Asian Military Review - October 2019

Volume 27/issue 6

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Contents oCtober 2019 VOLUME 27 / ISSUE 6

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Royal Australian Navy Collins Class Submarines HMAS Collins, HMAS Farncomb, HMAS Dechaineux and HMAS Sheean in formation while transiting through Cockburn Sound, Western Australia in February 2019. The submarines were in the area to participate in several activities, including Exercise Lungfish 2019 and Exercise Ocean Explorer 2019.

UNDERWATER ARMS RACE

Tim Fish finds out why owning submarines has suddenly become a priority for the region’s navies.

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ASIA-PACIFIC NAVAL DIRECTORY 2019

ASIAN SOF LOOKS FOR PROTECTED MOBILITY

SCANNING FOR TROUBLE

LIGHT GUNS KEEP HEADS DOWN

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ANTI-SHIP MISSILE EVOLUTION

PREPARING FOR THE UNTHINKABLE

TAIWAN’S DEFENCE INNOVATION ON SHOW

ANALYSTS COLUMN

Dr Alix Valenti presents a three part look at Indo-Pacific naval strategy, and interviews Rear Admiral David Proctor, Chief of the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN).

Anti-ship missiles are now big enough to be ‘carrier killers’. Jon Lake examines how such missiles evolved.

Andrew White reviews transport options for SOF on the move.

JR Ng takes a regional look at national capabilities to tackle CBRN contamination.

Dr. Thomas Withington analyses the capabilities and utility of ground scanning radars.

Andrew Drwiega reports from the biennial Taiwanese TADTE defence expo.

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Light artillery, from mortars to guns, can make a huge difference to the welfare of the PBI (Poor Bl**dy Infanty), as Steven W Miller reports.

Ben Ho examines South Korea’s plan to add a large-deck STOVL capable, amphibious-warfare ship to its navy.

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Index of Advertisers

ASELSAN 11 COLLINS AEROSPACE

15

CST 27 DIMDEX 29 DSA 37 DUBAI AIRSHOW

COVER 3

EUROSATORY 41 EXCALIBUR 25 GENERAL ATOMICS

COVER 4

GULF DEFENsE

49

FLIR

COVER 2

IAI 5 INDO DEFENCE

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MAN 21 MTU 13 NEXTER 23 ROSOBORONEXPORT

17, 19

SINGAPORE AIRSHOW

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Editorial

INTELLIGENCE TAKES A BACK SEAT

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he spiral downwards in relations between the Republic of Korea (RoK) and Japan is worrying from a regional security viewpoint, especially the decision in August made by the Korean government to stop sharing intelligence with Japan.

With America’s eye distracted by the impeachment investigation against President Trump, and indeed Trump’s lack of strategy regarding North Korean leader Kim Jong-un following his initial meetings and handshakes, South Korea’s decision not to share intelligence through the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) must be very pleasing to both Kim Jong-un and China’s President Xi Jinping.

Any wedge between countries that adhere to the ‘under threat’ rules-based international order benefits those countries who seek to dismantle it and replace it with their own predominance, exactly what China (and Russia) are seeking to do.

The bad blood between Koreans in general and Japan goes back to the very serious humanitarian issues resulting from the Second World War and Japan’s occupation of the Korean Peninsula. While this is not going to be resolved any time soon, the security threats posed by Chinese expansionist ambitions regionally and increasingly further afield, North Korea’s belligerence by continuing missile testing following Kim’s meetings with Trump, would suggest that stopping intelligence sharing will benefit neither side.

Having both signed up to the GSOMIA agreement in November 2016, then renewed again in November 2017, South Korea’s move to withdraw intelligence sharing could be read as sending a not so subliminal message to Washington to re-engage in a more committed way to the problem of its northern neighbour and to act as moderator on an equal basis over its dispute with Japan.

The interception earlier this year by Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) F-15 and F-16 fighters of Russian and Chinese aircraft, at least one of which had entered the air defence identification zone near the disputed Dokdo islands (also known as the Liancourt Rocks and Takeshima to Japan) in the Sea of Japan, should be more than enough evidence that countries in that region need to be working closer together, rather than pushing each other away. The fact that the ROKAF aircraft fired around 360 shots and released flares around the Russian Beriev A-50 (NATO - Mainstay) airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft was exploited by Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga who called the action ‘totally unacceptable and extremely regrettable’.

Not sharing intelligence is a step too far in a region that is edging closer to a serious military engagement if cooler heads do not prevail.

Andrew Drwiega, Editor-in-Chief

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sea power

UNDERWATER ARMS RACE

The number of navies that can now invest in submarine technology is increasing, although operational capability will still vary widely.

by Tim Fish

Japan is expanding its submarine fleet and is still taking delivery of Soryu-class (16SS) boats.

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| Asian Military Review |

sea power

enter service in 2020 although it is not clear what stage of production these have reached.

“The Type 095 is supposed to be more capable than the Type 093 SSN with a stronger standoff offensive strike capability – speculated by some to incorporate a robust VLS [vertical launch system] capability to house SLCMs [submarine-launched cruise missiles],” Collins said. “In terms of overall strike capabilities the Type-095 could possibly get close to the US Navy, but less so perhaps in the area of sonar, combat management systems and most importantly, quieting,” he added making it comparable to the later variants of the USN’s Los Angeles-class.

The SSK fleet has been receiving new Type 039A/041 Yuan-class boats, which are a step up in noise reduction over the earlier Type 039 Song-class and Type 035 Ming-class before that. The Yuans have air-independent propulsion but how advanced they are is unclear. Collin said that using insights from imported Kiloclass SSKs from Russia and access to dual-use technology it means that each SSK model has got progressively more capable.

“The Yuan class has evolved into newer variants, most current being the Type039B/C, which bears an appearance closer to contemporary Western and Japanese designs, especially the Japanese Oyashio for instance. It’s plausible to surmise

that these new SSK models have enjoyed improved quieting, hydrodynamic performances, and combat capabilities,” Collin said.

Japan Counters PLAN Meanwhile Japan’s Maritime SelfDefense Force (JMSDF) is trying to counter PLAN submarine expansion by increasing its fleet of SSKs from 16-18 up to 22. It is achieving this by keeping more of its older Oyashio-class boats in service to supplement the Soryu-class (16SS) that are still entering service. The Soryu-class is built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industry and Kawasaki Heavy Industry shipyards.

Production started in 2005 and boat 10, Shoryu (SS 510) was the most recent to be commissioned in March 2019. Up to 14 are expected and the remaining boats (SS 511-514) will be equipped with Li-ion batteries instead of lead acid ones. Whilst the JMSDF can’t match the PLAN for numbers it hopes to retain a qualitative edge over its rival in terms of quieting, acoustic sensor capability and reliability.

Neighbouring South Korea has been gradually developing its own submarine production capacity across three variants of its KSS submarine programme. The first KSS-I Chang Bogo-class SSKs used the Type 209/1400 design from German shipbuilder ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS), the second KSS-II Son Won-Il-class variant was based on the Type 214 design. The final boat of this

Daewoo

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he submarine arms race in the Indo-Pacific region that has been underway for almost 10 years is continuing apace as more navies are expanding their fleets and are bringing new boats into service A combination of relatively strong economic growth in the region and the gradual realisation by political leaders that the maritime domain is of importance to their country’s finances and security mean that naval capabilities have received some attention. There is also a heightened appreciation of maritime security issues in the different sub-regions of the Indo-Pacific and the desire to possess submarines as reputed weapons for sea control.

Dr Collin Koh Swee Lean, from the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore told AMR that while the increase in the size and sophistication of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) “does play a significant role spurring the equivalent build-ups by at least some regional countries, such as Japan, there are a few other drivers.”

This includes the ‘me too’ need to copy what other countries are doing, growth in regional uncertainties that require improvement in defence, and a modernisation trend towards a more capable and balanced fleet. In terms of status, “for some countries, acquiring a submarine equates to being in the ‘club’ – one that brings prestige because operating and maintaining a submarine capability becomes testament to the country’s financial and technical prowess,” Collin said.

China wants the status of developing capabilities on a par with the US Navy (USN) and the PLAN is moving on to building the next generation of nuclearpowered ballistic missile (SSBN), nuclearpowered attack (SSN) and conventional diesel-electric powered (SSK) submarines.

The PLAN is developing a new Type 096 SSBN boat called the Tang-class. It is expected to be larger and more capable than the current Type 094 Jin-class that have provided the PLAN with its first continuous-at-sea-deterrent nuclear posture with at least four boats in-service offering a round-the-clock nuclear launch capacity.

The PLAN’s six Type 093 Shang-class SSNs are set to be joined by a new class of five Type 095 Sui-class SSNs. Media reports state that the first of-of-class will

The Korean Navy’s first Jangbogo-III Batch-I submarine was launched in September 2018.

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sea power

class will be commissioned this year.

But the new KSS-III Jangbogo-class SSKs uses a Korean design from local shipbuilder Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME). The KSSIIIs will replace the Chang Bogo-class and construction of a first batch of three boats is underway. The first-of-class, Dosan Anh Chang-ho was launched in September 2018 and will be commissioned in 2020-21 with the second due to launch in 2020 and commission in 2022. Work on the third started at Hyundai Heavy Industries in 2017. A second batch of three is expected to start construcution this year that could be larger and with more vertical launch tubes.

RAN SEA 1000 At the opposite end of the region, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) has committed itself to procuring, manning and maintaining 12 new SSKs under its SEA 1000 Attack-class future submarine programme worth about $36 billion (A$50 billion). In 2016 the Shortfin Barracuda 1A design from French naval shipbuilder Naval Group was selected and a Strategic Partnership Agreement was eventually signed in February 2019.

This will manage the relationship between the Australian Commonwealth and the company for 50 years and cover the design, construction and delivery of the boats out to 2054. There is considerable risk in the programme as the design will be heavily modified from its initial SSN layout to become an SSK and it will use a different propulsion, weapon system and combat management system.

But SEA 1000 will also provide Australia with a new state-of-the-art submarine construction facility in South Australia. A submarine design contract was signed in March 2019 that has initiated next steps of the programme.

According to the Naval Group the design contract takes in preparations for Attack class construction at the Osborne North naval shipyard on the outskirts of Adelaide. This includes ongoing support to Commonwealth-owned Australian Naval Infrastructure for the design and build of the dedicated submarine construction yard and the information and communications technologies systems to be employed there.

The only other major submarine builder and operator in the Indo-Pacific is India, which is trying to build its own SSBNs, SSNs and SSKs. The Indian Navy (IN) saw its first SSBN, INS Arihant,

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An Indian Navy Scorpene-class submarine, INS Kalvari (S50).

Only two out of six have so far been delivered.

built by the Navy Shipbuilding Centre in Visakhapatnam, commissioned in 2016 after a very long procurement programme that started in the 1990s. A second boat, Arighat was launched in 2017 but it is not clear when it will be delivered or commissioned. Two more boats are expected to follow. Visakhapatnam will be used for the future production of a new class of six new Indian-built SSNs. Meanwhile the IN has a requirement for 24 new SSKs but it is struggling to take delivery of six new boats built at Mazagon Docks Ltd (MDL) to the Scorpene design from Naval Group under the Kalvari-class (Project 75) programme. A Naval Group spokesperson told AMR: “Four Scorpene submarines out of six being built by MDL have been already launched, the first one INS Kalvari has been commissioned and has been in service since 2017. The second one is close to completion of trials and delivery.” Kalvari was due to have been commissioned in 2012. When the second boat is commissioned the rest are supposed to follow on an annual drumbeat out to 2022.

India is already embarking on a followon project for six more SSKs dubbed Project 75(I). According to the company it has been in contact with IN to propose and

| Asian Military Review |

adapted technically advanced submarine suiting their expected operational needs.

This new design from Naval Group will be a next generation follow-on to the Scorpene class. The company is preparing its response to the Expression Of Interest recently issued by IN.

Recapitalisation Neighbouring Pakistan is responding to the IN build-up with its own SSK recapitalisation programme. It has decided to buy the S26 – an export variant of the PLAN’s Type 039B – from China. The Pakistan Navy (PN) needs to replace its ageing pair of Hashmat-class Agosta 70A and three Agosta 90B SSKs built in France and has a requirement for up to eight boats.

“The Chinese boats are most likely going to carry a robust offensive strike capability in the form of SLCMs for land attack. The existing fleet of French builds is ageing and no longer economical to maintain in service, so the Chinese boats are meant to block-replace all these eventually,” Collin said. Meanwhile the PN is upgrading the Agosta 90Bs built in France under a $350 million contract with Turkish shipbuilder STM. China is also supporting Bangladesh,

sea

TKMS

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which purchased two old PLAN Type 35B Ming-class SSKs in 2016. Whilst the submarines are not much of a threat the relationship between the two countries will be of concern to India.

China also has influence in South East Asia where Thailand has also decided to buy S26T SSKs. The Royal Thai Navy has

a requirement for three boats, showing they are serious about a submarine capability. Collin said that cost is the driving factor in the selection: “With the basket of cash on hand, Thailand could only get one submarine if they insist on Western or even South Korean design, and this may not even come with the full training, armaments and after-sales support package they need. And you end up with a token fleet. But with the S26T, the Thais argue that they could get three boats with the full package, which allows them to have a working fleet.”

The Philippines wants to buy submarines under its Horizon 2 programme but it is expected to have modest requirements and a limited budget. A Request for Information (RfI) has been released and Collin believes that Russia has made an offer but it unlikely any foreign shipyard would be interested. Collin believes the Philippine Navy needs to get experience with its anti-submarine warfare frigates and helicopters first before embarking on submarine acquisition.

Indonesia is set to expand its SSK fleet from the existing pair of Type 209 Cakraclass SSKs to six boats. It has received two new Type 209/1400 SSK from DSME called the Nagapasa-class and Indonesia is planning to build a third locally at PT Pal. A contract for a second batch of three boats has been signed that would see more boats built at PT Pal although the

The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) received the first of four new Invincible-class (Type 218SG) submarines from TKMS in February.

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shipyard is likely to be getting significant levels of assistance and advice from DSME. Malaysia already brought its two French-built Scorpene submarines into service in 2009 and has plans to double the size of its fleet to four boats. However, Collin said the budget is a problem and the increased costs and effort of sustaining the existing fleet are of concern in the short term.

Singapore will get four new Invincibleclass (Type 218SG) SSK from TKMS to replace the existing two 1960s vintage Challenger-class boats that are still inservice with the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN). The Invincible-class will be the first new SSKs that the RSN has purchased as the Challengers and the two Archer-class that entered service in 2011 and 2013 were formerly Royal Swedish Navy submarines. TKMS launched the first-of-class, Invincible in February and it is expected to enter service in 2021 with a second boat, Impeccable, due to follow in 2022. Work on boats three and four (Illustrious and Inimitable) has started with a commissioning date expected in 2024.

Vietnam has recently purchased six Kilo-class (Type 636.1) SSKs from Russia in three batches of two that entered service in 2014, 2015 and 2017. Collins said that this show the Vietnamese Navy was serious about having a workable fleet.

Not only does it get a robustly-sized fleet of one of the most capable and quiet boats on the market “but it went to the extent of investing in its supporting infrastructure, including a comprehensive on-shore training facility, and even thought about acquiring a submarine rescue capability,” he said.

Taiwan has instead decided to build eight submarines under its Indigenously Defense Submarine (IDS) programme. Taiwan has built a yard for the construction of the boats but even with substantial US and Japanese help there are significant risks. Collin believes that Taiwan does not have much choice: “I surmise Taiwan might have concluded, rightly, that the project risks of going alone with the programme (with foreign aid) is way lower than the risks of finding no suppliers or unreliable suppliers who are susceptible to Chinese pressure.”

Eight boats is a significant increase on the existing two Chien Lung-class SSKs but something that is necessary for Taiwan considering Chinese military expansion.

AMR

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Regional

US Navy

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A Chinese naval Z-9 helicopter prepares to land aboard the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) frigate CNS Huangshan (FFG-570) as the ship conducts a series of maneuvers and exchanges with the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Sterett (DDG 104) in the South China Sea during exercises in June 2017.

ASIA-PACIFIC NAVAL DIRECTORY 2019

The potential for maritime conflict in the region - and increasingly beyond - continues to increase with the growth of the Chinese Navy and the unpredictability of North Korea.

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here has been no shortage of news regarding security concerns in the Asia Pacific region as of late. In June, regional and international media reported that North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, inspected a newly built submarine for the North Korean Navy. Late July and early August, North Korea resumed missile testing, firing three short-range missiles that landed in waters between North Korea and Japan. Tensions between foes

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by Dr. Alix Valenti and allies in the region are also on the rise, with South Korea and Japan resuming an old feud while China and the US continue their trade war and India and Pakistan argue over Kashmir.

The simmering tensions in the Asia Pacific have been concerning analysts the world over for some time, especially concerning North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes as well as Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOP) in contested waters such as

| Asian Military Review |

the South China Sea. Coupled with nontraditional security threats such as piracy, illegal fishing and smuggling (whether drugs or people), these traditional threats have triggered a capability modernisation and procurement race in the region for the past few years. From patrol boats to high-end frigates, submarines and aircraft carriers, countries in the region are preparing their navies to tackle a wide variety of maritime threats. And today, this also includes cyber and space.

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This photo supplied by North Korea allegedly shows leader Kim Jong-un visiting a new submarine under construction - a date has not been verified.

Loose Canons A ‘loose canon’ is defined as: “An unpredictable person or thing, liable to cause damage if not kept in check by others.” Opinions generally vary, amongst analysts, as to whether there is a chance that a conflict, very likely maritime in nature, may erupt in the coming decades in the Asia Pacific region; where it would break out is even more uncertain. What is clear, however, is that an analysis of the maritime strategies in the region reveals growing tensions that have the potential to become ‘loose canons’ should misunderstandings ensue or diplomacy fail.

The first of these is the ongoing tension around the Korean peninsula. Following a period free of missile testing, in the wake of Kim Jong-un and United States President Trump’s Singapore meeting in June 2018, on 30 July Pyongyang proceeded with two new short-range missile tests. One flew 267 miles (430km) and the other 430 miles (692km), landing in waters between North Korea and Japan and proving that

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Seoul was well within range. Two more missile tests took place on 1 and 6 August.

According to statements released by Kim Jong-un, these tests were meant to warn the US and South Korea that if they held their joint military exercise as planned during the course of August, exercises that Pyongyang has strongly criticised and which Trump had agreed to halt while meeting in Singapore, North Korea would retaliate.

There is no shortage of speculations as to whether Kim Jong-un would really follow through on his threats or whether he is merely testing the two allies’ resolve. But the real concern actually lies elsewhere. The missiles that were launched appear to be similar to Russia’s Iskander short-range ballistic missiles, which Pyongyang said would be harder to intercept because they were guided and could be manoeuvred during flight.

These could pose a significant threat to the missile defence system being built by the US and South Korea; they also bring back to the fore concerns regarding submarine-

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launched ballistic missiles. Indeed, on 22 June photos were released showing Kim Jong-un inspecting a newly- built submarine, which could potentially be firing ballistic missiles thus considerably extending the range and reach of North Korea’s weapons.

China Seeks SSBN Bases China’s infrastructure developments on a number of contested groups of islands in the East China Sea (ECS) and South China Sea (SCS) has also been significant cause for concern in the region. Some of the most common explanations advanced for these developments include the nationalist sentiment, the need to assert sovereignty over natural resources particularly within the 9-dash-line, and shifting the balance of power. However, the article co-authored by Sarah Kirchberger and Patrick O’Keeffe, ‘Military-Strategic Aspects of the South China Sea Issue’, and published in 2017 in the book Traversing the Challenges: Political, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions of Maritime and

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CIA open source

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crucial developments in the SCS, Taiwan or elsewhere. More important is Taiwan, located between the two: its East coast offers immediate access to deep-water patrol areas for SSBNs. If China were to regain control over Taiwan and build a SSBN base there, it would significantly increase, once more, the level of threat to the USN and its allies in the Pacific region.

Mutual suspicion

A map of South China Sea showing the nine-dash line (in green).

Regional Security, debunks these theories and advances two new ones.

Based on a wide variety of Chinese sources, the article argues that: “China’s uncontested territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) are for the most part continental shelf and fall under the category of ‘confined and shallow waters’ that pose peculiar challenges for naval operations. Only the contested waters of the SCS south of Hainan offer China ready access to deeper Pacific waters, a crucial factor for China’s nuclear submarine patrol missions.” Using the territories it is claiming in the SCS would allow the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to create a bastion for its nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) fleet, thus facilitating passage through the exit points of the First Island Chain and

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at the rim of the SCS by avoiding enemy anti-submarine warfare (ASW) assets thanks to a link chain of sensors. “The infrastructure already built on the Spratly Islands appears to substantiate this theory,” Patrick O’Keeffe, Non-Resident Fellow at the Centre for Asia-Pacific Strategy and Security in Kiel, told AMR; part of the systems placed on the island would allow China to get a clear three dimensional (3D) picture of the threats to its SSBNs. This, in turn, would allow it to become a much more credible maritime threat to the US Navy (USN) in the Pacific region.

Strategically, the ECS has a different character for China than the SCS," according to Mr. O’Keeffe; it has been using activities on the ECS to attract media attention and deflect from more

| Asian Military Review |

But the ECS and SCS are not the only places where Chinese activity has been raising questions as to the rising power’s maritime strategy. For the past few years, there has been an increasing number of Chinese submarines operating in the Indian Ocean (IO). One of the most commonly accepted explanations for this development is China’s increasing reliance on maritime trade routes, in order to both access export markets and meet key resource needs. As such, the increased presence of submarines indicates a desire to protect Sea Lines Of Communication (SLOC). This, however, has contributed to increasing tensions between China on one side and India and the US on the other. As indicated in a report published in 2010 by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, ‘The Maritime Future of the Indian Ocean - Putting the G Back in to Great Politics’: “Historically embedded mistrust between China and India is encouraging mutual suspicion regarding each other’s maritime intentions, particularly given the tendency of both countries to think in terms of rights and responsibilities within their own naval backyard.” The IO has always been India’s ‘backyard’ for carrier strike group training, “as such, the growing presence of Chinese submarines in the area is troublesome for India,” added Mr O’Keeffe; especially as tensions with Pakistan continue to grow over Kashmir and China’s Gwadar port in Pakistan guarantees it increased access to the IO via the Strait of Hormuz.

Gwadar is only a small part of China’s port-building strategy in the Asia Pacific region. On the Western side of the IO, the Djibouti base opened in 2017, effectively introducing China to the restricted clan of countries with bases in the strategic choke point of the Gulf of Aden. Additionally, through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) China is securing a string of logistics ports that, while not necessarily benefitting immediately the PLAN, are part of a wider strategic context of seeking new allies in a region where it currently counts few. AMR

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Indian Navy

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INS Khanderi, the second of the Kalvari Class diesel electric attack submarines of the Indian Navy, was launched in 2017 and commissioned on 28 September 2019.

SUBMARINES TO SPACE; THE CHALLENGE OF MARITIME SECURITY

While submarines have become ‘flavour of the moment’, increased spending on defence has meant that a small number of nations are improving their 3D maritime posture.

“T

he proliferation of much more capable submarines in the region has necessitated that several countries improve their ASW capability,” Tom Waldwyn, Research Associate for Defence and Military Analysis at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), told Asian Military Review. However, only a limited number of countries in the Asia Pacific region can

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by Alix Valenti afford to have a truly three dimensional (3D) ASW capability for their navy - that is, sub-surface, surface and air.

India, perhaps the country most concerned with what it perceives as a Chinese threat in its neighbouring waters, is one of the few regional countries capable of such capability. Spearheaded by an economic growth that has seen the country’s annual real economic growth grow at an average of 7.2 percent over the

| Asian Military Review |

past ten years, according to the document published by the Australian Department of Defence ‘2017 Defence Economic Trends in the Asia-Pacific’, India has been focusing on the acquisition of submarines, destroyers, frigates, corvettes and Maritime Patrol Aircrafts (MPA).

In order to supplement its ‘Kolkata’ class guided missile destroyers, the Indian Navy (IN) contracted Magazine Dock Limited (MDL) in 2011 for the

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The Indian Government’s Project 15B is supplementing the Kolkata-class destroyers with a new Visakhapatnam-class, the first of which INS Visakhapatnam was launched on 20 Apr 2015 at Mazagaon Dock Limited (MDL), Mumbai.

construction of the next generation destroyers, Project 15B. The first of class, INS Visakhapatnam, was launched in April 2015, while the second ship, INS Mormugao, was launched in September 2016 and the third, INS Imphal, was launched in April 2019. The fourth ship, INS Porbandar, is scheduled for launching next year. Displacing 7,300 tones and with a range of 4,000nm (7,408km) the new guided-missile destroyers will be fitted with indigenously developed 533mm torpedo launchers and RBU-6000 anti-submarine rocket launchers. In terms of frigates, the IN concluded negotiations with Russia in February 2019 for the procurement of another four ‘Krivak III’ class frigates to complement the six frigates already operational. The 3,300 tonne frigates will features two twin torpedo launchers. Additionally, seven new stealth frigates (Project 17A) will join the IN in the 2020s: four will be built by MDL and the remaining three by Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE). GRSE was also selected in April 2019 to build the eight new ASW Shallow Water Craft (ASWSWC). According to a company statement, the ASWSWC will be capable of “full scale sub surface surveillance of coastal waters, SAU and Coordinated ASW operations with aircraft. In addition, the vessels shall have the capability to interdict/destroy sub

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surface targets in coastal waters.” Finally, under the surface the IN is currently in the process of receiving a total of six ‘Kalvari’ class diesel-electric attack (SSK) submarines, built by MDL and based on Naval Group’s Scorpene submarines. In June 2019, India also issued an Expression of Interest (EoI) for six Project 75i submarines.

In order to address the ASW air capability gap currently facing the IN - the majority of its 11 Kamov-28 and 17 Sea King ASW helicopters are not operational - in August 2017 the Indian MoD issued a Request for Information (RfI) for 123 naval multi-role helicopters with ASW capabilities, as well as 111 armed light Naval Utility Helicopters (NUH). So far, only the procurement of the NUH has been approved and in February 2019 the MoD issued a EoI for shortlisting of potential Indian strategic partners and foreign Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM). Moreover, in November 2015 the first squadron of Boeing P-8I Poseidon MPAs was officially inducted, and in 2016 India placed an order for an additional four P-8Is, which delivery is scheduled to begin in 2020.

These MPAs are bringing significant new capabilities to the IN, including MK-54 lightweight torpedoes and Mark 82 depth charges.

Australia is also seeking to reinforce

| Asian Military Review |

its ASW capabilities in order to be able to secure the Indian Ocean region and protect its interests therein. In a speech given during the Into-Pacific Conference hosted in Perth in August, Australia Defence Minister Linda Reynolds noted that Australia’s “equities in the Indian Ocean are clear”: the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extends deep into the IO, the IO is home to five of Australia’s top 15 trading partners, and the country’s LNG sector is booming largely thanks to project located on the North Western Shelf.

Key to the maritime strategic goal of securing the IO is the replacement of the ‘Collins’ class SSK submarines with the SEA 1000 ‘Attack’ class submarines. Based on Naval Group’s ‘Barracuda’ design for the French Navy, which was selected in April 2016 as the successful bidder, the 12 ‘Shortfin Barracuda’ (or ‘Attack’ class) submarines will significantly enhance Australia’s capabilities. Although, as the programme continues to face significant delays, there are now questions as to whether it might be necessary to further extend the life of the ‘Collins’ class: it is now expected that the first ‘Attack’ class will not be commissioned before the mid-2030s, whereas the ‘Collins’ class, commissioned between the mid-90s and early 2000s, were originally expected to start retiring by 2026. Moving to the surface, in June 2018 the Australian government announced that BAE Systems’ ‘Type 26’ frigate design had won the competition for the replacement of the ‘Anzac’ class frigates. The latter have been in service since the mid-90s and the ‘Hunter’ class will start replacing them in the late 2020s. Built in Australia by ASC Shipbuilding, the 8,800 tonne ships based on BAE’s Type 26 Global Combat Ship will accommodate Australian-specific systems such as the Aegis combat system, CEA’s CEAFAR2 active phased array radar and one Sikorsky MH-60R helicopter. It will be armed with MU90 torpedoes for ASW as well as fitted with BAE’s Nulka decoy launch system. Finally, Australia has also acquired twelve P-8A MPA: the first one arrived in Canberra in November 2016 and the remaining 11 are scheduled for delivery by March 2023.

Submarines in the Strait Singapore and Indonesia also have significant stakes in the region: their unique position around the Strait of Malacca means that they are particularly worried about the increasing passage of

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By 2023 New Zealand will join Australia and India as operators of Boeing’s P-8A Poseidon intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft over the maritime.

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| Asian Military Review |

Chinese submarines in the area. Moreover, their proximity to the SCS brings with it concerns in relation to disputes over island sovereignty.

As such, Singapore has a strong submarine fleet that will soon be complemented by an additional two Type 218SG attack submarines from Thyssenkrup Marine Systems for a total of four such ships. The ‘Invincible’ class submarines should start entering the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) by 2021, with the first one launched in February. The RSN also boasts eight ‘Formidable’ class frigates, built by Naval Group and Singapore Marine Technologies, equipped with EDO Model 980 ALOFTS active low-frequency towed sonar and armed with the Eurotrop A244S torpedo. As far as air assets are concerned, the Republic of Singapore Air Force operates eight Sikorsky S-70B Seahawk naval helicopter for the RSN, and the government is currently deciding if it will replace its ageing Fokker 50 MPAs with the P-8, Saab’s Swordfish or IAI’s G550.

Intrinsically linked to China for its economy, yet concerned with maritime developments in the region, Indonesia’s defence budget has been representing a small yet stable share of the GDP (between 0.6-0.8 percent of GDP) over the past ten years. Part of this spending has been allocated to the development of its submarine fleet, which currently includes the construction and delivery,

by Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME), of three Type 209 ‘Nagapasa’ class SSKs. The first one was delivered in 2017 and the last one is scheduled for delivery by 2021. The Indonesian Navy (Tentara National Indonesia - Angkatan Last - TNI-AL) is now considering different options for the next batch of submarines, including the Russian ‘Kilo’ class and Naval Group’s ‘Scorpene’. In the past few years, the TNIAL has also received two ‘Martadinata’ class guided missile frigates, built by PTPAL in collaboration with Dutch Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding (DSNS) and armed with two triple torpedo launchers.

In terms of air assets, in January 2019 the TNI-AL received another CN-235-220 MPA as part of an order of five such third generation aircraft to complete the naval aviation fleet of the Navy. At the same time, it also received five more AS565 MBe Panther ASW helicopters from PT Dirgantara Indonesia (PTDI) - this is part of an order of 11 helicopters in total, which was placed in 2014.

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HMAS Farncomb berthing at its home port of Fleet Base West, Western Australia. The Collins-class may require a life extension programme due to delays in the commissioning of the Attack-class submarines expected in the 2030s.

The Philippines is another country that has been emerging as of late in terms of military spending. Long confined to 0.70.8 percent of the GDP, under president Rodrigo Duterte defence spending has been growing steadily to reach 1.2 percent in 2016, and the proposed budget for 2020 - announced in August - has seen a three percent increase over the allocation in 2019 (reaching $3.6 billion) and represents nearly five percent of total government expenditure. Although half of the budget will be allocated to the Philippine Army, as the country continues to grapple with terrorism, some is expected to continue to cover recent acquisitions for the Philippine Navy. Indeed, embroiled with China in the overlapping claims over the Spratly and Paracel islands, the Philippines is increasingly concerned with China’s activity in the region and is seeking to significantly increase its ASW capabilities. These include the acquisition of a corvette vessel dedicated to ASW, two AW159 Wildcat helicopters, and two frigates built by Hyundai Heavy Industries and based on the design of the Incheon frigates (FFX-I) built for the South Korean navy.

Non-Traditional Threats It would however be misguided to interpret Asia Pacific countries’ naval modernisation and expansion solely

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through the prism of ASW to address the resurgence of great power politics in the region. As noted by Waldwyn, “each country has different threat perceptions and requirements,” which range from traditional to non-traditional threats such as illegal, unregulated, unreported fishing, piracy, illegal smuggling and, increasingly, the devastating effects of climate change that “have required a swift response from navies as well as disaster relief agencies.” The economic dependency of many of these countries on maritime trade routes is also a key driver in increasing capabilities in order to be able to secure key maritime trade channels.

As such, countries like New Zealand, that had seen its defence spending plateauing over the past decade, are making new, more significant financial commitments to their security forces. In the 2019-20 budget, the Vote Defence Force received 18 percent more funds than in 2018-19 reaching $2.6 billion (NZ$4.29 billion), of which $303 million (NZ$493 million) was allocated to the Navy. Part of this budget will serve to pay for the procurement of the four new P-8A MPAs, a contract awarded in July 2018 that will spread over fiscal years until 2026. In the coming years the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) also plans for ongoing upgrades to the ‘Anzac’ frigates

| Asian Military Review |

to maintain their offensive and defensive capabilities, including replacing the embarked Seasprite SH-2G(I) by 2027, as well as procuring an additional sealift vessel equipped with a docking well, hospital facilities, planning spaces and self-defence capabilities. Finally, a Southern Ocean Patrol vessel is scheduled for acquisition in the mid-2020s for dedicated patrol capabilities within New Zealand’s EEZ and the Southern Ocean.

It is interesting to see that countries such as Japan and Taiwan have also been modernising their air, surface and subsurface fleet, although their focus remains primarily on the development of the indigenous shipbuilding industry. Others, such as Malaysia and Vietnam, have been attempting to modernise and procure capabilities, however their plans have been significantly hampered by a lack of financial backing from the government.

Generally speaking, “although varying in terms of size, capability and quantity, Asia Pacific nation navies and coast guards are primarily investing in frigates, patrol vessels and diesel-electric submarines,” according to Walwyn.

But perhaps even more interesting is the slow yet steadily increasing attention some regional countries are paying to space assets. At first glance the link between space and maritime strategy may appear tenuous, however the race to

China People’s Daily The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) newest space tracking ship is the Yuan Wang 7, seen here in August 2018. Its missions include satellite and ballistic missile tracking.

increase satellites that will be able to give an accurate picture for maritime domain awareness is on. Nowhere is this more visible than in China’s infrastructure development strategy in the SCS and its increased presence in the IO. O’Keeffe explains: “If you want to go into space, you need to be at sea: the ships you will be positioning along the trajectory of the satellite system will ensure that you always maintain a connection.” This is primarily due to the fact that in the first

eight minutes of a satellite launch its trajectory can still be influenced by the Earth atmosphere and it may be necessary to re-adjust it accordingly; there is also the possibility that once into space, the satellite may need to be reignited, so again it is necessary to position assets in order to maintain that connection. In the SCS, on Hainan island, China has built a space station, which its naval assets are contributing to protecting; “proximity to the equator is key in launching assets into

Regional naval directory

space,” noted O’Keeffe, and for China the Spratly and the Paracel islands are a significant asset on its chessboard.

Other countries are slowly becoming aware of the new race to space assets that is shaping up; an article about Australia on the Defence Connect website, ‘Vulnerability of Space-Based Systems could Expose the ADF’, and the inclusion of maritime satellite surveillance and cyber security in the RNZN’ Capability Plan are two examples of this. However, according to O’Keeffe the link between space and maritime capabilities and strategies is still too tenuous in military planners’ mind, which is giving China a significant strategic advantage. “China is not necessarily building a PLAN ready for the next maritime war,” he noted; “rather, it is interested in expanding in areas where other countries’ presence is weak, making it difficult for them to access these regions and establishing its own power.” It will be interesting to see how this will contribute to shaping naval procurement in the near future. AMR

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NEW ZEALAND’S MARITIME PERSPECTIVE Interview with Rear Admiral David Proctor, Chief of Navy for the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN)

by Alix Valenti

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ear Admiral (RAdm) David Proctor assumed the role of Chief of Navy on 29 November 2018 following numerous senior positions within the New Zealand Defence Force, including Deputy Commander Joint Forces New Zealand and Acting Vice Chief of Defence Force from July to September 2018.

RAdm Proctor has held a number of senior logistics posts during his career, including operational logistics appointments at sea and overseas.

His operational service includes a deployment to the Solomon Islands and being appointed Chief of Logistics, United Nations Mission and the New Zealand Senior National Officer in Support of East Timor.

What do you perceive as the current main threats and challenges in the Asia Pacific region?

New Zealand is navigating an increasingly complex and dynamic international

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security environment. While there may be noteworthy effects on New Zealand’s interests from singular developments, New Zealand’s security outlook is being shaped by increasing pressure on the international rules-based order from the dynamic intersections of three forces: - The increasing importance of spheres of influence, with some states pursuing greater influence in ways that, at times, challenge international norms.

- Challenges to open societies and Western liberalism threaten to reduce the willingness of open liberal states to champion the rules-based order.

- A collection of complex disruptors, including the impacts of climate change, new technologies changing the nature of conflict, extremist ideologies, and transnational organised crime. These disrupters are forces for disorder disproportionately affecting open societies and weak states.

The Asia-Pacific region is increasingly shaped by strategic competition, historic and newly emerging inter-state tensions, and nationalism. While the regional order has accommodated regional states’ preference to pursue a diverse set of economic and security relationships, intensifying competition may challenge the framework in the future. In this context, states may be compelled to make choices, small and large, in ways they had previously avoided. Economic tension associated with strategic competition could impact the multilateral trading system.

As these forces pressure the international rules-based order, New Zealand, and its partners are confronted by shifts in the foundations of security requiring a span of high-level statecraft, all-of-government strategies, and community development.

Furthermore, when the effects of climate change intersect with a complex array of environmental and social issues, they can be significant contributors to both low-level and more violent conflict, and generate security implications, which can be further magnified in younger nations. In coming decades, the impacts of climate change will continue to test the security and resilience of the South Pacific region and the world. Understanding and accounting for the security impacts of climate change will be a critical component of operational planning in the years to come.

Closer to home, the impacts of climate change will necessitate more High

| Asian Military Review |

Availability Disaster Recovery (HADR) and stability operations in our region, and greater need to plan for and respond to domestic civil defence emergencies resulting from severe weather at home. New Zealand may be faced with concurrent operational commitments, which could stretch resources.

What are the challenges specific to New Zealand?

New Zealand is a large maritime nation, with significant resources, which remain unexploited because much of our productive capacity lies below the low water mark. Our greatest challenge is geographic remoteness, which gives some security, but also creates exposure, and isolation from markets. Our Area of Responsibility covers 11 percent of the globe creating significant responsibilities for search and rescue, and national defence, including territorial integrity, all of which require a significant degree of awareness.

New Zealand’s trade links to the rest of the world provide the goods and services that underpin its way of life. Free and unfettered access to the global maritime commons will continue to be integral to New Zealand’s development and economic prosperity, making the safety and security of sea lines of communication worldwide a vital national interest. New Zealand’s trade with some 240 nations and territories accounts for 60 percent of its total economic activity, so any disruption to shipping will have serious consequences to the national economy.

Any degradation of the security or commercial viability of New Zealand’s SLOCs, or those of its partners, will have significant implications for New Zealand’s economic prosperity. The AsiaPacific and Indian Ocean region contain the busiest highways in the world for the exchange of data, commodities capital, manufactures, and services. It is crucial to New Zealand’s national interests, and those of our regional friends and partners, that we meaningfully contribute to maintaining access to these trade routes and sea and data lines of communications, and the security of our maritime resources.

What is the role of the RNZN in addressing those threats?

New Zealand takes an ‘all hazards’ approach to national security, bringing Government agencies together to respond to all risks to national security, whether internal or external, human-

Regional naval directory

driven or naturally occurring. To this end, New Zealand maintains armed forces to defend New Zealand and protect its interests; to contribute forces to collective security, coalition, or UN-mandated operations; and to provide assistance to the civil power or for any other public service. These forces, including New Zealand’s naval forces are trained and equipped to fight and prevail in a wide variety of operational settings. They are also trained and equipped to conduct HADR operations, peace enforcement, peace keeping and peace building operations, border protection operations and capability building.

The Government has set out ten principle roles for the NZDF, one of which is to make a credible contribution to support peace and security in the AsiaPacific region, including regional security arrangements. The Defence contribution to New Zealand’s support for Asia-Pacific regional arrangements will become increasingly important in the future.

The RNZN is a blue water, expeditionary warfighting service

providing any one of the following options to the New Zealand Government if required: - Combat operations at sea – patrol, ISR, maritime strike and interdiction, barrier operations, protection of shipping, maritime trade operations.

- Combat operations from the sea – sealift amphibious operations, mine countermeasures, and rapid environmental assessment.

Constabulary operations – resource and border protection, sanctions enforcement, sovereignty patrols, and peace support or monitoring operations.

- Safety and assistance operations; stability operations, HADR, search and rescue and environmental protection.

- Naval diplomacy.

In addition to our Five Eyes relationship with the US, UK, Canada and Australia, New Zealand maintains bilateral defence relationships with countries across Asia, including Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Indonesia, Japan and the Philippines. New Zealand also

maintains its commitment to Singapore and Malaysia through the Five Power Defence Arrangements with Australia and the United Kingdom. Cooperation with WPNS (Western Pacific Naval Symposium) nations has grown over recent years, supported by a range of visits, exchanges, and development projects.

How is the RNZN cooperating with regional and non-regional navies to address the regional threats and challenges?

As previously noted, NZDF and the RNZN have a long history of engagement with regional maritime forces including navies and maritime police (RIMPAC, WPNS, FPDA, ASEAN, ADMM+, IFC). New Zealand’s approach is one of partnership focussed on quality of engagement exemplified by our initiation of the Southwest Pacific Heads of Maritime Forces Symposium bringing together the heads of regional maritime forces to discuss common problems and their resolution. AMR

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Afghan special operations commandos of the 6th Cobra Strike Kandak were the first of seven planned CSK units to get a new level of mobility and firepower during 2018. The units use heavily armoured and mine-resistant MSFVs.

ASIAN SOF LOOKS FOR PROTECTED MOBILITY SOF vehicles can be light and quick, but for some operators there is also a proved need for greater protection for the operators.

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n April, senior Special Operations Forces (SOF) delegations from across the Asia-Pacific (ASPAC) region met in Honolulu, Hawaii to share lessons learned from the contemporary operating environment (COE).

Organised by the US Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC), the Pacific Area Special Operations Conference (PASOC) provided SOF leadership from across the region with the opportunity to discuss a range of concepts of operation, tactics, techniques and procedures relating to counterinsurgency, counter-terrorism and maritime security missions in particular.

Speaking at the event, delegates (who must remain anonymous due to operational security concerns) discussed

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by Andrew White requirement for event greater ‘Rapid Reaction’ capabilities, particularly during operations across the austere topography of extensive waterways and island chains.

Critical to supporting such rapid reaction missions is Special Operations Vehicle (SOV) technology which, as delegates explained at the PASOC, must be capable of conducting a wide range of ground, airborne and amphibious operations.

Addressing delegates at the event, senior special operations officers from Armed Forces of the Philippines Special Operations Command described how SOF components had innovatively used non-traditional SOVs such as the M111 armoured personnel carrier to fulfil a number of more specialised roles beyond protected troop transport during the

| Asian Military Review |

Battle of Marawi in 2017.

According to officials, M111s were driven up ramps to the first and second floors of shelled-out buildings to provide overwatch across the battlefield with the vehicle’s ISTAR mission suite. Additional uses saw the same vehicles forwardmounted close to enemy lines, fitted with loud hailers to ‘negotiate’ with insurgent forces.

Despite such innovation, SOF commanders across ASPAC continue to demand a mix of protected mobility and lighter weight, lesser protected and more agile SOVs to support the full spectrum of special operations across the region.

Interoperability Speaking to Asian Military Review, vice president at Polaris Government and

l and warfare

Defense, Jed Leonard, described how the “expeditionary nature of special operations forces and their missions are well supported by the transportability, mobility and overall capability” of SOV technology, including the company’s own inventory of DAGOR, MRZR and MV 850 tactical ground vehicles, many of which are already operational with SOF customers across ASPAC. “As their missions expand, special operations vehicles flex to integrate different payload packages, integrated communications and weapon systems,” he explained.

Referring to increased levels in cooperation between one of Polaris’s main government customers, the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and Polaris-equipped SOF partner forces across Asia-Pacific including Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, Leonard went onto describe: “The vehicle trends are similar to those in the US because so many military efforts are joint and coalitionbased between the US and its allies.

“The same thing goes for training and exercises. We see that when our vehicles are demonstrated or trialled, their capabilities speak for themselves; operators quickly see how a mission can move from 3mph to 60mph. And the increased amount of tactical options the vehicles afford to a team. The need for special operations vehicles is increasing and we’re ready to continue supporting special operators.

Protected Mobility

In terms of protected mobility, particularly relevant to counter-terrorism (CT) and counter-insurgency (COIN) operations in urban environments, multiple state actors across ASPAC are driving requirements for SOV technology similar to Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles in capability.

Examples include the Afghan National Army Special Operations Corps (ANASOC) which in October 2018, announced a total of five Cobra Strike Kandaks or battalions were now operational across the whole of the SouthCentral Asian country.

The news followed a $333 million contract award to Textron Systems a year earlier, to provide up to 255 Mobile Strike Force Vehicles (MSFV) to the ANASOC to support CT and COIN operations including direct action missions.

Based on Textron’s Commando Select vehicle, the MSFV is available in

multiple configurations with options for the integration of the Objective Gunner’s Protective Kit featuring 40mm automatic grenade launcher; or 12.7mm heavy machine gun to provide an organic fire support capability to ground force elements as well as protected mobility for insertion and extraction across urban areas.

Delivery of the total inventory of MSFVs to ANASOC is due to run through to 2024, a company spokesperson for Textron confirmed to AMR. The 4x4 Commando Select has a top speed of 62mph (100km/h) at maximum ranges out to 400 miles (644km), it was added.

Similar CONOPs are being explored in Indonesia with Thales and PT Pindad’s design of the Sanca MRAP. As defence sources explained to AMR, a total of 30 vehicles could eventually support the Indonesian Armed Forces’ (TNI) army special operations command, KOPASSUS. Thales and PT Pindad first unveiled a technology demonstrator of the 4x4 Sanca at the Indo-Defence Exhibition in Jakarta in 2016. However, as AMR went to press, no contract award had yet been announced by the TNI for the Sanca which is based on the design of the Thales Australia Bushmaster MRAP (already in service with NATO and Non NATO Entity SOF customers in Europe and Asia Pacific).

Similarly, SOF components from Japan’s Ground Self Defence Force (JGSDF) are already benefiting from the procurement of Thales Australia’s 4x4 Bushmaster MRAP following multiple contract awards over the course of 2018.

According to Japan’s 2017 Defence Plan, JGSDF must be capable of countering attacks by enemy guerrilla forces as well as SOF units, with Bushmaster vehicles providing a protected mobility solution for the JGSDF’s Special Operations Group (SOG) which can be tasked with internal security missions as well as limited special operations abroad.

C S T Local situa onel awareness

Light Mobility Despite ongoing demand for protected mobility platforms to support fire support and insertion and extraction of small unit teams in densely populated areas of AsiaPacific, SOF units around the region also seek lighter weight platforms to support requirements for enhanced mobility and agility across and over the battlefield.

As an example, Japanese SOF remain regular operators of Polaris MRZR-4 SOVs, which are owned and shared by US

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A Thales Bushmaster protected mobility vehicle from the 8th/12th Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery during Exercise Koolendong in 2019. Indonesia’s PT Pindad has been working with Thales on its 4x4 Sanca version which might be supplied to the TNI.

SOF components in Okinawa to support ‘fly and drive’ operations as an internally transportable vehicle in the cargo holds of CH-47 helicopters and V-22 Osprey tiltrotors, defence sources informed AMR. Although not directly owned by Japan, the SOG regularly trains with US SOF partners including the US Air Force’s 320th Special Tactics Squadron at Kadena Air Base in Japan. This provides access to some unique capabilities of US SOF and provides an interoperable capability for the SOG with the Japanese government currently in the process of procuring its own inventory of V-22B Block C variants from Bell-Boeing.

In Malaysia, the Ministry of Defence remains in the process of selecting an SOV to support army SOF components including Grup Gerak Khas (GGK).

In August 2018, the MoD launched a competition to consider a variety of tactical ground vehicles with an initial evaluation programme understood to have been completed at the start of 2019, industry sources indicated to AMR. Competition participants are understood to include Cendana Auto’s Rapid Intervention Deployment Vehicle; Kembara Suci’s SOV; Weststar’s GKM1 SOV; and Nimr Automotive’s Rapid Intervention Vehicle (RIV) in association with DefTech. The MoD is seeking a 4x4 SOV capable of supporting the full spectrum of ground and airborne special operations.

Selected vehicles will replace and augmented a variety of SOVs currently in

28

operation with Malaysian SOF including Mercedes G-Wagens and “Lipan Bara” 4x4 high-mobility armoured vehicles (HMAVs).

Kembara Suci’s SOV totals 3,200kg (7,054lb)in gross vehicle weight (GVW), providing a five-strong small unit team with a total of 1,500kg (3,306lb) payload. Cendana’s Rapid Intervention Deployment Vehicle measures just 1,900kg (4,188lb) although it retains the capacity to carry a six-strong crew; while Weststar’s GK-M1 SOV has a 3,300kg (7275lb) GVW and total payload capacity of 760kg (1675lb) for a crew of four.

Nimr’s RIV has a GVW of 4,000kg (8818lb) and maximum payload of 1,500kg (3306lb), with the ability to project a maximum crew of four out to a maximum cruising range of 1,000km at 74mph (120km/h), a company spokesperson confirmed to AMR. In Indonesia, KOPASSUS is operating P6 ATAV (All Terrain Assault Vehicles) following delivery to force components over the course of 2017 and 2018 by SSE Defence.

First displayed at the Indo-Defence Exhibition in November 2016, P6 ATAVs are being used to support internal security operations targeting violent extremist organisations including Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD). SOVs, which have a 142hp turbo diesel engine, is used for the rapid insertion and extraction of small unit teams as well as organic fire support capability with the addition of light or medium machine guns.

| Asian Military Review |

Finally in New Zealand, the government is seeking to purchase a series of ‘utility light’ vehicles as part of an effort to support the “improved mobility, safety and versatility to rapidly deployable mobile forces”, according to a statement by defence minister Ron Mark on 3rd July.

A total of $11.7 million (NZ$18.6 million) has been set aside to procure utility light vehicles which could include an undisclosed number of MRZR variants from Polaris Government and Defense. However, Mark was unable to confirm how many SOVs would be made available to New Zealand Defence Force SOF components.

Polaris’s 4x4 MRZR-4, now available in a diesel variant (MRZR-D4), can carry a total of up to six operators with a maximum curb weight of 879kg (1,732lb) and payload capacity of 680kg (1,500lb).

Smaller MRZR-2/MRZR-D2 variants have a curb weight of 737kg (1,625lb) and payload capacity of 453kg (960lb), company literature explained.

The news follows the acceptance into service of Supacat’s Special Operations Vehicle-Mobility Heavy (SOV-MH) vehicle in January 2018, which provides operators with the flexibility to reconfigure the vehicle from a 4x4 platform into a 6x6 variant with extended wheelbase.

The SOV-MH, which is a variant of the HMT Extenda, has a GVW of 7,600kg (16,755lb) and 10,500kg (23,148lb) in 4x4 and 6x6 configurations with payload capacities measuring 2,100kg (4,630lb) and 3,900kg (8,600lb) respectively.

Platforms have been designed to carry a variety of support weapons including automatic grenade launchers, heavy machine guns and remote weapon stations, as well as C4ISTAR mission suites.

Conclusion According to Polaris’s Leonard, demand for SOVs will continue to drive designs and development in the short to medium term as SOF units seeking flexible and modular solutions to support an increasing range of mission sets across arduous terrain.

As he explained to AMR: “We’re developing future platforms right now and it’s critical for us to maintain the simplicity and flexibility of the base platforms so they can be maximised in the field. AMR

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Thales

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Thales’ Squire radar is an X-band GSR can be man backpacked over terrain and into position.

SCANNING FOR TROUBLE Ground Surveillance Radars (GSRs) help safeguard border lines, military and civilian installations and infrastructure. With local security challenges in mind, several GSR vendors are looking closely at the Asia-Pacific.

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n Asia-Pacific, as elsewhere, ground threats to national borders pose a serious problem, particularly at times when insurgency is high. To combat this, Ground Surveillance Radars (GSRs) play an instrumental role in helping to protect sensitive areas. Increasingly, these radars are also called upon to help detect Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Although not a replacement for optronics, radar is attractive as a tool to support ground surveillance. It may not be adversely affected by low visibility, fog or haze in

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by Dr. Thomas Withington the same way as optronics. Secondly, it is immune to camouflage; a person will still show up on a radar regardless of how good their camouflage is.

Mark Radford, co-founder and chief executive officer of Blighter Surveillance Systems says that a number of considerations must be factored into the design of GSRs intended for the Asia-Pacific: “For GSRs to be effective in this region, they need to be robust and low maintenance to cope with the environmental extremes of -30 degrees Celsius (-22 degrees Fahrenheit) in winter

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and a humid +40ºC (104ºF) in summer.” A written statement from Collins Aerospace, which builds the PSR-500 GSR (see below), emphasised the drivers for the GSR market in the Asia-Pacific including “the growing need for the protection of secure sites, critical infrastructure, military bases, camps and assets against current and emerging threats.”

Radford adds that “political instability in many parts of this region serves to intensify the need for an effective surveillance solution.” For Steen Trier, Terma’s director of sales

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transportation sectors.”

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communications

Counter UAV Traditionally, GSRs are used to detect people and vehicles. They are increasingly being employed to detect low-flying UAVs and drones. Such targets may fly relatively close to the ground, typically at altitudes of up to 500 feet (152 metres).

Blighter

for the company’s surveillance and mission systems, demand for GSRs in the defence domain still outstrips that of the civilian domain, although demand in the latter is increasing: “The needs (of the) defence sector usually outnumbers the rest, due to the need for military perimeter and border protection. We also see an increasing interest from end-users involved in ensuring security in the energy,

Dual Blighter B422-HP Ground Surveillance Radars on Tower - the field of view can be augmented by increasing the number of antennas used by individual systems.

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This can place such flying objects squarely within the elevation FOV of some GSRs. Moreover, a UAV or drone’s size can make its detection by conventional groundbased air surveillance radars difficult.

These aircraft can present a threat as they can be used to gather reconnaissance and, in nefarious cases, carry explosives. This March is was reported that the YPG/PKK Kurdish separatist group had made up to twelve attempts to target Turkish military bases in the southeast of the country with explosive-laden drones. The attacks are believed to have originated from Kurdishcontrolled areas in Syria. Fortunately on this occasion the attacks were foiled.

Thales has taken these threats into account with the realisation of the company’s Squire Mk.2 GSR. The Squire Mk.2, like its predecessors, is an X-band (8.5 gigahertz/GHz to 10.68GHz) GSR with an instrumented range of up to 45 kilometres/km (28 miles). X-band is an attractive waveband for GSRs. The short wavelengths of X-band transmissions lets such radars detect targets in fine detail.

This is an important consideration when it is necessary to depict targets such as people crawling and moving vehicles, and to discriminate them from animals.

X-band radars achieve such a performance using comparatively small-sized antennas, allowing them to be moved with relative ease; a Squire radar can be carried by two people in backpacks. The trade-off is that X-band radars have a comparatively short range compared to lower frequency radars transmitting in S-band (2.3GHz to 2.5GHz/2.7GHz to 3.7GHz) and L-band (1.215GHz to 1.4GHz). Nevertheless, this is an acceptable compromise. A GSR will typically be required to look several kilometres out from a base to provide early warning of approaching potentially hostile troops or vehicles. Such ranges may also be sufficient to protect a border from people attempting to cross it illegally.

All radars are, to an extent, restricted to a line-of-sight range. Therefore one may as well use a radar providing a detailed depiction of targets within its line-ofsight.

Thales’ Squire Mk.2 includes a new processor and an embedded, uncooled infrared camera. Its detection range for a person has been increased to 13km (eight miles), compared to the 10km (six miles) of the previous version. Regarding counter-drone performance, Thales officials told the author that the radar can detect a drone at 2.7 nautical miles/nm (five kilometres) and classify that drone

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Collins Aerospace

warfare

Whereas Pulse Doppler radars transmit a pulse of RF energy an FMCW radar transmits a continuous signal. The signal’s frequency will change over a set time pattern as the signal is swept across a set bandwidth. The radar will record which frequency was transmitted at which particular time, and record the frequency of the echo when the signal hits a target.

These two signals (original signal and the echoed signal) will be mixed together thus creating a new signal. It is this latter signal that will be processed to determine the target’s distance and velocity. FMCW are less complex to construct than their pulse Doppler counterparts, and hence can be less expensive. Such radars can also have a small physical size making them easy to transport and install, and use comparatively less power making them not only less expensive to operate, but potentially harder to detect by electronic support measures. FMCW radar is particularly attractive for applications where the user may need to procure several GSRs, such as to position along a border, or to protect the perimeter of a base.

Border Regions Collins Aerospace’ PSR-500 ground surveillance radar can be equipped with an optronics system to enhance surveillance capabilities yet further.

at 2.2nm (4km) range. The radar can also measure the altitude of such targets.

Thales added that existing Squire radars can be upgraded to the Squire Mk.2 specification. This is already being done for the Koninklijke Landmacht (Royal Dutch Army) which is upgrading 70 of its radars to Squire Mk.2 status. The first upgraded radars will be delivered to the force by the final quarter of 2019. The Canadian Army has, meanwhile, received new Squire Mk.2 radars.

FMCW Collins Aerospace has been energetically promoting its PSR-500 C-band Frequency Modulated/Continuous Wave (FMCW) perimeter protection radar. The company states that this product “combines all functionalities for ground intrusion detection, such as the efficient detection of moving targets, night and day whatever the weather conditions.” Its statement goes on to say that the PSR-500 “is a low power, lightweight and easily-deployable system, well adapted for the surveillance of various types of sites.” The radar can

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detect a person at a range of 500m (1,640ft) and a vehicle at 900m (2,952ft). Many radars employ Pulse Doppler techniques to determine the speed of a target relative to the radar. The radar transmits a pulse of Radio Frequency (RF) energy which travels at the speed of light, 161,825 knotsper-second (299,700 kilometres-per-hour).

By halving the time it takes for the radar to transmit a pulse, and then receive that pulse’s echo as it is reflected by the target, one can ascertain the target’s distance from the radar. Exploiting the Doppler Effect enables the measurement of the target’s velocity. An oft quoted example of the Doppler Effect is the seemingly rising tone of a police car’s siren when approaching a stationary observer, and the seemingly declining tone that it makes as it drives away. This is because the sound waves take a progressively shorter time to reach the observer as the police car approaches and progressively longer as it drives away. Pulse Doppler radars exploit this change in frequency of the echoes to determine a target’s speed.

FMCW work in a different way.

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Blighter’s GSRs employ a mix of FMCW and Doppler processing. The company has enjoyed success with its B-400 series Ku-band (13.4GHz to 14GHz/15.7GHz to 17.7GHz) systems which have an instrumented range of up to 25km (15.5 miles) for a large vehicle, and 4.6km (2.9 miles) for a crawling person. They can detect a target moving as slow as 0.37 kilometres-per-hour (0.23 miles-perhour). The FOV of the B-400 series is dependent on the number of antennas used therein. The baseline B-402 has a 90 degree horizontal FOV using a single antenna. This can be increased to 360 degrees for the B-442 which employs four antennas. As Radford notes these azimuths allow “hills, mountains, plains, riverine territories and marshes to be scanned simultaneously, without the need to tilt the radar.” Meanwhile, the 20 degree elevation beam width “provides detection of low flying manned aircraft, UAVs and drones, which is a growing concern in most border or coastal security applications.” In 2010 Blighter began supplying B-400 series radars to equip the DMZ (Demilitarised Zone); the de facto border between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The firm supplied 120 examples of these radars to this end, Radford notes.

Terma

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and civilian areas (in the Asia-Pacific) for which high resolution area surveillance is very important.”

The Market

As well as being used to help safeguard critical infrastructure and border regions, GSRs have a valuable role to play in helping to protect ports and coastlines.

miles), detecting a person at 3.7km (2.2 miles) and performing continuous scanning across a 360 degree radius.

Trier says that this radar is currently “deployed and operational in a number of Critical Infrastructure Protection systems in the Middle East and in the USA where it is used to provide enhanced situational awareness to protect sensitive sites and strategic assets.” He says that the “AsiaPacific market holds a large number of interesting opportunities.” Trier continues that the company has “identified several projects within the military, paramilitary

Thales

Procurements of the B-400 have also been made by India. These radars equip the Indian government’s Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System (CIBMS). The CIBMS introduces several technologies, including radar, to improve the surveillance of India’s borders with Bangladesh and Pakistan.

The Danish radar specialists are looking closely at the Asia-Pacific as a market for its SCANTER-1002 ground surveillance radar. Transmitting in Kuband, this radar has an instrumented range of up to twelve kilometres (7.4

Collins Aerospace expects the need for GSRs to grow in the Asia-Pacific: “Demand for the protection of secure sites and critical infrastructure will increase. Leveraging current and future technologies such as drones and artificial intelligence to detect, identify and contain threats will increase the need for GSR in the Asia-Pacific,” the firm’s statement argues. Radford agrees saying that the potential threat emanating from drones and UAVs is driving the market: “The ability to simultaneously detect drones and ground targets is key to enhancing security when drones are commonly used for surveillance as a precursor to the physical (action) by the transgressors themselves.” The drive to protect key sites and military deployments against drones has been noted by Terma with Trier stating that “the detection and tracking of drones represent a real threat since their incursion not only disrupts civilian infrastructure (such as airports) but (can also) be a threat to lives and valuable assets.” Radford expects a plethora of security challenges to continue driving the demand for GSRs in the Asia-Pacific: “We are receiving increased enquiries for our ground and coastline security radars to help secure borders and coastlines against a multitude of threats including smuggling, terrorism, people-trafficking and illegal immigration.” Security challenges show no signs of abating in the Asia-Pacific. Fortunately, ground surveillance radars can play an important role in helping to keep such challenges in check. AMR

Thales’ Squire Mk.2 radar can detect a UAV at 2.7 nautical miles/nm (five kilometres) and classify it at 2.2nm (4km) range.

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Soldiers fire a 105mm round with an M119 light-tow howitzer from their base at Combat Outpost Monti in Kunar province of Afghanistan, December, 2009.

US ARMY

warfare

LIGHT GUNS KEEP HEADS DOWN The strength of light artillery lies in its

responsiveness and reliability in support of ground forces. Its firepower can make the difference between winning or losing in an engagement.

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by Stephen W. Miller

n defence light artillery excels at disrupting attacks and preventing rapid reinforcement. In attack, it can keep the enemy under cover and preventing them from effectively engaging the attackers.

The availability of indirect fires is particularly critical to light forces. Light infantry, airborne, and helicopter inserted forces have limited organic firepower making them especially reliant on outside support to neutralise threats.

Much attention is currently being given to extended range and deep strike missions that are the purview of heavy artillery systems. Yet, for the individual soldier, those supporting fires that are rapidly available and delivered directly in his battle space remain vital. The availability of these often falls to either mortars that are part of the ground unit or light artillery which are assigned to

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provide direct support responding to the calls for fire of units in contact.

Mortars According to the US Army manual: “Mortars allow the manoeuvre commander to quickly place killing indirect fires on the enemy, independent of whether he has been allocated supporting artillery.” Unlike tube artillery and air support mortars are directly responsive to the ground manoeuvre commander.

The rapid, high-angle, plunging fires they offer are invaluable against dugin enemy troops and targets in defilade.

These attributes also allow mortars to place its rounds close to friendly troops.

This makes it ideally suited in the final defence where the enemy assault is trying to overrun ones positions. It is often referred to as a “Commander’s hippocket artillery”.

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The 81mm and 120mm are the most prevalent mortars at company and battalion level and those for which significant capability improvements have been made. These calibers have allowed for the introduction of precision guided projectiles that can place a round within a few metres of a target. General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems and BAE Systems successfully demonstrated that their 81mm Roll Control Guided Mortar (RCGM) could impact within seven metres of the target at any range. Raytheon developed its PERM (Precision Extended Range Munitions), a 120mm GPS-guided mortar round that also extends the range from seven to 16 kilometres. The US Army Armament Research Development and Engineering Centre (ARDEC) fielded similar 120mm GPS guided Accelerated Precision Mortar Initiative cartridges (APMI) to Infantry Brigade Combat Teams in Afghanistan. Peter Burke, PEO Ammunition’s deputy product manager, Guided Precision Munitions and Mortar Systems suggested that: “ Coupled with a Lightweight Hand-held Mortar Ballistic Computer and the Dismounted 120mm Mortar Fire Control System, the infantry commander has a precision-strike capability and responsiveness he has never had before.”

The Russian news agency TASS reported earlier in 2019 that its army had begun to receive a new ‘silent’ 82mm mortar model 2B25. Initial deliveries were made to special forces. The system, manufactured by CRI Burevestnik, is reported to be quieter than traditional mortars, which are not especially loud themselves, and have more limited muzzle blast when fired. Its rate of fire is 15 rounds per minute (rpm) using high explosive. Reports suggest the range is over a kilometre which, if true, is significantly shorter than 3km of the 82-PM-41 conventional mortar in service.

However, the 2B25 at 13kg (28lb) is much lighter than the 50kg (123lb) of the PM-41.

Russia also fields the 2B9 Vasilek Cornflower automatic 82mm mortar. It uses a wheeled chassis and has a recoil system as well as an automatic loader that uses clips of four rounds. A clip can be fired off in less than two seconds. It can also fire single rounds either breech loaded or dropped down the muzzle.

It has an indirect fire range of 4.25km or direct fire range of 1km. At 632kg (1,393lb) it can be towed but in practice is more commonly carried in the bed of a 4x4 truck. In service with Russian

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US ARMY

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The 120mm mortar has been the principle battalion organic indirect fire assets for NATO, Russian and many other armies. With maximum ranges of 7000 to 9500 meters plus the ability to fire precision guided projectiles these can be disassembled and man-packed or carried in or towed by light tactical vehicles. Here a US mortar team executes a fire mission.

Airborne units it has also been seen in Syria. China’s Norinco manufactured its own copy of the Vasilek designated the W99.

The Hungarian company DIGÉP (Diósgyöri Gépgyár) began manufacturing the 2B9M with some modifications in 1982 delivering over 2500.

Continuing its improvements it produced the DE-82 which, with conversion to 81mm, was pursued in collaboration with the US Army ARDEC for mounting the HMMWV tactical truck.

The system was tested extensively.

Another light truck mobile mortar system being offered is the Thales Scorpion which has been displayed mounted on the 4x4 Toyota Land Cruiser but which, a spokesperson suggested, can be fitted onto similar vehicles. The system uses a shock absorbing platform in the vehicle bed that can accept an 81, 82 or 120mm tubes, has onboard fire control, and allows automatic laying of the mortar.

The ability to fit commercial 4x4 open bed light trucks makes the system particularly attractive to militaries in Africa and the Middle East which have shown a preference for such fleets (technicals).

The US Army announced in October 2018 that is was looking for a replacement for its current M120A1 mortar. The new Extended Range Mortar or ERM must have at least 9km range and is therefore allowed to be heavier but not over 181kg (400lb). The goal would be to field the ERM in 2026. They are also looking for an

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automated remote loading/firing system that can be adapted to both 81 and 120mm and fire 20 to 30 rounds per minute.

Light Howitzers While today’s artillery is predominantly 155mm or 152mm calibre there is also a need to have guns that can be easily lifted by medium helicopter and moved on the ground by light vehicles. This has seen the 105mm in western supplied armies and 122mm in Russian and Chinese supported forces. These guns sacrifice range to active light weight and transportability. In the later case the goal is to be able to utilise more numerous medium lift helicopters and to parachute drop these guns and accompanying light tactical prime movers to accompany these forces.

The British L118 and its US sister the M119A3 are both widely fielded, being used by 39 armies including UK, New Zealand and Thailand. An L19 gun on the L17 carriage weights 1,858kg (4,096 b) and has a range with standard ammunition of 17.2km and 20.6km with base bleed. Accuracy and responsiveness was improved with the 2013 introduction of LINAPS artillery pointing system, a digital fire-control system and GPSaided inertial navigation unit. This selfcontained system uses ring laser gyros to calculate azimuth, elevation and trunnion tilt, as well as, position and self-survey using a global positioning system. It has also been fit with a telescope and night

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vision device for direct fire. The gun is towed by the Land Rover, Pinzgauer, HMMWV or other light tactical vehicle.

Barrages fired by L118 batteries were credited with contributing greatly to the British Falkland ground operations.

Another popular light howitzer is the LG1 towed piece developed by GIAT (now Nexter) in France. It at 1520kg the lowest weight gun yet has a maximum range of 18.5km, exceptional accuracy and a firing rate of over long distances.

The gun was specifically designed for light and expeditionary forces and although first fielded in 1992 it remains in service with Thailand, Indonesia, Canada, Colombia and Belgium. Singapore retired its LG1s in 2005 replacing them with the ST Kinetics Pegasus 155mm light-weight howitzer. Malaysia has ordered 18 LG1 MkIIIs for its 10th Airborne Brigade with first deliveries in November 2019.

Sixteen of these guns will be assembled in country.

This latest improvement in the MarkIII provides the gun with inertial positioning and north seeking system, a ballistic computer and a muzzle velocity measuring system. These reduce the inaction time, increase accuracy and permit a gun crew of as low as three to service the piece. The Canadian Forces further improved their LG-1 guns with a new muzzle brake, a new spade design for better stability and larger tires.

Light Truck Mounted Artillery Light guns have proved to be ideal candidates for mounting on tactical trucks. Although this will increase the lift load when slung under a helicopter it actually allows the gun system - meaning the howitzer and its mobility component - to be carried in a single lift. With towed guns the prime mover would need a separate helicopter. Vehicle mounted guns have the advantages of being able to set-up more quickly and to displace just as rapidly. This is a critical capability as recent near-peer combat experience has shown that artillery can be quickly located and targeted once they fire. The surest means to survive is to move immediately after concluding a fire mission. A vehicle mounted weapon can do this much more rapidly that a towed gun. The question is: at what point does the size and weight of a truck mounted gun move from it being considered light to medium?

This divide could reasonably be whether it can still be lifted by the same transport helicopter as the towed gun that

Nexter The French LG1 is the lightest 105mm howitzer offered. It has been improved with inertial positioning and digital fire controls.

No longer in active service with the French army it is still popular and recently fielded by Malaysia’s airborne brigade.

it is indented to replace. This criterion narrows the range of candidates. One that meets the mark is the Hawkeye that was debuted by AM General several years ago at the AUSA Expo in Washington DC. It uses a ‘soft-recoil’ mount for the M20 105mm howitzer mounted on

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the M1152A1 HMMWV 4x4. Nguyen Trinh, director International Business Integration explained: “Hawkeye going into firing position is fully automated and powered while its navigation and digital fire control provide a ready to fire solution within under two minutes of halting. It is manually loaded achieving a maximum rate of fire of eight rounds per minute for three minutes and then a sustained rate of three rounds per minute.” A drawback is that Hawkeye requires a Boeing CH-47 Chinook to lift it where as the M119A1 (although gun alone) can be sling lifted by the Sikorsky UH-60 Blackhawk. The system recently was subject to field trials by the US Army National Guard in which multiple guns were put through the paces conducting fire missions. These include “shoot-and-scoot” exercises where the gun move, take up positions, fire and then immediately move again.

Light Gun Trends Several trends are evident in the direction of light guns and mortars. First are efforts that enhance their responsiveness. This is

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typified by the integration of positioning and fire controls directly on the system.

Next is providing greater tactical mobility to the systems. The introduction of ‘soft’ and recoil absorbing features are permitting the mounting of both howitzers and mortars on lighter vehicles to provide this ability to fire and move.

Finally there is increased automation of the entire gun servicing process. This not only reduces gun set-up but allows for a reduced gun crew size. An evolution of automation is the quest for automatic loading and rapid fire capability.

A principle driver for auto-loading is the significantly higher target effect that it can provide. Placing a number of rounds on a target simultaneous or in rapid succession has the greatest destructive and physiological impact. Being able to do this with a single gun provides major advantages.

Although research and development efforts continue to find a way to apply the 155mm calibre to light artillery as of today this category remains dominated by the 105mm. AMR

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Lockheed Martin

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Lockheed Martin's Long Range Anti-Ship Missile during testing in May 2018.

ANTI-SHIP MISSILE EVOLUTION

The anti-ship missile has come a long way since the crude guided weapons first witnessed during the Second World War.

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here are a bewildering array of weapons systems optimised for the destruction of surface vessels.

At the height of the Cold War, the RAF’s Blackburn Buccaneer aircraft had an arsenal that included TV- and radar-guided Matra Martel missiles, longer-range BAe (now MBDA) Sea Eagle anti-ship missiles, Texas Instruments (now Raytheon) Paveway laser-guided bombs and tactical nuclear weapons, while during the Falklands War, the courageous and highly skilled Argentinian pilots wreaked havoc on Britain’s naval task force - largely using unguided ‘iron bombs’. The Royal Navy (RN) was saved from disaster

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by Jon Lake largely because some of these weapons had not fused by the time they hit their targets. During an engagement between the US Navy and Iranian forces in 1988 (Operation Praying Mantis), US aircraft attacked enemy vessels using AGM-84 Harpoon missiles, AGM-123 Skipper rocket-propelled bombs, Walleye TVguided bombs, and unguided 1,000lb (453kg) bombs.

But with the increasing sophistication and lethality of today’s anti-aircraft defences, anti-ship attacks are better carried out without having to overfly the target, and ideally from significantly greater stand-off range, and to do this requires the use of (ideally guided) anti-

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ship missiles (AShMs).

These range from small weapons intended for use against fast and agile small boats to ballistic missiles that are designed to take out a capital ship. There are systems that can be fired from other ships, or from land-based platforms, or from helicopters or fixed wing aircraft, while some missiles have variants for each of these classes of firing platform.

These various anti-ship weapons employ different types of guidance, use different warhead types and sizes, and follow a wide variety of flight profiles.

During the Second World War, allied anti-shipping aircraft used cannon, unguided rockets, bombs and homing

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torpedoes against enemy ships, but Germany did develop the first operational anti-ship missiles, which used radio command guidance. Weapons like the Henschel Hs 293 and the unpowered, armour-piercing Fritz X gained some success, especially in the Mediterranean Theatre, from 1943–44, sinking or heavily damaging at least 38 ships including the Italian battleship Roma and the cruiser USS Savannah. The wire-guided Hs 293B and the television-guided Hs 293D variants were developed to counter allied radio jamming, but neither reached operational service.

On the Allied side, the US Navy deployed the ASM-N-2 Bat radar-guided glide bomb, which was claimed to be the world’s first autonomously-guided, radar-homing anti-ship weapon, and used it operationally against the Japanese in April 1945. The powered McDonnell LBD-1 Gargoyle saw no operational use.

During the Cold War, Western Navies were more concerned with tackling airborne and underwater threats than with engaging enemy warships, since the Russian Navy’s ‘blue water’ capabilities were relatively limited, while the antiship mission tended to fall to submarines, using torpedoes, and to airborne platforms – particularly fast jets – using much the same weapons as they employed against ground targets. For many years, missile technology was insufficiently advanced to allow the development of effective antiship missiles, though some larger aircraft (like the Soviet Tu-16 ‘Badger’ and Tu95 ‘Bear’) did carry large cruise missiles (usually nuclear-armed) intended for use against large naval targets like US aircraft carriers.

Modern anti-ship missiles came to prominence following the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat (the former HMS Zealous) by Egyptian missile boats in 1967, while air launched anti-ship missiles were used in the 1982 Falklands War. Five Exocet missiles had been delivered to Argentina before the war, and these were used to sink the British Type 42 destroyer HMS Sheffield on 4 May 1982.

The official Royal Navy Board of Inquiry Report stated that evidence indicated that the warhead had not detonated – demonstrating the lethality of modern AShMs. A single Exocet which failed to explode left a destroyer dead in the water, and which sank four days later. Two Exocets were then used to sink the 15,000ton container ship Atlantic Conveyor on 25 May.

During the long Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s, Iran and Iraq targeted one another’s merchant shipping and especially oil tankers in what became known as the Tanker War. The Iraqi Air Force used MiG-23s, Mirage F1s and Super Frelon helicopters armed with Exocet anti-ship cruise missiles during the first phase of this campaign, before France supplied Dassault Super Etendards in 1984, allowing Iraq to increase the range of its anti-shipping Exocet strikes. A Liberian tanker, Neptunia, was hit by an Iraqi Exocet in February 1985, becoming the first tanker to sink as a result of a missile strike. In 1987, a US Navy guided-missile frigate, USS Stark, was hit by an Exocet anti-ship missile fired by an Iraqi Mirage F1.

Most early air-launched anti-ship missiles were derivatives of weapons originally developed for ship-againstship combat, including the US AGM-84 Harpoon, the Chinese YJ-83, the French AM39 Exocet, the Italian Marte, the Norwegian Penguin, Russia’s Zvezda Kh-35 and the Swedish RBS-15, although some dedicated air-launched missiles were also developed and deployed, including the Anglo-French Martel and its active radar-homing, turbojet-powered Sea Eagle derivative.

While early anti-ship missiles used radio command guidance, most modern missiles are ‘fire and forget’ and use infrared or active radar homing, often in conjunction with inertial guidance.

Sea-skimming Most anti-ship missiles follow a flat sea skimming trajectory, often with a final highly supersonic ‘dash’ to the target, though some ballistic missiles have been re-purposed or designed for an antiship role, especially by China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy. Anti-ship ballistic missiles would approach their targets at enormous speed, with sufficient kinetic energy to cripple or destroy a large naval ship (including the largest aircraft carriers) with a single hit, even with a conventional warhead, as well as being very difficult to intercept.

Because a direct hit is required to be effective, they would need a precise and high-performance terminal guidance system. Such weapons can be air launched.

Russia’s Kh-47M2 Kinzhal, for example, was developed to hit ballistic missile defence ships and can be carried by Tu22M3 bombers or MiG-31K interceptors.

Whether ballistic or sea-skimming,

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modern anti-ship missiles are hard to evade, outrun or out-turn once a target has been acquired. To counter the threat, the modern surface ship has to avoid being detected, or has to decoy or destroy all of the incoming missiles or their missile launch platforms – ideally destroying the latter before missiles have even been fired.

An incoming missile does not have things ‘all its own way’, however, and will have to overcome multi-layered defences, perhaps beginning with patrolling carrieror land-based fighter aircraft carrying long-range missiles. Its target will probably be equipped with integrated computer fire-control systems for agile surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) guided by powerful and agile radar systems, and may be able to simultaneously track, engage, and destroy several incoming anti-ship missiles or hostile aircraft.

The missile will also have to cope with electronic countermeasures, chaff, and decoys, and an ‘inner layer’ of missile defences, using short-range missiles like the Raytheon Sea Sparrow or the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM). Even the target ship’s own main gun armament may be used defensively, as well as dedicated close-in weapons systems (CIWS), using rapid firing guns.

The development of new air-launched anti-ship missiles slowed following the end of the Cold War, as navies increasingly operated in the littoral zone, and as the need to prepare for peer-onpeer engagements gave way to a need to engage small, manoeuvrable boats and other asymmetric threats – even including suicide bombers using jet skis. This did, however, lead to the development of a whole new class of cheap, lightweight missiles for use against this class of target. The chance of peer or near-peer engagements (increasingly entailing shipagainst-ship maritime warfare) seemed to grow with increasing tensions between the USA and its allies on one side, and China and Russia on the other, and this led to some renewed emphasis on the development and procurement of bigger anti-ship missiles.

Most of the new generation of AShMs are stealthy, highly supersonic and autonomous, and many of them carry large warheads – sufficient to inflict a manoeuvre kill on even the largest targets, and able to saw smaller vessels in half.

They come screaming in at sea-skimming heights, giving defences little time to react and presenting a difficult target for defensive systems.

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A Mig 31K interceptor of the Russian Air Force carries a Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air launched ballistic missile on a flypast during the 2018 Moscow Victory Day Parade.

The joint Russian-Indian PJ-10 BrahMos has a 660lb (300kg) warhead, and is claimed to be the fastest low-altitude missile in the world, while also enjoying a 500km range. Brahmos is powered by a two stage power-plant, with a solidfuel rocket providing the first stage, accelerating the missile to supersonic speeds and with a liquid-fuelled ramjet as the second stage, accelerating it to Mach 2.8 at wavetop height. The BrahMos-II, now under development, is a hypersonic version with a speed of Mach 7-8. It is due to begin testing by 2020.

China’s CASIC YJ-12 is similar to BrahMos, with a 550lb (250kg) warhead and an integrated liquid fuel ramjet engine and a solid rocket booster conferring a cruise speed of Mach 2.53.5 and a range of 150-400km. In service with the PLA Navy’s Xian H-6J and H-6L ‘Badger’ bombers the YJ-12 will also be carried by the Shenyang J-16 (a derivative of the Su-30MKK) and is being offered to export customers as the CM-302.

Japan’s new ASM-3 has completed testing, and is expected to enter service imminently, initially equipping the JASDF’s Mitsubishi F-2 fighters, and perhaps later the F-35A and Kawasaki P-1.

The XASM-3 is a stealthy sea-skimming missile with hypersonic performance, its

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solid-fuelled rocket and integrated ramjet powering it to speeds of up to Mach 5. Range is being boasted to 400km, but exact warhead weight remains classified.

Less speed; more stealth But not all new AShMs are hypersonic or even highly supersonic. Norway’s Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile (claimed to be the world’s first 5th generation antiship missile) relies on stealth rather than speed, and is claimed to be ‘fully passive,’ not using active sensors to track targets and not emitting infrared or radar that could be detected by enemy ships. The missile is powered by a small turbofan (after an initial rocket boost) and has a range of 185km. It carries a 275lb (125kg) warhead. A derivative, the developmental Joint Strike Missile, is designed to be capable of both air to ground and antiship missions. The JSM will fit the internal weapons bay of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

Another relatively slow mover is the American Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), intended as a successor to and replacement for the ageing AGM84 Harpoon. LRASM is a derivative of the JASSM-ER cruise missile used by US Air Force bombers, and is stealthy and jam-resistant, producing no trackable

| Asian Military Review |

radar return and no real IR signature.

LRASM will use this low observability and its autonomous capabilities to detect and attack targets while evading their defences. LRASM has a range of more than 500 miles, compared to 67 miles for Harpoon. It can deliver a 1,000lb (453kg) penetrating warhead, hitting targets with an accuracy of within three metres.

For the US and its allies, LRASM promises to be a useful means of addressing the growing threat posed

by Chinese naval forces in the Western Pacific, protecting international shipping routes and preventing China from turning the area between its coast and the island chain stretching from the Japanese archipelago to the Philippines into a nogo area for allied ships and a sanctuary for its own.

At the other end of the scale, the development and refinement of weapons like the MBDA Brimstone and Sea Venom has produced a new generation of shortrange missiles for use against maritime targets, replacing lighter weight AShMs like the Aerospatiale AS 15 TT and the MBDA Sea Skua. The Sea Venom is a lightweight Anglo-French anti-ship missile (formerly known as the Future Anti-Surface Guided Weapon (Heavy)) that was designed to equip Royal Navy Wildcat helicopters and French Navy Panther and NH90 helicopters. The weapon is expected to enter service with the Royal Navy in late 2021. AMR

LAND AND AIRLAND DEFENCE AND SECURITY EXHIBITION

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227 Official delegations from 94 countries and 4 organisations (representing 760 delegates)

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land warfare

PREPARING FOR THE UNTHINKABLE

Tackling any type of CBRN attack demands the proper equipment.

Some Asian-Pacific countries have the capability to react if the worst should happen.

T

he threat of biological and chemical warfare in the Asia Pacific remains low with a firm commitment by the 10 member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – comprising Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam – along with other regional countries and stakeholders: Australia, China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Russia, and the United States, who have all principally committed to the nonproliferation and use of these deadly weapons.

“We recognise the need to address ongoing chemical weapons challenges, to speak with one voice against the use of chemical weapons anywhere, by anyone, and under any circumstances,” the leaders of these countries asserted in their joint statement on chemical weapons during the 12th East Asia Summit (EAS) in Manila in November 2017 .

Despite this assurance, the risk of a biological or chemical attack is not

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by JR Ng non-existent. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) continues to pursue weapons of mass destruction and is believed to maintain a stockpile of between 2,500 and 5,000 tonnes of mustard, phosgene, sarin, and V-series nerve agents.

The threat has also been broadened with the rising tide of transnational terrorism in the region, largely stemming from returning Daesh foreign fighters from Iraq and Syria. In the latter half of 2015 and early 2016, these fighters were recorded employing in multiple instances deploying mustard gas and chlorine via improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and mortar bombs, mainly in Iraq.

In its latest worldwide Threat Assessment Report released in January 2019, the US intelligence community warned that the overall threat from weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) will continue to grow during the year, noting “the most significant and sustained use” of such weapons in decades.

“This trend erodes international norms against chemical warfare

| Asian Military Review |

programmes and shifts the cost-benefit analysis such that more actors might consider developing or using chemical weapons,” the report stated.

In April 2019, chairman of the National Authority of Malaysia, Ambassador Dato Ilankovan Kolandavelu specifically noted the threats posed by non-state actors at the opening of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), warning that the risk of terrorists acquiring and misusing toxic chemicals constitutes to be a serious threat to peace and security in the region. “[The] thriving chemical industry in Asia, along with the influx of chemical imports entering and moving within the region, requires vigilance against potential misuse of these goods, especially by various terrorist groups,” Ambassador Kolandavelu noted.

Although most Asia Pacific countries are well aware of the dangers, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defence capabilities and preparedness remain uneven across the region, largely due to limited budgets and other competing defence requirements.

l and warfare

Nevertheless, several countries appear to have invested considerable resources.

Australia The Australian Defence Force (ADF) provides specialist CBRN advice and resources for detection, decontamination, rendering safe and recovery in hazmat (hazardous materials) emergencies including analysis of CBRN material, personnel and civilians, and areas affected

by CBRN materials. Its International Deployment Group utilises the Specialist Response Group for particular mediumand high-risk planned operations or emergency incidents in addition to force protection.

The service also maintains the elite Special Operations Engineer Regiment (SOER), which provides Special Operations Command with ‘leadingedge’ mobility, survivability and specialist counter-CBRN and explosive capabilities. SOER combat engineers are specially trained and equipped to work alongside other special forces on a range of contingencies, both domestically and in support of forces deployed overseas in high-threat environments.

As part of the Department of Defence (DoD)’s Project LAND 2110 Phase 1B, the ADF is receiving equipment worth $201 million (A$300 million) to acquire new equipment and facilities that will enhance its ability to address CBRN threats. In July 2017, the DoD announced that new detectors, suits, masks, protection tents, decontamination systems, containers for contaminated equipment, warning and reporting software and simulation systems, will be procured under this effort.

“The new equipment enhances the Australian Defence Force’s ability to detect, identify, monitor and warn others of CBRN hazards, protect personnel from exposure and decontaminate affected personnel and equipment safely,” said then-defence minister Marise Payne, who also noted that the investment will provide an integrated and layered CBRN defence capability and replace ageing equipment reaching the end of service life.

The DoD awarded Leidos Australian a $160 million (A$243 million) contract in September 2018 to “deliver and sustain capabilities in detection, identification and monitoring, warning and reporting, physical protection, hazard management and medical support”, although the company did not disclose specifics.

In June 2019 local firm Oil Pollution

and Environmental Control (OPEC) Systems announced that it had won a $16 million (A$23 million) contract with Leidos Australia to provide a range of equipment including newly developed protective gear called the Kestrel medium protective CBRN ensemble.

South Korea The Republic of Korea (RoK, or South Korea) is among the few countries in the world today to face active CBRN threats, and is therefore on constant alert against an attack from the belligerent DPRK. The Worldwide Threat Assessment Report, again warned of a continued danger posed by Pyongyang, having the distinction of being one of two countries that have “used chemical weapons on the battlefield or in assassination operations during the past two years”.

The DPRK also continues to defy international pressure to denuclearise, and is also pursuing increasingly sophisticated missile systems that could reliably deliver nuclear payloads beyond the Asia Pacific, placing all regional countries well within range of its wrath.

Moreover, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) has deployed thousands of chemical-capable artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers within range of South Korea’s capital city of Seoul. It is conceivable that a major conflict on the Korean peninsula could entail the use of chemical or biological weapons, potentially devastating much of the RoK’s urban population.

It is unsurprising, then, that the RoK Army (RoKA) expends considerable resources to equip, train, and sustain numerous counter-CBRN units. These include the 1st Chemical Company based in Wonju, the 8th Chemical Company in Yangyang, the 13th Chemical Battalion in Inje, the 21st Chemical Battalion in Seoul, as well as a dedicated CBRN Command and Chemical Defence Training School.

The RoK Air Force and Navy also maintain organic CBRN defence capabilities.

The RoKA has fielded the tracked CBRN Recon Vehicle II manufactured by Hanwha Land Systems, a protected CBRN reconnaissance platform specifically configured to rapidly detect and identify nuclear and chemical warfare agents to provide early warning of dangers to friendly units.

The CBRN Recon Vehicle II is an updated and networked version of the earlier K216 NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBCRV) and is based on the improved

| october 2019 |

K200A1 Korean Infantry Fighting Vehicle (KIFV) chassis. The 13-tonne vehicle is operated by a four-person crew within a reinforced hull that offers protection against small arms fire, explosive blasts, and localised NBC agents.

The vehicle is expected to operate close to the forward edge of the battlespace behind the RoKA’s main battle tank and armoured fighting vehicle units, so it is armed with a M60 7.62mm machine gun and a K6 12.7mm heavy machine gun for self-defence.

Its key feature is an extensive NBC detection suite comprising equipment such a soil and air sampling system, chemical sampling tools, contamination marking set, mass spectrometer, radiological detection system, warfare agent indication system, and weather observation system. This package enables the vehicle to detect chemical agents at distances of up to 5km, while the integral battlefield management system (BMS) facilitates information sharing via a secure network.

Hanwha Land Systems has also developed the 7-tonne 4x4 CBRN Recon Vehicle I derived from the long wheelbase version of the Kia Motors Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV) chassis. In contrast to the tracked CBRN Recon Vehicle II, this platform is operated by a three-person crew and can attain a higher road speed of 100km/h.

It is also equipped with a comparable NBC reconnaissance suite, although being a soft-skinned truck the Type I is aimed at providing support to rear-echelon units.

Deliveries of both vehicles are ongoing to replace the service’s ageing legacy CBRN fleet, and are expected to be completed by around 2021.

Japan Staunchly pacifist following the Second World War, Japan has nevertheless suffered one of the most deadly CBRN attacks in the world, when the doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth) unleashed a near-weapons grade Sarin nerve agent on the Tokyo subway in March 1995.

The country also experienced yet another nuclear disaster when the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant was severely damaged by a 9.0 magnitude earthquake and the resultant 15 metre tsunami on 11 March 2011.

Although resistant to the seismic shock of the earthquake the flood of seawater disabled the power supply and cooling

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land

JR Ng

warfare

The Japan Ground Self Defense Force operates a variety of CBRN response vehicles, such as the NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle

systems of the crippled plant’s three reactors, causing their cores to overheat and melt.

Spurred by the performance of the Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF)’s Central NBC Weapon Defense Unit in the evacuation and recovery operations in Fukushima, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) has authorised the acquisition of various decontamination capabilities to strengthen the service’s ability to respond to large-scale NBC attacks and to minimise the potential damage.

The MoD allocated $60 million (¥6.5 billion) in the following year to boost the service’s CBRN capabilities, acquiring a broad range of equipment such as decontamination devices and vehicles, personal protection, and to fund related research.

It also awarded a $19.3 million (¥2.1 billion) contract to Lockheed Martin and its local partner Itochu for the delivery of the AbleSentry system, which is designed to fuse data from multiple sensor nodes over a wide area to provide tactical early warning of a possible attack with chemical, biological, or radiological agents.

The AbleSentry is an evolution of the company’s Biological Aerosol Warning System (BAWS) and Enhanced Biological Aerosol Warning System (EBAWS) which have been in JGSDF service since 2005.

The new system adds chemical and radiological detection capabilities to the earlier systems, which could only provide

44

warning of biological agents.

More recently in May 2018, the JGSDF unveiled a new 6x6 medium truck-based NBC decontamination system at Camp Omiya in Saitama Prefecture, where its Central NBC Weapon Defense Unit is based. The system comprises the Type I and Type II decontamination equipment and replaces the service’s ageing Type 94 decontamination set mounted on the 4x4 Mitsubishi Type 73 light truck.

According to the MoD’s Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA), development and initial trials of the new decontamination system commenced between fiscal year 2008 and 2010, followed by operational testing from fiscal year 2013 to 2014. Each Type I system is understood to cost around just under $1 million (¥100 million),

Singapore The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) deploys the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Explosives Defence Group (CBRE DG) for CBRN interventions and other related contingencies. The group comprises the 36th and 39th Battalions of the Singapore Combat Engineers – which specialise in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and CBRN respectively – and leverages on the capabilities of the SAF Medical Corps’ elite Medical Response Force (MRF).

The CBRE DG operates the Trinity CBRE Robotic Suite, which is a CBRNoptimised UGV developed jointly

| Asian Military Review |

developed by the SAF, DSO National Laboratories, and the Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA).

The 72lb (33kg) UGV measures 0.68m and is designed to be highly mobile and can travel at a maximum speed of 1.97metres/second. Like Japan’s Type I KAI, the vehicle is equipped with a set of flippers, which extends its length to 0.87m and boosts its urban manoeuvrability when deployed.

According to the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF), the Trinity CBRE Robotic Suite can be fitted with a range of mission-specific payloads. These include a detection package comprising chemical, radiological, explosives trace detectors, as well as an oxygen detector; a sampling package that includes a manipulator arm to allow the UGV to collect samples, and a mitigation package featuring a compact decontamination system, to reduce the severity of a chemical or radiological threat. The vehicle can also carry a radio to facilitate communication between the operator and a victim.

More recently, the Trinity CBRE Robotic Suite has been fitted with a waterjet disruptor, which is designed to remotely trigger suspicious objects and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) from a safe distance. The disruptor is powered by an electrically initiated power cartridge and generates a highvelocity water project to separate the key components of an IED. In contrast, MRF personnel don the Mission Oriented Protective Posture Suit (MOPP), a protective kit which comprises several components: a protective gas mask, overgarments, gloves, and overboots.

The mask contains a filter that protects its wearer against harmful chemical agents. Different canisters can be attached to the mask to address the anticipated type of chemical agent, with each MRF trooper equipped with two types of gas canisters. These cover the spectrum of typical chemical agents and can also provide extended protection inorganic agents.

MRF personnel are also issued autoinjectors and filtered bag valve masks (BVMs), with the former enabling them to administer the appropriate antidote to counteract nerve agent damage, while the latter aids patients who are unable to support their own breathing. BVMs can be fitted with similar gas canisters for protection against active agents. AMR

Regional

Andrew Drwiega

M i l i t a r i e s

The NCSIST developed Teng Yun (Cloud Rider) MALE UAV.

TAIWAN’S DEFENCE INNOVATION ON SHOW This year Taiwan’s biennial defence show, the Taipei Aerospace

& Defence Technology Exhibition (TADTE), was staged from 1517 August in Taipei. Taiwan’s External Trade Development Council (TAITRA) invited

T

wo of the most striking exhibits at TADTE 2019, both of which took pride of place within the Ministry of National Defence (MND) Pavilion were the Taiwan National Chung-Shan Institute of Science & Technology (NCSIST) loitering antiradiation munition and a beta version of a medium-altitude long-range (MALE) unmanned aerial vehicle.

The Jian Hsiang anti-radiation loitering munition was displayed on its own and as part of a truck mounted battery which can carry up to 12 of the munitions in individual bays - one solution to keep them mobile and avoiding counter-attacks by hostile forces.

Jian Hsiang has a range of around 186

46

to review what was on show.

by Andrew Drwiega miles (300km) and can be fired from fixed launchers, the mobile battery or loaded onboard ships belonging to the Republic of China Navy (RoCN). Defence observers have noted a strong resemblance of the system to the Harpy loitering munition produced by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), although this was claimed to be coincidental.

NCSIST is Taiwan’s main research and development agency responsible for developing technology and creating a national independent defence capability.

It also develops critical technology and systems that can be integrated into future weapons development and production.

The MALE UAV on show was a beta updated version of the Teng Yun (Cloud

| Asian Military Review |

Rider) UAV, the development of which was started by NCSIST in 2015. The current timeline will see the Teng Yun begin testing in January 2020 and will progress to full operational trials by 2021. The new version has an improved and enhanced flight control system and is capable of automatic take-off and landing using a turboprop engine, allowing it to carry a larger payload.

During development, NCSIST’s aim was to enable the Teng Yun to have a 24 hour endurance capability with a range of over 621 miles (1,000km) which would allow it to engage in long patrol missions, particularly in the maritime environment.

It will carry a range of sensors that will include providing real-time video

Regional

Andrew Drwiega

M i l i t a r i e s

transmission.

In total the MND exhibited 81 different weapons systems and military hardware. including a prototype of the Cloud Leopard M armoured vehicle complete with 81mm mortar mounting.

Taiwan’s Defence Sector Grows

Andrew Drwiega

Top view of the the Ministry of National Defence (MND) Pavilion at TADTE with Cloud Leopard vehicles sporting a new 30mm gun turret and mortar carrying versions.

During the opening ceremony, James Huang, chairman, Taiwan External Trade Development Council (TAITRA), drew attention to the achievements of NCSIST and Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (ADIC), highlighting “their latest instructional jet [for the military], which will help train even more top fighter jet pilots.” He added the achievement Taiwan’s National Space Organisation which, in June this year, “saw the successful launch of the Formosat-7 constellation, the biggest US-Taiwan scientific collaboration in 10 years.”

He also gave thanks to the participation in TATDE of international companies including Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, BAE Systems, GE Aviation, and Thales. Other international defence companies did participate, usually on shared stands and keeping a low profile.

The Jian Hsiang anti-radiation loitering munition with 12 pod transporter, again designed by NCSIST.

| october 2019 |

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Regional

TAITRA

Andrew Drwiega

M i l i t a r i e s

Andrew Drwiega

President Tsai Ing-wen gets to experience the F-16 cockpit demonstrator for herself.

Lockheed Martin’s F-16C/D cockpit demonstrator.

Jennifer Chuang, director, AIDC stated that her organisation supported both military and civilian aviation development. Within this, ADIC had supported the development of numerous programmes including the Xiong Ying (Taiwan Eagle), the Ching-Kuo (IDF) fighter, AT-3 and F5E/F. The development of Taiwan’s Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) is being conducted by the Aeronautical Systems Research Division within the NCSIST. The aim is to produce a subsonic jet trainer that will improve on legacy aircraft to better prepare pilots for the F-16 that they will ultimately fly. The AJT’s airframe has been redesigned to deliver a higher lift-to-drag ratio.

The big news that broke just after TADTE had closed was the announcement by the US State Defence Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) that approval had been granted for an $8 billion Foreign Military Sale (FMS) of 66 Lockheed Martin F-16C/D Block 70 aircraft to Taiwan, something that the Republic of China Air Force (RoCAF)

48

Geosat’s Maritime Aerial Reconnaissance System GRH-1 is being targeted for naval maritime and coastguard missions.

had sought for over a decade. The F-16 Block 70 represents the latest baseline model that combines Lockheed Martin’s Mid-Life Update (MLU) and Common Configuration Improvement Programme (CCIP) which will allow the F-16 fleet to be upgraded with technology insertion well into the future.

The complete package included 75 Block 70 F110 General Electric engines (one for each aircraft and nine spares); together with the same number of Link16 Systems; Improved Programmable Display Generators (iPDG); APG-83 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Radars; Modular Mission Computers 7000AH; LN-260 Embedded GPS/INS; M61 Vulcan 20mm guns; as well as a wide variety of kinetic ordnance.

During the show Lockheed Martin had

| Asian Military Review |

been discreetly demonstrating its F-16V cockpit simulator to invited guests, including President Tsai Ing-wen.

Running at the same time as TADTE, the Taiwan International Drone Show (Drone Taiwan) attracted over 20 exhibiting companies, although most of the more serious models were aimed at the government emergency response market.

One outstanding UAV was the three bladed Maritime Aerial Reconnaissance System (MARS) GRH-1 from Geosat.

According to chairman and CEO, Dr Cheng-Fang Lo, the heavy fuel oil 100cc engine, fed by three fuel tanks, could allow the GRH-1 to fly at a cruise speed of up to 108km/h for over three hours with an EO/IR camera and optional laser sight.

Likely customers would be the Taiwan Navy and Coastguard. AMR

Analyst C o l u m n

SOUTH KOREA JOINS ASIA’S CARRIER RACE

By Ben Ho

T

he Republic of Korea (ROK) recently announced that it plans to launch by 2030 a large-deck amphibious-warfare ship that could handle Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft. With a displacement of 30,000 tons, the new Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH) is over twice the size of its predecessors, the 14,500-ton Dokdo-class vessels, and is expected to have significantly more capabilities. For instance, its aviation complement could number 20 STOVL jets (likely to be the Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning) on top of other air assets, and this is a step-change from the Dokdos with their dozen helicopters.

This development is part of an ambitious five-year naval build-up unveiled in midAugust that includes ballistic missile defence-capable Arleigh Burke type Aegis destroyers and submarines armed for land attack. LPX-II, the official name for the ROK’s new capital ship, marks the first time the republic is pursuing a true aircraft carrier-type platform. What then are the main drivers behind this keystone acquisition?

South Korea’s Ministry of National Defence stated in no uncertain terms that the naval build-up has North Korea in mind. Indeed, its northern neighbour has been an existential threat for much of its history. Should a second Korean War break out, ROK airfields could be prime targets for the much-feared artillery, tactical ballistic missiles, and special operations forces of the Korea’s People Army (KPA). Having a carrier force would mitigate this threat. Should its land bases be knocked out, South Korea could turn to sea-based airpower for one of its ‘second-strike’ options. it could be argued that the relatively small air wing

50

of an LPX-II militates against it shaping the battlespace to any significant degree.

However, this line of reasoning ignores the fact that the flat-top could bring about disproportionate strategic effects.

A carrier force could use its mobility and speed to complicate the enemy’s calculus, and trying to locate one (or two) of them roaming off the North Korean coasts in the Japan and Yellow Seas is essentially trying to find a needle in the haystack. Matters are not helped by the KPA’s anaemic naval and air-defence capabilities.

Another driver behind the LPX-II acquisition would be the increasing uncertainty clouding the north-east Asian geo-strategic environment. China is becoming increasingly assertive in its environs and the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) is growing from strength to strength. In addition, South Korea’s ties with Japan are at its lowest ebb in recent times. In August, the ROK ended a military intelligence-sharing deal with Japan in a tit-for-tat move against trade sanctions imposed by Tokyo a month earlier. Soon after the termination of the deal, the South Korean military launched an exercise aimed at demonstrating control over the Dokdos that Japan also claims. Even though these islets are within range of South Korean land-based aircraft, the highly maritime nature of this spat means that there would be a premium placed on sea-based airpower during any crisis. For instance, the latter offers various tactical advantages over its shore-based counterpart, such as longer loiter time in the area of operations. It also bears consideration that the LPX-II was revealed after Japan said its Izumoclass “helicopter destroyers” could be converted to carriers. And just over a

| Asian Military Review |

week after the LPX-II’s unveiling, Tokyo officially announced that it will buy the F-35B from the United States. Are these developments too much of a coincidence perhaps?

All in all, continual inter-state tensions are probably the main factor driving South Korea’s aircraft carrier ambitions.

Moreover, with the ROK gazing increasingly towards the ‘blue waters’ and concomitantly out-of-area operations, having a carrier would stand South Korea in good stead should it partake in a major humanitarian-assistance/disaster-relief mission given that the vessel could then be a key node in such an operation. In summery, the utility of a carrier-like platform invariably expands a nation’s military toolbox, and it makes for a good hedge against the uncertainties of the regional security environment. There is arguably a prestige element to the LPXII acquisition as well. Flat-tops are the ‘Queen of the Waves’, and owning (and being able to operate) them invariably adds to a country’s standing amongst the league of nations. Indeed, possessing an aircraft carrier seems to be par the course for medium powers these days, with the likes of Australia, India and Japan already having or working towards such a capability. While South Korea’s current Dokdo-class vessels are certainly aviation-capable, they are too small in size and too limited in capability to be categorised even as ‘quasi-carriers’. The LPX-II, however, would change that state of affairs.

Note: Ben Ho is an associate research fellow with the military studies programme at Singapore’s Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

E-mail: iswbh@ntu.edu.sg

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