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Ute Indians along Civil War Communication Lines
Utah Historical Quarterly
Vol. 46, 1978, No. 3
Ute Indians along Civil War Communication Lines
BY S. LYMAN TYLER
ALTHOUGH IT IS KNOWN THAT Ute Indians occupied the mountain areas of what is now Colorado, as well as northern New Mexico, and hunted buffalo on the plains further east, one has to be reminded periodically that they are not just Utah Indians.
As late as the 1850s the Colorado Utes continued to be relatively free to move throughout their mountain domain and on into western Colorado and eastern Utah. The Rocky Mountains had formed a barrier to the westward flowing stream of immigrants who tended to follow the trail further north through South Pass or further south to Santa Fe and beyond.
The discovery of gold in the Pikes Peak region in 1858 and the rush to the Rockies in 1859 had changed this pattern, and soon miners were scaring away the game in San Luis Valley, and the Tabeguache Utes who had been assigned to the Conejos agency were going hungry. Food that had been sent to them was reported to have arrived spoiled. Eight hundred acres had been placed under cultivation by 1862, but only small patches of corn and vegetables were grown.
Tabeguache chiefs visited Fort Garland near their agency to seek relief, and they were given a small amount of lead and powder for hunting. The inadequacy of the food supply eventually led to trouble a considerable distance away along the route of the Overland Stage Company north of the Colorado border, for a number of the Utes went to Fort Halleck, Wyoming, to beg for food.
The spread of settlements in Utah, with the resulting disappearance of game animals and lack of food there, had brought on the Black Hawk War. The starving Utes were raiding settlements in search of food. On December 3, 1860, President James Buchanan had reported to Congress, "Utah is now comparatively peaceful and quiet, and the military force has been withdrawn, except that portion of it necessary to keep the Indians in check and to protect the emigrant trains on their way to our Pacific possessions."
In July 1861 conditions relating to the Civil War caused army headquarters to pull the last troops from Utah, those located at Camp Floyd— renamed Fort Crittenden—and to reassign them to more active service on the war fronts. Until 1861 the eastern boundary of Utah Territory was the crest of the Rocky Mountains and included much of the homelands of the Utes in what was to become Colorado in addition to their territory in Utah. Colorado officials knew that the pattern of unrest among the Utes in Utah might well spread to Ute bands in Colorado.
Encounters along the Overland Stage Company line reputedly involved Ute Indians of the White River band from northwestern Colorado, the Tabeguache band with an agency on the Conejos River in south central Colorado, the Uintah band from northeastern Utah, the Bannock and Shoshone from southeastern Idaho, and the Gosiute Shoshone in northwestern Utah and Nevada.
In April 1862 President Lincoln requested that Brigham Young, although he was no longer territorial governor, raise a company of 100 men for ninety days service to protect the stage route and telegraph lines from possible Indian depredations in the vicinity of Independence Rock, Wyoming. In the effort to tie East and West together, and thus solidify the Union cause, these communication lines were important to the war effort.
On December 1, 1862, Lincoln reported to the Congress: "The Indian tribes upon our frontiers have during the past year manifested a spirit of insubordination, and at several points have engaged in open hostilities against the white settlements in their vicinity." The use of the Utah volunteers had been only a temporary expedient, however; and by order of the War Department Gen. George Wright, commander of the Department of the Pacific, was soon called upon to give more permanent protection to the mail route. Col. Patrick Edward Connor, in command of a force of California volunteers, arrived in Utah during the fall of 1862.
Students of Utah history are sometimes led to believe that a strong reason for the presence of Colonel Connor in the territory during the Civil War was to keep an eye on the Mormons. Actually, the reason given by his superiors was to furnish protection to the mail and stage route that was the chief link between East and West.
After the establishment of a base of operations at Camp Douglas in January 1863 Colonel Connor led a unit of his men against a force of Shoshone Indians at the Battle of Bear River. The success of this campaign brought him a commission as brigadier general and his men a commendation from the War Department.
In the spring and summer of 1863 the Gosiute Shoshone attacked the stations and stagecoaches at and in the general vicinity of Eight Mile Station and Deep Creek in northwestern Utah. Drivers and other employees were killed.
In July 1863 Gov. James Duane Doty of Utah and General Connor made a treaty with the Indians at Fort Bridger. As usual, trade goods were distributed, and the tribes agreed to discontinue their depredations along the stage and telegraph routes.
In the meantime, the Ute Indians continued to keep the interest of the troops alive by intermittent disturbances in the vicinity of Fort Halleck, located west of the Medicine Bow River at the north base of Elk Mountain in Wyoming. (Actually, this did not become Wyoming territory until 1868.)
Another attack occurred on the station at Pass Creek, Wyoming; horses were reported stolen from Cooper Creek Station, Wyoming; food and clothing were stolen from Medicine Bow Station, Wyoming; and some 250 head of horses were taken in a raid within fifteen miles of Fort Laramie.
To put a halt to these depredations charged against Ute Indians, on July 7, 1863, Capt. Asaph Allen of the Ninth Kansas Cavalry sent Lt. Henry Brandley and Lt. Hugh W. Williams with his entire command, except three men who remained at Fort Halleck, in pursuit of the Utes. The soldiers overtook the Indians at a mountain pass about thirty miles from the post shortly after sunrise:
Solid lines represent communication routes.
Of Captain Allen's command, one was killed and six others wounded. In order to protect the post, all emigrants had been stopped and armed to stand guard against 600 to 1,000 Utes reported to be somewhere between Fort Halleck and the Middle Park in Colorado.
On June 30, 1863, Maj. Edward W. Wynkoop of the First Colorado Cavalry had been ordered, with four companies, "to proceed west, on the Overland Stage Route, as far as Fort Bridger, and chastise any Indians who may have committed depredations on either ranches or emigrants." There he was to join General Connor. Major Wynkoop was told to "cooperate with him in any way that may be for the good of the service and the safety of settlers and travelers on the overland line, and especially for the security of the mail line to and from the Pacific States."
Letters exchanged by the officers and representatives of the stage lines involved in these encounters help to supply some of the flavor of the period:
D. Johns, Esq., Division Agent:
FORT HALLECK, July 7, 1863.
Dear Sir: I regret to inform you that night before last the Indians stole all the horses at Cooper Creek, but did not take any mules. I notify you of this for fear that Mr. Taylor, the station keeper, may not do it. 1 suggest that you bring several bell horses with you, as you know how difficult it is to keep the mules without a bell horse.
Day before yesterday afternoon the Indians visited Medicine Bow Station, and took all the provisions that they had at the station, then stripped Hazard and Nicholls of their shirts and cravats, &c, and left without taking any animals. Captain [A.] Allen sent out 75 men in pursuit of the Indians, who overtook them 18 miles from here, where a battle is now going on. How it will terminate I cannot say; 3 wounded men have been brought in; one will die.
We will try and keep the coaches running until you come up with the stock, though the drivers and stocktenders complain a good deal. I forgot to say that the Ute Indians have with them some 250 head of horses, stolen within 18 miles of Fort Laramie. They stole 211 from old man Richard (called Reshaw).
Yours, truly, J. H. JONES, Agent
The reason Jones made such a point of the need for "several bell horses" was clarified in another letter. The Indians had "shot the bell mare three times" and "you know how difficult it is to keep the mules without a bell horse."
Dispatches were sent to Major Wynkoop ordering him to take steps to intercept and "chastise the guilty party." Of special interest are the instructions "not to get into trouble with any party of Indians who are peacefully disposed" and the presence of other Indian tribes that are enemies of the Utes.
HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF COLORADODenver, Colo., July 10, 1863
Maj. E. W. Wynkoop, Comdg. Indian Expedition on Overland Stage Route, Colorado:
Sir: Information has incidentally been received at these headquarters that Indians have recently been depredating on the overland line, this side of Fort Halleck, and the colonel commanding directs that Maj. [E.W.] Wynkoop, with the forces comprising the Indian expedition, go into camp at Collins, or west of there, and that a sufficient force be sent to chastise the guilty party. Great caution should be observed not to get into trouble with any party of Indians who are peacefully disposed. Major Wynkoop will be careful to make timely requisition for the wants of the command.
I am, with much respect, your obedient servant.
S. S. SOULE, First Lieutenant and Assistant Adjutant-General
[Inclosure]
HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF COLORADO, Denver, Colo., July 11, 1863
Maj. E. W. Wynkoop, Comdg. Indian Expedition on Overland Stage Line, Colorado:
Major: It has incidentally come to the knowledge of the colonel commanding that "Friday" and a large number of Cheyenne and Arapaho braves are at Camp Collins, on the war-path against the Utes, or that they intend to follow your command for the purpose of plunder. This you will not allow, nor on any account whatever will they be permitted to go into the mountains while your command is in pursuit of the Utes. You had better leave one company at Camp Collins, and take the other four in pursuit of the Utes. A company will be sent to the Middle Park, who will look out for the Utes there, if they move in that direction.I am, with much respect, your obedient servant,
S. S. SOULE, First Lieutenant and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General
To keep his superiors informed of the way the campaign was proceeding against the Indians, Colonel Chivington sent the following report to Headquarters, Department of the Missouri:
HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT OF COLORADO, Denver, Colo., August 7, 1863.
Assistant Adjutant-General, Department of the Missouri:
Sir: I have the honor herewith to send the official report of Captain Allen, commanding Fort Halleck, of the recent skirmish with the Ute Indians near that post. On the receipt of a similar unofficial report from Captain Allen (and before I had received notice that the troops in that part of Idaho Territory were attached to this district), I ordered Maj. E. W. Wynkoop, First Colorado Cavalry, to proceed, with four companies of cavalry, to that country and recover, if possible, the stock they stole from the Overland Stage Company and others, and to chastise them if they refused to give them up. Major Wynkoop, with his command, proceeded, with forage and subsistence train, to a point about 100 miles southwest of Fort Halleck. I started on the 17th, and overtook the command on the 24th of July, and on the 27th saw them packed with 56 mules and fifteen days' rations, taking 150 men, with instructions to penetrate the country to the headwaters of Bear, White, and Snake Rivers, and deeming the state of affairs on the Arkansas River and other points in the district such as to require my attention, I returned to this place. Will in due time give a full report of the expedition.
I am, with much respect, your obedient servant,
J. M. CHIVINGTON, Colonel First Colorado Cavalry, Commanding District
A few days later as Major Wynkoop and his command proceeded along the route from Camp Collins to Fort Bridger, while in the vicinity of Virginia Dale Station, they received orders to return to headquarters. General Connor was no longer in need of their services since he had concluded a satisfactory treaty, as mentioned above, with the hostile Indians.
As Major Wynkoop began his return journey, however, he received further word that the Ute Indians had again attacked Fort Halleck, and was ordered to proceed against them with his command "for the purpose of hunting down and punishing the afore-mentioned Indians." He was told to use his own discretion in determining how he should proceed to carry out his orders. This is Major Wynkoop's official report:
Immediately proceeded by forced marches to Fort Halleck, and having ascertained the direction that the Indians had taken from that point I proceeded thirty miles north of Fort Halleck on the Overland Mail Route. Then diverging I struck in a southerly direction and after proceeding over a country by which I was guided alone by the compass for the distance of eighty miles I found myself at the North Western entrance of the North Park [Colorado].
Here having ascertained through scouting parties the direction that the Indian trail had taken I established a camp. Leaving the wagons and taking a force of one hundred and sixty picked men and fifty pack animals I struck clown through the North Park. I started with fifteen days ration but in consequence of having animals who had never before been packed and who became unmanageable our rations through wastage was reduced to about ten days.
We found while traversing the North Park game in abundance consisting of Antelope, Bear, Elk, Deer and Grouse while the rivers were alive with fish. After a two-days march we left the Park at the Southwestern extremity crossing a Range and coming into a valley called by my guides the Old Park.
Here we found the well defined trail the Utes had taken in their retreat and I took it for the purpose of following the same wherever it might lead, and with the hope of coming upon their permanent village.
The only evidence after leaving the North Park that a white man's foot had ever pressed the ground we were marching over was the fact that we crossed the trail made by Sir George Gore, the English Baronet in 1854, under the guidance of Bridger; that fact being established by the names of himself and party rudely carved on trees bearing the date of 1854.
Having taken up the trail of the Indians I followed it by rapid marches for the distance of about eighty miles in a westerly direction passing the waters of the Grand. From that point the trail struck directly south.
I continued to follow the trail until the locality became a matter of doubt and our rations were almost exhausted, the animals worn out, and our only safety consisted in reaching in the course of a short time some point of civilization. At our last Camp before turning back, which was presumed to be on Eagle River, the trail turned again to the west, and although a false report came to me from the scouts I had in advance that the Indians were within a days march (the incorrectness of which I soon ascertained), I had ample evidence that the trail was no fresher than when we first struck it.
I started to return in a North Easterly direction eventually striking Georgia Gulch which is situated west of the South Park and of the Snowy Range. Our last Camp previous to the return march was one hundred and fifty miles South West of Georgia Gulch.
We had traveled during our march through portions of the territories of Colorado, Nebraska, Idaho, Utah, and found ourselves on the confines of New Mexico.
It was later learned that the Ute Indians being pursued by Major Wynkoop were of the Tabeguache band. Their agency was far away on the Conejos River, and their agent was Maj. Lafayette Head, to whom they reported the details of their pursuit by the military. The Indians claimed that the horses were taken from the Sioux Indians, with whom they were at war, and that it was the Sioux who had stolen them in the first instance. The Utes explained to their agent that from their point of view the government forces should not have interfered in what they considered to be their right to engage in a raid on an enemy.
The encounters referred to above were reduced to the following terse statement from the Colorado Superintendency of the Bureau of Indian Affairs which appeared in the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs:
COLORADO SUPERINTENDENCY October 14, 1863.
In the latter part of June a party of prospectors in the Middle park were robbed of their horses and provisions by some Utah Indians, who warned them to leave the country. A number of other parties west of the Snowy ridge were also warned to leave the country by parties of this tribe.
Major Whitely, United States Indian agent for the Uintah and Grand river bands of Utah Indians, was directed to meet them if possible, and started with his interpreter for the purpose of a friendly council. But the Indians had left before his arrival at the place selected in the Middle park for the location of his agency.
About the first of July a party of Utah Indians, supposed to be the same as those referred to as having committed depredations in the Middle park, were reported to have stolen a lot of horses from a citizen near Fort Halleck, and to have stolen stock, and committed other depredations on the property of the overland stage line in that neighborhood. A party of soldiers went in pursuit, from Fort Halleck, and coming upon the Indians with the stolen horses, demanded that they should be given up; this the Indians refused to do, claiming them as legitimate booty from the Sioux Indians, when a battle ensued, in which the soldiers were repulsed, with the loss of one killed, and four [elsewhere reported six] wounded, and the Indians made their escape with their stolen property.
An expedition of stronger force was immediately sent out by the district commander, under Major Wynkoop, to overtake and chastise the Indians, but they made such rapid flight over their rugged mountain trail that he was obliged, after a hard campaign, to give up the pursuit. These Indians were subsequently found to be a party of the Tabeguache band of Utah Indians, belonging to the agency of Major Lafayette Head, of the Conejos agency, to whom they reported the facts, but claimed that the horses were taken from the Sioux Indians, with whom they were at war, and complained bitterly of the interference of the soldiers.
They set about making a combination with other bands of Utah Indians for the purpose of going to war with the whites; this plan was opportunely counteracted by the urgent protestations of the chiefs and headmen who had but recently returned from their visit to Washington, who told their brethren that the government had enough soldiers to surround their whole immense mountain country, and closing in upon them, to wipe them from the face of the earth.
The timely action of the department in causing these hitherto uninformed Indians to become conversant with the power of the government, by their deputation to Washington last spring, has had much influence in arresting one of the most troublesome and expensive Indian wars in which we could be engaged.
The announcement to them at this time of the appointment of a commission to hold a treaty council with them doubtless had much to do also in averting the dangers of a war. . . .
Thus, the general activities of Indians and representatives of the United States in this broad region were placed in a somewhat different perspective than that given by the armed forces, which had actually failed to successfully engage the Utes.
Difficulties had existed between the Tabeguache Utes and settlers of the region for some time that now threatened to break out into an Indian war, and in October 1863 a conference was held which included Superintendent Michael Steck from New Mexico, Simeon Whitely from the agency to be created in western Colorado, Lafayette Head from the Conejos Agency, Gov. John Evans of Colorado, and John Nicolay, President Lincoln's secretary from Washington, to try to settle the differences.
As the power of the Colorado and California volunteers assigned to protect the stage route against the Indians in the mountain-based area was asserted, it became apparent that Indian forces could not meet these units in any real show of force. Peace with the Utes, with some intermittent outbreaks, was established as a result and continued through the Civil War period.
Although the Tabeguache and other Ute bands in their treaty negotiations eventually lost control of millions of acres of lands they had formerly held, their sagacity is indicated by their assertion during the preliminary negotiations referred to that the power of the president of the United States "must be as potent to control and restrain his white as his red children; and while it was their duty to acknowledge obedience, it was also their right to claim protection."
That the presidents of the United States through their representatives consistently refused to restrain the rapacity of the non-Indians in their greed for Indian possessions is a matter of record and is at the base of many of the difficulties in relations with the Indians from the time the treaties were negotiated until today.
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