Asian Military Review - December 2018

Volume 26/issue 8

decEMber 2018 US$15

A s i a P a c i f i c ’ s L a r g e s t C i r c u la t e d D e f e n c e M a g a Z i n e

AIRBORNE COUNTERMEASURES SUBMARINES

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Contents

DECEMBER 2018 VOLUME 26 / ISSUE 8

06 Tim Fish reports on the perceived importance of owning submarines in Asia Pacific.

Three United States Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles display their countermeasure flares over the Utah Test and Training Range, 3 July, 2018. The aircraft are assigned to the 391st Fighter Squadron. (USAF)

SUBMARINE CLOSE ENCOUNTERS

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UNDERSTANDING DEFENSIVE AID SUITES

KEEPING FAITH WITH LIGHT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

NIGHT VISION: THERMAL IMAGING TO IMAGE FUSION

Protecting aircraft through countermeasures is a continually evolving skill. Peter Donaldson investigates.

David Oliver looks at the aircraft being selected to provide kinetic support to land forces.

Stephen W Miller peers into the ever clearer world of night vision and thermal imaging systems.

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CYBER: A GLOBAL WEAPON

MODERNISING THE PHILIPPINE ARMED FORCES

ANALYST COLUMN

Angus Batey discusses the fall-out from three cyber attacks that often ended with greater consequences than intended.

Andrew Drwiega looks into Horizon 2 of the Philippine armed forces 15 year modernisation plan.

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Columnist Anthony Davis examines the insurgency within the Philippines.

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Index of Advertisers

AVALON

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HOUSE AD

Editorial

COVER 3

IMDEX

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ISDEF

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LAAD

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NORTHROP GRUMMAN

COVER 4

ROSOBORONEXPORT

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SEOUL AIRSHOW

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UTC

COVER 2

Advertising Offices France/Spain Stephane de Remusat, REM International Tel: (33) 5 3427 0130 E-Mail: sremusat@rem-intl.com Germany Sam Baird, Whitehill Media Tel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646 E-Mail: sam@whitehillmedia.com Turkey / Eastern Europe / UK Zena Coupé Tel: +44 1923 852537, zena@expomedia.biz Nordic Countries/Italy/ Switzerland Emanuela Castagnetti-Gillberg Tel: (46) 31 799 9028 E-Mail: emanuela.armada@gmail.com Russia Alla Butova, NOVO-Media Ltd, Tel/Fax: (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653 Email :alla@mediatransasia.com USA (East/South East)/Canada (East) Margie Brown, Blessall Media, LLC. Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581 Email: margiespub@rcn.com USA (West/South West)/Brazil/Canada (West) Diane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc Tel : (+1 858) 759 3557 Email: blackrockmediainc@icloud.com All Other Countries Jakhongir Djalmetov, Media Transasia Limited Tel: +66 2204 2370, Mobile: +66 81 6455654 Email: joha@mediatransasia.com

THREATENED JAPAN BREAKS OUT OF SELF-DEFENCE

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s the People’s Republic of China ramps up its foreign policy strategy hand-in-hand with the expansion of its armed forces, particularly in the maritime environment, and Kim Jong-un’s North Korea remains in practice unrestrained despite the meetings earlier in the year with President Trump, Japan looks to have set course to accelerating its strategic posture beyond its traditional Peace Constitution.

China’s rapid ‘island building’ campaign in the South China Sea caught the international community off guard, and the vulnerability of Japan’s Senkaku Islands (also known to the Chinese as the Diaoyu Islands since the early 1970s and Tiaoyutai Islands in the Republic of China - Taiwan) is now all too apparent to Japan and is a major issue between the states. The tension was significantly heightened in September 2012 when the Japanese government officially purchased the islands from the Kurihara family for a total of around $25 million (Y2.05 billion) at 2012 rates.

Two months later the Chinese government announced that it had established the East China Sea Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) and required all aircraft entering the zone to file a flight plan and identification information so that China could “identify, monitor, control and react to aircraft entering this zone with potential air threats.”

There is now serious concern that the Chinese will now try and established a similar ADIZ in the South China Sea, having developed the disputed islands including the Spratly Islands into military bases with operational airfields that could (theoretically) physically ‘police’ such a declaration.

China’s long-stated aim to reunify Taiwan with the mainland is a standing long-term goal and the envelopment of the nation through control of the seas around it also seems to be part of China’s maritime strategy. Doing this would also allow it much more freedom for its navy to roam into the western Pacific. The United States has defence agreements with both Japan and Taiwan to come to their aid should defence be required.

However, Japan is now taking matters more into its own hands, with increased outreach to countries within the region. At the start of the year then Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull travelled to Tokyo to meet Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and concluded broader defence agreements that would cover more frequent “exercises, operations, capacity building, navy, army and air force visits, and further co-¬operation on defence equipment.”

The opening up of Japan to both increased imports and exports of defence equipment has also triggered the arms industry into heightened activity. The establishment of the first tri-service DSEI Japan, managed by Clarion Events and Crisis Intelligence Japan, looks to rapidly integrate Japanese defence and security companies into the international marketplace, certainly regionally and inexorably worldwide.

Roman Durksen, Media Transasia Limited Tel: +66 2204 2370, Mobile +66 83 6037989 E-Mail: roman@mediatransasia.com

Andrew Drwiega, Editor

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SUBMARINE CLOSE ENCOUNTERS

The burgeoning need for submarines in Asia Pacific is outstripping the region’s capacity to produce them.

by Tim Fish 06

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he trend towards the acquisition of submarines in the Asia-Pacific region is gathering pace as more countries join the race. Maritime industry representatives attribute this submarine arms race to the growth of China and the rapid expansion of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) sub-surface capability across both nuclearpowered and conventionally powered submarines.

The PLAN’s nuclear-powered submarine classes are still largely developmental but with its Jin-class (Type 094) ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) it has a medium range capability and is embarking on a new Type 096 SSBN project that will upgrade its sea-based deterrent further. The Shangclass (Type 093) and earlier Han-class (Type 091) attack submarines (SSNs) are based on Russian designs and are reputed to be rather noisy, however the latest Type 095 being built is intended to be much quieter.

For hunter-killer submarines (SSKs) there is a similar story. The early Mingclass (Type 035) submarines delivered unsatisfactory performance and the PLAN ended up buying a large number of Russian Kilo-class boats to supplement its force. But the newer Song-class (Type 039) have more enhanced features and up to 13 hulls are rumoured to be in existence. The most recent is the Yuan-class (Type 39A/Type 041) which appears to have been developed from the Kilo-class but are far more effective than their predecessors and are another step up in capability with over 17 in service.

Reducing target echo strength is a key development in all submarines across the Asia-Pacific region with the use of more internal mountings for machinery and new materials for the outside of the hull. A further development for SSKs is energy storage where new Li-ion batteries will bring significant enhancements in power usage and will complement the introduction of air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems. AIP allows conventional submarines to engage in longer submerged missions.

Despite the expansion of the PLAN fleet, other nations including India, Japan and South Korea are looking to their own industries to support larger submarine fleets. However, the response in southest Asian countries will be limited due to constrained budgets and the ability to provide crews and maintenance for the boats.

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Submarine supermarket In June, Philippines president Rodrigo Duterte announced that his country would acquire two diesel-electric submarines under the Horizon 2 military modernisation programme.

The Philippine Navy (PN) has been training personnel for submarine operations since it released a Request for Information (RfI) in December 2016. It is explicated that this will have appealed to European submarine yards such as France’s Naval Group, Germany’s Thyssenkrupp Marines Systems (TKMS), Sweden’s Saab Kockums along with South Korea’s Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME) and Russia’s Rosboronexport.

Horizon 2 will run from 2018-22 and the delivery of a first boat is expected in 2025 but questions have arisen about whether the PN will be able to operate and support submarines without dedicated facilities or any existing antisubmarine warfare assets. It would be a considerable leap forward and the Philippines has more pressing maritime security requirements with its surface fleet.

Current designs that the PN may consider include the Scorpene variant from Naval Group, a Type 209, 210 or 212 from TKMS, a variant of the Chang Bogo class from DSME and a Kilo-class project 636 from Russia. But Duterte’s drive for submarines looks to be more about prestige than building an actual

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capability. It appears that he is merely copying rivals in the region and it will be interesting to see if the PN can sustain an SSK capability.

Thailand is another country that is developing a new underwater capability with the selection of China’s S26T design, a 2,600 tonne export variant of the Type 041 Yuan-class boat. A single boat was ordered for the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) in May 2017 under a $410 million contract and will be built by China Shipbuilding and Offshore International Company (CSOC). Steel was cut in September this year with delivery expected from 2023.

A further two boats will be ordered separately.

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The S26 has also been ordered by Pakistan, which has a requirement for eight new boats. Bangladesh is also buying two second hand Type 035G Ming-class boats from China.

Indonesia selected the DSME Chang Bogo Type 209/1400 design for its submarine programme in 2011 under a $1.1 billion contract for three submarines.

It received the first, named KRI Nagapasa, in August 2017, with the second boat, KRI Ardadedali delivered in April. The third is to be built by Indonesian shipbuilder PT Pal under a technology transfer arrangement. DSME has also secured a $27 million contract to upgrade the Indonesian Navy’s (Tentara Nasional

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Indonesia-Angkatan Laut - TNI-AL) existing two Cakra-class Type 209/1300 boats that TKMS delivered in 1981.

In South Korea, DSME is building a third series of Chang Bogo-class submarines for the Republic of Korean Navy (ROKN) to its own KSS III design.

Ki Seong Hong, deputy general manager of DSME’s Navy and Special Ship division told AMR that there will be three boats in the initial batch of Chang Bogo III submarines. “DSME designed the KSS III; we launched the first boat in September and are constructing the second boat with a plan to launch in 2020,’ he said.

Rival South Korean shipbuilding Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) is building the third of class. Hong said that the second batch of KSS III boats will start with the fourth boat, and could go to an additional three or even six boats in total.

The original Chang Bogo I class was based on the Type 209 from TKMS with the Chang Bogo II class based on the Type 214. Hong said that the new design from DSME will result in the Chang Bogo III class having “double the operational endurance” of the Type 209, with better stealth characteristics and technology, a different propulsion system and a wider array of weaponry. Hong added that the ROKN will not retire its older submarines as it wants to expand its fleet.

Neighbouring Japan is also retaining more of its older SSKs in service to provide an expansion to its sub-surface fleet. The Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) has been able to support a large force of 16-18 submarines for some time on a rolling programme of annual construction but now aims to grow this to 22 boats within the next few years.

It announced in February this year

that it was upgrading seven of the 11 of its older class of Oyashio-class submarines to the standard of the newer class of Souryu-class submarines, of which 11 have been built out of an expected 14 boats. Like South Korea, Japan has split production of its submarines between two suppliers: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, however Japanese industry has not been as successful on the export market. Although it is engaged in the Indian P-75I submarine programme and Taiwan’s submarine programme it failed to secure the Australian SEA1000 Future Submarine programme despite being touted as a preferred option.

Shortfin Barracuda Hooked The $36 billion (AUD$50 bn) programme for 12 boats was won by Naval Group in 2016 with its offer of the Shortfin Barracuda 1A design – a conventionally powered variant of the company’s Barracuda design that is being used for the French Navy’s Suffren-class SSN. However, despite the signing of a design and mobilisation contract the programme is rumoured to be in trouble due to a breakdown in relations between the company and the Australian government and the failure to sign a strategic partnership agreement to allow the programme to progress.

Naval Group director of communications, Arnaud Genin, told AMR that despite news reports of a delay the programme “is on track” with 100 personnel from the company in Australia and 350 Australian personnel in France at sites in Cherbourg, Toulon and Nantes.

He said that Naval Group is delivering the solution but the design

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is not yet finalised. Genin explained that there needs to be a visibility study, followed by the basic design stage and then the detailed design stage – a process that can take up to seven years.

He added that Naval Group and the Australian government are about to reach a milestone on the visibility study and are training the Australian team that will become responsible for that design.

Genin added that a design and mobilisation contract would be signed by the end of the year and that a Strategic Partnership Agreement would cover relations for around 50 years. He added that it did not help that “political instability” in Australia has affected the progress of negotiations, but that the construction of the new shipyard at ASC North in Osborne near Adelaide in South Australia would begin within the next few months.

Naval Group is also engaged in the P-75 Kalvari-class submarine programme in India that aims to deliver six Scorpene class submarines in partnerships with Indian shipbuilder Mazagon Docks Limited (MDL). The programme has experienced considerable delays but the first boat, INS Kalvari, was finally commissioned in November 2017 and has undertaken operations with the Indian Navy. The second boat is undergoing the final stages of sea trials and will be commissioned by the end of 2018. Future plans are to deliver the remaining four boats on an annual drumbeat from 2019-2023.

The delays are blamed on the lack of experience of MDL, which had lost skills it had developed in the 1980s with TKMS when it delivered the Shishuma-class of submarines. This meant that Naval Group had to help restart skills training from 2004-05 when the P-75 programme started. India still has a requirement for 24 SSKs and after the first Kalvari-class boats have been delivered it is expected that a follow-on class of six P-75I boats will follow. It is unclear if the Indian government will stay with Naval Group or choose a different design supplier, or even if it will continue with MDL as the domestic builder.

With all the submarine programmes underway there are projected numbers for over 300 submarines to be in-service with Asia-Pacific countries over the next few decades, a massive increase on the existing inventories. This could create considerable security challenges later this century as navies increasingly rely on submarines to preserve their maritime security in a more congested environment. AMR

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While the human eye can easily distinguish between this F-16 and the flares it has launched, the problem is much more difficult for IR missile seekers, even the imaging kind, although flares alone are not enough today.

UNDERSTANDING DEFENSIVE AID SUITES Systems to protect aircraft can be easily taken for granted, but the science behind their development is intricate and continually evolving.

by Peter Donaldson

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ir power depends on the balance of capability between surface-to-air and air-to-air missile systems and aircraft self-protection systems.

Inevitably, this balance will be different between different pairs of antagonists even if they are equipped with broadly comparable platforms, and much will be decided by the quality of their electronic warfare (EW) support establishments.

Knowledge of this balance in technological terms and in particular cases is hard to come by and highly classified, and without it discussions of the relative merits of various force structures and aircraft types, fascinating though they are, suffer from a debilitating lacuna.

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Insights into the complexity of the subject are available from open source discussion of the modelling and simulation that play a vital part in the development of missile seekers, electronic countermeasures (ECM), electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs).

Inevitably, unclassified discussion has to centre on generic models and arbitrary values for the performance parameters of all the systems involved. These include the radar and infra-red (IR) signatures of aircraft, tracking radars, gunfire control radars and missile seekers, along with defensive devices such as radar warning receivers (RWR), missile approach warners (MAW), radar and IR jammers, on-board

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and off-board decoys, and the chaff and flares that are the focus of this article.

Simple devices, complex job Conceptually, these are simple devices given a difficult and complex job. Chaff consists of bundles of radar reflective dipoles cut to approximately half the wavelength of the radar they are intended to counter, while flares are small pyrotechnics. Both must be indistinguishable from a target aircraft – from a missile seeker's point of view – for long enough to protect it. Once, this wasn't very difficult as missile seekers were analogue and fairly dumb, but now they are digital, much smarter and software upgradeable.

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A chaff cloud begins to form behind a Gripen equipped with a BOL dispenser. Chaff can serve both to decoy missiles away from the platform and as a screen to hide it. As with flares, however, it is used in combination with other countermeasures.

While chaff is intended to fool radars and flares to decoy IR guided weapons, countermeasures system designers have to consider using them together. This is because threat systems are increasingly likely to employ both throughout the engagement, from detection and tracking by the launch platform to missile guidance and terminal homing in the end game.

For example, a fighter might detect a target with either a radar or an Infrared Search and Track (IRST) sensor and engage it with either a radar- or IR-guided missile, or both. Russian doctrine has long emphasised the launch of air-to-air missiles (AAMs) in such pairs, while the latest generation of missiles can include dual mode radar/IR seekers. Furthermore, aircraft that are expected to encounter sophisticated threats combine their chaff/ flare dispensing with other warning and countermeasure systems in tightly integrated Defensive Aid Suites (DAS).

TESS engagement simulation One organisation that specialises in simulating engagements for development purposes is Canadian Leonardo subsidiary Tactical Technologies, whose Tactical Engagement Simulation Software (TESS) suite covers the airborne and seaborne Radio Frequency (RF) and IR domains.

The company emphasises that developing effective countermeasures to radar and IR guided weapons requires an intimate understanding of the way in which they operate and interact with targets in dynamic engagements. This, states the company, includes the effects of variables including specific engagement geometries, evasive manoeuvres, environmental conditions and countermeasure deployment strategies.

Using the MATLAB computing environment and Simulink simulation and model-based design software, Tactical Technologies developed TESS to provide high fidelity, physics-based simulations. These include either one or two threat missiles, the environment between them and the and target, plus the target itself and its countermeasure and evasive manoeuvring capabilities. After each run, TESS calculates miss-distance and probability-of-kill (Pk) results.

The Air RF ‘sub-group’ within TESS simulates radar guided surface-to-air and air-to-air missile systems and anti-aircraft artillery, with separate products based on the type of guidance that the threats use.

For example, the SAAM (APD) product simulates SAMs and AAMs with active pulse Doppler homing, either one or two per engagement, and a target aircraft.

The simulation permits the aircraft to defend itself using chaff, active noise and/or repeater towed decoys and a coherent DRFM-based on-board jammer in conjunction with manoeuvres. ECM techniques can be applied individually or in combinations against each of the missile seeker's modes, including search, acquisition and track.

Similarly, the Air IR sub-group simulates engagements between aircraft and passive IR guided SAM and AAM systems, dividing four generations of threats into two categories, putting the first three into the passive IR homing category and the fourth into the passive IR imaging category The simulator focused on fourth generation threats is called SAAM (IIR), and pits a manoeuvring aircraft, which can be a rotorcraft or a fixedwing platform, against either one or

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two state-of-the-art imaging IR missiles.

The countermeasures suite can include standard, propelled and distributed IR flares and a laser-based Directional Infrared Countermeasure (DIRCM) system.

According to Tactical Technologies, the user defines the aircraft's IR signature in one of two ways. The first is to specify a radiant intensity profile for each IR radiation source as a function of wavelength and aspect angle. These IR sources include the fuselage and up to four engines. The second method is to specify individual and/or group surface properties of a 3D model.

The simulated missile's seeker features generic tracking algorithms that take into account target size, peak and total radiated power and average centroid location. It can also run IR countercountermeasures (IRCCM) algorithms including two-colour discrimination, intensity ratio change and line-of-sight rate change.

We can dig a little deeper into the infra-red side of this struggle with the aid of Key considerations in infra-red simulations of the missile-aircraft engagement, a paper published six years ago by Maria S. Willers and Cornelius J. Willers of South Africa's Denel Dynamics.

IR simulations used in development environments, they emphasised, must be radiometrically accurate in all the spectral bands including sunlight and thermal radiance to ensure that all the ratios between colours are correct.

The surface temperature behaviour of emitting sources, whether they are heated aerodynamically or thermodynamically, must also be accurately modelled, while geometrical and spatial textures must be rendered with high fidelity to create

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rate at which it separates from another blob exceeds a predetermined threshold it is rejected.

Colour is another key discriminator, as seekers that operate in two IR spectral bands measure the blob's ratio between the two to see if it matches the ratio characteristic of aircraft exhaust plumes, rejecting the blob as a non-target if it doesn’t.

These target discrimination techniques imply BOL dispensers can fire both chaff and flares and offers a high the kinds of things that payload-to-volume ratio, a non-pyrotechnic release mechanism flare developers are and effective dispersion, which allows covert dispensing of a obliged to do to defeat special material that is effective against advanced IR missiles. them. Burn profile shaping is one area of response in realistic target and countermeasure shapes. which the energy that the flare puts out is manipulated through its burn time to The simulation must also reproduce how mimic jet profiles as closely as possible. real targets and countermeasures move.

The simulation must further include Another response is the development of detailed, accurate modelling of signatures low drag flares and even ones that produce and backgrounds, along with several other thrust to fool both trajectory sensing and key physical properties. These include line-of-site separation rate algorithms. atmospheric transmittance, which deals Multi-spectral flares have composiwith how various wavelengths pass tions that include cooler burning materials through or are absorbed by the atmosphere. so that their colour ratios will match jet Imaging missile seekers also have to exhaust plume ratios well enough to be modelled accurately to account for defeat two-colour capable missile seekers. primary and second order imaging effects Smart dispensers carry cocktails that govern how they perceive the image. of flares with different chemistries to counter multiple threat types, and multishot flares combination different flare Blob discrimination types in one payload.

An imaging seeker must distinguish between objects within its field of view known as blobs, according to the Willers' Multi-burst covert flare paper. Implemented either in hardware One potentially important direction for or software, the seeker's algorithms future flare development was flagged must isolate blobs from background up early this year in a Small Business noise and extract features from them to Innovation Research (SBIR) programme classify them as targets, countermeasures, announcement from the US Navy clouds or other clutter. Shape is one type (USN), which wants a timed payload of feature used for classification, and release mechanism for multiple stacks of includes parameters such as compactness pyrophoric foils in a single decoy cartridge. and length to width ratio.

Pyrophoric decoys use high surface Features that change with time, such area metal foil that reacts with oxygen as intensity are also discriminators. For in the air to emit intense IR radiation example, a rise in intensity that is faster invisible to the naked eye. The current than would be expected from a jet engine decoy payload uses pyrophoric iron throttling up would trigger a “flare coated onto coils of steel foil, several detected� flag. DIRCM transmissions can hundred of which are dispensed be also detected this way. simultaneously from an airtight casing How blobs move is also telling, and by a single impulse cartridge. The USN seekers use trajectory sensing to exploit wants a mechanism that can either bind the fact that aerodynamic drag slows or contain three or more discrete foils and flares rapidly so they soon lag behind the release them to produce multiple discrete aircraft, and gravity pulls them down. bursts of IR energy from the launch of a Also, the seeker tracks all blobs and if the single cartridge.

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| Asian Military Review |

While chaff operates in a very different portion of the electromagnetic spectrum from flares and it reflects energy from hostile active sensors rather than emitting energy towards them, its purpose is essentially the same, although chaff clouds can also screen targets from detection in the way that smoke can in the visual spectrum, and they can hang in the air long enough to persistently disrupt radar operation over large areas.

Chaff challenges Chaff forms a cloud of aluminium coated glass fibres sized to reflect RF energy over the range of wavelengths that threat radars and missile seekers use designed to create a false target. In some ways, this is an even taller order than the task facing flares, as a cloud of tiny fibres behaves less like an aircraft than small chunks of burning chemicals do.

There are many ways in which radar and missile ECCM can exploit the physical, dynamic and electromagnetic differences between chaff clouds and real Australian DoD

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A Royal Australian Air Force armament technician reloads an F/A-18's countermeasures dispenser with chaff cartridges during major international Five Power exercise Bersama Shield in 2012. Most modern dispensers can handle mixed chaff and flare loads.

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A Romanian IAR-330 Puma helicopter deploys flares in display mode during Romanian Navy Day in Constanta, Romania in August 2018. The vortices on either side of the fuselage illustrate a feature of helicopter aerodynamics that dispensing systems have to take into account.

targets. For example, chaff decelerates almost instantly to the speed of the surrounding air means that techniques such as Doppler and Moving Target Indication (MTI) processing are valuable in distinguishing chaff clouds from real targets, although using a jammer in conjunction with chaff can add another layer of deception to the engagement, with the jammer aboard the fast-moving aircraft illuminating the chaff cloud and giving a strong Doppler component to the signal apparently coming from the chaff.

Chaff clouds also form extended “targets” that also produce returns with greater pulse widths than aircraft because echoes of the same pulse from reflectors at different ranges can partially overlap at the antenna, creating pulses that last longer.

Two kinds of fluctuation known as scintillation and glint can also be used as discriminators. An aircraft structure has a small number of elements of different Radar Cross Sections (RCS) in fixed positions relative to each other that scatter radar signals, although manoeuvring can change their apparent positions.

In contrast, chaff clouds contain vast numbers of tiny elements of very similar RCS that are in constant relative motion.

Scintillation is a change in the amplitude of the signal from the target, and the scintillation of a chaff cloud is likely to be much more rapid than that from the target and contain higher frequency components. Glint arises from distortions of the signal's phase, which will also be less distinct and change more rapidly in a reflection from a chaff cloud than that from a real target.

Assessing the use of glint in ECCM in an anti-ship missile context, William Vigder of TTI Tactical Technologies wrote that the low frequencies associated with

glint means that the technique needs a relatively long time to make a decision, so the missile may not have enough time to lock onto a new target if the seeker determines that its current target is a chaff cloud. With aircraft capable of much more rapid manoeuvres, this may be less of a problem for the missile.

The greater pulse width associated with chaff clouds than with real targets can also be exploited by waveform filtering techniques including fast time constant (FTC) processing, according to Vigder. FTC functionality in a missile seeker processes radar returns to reduce the power in long duration pulses by passes only the leading portion of an incoming pulse and zeroing out the remainder. It is only likely to be effective if the peak power in the target signal is higher than the ECM peak power, Vigder cautioned.

The numerous ECCM techniques that can be employed against chaff have caused some to question whether it has a future as an effective countermeasure. However, most of those techniques help discriminate between chaff and don’t seem to address its screening capabilities.

Furthermore, large amounts can be carried to produce multiple clouds with precisely controlled timing to saturate a missile seeker’s processing bandwidth.

The chaff and flare industry consists of companies that develop the countermeasures themselves and others that develop dispensing systems such as cartridge launchers and chaff cutters for mounting on or into aircraft fuselages or pods, systems integration, simulation and testing. Industry leaders include BAE Systems, Chemring, Elbit, Esterline, IMI, Lacroix, MBDA, Pacific Scientific, Saab and Terma.

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New smart dispensers On 8 October, BAE Systems announced its new Smart D2 countermeasures dispensing system that is designed to manage and deploy smart, expendable countermeasures including multi-shot flares, active radio-frequency (RF) decoys, and even kinetic interceptors. Smart D2 improves on in-service systems, says the company, by providing two-way communication between the dispenser and aircraft using the NATO-standard Smart Stores Communication Interface (SSCI), providing crews with critical inventory information and the ability to program expendable, active decoys in real time to improve survivability against advanced threats. The system monitors the quantity, location, age, and carriage life of each expendable and can deploy a tailored mix of smart countermeasures against specific threats, the company adds.

This came just months after Terma revealed a re-engineered an upgraded version of its Advanced Countermeasures Dispensing System (ACMDS) that is designed to be form-fit compatible with legacy Terma and third party dispensers and to be fully reprogrammable in customer countries. The refreshed ACDMS also features an SSCI interface a part of its new digital sequencer to support new generation expendables, improve its mixed payload capabilities and provide intelligent inventory management in addition to enhancing its operational capabilities. The SSCI enables in-flight pre-launch programming of smart stores, including multi-shot cartridges, expendable active decoys (EAD), and hard kill expendables. The ACMDS also has hardware-controlled safety features that are adaptable to different platforms including fixed-wing, fighter, transport and large-body aircraft as well as rotorcraft, and is controlled by the company’s AN/ALQ-213 EW management unit/DAS controller.

Research and development also continues into the chaff itself, deployment sequences and timing, and its use in conjunction with other countermeasures and with aircraft manoeuvres to produce combined effects that last long enough to fool a threat missile into choosing the wrong target.

Incremental improvements, therefore, in their deceptive performance are worthwhile and likely to motivate the development of both chaff and flares for a long time to come. AMR

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KEEPING FAITH WITH LIGHT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT The appeal of light, close air support aircraft endures in a region increasingly worried by the likelihood of returning Daesh fighters adding to existing insurgency challenges.

by David Oliver 14

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A total of 26 A-29 Super Tucanos manufactured in the United States have been ordered by the US DoD for the Afghan Air Force.

Aero Vodochody is optimistic that Asia Pacific Albatros operators will adopt its latest L-39NG AJT/ light combat aircraft.

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ith internal threats from Daesh-linked militants, the light attack aircraft is a sought after weapon for a growing number of Asia Pacific countries. The latest generation of counter-insurgency (COIN) aircraft are specialised variants of basic or advanced training aircraft designed for close air support (CAS) and armed reconnaissance missions in low-intensity operations.

In 2010 the United States Air Force (USAF) issued a Light Air Support

(LAS) aircraft requirement for the then Afghanistan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) to be fielded by 2013. The programme called for fixed-wing singleengine turboprop platform, with a number of critical requirements that the winning aircraft had to fulfil including a roughfield capability without ground support, dual controls, ejection seats, specific airto-ground weapons and systems, as well as a defensive-aids system.

Two contenders for the LAS programme turned out to be adaptations of basic trainer aircraft, the Brazilian Embraer A-29 Super Tucano and the American Beechcraft AT-6B Texan II, while a third was a modified agricultural crop sprayer, the Air Tractor AC-802U. None were designed as armed reconnaissance/ COIN platforms.

Finally, on 27 February 2013 Embraer and its partner Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC) was awarded a $427 million contract to supply 20 Embraer A-29 Super Tucano aircraft to be built in Jacksonville, Florida, as well as ground-based training equipment, pilot and maintenance training, and logistical support.

The first production A-29 LAS aircraft was delivered to Moody Air Force Base (AFB) in September 2014 prior to training of Afghan pilots and maintainers. AAF A-29 Super Tucanos based in Kabul took part in their first air strike operations against Taliban targets in Afghanistan in April 2016 since when an additional four aircraft have been ordered for the Afghan Air Force (AAF).

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Powered by a 1,193kW (1,600shp) Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-633 turboprop with FADAC, driving a Hartzell five-blade propeller, the light attack version’s armament includes one FNH 12.27mm machine gun in each wing and the provision of a variety of ordnance including two Nexter NC621 20mm canon pods, Mk 81/82 bombs, BLG-252 cluster bombs, LM70/19, or LAU-68A/G rocket pods, on underwing stations. A FLIR AN/AAQ-22 Star SAFIRE multisensor laser designator provides the aircraft’s ISR capability. In May 2018 the USAF announced that AAF A-29s had begun using laser-guided bombs and that 96 percent of the LGB strikes had been successful.

In September the US Department of Defence (DoD) extended the AAF’s A-29 procurement contract to cover a total of 26 aircraft to be delivered by 2024.

In February 2016 the Indonesian Air Force (Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Udara - TNI-AU) took delivery of the last four of 16 Embraer A-29B Super Tucanos to be operated in the COIN role with No 21 Squadron based at Malang.

The TNI-AU also has a fleet of singleseat lightweight multirole BAe Hawk 209 combat aircraft operated by No 2 Squadron at Pekanburu in the ground attack role. The Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) also operates a fleet of similar Hawk 208s with No 6 ‘Chakra’ Squadron at Labuan.

In November 2017 Embraer announced an order of six A-29 Super

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The Republic of Korea Air Force has ordered a total of 60 KAI F/A-50 light attack aircraft to replace its large fleet of veteran F-5E Tiger IIs.

Tucanos for the Philippine Air Force (PAF). The Super Tucano was selected as part of the PAF’s ongoing modernisation plan and will be deployed for close air support, light attack, surveillance, airto-air interception, and COIN missions.

Deliveries will start in 2019 to the PAF’s 15th Strike Wing at Lumbia to replace its veteran North American Rockwell OV-10 Broncos. The OV-10 was a twinturboprop light attack and observation aircraft developed in the 1960s for the COIN role, and was used extensively during the Vietnam War. While the Super Tucano has been viewed as a natural successor to the OV10 with more than 250 produced, many air forces in the region have selected light attack variants of the latest generation of advanced jet trainers such as the Yak-130 Mitten and the KAI T-50 Golden Eagle.

The protracted development of the twin-engine subsonic Yak-130 has its origins in the Yakovlev’s Design Bureau’s relationship with Italy’s Aermacchi in 1994. However, this relationship was terminated in 2002 with Aermacchi developing its own advanced jet trainer, the M-346, based on the Yak-130. Assigned the NATO reporting name ‘Mitten’ and powered by two 24.5kN (5,512lb) Ivchenko-Progress AI-222-25 turbofans, the first Yak-130s entered service with the Russian Air and Space Force in 2009 since when a light attack variant has been

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offered to export customers.

With nine underwing hard points, the Yak-130 has a weapons payload of 3,000kg (6,615lb) that include a GSh-23L twin-barrel 23mm gun on the centreline station, 250kg free fall bombs, 500kg laser-guided bombs, 80mm and 122mm rocket launchers and Kh-25ML or AGMMaverick air-to-surface missiles.

By 2016, the Bangladesh Air Force had taken delivery of 16 Yak-130s in the light attack operated by Nos. 21 and 25 Squadrons at Zahurul Haque Air Base role to replace its fleet of Chinese Nanchang A-5C ground attack aircraft although two have subsequently been written-off. The second Yak-130 customer in the region is the Myanmar Air Force which ordered eight aircraft in 2015 and an additional four in 2017, also replacing its A-5C fleet. It has been reported that the Yak-130 has been ordered by the air forces of Laos and Vietnam but this has not been confirmed.

The other light attack variant of an advanced jet trainer that is attracting sales from a growing number of Asia Pacific countries is the Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) F/A-50. Developed from the T-50 Golden Eagle AJT, the tandem-seat supersonic F/A-50 powered by a single 78.7kN (17,700lb) General Electric F404-GE-102 turbofan first flew in 2003.

Equipped with the Elta EL/M-2032

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Multimode Airborne Fire Control radar, the F/A-50 has an internal General Dynamics M197 20mm three-barrel Gatling-type cannon and seven external weapons stations carrying up to up to 3,740kg (8,250lb) payload. Weapon options include Mk.82/83/84 and BLU-109 general-purpose bombs, GBU31/32/33 guided weapons, LAU-68/131 and LAU-3A/5003 rocket pods and Raytheon AIM-9L air-to-air missiles.

The Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) has a total of 60 F/A-50s on order to replace its fleet of more than 100 Northrop F-5E Tiger II aircraft. The T/A-50 is a lead-infighter trainer (LIFT) and a light combat version with Elta radar, weapon delivery software, wingtip missile launch rails and the internal gun.

The first export order was from the TNIAU which in 2011 selected the T/A-50 in preference to the Yak-130 and Aero Vodochody L-159B to replace its BAE Hawk Mk53s.

The Philippines Air Force (PAF) also selected the F/A-50PH as its first operational combat aircraft for a decade.

Deliveries of an initial order for 16 aircraft were completed in July 2017. The aircraft have already been in operations against terrorist groups and in July 2018 the PAF announced plans to acquire and additional 12 F/A-50PHs in the future.

In 2015 the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) ordered four KAI T-50TH LIFT

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The supersonic KAI T/A-50 and F/A-50 light combat aircraft have been selected by the air forces of Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand.

The light attack variant of the Russian Yak-130 advanced jet trainer is operated by the air forces of Bangladesh and Myanmar.

aircraft which are a modified armed version of the T-50 equipped with some weapon systems used in the F/A-50, but will not be equipped with communication facilities of the Link-16 standard and a number of other systems.

A second contract for an additional eight T-50THs was signed in July 2017 which are expected to be delivered by 2020 to replace the RTAF’s Aero Vodochody L-39ZAs. Variants of Aero Vodochody’s L-39

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aircraft remain in operation with a number of Asia Pacific air forces including Cambodia and Vietnam, and North Korea and Aero Vodochody is making a late pitch to replace them with is latest iteration of its Albatros, the L-39NG Certification is expected in 2019 with first deliveries in 2020. With a lead-time of seven months, the planned production rate is 20 aircraft a year.

Designed primarily as an AJT, the L-39NG can also performed a variety of other roles including light combat, close air support and reconnaissance. Powered

by Williams International FJ44-4M engine, the L-39NG’s avionics include an embedded virtual training capability.

It has five hard points with a 1,640kg (3,620lb) external weapons payload and an optional gun-pod.

Certification is expected in 2019 with first deliveries is 2020. With more than 3,000 L-39s produced, 400 of which remain in service in 46 countries, Aero is confident that many of them will be future L-39NG customers. AMR

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NIGHT VISION: THERMAL IMAGING TO IMAGE FUSION Night vision systems, once jealously guarded, are now cheaper and more widely available than ever before.

by Stephen W. Miller

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he introduction of technology that allows soldiers see in darkness has added a new dimension to the military and civilian agencies operate. As the price of the technology has reduced it has been more broadly adopted to the point that in some armies, night vision of some type can be provided to every front line soldier and tactical vehicle. Some special mission teams in the special forces community and some law enforcement SWAT units have every member equipped with night

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vision goggles, increasing their tactical advantage over their opponents.

Night Vision Technologies The first night vision was ‘infrared illumination’ which was an advance over visual ‘white’ lights. A special filter or lens that only allowed the near infrared (IR) spectrum to pass through was placed over a normal visible light source.

This could be a flashlight, headlight or searchlight. Near IR cannot be discerned by the human eye but can be with special

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viewing devices. Requiring a light source though makes it ‘active’ and anyone with an IR viewer can see the source. IR was widely used by armies in the 1950s through the 1970s when it began to be replaced by passive light intensification technology.

Often initially called Starlight scopes, a take-off on its ability to take the light of stars and amplify it sufficiently to see in darkness, light intensification or I², was introduced in the 1960s. It uses special electronic tubes that magnify the

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by too much light resulting in ‘blooming’ where exposure to sudden bright light causes part or the entire image to be lost.

Advances in the technology have partly addressed both of these issues but they remain a consideration. However, I² has become significantly more compact and lighter, as well as cheaper. As a result it has been the technology of choice for wide spread use such as individual night vision goggles (NVGs) for infantry, vehicle crews and helicopter crews.

Thermal imaging (TI) uses an entirely different technology than IR or I². It could actually be called an ‘all conditions’ vision system since it operates in both daylight and darkness, as well as in limited to no light conditions, and even in fog or smoke.

This is because TI uses a technology that differentiates the temperature of objects in its field of view. Thus; a person generating body heat stands out against a rock or tree. By digitally displaying these differences an entire scene is shown. The quality of the image is reflected in the ‘Delta-T’ or sensitivity, and size of the TI array. Early TI systems offered a legoblock like image that allowed good target detection but made target recognition and identification difficult. In the Iraq War, the TI sights of American combat vehicles proved a critical edge over Iraqi I² sights.

US crews were able to acquire the Iraqi vehicles more quickly and at longer range and engage them before the Iraqi crews were aware of the US presence.

However, the limited definition of the

Night Vision Performance The quest for improved battlefield vision is primarily defined by achieving three main criteria. First, the range at which a target can be detected – meaning that the user of the vision device is able to realise that ‘something’ is there. This is followed by the range at which recognition is possible, whether a person or a building, vehicle, or on water a vessel versus a floating log.

The final consideration is at what range it can identify what has been observed.

So the observer can not only identify that the vehicle is a pick-up truck, but also recognise the make and even model of the pickup. For the combatant this can be critical in that it permits a tank gunner to tell with some certainty if the target in his sights is a friend or foe by the shape, configuration, markings and other physical attributes that define it. This ability has become even more important in counter-insurgency. Here the level of detail provided by the vision device has been increasingly relied upon to differentiate civilian non-combatants from the armed insurgent. Being able to reliably determine at a distance if the person is carrying a weapon or possibility explosives is critical in contributing to reducing both soldier and civilian casualties.

US Army

The Panoramic NVG from L-3 gives 97 degrees observation.

images also contributed to friendly fire and fratricide incidents whereby crews were unable to clearly identify if the vehicle in their sights was an Iraqi T-72 tank or a US M1.

existing ambient light of a scene. This can be natural light like the moon and stars or man-made light, even at distance or reflected from the sky. The image is then displayed to the user in the I² device.

Often displayed in green, it can be shown in any colour or just monochrome, with red or blue-green becoming more popular as these are better allowing the wearer to maintaining normal low light vision.

More importantly is that I² is entirely passive neither requiring nor emitting an outside illumination source, although it is able to detect and use light in the near IR. The primary limitation of I² is its dependency on ambient light which restricts its effectiveness when these sources are not available such as inside building. They also can be over-loaded

The ‘green’ night vision image is well recognized as here with a special operations team.

However, this image could be, and has been red, blue or monochrome as it is simply the colour selected for the display.

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Size and Weight A key factor influencing the practical application of night vision is the size and weight of the systems. For the dismounted soldier these are especially critical but this also influences whether the system is suitable for use in vehicles and aircraft.

The expanded application of night vision seen today is directly attributable to them being smaller and lighter. The AN/PVS4 I² Rifle Sight introduced is 1976 weights 1.8kg (4lbs). Today the AN/PAS 29 thermal imager is only 0.45kg (1lb) and much smaller in size.

For image intensifiers the driving design factor is the size of the intensifier wafers which been reduced but are reaching their limit. Thermal imagers do not have this physical limitation. Early thermal imagers required cooling of the detector which meant either a pressurised nitrogen bottle or a cooling engine which made them especially bulky and heavy.

However, the development of uncooled detectors eliminated this requirement.

Thermal imaging which uses an electronic process has been able to take advantage of digitalisation. I² which physically amplifies light does not have this ability. TI has, therefore, been able to capitalise on the advances in data processing and accompanying miniaturisation. The result has been not only increased performance and resolution but also integration of a broad range of complementary functions. Thus; even as thermal systems have become significantly smaller their capabilities have expanded.

The impact of miniaturisation in night vision, especially TI, has been to allow the capability to be incorporated into a much wider array of platforms and to undertake functions previously impractical. A notable example of this is the nano (micro) Black Hornet PD-100 hand launched unmanned aerial system (UAS). Offered by FLIR (who bought out ProxDynamics in 20160, it includes long-wave thermal imaging plus day video despite its small 10cm x 2.5cm (4x1 inch) size and 16 gram weight! These advantages have similarly been incorporated into handheld pocket scopes, handheld weapon sights, helmet mounted and fixed observation cameras applications where weight and size are critical factor.

These compact cameras are facilitating the ability to offer 360 degree situational awareness to combat vehicles. Placement of miniature often panoramic digital cameras around the vehicle allow the crew and

The US Army is fielding a system for the soldier that combines two devices – the ENVG III night vision goggles and FWS-I thermal weapon sight – wirelessly integrating both elements into a single night vision and targeting system for the individual soldier.

embarked troops to gain and maintain a comprehensive picture of their surrounding at all times. Rheinmetall’s Situational Awareness System (SAS) features both high definition uncooled thermal camera and either day monochrome or colour cameras. It incorporates moving target indication and automatic alerting. Utilising an open architecture allows them to be fully integrated into the vehicle’s fire control and/ or battle management systems allowing rapid realisation of a threat and response.

Long Range Surveillance and 0bservation Despite advances in uncooled technologies, long-range surveillance and the higher resolution still generally requires cooled sensors like the 640x512 InSb or 1280x1024 InSb mid-wave infrared (MWIR) detectors used in the L-3 Cincinnati Electronics WALRSS and WALRESS HD units. Such long-range systems also require relatively large optics to achieve the resolution and performance sought. The requirement for continuous zoom magnification (these go from 200mm to 1200mm lens) adds further weight. Still the performance is extraordinary with the later unit able to detect a man at over 30km distance. Such system performances are demanded in naval, border and target acquisition applications.

In long range systems the mount is of particular importance. Controp, which offers not only cooled and uncooled thermal imaging cameras also focuses on its range of mounts stabilised mounts and gimballed balls that can be employed on land, maritime, and air platforms.

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Lori Erlich, Controp’s spokesperson explained: “maintaining a stable line of sight is especially critical with long range systems. With these systems, even a slight movement will be amplified as the distance to the target increases. This will impact on the quality of the image and its ability to provide the desired target recognition.” Controp mounts are also configured for the inclusion of other complementary sensors like high resolution day colour cameras and laser rangefinders which are able to maintain a common line of sight and stability.

Handheld Multi-mission Systems An obvious application of night vision technology was its configuration as a handheld device. This followed as the ‘binocular’ since the day optical handheld binocular was already commonly employed in many applications by military users such as artillery observers and commanders. Having a similar device that operated in limited visibility conditions had obvious attraction. The challenge is that to be practical handheld devices must be light and compact.

These criteria were initially only possible using I² technology. An additional option of the I² was to provide an attachment that could be fitted to traditional optical binoculars such as the M25 Stabilised Binocular that offers a steady image regardless of movement. Thus, stabilised passive night vision and magnification is offered to the soldier without requiring another separate device.

With the perfection of miniaturised cooling and the uncooled thermal detector

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targeting device. Entering full scale production in 2019 its objective accuracy is less than five meters at 5km.

Multi-spectral Images and Fusion

Long range surveillance requires large optics and high resolution cameras which are also larger and heavier. Having a stable mount like the Controp MEOS-LRS is critical in these systems which also often include multiple sensors.

and the Czech Republic. JIM LR binoculars have been chosen by 30 countries.

As is typical of many of these handheld systems, JIM is a compact unit weighing just 3kg. It integrates into a single portable equipment day vision, thermal vision, rangefinder, laser pointer, GPS, magnetic compass, or inclinometer. The latest version adds additional functions: video recording, day-night image fusion to see through camouflage, anti-glare function in the infrared band, and a laser pointer. The LR offers vehicle detection at 1,800m and a soldier at 7000m. For the UC these ranges are 5km and 3km respectfully.

The trend in these handheld systems is toward modularity. JIM and JETS2, can be incorporated with other mission subsystems such as a tripod, digital communications package, and a target designation system. The later designed by Leonardo DRS and is being fielded by the US Army as an all-conditions Safran

it was finally possible to design man portable infrared night vision systems.

The capabilities of these thermal binoculars was further enhanced by the fact they were digital. As a result it was possible to integrate a number of additional functions into the device without compromising the ergonomic parameters. The Jumelle Infrarouge Multifonction (JIM) offered in cooled ‘LR’ Long Range and ‘UC’ UnCooled versions is built by Sagem, part of the French Safran Group. The international success has seen over 8,000 units in service or on order, decided between 6,000 for international markets and 2,000 for the French armed forces. In addition to France, the JIM LR is deployed

by NATO forces, including the United States, Denmark, Poland, the United Kingdom

Thermal imaging offers particular advantage in that it provides better target detection using the heat contrast to the surroundings.

Therefore, its initial application was to weapon sights. Sagem's Sword light weapon sight has integrated remote control and optional wired or wireless image transmission allowing the shooter to maintain his firing position and shoot around corners.

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Each night vision technology has advantages and weaknesses. The idea of combining their outputs so as to offer a common presentation to the user has been an ideal long sought. Yet, as Deborah Ratushniak of Raytheon ELCAN Optical Technologies explained, “such integration is not simple. An approach successfully demonstrated by ELCAN uses processing algorithms which then project a digital image on to a display.” The idea of image fusion is directly the objective of the US Enhanced Night Vision Goggle (ENVG).

Christian Johnson, senior manager business development with Harris shared: “ENVG, classified as AN/PSQ20, takes the output of an I² optical and an uncooled TI and brings them together to the wearer.”

Other companies involved include BAE Systems, L-3 Insight Technologies, Raytheon, ITT Exelis and Leonardo DRS. Early versions of the PVS-20 were in limited Army use in 2008. Later models (ENVG-II and ENVG-III) further refined the design including allowing linkage and display of not just the Family of Weapon Sights (FWS) TI but also the wider field of view of the helmet mounted optic.

The ultimate objective is to tie the helmet mounted monocular and weapon mounted FWS together.

Thus the soldier will be able to view a common presentation from an I² helmet optic plus wireless transmitted weapon sight crosshair and weapon mounted thermal imager. A weapon mounted laser aimer can also be used at the option of the soldier together giving him vastly improved night, day and limited visibility target acquisition and engagement capabilities.

The Program Executive Office Soldier, BGen Anthony Potts has stated that 10,000 ENVG-B will be fielded beginning mid 2019. The total requirement could be over 40,000 units for US forces alone.

The Spread of NV In the 1970s the US and Western militaries spoke of “owning the night”. A quick web search today reveals this is no longer the case - I² can be found offered retail for under $2000 and TI sights for less than $3000. Both technologies are manufactured across the globe and widely available.

Once luxuries, night vision capabilities are critical on any battlefield. AMR

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NATO's cyber warfare exercises routinely include simulated attacks against privately owned infrastructure.

CYBER: A GLOBAL WEAPON An examination of state-owned cyber operations conducted by North Korea, Russia and China.

by Angus Batey

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eography traditionally underpins defence analysis, and even in today's era of global digital networks, there are distinct advantages to this kind of approach. Militaries are making increasingly detailed use of geospatial-intelligence toolsets to discover the so-called ‘unknown unknowns’ - those pieces of information that elude traditional intelligence-gathering approaches because the entity discovering them does not know that they exist, so does not set out deliberately to look for them. By layering disparate information sets onto

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map-based interfaces, hitherto unknown interrelationships between people, physical locations, and data generated by them can prove invaluable in understanding an operating environment or obtaining insight into an adversary's order of battle.

But with cyber warfare capabilities, a geographic approach may not always prove quite so helpful. Certainly, there is much value to be obtained from understanding the tools, techniques and tactics used by a nation state, and that state will have physical cyber infrastructure that can be mapped in the real world. There will also often be clues

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that can be obtained by studying the code that forms the basis of digital weapons, that can help to attribute an attack to a particular entity or physical location.

But cyber warfare tools exist in the unmappable digital realm, their impacts will usually be felt regardless of physical geography, and their second- and thirdorder effects can all too easily spill over beyond an intended target and have unexpected consequences. So while an assessment of the cyber warfare capabilities available to Asia-Pacific nations will of necessity have to look at the three countries in Asia with the most

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extensive, well-resourced, staffed and skilled cyber cadres - China, Russia and North Korea - the impacts those cyber divisions are having are global.

And, despite the obvious (though denied) deliberate attempts by Russia to use computer hacking and digital disinformation to influence elections and referenda in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and elsewhere, often the effects of today's pervasive, lowlevel cyber-warfare operations are not necessarily the ones that those launching the attacks intended.

Unintended victims There are few indications in open sources that North Korea is currently intending to take military action against nations in western Europe, or has plans (or geostrategic reason) to do so in the near future. Yet, in 2017, a cyber weapon, later attributed to organs of the North Korean state, caused widespread disruption to entities including German railways and the British National Health Service.

The Wannacry ransomware attack does not appear to have targeted the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) intentionally, but its effects required an immediate and considerable response from various parts of the British state. That response was led by the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), a division of the UK's signals-intelligence agency, GCHQ (General Communications Headquarters), that had been created barely two years before the attack. In a presentation to the InfoSecurity 2018 conference in London, Paul Chichester, the NCSC's director of operations, described the episode as a watershed moment: ”It was a huge test for us," he said. "I think the UK as a whole responded better because we had a single point to co-ordinate [the response]. And in terms of a dawn of a new age in this space, I think it really got into people's consciousness about how [cyber] could really affect us as citizens.”

The impact on the NHS began to be felt on a Friday afternoon, when a large number of computer monitors across the country began to display messages telling their operators that the contents of the machine's hard drives had been encrypted, and would only be unlocked after a fee was paid in Bitcoin. Until this was done, data on the machines - which included patients' medical records, details of appointments and scheduled operations - could not be accessed. Although a solution was found and impacts minimised relatively quickly,

Ransomware attributed to North Korea crippled parts of the UK's National Health Service in 2017.

thousands of non-urgent procedures were cancelled and the disruption was considerable.

“Looking at how Wannacry spread, even the people writing it probably didn’t realise the long-term effect when they were writing and planning,” said Chichester. "That's quite a worrying feature. Without even trying, people are having global impact.”

Ransomware is generally a tool used by criminal gangs. Its purpose is not to cripple critical infrastructure in a nation, but to extort money from individual victims. The attribution to North Korea - which did not become apparent until some time after the incident - does not, therefore, appear to make much sense at first glance. But there are solid reasons not to doubt the attribution.

“North Korea needs foreign currency, and as sanctions bite it needs it more and more,” Robert Hannigan, a former director of GCHQ, told the InfoSecurity 2018 conference, held in June in London.

"It's doing all sorts of things in the physical world to try to steal money, and has started to do that in the digital world.”

Hannigan argued that attacks on targets in the financial sector - he singled out one against Bangladesh Bank - were also evidence of North Korea using its cyber warfare capabilities to subvert sanctions and raise revenue. "It's perfectly rational: this is not a crazy state," he said. “This is a rational state pursuing rational objectives.”

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Nevertheless, the risks being run are considerable. “Nation states are getting more sophisticated,” Hannigan said. “And they are getting more brazen; they’re getting less worried about being caught and being named. While the world is in a certain amount of turmoil, while people feel they don’t have a stake in the international order or the international system - including international digital systems - what's to stop [nation states] just being a little bit reckless? Doing it online always gives you a certain level of deniability, and while an attack may be attributed with a high degree of confidence, for the moment it's below the threshold of what we would see as a military attack.

“The problem, I think, is that the risk of miscalculation is huge,” he continued. “We haven’t yet seen anybody killed or seriously injured as a result of cyber attacks. But if you start to tamper with industrial-control systems; if you start to tamper with health systems or networks - it feels like it's only a matter of time before somebody gets hurt, or somebody ultimately gets killed. If you think back to relations between the US and North Korea before the current phase of dialogue, if one of their attacks ended up with medical patients in the US dying or being seriously harmed, the pressure on the US government to do something and to do something pretty physical and decisive - would be huge.”

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US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (right - a former director of the CIA) met North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang in October. It is not clear whether North Korea's cyber capabilities were discussed.

Military malware The kinds of tools and techniques that have enabled North Korea to attempt to improve its financial position through ransomware can also be repurposed to a more militarily conventional end - the destruction of an adversary's equipment, to erode their capability to defend themselves or to launch an attack.

The malware that became known as NotPetya earned its name for its similarities to a piece of ransomware called Petya, but NotPetya's goal was destruction rather than extortion. The malware spread after hiding inside legitimate and widely used accountancy software. Infected devices displayed the usual instruction to pay ransom via Bitcoin to unlock data, but the payment system did not work: the effect was to render the machine useless.

The malware, which concentrated much of its ‘fire’ on targets in Ukraine, proved devastating across the globe. The Danish-based shipping firm, Maersk, was unable to use any of its global computer network for a fortnight; it ended up with damage totalling some $870 million.

The US government estimated total worldwide losses at $10 billion.

Part of the reason for such a massive level of losses and disruption was the speed with which the malware propagated and took control of devices.

“Maersk’s global logistics system was taken down in 17 minutes," Dr Jamie

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Shea, NATO’s deputy assistant secretary general for emerging security threats, told InfoSecurity 2018. “It took them about six weeks to get fully back up. Of all the weapons I've dealt with throughout my career, cyber is the first where the victims who are not directly targeted tend to suffer massively greater levels of destruction or economic loss than those who were deliberately targeted.”

In an unprecedented step, seven governments co-ordinated statements attributing NotPetya to Russia's military, though the Kremlin denied involvement. In October 2018, the cybersecurity firm FireEye published a report attributing another cyber attack - known internationally as Triton - to the Russian state. The FireEye report claims that analysis of the code suggests it was written by at least one person in the Central Scientific Research Institute of Chemistry and Mechanics, a Moscow research facility with long-standing ties to the Russian government.

Although FireEye did not name the target of the Triton weapon, news reports had identified it as Sandara Chemical Company, a joint venture between Saudi Aramco and Dow, located in Saudi Arabia.

Analysis of the code strongly suggests it was designed not just to cripple computers in the company's facilities, but to cause an explosion that would have destroyed physical infrastucture and possibly killed workers at Sandara's site.

| Asian Military Review |

FireEye's Triton attribution followed an alert issued by the US Department of Homeland Security in March, following an investigation by the agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), that accused Russia of being behind a "multistage intrusion campaign" that "affected multiple organisations in the energy, nuclear, water, aviation, construction, and critical manufacturing sectors".

Although the attacks stopped short of any disruptive activity, the access gained would have given the attackers the ability to, among other possible outcomes, switch off power to American homes.

"This isn't new for us in GCHQ," Hannigan said. "We and the US and others have seen Russian activity on networks going back to the early '90s, when there wasn't much to attack beyond governments and the military. A couple of things have changed, though. One is the investment they've put into it over the last 10 years, in people and in money - and I think we're seeing that paying off.

Their three agencies are all competing with each other to be good at cyber. But the biggest change is intent.

"The kind of pre-positioning for a cyberattack could go all sorts of ways," he continued. "It could be about intelligencegathering, it could be about some motive we really don't understand. But if your geopolitical intent changes, and you want to take risks and you don't mind being found out, and you feel like being destructive, that suddenly becomes very dangerous - and I think that is what has changed for the west - not just online, but in other areas over the last few years - with Russia. So the fact that both the US and UK governments have been talking about finding Russia on utility, energy-company networks, and on the infrastructure of the internet, I think is really important and quite worrying.”

China’s Unit 61398 Arguably the pre-eminent cyber power in the region remains China - though the country's full range of capabilities is often missed by those who concentrate their attention on its use of digital intrusion techniques to siphon trade secrets and gain insight into sensitive technologies.

This focus is understandable, however, given China's evident - if long-denied - prowess in this area. Well-publicised hacks of weapon-system programmes such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter - and the subsequent unveiling of Chinese stealth fighters that include elements

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Civilian companies including Danish-based shipping firm, Maersk, had their global operations serious compromised by the NotPetya malware.

apparently derived from US designs have reinforced this view.

Five officers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Unit 61398 were indicted by the US Department of Justice in 2014 after an investigation into theft of intellectual property from, and planting malware on, systems belonging to a number of American businesses.

Digital intrusions into US systems since associated with the Shanghai-based Unit 61398 go back to 2002. In 2011, computer-security firm Dell SecureWorks uncovered a five-year campaign that targeted organisations including the United Nations (UN) which it codenamed Operation ShadyRAT: this, too, has since been attributed to Unit 61398.

However, Chinese cyber capability needs to be considered in the wider context of Chinese concepts of information superiority and information warfare. The idea that control of information could provide decisive strategic advantage has long been a part of Chinese military

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thinking, and the nation's military cyber capability has been constructed within this broader framework. This has given China a considerable advantage.

In the UK, it is, arguably, only with the establishment of the NCSC that questions have been resolved over the role of the state in protecting elements of critical national infrastructure owned and operated by private companies. Western militaries still find concepts such as the integration of cyber capabilities with electronic warfare and signals intelligence quite new. In China, these disciplines have been seen as indivisible for decades. The result is that China's military has avoided much of the doctrinal indecision and inter-service ‘turf wars’ that have, in part, held back the effective integration of cyber within western military command structures.

Nevertheless, the nation is still refining its military cyber apparatus, and has realigned its political posture. In 2016, under a wide-ranging reorganisation of the PLA's structure, a dedicated cyber

| Asian Military Review |

component was created, ostensibly putting the Chinese military on a similar footing to major western militaries. Senior government figures, from President Xi Jinping down have sought, since then, to distance China from industrial espionage and it is arguably more common today to learn of western companies signing partnership deals with Chinese firms than it is to find them reporting the exfiltration of technical data.

Yet the one thing that remains unchanged is China’s belief that established military methodologies still apply to cyber. The new domain does not require new concepts to be drawn up to go along with the new digital weapons.

Rather, the new tools and technologies can be used within tactical and strategic operational concepts that have been established and proven over decades if not centuries. As a result, there is probably no nation better placed to achieve its geopolitical goals in cyberspace. AMR

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MODERNISING THE PHILIPPINES ARMED FORCES The second five year plan in the ambitious 15 year Philippine armed forces modernisation strategy is moving beyond counterinsurgency and onto ‘big-ticket’ assets.

by Andrew Drwiega

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he Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), never cashrich at the best of times, is nevertheless progressing through a modernisation programme which, importantly, has the support and encouragement of President Rodrigo Duterte according to Major General Restituto Padilla, AFP deputy chief-ofstaff. Modernisation has been an growing necessity for many years in order to renew old and obsolete naval vessels, military aircraft and army equipment, some of which dates back to the World War Two era.

However to date the overall focus on defence has been split between the ongoing requirement to conduct internal security and counter insurgency (COIN) operations, and the growing need to protect the Philippines territorially from foreign incursions particularly by the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).

The Philippine government has, for

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Saab has been discussing the suitability of its Gripen C/D for the Multi-Mission fighter requirement with the Philippine Air Force for several years.

several decades, battled against communist rebels and, more recently, jihadist groups.

This conflict gained worldwide attention in May 2017 as the army fought a five month long battle for the city of Marawi, parts of which had been overrun by insurgents sympathetic to Daesh.

Unsurprisingly the first modernisation phase, from 2013-2017, largely focused on

| Asian Military Review |

arms and equipment for internal security operations to bolster the army’s capacity to take on the well equipped insurgent groups.

On to Horizon 2 According Philippine Department of National Defense spokesman Arsenio Andolong, $5.6 billion (PHP300 billion) was allocated to the second of three five-

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year modernisation phases, Horizon 2, which runs from 2018 to 2022.

With extensive modernisation still required to much of the force, the Horizon 2 focus will see the majority of the budget being allocated to the Philippine Air Force (PAF) for more fighters, improved airlift and maritime helicopters while the Philippine Navy (PN) will gain new corvettes and a range of offshore patrol vessels (OPVs), in addition to well publicised but not precisely defined new submarine capability.

The Army’s wish list includes heavier equipment including self-propelled artillery, multiple rocket launchers, light tanks and other general purpose vehicles.

Renato Cruz de Castro, professor in the International Studies Department, De La Salle University, Manila, writing for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) notes that the ‘big-ticket’ items that the AFP will fund include “two more missile-capable frigates (two are currently being constructed by Hyundai Shipbuilding Corporation and will be delivered in 2020), amphibious assault vehicles, anti-submarine helicopters, multi-role vessels, and submarines.”

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Hyundai Heavy Industries

Nose-on view of an FA-50PH aircraft of the Philippine Air Force.

The Philippines has ordered two future frigates from Hyundai Heavy Industries.

The two ‘semi-stealth’ future frigates based on the HDF-3000 Inchon design will weight 2,600 tons and are now under contract for construction. General Padilla commented earlier that the “keel-laying ceremony for our frigate’ had occurred on 16 October and that the first frigate was likely to be delivered in early 2020,

| Asian Military Review |

followed by the second later in the year.

Philippine Air Force (PAF) One of the biggest acquisitions planned by the PAF concerns the Multi-Role Fighter (MRF) programme. The PAF is looking for two squadrons worth of multi-role aircraft. Although a formal Request for

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Might the Philippine Marine Corps (PMC) follow the US Marine Corps into an acquisition of the BAE Systems Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV).

Information (RfI) has not yet been issued, one of the leading contenders appears to be Saab’s Gripen C/D (single/dual seat) aircraft which could be fitted to carry a wide range of weaponry.

Magnus Hagman, campaign director Gripen and airborne systems recently admitted that Saab has been in discussions with the Philippine government for “several years where they have agreed the the Gripen C/D version with the latest software release, MS20 and the [PS-05/A fighter] Mk4 radar.” The MS20 software package is the last for the Gripen C/D as it is “designed as a basic package with a number of optional add-ons to allow it to be customised.”

The Mk4 radar, according to Saab literature “gives significantly improved radar performance and operational range, enhances the Gripen Weapon System capabilities and offers full AMRAAM

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and Meteor integration. It also enables significant capability growth through software upgrades to successfully counter evolving threats in decades to come.”

The government has already committed to the KAI T-50 as a light attack and lead-in fighter trainer. An initial 12 FA-50PH fighters are already in service and have been used in action against insurgent groups. Their successful deployment has sparked a stated requirement for a further 12 FA50PHs which will be afforded within the Horizon 2 budget.

Philippine Air Force (PAF) has recently procured three Airbus C295 transport aircraft. An additional aircraft is also believed to have been ordered which will serve as a more specialised command and control platform for the Philippine Armed Forces.

A $233 million contract for 16 Bell

| ASIAN MILITARY REVIEW |

412EPI helicopters for the PAF was cancelled by the Canadian government over human rights concerns relating to President Duterte and his government.

Philippine Navy (PN) The decision to acquire diesel-electric submarines is still being deliberated as the PN does not have experience of modern submarine operations. This is a decision perhaps borne out of strategic pressure with so many countries in the region acquiring this maritime capability.

“The acquisition of submarines was originally planned for the third horizon (2023-2028). But the current navy chief, Vice Admiral Robert Empedrad, lobbied for the immediate inclusion of dieselelectric submarines in Horizon Two, stated Professor Castro.

Notably the Royal Thai Navy signed a contract with the China Shipbuilding

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Industry Corporation (CSIC) in May 2017 for an S26T diesel-electric submarine which will be delivered by 2023. The Navy intended this initial order to be followed by an additional order for three more S26T boats (derivatives of the PLAN’s Type 039B Yuan-class) but this plan has currently been shelved due to reported opposition to the purchase within Thailand.

At a briefing in late October, General Padilla stated that the submarine acquisition would be a “very long term development, it is not something that we can get off the shelf, it is a capability that needs to be slowly, deliberately [built] and in consultation with our allies, the United States included.”

In March 2016 Leonardo was selected to provide the PN with two AW 159 Wildcat helicopters together with training and multi-year support packages in a $113 million contract. Flight trails on the first aircraft have been conducted at Leonardo’s Yeovil facility during the latter months of 2018. Both helicopters are expected to be delivered to the PH during early 2019.

These anti-submarine warfare (ASW) are likely to be configured with active dipping sonar (ADS), sonobuoys, and torpedoes, with alternative weaponry including anti-ship missiles and rockets giving them an anti-surface warfare (ASuW) role as well.

In July, PN flag-officer-in-command Vice Admiral Robert Empedrad stated that the new helicopter capability would be used to strategically reinforce the defence of the Philippines, and may be tasked to work in the future with additional frigates/corvettes in the second and third parts of the modernisation plan.

In October 2018, the Philippine Marine Corps (PMC) through the PN, issued an Invitation to Bid (ITB) for 16 fibreglass speedboats. This has set out to be a rapid acquisition with the analysis of bids set for the end of November. Ninety days from Notice to Procure (NTP), the first batch of eight craft should be delivered followed by the remaining eight at the end of the following 90 days.

The PMC also has on its shopping list new amphibious assault vehicles. With the United States Marne Corps (USMC)

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handing BAE Systems a $198 million contract for an initial 30 Amphibious Combat Vehicles (ACV) to become its new amphibious assault capability (with options for a further 204 vehicles), the PMC may decide to follow this decision.

Philippine Army The Army’s equipment wish-list during Horizon 2 includes both towed and selfpropelled howitzers, multiple launch rocket systems, armoured recovery vehicles, and general support vehicles in terms of heavy equipment. For the infantry there is a need for new tactical radios, ground mobility equipment (light, medium, heavy), individual weapons, crew-served weapons, and night vision goggles.

Beyond that, and perhaps more longer term, heavy lift helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) would bolster the tactical air support picture.

Other more specialist requirements include improvised explosive device (IED) detection and disposal, improved medical facilities and equipment and more specialist force protection kit. AMR

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mplified by a suicide bombing and ongoing military clashes, alarm bells are ringing loudly across Southeast Asia: Mindanao, it seems in some quarters, is about to emerge as the next Syria. As local Muslim insurgents regroup following their siege of Marawi city last year and foreign fighters associated with the Daesh move in on the chaos, local and foreign media experts are pointing to the Philippine’s second largest island as the epicentre of a new jihadist threat to stability across the region and beyond.

Tediously, the reality is more prosaic. Mindanao remains perennially prone to insurgent violence but will not become the next Syria, either as a hearth of regional Islamist revolt or as a home for a significant contingent of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) fleeing the collapse of Daesh’s Middle Eastern ‘Caliphate’. There are good reasons for Southeast Asian security planners to monitor events on the island and in the adjacent Sulu Sea region closely: breathless media reporting notwithstanding, the ‘second coming’ of Daesh need not be one of them.

The difficulty faced by FTFs in reaching the southern Philippines in the post-Marawi security environment constitutes a basic obstacle to any resurgence. To date most appear to have used the ‘back door’ route from Sabah in East Malaysia up through the island provinces of the Sulu Sea to the main landmass of Mindanao.

While traditionally porous this maritime border is now relatively well policed especially on the Sabah side and is also the target of joint sea patrols. It is a far cry from Syria’s land borders with Turkey or Jordan across which thousands of foreign enthusiasts, mostly fellow-Arabs, rallied to the Syrian jihad in the 2012 -2015 period.

Over a year after the fall of the Daesh capital of Raqqah and the siege of Marawi, around 100 FTFs are estimated by the Philippine authorities to have reached the Sulu-Mindanao region. Whether this number warrants terms such as ‘flocking’ and ‘flooding’ currently bandied around in media reporting is a matter of semantics.

However, it certainly does not amount to a militarily decisive force let alone a capability to form the all-foreign units seen is Syria recently and in Afghanistan in the late 1980s.

Another fundamental constraint on the ‘new jihad’ in the southern Philippines is the striking lack of military or political organisation. For FTFs who do reach the region there is no equivalent of Raqqah or Peshawar, the Pakistani border city that served as an organisational

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hub for the Afghan jihad. Isolated by language, culture and terrain, foreigners find themselves operating in pennypackets from jungle hide-outs.

Their local hosts coalesce around tribal and clan loyalties that divide the Tausog and Yakan of the Sulu archipelago from the Magindanao of southern Mindanao and the Maranao of the Lanao lake area to the north.

While local insurgent factions may be happy enough to welcome foreigners as pan-Islamist status symbols or even tactical force multipliers, they remain incapable of channeling FTF energies and skills into any cohesive or strategic direction.

It remains an open question whether the Moroccan who volunteered to blow himself up at a military checkpoint in Basilan on 31 July, killing 11, was driven by ideological fervour or suicidal frustration.

Thirdly, to the extent it still has the time or space to plan external operations, there is no evidence to suggest that ‘Daesh Central’ in Syria is consciously directing FTFs to the southern Philippines in pursuit of any strategic goals or supporting them financially. While local groups have sworn allegiance to ‘Caliph’ Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Daesh has yet to reciprocate by formally recognising the region as one of its ‘provinces’.

Finally, ongoing counter-insurgency operations by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) since Marawi have pushed most groups onto the defensive. Even as it cost the insurgents hundreds of casualties, the siege of the city also underscored woeful and longstanding AFP weaknesses, not least in terms of intelligence and operations in urban terrain. But it also prompted significant infusions of aid and advice from fellow ASEAN states and Australia which have gone some way to mitigate problems and maintain military momentum.

In the coming years Mindanao will undoubtedly remain beset by chronic rural insurgency punctuated by terrorist bombings in urban areas. In short, it will conform to a pattern first established in the 1970s and 1980s. Jihadi tourists who first arrived in the 1990s from Pakistan, the Middle East and Malaysia will hardly improve the situation. Equally though they will not transform Mindanao into a Daesh bastion in Southeast Asia.

Note: Anthony Davis is security analyst and consultant specialising in insurgency, terrorism and military affairs in the Asia-Pacific region.

| ASIAN MILITARY REVIEW |

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