Presny

Mobility policies in the Paris area J.P. Orfeuil UniversitĂŠ Paris Est Atelier Transit City 1 Juillet 2011 1

1982-2007 A decentralization process • This process leads to give the responsibility of local and regional networks (investment, operations) to local / regional authorities • They will « do the job »: restriction of the access of the car to the central city (Paris municipality), land use planning and new transport investment in a long term view (region Sdrif) • Dominance of « environmental justification » 2

2007-now Intervention of the central government The capital region, which is a world city, is loosing jobs, international influence, etc.

The governance of the transport/ land use system is not at the top As a result, the “metropolitan idea� is insufficiently taken into account 3

2007-now Some support on the diagnosis • From experts on the metropolitan dimension • From residents, due to lack of quality of service of the PT system • From residents, who are opposed to new roads in the “core part” of the region 4

Les TC du Sdrif

5

Exemple (plusieurs pages de ce type)

6

L’annonce du Grand Huit dans la presse

7

Ideas at the departure point • A quick transport network (150 km) opening the opportunities of urban development and serving current or future clusters • Financed by private money (on the growth of the land values) • Contracts for operations not necessarily to “historic operators” • A development through a specific company, the “Greater Paris company” 8

Au moment de l’accord « historique » (janvier 2011)

9

La carte de mai 2011

10

A guaranted emotional reaction Immediate perception of the ambition Associated with a good story telling Esthetics No need to go through rationality process Evaluation through seduction more than through public participation

11

(Portzamparc)

12

A major criticism • “We have first to improve the existing network” is the first requirement issued from the public participation process

13

A storytelling … which is wrong • A million more jobs in relation to the project…

• Private funding will be marginal only • Taxes (mainly on companies) will be the solution • Monopoly of RATP by law

14

The final agreement between the government and the regional authority • Yes, the existing network will be improved • Yes, the “Grand Paris network will be built For a total of 32,4 billion euros from now to 2025 With a usage fee for the operator which ill not exceed 0,8 % of the total investment value

15

Unsolved problems

16

Unsolved problems • Usually, the final investment cost is much higher than the predicted ones “Underestimated costs + overestimated benefits= project approval” (Flyjvberg) • Patronage has very good reasons to be overestimated (hypothesis of a land use control very strict) • “The infostructure” linked to the “infrastructure” not taken in consideration 17

Unsolved problems • “The infostructure” (fare structure, relations to companies, level of “versement transport) linked to the “infrastructure” not taken in consideration • Very few expected modal shifts from cars, so congestion remains, and car remains the main transport mode 18

Unsolved problems • Impossible to anticipate productivity progresses from the operator • New taxes on companies and region’s attractivity • New expenses in the context of economic crisis

19

Sur 225 méga projets dans le monde Coûts réels / coûts anticipés

Trafics réels / trafics anticipés

Rail

+45 %

-51 %

Route

+20 %

+9 %

20

Can we continue that way?

Subsidies to PT operations

RĂŠgional GDP 2000-2009

+ 46 %

+ 16 %

21

Comparaison du prix du km pour l’usager Idf / province (2007) (différence de salaire: + 37 %) Normal, pas normal, ça aurait pu se discuter…

Prix du km TC pour l’usager(c€)

Idf

Province

8,7

14,0

22

Fare structures in favor of long commuting

30 25 20 15

Co没t / km

10 5 0 2z

3z

4z

5z

6z

23

A huge public support to long distance commuting

2 zones: around 800 euros / year 6 zones: environ 5200 euros / year

24

No effort to “import” the “Oyster system from London

25