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An Explosive Lesson: Gomer Thomas, Safety, and the Winter Quarters Mine Disaster
An Explosive Lesson: Gomer Thomas, Safety, and the Winter Quarters Mine Disaster
By NANCY J TANIGUCHI
On May 1, 1900, the Winter Quarters Mine exploded On September 1, 1912, former Utah State Coal Mine Inspector Gomer Thomas died. His obituary read, "He had not been well since the Winter Quarters Coal Mine disaster eleven years ago, when two hundred and one miners were killed He was not injured by the explosion, but undermined his health in the rescue work by inhaling the poisonous smoke and gases."1 These noxious gasses and the practices and substances that caused them became the focus of the Winter Quarters Mine disaster investigation and Thomas's ongoing crusade for mine safety. The primary problem at Winter Quarters was explosives—the amount, how used, by whom, with what results—all of -which were reported by Thomas long before their effects finally took his life
Gomer Thomas, as the second state mine inspector (the first had served only a matter of months),was the government official most intimately concerned with coal mining The position itself dated back to late territorial days when western commercial coal mining was in its infancy A federal law passed in 1891 mandated a mine inspector in each territory with coal mines; Utah appointed one the following year. 2 Robert Forrester, the first territorial mine inspector and a trained geologist, filed a report in 1893 (based on 1892 data) In it he summarized the industry's haphazard condition with a list of serious deficiencies First, he noted, "with one or two exceptions, the mines have been worked in a very primitive and incompetent manner." Second, the typical mine superintendent "has been chosen, not because of his knowledge of Coal Mining, but because he was an influential friend of the most prominent shareholders; or he may have had a large amount of the shares himself." Third, unsafe practices included "an insufficiency of pillars [of uncut coal] to support the roof [of the mine tunnels, rendering the coal in them]...irrecoverable, and thus thousands of tons of coal are lost to the mine-owners." Finally, he minced no words regarding safety: "Such a miserable apology for mining presents almost insurmountable difficulties in circulating a current of fresh air sufficient for the needs of the miner at the working face [the exposed area at the end of the tunnel where the coal is mined]."3
Not only were the mines themselves generally in dismal condition but also practical knowledge, particularly regarding fires (often of deadly consequence in a coal mine), was in its infancy. In the context of a"gob fire" or continued smoldering in the Union Pacific Mine in Pleasant Valley, Forrester detailed the two prevailing theories of coal combustibility: "The spontaneous combustion of coal in the past has been attributed to Iron Pyrites, and more lately to the oxidation of the carbon of the coal." In the older view, the decomposition of iron pyrites, particularly when found in marcasite, was believed to cause sufficient heat to start a coalfire. The more recent theory (as of 1892) held instead that extant gasses absorbed by the coal would bring "the carbon into closer contact with the oxygen...and the heat developed by this action, under favorable circumstances [would cause] inflamniable particles actually to ignite."Forrester,in his own analysis, combined these two theories to opine that the existence of marcasite in the coal generated sufficient heat to drive off natural moisture while speeding the breakup of the coal, which could then more readily absorb oxygen and ignite.4
After filing this report, Forrester apparently left (or was removed from) the position of mine inspector for Utah Territory. In the report filed for 1896, at the beginning of statehood, his immediate successor was described thus: "The last incumbent of that position under Territorial government failed entirely to compile annual reports covering the years of his incumbency [and] he left no reliable data...."5 Consequently, when Gomer Thomas assumed the position of state coal mine inspector in 1897, he had very little except his own extensive practical knowledge to go on. His task would be to establish and enforce most of Utah coal mining's initial safety procedures His own awareness of the urgency of his task was suddenly shared by people throughout the state following the explosion at Winter Quarters, which brought repeated calls for mine safety.
Fortunately for Utah, Gomer Thomas -was a professional mining man with lifelong ties to the industry. Born in Wales in 1843,he immigrated to the United States in 1864, working first in Pennsylvania, then Ohio, and finally in Utah in 1878, always in coal In Utah, he was first employed by the Utah Central Railroad in Scofield, moving a year later to the Union Pacific Coal Company, or U. P. He superintended the U. P.'s Grass Creek Mine in Summit County until it closed in 1887,after which he continued with the company until his appointment as state coal mine inspector ten years later His duties then included an annual or more-frequent visit to each of the state's coal mines employing more than six men and an occasional inspection of smaller enterprises as well. When hydrocarbon mines opened, he also inspected them.6
As required by law, every year the state coal mine inspector made an official report to Utah's governor; the reports were published biennually Each report typically began -with a letter of summary and tables of statistics then continued with a narrative report on each of the significant coal mines, their owners and officers, tonnage produced, amount of explosives used, brief overviews of the hydrocarbon mines, individual accounts of the deaths and injuries occurring that year, and, usually, a summary statement. Thomas's official "Reports of the State Coal Mine Inspector" also detail the nitty-gritty side of theWinter Quarters development and disaster
Not surprisingly, when Thomas assumed his official post, one of his main concerns was the Winter Quarters Mine, then one of the leading producers in the state His first, typically detailed, report of the Winter Quarters No 1 Mine (the only one then operating) was based on his first official visit on October 27, 1897.He noted 267 men inside and outside, along with eighteen horses, a Guibal exhaust fan (-with full particulars as to its capacity and performance), electric hoists (also with full mechanical details), "escapement ways," and coal production of 210,693 tons, with complete chemical analysis. Thomas was a thorough man. Despite the use of the fan, he also warned about an insufficient "current of air...on account of the friction in the return airway ,which is small, being driven some considerable distance in the rock. "When he complained about this to management, he learned that steps to widen the airway would begin on November 1,just two days after his visit. Subsequent reports followed up on Thomas's concerns. In 1898 he reported, "I found great improvement from my last [visit]...and a great deal larger amount of air traveling through the mine." He added, "There is no gas in this mine and dust is not very dangerous, but management sprinkles traveling roads."7 His views on gas, dust, and sprinkling would all change dramatically after the explosion
Thomas's 1899 report began with the proud assertion that "this has been the most successful year in the history of the coal mine industry in the State of Utah. "There had been no fatal accidents, and total production had increased 204,825 tons over 1898,with 407 more employees. Thomas continued, "All suggestions and requests that I have made during the year, for the safety, comfort, and health of the employees, have been cheerfully complied with on the part of the employers. "To prepare this report, Thomas had inspected the now much-larger Winter Quarters No. 1 seven times, noting variances in numbers of miners working and complaining about the amount of water in the man-way, which was being sprinkled at his suggestion. He brought these issues to the attention of Superintendent Thomas J. Parmley, who promptly supervised amelioration. As always, Thomas had checked the ventilation, saying (on visit six) that it was "fairly good considering the amount of powder used in the mine." He noted, "All shots are fired in this mine by the miners at any time." He also reported on "a new mine... one of the most difficult mines to open in the State": Winter Quarters No 4 "The graders who were grading for a tramway to the mine, put in a big blast which cracked the rock and earth at the mouth of the tunnel, causing a big slide of thousands of tons of rock and dirt, making it very difficult to timber and drive. "The tunnel mouth consequently "had to be secured with rock walls and cribs, which was done, and in a manner creditable to the mine foreman, [Thomas Parmley's brother] William Parmley"8 Both the Parmleys, like Thomas, were experienced mining men, a far cry from the "big shareholders" Forrester had excoriated in his first territorial report. They sawto it that their mines ran in a professional manner.
At the nearby Clear Creek mine, also new that year, the dust was deemed highly explosive, and a sprinkling system was installed at Gomer Thomas's suggestion. Another sister mine, Castle Gate, had recently modernized under the direction of superintendent Frank Cameron. Not only was the mine sprayed with water but also the coal was dug "by being first undermined and shot off with Hercules powder [dynamite], of which they used 38,450 pounds during the year 1899.All shots are fired by electricity, when all men are out of the mine,-which I think is the safest way to mine coal where dust is explosive." In his report, Thomas then highlighted Utah's superior coal deposits, availability of timber for mine uses, and gentle mountain grades for tram and rail-way accessibility, opining that "all that is needed to make these fields superior to others [in the West] is organized capital to operate them on a large scale."9 Everything seemed ready for continued growth in the industry
At that time, coal was in great demand Especially in the arid stretches of the West where wood was scarce, coal was the fuel of choice for factories, home heating, and, most of all, locomotive power. Not surprisingly, the great western railroads, such as the Denver and Rio Grande Western (D&RGW), opened the first commercial mines in the West Nearby, they built company towns or allowed miners to build their own homes on company land at the mouth of the mines. As a result, these commercial giants regained much of what they paid the miners by insisting that they buy their supplies—fuses, lanterns, blasting powder, and daily necessities—at the company store The D&RGW, through interlocking directorates, controlled the Pleasant Valley Coal Company (PVCC), which opened the Winter Quarters Mine. In the same canyon where these mines penetrated the earth stood the Wasatch Store, the mercantile arm of the PVCC, again bound to the same commercial behemoth by an interlocking directorate In essence, one huge industrial empire tried to control virtually every aspect of the miners'lives.10
The labor of these men was necessary for the commercial giant to grow. They first carved the portals then drove tunnels deep into the earth, supporting the ceiling (with -wooden timbers at Winter Quarters instead of pillars of unmined coal) and removing the coal as they -went A coal mine consisted of a -web of passageways; in the case of Winter Quarters Four these rose from the main entry and -were labeled for the direction: First Rise, Second Rise, and so on, to the Farrish Level, which was above the Third and Fourth rises Off the passageways, or rises, -were rooms where men dug the coal at the face. This mine, being new, was small; the tunnels penetrated only 1,600 feet from the surface, and it had four cross entries and twenty-six rooms. 11
Mines were full of dangers. With the exception of Castle Gate, where company men supervised the use of dynamite and detonated it by remote electrical charges, each miner blasted out his own coal to loosen it before picking out more and shoveling it into cars Typically, the miner drilled a hole horizontally into the face, filled it partly with blasting powder, laid down a length off use, tamped the hole shut with a "dummy" (a cylindrical sack filled -with earth) or with wet wood pulp, lit the exposed end of the fuse and moved away from the harm of the ensuing blast Occasionally there was a missed shot—a charge that did not fire—which could kill a man if he hit it with his pick. A windy or blown-out shot—one that was improperly tamped—could create a life-threatening explosion. Another danger was the "bounce"—the motion of the earth abruptly settling itself, causing choking dust and small bits of coal to shoot out as cracks snapped shut. Sometimes the tunnel roof would start to collapse. Then, the -wooden pillars that supported it twisted with the pressure, and the small -wooden wedges driven in at the top, where posts met the ceiling, shot out to warn the men to run for their lives Bounces, roof falls, explosions, and daily wear and tear all raised a fine mist of coal dust, which was not necessarily considered flammable by itself. Some coal mines, due to the chemical composition of the coal, had the added danger of flammable methane gas, called fire damp, oozing out of the coal The Winter Quarters mines, however, were not gassy and-were considered some of the safest in which to work.12
Then came that disastrous day of May 1, 1900 A book written shortly afterward by Scofield school principal and town clerk James W Dilley was published free of charge by the Skelton Publishing Company of Provo and sold to raise money for the bereaved families. From it comes this account:
As the news spread, some people rushed up the incline to the mouth of Number Four Mine, where they encountered several men severely injured by the escaping blast. At the mouth of the mine, "one horse was found dead but his driver [of the mine cart the horse had pulled] could not be seen until someone looking down the gulch saw the form of...the driver [who] had been blown eight hundred and twenty feet, by actual measurement." The first relief party, headed by mine superintendent Thomas J. Parmley "started for the levels of Number Four through Number One, there being inside connections, but were driven back by the terrible after-damp [carbon monoxide] that had by this time reached the lower levels of Number One."14
It took about twenty minutes to clear away the dead horse and the tangle of mine timbers that had been blown out to the mouth of Number Four, blocking the entrance Then, "the relief committee was able to follow the air and the actual work of rescue began. The first one to be met was Harry Betterson, supposed at the time to be John Kirton, and being still alive was brought [out of the smoke-filled tunnel] to the surface where he was found to be burned beyond recognition. "As men set up canvas barriers (called brattices) to force the air into the mine one level at a time, clearing the smoke and dispelling some of the after-damp, they discovered horrible carnage. "Men were piled in heaps as there were not enough men [on the rescue squads] to carry out the dead as fast as found." The groups pressed into Number One and found more bodies. After miners arrived from Clear Creek to help, "The dead began to arrive at the mouth of Number One by the car load, sometimes as many as twelve bodies having been loaded upon one mine car."
Among the first outside rescuers on the scene was former Utah Territorial Coal Mine Inspector Robert Forrester, now the geologist for the Pleasant Valley and Utah Fuel Coal companies He plunged into Number One, where according to the Los Angeles Times "he was found [unconscious from after-damp] near the mouth of the tunnel, having just gone in, and was quickly rescued. As soon as he recovered, he "went right back in the mine to aid the relief party and was again brought out in an unconscious condition He was carried to his room, and upon recovering, once more returned to aid in directing the work."16
An astonished rescue party entering Number One mine found David Uro still working in Room 11 on the Eighth Rise. He was unaware that an explosion had occurred, and, as later reported by Gomer Thomas, "There being sufficient air in his place his life was saved All the other men on this level, hearing the explosion, ran [toward Number Four, the shorter way out] trying to make their escape, and encountered the after damp to "which they succumbed." Uro and one other man were brought to the surface three and one-half hours after the explosion, the only two saved above the Fourth Level of the Eighth Rise and the only survivors from an extensive area in -which eighty-three men died.17
Another rescue party going into Number One was led by William G Sharp, general manager of the Pleasant Valley Coal Company. By the time Gomer Thomas arrived in early afternoon, fifty bodies had been recovered, and Sharp was exhausted. Thomas relieved him so he could get a few hours sleep Sharp returned at 8 p.m to join a party led by Thomas that included James Harrison and Frank Cameron, superintendent of the Castle Gate mine, in probing Winter Quarters Number Four.18
Thomas stayed involved in rescue work almost continuously throughout May 2 but had to hold back on the afternoon of May 3 until the back of the connected mines, where the fire had been hottest, was cleared of most of the charred and mangled bodies Superintendent Thomas Parmley's brother, William Parmley, the mine foreman at Winter Quarters Number Four, was among those bodies there recovered and identified. The confirmation of his death extinguished all hope that the victims would all be found Since William alone knew -where all the men had been working and since several rooms had caved in, blocking passage-ways and burying bodies, questions remain to this day whether all the miners -were recovered.19
By then, word of the disaster had spread widely. The mounting toll from Winter Quarters revealed that this explosion was the worst in the United States to that date. Condolences and assistance poured in. Locally, the Pleasant Valley Coal Company provided free coffins and burial clothes, the Wasatch Store Company wiped out the debts of the dead miners, and mine officials delivered the victims' full paychecks privately to each bereaved family Superintendent Welby of the Denver and Rio Grande Western Railway, a sister corporation to the Pleasant Valley Coal Company, provided free railroad transportation for flowers gathered by Salt Lake City school children to adorn the graves of the dead. Utah's Governor Wells received a cable from President William McKinley expressing his "intense sorrow...and deep sympathy with the wives, children and friends of the unfortunate victims." Foreign governments also responded For example, President McKinley received condolences from France's President Loubet, delivered by the French ambassador in Washington The London Daily Telegraph rated the international outpouring of sympathy on a par with that caused by the explosion of the Maine.20
Meanwhile, relief supplies began arriving, and a way had to be found to manage them Governor Wells appointed a committee, chaired by Utah secretary of state James T. Hammond, to receive and distribute contributions Committee members included E.W. Wilson, William F Colton, Ezra Thompson, A.W. Carlson, Arthur L. Thomas, William Iglehart, Mrs. O. J. Salisbury, Mrs George M Downey, Mrs A R Haywood, Lafayette Holbrook, John Jones, O. G. Kimball, and the busy Winter Quarters superintendent, Thomas J Parmley.21 However, while private donors proved generous, requests for both state and federal aid were turned down by the respective legislatures.22
While government faltered in providing monetary aid, state officials— particularly Inspector Gomer Thomas—worked overtime. Rescue teams supervised by Thomas continued probing both mines, corridor by corridor and room by room, until May 12, bringing up more of the dead. A subsequent inspection attempting to identify the explosion's cause also proceeded room by room through Number Four Mine. In this painstaking analysis, Thomas was aided by Superintendent Thomas J. Parmley, Assistant Superintendent H. G. Williams, Utah Fuel geologist Robert Forrester, and mining engineer George W. Snow. This investigation resulted in a fifteen-page, typed, legal-size report and a five-page summary (the latter later included in the inspector's annual report),which were submitted to the governor on June l.23
The dynamics of the explosion had been extraordinary. For example, some rooms experienced the force of the blast; others, the fire; some had signs of both. In Number Four Mine, the explosion's force apparently traveled inward on the third level and back on the second level, as indicated by smashed steel mine cars in each location. "The force of the explosion on these levels was very strong and [there were] but little signs of fire," added the report.24 At the mouth of Room Five, Level One, the blast of air was so strong and hot that some of the coal in the walls coked. At Room One on the first level, a toolbox, clothing, paper, and mine props were all scorched and burned, but a keg of powder, although scorched on top, did not explode. In some cases, huge tongues of flame flashed into rooms but halted short of complete destruction For example, at Room Two, First Rise, two-thirds of a keg of powder, not exploded, still rested 100feet into the 160-foot-deep room, some thirty feet beyond the fire limit as shown by ashes on the props. Jacob Anderson had been working there alone and was brought out alive, apparently because fire, not force, had hit his work area and not all the oxygen had been consumed. At the top of the First Rise there was no sign of fire or blast; in fact, in the Third Level off the First Rise "a keg of powder intact is found in a sack; also seventeen and one-half sticks of giant powder [dynamite] and some [blasting] caps...were found intact." In other places, superheated air from the blast caused horrific results. For example, "The 4th Rise below the Farrish Level is badly caved and the men taken out here were badly burned and blistered with heat, but had no fire on their clothing." Up at the Farrish Level (beyond the Third and Fourth rises), two blasts traveling in opposite directions apparently met. Upon reaching the end of the Farrish Level, H.G. Williams dryly remarked that "a great deal more air tried to get through that hole than could." In the last room of the Farrish Level, Room Fourteen, a unique array of evidence showed that the heated blast had come from the face itself. No black powder or dynamite could possibly have caused this result.21
Finally, although the heat dissipated with distance, the after-damp (carbon monoxide) did not As Thomas noted, most of the miners in the back of Number One "were warned of the explosion but they stopped to put their tools away and lock up their boxes, and some went so far as to finish load[ing] their cars and put up props If they had run right out they could have come right out in fresh air most of the way but they did not think there was much danger for they did not hurry as they knew the mine did not give off any explosive gas and was not known to be a dusty mine."26 By the time many left, taking the short-cut through Number Four, the after-damp had risen and killed them. This poisonous gas eventually reached the mouth of both mines, where it repeatedly struck down rescuers such as Robert Forrester, as previously noted.
Gomer Thomas spent almost the -whole of May in Scofield, bringing out the dead,ventilating theWinter Quarters mines, and compiling his exhaustive report. His concluding "official visit of inspection of No. 4 mine, Winter Quarters, on this 25th day and night of May" found it sufficiently damp and ventilated to be reopened on the twenty-sixth.27 While his investigative report had located virtually every keg of powder, dynamite stick, tool box, horse carcass, mine prop, lunch box, and dented mine cart remaining after the explosion, it had not definitively pinpointed the cause of the explosion. However, Thomas offered a personal assessment. On the first page of his fifteen-page report to the governor, submitted June 1, he wrote:
The phrase "and fifty-six (56) sticks of giant powder were burned" was crossed out when the missing sticks of dynamite were later located.29
Others had their own theories of the explosion's cause. Initially, an angry Superintendent Thomas Parmley, whose younger brother, foreman William Parmley, was then among the missing (later a confirmed casualty), was reported as stating that "some of the Fins [sic], recently imported, secretly took giant powder [dynamite] down into the mine to assist them in their work. They were exceedingly anxious to make a good showing, and as much money as possible, and it is thought that when the giant powder was touched off, it ignited some of the dust, of which every coal mine in the country has more or less."30
While some voices tended to blame the Finnish miners,31 toThomas and other mine officials the explosives themselves,not who wielded them, were a major issue. In 1900, dynamite -was new in Utah's coal mines. In 1899 only Castle Gate had used it—38,458 pounds—electrically firing all of the shots when the men were out of the mine.32 That same year, all other mines in Utah relied solely on kegs of powder, numbering 4,400 at Winter Quarters and 1,164 at Clear Creek, just to the west. By 1900, however, these proportions had changed dramatically. Castle Gate still used dynamite exclusively (32,147 pounds);Winter Quarters Number One used only kegs of powder (4,730), but Winter Quarters Number Four, where the explosion occurred, used 2,290 kegs of powder and 1,100 pounds of dynamite Like-wise, Clear Creek had shifted to partial dynamite use, about one pound to every three kegs of powder.33
Using black powder in kegs versus sticks of dynamite raised a touchy issue in coal mining The packaging could make a significant difference in the effect of the explosives. The drilling, loading, and tamping process previously described took longer than using a prepackaged dynamite stick, but the amount of explosive could be tailored to the work area and the type of coal The issue of explosives—their type, amount, use, and effect—became key in analyzing the Winter Quarters explosion. While some, like Superintendent Parmley, blamed over-eager Finnish immigrants, some other miners were "exceedingly bitter in their denunciation of the company Others took a more conservative view of the matter, and said it -was one of those things over -which no man has control and no man or men should be held responsible."34
The task of identifying the source of the explosion in a reputedly safe, non-gassy mine preoccupied many experts for months. The state hired a chemist to make an official analysis of the composition of Winter Quarters coal to try to determine if the coal itself had caused the explosion, but results proved negative. After spending virtually all of May at Scofield, Gomer Thomas returned on August 9 and found the missing body of John Pitman, the last of the dead to be brought out During his stay, Thomas took testimony from some of the survivors, virtually all of them experienced miners who had emigrated from the British Isles. He included a verbatim transcript of the testimony of eight men in his annual report. Some of the examinations were conducted by a Mr. McNeil, the former mine inspector of Colorado The main points at issue were whether Winter Quarters was considered a gassy mine (it was not); if the air was good (it was); if there was much coal dust in the mine (no); whether the men -were always cautious in handling powder (they -were not; some would bend over their kegs and set charges "with lighted lamps on their heads); and whether the company encouraged safe mine practices (uncertain). Questions about the value of sprinkling with water to settle coal dust received a wide range of responses; one man simply noted that it had been tried but had not become general practice.35
These questions about mining practices pointed toward a new avenue of investigation. If the mine itself did not threaten an explosion, human error must have been to blame But whose error -was it—the company's, the miners', or the government's, through insufficient oversight? By stressing the role of kegs of powder, -which each man had to fire individually, the investigators obliquely accused the miners of being the sole agents of their own destruction If dynamite, sold in pre-packaged amounts at the company store, were to blame, the company would be more at fault for the explosion.
The local judicial system reached essentially the same conclusion. Carbon County convened a grand jury that spent three days investigating the cause of the mine explosion It issued its report on June 13 after taking the testimony of ten employees, and it attached no blame to the coal company. A coroner's inquest agreed—or at least could not determine a cause. 36 Some survivors disagreed, however, and sued the Pleasant Valley Coal Company These suits were so numerous that Carbon County found it economical to have forms printed that set forth all specifics of the disaster and the company's response. The forms detailed the events of the explosion, the company's contentions that the deceased were experienced miners, and the safe reputation of the mine. The company apparently harbored concerns about explosives, for the printed document continued, "No dynamite was used in said mine except in excavating for openings in rock, and the small quantities in the mine, at the time of the explosion did not burn or explode; that the miners were not allowed to take in, and did not take in, or have in the mine, at the time of the explosion, more powder than is customary and allowed in other mines considered free from gas and explosive dust...." The only blanks on the form accommodated the names of the plaintiffs, the amount for which they were suing ,the name of the deceased and the date.A typical form, used by survivors of Joseph Maio, was filed on February 11, 1901, claiming damages of $5,000.37 The company won all its cases.
Gomer Thomas reached his own conclusions regarding the human cause of the disaster. Sidestepping specifics, he reported: "This explosion -was either due to carelessness in handling explosives or to a windy or blow-out shot, thus igniting the dust, in air free from fire-damp." Up to this point, the existence of fire-damp, or methane gas, had been considered the main danger in a coal mine; coal dust by itself was not considered highly flammable. Thomas had learned otherwise. He continued:
In essence, since coal dust by itself had been proven explosive by the disaster at Winter Quarters, it made little difference who used which explosives or where they were obtained. For mine safety, the coal dust had to be damp.
After this disaster, Thomas believed more firmly in sprinkling and insisted that it be increased, even in so-called safe mines like Winter Quarters. On June 9, about two weeks after the mine reopened, he found the sprinkling system in good order and the mine working fulltime.39 He stressed other safety precautions in the introductory letter to his 1900 annual report, -where he recalled recommendations made at Clear Creek the year before Then, he had foreseen "the danger of taking too much powder into the mine at one time." He continued:
Naturally, the Winter Quarters Mine disaster spread Thomas's concern for safety procedures.
Some changes came only through repeated requests, however. On September 26, during Thomas's fifth inspection since the explosion, he found that Winter Quarters Number One had "too much smoke in the levels off the eighth rise," a condition that persisted into his two October visits. He brought this ventilation problem to Superintendent Parmley's attention, and when it had not been corrected by November 1,he wrote a letter demanding improvements On November fifth, they had apparently been made.41
The smoke generally came from the use of explosives. After the Winter Quarters disaster it ,too, was recognized as creating a significant health hazard In his 1900 discussion of "Powder Consumed in the Mines of the State During 1900,"Thomas cautioned, "Intimately connected with the subject of ventilation is that of the explosion of powder in displacing the coal. The fumes thus liberated highly impregnate the air with carbonic oxide, or white damp, -which is a most deadly gas. This, spreading through the mine, vitiates the air. "While efficient ventilation could reduce the risk ,he recommended that companies "regulate the hours for shooting, so that the employees of the mine could withdraw to currents of fresh air while the blasting -would be done. "Thomas added, "I have had complaints in regard to the excessive quantities of smoke created by the discharge of powder in the mines, and my belief is that the evil complained of is largely due to the employment of unskilled miners who use the powder in excessive quantities."42
Largely through Thomas's pressure, the state legislature, when it next convened (it met every other year), took an interest in coal mine safety improvements. In 1901 it passed a law mandating dust-control measures, one of only two such laws in the country. The statute also contained new regulations for mine ventilation, explosives, and supervision Specifically, mines had to be sprinkled up to the face in all working rooms; abandoned areas had to be ventilated and abandoned crosscuts sealed off. No explosives could be stored inside the mine. Thomas's suggestion of limiting miners to 6 1/2 pounds of powder was also adopted as law. Large mines had to be subdivided and each division ventilated separately; the workforce in each section could not exceed seventy-five men. Rooms had to be inspected daily for gas, and air currents had to be measured weekly. Amount and extent of timbering was also mandated; any hazards had to be reported immediately to the mine boss Perhaps most important, foremen had to ensure that all men using explosives knew how to handle them. No longer could unqualified men become bosses; instead, a committee consisting of an operator, a miner, and the mine inspector would certify mine bosses, and the coal mine inspector himself certified fire bosses, the men most intimately involved in preventing explosions.43
In his next report, Gomer Thomas approvingly remarked, "I was pleased to see that the management [of Winter Quarters Number Four] had made such great changes in compliance with the new law."44 Mine Number 1, however, was drier in part than it should have been; management made the required improvements, including instructing "the water-men to -water the mine twice a week."45
The following year, Thomas again made repeated inspections of the Winter Quarters mines, periodically demanding better airways, less smoke, and more -watering. He repeatedly championed better safety legislation and new, less dangerous inventions, such as the Safety Blasting Cartridge, used successfully in Pennsylvania in 1902 He urged its adoption, saying, "If this cartridge could be introduced and used successfully in the mines of Utah, it would be nothing short of a God send to the miners of this state."46 In 1903, always particularly concerned -with Winter Quarters, he wrote a glowing letter to H. G. Williams, general manager of the Utah Fuel Company noting, "The [Winter Quarters] mine in general is in good condition, better than I ever saw it before."47 Whether coincidence or not, Henry Parmley, another brother of Superintendent Thomas Parmley, had just been put on as foreman.48
Meanwhile, the coal industry reeled under the acrimonious strike of 1903—1904,which drew governmental attention from issues of safety to so called issues of law enforcement.49 Thomas continued calling for increased safety measures, but he was largely ignored in the confrontational climate Furthermore, Thomas's health was deteriorating In February 1906 the governor dictated a sympathetic letter offering "his sincere regrets on account of your ill health and to say that he is not at all concerned over your absence in trying to regain your health... [T]he men you have in charge will be able to do justice to the work."50 Some local pundits disagreed, however, and a Carbon County editorial scathingly insisted that "Thomas has simply outlived his usefulness, if he ever had any"51 In fact, Thomas was even unable to get up to the Winter Quarters mine that May because his doctor had advised avoiding high altitudes for at least another month Instead, he admonished his replacement, "As you go around the mine, I wish you would take notice as to the amount of powder [that] is used in each shot and the kind of tamping used, as they must not use coal slack for tamping I would also like you to take notice as to the timbering in rooms and pillars."52
In 1906 the faltering Thomas wrote in his final report of an unmet concern resulting from the Winter Quarters explosion:
By that time, Thomas was dead. As his 1912 obituary noted, he had retired as state coal mine inspector in 1907 due to failing health. It continued, "He was said to be one of the best informed men in Utah on coal and coal mines... He belonged to no church, but was broad in his religious views and tolerant of the views and beliefs of others. "The obituary could also have added that he never forgot the lessons of Winter Quarters. He consistently stressed safety, always trying to temper the explosive potential of Utah's coal.55
NOTES
Nancy J Taniguchi, professor of history at California State University, Stanislaus, has been studying Utah's coal industry for more than twenty-five years She lived in Price, Utah, from 1976 to 1989 and taught at the College of Eastern Utah In 1996 she published Necessary Fraud: Progressive Reform and Utah Coal.
1 (Price) Eastern Utah Advocate, September 5, 1912 (hereafter Advocate).
2 "Annual Report, Robert Forrester, U S Mine Inspector 1892, filed March 27, 1893," Secretary of Utah Territory/Territorial Executive Papers, Series 241, Reel 13, 13500-507, Utah State Archives, Salt Lake City, Utah.
3 Ibid., 13,459-60
4 Ibid., 13,468-71.
5 Report of the Coal Mine Inspectorfor the State of Utah from April 6th to December 31st, 1896 (Salt Lake City: Deseret News Publishing Company, 1897), 3, 4
6 Advocate, September 5, 1912; Union Pacific Coal Company, History of the Union Pacific Coal Mines, 1868 to 1940 (Omaha: Colonial Press, [1940]), 103;"United States v C M Freed et al., [1910] Vol 2," Records of Utah State Land Board, Utah State Archives, 419-29 Hydrocarbons are other carbon-based substances, specifically asphaltum, gilsonite, elaterite, and ozokerite
7 State Coal Mine Inspector's Report (hereafter SCMIR) 1897, Utah State Archives, 2; ibid 1897, 23; ibid 1898, 52-53
8 Ibid 1899, 4, 17-19.The man-way is the tunnel through which the miners travel
9 SCMIR 1899, 20,33
10 "Articles of Incorporation, Wasatch Store Company," no page, listing David Dodge and William E Colton, both of the D&RGW, as two of the initial incorporators, and "Articles of Incorporation, Pleasant Valley Coal Company," listing W F Colton as the largest shareholder (100 shares; all others owned one share), no page, College of Eastern Utah Special Collections, Price, Utah For an extended description of mine acquisition, see Nancy J. Taniguchi, Necessary Fraud: Progressive Reform and Utah Coal (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), 10—42. For a complete description of the company town system, see James B.Allen, The Company Town in the American West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966)
11 SCMIR 1900,67
12 See the testimony in ibid., 68—80
13 J.W Dilley, History of the Scofield Mine Disaster (Provo: Skelton Publishing, 1900;privately reprinted by Paul and Linda Helsten for the 100-year commemoration of the Winter Quarters Mine disaster, May 1, 2000), 47-48
14 Ibid., 493
15 Ibid., 50-523
16 Los Angeles Times, May 3,1900
17 "Report of Explosion atWinter Quarter[s] Mines, May 1st. 1900," attachment to Gomer Thomas to Governor Heber M.Wells,June 1, 1900, in Dept.: Industrial Commission, Div.: State Coal Mine Inspector, Series: Reports 1900—1916, Box B106gl, "Reports by State Mine Inspector to Governor and Various Organizations 1902-1904," Utah State Archives, 2 (hereafter Disaster Report) This report has a blank to represent the name of the other rescued miner See also SCMIR 1900, 64
18 SCMIR 1900, 61; Los Angeles Times, May 3, 1900
19 Allan Kent Powell, The Next Time We Strike (Logan: Utah State University Press, 1985), 231 n 10
20 Ibid., 32, 33; Los Angeles Times, May 4, 1900.
According to Powell (231 n 1), the Winter Quarters Mine disaster is the fourth most severe coal mine disaster in the United States and the worst to that point in history. The others with larger loss of life were: December 6, 1907, 362 killed at Monongah, West Virginia; December 19, 1907, 239 killed at Jacobs Creek, Pennsylvania; October 22, 1913, 263 killed at Dawson, New Mexico
21 Noble Warrum, ed., Utah Since Statehood, 4 vols (Chicago and Salt Lake City: S.J Clarke, 1919), 1:267
22 Powell, The Next Time We Strike, 32 A partial list of individual, fraternal, mercantile, and municipal donors canbe found in Dilley, History of the Scofield Mine Disaster, 197-98
23 Disaster Report
24 Ibid.,5.
25 Ibid., 9, 11,12, 15.Only a very hot fire could cause coal to turn to coke. This process was usually performed in beehive-shaped ovens under controlled conditions Coke was used largely for smelting throughout the West
26 SCMIR 1900,62.
27 Ibid.; italics added.
28 Disaster Report, 1.
29 Dilley, History of the Scofield Mine Disaster, 115-16.
30 Los Angeles Times, May 3, 1900.
31 See Powell, The Next Time We Strike, 33-34.
32 SCMIR 1899, 8.
33 Ibid. 1900, 49.
34 Los Angeles Times, May 3, 1900.
35 SCMIR, 1900, 61-97.
36 Ibid 1900, 95
37 "In the District Court, of the Seventh Judicial District, Carbon County, Utah, and , Plaintiffs, v. Pleasant Valley Coal Company, Defendant, Answer.... Dated 1900"; Carbon County Recorder's Office, Price, Utah; copy in possession of the author. In this case the suit was brought by "Fortunato Maio, Joseph Maio, Humbert Maio, by Guardian ad [sic] Venturas Maio and [unintelligible] John Maio."The date has been altered; it reads February 11, 1901,with the final printed zero crossed out to represent 1 The practice of assigning blame to the miners was common throughout the industrial United States at this time.
38 SCMIR, 1900, 67.
38 SCMIR, 1900, 67.
39 Ibid., 63.
40 Ibid., 42.
41 Ibid., 63.
42 Ibid., 56
43 James Whiteside, Regulating Danger (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), 70—72 The other state with dust-control laws was Montana.
44 SCMIR 1901,19
45 Ibid., 17
46 Ibid 1902,78
47 Ibid 1903,19
48 Ibid., 18.
49 For a full description, see Powell, The Next Time We Strike, 51-80.
50 N P.Wilson, secretary to the governor, to Gomer Thomas, February 12, 1906, in State Coal Mines Inspector's Correspondence; original at American West Center, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah; copy in possession of the author
51 Advocate, April 26, 1906
52 Gomer Thomas to Andrew Gilbert, May 7, 1906, in State Coal Mine Inspector's Correspondence; copy in possession of the author.
53 SCMIR 1906, 46.
54 Whiteside, Regulating Danger, 151—52.
55 Advocate, September 5, 1912 In modern times, the explosive potential of coal dust has been harnessed In coal-fired electricity generating plants, coal is powdered and the dust exploded under controlled conditions to create a fireball that reaches up to 2,600 degrees Fahrenheit The fireball turns water to steam, which is used to turn the turbines The turbine shafts connect with generators that produce electricity
