical of the frequently stormy commission sessions during Lee's tenure.

On November 19, 1960, the city auditor warned of a projected deficit of nearly $300,000, but only three days later he cut the figure to $167,899. By November 29 it was down to $133,297. On December 14 the commission approved the transfer of $351,246 from the capital improvements fund to meet the anticipated 1960 deficit. At the same time, a $351,000 item was placed in the 1961 budget to return the money to the capital improvements fund.12 As a result, the city could close the books with a surplus of $259,354, the first time it had been in the black since 1951. Without juggling funds, however, the deficit would have approximated $91,892.

The Tribune denounced such "yo-yo financing" as unsound and misleading: No one seems to know from one day to the next just where the city stands financially. Deficits turn miraculously into surpluses. Funds supposedly earmarked for major capital improvements seem to vanish into thin air. Warnings of a deficit are accompanied by a cut in taxes.

This financial yo-yo game would be humorous if it didn't illustrate so graphically the ills of our form of city government. . . .

No wonder the taxpayers are confused. No wonder they are concerned about the sanctity of the sales tax money supposedly earmarked for capital improvements. No wonder 257

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they believe that with such slipshod bookkeeping there must be loose and therefore wasteful fiscal controls.43 The Tribune concluded that there was a need for "centralized and responsible control over budgeting and finances. We need to throw away the yo-yo and buy an adding machine."44 Obviously, a budget in the black was not all it seemed to be.

These dubious financial procedures dramatically portrayed the need for a strong mayor form of government for Salt Lake City, for in spite of Lee's best efforts at budget balancing he was constantly thwarted by the other members of the commission, each of whom shared an equal vote with the mayor. It was a frustrating experience for Lee, who had exercised considerably more power as governor.

The 1961 budget was prepared to meet the estimated amount of revenue with some difficulty. Original requests of $13,465,389 were pared to $12,718,944. That amount plus the $1,800,000 in capital improvements totaled $14,518,944.45 The budget was prepared under the leadership of Fred M. Oliver of Haskins and Sells, a certified public accounting firm that had been employed by the city on an independent contract to head a special budget committee. With expert advice the commission hoped to escape its profligate tendencies. Oliver said the budget was so tight that it would probably force personnel reductions. He saw no funds for any new equipment, with the exception of $218,000 that was to be borrowed from the capital improvements account to pay for a fleet of cars for the Public Safety Department.40 Even with the CPA firm, the city was still indulging in the same dangerous fiscal juggling it had practiced the previous year.

Fortunately, some help was found in the 1961 passage by the Utah legislature of the Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act for Utah Cities. Although Lee shared many of the opinions expressed in the act, it was not his creation. Rather, its passage culminated several years of research under the sponsorship of the Utah Municipal League. Originally introduced in the legislature in 1959, it did not emerge until 1961, following numerous redrafts and arduous committee work. Its purpose was to improve the financial environment and encourage good budgeting and 258

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fiscal management by tightening up statutory directives in some instances, removing strictures in others, and changing the fiscal year to bring budget-making and payday closer together. The league called it "one of the most significant fiscal advancements at the local government level in the history of our state." Reform was considered long overdue, because fiscal statutes governing Utah cities had not been revised since 1925. Fred M. Oliver and A. M. Fero, legal counsel for the league, wrote the act, which prohibited expenditures in excess of appropriations in the budget as adopted. One of the more important aspects of the act was a provision to accumulate surplus funds to meet emergencies or deficits or for the "orderly development of capital improvements."47 In the opinion of Lee's successor as mayor, E. J. (Jake) Garn, this act was responsible for putting the city in the black— "not Brack." The act prevented people from padding budgets and forced them to spend the allotted amount in each department. Garn was convinced that with the commission system of five members with equal votes, one member could never be responsible for major decisions or reforms.48 Conrad Harrison, who succeeded Garn as mayor, claimed that the city was put in the black "more in spite of Mayor Lee than because of him."

He recalled Lee's voting against employing a fiscal consultant several times and against changing to a fiscal year calendar.

Harrison firmly believed that the act "put the city back on its feet financially."49 A significant reform measure, it was the natural extension of the uniform system of accounting conceived by the 1957 legislature for the state tax commission.50 Garn and Harrison notwithstanding, Lee had more influence on the commission than any other member simply through the force of his personality. He made the city's financial condition a smoldering issue and thus prepared the way for acceptance of the Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act. Prior to its institution, he charged the commission with spending money it did not have and insisted that it "should not approve one dime until the budget is reopened, additional money added, and other unappropriated funds earmarked." He was alarmed that a financial report made 259

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by Haskins and Sells for the Citizens Advisory Committee on City Planning and Capital Improvements showed capital funds overspent by $50,000. Other commission members were embarrassed by the report, and L. C. Romney argued that it should not be made public until the commission approved it. He claimed that the report did not include additional funds and that there was still money remaining in the capital improvements account.

"I'm getting sick and tired of fighting with the commission over this money," retorted Lee, who insisted that he had the right to request any report he desired. He promised that if it were demonstrated that the city was spending money that did not exist, he would "ask for a warrant of arrest."51 Lee suggested taking the $33,000 remaining in the municipal affairs account and transferring it to the department budgets.

This account included funds for allocation to the chamber of commerce, the symphony, and other activities not included in regular city expenditures. Lee called it a "give-away fund" and wanted it transferred back into department budgets so that it would not be available when someone came after money. But Romney considered the symphony, the chamber of commerce, and other organizations to be vital city services. Angrily, Lee questioned the value of the symphony, saying, "If you ask me, it's just a few high toned people who want to listen to it."

Harrison thought it was as important as baseball and reminded Lee that the city had granted $26,000 in relief to the Salt Lake Bees by reducing the city's share of ticket receipts.52 The financial report was confusing, because it included estimates of all future expenditures, such as $371,000 for a downtown fire station that was only in the initial planning stage. The report showed a total of $2,408,903 available in the capital improvements fund in 1961 and $2,459,485 paid out, obligated, or planned. This left an apparent deficit of $50,582, causing Lee's misunderstanding. In fact, the auditor's office reported $780,000 in 1961 capital improvement funds not yet allocated for specific purposes. Auditor Louis Holley listed only items for which actual appropriations had been made against the fund, 260

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complaining that he could not list items merely talked about in his accounts.53 Nevertheless, the Tribune recommended continuing the kind of future planning of expenditures illustrated by the report and hoped that the Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act would clear up any confusion. The act established the auditor as the budget officer, with enlarged responsibilities and authority over budgeting, planning, and expenditures. Accordingly, the budget officer would submit "a supplementary estimate of all capital projects pending or which each department head believes should be undertaken (a) within the budget year and (b) within the next three succeeding years." The act also permitted accumulation of capital funds from year to year for specific capital improvements, thus eliminating some of the confusion created by juggling money between the general fund and the capital improvements fund. The Tribune suggested that part of the purpose of the act was to "permit taxpayers and investors to form intelligent opinions" on the city's financial health.54 In August 1961 the Advisory Committee on City Planning and Capital Improvements completed its two-year project and submitted a report which Lee graciously accepted. They intensively studied the capital improvements projects and recommended that each of the five be approved: sewage disposal facilities, $7,000,000; joint city-county public safety building, city's share $5,000,000; Redwood Road trunk line sewer, $2,500,000; public library, $2,500,000; and storm sewers, $2,500,000. The total amount was $19,500,000,55 to be submitted to voters in a bond election, which they approved on September 12. Since Lee had been less than enthusiastic from the beginning about capital improvements, the completion of these projects demonstrated that fiscal conservative Lee retained some flexibility and would try to be responsive to the people's wishes.

261

J. BRACKEN LEE ^Deseret News, October 21, 1959. Other candidates were Chandler, 2,722 votes; Preece, 2,395; and Wood, 628.

2 Deseret News, October 28, 1959.

3 Ibid.

4 William Call, Donald Gale, Arthur McKell, Paul Jacobsen, George Kuhn, Lawrence March, A. Krehl Smith, Mrs. Pearl Miller, and Dr. J. D. Williams to Dear Neighbor, November 2, 1959, mimeographed, copy in J. D. Williams's possession. <>Deseret News, October 28, 1959.

"Salt Lake Tribune, November 1, 1959.

7 Ibid. a Provo Daily Herald, November 1, 1959.

9 "Vote JENKINS for Mayor," handbill, copy in J. D. Williams's possession.

"Provo Daily Herald, November 1, 1959.

"Salt Lake Tribune, October 23, 1959.

12 Ibid.

"Provo Daily Herald, October 23, 1959.

"Deseret News, October 29, 1959. ^Ibid.

"Deseret News, November 4, 1959.

"Price Sun-Advocate, November 5, 1959. ls Salt Lake Tribune, November 5, 1959.

19 "Now It's 'Mr. Mayor' for Ex-Governor Lee of Utah," U.S. News and World Report, November 16, 1959, p. 27.

20 New York Times, November 7, 1959.

"Deseret News, January 5, 1960.

22 Ibid.

23 Salt Lake Tribune, November 5, 1959.

2i Deseret News, January 5, 1960.

25 Ibid.

26 Salt Lake Tribune, January 6, 1960.

"Deseret News, January 6, 1960, editorial.

2& Salt Lake Tribune, January 5, 1960.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Deseret News, January 7, 1960.

32 Deseret News, January 20, 1960.

33 Salt Lake Tribune, November 20, 1960.

3i SaltLake Tribune, January 19, 1960.

35 Ibid.

3G Ibid.

"Deseret News, March 23, 1960.

38 Salt Lake Tribune, January 22, 1961, editorial. See also Deseret News, October 24, 1960.

39 Deseret News, October 24, 1960. i0 Salt Lake Tribune, November 17, 1960.

"Ibid.

Harrison regarded Lee as a "character assassin." He believed Lee to be a politician first, public official second," who always based his campaign on ridicule. "He levied his forked tongue at me a number of times, and I felt,

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MAYOR OF SALT LAKE CITY without provocation." In Harrison's opinion, economy in government was a fetish with Lee. Interview with Conrad B. Harrison, August 4, 1972, Salt Lake City.

42 Salt Lake City Corporation, Budget for the Year, 1961, copy in Lee Mayoralty Papers. Under Transfer Funds, $351,246.00 is listed as Appropriation to Capital Outlay. It is included in total budget expenditures. *3Salt Lake Tribune, January 22, 1961, editorial.

"Ibid.

45 Salt Lake City Corporation, Budget for the Year, 1961. See also Salt Lake Tribune, December 22, 1960. ia Salt Lake Tribune, December 22, 1960.

47 Utah League of Cities and Towns, "Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act for Utah Cities," as enacted by the 34th session and amended by the 39th session (1972) of the Utah State Legislature. See also Salt Lake Tribune, March 23, 1961.

48 Interview with E. J. (Jake) Garn, Salt Lake City, August 11, 1972. Garn was then mayor and in charge of the Water Department. Garn was elected to the U.S. Senate as a Republican in 1974 and reelected in 1980.

"Harrison interview.

50 "Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act." ^Deseret News, March 28, 1961.

"Ibid. â&#x201E;˘Salt Lake Tribune, March 31, 1961, editorial. r,4 Ibid. See also "Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act." 55 Salt Lake Tribune, August 4, 1961.

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20 The Firing of W. Cleon Skousen On March 21,1960, Mayor Lee fired Salt Lake City Police Chief W. Cleon Skousen. Although Lee had only one vote among five, he received the reluctant support of two other members of the city commission, making the vote 3-2 in favor of dismissal.1 The community reeled under the impact of this thunderbolt. Not since Lee had refused to pay his federal income tax in 1955 had he received so much notoriety. As Time magazine observed, he became "beyond doubt the most unpopular man in town," illustrated by the burning cross placed on his lawn with the inscription, "Lee, you are a fool."2 Newspaper vehemence in some ways rivaled that of the nineteenth century and was extraordinary for mid-twentieth-century journalism. The credibility of public officials was questioned as the people tried to discern whether the mayor or the chief spoke the truth. Letters and phone calls of protest to the media came in record numbers. Both the public and the media voiced concern that police protection would suffer. Members of the Mormon church, many of whom had enthusiastically supported Lee's conservative brand of politics, found themselves torn between him and one of their own; Skousen was a Mormon and a conservative. Moreover, some General Authorities of the church had clearly taken sides in the dispute. The always thin line between church and state in Utah wavered, although not necessarily in the way expected. For it was Lee, rather than Skousen, who seemed to emerge with the church's blessing.

On a smaller stage, the episode was reminiscent of President Truman's dismissal of General MacArthur during the Korean War. In retrospect, historians have been much kinder to Truman 265

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than MacArthur, although Truman initially suffered heavy criticism. Lee demonstrated even greater political viability than Truman, for he was reelected to two additional four-year terms as mayor. When asked in a newspaper interview in 1971 to name the most interesting times of his political career, he unhesitatingly topped the list with the "firing of Cleon Skousen."3 Skousen was appointed police chief in 1956 by Mayor Stewart, who had sought an administrator outside the department in accordance with suggestions in a survey report made the previous year. The report by a New York firm cited "low morale, inefficiency, lack of manpower, inadequate technical equipment and loss of public confidence" in the Salt Lake City Police Department. Stewart went to Washington to ask the advice of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, who recommended Skousen because of his sixteen years as an FBI agent with extensive experience training police officers.4 Skousen was fascinated by the challenge, even though he did not wish to leave Brigham Young University where he served as director of public services and assistant professor of speech. When Stewart went so far as to persuade David O. McKay to approve the appointment by granting a leave of absence from BYU, Skousen accepted.5 He received a higher salary than the previous chief and was allowed to bring in his own assistant chiefs." He appointed Golden Jensen, undersheriff of Riverside, California; L. R. Greeson, former chief of Santa Barbara, California, and Reno, Nevada; and Golden Haight, who had headed the Youth Bureau in the Salt Lake City Police Department.'

By the end of 1957 Skousen claimed to have completely modernized the department in training, policies, equipment, and procedures.8 Time suggested that he ran a "model police force for 7>Vi years."9 Mayor Stewart had held him in high esteem, even writing "a little love letter" to Skousen in 1959 to tell him "how much DeEtte and I love you and how we appreciate all the wonderful things you have done and are doing." In a vocabulary more common to a church leader than a mayor, Stewart wished him "blessings of health, happiness and peace" in return 266

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for "unselfish service," and closed with "may the Lord bless and sustain you always."10 Yet Skousen was not beyond controversy. In 1958 Tribune reporter Harold Schindler removed the secrecy surrounding a year-long investigation by city and county officials into a narcotics and counterfeit ring working in the Utah State Prison.

The investigation was unique, for Skousen, Salt Lake County Attorney Frank E. Moss, Gov. George D. Clyde, and prison officials were all aware of it. When asked for a report Skousen refused comment because "the Tribune is going to print a story they have been asked not to print." Skousen and prison officials argued that secrecy was necessary in order to complete the investigation. But the Tribune quite correctly believed that there was a limit to how long a secret investigation could be justified and suggested that publication of the story earlier might have helped stop the activity.11 Skousen said he was only hours away from making an arrest and that publication of the story had allowed eighteen felons to get away with significant amount of narcotics. Consequently, Skousen ruled that the Tribune would no longer have access to police records. In response, the Tribune castigated Skousen in one of the more pungent editorials in its history, suggesting that he was lax in allowing a police report on the problem to be indiscriminately circulated. The Tribune accused Skousen of "bungling" and called him a "great man for bear stories," having "repeatedly issued marvelous, fictional accounts of impending invasions by international crime rings, gambling syndicates, nefarious gangsters and the like."12 In a counterattack, the Deseret News implied that the Tribune and other anti-Skousen forces preferred a more loosely run city.

Heaping lavish praise on Skousen, the News insisted that he had produced tighter law enforcement and had virtually eliminated prostitution, narcotics traffic, and "backroom crap games."

Admitting that Skousen had made mistakes (he had "not yet achieved perfection in this world"), the editors nevertheless concluded that he had prevented an open city. They urged readers to compare the efficiency, honesty, and dedication of the police 267

Left: Lee looked elated after his 1959 primary win in the Salt Lake City mayor's race.

Right: Mayor Lee faced a tense situation in a city commission meeting after his March 1960 firing of Police Chief W. Cleon Skousen.

Left: Throwing out the first ball of the 1964 home season at Derks Field. Deseret News photographs.

Left: Sports editor Hack Miller called Lee one of the best trapshooters in the state but found him off target when his economy drive threatened city golf courses. Deseret News photograph.

Right: Mayor J. Bracken Lee. /, Bracken Lee photograph.

J . BRACKEN LEE

department under Skousen with the chaos that had existed before.13 In 1959, when Lee was elected mayor of Salt Lake City, few observers suspected any conflict between him and the chief.

Both were political conservatives, and Lee had expressed admiration for Skousen's controversial treatise, The Naked Communist.

Skousen had every reason to believe that they had enough in common to work very successfully together. Yet, Skousen recalled that mayoralty candidate Bruce Jenkins had given unqualified support to the police department during the campaign, while Lee, to Skousen's "amazement," had refrained from doing so.

Rumors then surfaced that Lee intended to "dismantle" the department. Several tavern owners called Skousen to tell him that Lee had threatened to fire him as his first official act. But Gus Backman, executive secretary of the Salt Lake City Chamber of Commerce, told Skousen that if he did not oppose Lee, Lee in turn would support him.14 However, by February 1960 a major conflict had developed.

Mayor Lee, in his desire to economize, focused on possible cuts in the police department. Skousen responded by recommending areas where cuts could be sustained. For instance, he suggested eliminating the serving of warrants for the police court, thus releasing two officers for police work at a saving of $10,560.

Four officers could be released from the job of desk sergeant and replaced by clerks; trained clerks in traffic, radio patrol, and antivice divisions could take over jobs held by officers; the civil defense director could be eliminated, saving a man's salary; policemen could buy gasoline at public service stations instead of lining up for service at a single department pump, saving $4,500.

The total estimated annual savings reached $73,360.15 A debate ensued as to whether cuts in the department would affect protection to the community. The Deseret News argued that cuts would be acceptable as long as they did not decrease the level of police services. The News took issue with Lee's statement that Salt Lake had 1.4 police officers for each 1,000 population, a figure above the recommended standard of 1 officer per 1,000 for cities its size. Such figures supported Lee's belief that 270

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the size of the force could be reduced without danger. The News claimed that he was misinformed and that Salt Lake was considerably below the national average of 1.8 officers per 1,000 and the recommended standard of 2 per 1,000.10 Salt Lake was not "over-protected," the News stated. Although the rates of murder, rape, assault, and robbery fell well below the national average, crimes against property such as grand larceny and burglary were "considerably worse than the national average."17 The intensity of the problem was reflected in an interdepartmental memo later in the month, indicating a cut in the budget from $2,147,644.76 to $1,831,977.88. Of this total, $1,511,111.68 was for salaries and $320,866.20 for operations. According to the memo, these amounts were not sufficient to cover actual commitments beginning in 1960. For instance, salary commitments alone were $1,602,513.00, $91,401.32 more than budgeted. Then, on February 10 a further cut in salaries of $40,000.00 was announced. In order to absorb the total loss in salaries, it would be necessary to eliminate 40 patrolmen sixth grade or 31 patrolmen first grade,18 which would unquestionably cut the level of police service.

Claiming he did not wish to impair the efficiency of the department, Lee nevertheless was determined that the cuts be made. After a two-hour session with Skousen he asserted that the city must be operated in the black.19 Skousen argued that 17.5 percent had been allotted to the police department in past city budgets, compared with the 12.5 percent presently suggested.

Lee ended their meeting by responding: "I am sure that you will continue to do the fine job you are presently doing, despite the decrease in funds for this year."20 Skousen was nettled. In a letter to Lee a few days later, he said he had applied the mandatory cut of $40,000 to the budget but called it an "inequitable distribution of funds" that would "definitely impair the quantity of police service."21 A police department memorandum reflected the sincere concern of Skousen and his subordinates. It recommended savings in minor areas, such as the car-lease rental account and gasoline accounts, but it still forecast a major drop in personnel as inevitable to 271

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conform to the budget. The memo suggested that 14 first grade men be dropped by April 1 or 20 first grade men by July 1, beginning with those closest to retirement age.22 Only three days prior to the firing, Lee and Skousen were still debating the budget implications. Skousen claimed the department was already 25 officers short of the 294 policemen authorized by the city commission in 1958. Yet, he said, it would be necessary to fire more than 30 patrolmen of sixth grade rank if done by April 1 and 40 sixth grade if done by July 1.23 By forecasting the firing of newer men instead of the retiring of older men, he could use a higher figure. Skousen wanted the public to understand the implications of the mayor's budget, and his feelings were well publicized.

When confronted with Skousen's persistent belief that manpower would be lost, Lee suggested the alternative of dropping the three assistant chiefs. Implying that Lee spoke out of ignorance, Skousen reminded him of his own comment that he was "completely unfamiliar with police work."24 Skousen hinted that one assistant chief might be eliminated but certainly not three.

Yet, Lee claimed that Skousen had told him the three assistant chiefs could go without impairment of service. Skousen meanwhile complained that Lee had never seriously entertained the suggestions that Skousen had earlier made to effect economy.25 Finally, and seemingly without warning, Lee fired Skousen by securing the necessary support from Commissioners Geurts and Piercey who voted with the mayor, based on their belief that he should have the right to his own department heads, although Geurts thought Skousen had done a good job. When Commissioner Christensen complained that he knew too little and requested further study of the matter, Lee flatly refused. As a result, both Christensen and Commissioner Romney voted no.2(1 Since Lee had won his case by 3-2, the commission then voted unanimously to adopt a new ordinance eliminating the positions of the three assistant chiefs27 at a savings of $7,200 each per year and abolishing the uniform allowance for all personnel not required to maintain uniforms. Capt. L. C. Crowther, former police chief, was named acting chief pending the appoint272

THE FIRING OF W. CLEON SKOUSEN

ment of a successor.28 Lee gave no specific reason for the dismissal, but said, "I've given this a lot of thought and I'm doing it in the best interest of Salt Lake City. . . . He apparently didn't agree with me and I just found it impossible to work with him. I have no desire to hurt the man in any way and I don't intend to go into any details about it."20 According to Skousen, Charles Foote, the mayor's budget director, had once suggested that Skousen resign because of his disagreements with Lee. Skousen had told him that under no circumstances would he resign, because he could not abandon the department in time of crisis. The chief told the Deseret News: The Mayor, I understand today, suggested that I quoted him as saying that I had been asked to resign by him, and if I had said that, that was a lie. Well, let's be very clear on this.

The Mayor didn't ever extend me that courtesy of resigning.

He just up and fired me.30 Lee's version was very different. After several disagreements he called in Skousen and told him that they would "never get along. You're strong willed and so am I." Lee suggested that Skousen write a letter of resignation so they would not have to make a "big fuss" about their differences. Lee would promise to give him a good "boost" and tell everyone "what a good man I think you are." According to Lee, Skousen said he would not resign, and 'what's more, you can't fire me.' And I didn't think I could."31 When Lee decided to fire the chief he refrained from discussing it with anyoneâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;even his wife. "I thought, 'if I tell anybody it'll get out and this guy's got enough powerâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;the only chance I've got is to keep it quiet.'" He decided to make the motion in a commission meeting without prior warning, and "when I did, all hell broke loose." The next day the chambers and hallways filled with friends of Skousen, "the meanest, screaming bunch of people I've ever heard in my life." Lee saw them as "religious people, pretending to like Skousen because he was religious," but they used foul language and called Lee and his wife on the phone and swore at them. Later they burned a cross in front of 273

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his home and ruined the lawn with salt. The firecrackers were so loud that his wife was ready to move.32 On the day of his dismissal Skousen was unavailable to anyone. His office claimed that he had left no word as to where he could be reached. When reporters sensed the import of the commission meeting they tried without success to find him. Harold Schindler of the Tribune finally caught up with him shortly after five, walking south on State Street toward the police station.

Schindler shouted his regrets about the day's activities, but Skousen only laughed and said, "What's up?" According to Schindler, Skousen, when informed of his firing, was still "smiling, but uncertainly, as if he had misunderstood."

"Really?"

"You mean you haven't heard?"

"I haven't heard anything; I've been at the Hotel all day. Tell me what's happened."

Schindler then provided the details. Later, in describing Skousen's obvious surprise at the news, he commented: "Skousen's reluctance to discuss the Hotel Utah meeting or to identify its participants had always piqued my curiosity, but, then, that may be making a mountain out of a molehill." Schindler was convinced that Skousen would have been able to prevent the firing that dayâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;"if he had known what was happening."33 Skousen corroborated the important points of Schindler's version of their meeting on the street and the conversation that ensued. Their only significant difference concerned the Hotel Utah. Skousen said that he had been addressing a meeting of the Rotary Club that afternoon ("or was it the Kiwanis?") and had been detained for about an hour afterward by several businessmen. They asked many questions about the department and Mayor Lee's objections to Skousen's policies. Even though many of them were close friends of Lee, they were puzzled by his statements. Skousen gave them frank answers, concluding that Lee's attitude toward law enforcement was a major difference between them. Nevertheless, Skousen told them, he thought they could "work it out." After leaving the meeting, Skousen encountered Schindler. In response to the assertion that he could have pre274

THE FIRING OF W. CLEON SKOUSEN

vented the firing, Skousen remained indifferent. Given the opportunity, he would not have attended the commission meeting, for, he said, he had always accepted the commission's right to change the police administration. Therefore he made no attempt to appeal their decision.34 NEWSPAPER REACTION

Editorial reaction from the city's two newspapers was ambivalent. In contrast to its 1958 criticism of Skousen over the prison investigation, the Tribune called the firing a "distinct shock" and said that massive public reaction in the form of telephone calls to the Tribune and a noisy demonstration by some seventy-five persons at the city commission meeting indicated a need for clarification. The Tribune astutely observed that the debate over economies in the department played only a small part in the final action. The editors suggested that seeds for the firing were planted during the mayoralty campaign when Jenkins and Lee had disagreed over the status of the police department.

Finally, the Tribune credited Skousen, quite surprisingly, with "an outstanding job of reorganizing and strengthening the force" and said he was leaving a department "more efficient and with a far more enviable record" than when he assumed office. The editors implored the mayor to act quickly in appointing a permanent chief to continue strong law enforcement, avoiding "any trend toward 'opening up' the town." As to Chief Skousen, "the community owes him a vote of thanks for his past service and his responsiveness to duty."35 On the other hand, the Deseret News, which had always been in Skousen's corner, soft-pedaled the affair, first giving warm praise to Lee's decision to step down from public safety and assume finance while J. K. Piercey took over public safety. The News saw a possibility that Piercey might call Skousen back, since "public reaction certainly confirms our convictions that Chief Skousen has done a tremendous job of building the Police department of this city." In an overture to Lee the editors claimed he was right in his decision to fire Skousen; after all, Lee was in 275

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charge of public safety. Since the two men had clashed so often, harmony was probably impossible. The News said that public reaction, "unprecedented in memory," gave ample proof that the city was definitely not apathetic.30 With some difficulty the News had straddled the fence.

This was hardly the spirited defense they had launched so willingly for Skousen in 1958, but it was not because of a change of heart. In fact, the editors felt so strongly about the incident that they had prepared an unprecedented, full-page editorial to run in the News on March 23. It did not appear. With final preparations under way for its inclusion in the evening edition, the editorial was ordered killed by Henry D. Moyle, first counselor in the First Presidency of the LDS church, among whose official functions was the supervision of the Deseret News."

A scathing denunciation of Lee's "high-handed autocracy," the editorial heaped lavish praise on Skousen: Here is a man who has finer personal and professional qualifications than any man who has served as police chief of this city within the memory of most citizens; a man of such superb reputation that he was seriously considered to reform and give new moral strength to the police department of the nation's second largest city; a man who raised Salt Lake City's own police department from a morass of unbelievably low morale and efficiency to one of national reputation in which every law-abiding citizen now takes pride; a man never touched by the slightest breath of scandal, whose integrity and purpose and ability have not been responsibly questioned.38 Castigating Lee for reneging on an agreement to appear on television the previous evening to explain the firing, the News demanded an explanation. The editors next detailed Skousen's accomplishments in increasing morale and efficiency following a "parade of police chiefs in and out of the job"; eliminating internecine warfare within the department so effectively that one officer could report, "he had made us no longer ashamed to say we're police officers"; instituting a self-policing program among taverns, hotels, pharmacies, and doctors, bringing the cleanest, highest standards in years; and cleaning up "an abominable city 276

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hall situation." The editors concluded that the discharge was not justified by Skousen's performance in office.39 Then, they speculated on the reasons for the discharge: according to Skousen, Lee had instructed him to go easy on law enforcement, especially with respect to private clubs, bingo gambling, and striptease shows. When Skousen refused, Lee allegedly became distraught. Perhaps the organized drive to institute sale of liquor by the drink in the city, opposed by Skousen, created another stumbling block. Only one criticism made by Lee, said the awaiting editorial, was worth considering: the charge that Skousen had used department pressure on tavern owners to form an association and to attempt to collect a $2,000 debt from tavern owner Byron Jensen, even though he did not owe it. However, no proof of this allegation was forthcoming from the mayor or the tavern owners. Since it was not legally possible to recall or impeach the mayor, the editors recommended massive citizen pressure in the form of petitions asking for Skousen's reinstatement. In the wake of such pressure, the city commission would have to reverse its stand or reorganize itself so that someone other than the mayor would head public safety and gain the power to invite Skousen back. Then came the grandstand play: And so the vital question is: What kind of city do the people of Salt Lake want? Do they want an "open" city where vice is winked at, where huge profits can be made by those who control vice, and where those profits can in turn influence city government?

Or do they want impartial law enforcement, without fear or favor, in a city in which they can be proud and confident to rear their children?

Every Citizen who considers this question should consider also the profound message of this truth: "All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing."40 No wonder the editorial that replaced this one was ambivalent and ineffective. It was undoubtedly written hurriedly, without conviction, and reflected the pressures applied from above.

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The accounts of both Lee and Skousen regarding the first editorial are revealing. According to Lee, when he received word that the Deseret News was about to run a full-page editorial against him, he telephoned President McKay who instructed him not to worry.41 McKay said that the First Presidency supported Lee in the firing of Skousen, and he advised Lee to call the other members of the First Presidency, Presidents Clark and Moyle, to thank them personally.42 Lee recalled J. Reuben Clark saying that it had always been his opinion that it was impossible for Skousen to handle the chief's job and be active in church assignments too.43 He suggested that Skousen had often taught inaccurate doctrine and on at least one occasion the First Presidency had forced him to repudiate some stands he had taken in an article.

Moyle said, "Bracken, the Church supports you!" Furthermore, Moyle allayed Lee's fears by announcing that as the controlling official of the Deseret News he had personally ordered destroyed a full-page editorial against him that was already on the presses.

He said Lee would never have to worry about the News discussing the issue again.

Although Skousen's account differed in explaining motivation, it fully supported the basic details: that the News was in fact planning the editorial and that Moyle killed it.44 Skousen claimed that Lee had as many friends among church leaders as he did and that the president of the church had always been more comfortable with a non-Mormon in office who was friendly than a Mormon who might feel a need to be independent. Skousen was disappointed that he received no calls from church authorities saying, "Stick to your guns."15 He learned of the editorial when an employee of the News mailed him a proof and a note saying, "Good editorialâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;too bad Brother Moyle wouldn't allow it to be printed."40 Skousen believed that Moyle killed it because he was worried that the Deseret News, the church organ, attacking Lee, a Mason, might revive the Mormon-Mason feud of earlier times. Skousen claimed that Lee himself had conceived the idea of the MormonMason feud and had sold Gus Backman on the idea, who in turn convinced Moyle.47 Both Lee and Skousen thought that William 278

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B. Smart was responsible for writing the editorial. Because Smart was director of the editorial page, he presumably established the general tenor of the piece.48 In light of the editorial incident, one conflict between Lee and Skousen may have had additional overtones. A few weeks before the firing, Lee accused Skousen of "covering up for a Mormon Apostle" in connection with a traffic accident. Skousen denied the charge and then wrote a letter to Lee describing an accident occurring on September 12, 1959, in which Henry D. Moyle was involved. While Moyle and a cab driver were exchanging license numbers, a woman parked by the curb asked Moyle to move his car so she could move hers. He did so and then drove into a parking lot to call the police. Later, Moyle called Skousen to complain about the way one of the officers handled the incident. Skousen characterized the officer as "disgruntled" and took over the investigation himself: When I completed the investigation, I determined that Mr. Moyle had violated Section 98 of the Salt Lake City Traffic Code in that he did not "remain at the scene of the accident until authorized to leave by a police officer."

Later, Moyle was issued a citation and paid $100 for the violation.49 Neither Lee nor Skousen saw any connection between this incident and later events.50 SOFT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT

In a series of television appearances after the firing, Skousen attempted to clear his reputation by outlining his differences with Lee. Although the record illustrates severe budgetary disagreements, Skousen claimed the real reason he was fired lay in his refusal to agree to softer law enforcement. For instance, Lee allegedly advised Skousen that the practice of regularly sending the vice squad into the private clubs of the city, such as the Alta, Ambassador, and Elks, was a waste of manpower that should be directed toward major crimes. According to Skousen, Lee ordered him several times to stay away from those clubs. On one occasion, he even talked to several officers, advising them that 279

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he did not want any further suppression of fringe gambling; Skousen argued that such a request was impossible because the law required that police check for gambling and sale of liquor across the bar. Skousen voiced his intention to enforce the law and added that the mayor could not order him to do otherwise.

Angry words followed, with Lee suggesting that the police should stay away from striptease shows and admitting that he enjoyed them himself and had no desire to be arrested while attending one.51 Lee admitted talking candidly about the latter point to Skousen. He remembered a contractors' association gathering at a private club, raided by fourteen men sent in by Skousen.

There were some dancing girls who had very little on, and Lee asked Skousen later what he found when he got there. Skousen replied that they had arrived too early and "they hadn't taken off their clothes yet." Offered Lee, " 'Well, what if they had?

To me the most beautiful thing on earth is a naked woman.'

He gave that to the press and they played it up. But I don't give a damn what the press says. I think the prettiest thing in the world is a nude womanâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;a good looking nude woman."52 In his television rebuttal, Lee alleged that Skousen was guilty of telling "half truths" about the private club situation. When Skousen complained about a shortage of men to check burglaries and robberies at night, Lee advised him to stop bothering the legitimate clubs and use the men on the street automobile patrols where they were needed most. According to the mayor, he gave no order, only some advice about allocation of manpower.53 A major point of contention concerned a specific night at the Ambassador Club when Mayor Lee was in attendance. Part of the activities centered on a parimutuel horse race game, a clear violation of the law. After the game was over, police officers arrived to investigate, and the club owners frankly admitted the violation. It was then discovered that besides Lee, Tony Hatsis, tavern owner and good friend of Lee, and Charles Foote, Lee's budget director, were also present.54 A close associate of Lee's, John Lewis, claimed that the mayor made the initial call to the police to report the game, but Skousen coun280

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tered that the call was anonymous. Skousen criticized Lee's failure to enforce the law as mayor of the city.55 Lee said that "fine leading citizens" from all over the city were in attendance that night at an annual banquet for charity purposes, with proceeds going to the blind. He was proud to be there at what he called a "high class club," recognized as legitimate and honest. "The gambling—if you want to call it that— doesn't amount to anything. Mr. Skousen thinks it is a terrible thing." Lee argued that he had no advance knowledge of the gambling and did not buy any of the fifty-cent tickets. Worried that Skousen was setting a trap for him, Lee instructed Foote to call Skousen and ask who granted permission to run the game.50 Since Foote could not get the chief's telephone number, he gave the information to the dispatcher. Lee said he took this action to protect himself and the members of his party, because he knew it was against the law for the mayor or a police officer to be in the presence of illegality. But he called it a "silly thing to make a big fuss over."57 Skousen claimed a discrepancy in Lee's story, because employees had instructions to get a message to the chief from any legitimate person. The reason Foote failed to get the number is found in the official report, which recorded: "About 11:30 P.M., 3-19-60, an irate anonymous phone call was relayed by the dispatcher to Sergeant Haun."58 The next day Skousen discovered that the city attorney, James L. Barker, had also been at the club.

According to Lee, Barker told Skousen that "there wasn't anything to it," but Skousen retorted, "Well, it is too bad for you, too."59 That, said Lee, was the reason Skousen was fired— because he was a man who used the police department for "scaring his enemies and protecting his friends."00 Although the incident seems an excellent example of Skousen's vindictive spirit, Skousen himself declared, "the only problem is, I did not say it."01 SELF-POLICING

According to Skousen, the supervision of taverns was chaotic when he became chief, and so he inaugurated a self-policing pro281

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gram. Tavern owners were requested to keep their own places clean in return for fewer police checks. The majority of them were cooperative, and they cut drunkenness in half under the program. The tavern owners hired a former police officer, Sgt. T. W. Southworth, to advise them about the technicalities of the liquor law. When Southworth saw violations he reported it to the department which in turn told the association so they could "clean themselves up." The owners, said Skousen, were not forced to join any association as the mayor charged.02 Lee maintained that the only order he had specifically given to Skousen was to stop the self-policing program "because I believed there was something dishonest" in it. Lee told Skousen: "I think you could make a deal with the underworld to only steal so much at night and they would be glad to police themselves."

This would be self-policing with thieves in order to reduce stealing downtown. He suggested that these thieves were potential law violators who would be protected if they would cut down their activity: "That's what you're doing, and I don't like it."03 The analogy was not apt, however, since it inexplicably lumped tavern owners with thieves as potential law violators.

Lee said that he had affidavits to show pressure had been used by the department to force men in the tavern business to pay money for bills they did not owe. Tavern owner Byron Jensen said that in order to get his beer license transferred to another location he was required to sign a note for $2,000 to pay an obligation of another concern that had gone bankrupt. "The man said he didn't owe the note, but that Mr. Southworth had told him he should sign it."04 (He was also told that it was his responsibility to settle $16,000 in bad debts of the former owner of the new location.) At first Jensen refused to sign and then he agreed. He had paid $650 on the note when Mayor Lee advised him to stop payment.05 Skousen claimed that because the note was written four days before bankruptcy was declared, it was valid. All that had been required of the purchaser was to satisfy the bulk sales law of Utah, a legal necessity prior to gaining a license. Skousen reported that investigation to Lee and suggested that he have a public 282

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hearing to satisfy all, but Lee declined and instead directed the matter to the county attorney, Grover Giles.00 Eventually, Lee held a public hearing to determine the effectiveness of the self-policing program. Some tavern owners testified that the policy made them feel like businessmen instead of criminals, while others claimed they had been pressured and had had difficulty getting licenses. Lt. Marvin Butterfield, in charge of the vice squad, praised the program as an effective way of allowing the taverns to handle their own problems. Three tavern owners, Harry Wilkinson, Steve Floor, and Clifford James, all testified that the program had not been forced on them and that they were pleased with the results.67 On the other hand, Marion Spence and her husband had been in the tavern business for years, and yet they were forced to sell because of difficulty in securing a dance license. Mrs. Spence claimed that they had refused Southworth's request to join the Tavern Owners' Association. Later, Southworth gave them one more chance to join if they wished to survive. They refused and subsequently were denied a dance license even though they paid for it. Anthony Ventura said he had paid $1,425 for transfer of a beer license plus a $401 license fee to the city and still had not received a license. Pete Paulos complained than when he wrote a letter to the association requesting a vote on a 2:00 A.M. closing ordinance the vice squad began making more frequent visits to his tavern. Leonard Feraco said he had paid Southworth $300 for membership in the association and was later refunded $200; and Nick Karkus said he was obliged to join the association for $100 in order to obtain a card room license for his business.08 Skousen admitted there was pressure to join the tavern association but said it came from the association, not the vice squad.

When a tavern did not comply with the law the association would threaten the owner with losing his membership, and then the owner would correct the problem. Skousen was told that the tavern owners were big contributors to Lee's political campaign which, he concluded, was the reason that Lee was irritated by 283

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self-policing. Skousen noted that the tavern association supported him, not Lee, and that they editorialized on it in their regular bulletin.69 OTHER DISAGREEMENTS

Calling Skousen a "very expensive man," Lee referred to the 1958 police report which, he said, had cost the taxpayers $2,304.19 to print. Skousen had supposedly arranged for a number of hard-cover reports, with people's names embossed in gold, to be mailed to his friends around the country at taxpayers' expense. Lee said that 248 copies went to stake presidencies and bishops of the Mormon church, while others went to the Lions Club, Exchange Club, and other organizations. Copies had even been sent to Skousen's relatives in California. According to Lee, the actual money spent was relatively insignificant, but it was proof that Skousen was an egotist. Additionally, Skousen had persuaded the city commission to send him to Hawaii at a cost of $678.00 to the taxpayers.70 Skousen replied that the police department files showed that requisition order number 815, dated April 16, 1959, authorized payment of $1,371.23 for 300 copies of the 1958 annual report.

Only twenty-five copies were prepared with hardcovers so they could be placed in libraries and presented to the city commission for permanent filing.71 Skousen thought it unfair to mention that they were sent to Mormon officials without adding that they were also sent to all other churches in the area. He believed that sending them to other police departments was especially valuable.

He admitted mailing copies to members of his family in California: "This is entirely true. I was very proud of the work the department had been doing." The Hawaii trip was the annual convention of the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

Skousen served on two general committees. In Skousen's opinion, the services rendered by other departments to Salt Lake City as a result of contacts made at these conventions was worth far more than the money spent on the trip.72 A minor Lee charge was that Skousen had duped the taxpayer for his book The Naked Communist by using city police284

THE FIRING OF W. CLEON SKOUSEN

men and secretaries to assemble and type it.73 Skousen responded that the text of the book was almost completed before he became chief and that the final chapters were typed by his secretary's daughter, for which service he had cancelled checks to prove his personal payment.74 Lee estimated that Skousen had made numerous speeches each year at the expense of his duties as chief.75 Although Skousen did not deny this charge, he noted that the speeches were approved by the city commission. Mayor Stewart had always felt that such speeches were a compliment to Salt Lake City, and Lee had never expressed himself otherwise.

The trips were made without expense to the city except for Skousen's time.76 Lee was also disturbed by Skousen's use of polygraph tests in hiring policemen because most of the questions were about sex: "When did you first want a woman? When did you first have intercourse? Did you ever cheat on your wife? etc." Skousen allegedly told Lee that he wanted to "steer clear of sex fiends" on the force. When Lee argued that it was an unfair intrusion into private lives and asked him to discontinue the practice, Skousen ignored the suggestion.77 In response, Skousen insisted that Lee's description of the tests was inaccurate. There were some questions about sex "but only for the purpose of determining moral turpitude." He desired to weed out applicants "involved in promiscuous immorality or homosexuality" because they would be "vulnerable to blackmail." Skousen characterized the questions as routine and claimed they were the same ones asked throughout the country for this purpose. He believed that they continued in use after he left and during the remainder of Lee's tenure.78 A final problem concerned Lee's assertion that Skousen had instructed policemen to have no association with the mayor.

Policemen hesitated even to speak to him: "I thought, gee, of all the mean policemen I've ever seen!" One officer who was especially knowledgeable about police operations confided to him that a plainclothes detective was monitoring Lee's door; under orders from Skousen, he was to report the names of policemen seen visiting the mayor. The officer refused to come to the 285

J . BRACKEN LEE

mayor's office, but he agreed to meet Lee in a vacant building.

There he complied with Lee's request for a list of twenty policemen who were "real close to Skousen."79 Lee telephoned each of them, saying, "I'm ordering you to my office" where he asked them basic questions about their jobs. Lee claimed the practice worried Skousen, even though it was only a "game of cloak and dagger" they were playing with each other. Lee was also convinced that Skousen had put a tail on the mayor's car in hopes of getting some information about him.80 Skousen laughed off the charge, saying, "Why would I want to put a tail on Mayor Lee? Ridiculous!" He declared that the police department had never placed Lee under surveillance in any way. He also stoutly denied Lee's story about his forbidding the police to talk to the mayor. He did instruct policemen that official police matters must go from the police chief to the mayor, thus following logical channels. According to Skousen, if Lee had really been an astute administrator "he would have called me in," rather than officers suspected of being close to him.81 Although noticeably more tolerant of each other in later years, neither Lee nor Skousen changed his attitude appreciably toward the episode. Mellowing somewhat, Lee had a few kind words for Skousen, characterizing his record as comparable to any chief in the history of Salt Lake City. "When it comes to policemen doing their job," asserted Lee, Skousen excelled.

When he was chief, the policemen were always available, but "I never see a policeman around now." Lee also lauded Skousen's administration of the traffic department: "You didn't have a better traffic set-up than when Skousen was chief, and I think you could probably say it about every department." But Skousen's strengths did not outweigh his weaknesses: "I'll tell you though, he was a dictator! He was the type of guy who would cut off your head." Lee claimed Skousen was "practicing Communism to fight it" and was running the department like a Gestapoâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;through fear. Moreover, Lee maintained that Skousen was dishonest: "I know that. In my last campaign I said he was dishonest. Now you would think I would be sued for that, wouldn't you? But he 286

THE FIRING OF W. CLEON SKOUSEN

knows that I know something about him that he don't want other people to know."82 When Skousen was questioned about Lee's integrity, he flatly replied that Lee was not dishonest. He thought that Lee was a victim of bad advisers left over from the "Hatsis years" in Price, when he was mayor of that city. According to Skousen, Lee's good friend, Tony Hatsis, was the leader of the drive to get liquor by the drink in Utah.83 Skousen always objected to the charge that he operated the department as Communists would, claiming that morale was high among personnel. As proof he quoted Police Mutual Aid Magazine in which his own personnel had praised his service: As chief he corrected the loose construction which could have destroyed the department. He disciplined the division to a fine edge: Teaching us unity through order. Most important of all was his example of high principles and zeal, combined with unexcelled integrity and executive ability which enabled our police force to win national recognition. . . ,84 Skousen concluded that Lee was not the man that his wife was a woman and that it was too bad that he did not have the church to give him "stability." In Skousen's view, Lee had many fine personal qualities but one flawâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;"he's a rebel."85 The confrontation between Lee and Skousen should have been predictable, for it was a clash of strong wills represented by two aggressive, independent, and charismatic leaders, in some ways too much alike to work well together. They felt threatened by each other, yet their personal styles were dramatically different. Lee was plain-speaking and frank with special appeal to the common man, reminiscent of Truman's style if not his politics; Skousen, on the other hand, was polished, sophisticated, and fluent, recalling the majesty of Mac Arthur. Both attracted considerable support from members and leaders of the Mormon church.

The differences in their accounts of the dispute are impossible to resolve. Many of them rest on interpretation, while others grow out of personal, two-way conversations. Neither side of the story can be completely corroborated by outside evidence; city and police records are fuzzy on the significant details, and many 287

J . BRACKEN LEE

individuals with personal knowledge of the conflicts have refused comment.80 However, most of these details are unimportant, for it was the philosophies of the two men that produced the crisis.

Skouson's belief that Lee needed the church for stability is instructive, for it reveals the moral base for many of their disagreements. Although both men were politically conservative, their moral and religious backgrounds contrasted sharply. Lee could speak positively about law enforcement without ever considering the restriction of private clubs because they were an integral part of his way of life. To Skousen, on the other hand, the clubs and their activities not only threatened law enforcement, they were morally repugnant. While Lee enjoyed watching dancing girls, Skousen found them distasteful. To Lee the use of the polygraph in hiring policemen was an invasion of privacy, while Skousen believed in it as a way to gauge moral turpitude.

Skousen's philosophy was deeply rooted in his Mormon background, an ironic twist since the church supported Lee in the crisis. Yet, in self-policing, the moral argument reverted to Lee, who believed the program to be inherently dishonest, while Skousen considered it a boon to efficiency. In budgetary matters Lee could claim to be the real conservative, while Skousen argued the folly of cutbacks. Skousen was more interested in efficiency than in economy, while Lee gave the appearance of economizing for its own sake.

Through the dismissal both men gained an aura of public respect that may not have been attainable in any other way.

Neither career suffered in the intervening years. In fact, Lee's career received fresh impetus, since he survived a barrage of criticism unparalleled in the city's history. When people tired of disputing the issue, Lee was still in power, applying his familiar, resolute approach to city problems. If he was ruffled, he did not show it. Clearly, Lee had the edge, for he was an incumbent with continuing visability, while Skousen was forced to take on the more quiet role of the private citizen.

One aspect of the problem should not be overlooked: as mayor of the city with authority over the police department, Lee had the right to have associates with whom he could work. Just 288

THE FIRING OF W. CLEON SKOUSEN

as Truman could not govern while disputing with his general in the field, neither could Lee handle city affairs when his police chief disagreed with him on every vital issue. Although Skousen was unquestionably right in many of his disputes with Lee about effective police service, Lee still retained the right to remove.

He did not have to demonstrate malfeasance, incompetency, or other specific chargesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;only that he and Skousen did not work well together.

Because of the personalities involved, the Lee-Skousen feud is one of the more colorful confrontations in Utah political history. It illustrates unequivocally that a political decision need not be immediately popular to be politically rewarding. On the contrary, an unpopular decision may be the best route to enduring public approval for an officialâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;if he can retain composure and decisiveness in the aftermath. For it is incumbency coupled with composure that adds the historic dimension. J. Bracken Lee weathered the crisis.

289

J. BRACKEN LEE 1

Deseret News, March 22, 1960.

"Nettled Nickel Nipper," Time, April 4, 1960, p. 14.

Deseret News, December 22, 1971. ^Annual Report of Salt Lake City Police Department, 1957, p. 9. See also Deseret News, lune 9, 1956. â&#x20AC;˘^Interview with W. Cleon Skousen, August 8, 1972, Salt Lake City. According to Skousen, President McKay's attitude was an important factor in his acceptance of the position. Skousen had no aspiration to be chief and could have returned to the FBI anytime he wished. Stewart had assured him that there would be no political interference, and he kept that agreement. Skousen claimed that prior to the firing he was offered the chief's position in Seattle and was among the top three finalists in the search for a chief in Chicago, even though he had not sought either job. The Chicago Daily News called to tell him. He said he was not interested in being chief anywhere but Salt Lake, because he believed it should be better than elsewhere. He was referring to its religious history and character.

"Skousen was paid $10,000 annually instead of the $7,500 paid Odes Record. See Deseret News, March 22, 1960. The salary issue may have had more than a passing connection with the Lee-Skousen feud, since Lee made only $9,000 annually. See Salt Lake City Corporation, Budget for the Year, 1960, p. 17, copy in Lee Mayoralty Papers.

7 Annual Report . . . Police Department, 1957.

8 Ibid. Among the eighty-seven changes listed on pp. 16-17 were the following: an all-year motorcycle squad; radar speed control squads; one-man patrol cars adopted to double police coverage; polygraph adopted departmentwide; youth bureau restructured; curfew law actively enforced; juvenile counseling service; possession of beer by minors illegal; self-policing program; fringe gambling eliminated; liquor control tightened; prisoner-release program adopted; rehabilitation program for alcoholics adopted; year-round police training program; monthly firearms training programs; communications services improved; merit rating system; policies on press relations worked out with both newspapers; department rearmed with more effective equipment; active participation in the International Association of Chiefs of Police; etc.

9 "Nettled Nickel Nipper."

10 Stewart to Skousen, December 31, 1959, in Skousen's possession.

"Salt Lake Tribune, October 17, 1958.

"Salt Lake Tribune, October 19, 1958.

"Deseret News, October 21, 1958.

"Skousen interview. Since Backman and Lee had been both politically and personally close during Lee's governorship, it was logical for Backman to concern himself with this election.

"Deseret News, February 4, 1960.

"Deseret News, March 1, 1960. See also Annual Report . . . Police Department, 1957.

Skousen argued this point in the interview; Salt Lake City had 1.2 officers per 1,000, while the national average was 1.78 officers per 1,000. According to Skousen, more than 1,000 cities with populations of 10,000 or more were spending $12.13 per capita for police protection, while Salt Lake with a 200,000 population was spending only $7.17 per capita.

"Deseret News, March 1, 1960.

Lee later charged that Skousen had been deliberately misleading about crime statistics in order to get more money from the city commission by stating that Salt Lake showed a sharp increase in major crime during 1958, notably in robbery, grand larceny, and petty theft. But six months later when he was more interested in his reputation, he noted that willful homicide was down 75 percent, 2 3

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THE FIRING OF W. CLEON SKOUSEN robbery down 37 percent, burglary down 19.3 percent, and auto theft down 25.1 percent; rape and larceny were still up, but they were down from earlier reports. Skousen no longer needed money, Lee suggested, but "publicity to tell the people all over the world what a wonderful chief of police he was." Transcript of TV address by J. Bracken Lee, April 5, I960, p. 3, in Skousen's possession.

Actually, the 1959 offense report gives validity to Skousen's figures. Willful homicide was breaking even, rape was still up (29 percent), robbery was down even more (16 percent), burglary was up by 18 percent, while larceny and auto theft were down by 12 percent and 11 percent respectively. 1959 Offense Progress Report, Salt Lake City Police Department.

18 Memorandum from E. H. Morgan, assistant chief, to Skousen, February 16, 1960, Special Budget Report, in Skousen's possession.

"Deseret News, March 1, 1960.

20 Salt Lake Tribune, March 1, 1960. Later, Lee bitterly attacked those figures, accusing Skousen of dishonesty. He claimed that the city auditor said the police budget was actually 21 percent in 1959 and 19 percent in 1960. (Lee TV address, pp. 2, 3.) Actually, the records corroborate the Skousen figures: $14,832,743.00 total budget for 1960, with $1,831,977.00 for the police department, which is slightly short of 12'/2 percent. (Budget for Salt Lake City Corporation, 1960, pp. 6, 21, Lee Mayoralty Papers.) A police department memorandum listed the same figure for the total budget, but with a slightly higher police department figure of $1,915,937.00, still close to lZVi percent. (Morgan to Skousen, February 27, 1960, in Skousen's possession.)

Lee said that Skousen told three lies before the commission: (1) The department was undermanned and underpaid. He gave a figure which Lee contradicted because it did not agree with the National Municipal Association book.

Although Skousen said his came from the FBI, he never produced the evidence.

(2) Skousen said that Salt Lake's crime rate was much greater than the average city of its size. Lee thought that Skousen carefully chose cities for comparative purposes to make Salt Lake appear worse than it was in reality. (3) Skousen misrepresented the number of officers needed or assigned for traffic purposes.

Allegedly, there were 14 of 260 men on traffic. "I know you have more than that," said Lee. Lee believed that there was only a traffic problem at certain times in a day, and that the number of officers should be accordingly adjusted.

Lee interview.

"Skousen to Lee, March 9, 1960, in Skousen's possession.

22 Memorandum from Morgan to Skousen, March 14, 1960, ibid. Salt Lake Tribune, March 19, 1960, said Morgan reported 32 sixth grade men would have to go, or 25 first grade, by April 1.

23 Salt Lake Tribune, March 19, 1960.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid. Actually, Lee decided less than five months later that two assistant chiefs were, in fact, necessary. See Deseret News, August 11, 1960.

26 Deseret News, March 22, 1960.

27 The three assistant chiefs dropped were: Owen C. Poulsen, E. H. Morgan, and L. R. Greeson. (Deseret News, March 22, 1960.) Poulsen, assistant chief in charge of the Youth Bureau and Vice Squad, returned to the rank of captain and supervisor of communications. Greeson went into a private polygraph business but later became chief security officer for Skaggs Drug Centers in Reno, Nevada. (Deseret News, March 23, 1960.) Greeson's position was reported by Lt. N. K. lohnson, Planning and Research, Salt Lake City Police Department, in a letter to the author, April 12, 1973.

28 Skousen recalled that Lee put in as chief his "most incompetent captain."

In Skousen's opinion, Crowther was an outstanding patrolman but a terrible administrator. He had had a dispute with David O. McKay in 1947 when McKay was chairman of the Utah Centennial Commission. McKay asked

291

J. BRACKEN LEE Crowther to clean up prostitution, but Crowther claimed there was none in the city. The disagreement had caused Crowther to lose his job, and he had been disgruntled ever since. He had often consulted with Lee behind Skousen's back.

Skousen interview.

29 Deseret News, March 22, 1960.

3 °Deseret News, March 23, 1960.

31 In a letter to the author, April 14, 1973, Skousen reaffirmed his earlier position: "Not at any time did Mr. Lee extend to me the courtesy of resigning.

At no time did he discuss avoiding a 'big fuss' and suggest that he would give me a 'boost' and tell everyone 'what a good man' I had been."

32 Lee interview.

33 Harold Schindler to author, December 1, 1973.

34 Skousen interview and Skousen to author, March 19, 1974.

3!i Salt Lake Tribune, March 23, 1960.

3 "Deseret News, March 23, 1960.

37 A claim fully supported by both Skousen and Lee in personal interviews.

38 Unpublished editorial, Deseret News, March 23, 1960, taken from galley proof in the possession of Skousen.

3 9Ibid.

4 °Ibid.

"Lee interview.

42 Such a development may have surprised Lee. Ironically, Skousen had

the mayor, I thought he was a bigger man than that." Skousen prided himself in his association with Catholics, lews, Protestants, and in the fact that two of his assistant chiefs were not Mormon. Greeson, one of the assistant chiefs, made a good partner for him because he was a Mason and non-Mormon. Skousen claimed that Lee once called in Greeson and offered him the chief's job if he would help Lee "harpoon" Skousen. Greeson allegedly used some "colorful language" to tell the mayor what he thought of the offer. He also told him that Skousen was not run by church leaders. He said the department was operated by professional principles and Skousen was not dictated to by anyone. As a matter of fact, Greeson thought Skousen ought to talk to church leaders more than he did. Skousen interview.

43 It seems probable that Lee misunderstood Clark on this issue. Church leaders have never believed that a man's profession should or could significantly interfere with church assignments. Rather, Mormons take special pride in their ability to excel in both church and professional assignments.

"Skousen interview.

45 Skousen's most important support from the General Authorities of the Mormon church could reasonably be expected to come from Apostle Ezra Taft Benson, political conservative and ardent anti-Communist. In an interview with the author, August 15, 1972, Benson said he was out of the city when the firing took place and that he was "very unhappy" about it. However, he never did discuss it with Lee and only in passing with Skousen. He asserted that all General Authorities had been very happy about the original appointment of Skousen as chief. He would recommend that I talk with President McKay if he were alive, because he took a genuine interest in city and state affairs. He said that the "Brethren" were generally pleased with Lee both as governor and mayor and had heard President McKay say so on more than one occasion, but McKay also thought Lee could have been "tighter in eradicating sin" (specifically, prostitution) from the city.

292

THE FIRING OF W. CLEON SKOUSEN 40 Skousen told a slightly different version in a note to himself clipped to the editorial. He said that he had dropped by the News office just after Moyle's order and found the office in a furor. Employees were threatening to resign in protest since they thought the order was a violation of professional ethics.

As he was leaving an employee handed him the proof of the editorial as a "souvenir." Skousen believed that McKay and Clark were both "indisposed" at the time, which is why Moyle exercised so much power. This is in complete opposition to Lee's account of his telephone conversations with McKay, Clark, and Moyle.

"Skousen interview.

48 Interview with William B. Smart, August 3, 1972, Salt Lake City. Smart expressed his conviction that Skousen's firing was a "bad move" and that Salt Lake had had nothing but problems in the police department ever since. When asked about the editorial, Smart replied, "Well, we've never published nor ever will publish a full-page editorialâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;that's ridiculous. And I'd really rather not comment on that. That's an internal matter that I'd rather not get into."

49 Skousen to Lee, March 8, 1960, in Skousen's possession. This letter is labeled "personal and confidential."

50 Lee was certain that Moyle appreciated what Skousen did to protect his good name and that the incident was not the reason Moyle sided with Lee against Skousen in the editorial episode. Lee to the author, March 26, 1973.

51 Salt Lake Tribune, March 23, 1960; Skousen interview.

52 Lee interview.

53 Lee TV address, p. 1; Salt Lake Tribune, April 5, 1960. ^Deseret News, March 23, 1960. â&#x20AC;˘<5Salt Lake Tribune, March 23, 1960.

5e Lee TV address, p. 2; and Salt Lake Tribune, April 5, 1960.

"Salt Lake Tribune, April 5, 1960.

58 Skousen's private notes in his possession; Deseret News, April 7, 1960.

59 In a letter to the author, May 29, 1973, Barker gave an account similar to Lee's. He said Lee had ordered Foote to call Skousen and that Lee took no part in the gambling. Skousen called him to ask about the penalty if an elected official observed a violation of the law and took no action. When Barker told Skousen he was at the club, too, Skousen allegedly replied, "Then you are in the same boat and will have to suffer the consequences."

G0 Lee TV address.

"Skousen's private notes; Deseret News, April 7, 1960.

"2Deseret News, March 23, 1960.

63 Lee interview.

64 Lee claimed Southworth made a great deal of money through the program. Tavern owners were told they would not be harassed if they joined the association. If the owners said no, the vice squad would arrive the same night and "make a nuisance of themselves." Southworth would return the next day, and the owner would ask, "What the hell were those policemen doing here last night?" Finally, the owner would agree to join. Lee interview. Southworth declined to reply to the author's questions about the program. "^Deseret News, April 16, 1960. ""Deseret News, March 23, 1960.

"Deseret News, April 16, 1960.

08 Ibid.

09 Skousen interview. The bulletin named is not available. In a letter to the author, April 14, 1973, Assistant Chief J. L. Smith of the Salt Lake City Police Department reported that no copies could be located.

293

J. BRACKEN LEE ™Lee TV address, p. 4; Salt Lake Tribune, April 5, 1960.

"Skousen said that these twenty-five copies were prepared free by the publisher—at no cost whatever to the department. He sent paperback copies to other departments because it provided a "wonderful liaison." Skousen interview. ;2 Skousen's private notes.

73 Salt Lake Tribune, April 5, 1960. '"Skousen to Walter Knott, Knott's Berry Farm, Buena Park, Calif., Sept.

9, 1960, in Skousen's possession.

"Lee TV address; Salt Lake Tribune, April 5, 1960. Lee claimed that Skousen made between 300 and 400 speeches a year.

76 Skousen's private notes.

"Lee interview.

78 Skousen to author, April 14, 1973. In a previously cited letter to the author, Assistant Chief Smith claimed no direct knowledge as to whether Skousen included questions on sex. At the time of the letter, however, the department used the polygraph in hiring but included no questions on sex.

79 Lee interview. s°Ibid.

81 Skousen interview.

82 Lee interview.

83 Skousen interview.

84 As quoted by Skousen in his letter to Knott. Unfortunately, the author was unable to locate the actual editorial from individual police officers or from the Salt Lake Police Department which maintains there is no copy on file.

N. K. Johnson to author.

85 Skousen interview.

80 The author wrote numerous letters to police officers and politicians who knew either Skousen or Lee, and many of them refused to comment.

294

21 Problems of City Government Believing that his leadership had placed the city in excellent financial condition, Lee announced his intention in August 1963 to seek reelection. He said that the record proved he had kept his pledge to achieve fiscal reform and a balanced budget for the first time in ten years. He took pride in the fact that the property tax had been reduced by a half-mill, loose purchasing practices tightened, and thousands of dollars saved. Moreover, these accomplishments came without increasing taxes or sacrificing services. "Better bookkeeping has helped," a Tribune article noted, "but in the final analysis the making or breaking of budgets depends on the men elected to office."1 The mayor neglected to mention the Fiscal Procedures Act and its notable effect on city finances.

Lee also claimed credit for the capital improvements approved by his constituents and promised that they would be built for "substantially less than the amount authorized." He said that interest would be reduced by "prudent investment of unused bond proceeds," and "good management" had made it possible to finance retirement of the bonds with a net increase of 1.5 mills over the current levy. Some $1,000,000 in sales tax revenue was being set aside each year to finance capital needs not included in the bond program, and he pledged that he would resist any effort to divert these funds to departmental operations or other uses.2 The only other candidate for mayor was Sheldon Brewster, a Salt Lake City businessman and motel owner who had served five terms in the Utah House of Representatives, serving as Speaker twice.3 He was not considered a strong opponent because of low visibility among voters and a bland personality. Lee handily defeated Brewster by a margin, of almost two to one, 295

J. BRACKEN LEE

32,989 to 17,433.4 Clearly, Brewster was an uninspiring and token candidate against the still popular Lee. Ten thousand fewer voters went to the polls than in 1959, suggesting a marked decrease in interest. "If there was any mandate," speculated the Deseret News, "it was for economical and efficient government, with budgets in the black.""' The voters also approved a bond issue for construction of a combination civic auditorium, sports arena, and convention center, to be called the Salt Palace after a historic structure that had burned down.

In his second term Lee radiated the same confidence and candor that had earlier attracted national interest. When mayors were invited to the White House to discuss municipal problems and federal assistance Lee was typically forthright in declining the invitation, saying he could not afford it. The tax burden was such that the average person, like himself, lacked the funds for the trip; and he did not believe in asking Salt Lake City to pick up the tab, especially since it had been necessary to refuse salary increases to city officials who were much worse off than he.

Vice-president Hubert Humphrey explained in a telegram that the secretary of labor and administrators of other federal agencies would outline ways of obtaining money from the government for urban programs. From this, Lee inferred that the purpose of the conference was to "find more ways of spending the people's money." Proclaiming an interest in a conference to relieve taxpayers of some of their burden, he told Humphrey, "Let me know when the Federal Government has reformed."6 Frederick Nelson of the Philadelphia Bulletin found Lee's approach welcome: But a mayor who doesn't want his city to join Appalachia and couldn't be tempted to go on a junket to Washington on expense account is a refreshing novelty. No wonder he got 55% of the vote when he ran for mayor! No wonder the CIO's COPE describes Brack Lee as "very, very dangerous!'"

URBAN RENEWAL

One of the most convincing examples of Lee's disdain for federal spending programs was his consistent opposition to urban 296

PROBLEMS OF CITY GOVERNMENT

renewal. The federal government began providing funds for urban renewal projects in 1949. Cities held hearings and then referendums to approve the organizing of local urban renewal agencies. If voters granted approval, the agency worked with the federal government in drawing up plans for renewing selected sections of a city. The major controversy about the program concerned the power of eminent domain, which opponents claimed forced owners of homes to sell. Martin Anderson, a research fellow in urban studies at Harvard and MIT, wrote a scathing review of the program in 1965. He claimed that between 1950 and 1960 the program had demolished 126,000 low-rent homes and built only 28,000 new homes, most in a much higher rent bracket. The result was improved housing for relatively high-income groups only, while low-income groups were pushed into different slums.8 In the early 1960s, planning experts began urging Salt Lake community leaders to become involved in urban renewal and to revitalize the city center by emphasizing its natural assets. They argued that Salt Lake should avoid the trend toward suburban sprawl and urban scatter. More trees should be planted and buildings should be freshened with paint, especially older historic ones. A visitor's and convention center should be constructed downtown to emphasize the area as a place of interest and to attract more visitors by creating an inviting atmosphere.9 Lee's feelings were never in doubt. He brushed off these suggestions, claiming that Salt Lake City's slum problems were very minor.10 Others were not so complacent. The Tribune warned that completion of the westside freeway would "open up part of the seamier side of Salt Lake City to public view."

Although the editors believed that Salt Lake had "no long stretches of blighted residential areas," it did have its share of slum housing, "usually hidden on little traveled streets of the city's west side or just east and south of downtown."11 Although Lee realized that property deterioration was a constant problem in any city, he believed that many property owners could repair the buildings themselves if the tax burden 297

J. BRACKEN LEE

were not so great. He was convinced that taxes and the size of government would increase with urban renewal: So please forgive me if you find me opposing what may seem to be a good thing such as the advantages pointed out by those who support urban renewal. I am willing to sacrifice what may seem to be good, because I sincerely believe that the price we must pay by enlarging government is far greater than the good achieved!12 When Lee learned in 1962 that President Kennedy had proposed a new cabinet-level Department of Urban Affairs, he fired off an anxious telegram to Senator Bennett urging him to oppose it: "It is extremely dangerous to set up these new departments and especially so when they are not truly understood or explained."13 In 1965 President Johnson, following Kennedy's lead, succeeded in pushing through Congress a new cabinet position called the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Johnson advocated a "creative federalism," a partnership, which Lee rejected, between the federal government and governors and mayors. Johnson encouraged the formation of metropolitan area plans that would receive federal assistance.14 Urban renewal steadily gained momentum in Salt Lake City, and by 1965 all members of the city commission, with the exception of Lee, favored it. In August 1965 it reached the referendum stage. The commission decided that if voters approved organization of a renewal agency, they would appoint themselves as the Redevelopment Agency Commission to serve as the contracting arm of the city in negotiations involving urban renewal contracts. Lee was relieved at the latter decision, saying, "I don't believe in agencies running things when the top men are not responsible to the voters. I think it is better protection for the people if we name ourselves."15 As propaganda flooded the city, the issue became very heated.

Commissioner George Catmull claimed misrepresentation by opponents of the program: "Some people are going door to door saying that a bulldozer will level property if voters approve creation of this agency." Catmull assured doubters that the commission would not approve any project unless the majority of 298

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property owners agreed to it.16 Opposing that view, Sheldon Brewster headed a citizens committee for the protection of property rights which issued leaflets warning of "the Federal Bulldozer" and a printed one-page news sheet accusing the city's two dailies of "hiding the facts" in their support of urban renewal.

Opponents also distributed handbills saying, "This is your dispossess notice," which apparently caused some home owners to seek legal aid.17 Complaining of "misinformation" and "deliberate distortion," the Tribune insisted that urban renewal was "not a socialistic attack on private enterprise and private property rights" and that Utah law provided protection against abuse. The editors noted that the use of the power of eminent domain to condemn property was surrounded with safeguardsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;much more than in the case of highways, schools, parks, or other public places. The owner did not have to accept the price offered and could go to court to seek fair treatment, even recovering legal expenses if the price set by the court was higher.18 The Tribune further noted that the majority of voters had to approve urban renewal, and if three-fourths of the property owners involved in a specific project objected, they could require that the project be submitted to voters. Public hearings were required on any project, and judicial protection as well as protection by the city commission was assured: It is inconceivable to us, in the face of all these safeguards, that any urban renewal project could possibly be established in Salt Lake City unless it had very broad public approval and adhered strictly to the law with all its safeguards.19 KSL-TV, the Mormon church-owned station and ally of the Deseret News, urged an end to emotionalism, and in an on-the-air editorial claimed that a vote for a renewal agency was not "a vote to lose your home." KSL warned against scare tactics and asked "both sides to discuss the issue calmly and factually."20 Ironically, the most effective campaigning was done by opponents of urban renewal through a guest editorial aired by KSL the following week. J. McKinnon Smith argued that urban renewal did not 299

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cure slums: "It only moves them. Slums are not buildings—they are people, and people take their slummy habits and attitudes with them wherever they go." Smith claimed that the commission would have the power to take property against the will of the people: To ask you to vote YES is to ask you to vote your own destruction. Do not be insensible to your God-given, inalienable right to own property; to be secure in it and to protect it.

The astronomical cost of Federal Urban Renewal is sufficient reason to vote NO Tuesday; but the cost that is too high—too precious to sacrifice—is your freedom or your free agency to use your property as you wish to do.

As President David O. McKay has said, "We must recognize that property rights are essential to human liberty."

Therefore, I recommend that you vote NO Tuesday.21 A classic example of misinformation and propaganda, the editorial carried emotionalism to the extreme; but even more important, it was a blatant attempt to imply the support of the Mormon church by using loaded terms such as "free agency" and invoking the name of David O. McKay. Clearly, the church was not against urban renewal. If it had been, KSL and the Deseret News would not have argued persuasively in behalf of such a program. Yet, this propaganda struck home to the majority of Salt Lake City voters, as the church was skillfully identified with the opposition. A rather ineffectual attempt at rebuttal was made by John Preston Creer, Salt Lake County commissioner, who suggested that "old folks" had been "duped by the fear of losing their homes." Urban renewal, he said, was not designed to go into residential areas but would instead make the downtown healthy and attractive. "Our city leaders will not sit by and watch any program come in and destroy what has taken a century to build," Creer asserted. Self-consciously, he endeavored to invoke the Mormon heritage with a trite plea to "keep our city as beautiful as the mountains surrounding it."22 The following day, voters indicated which argument had impressed them by soundly defeating urban renewal 29,119 to 4,900. The New York Times called it "painful proof that a 300

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scare campaign centering around fear of 'the Federal Bulldozer backed by eminent domain' can easily defeat city planners and civic organizations." Proponents had hoped to receive $1.6 million in federal funds to widen land purchases and relocate homeowners in the downtown district where the $17 million civic auditorium was to be built. The vote left Salt Lake City the largest city in the nation ineligible to participate in the federal urban renewal program.23 Although a defeat for the city's progressive forces, it was considered an impressive victory for Lee as the only member of the city commission to oppose urban renewal. He reacted with characteristic overstatement: This makes me even happier than any of my own victories when running for office. The voters agree with me that the city can repair any blight that does exist without another Federal agency over which there is no local control.24 A few days later, he referred to urban renewal as a "fraud" that the people had opposed "by a vote of nearly 10 to 1. A few more demonstrations of this kind, I am sure, will open the eyes of our politicians who have been leading us to destruction."25 Actually, the defeat was closer to 6 to 1, but the voice had been heard, even if it did come in reaction to massive propaganda.

Lee had consistently hammered at his theme: "Urban renewal will mean more federal government and more taxes." He seemed unperturbed by the fact that the issue had caused his sharpest disagreement with the business community in twenty-five years.

He argued that most of the property that would have been included in the urban renewal package was owned by people wealthy enough to pay for its improvement themselves. Referring to his downtown committee to work on city problems, he claimed, "We are doing a pretty darn good job ourselves. The spirit catches on and if the pace keeps up we will do the job without Washington's help." Warning that urban renewal was part of a step-by-step program in which freedom was being lost by the public's willingness to rely on the federal government, he de301

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clared: "I'm not against rebuilding the community, but I don't want the government to run everything."20 Nevertheless, Lee seemed unconvinced that Salt Lake had any problems serious enough to warrant urban renewal. It was generally recognized, as the Chicago Sun-Times said, that "Salt Lake City, although worn in places, has not acquired real slum corrosion." Lee was characterized as "one of the country's most consistent and personable conservative politicians" who refused to be "diverted by the eagerness of downtown businessmen for federal funds to enhance the city as a convention center." Yet, with President Johnson mounting a massive urban assistance program, Lee's victory was predicted to be a "classic individualistic exercise comparable to Custer's Last Stand."27 Perhaps that prophecy was fulfilled, for Lee continued to bicker with the city commission and the federal government over programs involving matching funds. He voted against all federal programs and even refused to sign government forms when the rest of the commission approved. He was not only against any federal subsidies, but he was against any programs to raise money to match the funds.28 Without question, Lee's opposition to federal subsidies slowed Salt Lake City's urban progress.

Buildings that would have come sooner came later and served as an example of negative leadership. Instead of an assertive, positive force, Lee's voice was the perpetual, single, dissenting one, reminiscent of his regressive stand toward education as governor.

FLUORIDATION

Lee's fears of socialism surfaced often. While governor, he had warned the Utah Dental Association Convention in 1950 that socialized medicine was the "forerunner of socialism itself."

He promised that once medicine was socialized in America, everything would be socialized and democracy would be lost.29 He accused the Truman administration of "using deceit and dishonor to pedal socialistic programs under sugar-coated names," such as calling socialized medicine "public health insurance."

He claimed that socialism "flared and flopped" in America in the 302

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days of the Plymouth Bay colony. The pilgrim fathers soon dropped a common storehouse project in favor of private enterprise "because the strong men did not want to do four times the work of the weak and receive no bonus for their efforts."30 When fluoridation became more popular as a means of preventing tooth decay, Lee requested an opinion from the attorney general as to whether it would be "constitutional for a governmental agency to force the fluoridation of water upon the people." If the people voted for it and it should be determined constitutional, he acknowledged that he could do nothing to prevent it. But he was disturbed by the prospect and drew an analogy of forcing vitamins or a special diet on people to improve their health.31 In 1955 the attorney general declared it to be constitutional, but Lee remained doubtful, insisting that "mass medication" violated constitutional rights.32 Not all physicians favored the program. Dr. Frederick B. Exner, former secretary of the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, implored Lee to do everything in his power to prevent fluoridation, which he labeled an evil scheme. He told Lee that the association had passed a resolution condemning all compulsory mass medication and warned that "health officials, as a class, are committed to promoting this scheme, come hell or high water, and have completely closed minds on the matter."33 Even though Lee as the state's chief administrator considered fluoridation an invasion of freedom, he was faced with the Utah State Department of Health which favored it.34 When Lee became mayor, pressure mounted as the Utah State Medical Assoication passed a resolution unanimously endorsing fluoridation for Salt Lake City. Angrily, Lee complained that the association had consistently fought socialized medicine, but would now "endorse a Socialist program such as putting fluorine in drinking water." Insisting that the process would only be helpful to a small proportion of the people, he claimed that it was "dangerous and of no help to many others."

He asked what right any group had to "force people to take something that they do not want to take." He suggested to physicians that if they objected to dictation by the government 303

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they should not "use their profession to support dictation to others."35 Lee took to television to fight the program, and his influence prevailed, for the initiative ordinance requesting that fluorine be added to Salt Lake City's water supply was defeated at the polls in 1961 by a vote of 35,881 to 10,330.3G However, the issue continued to plague the mayor. Perhaps the most notable argument in behalf of fluoridation was presented by Dr. Kenneth B. Castleton, dean of the University of Utah College of Medicine. In 1967 he prevailed upon Lee to consider it seriously, arguing that it had been defeated due to misinformation and emotionalism. Castleton said that evidence had become even more impressive that fluoridation was effective, safe, and "one of the most important public health measures of the century." Citing numerous statistics, he alluded to the experience of eight of the nation's largest cities which were fluoridating their public water supply, including New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Cleveland, Washington, D.C., St. Louis, and Detroit. "Many studies have been made to test the safety of fluoridation and the evidence is overwhelming that it is a safe and reliable procedure," the physician asserted. Claiming the tendency to emotionalize the issue was widespread, especially among uninformed older people and lower income groups, he said it was advocated by almost all leading scientific organizations in the country. Then he challenged Lee: As Mayor of this city, you have a rare opportunity to render an enormous service. I dare say if you could implement this program, by this one act you would do more for the health of the people than 100 dentists could do in their lifetimes. This is a sobering statement and I hope you will give it due consideration.37 Although undoubtedly impressed by Castleton's erudition and evidence, Lee refused to budge. Citing his wife's five-month hospital stay, he explained that medication normally beneficial to other patients caused a violent reaction in her. Lee also noted that he was unable to take penicillin in spite of its well-known benefits. He concluded that neither Castleton nor any other physician could say with certainty that fluoride would have no ill 304

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effects upon anyone. He also declared that installation would be expensiveâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;"money which Salt Lake City does not have." He could not understand the logic of putting fluoride into the water supply when most water was used for purposes other than drinking. He promised to support a plan to make available free fluoridated water in bottled form to any citizen who desired it.38 Even though he continued to be inundated with letters and requests for fluoridation, he remained unalterably opposed to it; in a very real sense, it symbolized his conservative political philosophy.

SALT PALACE

Lee never favored the creation of the Salt Palace, or as it was originally called, the Salt Lake County Civic Auditorium Complex. After voters approved the bond issue to build it and demolition of the buildings on the selected site had begun, he fired a broadside at the project, calling it a high-priced burden on the taxpayers. He discovered that the University of Utah was planning a combined activities center and physical education complex and wondered why it could not serve the needs of the city as well. Predictably, he became the first signer of a petition which, if signed by 19,000 registered voters, would place the issue on the ballot for reconsideration.39 Marvin G. Jensen, county commission chairman, asserted that the project was "beyond the point of no return" and stressed his belief that the Salt Palace would be a very significant producer of revenue. McCown E. (Ed) Hunt, Civic Auditorium Board chairman, warned that abandonment of the project would cost the taxpayers $3,000,000, not to mention the need to redevelop the auditorium site.40 Lee's petition effort failed, but a few months later a more serious problem surfaced: there was a $4,000,000 difference between the budget for the auditorium and the bids made on the project. Hunt explained that the board had given the architects the figure of $12,599,825 as the amount available for the building, but they had "miscalculated with respect to design as to what could be done for that amount of money." Controversy 305

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flared when the lowest bid opened on October 14 was $16,916000 or $4,000,000 more than was available. The bid, submitted

by Jacobsen Construction Company, included $4,700,000 for electrical and mechanical work but not $4,810,000 for obtaining and clearing the site.41 Since Salt Lake City taxpayers were responsible for approximately 44 percent of the taxes to retire the bonds for the project, Lee was distraught; citizens had a right to believe that the architect's estimate was within reason. After renegotiation the county commissioners unanimously agreed to contract with the low bidder for $11,905,000 on the basis of revised plans eliminating the concert hall. But Lee was reluctant about that, too, because the county was assuming that the concert hall's cost was $5,011,000 and that it was a fair valuation. This, he said, was "improper and certainly would leave all of those concerned open to suspicion in view of the terrific amount of money involved."

Therefore, Lee recommended that the revised plans be presented for new bidsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;"the only way, in my opinion that we can avoid creating more suspicion in the minds of the people."42 McCown Hunt opposed such an action, arguing that if rebid the cost would be appreciably higher, due to increased spending on the Vietnam War, higher construction wages, and other factors. Marvin Jensen recalled that the last time the city had insisted on rebidding in the case of the Metropolitan Hall of Justice, the cost to the county was an extra $330,000. Nevertheless, the city commission accepted Lee's logic. Although the ground-breaking ceremonies were scheduled for the morning of December 20, 1966, the commission met on December 16, and voted to accept Lee's recommendation, 3 to 1, with George Catmull dissenting and Conrad Harrison, an ex-officio member of the Salt Palace Board, abstaining even though he disagreed with Lee. Then, to force the county commission to accept the recommendation, Lee filed suit in Third District Court asking that construction be delayed.4'1 The following day Judge Stewart M. Hanson issued a temporary injunction delaying the project.44 To avoid conflict of interest on the part of Salt Lake County judges, Sixth District 306

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Court Judge Ferdinand Erickson of Richfield heard the case and ordered that the county commission call for new bids. He accused the county of putting the cart before the horse in negotiating for a lower construction price. Accordingly, the crux of the question lay in a state statute that provided a way to alter a contract. After the commission entered a construction contract it could by unanimous vote alter the contract with the consent of the contractor. Although the commissioners had voted unanimously to accept a bid offering subject to change orders, the county did not have a contract when the changes were made.45 Project engineer J. Howard Dunn explained that because the contract was not signed at original bid opening, there was no formal contract, which he regarded as a technicality.40 Following the ruling, a pleased Lee said he had brought the suit because he believed "those in public office should lean over backwards to make sure they are following the law. I felt I was on the right side and the court has justified me."47 Meanwhile, the city commission went on record in support of the project and pledged full cooperation to the end. Howard Dunn believed that Lee "would now lend his full support of the project," but Lee backed off from an unequalified endorsement.48 It was March 1967 before the contract was signed with the new low bidder, Alfred Brown Company of Salt Lake City and Robert E. McKee Company of El Paso, Texas, offering $11,699,000. In spite of a significant delay, the contract was over $200,000 lower than the one almost signed with Jacobsen Construction Company. It was estimated that two years would be necessary to complete the construction.49 Lee received extensive criticism for his attitude toward the Salt Palace project, and it became an issue in the 1967 mayoralty race. His opponent, D. James Cannon, criticized him for breaking the contract and costing the city $200,000 in waiting.50 Cannon was on weak ground. The cost factor was of very little signficance, since the eventual bid was $200,000 lower than the original. Lee was opposed on principle to the entire complex, regarding it as expensive and unnecessary. But the cost and the bidding represented a question of equity and legality. His suc307

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cessful efforts to delay construction through the courts until the city could be certain of a fair valuation was not only justified, it was exemplary public service. In fact, Lee became the conscience of city and county government in this case. The courts supported him in the end, ample evidence of the correctness of his stand.

Consistency was the ultimate theme of Lee's mayoralty, as he fought for economy and against federal assistance. Ironically, in his approach to each of the problems considered above his weaknesses were as evident as his strengths; in fact, they were sometimes interchangeable. For instance, his strict adherence to principle was offensive when he blindly fought urban renewal; yet, it signified the idealistic statesman with the courage of his convictions when he protested the construction of the Salt Palace or defended his stand on fluoridation. He need not have been right as long as he could generate respect from the people, sometimes even those who opposed him. Inevitably, he thrived on fighting the lone battle.

308

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Salt Lake Tribune, August 4, 1963.

Ibid.

3 Deseret News, July 13, 1963. ^Deseret News, November 6, 1963. r 'Ibid., editorial.

"Frederick Nelson, " 'Dangerous' Mayor," Philadelphia Bulletin, April 27 1965.

'Ibid.

"Martin Anderson, "Exploding the Myths of Urban Renewal," Reader's Digest, April 1965, p. 3.

9 A1 Zelver, "The Visitor in Downtown Salt Lake City," paper submitted to the mayor on June 4, 1962, by Zelver who lived in Menlo Park, Calif., Lee Mayoralty Papers.

10 Lee to Mrs. Cardella D. Stanger, Salt Lake City, March 13, 1961, ibid.

"Salt Lake Tribune, September 14, 1964, editorial.

12 Lee to Stanger.

13 Lee to Sen. Wallace F. Bennett, February 7, 1962, telegram, Lee Mayoralty Papers.

"Message from the President of the United States Relative to the Problems and Future of the Central City and Its Suburbs, March 2, 1965, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (1965), House Document no. 99; a copy of this document is in Lee's Mayoralty Papers.

"Deseret News, August 4, 1965.

"Ibid.

"New York Times, August 22, 1965.

"Salt Lake Tribune, August 1, 1965, editorial.

19 Ibid.

20 KSL-TV, Channel 5, editorial on urban renewal aired week of August 2, 1965, Salt Lake City, transcription, Lee Mayoralty Papers.

21 J. McKinnon Smith, guest editorial on KSL-TV aired week of August 9, 1965, transcription, ibid.

22 John Preston Creer, guest editorial on KSL-TV aired week of August 16, 1965, transcription, ibid.

23 New York Times, August 22, 1965.

24 Ibid.

25 Lee to H. Belmont Houghton, Barre, Vt., August 30, 1965, Lee Mayoralty Papers.

26 Charles Bartlett, "Salt Lake Cityâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;A Last Stand," Chicago Sun-Times, September 17, 1965.

"Ibid.

28 Lee to Mrs. H. Pistorious, Salt Lake City, January 19, 1967, Lee Mayoralty Papers. Lee explained: "I have even refused to sign any of these government forms as Mayor of Salt Lake City and as a result, the Salt Lake City Commission has authorized Commissioner Barker to do the signing. I do not know if this is legal or not, but I suppose it is since the City Attorney has advised the commission it is."

2S Deseret News, May 15, 1950.

30 Deseret News, October 15, 1951.

31 Lee to Mrs. M. M. Wright, Salt Lake City, March 23, 1955, Lee Gubernatorial Papers.

32 Lee to Dr. A. R. Gould, San Francisco, Calif., June 22, 1955, ibid.

2

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Dr. Frederick B. Exner to Lee, February 12, 1956, ibid.

Lee to Exner, March 5, 1956, ibid.

35 Lee to Dr. Harold Bowman, executive secretary, Utah State Medical Assn., April 12, 1960, Lee Mayoralty Papers.

36 Lee to Mrs. Robert J. Readey, Kirkwood, Mo., November 16, 1961, ibid.

37 Dr. Kenneth B. Castleton to Lee, September 14, 1967, ibid.

38 Lee to Castleton, September 29, 1967, ibid.

39 Deseret News, July 28, 1966.

4 °Ibid.

"Deseret News, October 19, 1966.

42 Lee to Salt Lake City Commission, December 15, 1966, Lee Mayoralty Papers.

43 Deseret News, December 16, 1966. i4 Salt Lake Tribune, December 17, 1966.

"Salt Lake Tribune, December 21, 1966. i6 lntermountain Contractor, December 30, 1966.

"Salt Lake Tribune, December 21, 1966.

4S Intermountain Contractor, December 30, 1966. i9 Salt Lake Tribune, March 1, 1967.

50 Interview with D. James Cannon, Salt Lake City, August 4, 1972.

34

310

22 The Last Campaign As Lee neared the end of his second term as mayor, growing disenchantment with his performance among some groups indicated that his reelection fight could be difficult. In no way did his problems compare with those he faced in his abortive third-term bid for the governorship, but by June it was clear that city employees were ready to work for his defeat. When an estimated 400 employees gathered in city commission chambers to discuss salary hikes with commissioners, Mayor Lee surveyed the room and said, "Never in my eight years as mayor have so many of you city employees been in this room at one time." From the back of the room an angry voice responded, "That's because we are sick and tired of you, Mayor!" The remark was followed by immediate and sustained applause, a sign of deep resentment over what employees regarded as salary inequities.1 But as September rolled around and the filing deadline approached, there was no sign of opposition to Lee. Pundits wondered if he might run unopposed in what had been thought to be his most vulnerable year in politics. D. James Cannon, former Utah Travel Council director and administrative officer for Pro-Utah, a private industrial development group, was considering a bid. Cannon was studying the political scene to discover whether the citizenry actually wanted a change in their city governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;a key factor in his decision. In the meantime, Carl Buehner, former Mormon church leader and businessman, and John S. Boyden, attorney and sometime political candidate, both decided against running. Lee responded with typical pluck: "If no one else wants the job, maybe I should have my head examined for seeking it again." He scoffed at reports that he intended to use an impressive victory as a springboard for higher office, such as governor, senator, or as vice-presidential candidate 311

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with Alabama Gov. George Wallace: "My time has passed to try for offices on a state or a national level. I'm not even sure why I want to run again for the job I have."2 Two unknown candidates with little chance of winning eventually filed: Joseph N. Nemelka, retired police officer, and Lawrence R. Topham, a business office manager. D. James Cannon delayed entering the race until literally the last minute, filing his petition at 4:55 P.M. on the last day.3 In fact, he only reached a final decision in the early afternoon, and then backers hurriedly rounded up the necessary signatures, acquiring well over the 100 needed to qualify.4 He maintained that he entertained no special desire to be mayor but finally decided to run because he saw no other viable alternative to Lee: "I believed he would lose if the people could see a viable alternative."5 In 1964 Cannon had been a candidate for the Republican nomination for governor (defeating Lee in the convention) but had lost in the primary election. In his statement of candidacy for mayor he said that Salt Lake City had "the potential to become the business and cultural center of Western America."

That potential had not been reached under Lee's leadership, and there were many unresolved problems such as prostitution, a dying business community, and an airport unequipped to handle transcontinental jets. Cannon claimed that "potentially great strength from both civic leaders and city employees "was dissipated because of lack of unity and enthusiastic leadership."6 His enthusiastic campaign pictured a negative Lee who was against more things than he was for. Cannon's central theme was "What has the mayor of Salt Lake City Got Against Youl" Among the items he thought Lee was against were education, better vice laws, police promotions, improved morale among city employees, "complete law enforcement," and "turning over the police pension fund because this is the only way he can balance the budget."

Cannon suggested that after the voter had read the list, he would know that Lee was "against everything you're for."7 He also saw Lee as a "slasher"â&#x20AC;&#x201D;the "costliest governor and costliest mayor we ever had. I believe in economy too, but you don't slash everything\"K 312

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Predictably, Lee's campaign was based on his major strength: economy in government. He pointed with pride to "8 years of balanced budgets" and also claimed the city had made notable progress. Employees had received "periodic wage increases and fringe benefits" putting them on an equal status with employees in industry. Lee took credit for the $19 million capital improvement program then being completed, which he had opposed when he initially ran for mayor. He unabashedly stated, "This project alone represents the most ambitious improvement in the history of the city." His friendship with the taxpayer was demonstrated, he said, by voting against a sewer tax and an increase in utilities taxes. He claimed to have earned hundreds of thousands of dollars through investment of idle fundsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;a total of $453,596.00 during the most recent fiscal year. He had forced the rebidding of the Salt Palace, thus saving the taxpayers $250,000. Finally, he favored strict law enforcement: I do not believe that a police department can ignore any areas of law enforcement, for the reason that if we are lax in the enforcement of liquor laws, narcotics, prostitution or others, this only encourages elements that lead to more serious crimes. So, my stand is that we are obligated to enforce all laws, and if strict enforcement is maintained, then and only then will unpopular laws be repealed by the people.9 Part of the campaign was devoted to a revival of the LeeSkousen feud. In a television debate Cannon accused Lee of a soft approach to crime, exemplified by his firing of "a police chief who was trying to uphold city laws." Lee vehemently accused Skousen of dishonesty and added, "If I had my way he would have gone before a grand jury." Even though he did not consider Skousen an issue in the campaign, he expressed willingness to debate him. When KUED-TV offered him an opportunity, Lee hesitated but finally agreed to a debate the following day.

Skousen thought it would be "exciting" for the citizens to learn of his own successful method of curbing prostitution.10 The following day Lee became uneasy: "Why should I debate him? I'm running against Cannon!"11 The day before the elec313

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tion, Skousen appeared on television alone and called Lee "the greatest single frustration to good law enforcement in Salt Lake City." He accused Lee of carrying on a libelous vendetta against him. He alleged serious deterioration of the police department over seven and a half years and noted that there were forty-eight fewer officers than in 1958. He praised his own record as chief, calling special attention to tavern self-policing and to his success in controlling prostitution.12 In spite of Skousen's best efforts, Lee won his final term as mayor by a scant 291 votes—25,715 to Cannon's 25,424.

Although Lee must have been shaken by the narrow win, he wryly commented that "the first time I ran for Mayor of Price, I won by two votes, and these two votes held up in the recount.

Compared to that, 291 votes is a landslide."13 Nonetheless, it was a far cry from the 1963 election which he had taken by a two to one margin. Indeed, Lee had been vulnerable, but he had also demonstrated a remarkable ability to pull votes from normally Democratic areas. A canvass indicated that he took the west side (which Cannon termed the "prostitute district"), the central region east of Main Street to Thirteenth East and from Sixth South to Seventeenth South. On the other hand, Cannon took Federal Heights and the Avenues (near the University), the southeast region, and Sugar House, where he was especially well known and had published a newspaper.14 Cannon believed that he had attracted the youth vote— 84 percent of University Village, whereas Lee got 74 percent of the "prostitute district." "I really thought he was soft on prostitution—they were arrested and then released a few days later," Cannon claimed. Voicing a common cry among losing candidates in a close election, Cannon insisted that if he had "had another half day" he would have been victorious: "Lee was losing ground fast. A lot of people of course voted for him because they knew the name and always had voted for him—and didn't know what he stood for."15 Since Cannon was an attractive and vigorous candidate, his argument has some credibility.

It was very frustrating to come so close to retiring Utah's perennial politician.

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Skousen believed that his name in the campaign was a positive factor and "undoubtedly helped Cannon," because he was "not a hard hitting campaigner" like Lee. Skousen claimed that he encouraged Cannon to run, endorsed him, and gave speeches on his behalf.10 But Cannon denied any more than a "speaking acquaintanceship" with Skousen prior to the campaign and blamed Lee for injecting Skousen into the fracas. Cannon credited J. D. Williams, University of Utah political science professor, with the suggestion that Skousen be utilized to strengthen the campaign.17 Cannon had summarily rejected the idea. Nevertheless, Lee introduced the issue by predicting that Cannon would rehire Skousen if elected. Cannon maintained that he had no intention of either hiring Skousen or of requesting the public safety portfolio, since he did not consider it his strong suit.18 Cannon was convinced that Skousen hurt the campaign, because rnany people assured him afterward that they would have voted for him if he had not been Skousen's friend. Moreover, he thought Skousen was ineffective, even a "milktoast," in his television appearance. Cannon was surprised that Skousen did not sue Lee for making libelous statements about him on television. In his opinion, the videotape would have constituted superb evidence. Cannon suspected that such positive action from Skousen would have been a boon to his candidacy.19 As for J. Bracken Lee, even a narrow victory was sweet, for he had acquired in Salt Lake City what he had been denied in state governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;a third term. Nevertheless, he could detect the signs of political eclipse; at age sixty-eight he was clever enough to realize that he should make the most of it, for it would probably be his final four years in public office. There would be no bruising battle for an unprecedented fourth term; next time he would bow out gracefully while he was on top.

315

J. BRACKEN LEE teuscher, "Speaking of Politics," Deseret News, June 15, 1967.

Ibid., September 16, 1967.

3 Deseret News, October 4, 22, 1967.

4 Deseret News, October 4, 1967.

5 Cannon interview.

"Deseret News, October 4, 1967.

'Cannon for Mayor Circular, 1967: "You know what you're for. Jim Cannon is for a Great Salt Lake City that is for progress, for growth, for you.

Get the city you're paying for. Elect Cannon Mayor. Vote for the first name on the ballotâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;D. James Cannon." Copy in J. D. Williams's possession.

8 Cannon interview.

9 "Re-elect Mayor J. Bracken Lee, the Taxpayer's Friend," advertisement paid for by William Fields, chairman, Citizens for Lee, Deseret News, October 22, 1967.

"Deseret News, November 3, 1967.

"Deseret News, November 4, 1967.

"Deseret News, November 7, 1967.

"Deseret News, November 8, 1967.

"Ibid.

15 Cannon interview. lc Skousen interview. " J . D. Williams confirmed this contention in a letter to the author, April 3, 1973.

18 Cannon interview.

19 Ibid.

Skousen said he gave serious consideration to a suit against Lee that year and discussed it with attorneys. However, he insisted that he would have had to sue both Time and Lee in a joint action since Time had run an article quoting Lee's attack on Skousen. Since Time had no property in Utah, the suit would have been filed in New York, making the case weaker; hence, his attorneys advised him not to "waste a lot of money." Skousen interview.

Actually, the article referred to by Skousen appeared in Time in 1961, not 1967, and concerned right-wing organizations in America. It called Skousen the guiding light of "The All-American Society," a position he had taken with gusto since being fired in Salt Lake City. Lee was quoted in the article as saying that Skousen had operated the police department "like a gestapo."

Time, December 8, 1961, p. 24.

2

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23 Vice and Prostitution Lee's feud with Skousen was not his last with a police chief.

In April 1967 Lee severely criticized Chief Dewey Fillis and Public Safety Commissioner James L. Barker because two plainclothes officers had spent three hours at a Jaycee installation party at a downtown hotel on a tip that a striptease act would be presented and that topless waitresses would serve guests. Chief Fillis defended the action as simple enforcement of the law, but Lee was unimpressed: "I didn't know we had enough policemen to go around babysitting for the club patrons." In a reply reminiscent of Skousen, Barker said, "If the commission doesn't want the police department to enforce such laws, the city ordinances should be repealed." He reported that there were four officers outside the club who had handled two prostitution arrests and two liquor violations that night. The Jaycees were not unduly concerned; their president, Gary Miller, reported that the officers inside had stayed about an hour and a half, and he was proud that nothing unlawful had occurred.1 The Deseret News was incensed at Lee's reaction. It was well known that Chief Fillis was campaigning for more men and a better salary schedule and had made painstaking efforts to compile a detailed report on his use of manpower, yet he was criticized by the mayor. The News attacked Lee for ridiculing Fillis when as mayor he should have been "the first to uphold the law."

Furthermore, the editors stated, The people of Salt Lake City are being well served by a Public Safety Commissioner and a Chief of Police who are trying diligently to enforce the law and make this the clean city its residents want it to be. If there is anything Salt Lake City doesn't need and want it is a repetition of the squabble that led to the firing of another effective and dedicated police chief just seven years ago.2 317

J . BRACKEN LEE

Deseret News editors remembered the Skousen incident only too well and were preparing to do battle. What is more, the issue was a sensitive one in Salt Lake City.

Respected authorities suggested that the city had drifted from a "controlled" community to one that was notoriously "soft," with prostitution infesting a two-square-mile area of town. There was also an astonishing 100 percent rise in cases of venereal disease reported throughout Utah during the first five months of 1967. These statements were made after a meeting between the police chief and two health experts, Donald P. Clough of the American Social Health Association and Byron T. Haslam, field health representative of the Utah Department of Health. Clough claimed that Salt Lake had become known in areas as far away as Alaska as a place where public officials and the courts maintained a "soft" policy of coexistence with prostitution. Despite police efforts, Fillis believed that prostitutes came to Salt Lake from far-distant population centers.3 According to Clough, prostitution could be eliminated quickly if public officials, law enforcement officers, and the public moved together rapidly: "Prostitutes and their aides don't like publicity. Word gets around fast and travels far when a town becomes tough." He cited a "new" problem of homosexual male prostitution developing in Salt Lake City: "Our specially trained undercover investigators discovered at least two such homosexual centers in Salt Lake City." He argued that prostitution must be combated because it would lead to other crimes and support drug addiction.4 As if these problems were not enough for the city commission, the Utah State Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance dealing with prostitution, claiming that the state had "preempted the field" by enacting comprehensive laws on sexual offenses.

James Barker angrily complained that the ruling made prostitution legal because it was not listed in Utah's penal code among sexual offenses. The offenses included keeping a house of prostitution, detaining a female in a house of prostitution for debt, and taking a female under age eighteenâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;but prostitution itself was not listed. He suggested as an alternative that the city could swear out a complaint against a streetwalker and charge va318

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grancy, but such a practice was indirect and disappointing. Therefore, he asked for a clarification of the ruling by the court.5 While some people feared that Salt Lake would become an "open city," Lee vehemently denied it: "We are charged with enforcing state law, even if the courts have thrown out our ordinance." He insisted that the city had "all kinds of law" to control prostitution, but Barker thought that was misleading.

"If you want an open city, the best way to get it is to have no law controlling prostitution or an unworkable law," Barker said.

"The Supreme Court has put us in this position and, by its opinion, has provided that the only law we could have would be unworkable." City Attorney Homer Holmgren studied the Utah Code and concluded that the state had empowered the city to "provide for the punishment of tramps, street beggars, prostitutes," and others. He believed that the city could prosecute prostitutes, albeit with great difficulty.

The difficulty here is that this (section 10-8-51 of the state code) requires proof that the person charged has offered herself to indiscriminate sexual intercourse with men in the plural. Proof of one offering is not sufficient. This presents considerable difficulty in securing a conviction.0 Finally deciding to accept Barker's contention that vagrancy was the vehicle, Lee recommended to the commission that the police department be directed to "enforce the state vagrancy law and any other law covering this type of violation." It was his opinion that the police knew most of those involved, which would facilitate enforcement: "I believe these girls can be removed from the streets if they are continually arrested under the state vagrancy law."7 This approach failed to satisfy the commission, and instead they passed a new ordinance making it a misdemeanor for any woman to offer or agree to a sexual act for hire. In an effort to augment state law, the ordinance defined the misdemeanor as applying to "any prostitute, courtesan or lewd woman who shall by sign, word or action, endeavor to ply her vocation upon the streets or any public place . . . and any person who shall within the corporate limits of the city, make any insulting or licentious 319

J . BRACKEN LEE

advance, proposition or salutation to a person. . . . " The punishment was determined to be imprisonment up to six months, or fine, or both. Immediately after the ordinance went into effect police arrested seven women and questioned four others, all between the ages of nineteen and thirty-one. All were charged with offering a sex act to an agent of the police department.

Since there had been only twenty-six arrests during the first eight months of 1967, the ordinance seemed to portend improvement.8 But in spite of varying approaches the improvement was slight throughout Lee's tenure. Not only was prostitution an especially difficult problem, but Lee's record in Price made him vulnerable to suspicions that he was not sincerely interested in attacking it. For instance, in 1970 the commission attempted to combat prostitution by closing business establishments found guilty of "catering to prostitution" in the West Second South district. After hearing sworn testimony they voted unanimously to suspend the licenses of Nolan Jones, operator of Jeff's Grocery Store, 511 West Second South, for sixty days. Police Chief Calvin Whitehead testified that known prostitutes frequented the store, which also contained a rooming house and restaurant, but the lack of a registration book for guests made it difficult to obtain names.9 Jones's counsel, Robert McRae, asked what right the commission had to revoke licenses "because of alleged prostitutes being on the property?" Joining the battle with surprising energy, Lee maintained that the city had reached a "desperation point," for it was common knowledge that the area was busy with prostitute activity and the courts had not acted swiftly enough to correct it. The mayor's attack was direct: "There is no one, better than you, that would know these prostitutes . . . so who is kidding who?" When McRae persisted, Lee blasted him with one of his famous lines about attorneys: "The law profession is a special group. You have a license to steal and we don't." Then he advised that McRae do a service to the community and "see that these persons [prostitutes] stay off the streets."10 Lee's aggressive approach was not sufficient to impress a woman named Cathryn Harvell who also appeared at the hearing 320

VICE AND PROSTITUTION

to complain about "the bad situation around the Salt Palace on West Temple . . . and the transient type of persons that hang around the area." Aiming all of her venom at the mayor, she shouted, "I've been told that some of these places are remaining open because you get a payoff!" She claimed that more than two years earlier a police officer had told her that the prostitutes in the area were "Mayor Lee's gals." Visibly disturbed, Lee shot back, "That's news to me!" and demanded that the woman supply the name of the officer who made the accusation. When she declined, Lee claimed there was no truth to the accusation and requested that a police detective escort the woman to the hallway to interrogate her further: "I want to know the details of all of this."11 In spite of his disagreements with Lee over law enforcement, Barker rushed to his defense, assuring the hearing that "At no time did the mayor ever tell me not to enforce the law. He always insisted that the law be followed to the letter." Perhaps Barker had forgotten about the differences the two men had had about raiding of private clubs. Commissioner Jake Garn added persuasively that in a commission form of government "it wouldn't do any good to pay off just one commissioner . . . you would have to get to all of them."12 The most impressive evidence of police success in combating prostitution appeared the following year, 1971, when vice squad officers made 120 arrests in five weeks. Only 17 were woman prostitutes, while 5 were male juveniles and 98 were adult males.

This concentrated drive to rid the city of professional prostitutes known to frequent the Second South district was a direct result of a decision to change tactics and pick up men for soliciting through a decoy system using nine women. The decoy was Barker's idea, and he claimed the city was cleaner than it had been in years.13 The emphasis on the solicitor instead of the prostitute became almost as controversial as prostitution itself. Lee was one of the critics and complained that Barker was always embarrassing him and other commissioners by forcing them to take stands on highly sensitive moral issues. Frequently, the commission supported 321

J . BRACKEN LEE

Barker because no politician wanted the public to think he was "on the side of sin." As a result, Lee voted for bills that he knew were unconstitutional because a negative vote might be misunderstood. "Now he's down there arresting the men for soliciting," Lee protested, "when all in the world you have to do with these streetwalkers is keep arresting them." Lee maintained that the process of being arrested and getting an attorney over and over again eventually discouraged most prostitutes. According to Lee, Barker wanted to be "judge, jury, and everything else.

I think he's a mental case, myself. Strange fella."14 Barker believed that Lee saw little wrong with prostitution or pornographyâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;"if you wanted to do those things, you did them. He didn't enjoy them himself. I never knew a guy who was quite as dedicated to his wife as Brack Lee." Nevertheless, Barker regarded Lee as a good mayor who would have been "one of the great men of this country if you could have added a couple of attributes to him. He was always 'agin.'" Although he thought that Lee opposed programs with good reason, he very rarely produced a positive program to meet any problem in the community. Lee operated on principle and had "moments of true greatness" as exemplified by his refusal to "give in" to the schoolteachers at the 1964 Republican State Convention, even though he knew they could defeat him. On the other hand, Barker perceptively admitted that Lee had "no particular love for me."

Therefore, when Lee was calling him a "louse," Barker remembered some of those moments of greatness and thought, "Hell, maybe he's right."15 Barker's colorful characterization of Lee's attitudes was essentially accurate. Lee's rather tolerant approach to vice and prostitution in Salt Lake City was substantially the same as his earlier approach had been to the same problems in Price. Allegations of payoffs were not substantiated in Salt Lake any more than they had been in Price. However, his public utterances and his behavior were more temperate in the more sensitive environment of a large city. If Lee failed to exhibit any of "those moments of greatness" in his handling of vice and prostitution, he certainly demonstrated consistency and credibility.

322

VICE AND PROSTITUTION l

Salt Lake Tribune, April 18, 1967. See also Deseret News, April 18, 1967.

Deseret News, April 20, 1967, editorial.

3 Deseret News, June 21, 1967.

4 Ibid. â&#x20AC;˘â&#x20AC;˘Salt Lake Tribune, July 21, 1967.

"Salt Lake Tribune, July 26, 1967.

7 Salt Lake Tribune, August 2, 1967. See also Deseret News, August 2, 1967. s Salt Lake Tribune, September 18, 1967. See also Deseret News, September 18, 1967. a Salt Lake Tribune, July 31, 1970.

"Tbid.

Lee's diatribe against the legal profession failed to amuse either the president of the Utah State Bar, J. Thomas Greene, or Utah's attorney general, Vernon Romney, both Republicans. Romney asserted that "Lawyers are more honest than the general public. They have a great number of controls on them."

Romney accused Lee of literary license and exaggeration. Greene challenged Lee to name specific lawyers guilty of unethical or illegal conduct instead of making a blanket indictment. "Your vague and general charges, while perhaps popular from a political point of view, simply do not hold water," Greene said.

He called Lee's comments "grossly unfair and misleading to the public." Salt Lake Tribune, August 27, 1970.

"Salt Lake Tribune, July 31, 1970.

12 Ibid.

"Deseret News, July 15, 1971.

14 Lee interview.

15 Interview with James L. Barker, August 4, 1972, Salt Lake City.

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24 "Sick and Tired of Politics" Prefacing his remarks with "Never believe a politician," Lee hinted in August 1971 that he would retire at the end of the year and listed several reasons: his age, seventy-two; doubt in his own mind that he could win again; discouragement over his inability to convince citizens of the dangerous trends in government; and the passing of many of his friends who had delivered the vote for him in critical areas. In spite of these fears, his wife, Margaret, encouraged him to stay in the political fire: "She's an outgoing, friendly person and loves public life. She's naggin' me to go again." But Lee recognized that a long-time office holder inevitably acquires enemies and that his candid stands on several issues made him vulnerable.1 He voiced special concern that federal poverty agencies were trying to turn ethnic groups against him: "The Negroes used to stand in groups and smile and cheer me. But in the Pioneer Parade last month, something was different. Not one Negro clapped or waved at me." He complained that people who formerly did things for themselves were willing to allow the government to do everything: "Pretty soon, they [the government] will have an agency that cuts your lawn and waters it for you."2 The following month, Lee made his retirement official, concluding that Salt Lake City did not "really need a mayor" and that he was "sick and tired of politics and sick and tired of politicians." He was "no spring chicken," he said, and "there comes a time when all of us must think of quitting."3 Determined to go out just as flamboyantly as he governed, he complained that politics was "no longer any fun." People were becoming more critical of their leaders, and he did not blame them: "I'm disgusted with politicians as a rule, and politics in particular. I'm ashamed of the profession, ashamed of the people who are run325

J . BRACKEN LEE

ning and mislead people to get elected."4 He accused the politician of being a "sticky fingered" person who could not make a living in any other way.5 Editorial comment on Lee's exit from public life was prolific.

The Ogden Standard-Examiner observed that whether or not one agreed with his "free-wheeling, blunt-speaking approach," he was nevertheless "generally respected for the courage of his convictions."6 Perhaps the most significant acclaim came from the Salt Lake Tribune, which noted that the same "flair" distinguishing his governorship was evident in his mayoralty: His outspoken, sometimes brash, often unpopular views were given extra credence by the mayor's unquestioned honesty and dedication to principles of long standing. Many who disagreed with what the mayor said and did were nevertheless willing to accept his sincerity. . . .

His protracted fights to curb the advances of big government were both acclaimed and denounced and at one time he was widely mentioned as a possible presidential candidate on a conservative ticket. But it was as mayor of Salt Lake City that he functioned best. The office and the man seemed made for one another. More specifically, Brack Lee brought the office up to the level of his excellence.7 Dexter Ellis, Deseret News political editor, voiced some sentimental feelings about losing Lee, declaring that "Anyone who calls the Internal Revenue Service 'Public Enemy No. 1' can't be all bad." He promised that newsmen would especially miss Lee because he supplied an endless string of "quotable quotes."

Besides, he "was always accessible, rarely ever said 'No Comment' and was always on the record." Ellis quoted the Lee statements that impressed him the most: "Only death and taxes are certain, but death doen't get worse every time Congress meets."

Once, Lee called the Utah House of Representatives "a government of thieves, thugs and reprobates." Perhaps the most memorable was his admission that the United Nations actually did something of worth: "If I threw $100 bills out of the window, it would do somebody some good." Finally, Ellis thought it a measure of Lee's integrity, although perhaps political ineptitude, that he had criticized both popular and unpopular targets. Such 326

SICK AND TIRED OF POLITICS"

integrity was his outstanding characteristic. Another was an ability to defy the political norm by "harpooning various sacred cows" whose support was supposedly indispensable to political success.8 Gov. Calvin L. Rampton sponsored an "Appreciation Banquet" at the Hotel Utah to honor Lee on his seventy-third birthday for his thirty-two years of public service. It was attended by governmental, church, and business leaders, as well as many other citizens who overflowed both the Lafayette and Junior ballrooms. Tribune columnist Dan Valentine, master of ceremonies, recalled his arrival to the city many years earlier. Having been in Utah less than a day, he found himself next to Lee at a Chamber of Commerce meeting: As soon as I sat down everybody turned their coffee cup over, which is rather unusual and strange. I mean, how do you know the coffee's lousy before you taste it? But. I'll always remember thisâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;I turned to Brack, not knowing who he was at the time, and said, "Sir, what's with the coffee cup going over?" And he looked at me and said, "You're just new in town, aren't you, kid?" I said, "I just got here." He said, "Turn it over." And so I turned it over and they brought me orange juice with gin in it. I've been turning it over ever since.9 No doubt an apocryphal account, this story illustrated Lee's aplomb in building his career in a Mormon culture. Valentine remembered that Lee had always run an open administration and had opened many doors for him personally. Lee was "one of the few people in public office that when you ask him a question he gives you an answer right away because he doesn't have to think what he said yesterday." Valentine concluded that Lee was the kind of public official who kept everybody nervous, and "nervous men don't steal."10 Lee responded with great emotion and gratitude. He assured his audience that although he would never again be a candidate, he retained his strong views and willingness to fight. Then he told a story about President David O. McKay, whom he considered "a good, personal friend."

327

J . BRACKEN LEE

One day, I think he was in his late eighties and I considered him to be quite an elderly gentleman, we had lunch with him. It was the day following the last football game between the Agricultural College and the University of Utah.

By way of conversation I asked him, "Did you see the football game yesterday?" He says, "Oh, yes, I have never missed one of those games." He said, "I played on the first football team that the University of Utah had and 25 years later they invited this team out during half time. We were introduced and we stood in the position we played on the team. Now, they were all alive at the time, but there are only two of us left." He gave me the name of the other individual which I have forgotten. I said to him, "Have you seen him lately?"

And he replied, "Oh, yes, I saw him at the game yesterday and I never got such a shock in my life. He looked like an old man!"11 Apparently, Salt Lake City citizens were pleased with Lee's contribution. A 7>z'feMÂŤe-sponsored poll in the middle of his final term revealed that six of ten Salt Lake County voters rated him as either an excellent or good mayor, an impressive accomplishment for a man in the twilight of his career.12 He also received a winning rating from Republicans, Democrats, and independents. In explaining this support, the comment heard most frequently was "he has the courage of his convictions."

It should have been predictable, then, that Lee would continue to influence city elections even in retirement. He had singled out Jake Garn, a member of the commission, as an early choice for his successor. Although he did not campaign for Garn, he quietly endorsed him, which helped to build Republican support. Garn was elected mayor by a "tidal wave majority" of 24,682 votes over Conrad Harrison.13 Lee's influence was even more evident in the case of city treasurer Jennings Phillips,14 whom he warmly endorsed for the city commission. Garn already directed the Water Department, and Phillips wished to take over Lee's bailiwick in finance. Lee handpicked his own successor in Phillips and succeeded in transferring his own vote-getting ability to the new candidate. Phillips led the field with 31,744 votes,15 then freely acknowledged the 328

"SICK AND TIRED OF POLITICS

debt: "One of the main reasons that I'm city commissioner today is that I had the mayor's staunch support."10 Lee exercised considerable clout even in the 1973 city commission race by severely criticizing his one-time associate James Barker. In an eleventh-hour maneuver the day before the election, Lee issued a written endorsement of Glen Greener and followed it with a television blast at Barker who, he claimed, was "not a good public official and should be defeated." He charged Barker with "creating turmoil in the city generally and in the police and fire departments, particularly, by trying to organize unions."17 More important, Lee claimed that the city had never received a satisfactory answer to "what happened to the $16,000 paid to the so-called 'phantom employee.'" He was referring to a unique incident involving payment of $16,743 in wages from Barker's department to a man who had never been employed by the department. Barker's campaign manager, Hughes Brockbank, called Lee's attack a "classic example of the old politics" and accused Lee of purposely waiting until the day before the election, "knowing that in this way the truth about Commissioner Barker would notâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;because it could notâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;be brought out."18 Barker lost the election to the virtually unknown twenty-sevenyear-old Greener by 1,100 votes, and many analysts pointed to Lee's continuing influence as the significant factor. Unquestionably, Greener did very well in parts of the city known previously as Lee strongholds.19 However, there was a postscript to this election. The following week, Barker filed a slander suit against Lee, seeking $25,000 in punitive damages. In the suit, Lee was quoted as saying that Barker himself may have received some of the $16,000 paid to the phantom employee. "The statements . . . were made by the defendant with express malice, and with the specific intent of causing plaintiff to lose his bid for re-election," the suit charged.

Initially, Lee stood by his statements and brusquely claimed that Barker had no case.20 But later in the month Lee's attorneys asked for dismissal of the suit based upon the "privileges of a speaker in a political campaign."21 329

J . BRACKEN LEE

Finally, the suit was dropped when the two men agreed to an out-of-court settlement in which Barker would allow Lee or any other investigative body to examine all police records and documents dealing with the investigation of the phantom employee.

In turn, Lee agreed to make a public statement about his findings.22 After a thorough investigation, he released to the press a letter to Barker in which he said: "Based on my investigation, I can now say that I have found nothing which would indicate any direct or knowing involvement on your part in the phantom situation." More critically, he added that it was evident that Barker's employees had betrayed his trust and misled him.23 When asked at the end of his tenure what were the most interesting times in his political career, Lee had said, "firing Cleon Skousen and my fights with Commissioner Barker."24 It is true that Barker acquired a reputation for controversy during his eight years in public office and was even nicknamed the "pornography commissioner" by those who thought his interests were too much devoted to one theme. When Barker left office he said he would not have done anything differently "as far as the big decisions go," but he acknowledged that he "would do it in a better wayâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;so as not to cause such a furor."25 Garn agreed that all the "personal problems" and controversy were in Lee's and Barker's departments, and that both men would have been more productive as legislators where they could have pushed pet programs, worked on specific ideas in committees, and introduced bills.

In Garn's opinion, the responsibilities of the mayor for day-to-day detailed administrative work were not suited to Lee's talents.20 The use of invective against political opponents was an integral part of the Lee style. Nevertheless, his unfortunate blast at Barker was particularly ill-timed and ill-advised, even if it was politically successful. Perhaps he unleashed such a capricious attack partly because he was out of office and partly because he had enjoyed long years of unfettered freedom from retaliation, based on his deserved reputation as an unbeatable campaigner.

The freedom was finally tested; to his credit, Barker won his case in a bold legal challenge that repaired his reputation if not 330

"SICK AND TIRED OF POLITICS"

his political career. Had there been other successful legal challenges, Lee's career might have been less imposing.

Lee viewed his major contributions in Salt Lake City as a balanced budget and "the greatest number of civic improvements that the city had ever had." He never voted for tax increases, but the commission sometimes overruled him; therefore, he was convinced that had he been in a mayor-council form of government he could have been more effective and more satisfied with his work. He was able to accomplish more of his goals as governor of the state because he was not handicapped by a commission form of government, which was like "having five mayors."

He frankly considered his two predecessors, Glade and Stewart, to have been weak mayors, whereas Lee himself was the strongest mayor Salt Lake could have had under its limited system because he "tried to do what was right."27 Without question, Lee made his greatest contribution as mayor of Salt Lake City. His political maturity generally served the city well during twelve years known for fiscal stability and capital improvements. Even though his principles remained constant, he was more temperate and more effective during his final years in office. On the other hand, his gubernatorial record was a study in contrasts. He was incredibly unfair in his approach to education, yet he was highly effective in accomplishing liquor reform. His passion for economy had both detrimental and positive results. He administered a government remarkably free of scandal; nevertheless, his highly vocal positions on public issues often undermined his effectiveness. He was absolutely devoted to principle, yet he descended to the lowest level of political infighting with numerous subordinates and officials.

Although he gained a national reputation, he came to be reviled by many of his former supporters. Because of his bombast and moral insensitivity his record in Price was the least impressive; yet even Price sustained marked improvement during his leadership, and he left office a very popular mayor.

In the end, it was the personality of J. Bracken Lee that dominated all of his political offices and superseded most of his accomplishments and failures. Not only was he Utah's best 331

J . BRACKEN LEE

known and most durable politician but her most effective campaigner as well. He was both comfortable and controversialâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; the kind of politician who could arouse an angered voter to enter the polling place fully intending to turn him out of office. Yet, inexplicably, the voter would not be able to bring himself to do it, and he would leave, again having cast his vote for Lee. The perennial politician, Lee should not be confused with a political boss of the likes of Richard J. Daley of Chicago. He was too honest and candid for that, and he broke too many political rules. It could be argued that he was not even a good politician, as we know the term. He was not particularly given to compromise, and he often did and said the very opposite of what an astute politician in a quest for reelection would be expected to do and say. That was, after all, his most fascinating and endearing quality. Perhaps the most cogent summation lies in the statement, ironically, of a Democrat, Wayne L. Black, because it accurately reflects the consistent attitude of the Utah voter: Every county, state, and city needs a Brack Lee once in a whileâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;this state and city needed Bracken Lee.28

332

"SICK AND TIRED OF POLITICS" 1

Deseret News, August 11, 1971.

Ibid.

3 Ogden Standard-Examiner, September 29, 1971.

4 Associated Press story carried in several newspapers, among them Idaho Statesman (Boise), November 7, 1971; Tulsa Tribune, November 11, 1971.

5 Provo Herald, December 5, 1971.

"Ogden Standard-Examiner, September 29, 1971, editorial.

7 Salt Lake Tribune, January 1, 1972, editorial.

8 Dexter Ellis, "Speaking of Politics," Deseret News, January 1, 1972.

9 Record of Testimonial Dinner, January 7, 1972, Hotel Utah, Salt Lake City, Lee Mayoralty Papers.

"Ibid.

"Ibid.

"Salt Lake Tribune, August 9, 1970.

"Deseret News, November 3, 1971. Garn received 39,690 votes, Harrison 15,008.

"Salt Lake Tribune, November 4, 1971.

"Deseret News, November 3, 1971. In the city commission race, Jennings Phillips, Jr., received 31,744 votes, followed by Stephen Harmsen, 31,606, Richard C. Andrew, 30,951, and Stephen Holbrook, 13,800. Phillips and Harmsen were elected.

16 Phillips interview. Phillips remembered Lee's specific role in the campaign through radio, television, and newspaper advertising. He believed that Lee helped Garn considerably also.

"Deseret News, November 6, 1973.

18 Ibid.

"Deseret News,_ November 3, 1973. Dexter Ellis noted that opinion was divided among political analysts as to whether Lee's endorsement "helped or hindered the youthful candidate's drive." Greener did well in the westside, the southwest, and the south-central districts, Lee strongholds, although Barker led in a few precincts. University of Utah residential areas and the eastern Avenues districts, populated increasingly by young people, favored Greener.

Greener also did well in the wealthy Federal Heights area, a GOP stronghold.

Ellis added that Greener did carry out a more vigorous handshaking type of campaign than his opponent, demonstrating that old-style politicking can still prevail over media-oriented campaigns.

Conrad Harrison said that Lee's comments "definitely" had a profound effect on the outcome of the election, and Jennings Phillips remarked that if Barker had lost by several thousand votes he would have discounted Lee's statements. But since Barker lost by a small margin, Phillips believed Lee's influence was important. Deseret News, January 6, 1974.

20 Deseret News, November 13, 1973.

"Deseret News, November 30, 1973.

22 Deseret News, January 6, 1974.

23 Deseret News, February 2, 1974.

2i Deseret News, December 23, 1971.

25 Deseret News, January 5, 1974.

26 Garn interview.

Although Lee originally supported Garn for mayor, he soon became critical of his behavior in office, noting that he "had shown some weaknesses."

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333

J. BRACKEN LEE Lee viewed Garn as a "strong individual" with character but thought he was acting contrary to his own principles "in this begging for Federal money." He remembered Garn's voting with him in refusing federal money, "but now he's back there on his knees begging for it, and this disturbs me. . . . He's ambitious politicallyâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;let me say this!" Lee interview. Garn later became a U.S. senator.

"Lee interview.

28 Black interview.

334

Index Abraham Lincoln Brigade, 171 Adamson, W. S., exec. asst. to JBL, 44 Aguirre, P. B., illegal search of room of, 21 n. 18 Alfred Brown Co., Salt Palace contractor, 307 Alta Club, law enforcement at, 279 Ambassador Club, law enforcement at, 279, 280-81 American Civil Liberties Union, and Neal case, 192 American Magazine, 60 American Smelting and Refining Co., tax benefits to, under JBL, 87 Anderson, Martin, urban researcher, 297 Aramaki, A., arrest of, 8 Arnold, Joe, highway patrolman, arrest of, 16, 17 Ashton, Cliff, attorney for JBL, 83 Backman, Gus, exec, secy., SLC Chamber of Commerce, 270 Backman, LeGrand P., pres., SLC school board, 140 Barker, James L.: as city attorney, 281; feud of, with JBL, 321-22, 329-30; as SLC commissioner, 309 n. 28, 317-22 Bateman, E. Allen: criticism of,

by J. F. Merrill, 101; difficulties of, with JBL, 55, 109-14, 193-40; election of, as supt. of public instruction, 109; salary of, 11314; and special legislative session, 130; time spent out of state by, 110-11 Bateman, Richard, and father's feud with JBL, 113-14, 141 Beckstead, George, sheriff, and Neal execution, 192 Bell, Henry, liquor enforcement officer, 8-9, 12-13 Bennett, Wallace F.: relations of, with JBL, 204, 210, 233, 235-38, 251; and urban renewal, 298

Bennion, Heber, Jr., 94, 181 Bennion, M. Lynn: complaints of partisan politics in SLC schools investigated by, 215-16; salary of, criticized by JBL, 241; views of, on school spending and needs, 117-18, 130, 140, 141 Benson, Ezra Taft: and elections involving JBL, 24, 208-9, 211, 222 n. 45; influence of, 107 n.

53; as secy, of agriculture, 204, 220; and Stringfellow case, 244 n..44 Black, Hugo L., and Neal case, 192 Black, Parnell, feud of, with JBL, 9, 12, 14, 15, 47, 83-88 Black, Wayne L. (son of Parnell), and JBL, 141-42, 332 Blood, Henry H., JBL's charges against, not substantiated, 14-15 Boileau, Father, and Neal case, 196 Bolin, Brownie L., liquor store manager, 52 n. 37 Boulter, Ace, LDS Sunday School supt., 22 n. 31 Bowen, Albert R.: ad of, against IBL's independent race for governor, 212-13; as U of U regent, 105 n. 15 Boyden, John S., attorney and political candidate, 209, 311 Boyer, Selvoy J., tax commissioner, 105 n. 15 Braasch, Vern, murder case and execution of, 201 n. 23 Brewster, Sheldon, candidate for mayor, 295-96, 299 Brigham Street Pharmacy, illegal liquor sales at, 35 Brinkley, David, 187 Brockbank, Hughes, Barker's campaign manager, 329 Browder, Earl, Communist, 171, 172 Browne, J. Allen, fish and game official, 10 Browne, Mrs. J. Allen, 10 Buckley, William F., 206

335

INDEX Buehner, Carl, businessman, 311 Butterfield, Marvin, vice squad lieut., 283 Byrd, Harry F., 206 Cafe, Steve, arrest of, 8 Callister, E. R., Utah attorney general and Neal case, 192 Camomile, Arthur, Price bartender, 9,12 Cannon, Joseph J., and Morals and the Mayor, 24, 27 Cannon, D. James, political candidate, 239-41,307, 311-15 Carbon College (College of Eastern Utah), and JBL, 109,125,131,135 Carr, William G., exec, secy, NEA, 139 Castleton, Kenneth B., physician, fluoridation, advocated by, 304 Catmull, George, SLC commissioner, 298-99, 306 Central Utah Vocational School (Utah Technical College, Provo), 124 Chapman, Mrs. John, LDS Primary pres., 22 n. 31 Cherry, [James W.], Utah chief justice, 174 Chicago Sun-Times, 302 Chodorov, Frank, author and publisher, 178, 182 Christiansen, Joseph L., SLC commissioner, 252, 272 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints: and JBL, 24, 27-28, 33, 39; and junior colleges, 131, 132; and liquor by the drink, 33, 34, 37; and politics, 23-24, 33, 91-93, 96-104, 210, 214, 216, 220; in Price, 18; and Skousen firing, 265, 276-79 Citizens Advisory Committee on City Planning and Capital Improvements, 260,261 Citizens for Lee, 211 Civil Rights Congress, 171 Clark, J. Reuben, Jr.: demotion of,

by McKay, 101; and JBL, 33-34, 91, 92, 96, 101-2, 104; and Skousen firing, 278; as This Is the Place Monument Commission chairman, 105 n. 15 Clark, Rulon, juvenile court judge, 97 Clark, Tom C , and Neal case, 192 Clough, Donald P., health official, 318

336

Clyde, George Dewey: effect of JBL s surpluses on admin, of, 78, gubernatorial campaign of, 20720; and JBL, 251; LDS church support for, 101; and prison investigation, 267; retirement of, from office, 238-39; and schools, 142, 143 Colton, Don B., defeat of JBL by, 23 Congress of Freedom, 205 Counterattack, conservative periodical, 171-72 Cowley, Matthew, USAC trustee, 93, 105 n. 15 Creer, John Preston, SL County commissioner, 300 Croft, Bryant, judge, 29 Crowther, L. C , acting police chief, 272, 291 n. 28 Cummings, Leland, Utah Supreme Court clerk, and Neal case, 199 Daily Worker, 171, 172 Dalton, Pearl, liquor store employee, 52 n. 38 Dawson, William A.: defeat of, 232, 233; and education lobby, 142 Day, Elias, state sen., 92 Denver & Rio Grande Railroad, tax benefits to, under JBL, 71, 76 Deseret News: and economy in government, 53, 54, 68, 72, 77, 124; and education, 57,124-25,126,127, 128, 129, 143; and Eisenhower, 205; and elections involving JBL, 39, 212, 216, 217, 219, 230, 231, 232, 237, 250, 296; and JBL, 74, 179, 186-87, 253, 326; and liquor reform, 45, 47-48; and Morals and the Mayor, 27-28; and Neal case, 200; and police budget cuts, 270-71; and Skousen, 255, 26768, 273, 275-79; and Sunday closing, 99; and urban renewal, 300; and vice, 317-18 Dewey, Mrs. Thomas E., 95 Dewey, Thomas E., 38, 95 Dixie College, proposed transfer of, to LDS church, 99-100, 131, 132, 135 Doan, Kenneth M., liquor commissioner, 49, 98 Dowse, Chester, liquor enforcement officer, 8-9, 12-13 Du Bois, W. E. B., 171 Dudler, Joseph, highway patrol supt., 97

INDEX Dunn, J. Howard, Salt Palace project engineer, 307 Echo Dam, 204 Eddy, Don, journalist, 60 Education: financing of, 54-57, 72, 75, 79, 117-32; 138-43; and LDS officials, 91-92, 99-101; and teacher salaries, 118-19, 124, 125-26, 128, 131 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 180; Clyde endorsed by, 218; criticism of,

by JBL, 203-7, 210-11, 212, 217, 219, 220; JBL as running mate for, 171; and Rosenbergs, 171, 172 Eldridge, Mrs. L. R., PTA rep.

22 n. 31 Elggren, Lorenzo, state sen., and JBL's budget cuts, 69-70; liquor enforcement charges of 46^18 Ellett, Arthur, judge, and Neal case, 191, 192, 193, 195, 199 Ellis, Dexter, Deseret News political editor, and JBL's retirement, 326-27 Elks Club, law enforcement at, 279 Erickson, Ferdinand, judge, 307 Evans, Richard L., U of U regent, 105 n. 15 Evans, T. H., pastor, Price Community Church, 22 n. 31 Exner, Frederick B., physician, fluoridation opposed by, 303 Fagan, Myron, author, 205 Farley, Owen T., policeman murdered by Neal, 191, 193-96, 198, 199 Feraco, Leonard, tavern owner, 283 Fero, A. M., attorney, 259 Fillis, Dewey, police chief, 317 Floor, Steve, tavern owner, 283 Foote, Charles, SLC budget director, 273,280,281 For America, JBL's association with, 227-28, 251 The Freeman, right-wing periodical, 182 Frick, [Joseph E.], Utah Supreme Court justice, 174 Fuller, Edgar, educator, 92-93 Funk, James, Liquor Control Commission chairman, 13-14 Gardner, Erie Stanley, and Neal case, 196-97 Garn, E. J. (Jake): and JBL, 330, 333 n. 26; as SLC commissioner and mayor, 259, 321, 328.

Garner, Edith, welfare commissioner, 95 Geneva Steel, lay-offs at, 232 Geurts, Theodore I., SLC commissioner, 252, 253, 256, 272 Gibson, J. Lambert, tax commission chairman, 27 Gibson, Marl D., Carbon County politician, 8, 9, 10, 92, 110 Giles, Grover, Utah attorney general and SL County attorney, 29-30, 283 Glade, Earl J.: and education issue, 148; as JBL's opponent in 1952, 147-59; as SLC mayor, 147, 148, 149, 150, 331; and Weber College controversy, 152-53 Goldwater, Barry, 189 n. 43 Graham, Marcell, warden, 192 Grange, Mrs. Wallace, LDS rep. for MIA, 22 n. 31 Granger, Walter K., defeat of JBL for Congress by, 23 Greene, J. Thomas, pres., Utah State Bar, 323 n. 10 Greener, Glen, JBL backed, for SLC commissioner, 329, 333 n. 19 Greeson, L. R., asst. police chief, 266, 291 n. 27, 292 n. 42 Guymon, Mrs. Orson, Relief Society pres., 22 n. 31 Guymon, Orson H., school board pres., 15 Haight, Golden, SLC policeman and asst. chief, 48, 266 Hall, Fred, Kansas gov., 205 Hammond, J. W., justice of the peace, 13 Hansen, George, GOP national committeeman, 94 Hanson, Frank, Price city attorney, 15 Hanson, Stewart M., judge, 306 Harper's, 209 Harries, Robert, bribery conviction of, 35 Harrison, Conrad B., SLC commissioner, 256-57, 259, 262 n. 41, 306, 328 Harvell, Cathryn, accusations of, against JBL, 320-21 Haskins and Sells, CPA firm, 258, 260 Haslam, Byron T., health official, 318 Hatsis, Tony, associate of JBL, 280, 287

337

INDEX Haun, â&#x20AC;&#x201D; -, police sgt., 281 Higgins, R. R., "LDS Sunday School official, 22 n. 31 Hillside LDS Stake, objection of, to liquor store, 98, 106 n. 32 Hobby, Oveta Culp, HEW secy., 139 Holley, Louis, SLC auditor, 260-61 Holmgren, Homer, attorney, 97, 319 Hoover, Herbert, 94, 217 Hoover, J. Edgar, 266 Hopkins, Karl, on education committee, 110 Hoppe, Art, satirist, 184 House Un-American Activities Committee, 173 Hoyt, Will L., judge, 83 Hulsey, Billy, Neal attorney, 192 Humphrey, George, treasury secy., 183 Humphrey, Hubert, 296 Hunsaker, Earl, appointment sought for, 97 Hunt, McCown E. ( E d ) , Salt Palace board chairman, 305-6 Hyde, Gordon Taylor, and Morals and the Mayor, 24-27 Inside Detective, and Neal case, 196, 199 Internal Revenue Service, JBL's difficulties with, 177-79, 182-87 International Association of Chiefs of Police, 284 Isaacson, Thorpe B.: bias of, against teachers, 92-93, 100, 110; political influence of, as LDS official, 9 1 , 9 3 , 9 6 , 104 Jacobsen Construction Co., Salt Palace bid of, 306 James, Clifford, tavern owner, 283 Jaynes, A. H., liquor agent, 21 n. 18 Jeff's Grocery Store, 320 Jenkins, Ab, anti-Maw editorial reproduced by, 37 Jenkins, Bruce, campaign of, for SLC mayor, 247-50, 268, 275 Jenner, William, U.S. sen., 206 Jensen, Byron, tavern owner, 277, 282 Jensen, Golden, asst. police chief, 266 Jensen, Marvin G., SL County Commission chairman, 305, 306 John Birch Society: JBL's opinion of, 245 n. 76; Toronto backed by, 240 Johnson, Lawrence A., liquor com-

338

missioner, 42 Johnson, Lyndon B., 227, 298, 302 Jonas, Frank, political scientist, 232 Jones Club, liquor controversy involving, 8-9, 12-14, 25 lones, Merlyn, tavern owner, 8, 12 lones, Milton, LDS rep. for MIA, 22 n. 31 Jones, Nolan, storekeeper, 320 Jorgensen, George, LDS stake pres., 22 n. 31 Judd, Tom, anti-Maw editorial of, 36-37 KALL Radio, political poll of, 230 Karkus, Nick, tavern owner, 283 Keehn, Constance, Neal's innocence promoted by, 195-97, 199 Kelbach, Walter, murderer, 200 Keller, A. D., Price mayor, 10 Keller, Fred W., Price judge, 19, 29,30 Kennecott Copper Co.: lay-offs at, 232; tax benefits to, under JBL, 76,87 Kennedy, John F., 237, 298 Kennedy, Robert F., 2 4 1 ^ 2 Kerr, Kleon, candidate for gov., 239-40 King, David S., Utah rep., defeat of,

by Bennett, 238 Kirkham, Francis W., and Morals and the Mayor, 24, 27-28 Knowland, William F., U.S. sen., 205, 206 Korean War, effect of, on JBL's policies, 67-68, 72, 143 KSL-TV, urban renewal endorsed by, 299-300 KUED-TV, 1967 mayor's race coverage of, 313-14 Lack, Cyrus V., and illegal liquor sales, 35 Lambourne, Versa, liquor store employee, 52 n. 38 Lance, Myron, murderer, 200 Langlie, Arthur, Washington gov., 38, 178,205 Larsen, Leland G., judge, 97 Latimer, George, Utah Supreme Court justice, 84 Lauchnor, Mrs. E. J., secy.-mgr., Historical Society, 65 n. 28 Lausche, Frank, U.S. sen., 206 Lawrence David, syndicated columnist, 182, 183-84 Lee, Arthur (father), 2-3

INDEX Lee, Edwin C. (grandfather), 2 Lee, Harold B., member, Utah Civil Defense Council, 105 n. 15 Lee, Helen (daughter), 3 Lee, Ida May Leiter (mother), 2 Lee, James B. (son), 3, 94, 219 Lee, Jon (daughter), 3, 94 Lee, Joseph Bracken: and absentee officials, 49; attorneys hated by, 88, 320, 323 n. 10; Barker, feud of, with, 321-22, 329-30; Bateman, feud of, with, 109-14, 139; Black, feud of, with, 84-88; and Braasch and Sullivan murder case, 201 n.

23; business interests of, 3; candidates backed by, 328-29; Clark, relations of, with, 33-34, 9 1 , 92, 96, 101-2; and Colorado River project, 209-10; and Communists, 230; and economy in government, 41, 53-64, 67-79, 99, 248, 250, 253-58, 270-72, 295, 313; education of, 3; and eduction and educators, 54-57, 72, 99, 100-101, 109-14, 117-32, 135-44; Eisenhower criticized by, 101, 203-7, 210-11, 212, 217, 219, 220, 222 n.

41; election campaigns of, 3â&#x20AC;&#x201D;4, 5, 23-26, 33-39, 203-20, 225-42, 247-51, 295-96, 307, 311-15; family of, 2 - 3 ; federal funds, objection of, to 138-40; and fluoridation, 302-5, 308; and foreign aid, 236; and Forest Dale Golf Course controversy, 103; fraternal organizations of, 3; governorship of, 2, 41-50, 53-64, 67-79, 83-89, 91-104, 109-14, 117-32, 135-44, 159-68, 171-75, 191-200; and Governor's Mansion, 63; as independent candidate, 211-20, 225-35; and IRS, 177-79, 182-87, 228, 229; and Jones Club incident, 7-9, 12-14, 15, 25; and juvenile delinquency in Price, 15-16, 25; and law enforcement, 249,279-81, 288; LDS church, relations of, with, 22, 27, 33-34, 91-104, 210, 214; and liquor in Price, 7-9, 12-15, 19, 25; and liquor reform, 33, 42-50; McCarthy, opinion of, 204-5; and Montana sen. seat, 2 4 1 42; and Maw, 23-24, 35-38, 207; as mayor of Price, 1, 3-4, 5-9, 12-20, 24-26, 28; as mayor of SLC, 2, 2 5 2 - 6 1 ; 265-89; 295-308; 317-22; and Morals and the Mayor, 28, 29, 30, 6 1 ; and Mor-

monism, 2, 3; in national media, 58-61, 70, 73, 135-36, 182, 184, 191, 203,206, 209, 251,265; national office, mention of, for, 70-71; and Neal murder case, 191, 196-98, 200, photographs of, 10, 11, 94, 95, 180, 181, 268, 269; retirement of, 325-32; right-towork law signed by, 210; and Salt Palace, 305-8, 313; Skousen, feud of, with, 250, 255, 265-89, 313-15, 316 n. 19, 317-18, 330; and Sunday closing bill veto, 98-99, 210; and tax reduction, 5-6, 67-68, 71-72, 74-77; thirdparty interests of, 74; and Truman, 59-60, 215; urban renewal, objection of, to, 296-302, 308; and vice, 17-19, 25, 317-22; Watkins, feud of, with 204, 207-16, 218-19, 225-26, 234; and welfare, 53; and Wolfe controversy, 171-75; in WWI, 3 Lee, Margaret Draper (wife), 3, 10, 72-73, 94, 95 Lee, Nellie Pace (first wife), 3 Lee, Richard (son), 3, 94, 95 Lee, Robert E. (brother), 9, 12 Leonard, Mrs. Darrell, PTA rep., 22 n. 31 Levy, Monte, ACLU attorney and Neal case, 192 Lewis, John, associate of JBL, 280 Life, 61 Liquor Control Act, 21 n. 13 Liquor Control Commission: JBL's appointees to, 42; law enforcement under, 7-9, 12-14, 16; profits made by, 48â&#x20AC;&#x201D;49; reforms introduced by, 42-43, 44 Little Hoover, Commission, 65 n. 7 Los Angeles Times: and JBL, 64, 69; and Neal case, 195 Love, J. Leonard, LDS bishop, 97 Lunt, George H., liquor commissioner, 21 n. 18, 42 Mabey, Rendell N., gubernatorial campaign of, 207 Magnuson, Warren, U.S. sen., 227 Malmquist, O. N., Tribune political editor, and JBL, 78, 142^13 Martin, Gail, writer, 61-62 Mason, George, JBL's appointment of, voided, 83 Maw, Herbert B.: and Clyde, 207, 213; and educators, 143; as governor, 11, 15, 23-30, 62, 83;

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INDEX and LDS church, 23-24, 36-37, 91, 96, 103-4; and liquor controversy, 34-35, 38, 43; Moss's opinion of, 40 n. 11; 1948 defeat of, by JBL, 34-38; and utilities, 23,38 Mac Arthur, Douglas, 206, 265-66, 287 McCarthyism, effects of, in Utah, 171-75 McCullough, R. Verne, Neal attorney, 192 McGowan, Terry, liquor commissioner, 49 Mclntyre, William, Price patrolman, 8, 12-13 McKay, David Lawrence: Clyde supported by, 216-17; named to Fine Arts board, 105 n. 15 McKay, David O.: and Democrats, 101; dispute of, with Crowther, 291 n. 28; and Forest Dale land sale, 103; and JBL, 98, 327-28; and Maw, 23; and Skousen, 266, 278, 292 n. 45; and transfer of junior colleges to LDS church, 99-100; use of name of, for political ends, 93, 96, 300 McRae, Robert, attorney, 320 Melich, Mitchell, candidate for gov., 238-41 Merrill, Joseph F., LDS apostle, attempts of, to influence politics, 96, 100-101; and JBL's stand on liquor, 33-34 Metropolitan Hall of Justice, 306 Meyer, Daniel H., JBL's 1962 campaign manager, 237 Miller, Gary, Jaycees pres., 317 Mills, Wilber, 186 Milwaukee Journal, 182 Moley, Raymond, journalist, 64 Morals and the Mayor, 24-30, 61 Morgan, E. H., asst. police chief, 291 n. 27 Mormons: frugality of, aided JBL, 75-76; liquor purchased by, 106 n. 29; pride of, in Benson, 220; reaction of, to Skousen firing, 265.

See also Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints Morris, Joe, writer, 59-60 Moss, Frank E.: election of, to Senate, 225-33, 234; and JBL's tax protest, 189 n. 32; Maw criticized by, 40 n. 11; as SL County attorney, 267 Moss, John, California rep., 227, 229

340

Mountain Dell Golf Course, JBL against completion of, 255 Mountain View Ward, 106 n. 32 Mount Pleasant Pyramid, anti-Maw editorial in, 36-37 Moyle, Henry D., LDS apostle, attempts of, to influence politics, 96, 97, 100; editorial killed by, 276, 278, 293 n. 46, n. 48; traffic ticket of, 279 Mulcahy, P. H., finance commissioner, 58, 111 Murdock, Abe, U.S. sen., 226 Murdock, Franklin J., LDS travel agent, 97 Muskie, Edmund, 229 Musser, Burton, attorney, 13 The Naked Communist, treatise by Skousen, 270, 284-85 National Conferences on American Policy in China and the Far East, 171 National Council of Arts, Sciences, and Professions, 171 National Review, 206 Neal, Don Jesse, murder case and execution of, 191-200 Nelson, Frederick, journalist, 296 Nemelka, Joseph N., candidate for mayor, 312 New Leader, 61 Newsweek, 39 New York Times, 251, 300-301 Nixon, Richard M., 213, 231 North Davis LDS Stake, 106 n. 32 O'Connor, W. J., on education committee, 110 Ogden Standard-Examiner, 326 Oliver, Fred M., CPA, 258, 259 Olpin, A. Ray, U of U pres., and budget problems with JBL, 55, 56-57, 101, 143 Pace, Clint, director, White House Conference on Education, 215 Pace, J. W., liquor commissioner, 42-44, 47, 48, 49-50 Pappas, George, arrest of, 8 Parker, C. H., LDS stake pres., 106 n. 32 Paulos, Pete, tavern owner, 283 Paxton, Mark, Utah Senate pres., 128 Peterson, Blaine, attorney and Weber County Democratic chairman, 46,55

INDEX Peterson, Henry, asst. attorney general, 189 n. 43 Peterson, Orlando A., liquor commissioner, 42 Pettit, John, LDS patriarch, 22 n. 31 Philadelphia Bulletin, 296 Phillips, Jennings: and Benson, 221 n. 29; election of, to SLC Comsion, 328; as JBL's campaign manager, 107 n. 44, 210-11, 218,226 Phillips, Orie L., Denver judge, and Neal case, 192, 193-95, 196 Piercey, J. Knowles, SLC commissioner, 252, 253, 256, 272, 275 Pingree, J. Fred, finance commissioner, 83 Police Mutual Aid Magazine, 287 Poulsen, Owen C , asst. police chief, 291 n. 27 Price Chamber of Commerce, 13,251 Price, Utah: charges of corruption in, 32 n. 28; Morals and the Mayor objected to by citizens of, 26-27; municipal affairs of, under JBL, 5-9, 12-20; vice and liquor problems in, 7-9, 12-19 Priest, Ivy Baker, U.S. treasurer, 204 Prostitution: in Price, 17-19, 22 n.

41; in SLC, 317-22 Rampton, Calvin L.: admin, of, 50, 79; as asst. attorney general, 16-17; and education, 142, 143; election of, 238; JBL feted by, 327; and LDS church, 107 n. 53 Rawlings, Calvin W., attorney, 86, 209 Robert E. McKee Co., Salt Palace contractor, 307 Robinson, David, Deseret News editorial writer, 27-28 Romney, David B., symphony director, 60 Romney, George, and Wolfe controversy, 172 Romney, L. C : gubernatorial campaign of, 209, 212, 213, 215, 217, 219; as SLC commissioner, 252, 256, 260, 272 Romney, Vernon, state GOP chairman and attorney general, 36, 323 n. 10 Roosevelt, Eleanor, and Neal case, 196-97 Rosenberg, Julius and Ethel, 171,172

Rowley, George, Price judge, 15, 16 Royal, Paul F., public relations officer for SLC, 253 Richards, LeGrand, LDS apostle and USAC trustee, 93-94 Richards, Stephen L., LDS apostle, 23, 101 Ritter, Willis W.: and JBL's IRS problems, 186; and Neal case, 191, 192-93 Reeves, G. J., Carbon County school supt., 15 Reeves, Mrs. C. Jâ&#x20AC;&#x17E; pres., Ladies Aid, 22 n. 31 Salinger, Pierre, 242 Salmon, Parley, liquor enforcement official, 9 Salt Lake Bees, baseball club, 260 Salt Lake City: capital improvements for, 248, 261, 295, 313; finances of, 256-61, 295; form of government of, 247, 250, 258; police force of, 266, 270-72; and Salt Palace, 305-8; and vice, 317-22; and urban renewal, 296-302 Salt Lake City Board of Education, 140 Salt Lake City School District, 130 Salt Lake Ministerial Association, 98 Salt Lake Telegram, and JBL's economy program, 56, 64, 68, 69, 70 Salt Lake Tribune: and economy in government, 54, 56, 68, 70, 72; and education, 57, 126, 127, 129, 137, 142-43; and Eisenhower, 205; and golf courses, 255; and JBL's independent race for gov., 212, 213, 214; and JBL's retirement, 326; and liquor reform, 42, 45-46, 49; poll of, on JBL, 328; and SLC finances, 257-58, 261, 295; and Skousen firing, 274, 275; and urban renewal, 297, 299 Saturday Evening Post, 59-60 Schindler, Harold, reporter, and Skousen controversy, 267-74 Seegmiller, William, liquor commissioner, 44, 49 Sharon LDS Stake, 106 n. 32 Simmons, Roy W.: as bank commissioner, 44; as liquor commissioner, 42-44, 47, 49, 50 Simpson, Harold, JBL's press secy., 61-62, 96 Skousen, W. Cleon: access to JBL limited by, 285-86; firing of, 249,

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INDEX 255, 265, 268, 272-79, 317-18; and JBL's Price record, 29; JBL's character analyzed by, 287, 288, 292 n. 42; and law enforcement, 279-81, 288; libel claim of, 316 n. 19; and mayor's race, 313-15; and police budget and manpower, 270-72, 290 n. 16, n. 17, 291 n.

20; police morale under, 249, 276, 287; and polygraph tests, 285, 288; record of, as chief, 250, 266-71, 275, 276-77, 290 n. 8; and tavern owners, 281-84, 288; writings and speeches of, 270, 284-85 Smart, William B.: and Skousen editorial in Deseret News, 293 n.

48; and state building needs, 143 Smathers, George, U.S. sen., 227, 230 Smith Act, 171 Smith, J. McKinnon, objection of, to urban renewal, 299-300 Snow College, proposed transfer of, to LDS church, 99-100, 131, 132, 135 Sonne, Alma, USAC trustee, 105 n. 15 Southern Utah State College, budget of, 124 Southworth, T. W., and tavern owners self-policing program, 282, 283, 293 n. 64 Spence, Marion, tavern owner, 283 Spies, John, health commissioner, 66 n. 28 Sweetring, S. J., Price judge, 28 Stapley, Delbert, LDS apostle, attempts of, to influence politics, 96,97 Stevenson, Adlai, 219 Stewart, Adiel F., SLC mayor, 247, 249, 266-67, 285, 331 Strike, Nicholas, gubernatorial candidate, 107 n. 53 Stringfellow, Douglas, dropping of, from GOP ticket for lying, 244 n. 44 Sullivan, Melvin, murder case and execution of, 201 n. 23 Taft, Robert A., U.S. sen., 71, 139 Talmadge, Herman, Georgia gov., 145 n. 12 Tanner, N. Eldon, LDS general authority, influence of, 107 n. 53 Tavern Owners' Association, 281-84 Taylor, Milton B., finance commissioner, 83-84

342

Teuscher, DeMar, Deseret News political editor, and JBL, 77-78, 143; and 1958 Senate race, 22829, 230-31, 232-33; and 1962 Senate race, 236-37 Thomas, Elbert D., U.S. sen., 100 Thomas, George, U of U pres., 101 Thurmond, Strom, U.S. sen., 206 Time: and JBL, 58-59, 135-36, 203, 265, 266; and Skousen libel suit, 316 n. 19 Topham, Lawrence R., candidate for mayor, 312 Toronto, Lamont, candidate for gov., 238-41 Truman, Harry S, 38, 215, 229, 265-66, 287, 289 Tully, Wilma, Neal's companion, 191, 193, 194, 195, 196, 199 Udall, Stewart, Moss supported by, 227 Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act, history and effect of, on SLC budgeting, 258-61, 295 Union Pacific Railroad, lay-offs by, 232 U.S. News and World Report, 251 University of Utah: activities center for, 305; budget of, 55-57, 72, 124; building at, 123; criticism of, 101; poll taken by, 230 Upper Colorado River Storage Project, 204, 205, 208-10, 218, 219, 225, 228, 232, 233, 234 Urban renewal, controversy over, in SLC, 296-302 Utah Council of Churches, and Sunday closing bill, 98 Utah Educational Review, 119-20 Utah Education Association: and financial needs of education, 118-19, 123, 124, 215; JBL's criticism of, 241 Utah Dental Association, and fluoridation, 302 Utah Foundation: address of JBL to, 70; report of, on liquor, 45-46 Utah State Agricultural College (Utah State University): budget of, 56, 57, 121, 124, 125; building at, 123; LDS officials on board of, 91,93,96 Utah State Board of Education, budget of, 124 Utah State Historical Society, 65 n. 28

INDEX Utah State Medical Association, fluoridation endorsed by, 303 Utah Municipal League, and Fiscal Procedures Act, 258-59 Utah State Prison, narcotics investigation at, 267 Utah State Senate, Wolfe cleared of Communist charges by, 173-74 Utah Symphony Orchestra, appropriation for, vetoed by Lee, 55 Valentine, Dan, Salt Lake Tribune columnist, 327 Vance, Herbert, road commission chairman, 216 Ventura, Anthony, tavern owner, 283 Vernon, Clinton, Utah attorney general, 46, 63, 136 Vest, H. Grant, and school survey, 125 Wade, Lester, Utah Supreme Court justice, 181 Wade, Mac, Weber County sheriff, 46 Wallace, George, JBL as running mate for, 311-12 Wallace, Rawlings, and Black, law firm, 86 Warren, Earl, U.S. chief justice, and Neal case, 192 Washington Post, 74, 182 Watkins, Arthur V.: Clyde supported by, 225; feud of, with JBL, 204, 208-16, 218-19; Senate race of, against JBL, 225-35; and Stringfellow case, 244 n. 44; and Upper Colorado River Project, 232, 233 Watson, Edward, state sen. and JBL's budget cuts, 69-70

Weber Junior College (Weber State College): bill affecting, vetoed by JBL, 55; building at, 123; transfer of, to LDS church proposed, 99-100, 131, 132, 135 West, Allan M., exec, secy., UEA, and teacher salaries, 118-19, 136 Widtsoe, John A., member, Utah Water and Power Board, 105 n. 15 Wilcox, Floyd, JBL's fiscal policies analyzed by, 76-77 Wilkinson, Ernest L., BYU pres., 125 Wilkinson, Harry, tavern owner, 283 Wilkinson, O. J., civil service commissioner, 105 n. 15 Williams, D. E., Carbon County , school official, 16 Williams, J. D., political scientist, 315 Williams, Richard L., writer, 61 Wilson, Dave, GOP state chairman, 95 Wilson, Melvin, on education committee, 110 Wilson, Melvin C , principal, Carbon High School, 22 n. 31 Wirthlin, Joseph L., LDS presiding bishop, attempts of, to influence politics, 96-97; speech of JBL praised by, 100 Wise, Roland V., IRS director for Utah, 183-84, 186 Wolfe, James H., Utah chief justice, Communist witch hunt involving, 171-75 Young, Brigham, advice of, to voters, 213-14 Young, Levi Edgar, Historical Society board member, 105 n. 15

343