Open Hand and Mailed Fist: Mormon-Indian Relations in Utah 1847-52

Utah Historical Quarterly

Vol. 46, 1978, No. 3

Open Hand and Mailed Fist: y\l< wmon-lndian Relations in Utah, 1847-52

BY HOWARD A. CHRISTY

WHEN HISTORIANS DISCUSS MORMON policy toward the Indians they usually mention attitudes of fairness, benevolence, and conciliation exemplified in the phrase coined by Brigham Young: "It is cheaper to feed them than fight them." Virtually all the prominent Utah scholars have pointed out such a policy, emphasizing or at least implying its essentially beneficent nature. A typical treatment is that of Juanita Brooks who wrote: "When the natives gathered around to watch the new-comers . . . they were treated with kindness and tolerance. Brigham Young early made the pronouncement that became a basic Mormon tenet, It is cheaper to feed the Indians than fight them.'"

Though the existence of this policy is not questioned, the interpretation of its essential beneficence flies in the face of evidence that is, at the least, ambiguous. Hostility and bloodshed, as much as benevolence and conciliation, characterized Mormon-Indian relations in Utah before 1852. The policy actually carried out, though couched in terms of beneficence, had as one of its major elements, in addition to assistance, stern punishment when deemed appropriate or necessary. The best evidence indicates that Brigham Young's first mention of his now famous statement was in July 1851 following a number of punitive campaigns carried out between March 1849 and June 1851. By then, experience had demonstrated that it was indeed cheaper to feed the Indians than fight them.

I

Though the Mormons did not arrive in Utah until July 1847, they established their initial policy toward the Indians before the first group left their Winter Quarters in Nebraska and Iowa. It was a practical policy centered on two aspects: separation and fairness. Brigham Young established the basic approach as early as 1846 when he presented his position to the high council at a special meeting. He remarked that it was his impression that the committee should not enter into any specific agreement with the Indians but endeavor to create a friendly feeling and have a meeting at a future time: "We should not invite the Indians to our camp," said the president on August 15, "we can go and see them." Young continued:

We want the privilege of staying on their land this winter, cutting timber, building houses, perhaps leaving some families and crops; suggest that we might do them good, repairing their guns, and learning them how, and teaching their children and if they want pay for occupancy of their lands, we will pay them.

There were many contacts with Indians in the vicinity of Winter Quarters. Though friendship generally prevailed, Indians stole a considerable number of horses and cattle. Each loss was considered serious, as the Mormons were in a desperate condition following their premature expulsion from Illinois. Horses and oxen were essential for the westward trek. Yet, the prophet strongly counseled against killing Indians for theft. Young's clerks reported in his manuscript history that in March 1847 just before heading west he

told the Council that if any of the brethren shot an Omaha Indian for stealing, they must deliver the murderer to Old Elk to be dealt with, as the Indians shall decide, as that was the only way to save the lives of the women and children.

I felt that it was wrong to indulge in feelings of hostility and bloodshed toward the Indians, the descendents of Israel, who might kill a cow, an ox or even a horse; to them the deer, the buffalo, the cherry and plum tree, or strawberry bed were free. It was their mode of living to kill and eat. If the Omahas would persist in robbing and stealing, after being warned not to do so, whip them. I realize there were men among us who would steal, who knew better, whose traditions and earliest teachings were all against it. Yet such would find fellowship with those who would shoot an Indian for stealing.

Mormon leaders obtained valuable information regarding the Ute Indians at Fort Bridger three weeks before the advance party of settlers reached the Great Basin. James Bridger warned the party that "the Utah tribe of Indians [centered in Utah Valley] are a bad people; if they catch a man alone they are sure to rob and abuse him, if they don't kill him.'" Young's concern was described in a letter written by Willard Richards and George A. Smith, both Mormon leaders. Young "felt inclined for the present not to crowd the Utes until we have a better chance to get acquainted with them. . . . The Utes may feel a little tenacious about their choice lands on the Utah Lake, and [we] had better keep further north towards Salt Lake. . . ."

Within a few days of the Mormons' arrival in the Great Basin, small groups of Shoshonis and Utes came to trade horses for guns. The situation soon became complicated when the Shoshonis claimed that the Utes were trading on Shoshoni land and interfering with their rights. They also desired to sell land to the Mormons for ammunition. Concerned that trouble might ensue, Heber C. Kimball, speaking for Brigham Young who was ill, responded the next day by establishing a strict policy of separation. He exhorted the Mormons to build their houses together in the form of a stockade and to cease trading their guns and ammunition. Kimball then established a far-reaching policy regarding land ownership. Rather than contracting with the Indians for purchase of land, or paying for the use of the land—policy proposed by Brigham Young in 1846 in Iowa—Kimball declared that the Indians did not own the land in the first place.

He discouraged the idea of paying the Indians for the lands, for if the Shoshonis should be thus considered, the Utes and other tribes would claim pay also. "The land belongs to our Father in Heaven, and we calculate to plow and plant it; and no man shall have the power to sell his inheritance for he cannot remove it; it belongs to the Lord.

The Indian position, as if in response to the above, was reported three weeks later at a special conference. They claimed "all the land was their own" and that they "were in the habit of taking a share of the grain for their use of the land." There is no indication that such a proposition was ever seriously considered in Utah.

On August 26, 1847, Young and most of the church leadership left the Great Basin to return to Winter Quarters for the purpose of bringing more settlers west the following season. They left to those remaining an epistle that in part reiterated the policy of strict separation and added, "if you wish to trade with them, go to their camp and deal with them honestly."

The remainder of 1847 and most of 1848 was a period of generally peaceful relations with the Indians, though in March 1848 a forty-five man posse was sent in pursuit of Indians "about Utah Lake" who had stolen seventeen cattle and one horse. Contact was made east of LItah Lake but no fighting broke out. The Indian chief whipped the "two principal thieves" and "all promised to do better." The high council at Great Salt Lake City reported that the marshal of the posse "was sent out with discretionary power and plenty of force," an indication that the Mormon settlers were stiffening in their attitude toward the stealing of stock and that further such "depredations" might be dealt with harshly.

During the remainder of 1848 survival was the Mormons' primary concern, and the new settlers expended most of their energies on bringing in a food crop for the expanding settlement as soon as possible. Exploring parties scouted adjacent areas, but the settlement remained confined to greater Salt Lake Valley. Still, the local Indians, especially the Utes, were confused and angered by this attempt at a permanent white settlement in their domain. Hostile action was restrained, however, possibly due to the location of the settlement in the buffer zone between the Shoshonis and Utes.

By early 1849, however, relations between the Mormons and the Utes had begun to deteriorate. Responding to reports of many horses being stolen and cattle being killed by renegades, Brigham Young dispatched a company of militia, under Col. John Scott, with orders (according to Hosea Stout's account) "to take such measures as would put a final end to their depredations in future." Scott, with his detachment of thirty-five men, entered Utah Valley on March 3 and was informed of the location of the renegade band by a local Ute Indian named Little Chief. The detachment then proceeded to surround the band and, on March 5, laid siege. The Indians answered a challenge to surrender with a shower of arrows and a two-hour battle ensued. All four warriors were killed, but there were no militia casualties. Scott's detachment returned to Great Salt Lake Valley the next day, followed by the "squaws and children of the slain." The action, carried out with determination and dispatch, was apparently in contravention of Brigham Young's previously proposed policy that Indians would not, or should not, be killed for stealing.

Though the militia killed all the men of the renegade band, they failed to "put a final end to . . . depredations in future." In fact, their actions may have had an opposite effect. Even the Indians who had recommended that the renegades be killed and who had led the militia to the renegade camp bemoaned the ruthlessness with which the action was carried out. Little Chief "howled, cried, . . . screamed and smote his breast in the greatest agony" and "blamed and cursed the whites, and said it would not be good medicine for two or three to come there alone as they had done before."

Just five days later the Mormon leadership voted to send out a small colony to settle in the midst of the Utes in Utah Valley. The settlers, led by John S. Higbee and numbering about 150 persons, set out on March 18. They were stopped en route by the Ute Indians. As no effort had been made to treat with the Indians before the colony was dispatched, the Indians demanded to know the intent of the settlers before they were allowed to proceed. Dimick B. Huntington, interpreter for the colony, parleyed with the Indians and promised that though their intent was to establish a permanent settlement, the settlers would not drive the Indians from their lands or take away their rights.

Nevertheless, as early as April 17, President Young had some indication that the Utes were planning an attack on the settlement. Young warned the colony the next day "to look out for the Indians, not to make them any presents, but, if they would be friendly, to teach them to raise grain and to quit stealing." In May he remarked that old Indians will not "enter into the new and everlasting covenant" or gain knowledge, "but they will die and be damned." He admonished the people to "stay at home and mind your own business and the Indians will do the same. And if they come and are not friendly, put them where they can't harm us. . . ."

As a precaution, Young directed that a letter of friendship be sent to the Ute war chief Walkara on May 14, and a few days later he again warned the Utah Valley settlers—this time instructing them to finish their fort quickly—to strictly control the number of Indians to be allowed in the fort at any one time, and to beware of deception. Later, he enlarged upon his previously stated policy of separation by urging the settlers not to be so familiar with the Indians, because, he said, "it makes them bold, impudent, and saucy, and will become a source of trouble and expense to you. Keep them at a respectful distance all the time, and they will respect you the more for it."

On June 13, Brigham Young, his two counselors, and an interpreter met in council with Walkara and twelve of his warriors. During the discussion Young and Walkara expressed friendship. Walkara, having temporarily mellowed, indicated his antagonism toward the Utah Lake Utes and invited the Mormons to settle in his lands to the south of Utah Valley. Young responded affirmatively and went on to propose that the Mormons could help the Indians grow crops, develop herds, and learn to read.

Despite growing concern over Indians, expansion was a primary theme during the summer of 1849 and the following October church general conference. A new settlement in San Pitch (Sanpete) Valley, south of Utah Valley, was announced and an appeal went out to members worldwide: "We want men. Brethren, come from the States, from the nations, come! and help us to build and grow until we can say enough—the valleys of Ephraim are full." The San Pitch company, numbering 224 people led by Isaac Morley, departed Salt Lake City on October 28. Later in the year a party under the leadership of Parley P. Pratt embarked on an extensive exploration of the valleys further south.

On October 15, Isaac Higbee, who had replaced John S. Higbee as leader of the Utah Valley colony, wrote that Indians had been troublesome for several weeks. Three men were shot at, two animals were killed, and some corn was stolen. The Indians were reported as "very saucy, annoying and provoking, threatening to kill the men and the women." President Young answered with a letter repeating his previous counsel to build up their fort, attend to their own affairs, and to leave the Indians alone. He went on to scold them for mixing "promiscuously" with the Indians.

II

Events came with a rush in 1850 and forced total reversal of the policy of fairness. Ironically, the reversal was precipitated by three Mormon settlers. In early January the three men accosted "Old Bishop," a member of one of the Indian bands living in Utah Valley, reportedly for stealing a shirt. The men shot him, cut his stomach open, filled it with rocks, and dumped the body into the Provo River. They returned to the settlement and openly boasted of their exploit. Indians soon found Old Bishop's body and furiously called for revenge. Their hostile communications to the settlers, and increased killing and stealing of cattle, led to alarm. One of the Utah Valley settlers, Alexander Williams, wrote to Brigham Young requesting that action be taken to quell the increasingly troublesome Indians. Young responded on January 9 and once again reiterated his policy. He warned that if they killed Indians for stealing they would have to "answer for it."

Leaders of the Utah Valley settlement were not persuaded. Determined to take action, Isaac Higbee traveled to Salt Lake City to petition personally for authority to launch a punitive expedition. On January 31 he attended a meeting with President Young, his counselors, the Quorum of the Twelve, and militia commander Daniel H. Wells. Apostle Parley P. Pratt, who had recently returned from his southern exploration, argued that the only alternatives were abandoning Utah Valley (with the resultant break in communications with settlements further south), defending the Utah Valley settlement, or leaving the Utah Valley settlers to their destruction. He recommended "it best to kill the Indians." Higbee responded that "every man and boy [in Utah Valley] held up their hand to kill them off. . . ." The record does not indicate that Higbee made any mention of the murder of Old Bishop—the incident that had precipitated the dilemma. Willard Richards added to the above by declaring "my voice is for war, and exterminate them." Young, convinced of the need for action, and persuaded by the unanimous recommendation of all those present, ordered a selective extermination campaign to be carried out against the Utah Valley Indians. He ordered that all the men were to be killed—women and children to be saved if they "behave themselves" —and military orders were immediately drafted to that effect by General Wells. Wells's "Special Order No. 2," dated January 31 and addressed to Capt. George D. Grant, commander of the militia company sent from Great Salt Lake City, reads in part:

You are hereby ordered ... to cooperate with the inhabitants of said [Utah] Valley in quelling and staying the operations of all hostile Indians and otherwise act, as the circumstances may require, exterminating such, as do not separate themselves from their hostile clans, and sue for peace.

The next day Young met with Capt. Howard Stansbury, head of a unit of U.S. Army Topographic Engineers carrying out land surveys in Utah, who encouraged an attack on the Utah Valley Indians and offered his fullest support. On February 2, 1850, Young addressed the general assembly and announced his decision.

The campaign was carried out with zeal. On February 8, 1850, a voluntary force made up of militia from Salt Lake City and Utah Valley, supported by cannon, surrounded and laid seige to a group of about seventy Indians under Big Elk (Old Elk) who were dug in at a nearby location on the Provo River. After two days of heavy fighting the Indians withdrew, leaving eight dead, including one woman whose legs were severed by cannon shot. One militiaman was also killed in the battle. The Indian wounded and sick retreated up Rock Canyon and the main body fled in the direction of the Spanish Fork River. General Wells then departed for Utah Valley on February 10 and personally directed a relentless pursuit. Unit commanders were instructed to "take no hostile prisoners" and "let none escape but do the work up clean." One party entered Rock Canyon, finding eight or nine Indians, including Big Elk, dead of wounds, disease, or exposure. Wells and a two-company force of 110 men pursued the main body of Indians who were withdrawing south.

What happened next is recorded in General Wells's field dispatch to Brigham Young written on the night of February 13. Wells reported that a force of "15 or 20" warriors, with their families, surrendered to a militia unit under Captain Grant on the lake shore west of Table Mountain (near Payson). The Indians, stated Wells,

came rather through fear than otherwise and seemed determined but to give up refusing to smoke the pipe of peace we shall deal with them in a most summary manner as soon as another day favors us with light. . . .

Then, in a postscript appended the next morning, Wells wrote: "Please to make some suggestion in relation to the disposal of some 15 or 20 squaws and children who probably belonged to some 11 warriors who met their fate in a small skirmish this morning." Apparently General Wells had seen to it that his orders were carried out not to take hostile prisoners nor to let any escape.

After the killings, Dr. James Blake, a U.S. Army surgeon, with the assistance of two militiamen, decapitated the bodies, ostensibly for future research. Units dispatched later in the day of February 14 spotted and fired upon five Indians thought to be scouts, killing three. Three more warriors were killed in their camp on Peteetneet Creek on February 15. Another Indian (probably a woman) was killed in Rock Canyon by militiamen on February 17. The following day, General Wells and the main militia force, in response to instructions from Brigham Young, started back to Great Salt Lake City, taking Indian women and children prisoners with them. An eleven-man detachment of the Great Salt Lake City force remained to assist the local (Utah Valley) militia in further pursuit and to escort other prisoners—and wounded militia—northward when they were able to travel. The campaign came to a close a few days later when militia responded to a report of Indian fires being spotted nearby. The force came upon twenty-four Indians, who were reported to be "very hostile." No fighting broke out, however, the forces being equal, and all repaired to the fort where a truce was negotiated.

Brigham Young's decision to launch an extermination campaign was seemingly in total contradiction of his position stated only three weeks before. The reason for this reversal-—and his reluctance to do so—is suggested by his statement at a meeting held with his counselors and the Twelve on February 10, 1850:

I am sent now to confiscate all their property—and then put them in the heat of battle and kill them—if men had taken a different course there— there would not have been any trouble—I have told them the cause of their difficulties—shooting with the Indians—gambling—and running horses with them. . . .

He went on to indicate his fear that the loss of the Utah Valley might lead to ultimate loss of the entire Utah settlement.

They must either quit the ground or we must—we are to maintain that ground or vacate this—we were cold [told] three years ago—if we don't kill those Lake Utes, they will kill us—every man told us the same—they all bore testimony the Lake Utes lived by plunder and robbing—if we yield in this instance—we have to yield this land.

Captain Stansbury also recorded that "the President was at first extremely averse to the adoption of harsh measures. . . . In 1854, when Young heard of the Old Bishop murder for the first time, he inserted the account in his manuscript history with the following comment: "These facts, which were hid at the time, explained to me why my feelings were opposed to going to war with the Indians; to which I never consented until Brother Higbee reported that all the settlers in Utah were of one mind in relation to it."

Ill

After the Utah Valley expedition it became customary for reports of depredation to be followed by militia action—and more killings. Whereas policy towards the Indians had been geared initially to benefit both sides, it had, by February 1850, deteriorated to a policy favoring only the new settlers. The best land was to be taken up as fast as possible without payment, the Indians were to be strictly excluded, and stealing by Indians was often to bring swift punishment.

The peace hoped for as a result of the Utah Valley expedition was not to be, contrary to most contemporary and historical treatments of the period. Hatred on the part of at least some of the survivors was intense. On April 29, Alpheus Baker, returning alone from Sanpete Valley, was murdered by two Utes—the first Mormon settler to be murdered by Indians in the Great Basin. A posse rounded up and brought in nineteen suspects. One of them, Patsowett, was summarily tried by a local court at Manti, Utah, convicted, and executed.

In the late summer of 1850 the killing of an Indian for stealing once more caused trouble. This time it was in Shoshoni country (near Ogden) and retaliation was immediate and vicious. A Mormon farmer, Urban Van Stewart, caught Terikee, a Shoshoni chief, in his corn patch and killed him. The Shoshonis were enraged. They murdered a nearby millwright named Campbell and threatened to massacre all the settlers and burn their property if Stewart was not delivered up to them for punishment by nine o'clock the next morning. Alerted, a large militia force under Gen. Horace S. Eldredge rode out from Great Salt Lake City with orders to quell the disturbance but to do it peacefully if possible. Brigham Young and Daniel Wells were aware of the hitherto friendly relations with the Shoshonis and apparently had been informed that Stewart's act may well have been unwarranted. At the approach of Eldredge's force, the Indians broke and fled and the incident terminated without futher bloodshed. Still, as if convinced that their policy toward the Indians had been unsuccessful, the First Presidency of the Mormon church sought to rid themselves of the problem by having the Indians removed completely beyond the boundaries of the territory. On November 20, 1850, the day after receiving information by mail that Congress had voted to organize the territory of Utah, the LDS First Presidency wrote a letter to John M. Bernhisel, agent for church and state of Deseret interests in Washington, D.C. Brigham Young explained later that the letter's purpose was

to endeavor to effect the extinguishment of the Indian title and the removal to, and location of the Indians at, some favorable point on the eastern slope of the Sierra Nevada where forests, game and streams are plenty; or to the Wind River chain of mountains, where fish, and game abound; or on the Snake River: at neither of which points white men dwell. The progress of civilization, the safety of the mails and the welfare of the Indians themselves called for the adoption of this policy.

On December 2, 1850, just two weeks after the letter to Bernhisel was written, Brigham Young addressed the General Assembly of the state of Deseret to inform them of the creation of Utah Territory. He spoke of the Indians. Without reference to the request for removal that had been dispatched only days before, he commented on the serious cultural gap that existed and implied that the gap might be impossible to bridge.

All the Indians with whom we have had difficulties, are detached or broken off bands from the main tribes; with them, our peaceful relations have never been interrupted. We have spared no time or expense in endeavoring to conciliate the Indians, and learn them to leave off their habits of pilfering and plundering and work like other people. But habits of civilization seem not to be in accordance with their physical formation; many that have tried it, pine away, and unless returned to their former habits of living, die in a very short time. Could they be induced to live peacefully and keep herds of cattle, then conditions would very materially be ameliorated, and gradually induce a return to the habits of civilization.

The Bernhisel letter was never specifically acted upon; title to Indian lands in Utah was never extinguished completely. As no documented response by Bernhisel can be found, it is assumed that he opted to respond in person upon his return to Great Salt Lake City in the spring of 1851, and that he counseled against any formal action. The significance of the letter is that it reflects the attitude of the Mormon leaders at the time and indicates that they despaired of a solution that might be mutually beneficial. Complete removal seemed the only way out.

IV

Hostilities continued in 1851—again in Utah Valley and later in Tooele Valley, west of Utah Lake. On January 17, 1851, a Mormon settler named Stewart killed an Indian whom he had reportedly mistaken "for a wolf in the grass." Stewart successfully mollified the dead Indian's family by giving them an ox, 300 pounds of flour, and "making a feast for the Indians." Three weeks later, the militia reponded to the report of the theft of fifty cattle and horses in Tooele Valley by dispatching a twenty-man party to that vicinity. The party returned without making contact due to deep snow.

Indians continued to drive off stock in Tooele Valley, and another party was sent in pursuit in April. This group, under the command of Orrin Porter Rockwell, captured thirty Indians. In an escape attempt, one white, Lorenzo D. Custer, and five Indians were killed. The remainder of the natives made good their escape, except four who were recaptured and probably slain.

In June, the theft of another sixty head of cattle again led to a mobilization of militia. General Wells issued orders on June 13 to Maj. George D. Grant, Capt. Peter W. Conover, and Capt. William McBride to raise forces totaling ninety men for the purpose of trapping the Indian cattle thieves in the mountains between Tooele and Utah valleys. Instructions to Conover indicated the necessity to "chastise them in the most summary manner"; and those to Grant—and subsequently to Mc­ Bride—were "to down them . . . and if possible let no hostile Indians escape. ..." The next day, however, the orders to Grant and Conover were rescinded, and only the twenty-man force under Captain McBride went out. Having trailed the Indians to their camp, McBride held up and sent back a request for reinforcements. On June 20, reinforcements under Capt. William F. Kimball headed for Tooele with orders to "endeavor to rout the Indians and recover the stolen property." McBride and Kimball, supported by local militia, moved against the Indian camp, severely wounding two warriors in a fire fight on June 24, then killing nine in an assault on the camp on June 25. The militia returned to Great Salt Lake City on June 27 and claimed eleven Indians killed. There were no militia casualties.

Though the attack was carried out with zeal on the part of Captain McBride, General Wells had begun to reverse himself regarding the extermination strategy. In his June 14 rescinding orders to Major Grant he rhetorically stated:

If we pursue the same course that people generally do against the Indianswe may expect to expend more time and money in running after Indiansthan all the loss sustained by them. . . .

Wells stated essentially the same to Captain Conover, adding that "all might be saved by proper care and watchfulness and the lives of the Indians spared."

A turning point had been reached. The June 1851 Tooele expedition was the last extermination effort against Indians in Utah, though militia actions against thieving Indians continued in 1852, and sporadically in later years. Additionally, the rhetoric inserted into General Wells's orders of June 14 may well have been the basis for the "cheaper to feed them than fight them" statement of policy to come. Brigham Young elaborated on the thoughts expressed by Wells just three weeks later in a letter to Lorin Farr in Ogden. In response to Farr's report of a militia action against Shoshonis for stealing horses, Young stated: "do not the people all know that it is cheaper by far, yes hundreds and thousands of dollars cheaper to pay such losses, than raise an expedition ... to fight Indians."

Whether or not the territorial leadership had forsworn extermination as strategy in 1851, local militia actions were carried out in 1852, again in the vicinity of Tooele. Some of the militiamen, however, opposed ruthless killing of the Indians that had continued raiding their herds. Jacob Hamblin, a Tooele militia lieutenant, recounted that he brought a number of prisoners into Tooele after assuring them that they would not be injured:

On my arrival home, my superior officer ignored the promise of safety I had given the Indians, and decided to have them shot.

I told him I did not care to live after I had seen the Indians whose safety I had guaranteed, murdered, and as it made but little difference with me, if there were any shot I should be the first. At the time I placed myself in front of the Indians. This ended the matter and they were set at liberty.

Juanita Brooks, in her biography of Dudley Leavitt, mentions a similar incident where Leavitt brought in a prisoner to Tooele and refused to allow his being shot. Brooks reports that the Indian's fate was decided by Brigham Young, who was contacted by letter (or dispatch). Young "told them to feed the Indian and let him go."

V

Apparently some sort of practical policy had evolved after the Mormon settlers arrived in Utah that was a combination of separation (based on the need for security), fair dealing, and assistance—tempered by a determination to take ruthless action whenever the Indians refused to accept the quantity of largess offered.

Brigham Young strongly indicated the practical nature of such a policy in an address to the Utah Territorial Legislature in December 1854 when he stated: "I have uniformly pursued a friendly course toward them, feeling convinced that independent of the question of exercising humanity towards so degraded and ignorant a race of people, it was manifestly more economical and less expensive, to feed and clothe, than fight them." Earlier that year Young spelled out what appears to have been actual policy in a letter to Colonel Thomas Kane:

We have ever pursued this policy toward them to feed and clothe them and then if they presumed upon forbearance to become ugly saucy and hostile beyond endurance to chastise them. Yet we have never lost sight of this policy to conciliate them as soon as possible.

Unfortunately, for a period of time the element of "chastisement" received the major emphasis.

Beginning in 1851, stimulated by establishment of the Utah Territorial Indian Agency by Congress in February 1851 and the subsequent proclamation of that superintendency by Governor Young in July 1851, some considerable efforts were inaugurated to aid the Indians. "Indian farmers" were called by Young in the fall and winter of 1851. Two "Indian farms" were also designated in late 1851 to go into operation under those called by spring 1852. Throughout 1853 a policy of conciliation was zealously carried out during the Walker War. Following the war, other farms were established, as well as several Indian missions, from 1854 to 1857. However, commendable as these later efforts were, in most respects they came too late. The Indians, especially the Utes, declined rapidly as a result of extreme poverty brought on by usurpation of their lands, selective extermination, disease, and starvation.

Five observations seem warranted. First, conflict over who would control the limited usable land was inevitable. The Mormons poured into the valleys of the Wasatch oasis and displaced the Indians from their choicest lands. Having no idea how massive the Mormon immigration would be, the Indians put up only slight resistance to early expansion; they even invited settlements in the southern valleys in 1849, believing that there was room for all and that both groups could benefit by the other's presence. Not only were the Indians displaced, but the extensive conversion of the grassland to grain fields ruined their native food supply. Angered at the loss of their lands, rapidly becoming impoverished, having no other place to go, and refusing to take up the white man's farming methods, the natives increasingly relied on theft for survival. Their stealing and expressions of hostility led to bloody reprisal on the part of the Mormons, who felt that the land rightly belonged to those who would develop it.

Second, there was an awesome cultural gap between the two peoples. The Mormons perceived slovenly, naked Indians of small stature living primitively in rude huts made of brush, eating roots and crickets. They perceived other Indians of a higher cut who brutually exploited their lesser brethren, sold them as slaves, and brazenly carried out the vilest sort of atrocities, seemingly without conscience. The Mormons had some minor success at converting but almost no success at acculturating their new associates. The Indians, on the other hand, looked upon the agrarian life-style of the Mormons with almost total disdain. Most were proud of their gatherer-hunter-warrior way of life and had no desire to settle down on small plots of land and grow grain or tend cattle. The Utes under Walkara were famous and wealthy (by their standards) when the Mormons arrived in 1847. Throughout the 1840s they made massive raids in California and brought away thousands of horses. Walkara was hailed throughout the West as a great Indian chief. Reluctance to being reduced to the status of farmers and herders is understandable.

Third, and closely related to the cultural conflict, the Mormons were convinced of the inferiority of the Indian race. There was little desire to allow assimilation. Though a considerable number of Indian children were brought into Mormon homes and raised to maturity, the general policy was strict separation based on a desire for security and a belief that the Indians would never rise to the level of the white man if treated as equals. This policy of separation was similar to the general American experience. Robert F. Berkhofer closes his book Salvation and the Savage on a point that could as well be made with regard to the Mormons: "In many cases the failure of the aborigines to achieve [the] goal of Christian civilization was due to civilized Christians not accepting them on equal terms, for American society traditionally discriminated against non-Caucasian peoples."

Fourth, there was little real compassion on either side. Mormons and Indians alike, inured to suffering and struggle and bent upon survival, had little tolerance for those who stood in the way. Feelings of benevolence— expressed by spokesmen of both groups from time to time—were often eclipsed by less forgiving men.

Fifth, the Mormons put no viable programs into effect before 1852 to support a policy of benevolence. The policy was never more than ad hoc, relying mostly upon the good will of individuals. Whatever individual generosity and kindness that existed was overwhelmed by other attitudes—and the regrettable strategy of selective extermination.

The significant tragedy of the Mormon-Indian experience before 1852 is that it was not unique. In spite of the Mormon's much-quoted feelings of benevolence, they performed typically. The Mormon experience, like that stated by Roy Harvey Pearce in his book The Savages of America, showed that "practice did not support theory. Indians were not civilized, but destroyed.

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