"What Virtue There Is in Stone" and Other Pungent Talk on the Early Utah Frontier

"What Virtue There Is in Stone" and Other Pungent Talk on the Early Utah Frontier

BY HOWARD A. CHRISTY

AS ONE EXAMINES THE THOUSANDS OF DOCUMENTS that make Up the historical record of the pioneer days in Utah it is impossible not to be startled, intrigued, and sometimes amused by the communications of those who lived the momentous and trying events of those times. All are interesting and many are fascinating. Whereas most of the speech or writing of common folks was not much different from today, the language used by prominent persons is astonishingly different Leaders in high political and ecclesiastical offices often spoke and wrote in a manner that would shock us today if individuals in similar positions were to speak or write in a similar manner. On the other hand, as often as not hearers seem to have reacted as strongly as the speakers.

In this essay I quote and discuss some of the language of those times— the strong counsel, the colorful rhetoric, the dark humor, the use of euphemisms, and, in many instances, tough talk—tough to the point of sounding hard hearted and mean spirited from today's perspective. Additionally, I comment on the effect, or lack of it, such communications might have had on the intended audience. Was the communication effective. That is, did the recipient respond obediently. Dutifully. Defiantly. Smilingly. Or not at all? The essay cam therefore be read on two levels: it cam be enjoyed as colorful language or it cam be perused as rhetoric

I concentrate on communications for the record (e.g., minutes of conferences and militia reports to higher authority) and communications for effect (e.g., oral discourses to the people and orders and letters of counsel to subordinate militia commanders)—all dealing with policy regarding and conflict with the local Indians during the early 1850 s. This colorful material is taken from church and territorial archives, most of it readily available but little of it hitherto published The material treated here is but a taste(; of those rather vast resources; still, it is a representative taste and one that allows for some focus.

In the winter of 1850 war erupted in Utah Valley near present-day Provo. There had been trouble brewing since the preceding summer between the newly arrived white inhabitants of Utah Fort and the Utes nearby. The white presence was resented and some hostile feelings were exchanged In the fall of 1849 a local Indian was accosted, ostensibly for stealing a shirt off the line, by three settlers. The Indian was shot down, his stomach slit open ("nepo'd," or "open'd" spelled backwards in the cryptic vernacular of the day), filled with rocks, and the body dumped in the river. The Indian's mutilated body was found by members of his band who then "kicked up a fuss." Isaac Higbee, the ecclesiastical and military leader at Utah Fort, sent a letter to Brigham Young that mentioned trouble with Indians but: slyly avoided mention of the killing. Young responded with counsel that, had it been acted upon, would probably have averted further bloodshed and war:

In reply to your letter of the 15th instant, requesting counsel concerning the Indians. We reply, take care of your com, Brethren, and grain of all kinds, and pursue the course prepared in our former letters and counsel to you. Stockade your fort and attend to your affairs, and let the Indians take care of theirs. Let your women and children stay in the fort, and the Indians stay out, but, while you mix with them promiscuously, you must continue to receive such treatment from them which they please to give. This is what we have told you continually, and you will find it true ....

... A steady and upright and preserving course may yet restore or gain the confidence of the Indians, and you be safe.

Here are the elements of Brigham Young's most consistent policy toward the Indians: he admonished his charges to " stockade their forts" and maintain am "upright and preserving course." Simple, straightforward, and sensible as that policy w;is, it was, as will be seen, possibly the most unpopular policy he ever enunciated

There is no evidence that Young's counsel to Isaac Higbee had much positive effect on the Provo settlers, and the tension and hostility continued to build In late January 1850 a delegation from Utah Fort came to Great Salt Lake City for am audience with the First Presidency, with the intention of getting militia support for a campaign against the Indians to quell the disturbance—or, in the words appended to the Brigham Young Collection, in the archives of the church, they asked for "the privilege of defending themselves and chastising the Indians." Here are the minutes of that meeting, which was attended by Brigham Young, his counselors, Daniel H. Wells (the newly elected commander of the territorial militia), and others:

Higbee [Isaac]: The Indians are continually killing our cattle and stealing horses, and they shot at our boys—we have lost between 50 and 60 head The Indians fired two guns at our boys—and they found one ox with 4 arrows—another with a tomahawk in it—they say the Mormons are [cowards]—they want to fight and will live on our cattle—they say they mean to keep our cattle—and go get the other Indians to kill us.

Pratt [ Parley P. ]: My own mind is I can only see 3 ways— the place be abandoned—or we see to defend—or leave them [the Utah Valley settlers] to destruction.

Higbee: We cannot defend our cattle unless there is a company of men—there are 25 [Indians] close by—and 50 or 75 on the other side of the lake. Pratt I feel it best to kill the Indians. Higbee: Every man and boy held up their hand to kill them off—we have 60 men and our arms—they say we are afraid to kill them. Pratt Walker's [Ute Chief Walkara] men are different to these There can be no communication [with settlements further south] without a settlement at Utah.

Willard Richards: My voice is for war and exterminate them. Brigham Young I say go and kill them (all hands held up). Higbee: We thought we should want help to do it Young. Tell Dimmick Huntington to go and kill them—also Barney Ward—let the women and children live if they behave themselves.

Pratt: I would take the women and children and clothe them and [illegible word] make them do what we want and don't let them prowl about Young We have no peace until the men are killed off—never treat the Indian as your equal There are a company of 50 men— get them and take them up with you. They [the Indians] strengthened up the last year and they gather men from other tribes to come and steal our cattle and horses.

In seeming total contradiction of his policy and subsequent counsel, Brigham Young ordered the destruction of the Ute people in Utah Valley. But other evidence indicates that Young's extermination order was given only when failure of the settlers to adhere to his defensive policy forced him to take ruthless action to maintain control of the vital lines of communication to all the settlements south of Salt Lake Valley. Whatever his motivation, or whether he was justified in such a drastic move, he was resolute. If it had to be done, it should be done forcefully and thoroughly. Note the very clear terms, particularly "exterminate' and "kill" These men—or at least Willard Richards, who took the minutes for this confidential meeting— certainly minced no words.

Orders for the campaign were drafted immediately. Special Order No. 2, addressed by General Wells to Capt George D. Grant, states in relevant part "You are hereby ordered ... to cooperate with the inhabitants of said Valley in quelling and staying the operations of all hostile Indians and otherwise act, as the circumstances may require, exterminating such, as do not separate themselves from their hostile clans, and sue for peace." Again, "exterminating" was used, as well as "quelling."

Grant's force plunged south through deep snow in sub-zero cold, linked up with the Utah Fort contingent, and on February 7 launched an assault against the Indians, who were entrenched on the far side of the river near the fort The two foes exchanged fire for several hours; then the Indians broke contact and withdrew, leaving several dead, and escaped up Rock Canyon to the east A report of the river battle (and its indecisive results) was dispatched to General Wells in Great Salt Lake City along with a request that he come to Utah Valley and personally take charge of further operations. He left immediately, apparently determined to see that his orders, backed up by instructions from Brigham Young "not to leave the valley until every Indian was out," were carried out in full.

To this point all significant communications seem to have been straight forward But follow-up orders to Grant the same day Wells left for Provo were euphemistic by comparison. Wells admonished Grant to "take no hostile prisoners" and "let none escape but do the work up clean." And further communications were also couched in euphemistic language. On February 13 General Wells wrote a dispatch to Governor Young, which reads in significant part

Captain Lyde retraced his steps and joined Captain Grant about dark who was found encamped at this place with 15 or 20 Indians.

It appears that they came rather through fear than otherwise and seemed [illegible three-letter word] to give up refusing to smoke the pipe of peace. We shall deal with them in the most summary manner as soon as another day favors us with light and proceed in quest of other Indians in this direction.

The dispatch seems purposely vague, and the hastily written holograph is difficult to read, but it is apparent that prisoners were in hand and that some forceful action would be taken against them the next day. Wells substantially clarified what he meant by "summary" in a postscript, dated February 14, that he appended to the February 13 dispatch: " Please to make some suggestions in relation to the disposal of some 15 or 20 Squaws and children who probably belonged to some 11 warriors who met their fate in a small skirmish this morning."' Ambiguity notwithstanding, the two statements taken together indicate that Wells, already under instructions " not to leave the valley until every Indian was out" and who had only a few days before ordered Captain Grant to "take no hostile prisoners," either ordered or approved the shooting down of prisoners in cold blood.' It is important to note that there is no category "hostile prisoners" in the rules of war. A prisoner, regardless of his deportment, is expected lo be humanely treated.

Brigham Young responded the next day to "the cheering and gratifying intelligence of your success over your enemies yesterday morning, in which the courage, and valor of the boys, as heretofore was manifested. If the Indians sue for peace, grant it to them, according to your discretionary Judgment in the case—If they continue hostile, pursue them until you use them up—Let it be peace with them or extermination'' Did Governor Young misunderstand Wells's covered language. It is hard to believe that Young would have complimented the shooting of prisoners, hostile or not, as being a courageous or valorous act It is possible that in his haste Young missed the all-important point about the Indians having surrendered before they "met their fate," a possibility that would explain his comment regarding gram ting peace to the Indians if they sued for it Surely, surrender should have been considered am acceptable first step toward a suit for peace. Whatever his understanding of Wells's report and postscript. Young still urged extermination for those who remained hostile. On the other hand, perhaps Wells intended nothing more than that Indians were killed in the line of duty and Young understood the dispatch as such. Nevertheless, Wells's comments of February 13 foretelling the actions of the next morning, and Young's response, strongly imply that selective extermination was fully intended by both parties, even if it meant killing prisoners.

One might ask how atrocities are normally reported or otherwise handled by military authorities. How, say, might an officer report am atrocity committed (with or without orders) by an individual or unit under his command. First, he might not report such am event at all. An officer would almost instinctively resist the urge to report something that would possibly redound to his discredit or disgrace—or serve to thwart his aims. Isaac Higbee's silence regarding the above-mentioned killing and disemboweling of an Indian is a useful example. Second, he might forthrightly and accurately tell the truth, especially if the incident was the responsibility of somebody else, or if the incident was so obvious that attempting to hide it might ultimately have serious repercussions. Third, he might report am incident, but in the fewest words and in the best light Fourth, he might give a euphemistic account, especially if he is reporting an action to the party sanctioning it in the first place. And fifth, he might give a deliberately false account that would cover or justify whatever occurred. Or several such approaches might be employed.

The killings on February 14 are a case in point The episode was reported in different ways and in different mediums. The immediate report from the battlefield, using euphemistic and possibly misleading) language, is described above. But there is also a secondary account of the incident—am account that in its several versions has become the standard in popular histories— that states that the prisoners somehow escaped from their captors and were shot down as they attempted to flee across the frozen lake. But in the light of General Wells's communication of February 13-14, an escape was highly unlikely. Surely, Wells would have reported am escape because it would have provided him a militarily acceptable justification for killing the Indians. That the secondary account lacks any explanation of how the Indians might have made good their escape also invites suspicion. The account only has it that the Indians somehow managed to get away, with their weapons, and without even the hint of a scuffle; then, instead of escaping south into the hills or marshes, where they had a reasonable chance of eluding pursuit, they stupidly dashed out onto the frozen lake where they could be easily spotted, chased down, and killed one by one. The only rational explanation for such am eventuality is even worse than that indicated by Wells in his report to Governor Young—the possibility that the prisoners -were told to run out onto the ice, in the "time-honored" fashion of warfare where prisoners have been allowed to made a "run for it".

The more-or-less official account of the incident is a classic example of fewest terms and in the best light "Upon reaching Promontory Point at the south end of Utah Lake, the volunteers encountered and killed a party of Indians, except the women and children, all of whom were spared; the women, in accordance with the Indian custom, claimed the protection of the volunteers." And, finally, there is am account written by Wells many year's later which simply states that "we encountered the Indians near the north end on the west side of the mountain, east of the south end of Utah Lake, and completely defeated them." Note that more space was given to describing humanitarian care of the widows and children in the official account, and getting the location straight in Wells's later account

What really happened. It is possible that none of the above accounts accurately describes the event The most plausible answer indicated by the conflicting evidence is that the Indians surrendered to the militia, were deliberately killed while in captivity, and that false or misleading reports of the atrocity were deliberately submitted. Such an eventuality is entirely consistent with past military practice. That is, atrocities have been commonly committed on the battlefield and false accounts of such dark deeds have been commonly reported to higher authority. And as discussed later, such an eventuality in the case of 1850 is also consistent with later actions against Indians in Utah.

Hostilities with the Utes ceased, only to flare up again in 1853— but under much different circumstances. Between February 1850 and July 1853 the strategy regarding Indians had once again changed back to the more magnanimous approach recommended by Brigham Young before the events of February 1850, but other factors overwhelmed any hope of peaceful accommodation. Young, determined to put an end to the Utes' practice of stealing children from surrounding non-Ute tribal groups for sale to the Mexicans, in April 1853 signed a proclamation that prohibited the slave trade in Utah Territory—which action precipitated the Walker War. In this instance Young not only had to dead with the Utes, but he also had to dead with his own people. When it became obvious that Ute fury over the proclamation would likely lead to war. Governor Young delivered an address from the Tabernacle pulpit apparently intended to put everyone on guard The speech, which can be entitled his "Watch Address," used hard language:

Take up the history of the first settling of America, and you cannot read of a colony ever being settled in the midst of savages, without having trouble, and suffering more from them than this people have in Utah. What is the reason? It is because these people did not know how to take care of themselves. We can scarcely read of one colony founded among the aborigines in the first settling of this country, wherein the tomahawk of wild Indians did not drink the blood of whole families. Here there have been no such deeds committed; because when we first entered Utah, we were prepared to meet all the Indians in these mountains, and kill every one of them if we had been obliged so to do. This preparation secured us the peace....

I have prayed many times, and had a man at the door to watch for the murderers who thirsted for my blood. Then he would pray, and I would watch. What for. To kill the blood thirsty villain. I would not go and seek for him, but when he came to kill me in my own home I wished to be prepared to disembody his spirit, to save my own tabernacle, and send his down to the dust, and let him go to the place prepared for murderers, even to hell.'''

Hard language, indeed. A month later Young again addressed his people, but this time his rhetoric was along different lines. The tough talk gave way to irony and gentle ridicule in what could be entitled his "Cats and Kittens Address." But the message, and the intent, seems to have been the same

You will find that there will be cats and kittens leaping out of the bag continually. "What can come next, I wonder. I do not know; but this I know, the Lord Almighty will not suffer the Saints, neither the world, to slumber upon their oars The time is passed for them to fold their hands, and say, "A little more sleep, a little more slumber, a little more folding of the hands." This people will never see that day, for the Lord will keep them on the alert all the time; they will continually have something to contend with; to keep them from dropping to sleep, and it is no matter to me as to what means he shall use to do it.

Whatever the merits of the language and style employed in the above two examples, the extant evidence gives no hint that the counsel had the intended effect Actually, the first speech may have had am opposite effect Aside from seeming to be entirely consistent with a purely defensive strategy, a crossed signal may have resulted from the very toughness of the language used. There is no way to prove that this address generated or reinforced am offensive spirit on the part of militia leaders in Utah Valley, but it is at least ironic that when the first shot was fired in anger, the first militia response was immediately to go into the attack, figuratively to go out and "kill those blood thirsty villains." The war came, again triggered by the killing of am Indian by a white settler, albeit in this case the act was unintentional, and for the next several months most of Governor Young's hard rhetoric would be reserved not for the villain at his door but for the settler down the road.

When the shooting commenced Young issued two general orders. General Order One, dated July 21, was precise and clear—and devoid of colorful rhetoric It essentially ordered all in the territory, first, to go on the defensive, and second, to extend conciliation to the Indians. Specifically, the order required that all offensive action in response to the marauding Indians was to cease forthwith, that all settlers and militia were to return to their settlements and fort up, and that all stock was to be put under guard The closing paragraphs read:

VIII We wish it distinctly understood that no retaliation be made and no offense applied but for all to act entirely on the defense until further orders.

IX It is desirable... that no threats or intemdations [sic] be made or exercised [sic] toward the Indians no more than if nothing unusual had occurred [sic] to disturb peaceful relations heretofore existing.

But early reports indicated that many opposed such a strategy and that most of its provisions were ignored, especially by militia commanders who seemed to have had aggressive action uppermost in their minds. That is, regardless of the wishes of higher authority, "using up" was preferred over "no retaliation being made." Determined to see his defense and conciliation strategy strictly carried out, and almost at any cost, on July 25 Governor Young issued General Order Two, which language leaves no doubt as to his intent The entire order deserves reading:

I Colonel G. A Smith is hereby assigned to the command of all the Military Districts of the Territory South of Great Salt Lake County and is strictly enjoined and commanded to enforce Orders No. 1 of the 21st instant.

II It is distinctly understood that all the people shall assemble into large and permanent forts and no man is at liberty to refuse to obey this order without being dealt with as our enemy.

III All surplus stock that is not particularly needed for teams and milk must be driven to this city and placed in the charge of the Presiding Bishop of this city until further orders.

IV Colonel Smith is fully authorized and required to carry out the instructions which have heretofore been occasionally given by the Governor and other authorities of the Territory in regard to defense and all the people are now required to obey these instructions as Colonel Smith shall direct.

V Colonel George A. Smith's instructions and orders will be those of the Executive of the Territory, and we will be sustained by him in enforcing the orders which in his judgment he may think proper.

By placing George A Smith in command over the entire war zone. Governor Young nearly preempted all other militia commanders who may have opposed his strategy. And he could not have chosen a better man for the job. Although Smith had had little or no part in militia activity previously (both his rank of colonel and his Southern Militia Department command were initiated on the spot by General Order Two), he was a powerful figure in every respect He was a giant of a man in body and a forceful and resolute man in style and personality. And he was am apostle who was extremely loyal to Brigham Young. Additionally, Young made the order personal. That is, he seemingly determined that by General Order Two he would make General Order One stick by informing everyone that such orders would now be carried out in person by a powerful individual everyone knew would resolutely do his duty.

But Young didn't stop there. He instructed Smith, with General Orders One and Two firmly in hand, to travel to every settlement south of Great Salt Lake City to make absolutely sure that every settler was informed. Then, apparently still not satisfied, he dispatched to Smith, who had already departed south, the following additional letter, which reads in part:

We now as the First Presidency of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, as Governor, Superintendent of Indian Affairs of Utah Territory and Commander in Chief of the Militia and Lieutenant General of the Nauvoo Legion, Appeal to you, the Commandates [sic] of all the Military Districts South, to all the Officers and Authorities of the Church of the Legion and of the Territory, and to all the People, And say unto you all do not in the least degree relax your efforts ... to save your grain, your stock, and all your property, And Fort up strong and permanent that your Families and your selves may be living and that you not be massacred by the Indians, and do not feel afraid that we want your property because we have ordered Surplus Stock to be driven to this place in order to keep you from feeding Indians with it, for we do not want it but expect that you will,draw it out when you can take care of it, although you had better put it into the Church tithing herd .... And we say further that inasmuch as you do not second our efforts, carry into effect our orders and instructions, and listen to our counsel, we shall consider you as aliens and not Brethren, as enemies and not friends; that we shall not hold you by our Faith nor assist you by our influence nor our works. Enough has been said; works and not words are now required. Let your works speak and show for itself.

Respectfully your Brethren in the Covenant of Truth Brigham Young, Heber C. Kimball, and Willard Richards Brigham Young, Governor, Superintendent of Indian Affairs.

Although there is no humor in this terse, clear directive, in retrospect one can smile to see to what extent Governor Young went to assure that he meant business; note the formality as to tides and ecclesiastical language—and again the general absence of rhetorical embellishments. But did these last two communications have any better effect Surprising as it may seem, in the case of numerous individuals, and of at least one entire settlement, not at all. The people of Cedar City, or perhaps more important their leaders, openly mutinied despite the best efforts of both Brigham Young and George A. Smith. Apparently, these settlers could not accept the temporary loss of their cattle— to say nothing of having to tear down all outbuildings and to crowd into a hastily constructed fort. What followed is a sad episode of hard hearted defiance met with hard hearted force. Again, read it from the record— in this case George A. Smith's report, written in journal style, of his expedition to warn and instruct the people of the southern settlements.

August 7 Had Adjutant Greene read General Orders I and 2 and letter to the people at the meeting house in Parowan. 2 and a quarter p.m. Headed again for Cedar Fort At 3:20 p.m. read express regarding a mutinous outbreak among the citizens of Cedar Fort, and am open opposition to carrying the Governor's orders into effect Arrived Cedar Fort about 5 p.m. Had General Orders I and 2 and letter read again We learned that several men of this fort had risen in the morning opposing Lt Col. James A Little and Captain J. L Smith who had been chosen by the people and appointed by Lt Col. William Kimball to carry out the Governor's order in relation to the surplus stock of this place. Some of them had threatened to shoot their stock and to shoot and bayonet men. 8 August Kimball arrested 5 men. Again addressed citizens in the evening relative to their fort, Indian aggressions, and protection. 9 August I spent the morning among the citizens.

Apparently the anger and defiance of the Cedar City settlers was widespread, harsh, and sustained. A week later, after a short visit to Parowan. Smith found that the people at Cedar Fort were still openly defiant Determined to achieve compliance, he "gathered all officers and leaders, read [reread] General Orders 1 and 2, instructions [no doubt the July 30 letter from the First Presidency], then asked the officers if they would exonerate [him] from all further responsibilities relative to their surplus stock—they unanimously answered no.'' The determined Smith continued his resolve:

One of the officers very gravely began to thank God, that they would have an apostle with them to help bear their burthens [sic] (referring to chap. F. L Richards, who was intended to stay). When on seeing their spirit manifested and the desire to throw all responsibility off from themselves, or to someone else, and not to obey the orders, I said immediately, they could not have him, and ordered him to be ready to march with me in one hour, telling them I would not risk the life of any good men with them, or with any people that would not obey those orders of the governor. I then spoke of men obtaining and holding influence by their works, etc [W]hen I sat down Maj. M. Caruthers presented his resignation, which I accepted, and after giving them some strong advice requiring them to obey the Governor's orders, and to see them carried out, ... I dissolved the council and at 3 o'cl PM started for Parowan, taking Chaplain Richards along with me.

It appears that the "grave thanking of God" for Apostle Richards was intended as a direct insult to Apostle Smith—and perhaps even to the Prophet Brigham Young—to which insult Smith immediately responded with some" strong advice." Smith did not return to Cedar City, however, his August 15 journal entry indicates that the people of Cedar City finally acquiesced but only after the arrests of several of their number and the threat of direct force. Smith stated that "cattle from Cedar Ft arrived," and on August 17: "Left Parowan, ar(rived] Beaver, with cattle.

At this point it is only fair to state that, sensible as the defense and conciliation strategy was, full compliance required enormous personal sacrifice. Literally, the settlers had to abandon everything they had strived so hard to build for themselves. Some communities complied, some did not. For prime example, it is interesting to compare the collective response of the people of Cedar City and that of nearby Parowan, a settlement of comparable size and circumstances. Both communities were relatively distant from the open fighting, both were given the same orders, and both suffered the same sacrifices. But where the people of Cedar City openly rebelled, the people of Parowan willingly complied Smith had property in Parowan and was therefore a citizen of that community, which may have generated a positive attitude toward him there, but it is apparent that the attitudes of local leaders toward higher authority generally made the big difference.

This episode is only the most dramatic example of what turned out to be continued opposition to the defensive strategy. There are numerous examples of written admonitions to carry out the general orders—to settlers far from the action as well as those in imminent danger. That individuals as far away as Ogden (seventy-five miles north of the nearest hostilities) questioned the need to fort up and to send stock to Salt Lake Valley— south toward the fighting— is understandable. No matter. For example, General Wells admonished David Moore, the Weber District militia commander, that "if men resist or refuse to obey orders like Jas. Davis put them in irons with ball and chain."

Unfortunately, regardless of the style employed, appeals to the settlers for constant were either too late or were ignored, and the bloodshed that resulted was entirely unnecessary. Killings led to retaliation and more killings. A tragic case in point is the incident that occurred at Nephi Fort on October 2, 1853, only a week after several Indians were shot down in cold blood at Manti Fort Probably in retaliation for the Manti Fort killings, Indians crept up on and slaughtered four settlers, who had gone out to bring in part of the wheat harvest, as they slept in their unguarded camp at Fountain Green on the mountain road between Manti and Nephi. When the mutilated bodies were brought into Nephi Fort the next morning, the settlers were dismayed and enraged Knowing of a camp of supposedly friendly Indians near the fort, a militia party was sent out to bring them to the fort, ostensibly for questioning.

Accounts of what happened next vary drastically. The militia commander's account explained that the Indians "were told to lay down their arms but they refused and showed fight I ordered their arms taken whereupon two shot arrows and wounded one white in the arm and one arrow went through the coat of another upon which I ordered them to be fired upon." Eight of the Indians were killed But Martha Spence Heywood, a resident of that place, entered quite another account in her journal. She wrote that the grisly sight of the men murdered at Fountain Green "actuated our brethren ... to do quite as barbarous am act the following morning, being the Sabbath. Nine Indians coming into our camp looking for protection and bread with us . . . were shot down without a minute's notice." Another journal entry, by Adelia Almira Wilcox, amply backs up Mrs. Heywood by reporting that the Indians "were shot like so many dogs, picked up with pitchforks [put] on a sleigh and hauled away." As might be expected, only the Nephi militia commander's account found its way to Great Salt Lake City, where, as in the case of the killing of prisoners in 1850, it was boiled down to the barest minimum for the record In the Brigham Young manuscript history for that date all that is given is that "in a skirmish at Nephi, Juab Valley, eight Indians were killed and one squaw and two boys taken prisoners."

The militia field report of the incident could be true, but it is unlikely. As in the case of the 1850 atrocity, the story raises serious questions. In particular is the statement that the Indians refused to give up their weapons but were nonetheless allowed inside the fort That the militia would have been foolish enough to allow eight Indians into the fort with their weapons and that at least two of the Indians could have been adroit enough to draw arrows and shoot while surrounded with militia armed with guns is at best suspect.

In mid-October, following the above-described rash of killings on both sides, Brigham Young may have begun to despair that his people would ever comply either with friendly counsel or terse orders. On October 16 he personally, appealed to three of the settlement militia commanders: "Brethren we must have peace. We must cease our hostilities and seek by every possible means to reach the Indians with a peaceful message." No colorful rhetoric No tough talk. No threats. Although this message could be interpreted as a directive. Young rather seemed to be beseeching these men to seek peace rather than seek more blood and thereby perpetuate the war. Not that Young was weakening in his resolve; nor would he ever stoop to groveling. But few will argue that he was not a pragmatic mam, one capable of reversing a decision or taking a new tack if it might solve the problem at hand. Indeed, the defensive strategy employed in the 1853 Walker War was a dramatic reversal of previous, much harder, measures. The evidence indicates that at some point Young may have decided that the Walker War must end no matter what price had to be paid— perhaps even if it meant begging for compliance Thus, his October 16 letter can be considered still another style of communication, a humble request indicating a willingness to pay whatever price necessary to gain an objective, an objective that, in the case of the Walker War, seems in retrospect to have been worthy and justified.

In the face of continuous opposition by the settlers, the strategy decreed by Governor Young was stubbornly insisted upon and painfully forced through to the very end. Even after the fighting had long ceased and a peace was about to be negotiated. Young had occasion to hurl one last stinging rebuke—and threat—at a bishop in Utah County for not "suitably responding" to one of his requests.

I made a public call in your place yesterday for some fat cattle to take to Walker which has not been suitably responded to.... If there is the least hindrance or difficulty in obtaining go upon the range and pick them up and send them .... I must and will have and if the people have not learned that when I order a thing to be done I mean to have accomplished it is time they had. And this will leave them a lesson. I am determined not to hold any person in fellowship who will tred lightly on things of God.

Many communications during this period are just as fascinating— and hard hitting. Two communications are particularly interesting, one for its dark humor and the other for its eloquence. George A Smith, in his "Settle in Forts!" address, presented at general conference in October 1853, declared

I went to every settlement, and attempted to encourage them to fort but failed to accomplish anything towards getting them to obey the word of the Lord on this matter ....

Sometime in the summer, however, a man known in these mountains by the name of Walker, found that the people cared nothing about God, nor the instructions of Brother Brigham, and Brother George A. Smith. So he said, "I wonder if you will mind me," and in less than one solitary v/eek he had more than three hundred families on the move; houses thrown down in every direction, and I presume one hundred thousand dollars worth of property wasted.

Smith went on to state that "if the counsel of President Young had been observed, not one of the Saints would have lost their lives by am Indian"—an observation that is well borne out by the evidence. Indeed, offensive action taken or provoked by individual settlers in the first instance and by militia units in defiance of orders there after was at the root of every death of the war—white and Indian. Notice also that, like Brigham Young, when appropriate to "tell it like it is," George A. Smith could do so with equal clarity. In the case of his October 7 discourse he employed both colorful rhetoric, here, and straight talk, there. Smith ended that speech with apparent humor, although he might have been at least partly serious:

Walker himself has teased me for a white wife; and if any of the sisters will volunteer to marry him, I believe I cam close the war forthwith .... If any lady wishes to be Mrs. Walker, if she will report herself to me, I will agree to negotiate the match."

But no rhetoric of the period exceeds the following communication for sheer eloquence. To a query as to what to do about am Ogden settler who had refused to take down and remove his house to the fort, General Wells, taking part of his text from a previous letter written by the First Presidency, answered:

Now in the case of Brother Barnes, my council to you is go to him show him this letter offer to assist him kindly to remove his house as carefully as possible into the fort, and ten chances to one in my opinion he will promptly comply.... [W] e should sustain ourselves free and unbiased in all of our official acts and seek to conciliate the feelings of all good men and still pursue the even tenor of our way regardless of every obstacle. You remember the old proverb "If gentle means will not prevail["—]"if neither grass nor tufts will answer then I will try what virtue there is in stone." This is the case with us precisely[;] the authorities have preached to us[,] to this People(,] all the day long to build forts to secure ourselves[;] have kindly told us time and again [that] the first we know the Indians would be upon us[;] but all to no avail[. But] we find that Capt Walker cam elucidate the subject in a clearer more striking and Effectual manner. I am actually ashamed to confess that our People have to learn by what they suffer all the day long instead of profiting by their own past Experiences. As it was said of Israel of old so now it may well be applied: "My people do not consider! How short are their memories! How forgetful!"

It is interesting to contemplate how many times in history men have been deaf to the biblical complaint "My people do not consider!

How short are their memories! How forgetful'" This eloquent quotation of an ancient lamentation raises the question of just how effective such communications ever are, especially when severe sacrifices are asked or demanded. Perhaps most people respond only to what they want to hear regardless of the style employed—or respond only to force directly applied, even at the risk of imminent death. In the case of the Utah frontier, leaders employed every style of communication they knew, including shocking harshness, to warn of and guard against the dangers ahead and then applied corrective measures when the warnings went unheeded Sometimes they got positive results and sometimes they were ignored or outright defied. The cases of Cedar City and Parowan during the Walker War are the best example of this contrast Often, as in the extreme case of the citizens of Cedar City, when it came to push giving way to shove, when "grass nor tufts" did not "answer," the only workable "virtue" seemed to have been in stone.

NOTES

Mr. Christy is the senior editor of the office of Scholarly Publications at Brigham Young University.

1 See Brigham Young Manuscript History, 1850:17-18, LDS Archives, Salt Lake City (hereafter cited as HBY).

2 "Journal History of the Church," October 28, 1849, LDS Archives (hereafter cited as JH).

3 Brigham Young Collection, January 31, 1850, microfilm reel 80, box 47, folder 6, LDS Archives (hereafter cited as BYC) "Chastise" was the favorite term for punitive action against Indians during these times.

4 Ibid.

5 That Young took this action reluctantly, and only later found out what had provoked the trouble in the first place, is discussed in Howard A Christy, " Open Hand and Mailed Fist Mormon Indian Relations in Utah, 1847-52," Utah Historical Quarterly 46 (1978): 224-27.

6 Utah Territorial Militia Correspondence, ST-27, 3 microfilm reels, reel 1, doc 5, Utah State Archives, Salt Lake City (hereafter cited as UTMC).

7 Daniel H. Wells, "Daniel H. Wells' Narrative," Utah Historical Quarterly 6 (1933): 126.

8 UTMC, Special Orders No 10, February 9, 1850, reel 1, doc 16 Another example of euphemistic language is in the orders to militia Col John Scott, who a year earlier was sent against a band of Indian cattle thieves near present-day Pleasant Grove "to take such measures as would put a final end to their depredations in future." All four men in the resulting skirmish were killed, their families taken prisoners See JH, February 27 and28, 1849, and March 10, 1849; see also Hosea Stout Diary, 8 vols., 4:48-56, and Oliver B Huntington Diary, pp 53-55, both in the Harold B Lee Library, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah The term "depredation" was commonly used to identify all sorts of unfriendly acts by Indians, for which they were more often than not "chastised." A classic recent example of euphemism comes from the Vietnam War where the sardonic expression "terminate with extreme prejudice" was coined for the assassination of certain marked individuals.

9 UTMC, Daniel H Wells to Brigham Young, February 13-14, 1850, reel 3, doc 1,309.

10 Ibid., postscript.

11 One particularly wordy and self-justifying euphemism was penned by Edward W Tullidge to describe another incident of shooting down Indian prisoners who apparently attempted to escape— in this case in 1851. Tullidge wrote that a posse under the command of Orrin Porter Rockwell "deemed it unwise to turn the thieves in their power loose to commit more depredations and perhaps shed the blood of some useful citizen and they were sacrificed to the natural instincts of self-defense." Tullidge, Tullidge's Histories {Sait Lake City: Edward W Tullidge, 1889), 2:83-84 In the case of the Utah experience, although both clear language and euphemisms were employed to describe atrocities, it appears that clear language was more prevalent in confidential, "your eyes only," correspondence, and euphemisms were oftener employed in more open communications such as orders to militia units and reports intended for the record.

12 UTMC, Brigham Young to Daniel H Wells, February 15, 1850, reel 3, doc 1,312 (emphasis Brigham Young's).

13 For accounts of the February 14 killings see John W Gunnison, The Mormons, of Latter-day Saints (Philadelphia, 1852), p. 147; and Provo: Pioneer Mormon City, comp Writer's Program, Work Projects Administration (Portland, Ore.: Binfords and Mort, 1942), pp 58-59 Gunnison's account, although not published as a government document, can be considered a report for the record in that he was on active duty with the U. S. Army at the time the above tide was published. Other accounts of the killings and subsequent decapitations of the Indians can be found in the autobiography of Epsy Jane Williams Pace and the supposedly eyewitness account in the autobiography of Abner Blackburn, both in Archives and Manuscripts, Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham Young University. See adso Christy, "Open Hand and Mailed Fist," p 226 That the Indian prisoners could have been "given a chance" to escape, then shot down, isnot a ridiculous possiblity Such a twisted rationale to ease the guilt of brutal killings occurred in Utah seven years later. The militiamen who planned and carried out the Mountain Meadows Massacre, although willing to kill the men of tne Fancher party themselves, apparently determined to allow the Indians to slaughtf r the women and children so that" no Mormon would be forced to shed innocent blood." See Juanita Brooks, The Mountain Meadows Massacre (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1950), p 73 and passim.

14 JH, February 14, 1850.

15 Wells, "Narrative," p 126.

16 The new strategy has since been popularly known as Brigham Young's "feed them rather than fight them policy." For a discussion of the reversal of strategy that developed after the events of the winter of 1850 see Christy, "Open Hand and Mailed Fist," pp 215-35 Not that the strategy was followed with any enthusiasm—either during the Walker War or during the Black Hawk War that occurred in the mid-1860s For evidence of other recorded instances of "chastisement," to include summary executions of prisoners, see UTMC, letter of Erastus Snow, July 27, 1864, reel 2, doc 1,307, pp. 3-4; Col. Daniel D. McArthur to Mai. R. Bendey, January 21, 1866, reel 2, doc 1,307 pp. 11-12; Brig Gen Warren S Snow to Col William B Pace, March 18, 1866, reel 2, doc 822; Brig Gen Warren S Snow to George A Smith, March 18, 1866, reel2, doc 823; and commander of the San Pete Military District to Daniel H. Wells, April 14, 1866, reel 2, doc 835. See also the Tullidge account at note 11 above The last outright attempt to exterminate Indians occurred in 1851 when a militia commander requested arsenic and/or strychnine to poison the water and food supplies of a sizeable camp of Indian men, women, and children. There is no evidence that the request was honored See UTMC, Capt William McBride to Daniel H Wells, June 24, 1851, reel 3, doc 1, 328.

17 JD, May 8, 1853.

18 Ibid., June 19, 1853 (emphasis Brigham Young's).

19 For circumstances leading up to the commencement of hostilities, see Howard A Christy, "The Walker Wan Defense and Conciliation as Strategy," Utah Historical Quarterly 47 (1979):396401.

20 JTMC, General Order No. I. July 21, 1853, reel 3, doc 1,334.

21 Ibid.. General Order No. 2, July 25, 1853, reel 1, doc 288.

22 Ibid., Brigham Young et al to George A Smith, July 30, 1853, reel 1, doc 314.

23 Ibid., George A Smith to Daniel H Wells, August 12, 1853, reel 1, doc 357. This is an extensive journal account of Smith's entire trip to the southern districts.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.(emphasis Smith's).

27 For further details on the events in Cedar City and Parowan see ibid., reel 1, doc 357; and reel 3, docs 1,348 and 1,352 See also Deseret News, October 15, 1853 George A Smith was also a property owner in and citizen of Provo where he was received almost as rudely as he was in Cedar City. See note 28 below.

28 UTMC, Wells to Moore, September 1, 1853, reel 1, doc 375. For other examples see ibid., reel, docs 317,328,410, and424, and reel 3, docs 1,337 and 1,359 On his return north and upon passing through Provo, Smith was so furious with the lackadaisical atdtude regarding forting up there that he ordered Col Peter W Conover, the Provo district militia commander, court-martialed for "noncompliance." Conover was relieved of his command but was soon reinstated Not that Smith enjoyed taking such actions In the case of charging Conover and receiving harsh opposition to it— this after an exhausting and trying nine-hundred- mlietrip to the southern settlements and the mutiny there he wrote: "Myheadache increased to that extent that produced blindness that 1 was obliged to get a mjui to lead me home." See ibid., reel 1, docs 353, 356, 358, and 359, and reel 3, doc 1,363.

29 UTMC, George W Bradley to Daniel H Wells, October 2, 1853, reel 1, doc 396.

30 Juanita Brooks, ed., Not by Bread Alone: The Journal of Martha Spence Heywood 1850-56 (Salt Lake City: Utah State Historical Society, 1978), p. 97.

31 Adelia Almira Wilcox Memoirs, October 2, 1853, Utah State Historical Society, Salt Lake City.

32 JH, October2, 1853 See also Christy, "Walker War," pp 411-12.

33 BY, Brigham Young to Peter W. Conover, Stephen Markham, and George W. Bradley, October 16, 1853.

34 Brigham Young's actions leading up to and during the peace negotiations seem to corroborate his pragmatism As a first gesture, several months before the peace parley, he offered total amnesty Then, when the peace parley commenced, he went to the tent of his substantially defeated adversary and blessed a child And, when Chief Wakara, seemingly as a last gesture of defiance and pride, demanded that Young trade for a slave—recall that Young& s prohibition of the slave trade is what brought on the war in the first place—without hesitation Young handed over the two blankets and gun that were asked-and apparently took the child For a discussion of the peace negotiations see Christy, "Walker War," pp 415-18.

35 BYC, Brigham Young to Bishop Blackburn, May 8, 1854, reel 32, box 13, folder 13.

36 Discourse of George A. Smith at the semiannual conference of the church, October 7, 1853, Deseret News, November 24, 1853 Such discourses could also be rather long-winded Smith's discourse of October 7, although both sharply focused and witty in places, also rambled on at length.

37 Ibid. For an in-depth discussion of the war that leads to this same conclusion, see Christy, "Walker War," pp. 404-20.

38 Ibid.

39 JTMC, Daniel H Wells to David Evans, August 24, 1853, reel 3, doc 1,359, which borrows substantially from Brigham Young, Heber C. Kimball &c to Allen Weeks, July 26, 1853, ibid., reel 3, doc, 1,337. Wells's (Young's?) tantalizing references to "grass nor tufts" and "what virtue there is in stone" are nowhere to be found in the scriptures—nor could they be found in the several concordances and collections of proverbs at hand. (The letter to Allen Weeks somewhat less elegantly puts it, "if tufts and grass only will not prevail stones must be used.") Only Wells's "My people do not consider" could be found, in another context, at Isaiah 1:3 The closest proverb found is from Pierre Corneille's Heraclius, which in translation, and rather less elegantly than Wells, reads: "Severity is allowable where gentleness has no effect."