april-may 2022. Issue 02.
armadainternational.com - april/may 2022 AD We are pleased to announce the flagship international event of the Association of Old Crows (AOC) will take place in France for the first time. Join the Electronic Warfare community in Montpellier on 10-12 May 2022. 10-12 May 2022 AOC Europe Montpellier, France REGISTER AOCEUROPE.ORGAT INTEGRATING ELECTROMAGNETIC EFFECTS ACROSS ALL DOMAINS FREE-TO-ATTEND EXHIBITION For sponsorship and exhibition enquiries, please contact Max Max.Webster@clarionevents.comWebster. Organised byProduced by Platinum Sponsor Gold Sponsor WorkshopIntelligenceSponsor AreaCateringSponsor
Integrated Tactical Networks (ITN) a new
technology focus QUBITS KEEP COMMS ‘HUSH-HUSH’ Dr
power WHAT CAN YOUR WINGMAN DO FOR YOU?
lAnD W Miller examines how level ofGeneral Anthony Henderson, USMC, his view that Lee Willett reports.
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technology focus
discusses
quantum communications
unmanned
the 'seaward' and 'landward' roles within an amphibious task force must function as one. Dr
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data and communications sharing across muliples of tasks and users. commAnDer's intent INTEGRATING AMPHIBIOSITY Brigadier
wArfAre SPREADING THE WORD Stephen
ArmADA Greg Sanders and colleagues assess Washington DC's materiel support to the Ukraine government.
commentAry INDUSTRIAL DILEMMA: BUY AMERICA OR LEVERAGE ALLIES? Analyst
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN A NAVAL CONTEXT Alix
the
Air Jon Lake reviews the progress being made on the development of 'loyal wingman' aircraft. UNDERSTANDING Valenti assesses the gap between expectation and reality when applying AI to complex data. Drwiega, Stephen W. Miller and David Oliver examine how NATO's airborne ISR, Russian artillery logistics functioned at the start of the invasion of Ukraine. Thomas Withington lifts the lid on what will mean to military.
uKrAine conflict CONFLICT IN UKRAINE: ANALYSIS OF THREE FACTORS IN THE FIRST STAGE Andrew
3april/may 2022 - armadainternational.com
Once divided and isolated from collective protection, the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, the Crimea in 2014, and now Ukraine in 2022 shows how Russia would treat those countries who strove to maintain their independence outside of Russia’s political and strategic ambitions.
COuNTRIES/ITAly/SwITzERlAND
Editorial
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WILLMISCALCULATIONPUTIN’SRUINRUSSIA Marine comes ashore as part of an amphibious beach landing for Exercise Cold Response 2022 in Norway. Brigadier General Anthony Henderson, the USMC's Commander of the Landing Force talks to Armada about the need for command integration during such operations. (DVIDS)
The end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany on 3 October 1990 seemed to wipe the collective memory clean regarding the subjugation of Eastern Europe following the Second World War. Joseph Stalin’s creation of the Eastern Bloc, ensuring the subservience of all of the states that the Red Army ‘liberated’ is basically a status to which President Putin aspires to return.
Once detached from NATO, this would mean that Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary (NATO members since 1999), and the Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia), Rumania and Bulgaria (members since 2004), would no longer have the protection offered to them guaranteed by NATO’s Article 5; “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.”
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Editor-in-Chief: Andrew Drwiega General Manager: Jakhongir Djalmetov International Marketing Manager: Roman Durksen Digital Manager: David Siriphonphutakun Art Director: Rachata Sharma Chairman: J.S. Uberoi President: Egasith Chotpakditrakul Chief Financial Officer: Gaurav Kumar Advertising Sales Offices
Certainly energy supply and economics were central pillars in the willingness of the West to sleep walk into a position of being strategically vulnerable to the one country that lay behind the need to found the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the first place. Economic prosperity dominated strategic security. But President Putin must understand that it is to all intents impossible for a modern Europe to reset to 1997, as has been his government’s demand. His huge, historic miscalculation about the willingness of Ukrainians to remain independent, and the level to which NATO members - particularly the United States, United Kingdom and those Eastern European countries who raced for NATO membership to protect themselves from just such an invasion as occurred in Ukraine - would supported Ukraine’s fight with arms and intelligence has left Putin little room for manoeuvre. War crimes are multiplying and the destruction of towns and cities are making any type of forgiveness and return to normal relations highly unlikely for at least a generation, if not more.
ANDREw DRwIEGA, Editor-in-Chief
The rise of President Putin has been in plain sight, but the question must be asked as to why there was such a collective misinterpretation of intelligence that led to the slumbering assumption that the Russia of old, built on despotic rulers such as Joseph Stalin, could not return?
ON ThE COVER A US
invasion of Ukraine by Russia has generated some uncomfortable truths about how Western Europe’s perception of Russia’s liberalisation became derailed, almost to the point of self-delusion. The lure of money and business deals with the Russian government and its band of hugely rich oligarchs (made rich usually at the expense of the Russian state and its people), proved too much temptation to ignore.
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4 armadainternational.com - 2022 Volume 46, Issue No.2, APRIL-MAY 2022
President Mikhail Gorbachev’s push for perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness) created such a wave of optimism, culminating in the tearing down of Berlin Wall and German unification, that the West almost immediately delved into the race to recoup finances through the “Peace Dividend.’
Russia’s new isolation from Western Europe will not only harm its development for the next couple of decades, but is likely to initiate another arms race that, as last time, it will not be able to financially sustain.
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Integrating into a coherent whole the ATGs and the amphibious ground force units – and, particularly, the CATF and CLF command structures and staffs – was a major focus of ‘Cold Response’. The exercise underlined and demonstrated the core pur pose of amphibiosity: to deliver an effective, integrated landing force ashore from the sea.
“I’m in disagreement on the division of a role at the high-water mark,” said Briga dier General Henderson who, as well as operating as the CLF in Cold Response, is double-hatted as Commander 2nd MEB and Deputy Commanding General of the USMC’s II Marine Expeditionary Force during an interview with Armada onboard Garibaldi, in Narvik, Norway in late March. Underlining the requirement for integra tion in command and operational output between the CATF and the CLF, Gen. Hen US Marines prepare to disembark the HNLMS Rotterdam for an amphibious beach landing during Exercise Cold Response 2022, Norway, March 21, 2022. Exercise Cold Response '22 is a biennial Norwegian national readiness and defence exercise.
6 armadainternational.com - april / may 2022 Commander's
DVIDS
IntentINTEGRATINGAMPHIBIOSITY
Conducting at scale in complex environments is a challenging military task, requiring seamless integration in both command and capability. Such integration at scale was something NATO put to the test in Exercise Cold Response, held in Norway’s northern fjords in March.
amphibiouseffectiveoperations
The importance of amphibiosity in alliance deterrence and collective defence strategy in the Euro-Atlantic theatre and the need to be able to deliver amphibious force at scale around the alliance’s flanks in support of this strategy was demon strated by the fact that, for the first time during Cold Response, three amphibious task groups (ATGs) were present. These task groups – based onboard the Italian Navy (ITN) landing platform helicopter (LPH) amphibious assault ship ITS Giuseppe Garibaldi, the UK Royal Navy landing plat By Lee Willett form dock (LPD) amphibious vessel HMS Albion, and the Royal Netherlands Navy LPD HNLMS Rotterdam – were brought to gether under the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF), the ITN’s Rear Admiral Valentino Rinaldi, embarked in Garibaldi. Four amphibious ground force units, drawn from the US Marine Corps’ (USMC’s) 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), the UK Royal Marines’ 3 Commando Bri gade, the Netherlands Korps Mariniers, and the ITN’s San Marco Brigade, deployed from these ATGs under the exercise’s Com mander Landing Force (CLF), the USMC’s Brigadier General Anthony Henderson (who was also embarked in Garibaldi). Ashore, the landing force was opposed by two brigades, the Norwegian Brigade and the Swedish-Finnish Brigade; with these forces working in an integrated manner, this was the first time Cold Response had been conducted with two brigades provid ing the defensive land force.
Brigadier General Anthony Henderson, USMC, explains the need to integrate the roles of Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) with Commander Landing Force (CLF), set in the context of the recent NATO Exercise Cold Response
HIGH WATER MARK
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As regards the conduct of any amphibious US Marine Corps (USMC) Brigadier General Anthony Henderson, Commander 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, addresses US marines before embarking in the Italian Navy (ITN) amphibious ship ITS Giuseppe Garibaldi. Gen. Henderson operated as the allied Commander Landing Force (CLF).
“The CLF must understand the applica tion of military manoeuvre and effects, and then, once landward, apply not only land capabilities but the seaward capabilities of the fleet to achieve the objective,” Gen. Hen derson continued. “To do that, I believe that a CLF and a CATF must function as one.”
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To ensure seamless integration of CATF and CLF commands and force elements across the high-water mark, various layers of structure, process, and capability must be integrated, including command-and-con trol (C2) systems and capabilities, opera tional orders, and staffs, Gen. Henderson explained. “The ways and means are all the above, from systems to process to people,” he said. “The strength we had here with the Italian CATF, I would first start with, was people who had an understanding and a competency of seaward and landward ma noeuvre, and fires and effect, and an under standing of the doctrine, using as a starting point the NATO process that is written in the current, 2017 version of the NATO Doc trine.” “We moved forward together from there,” he added.
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derson explained: “In order for the amphib ious task force to succeed, the two leaders must function as a single battle force. Their staffs and their subordinate commands must emulate the same.”
To ensure effective delivery of the land ing force component of this amphibious capability, “the CLF role entails the ability as a naval force to project power seaward to landward,” said Gen. Henderson. “That requires that a CLF must understand the seaward side of the manoeuvre and the application of its power in order to set the conditions for landing force [operations], whether contested or even what would be considered uncontested.”
7april / may 2022 - armadainternational.com Commander's Intent
PEOPLE AND PROCESS
Brig Gen Henderson (left) and Italian Navy Rear Admiral Valentino Rinaldi are pictured in Garibaldi’s hangar during Cold Response. RAdm Rinaldi was Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) for the exercise, and the two officers worked side by side.
“I started with people, because processes reflect people’s culture, people’s leader ship, and guidance. People don’t reflect the process: the process reflects the military culture,” stated Gen. Henderson. As regards doctrine, Gen. Henderson pointed to an important development in CATF/CLF integration that took place with in Cold Response. Some amphibious doc trine that covers the CATF/CLF relation ship refers to the roles of and differences between ‘supporting’ and ‘supported’ com mands and forces, whereby one command or unit may be perceived as ‘supporting’ another command or unit (which becomes the ‘supported’ element). While teaching a ‘supporting’ and ‘supported’ framework to marines and sailors is important in building understanding of the approach to con ducting amphibious operations, it should be seen as a spirit of that approach rather than hard guidance for it, Gen. Henderson explained. Using a ‘supporting’ and ‘sup ported’ framework can create a perception that one command makes decisions over another. “Admiral Rinaldi and I removed that construct, to make it understood by the people of the staffs, of the ships, and of the subordinate forces that it is an integrated, mutual analysis and commanders’ decision that we had to agree upon, discuss, debate, compromise, and understand,” he said. “Those steps are what’s necessary when you have two entities coming together like a CATF and a CLF, whether they have been working together for months and years or coming together in the moment of an event; those steps are necessary in order for the two entities to function as a single battle approach.”Gen.Henderson argued that creating the single battle approach by removing any command seams is important in building advanced warfighting ability. “If you’re going to operate at an advanced level [such as] up in the Norwegian Sea, relative to the terrain of Norway, that requires you to have that type of advanced skill thought as com manders, because it’s a very, very challeng ing environment,” said Gen Henderson. “In the Cold Response scenario, the adversary was also very challenging,” he added. The demanding nature of the operational environment and operational scenario mandated the need for seamless command and force integration to deliver and demonstrate advanced amphibious capability and operational effect, Gen. Hen derson explained. “The decisions we made on the timings of the execution were mutual positions [between the CATF and the CLF].”
NATO’s overall framework for integrating alliance amphibious capability is the NATO Amphibious Leaders Expeditionary Sym posium (NALES) C2 construct.
Commander's Intent assaults, while the CATF would have under standing of the landing conditions in the amphibious operating area (AOA), “the CLF has significant input because the AOA may have sufficiency for naval ship manoeuvre but insufficiency for landing forces to gain control of the landing beach and other objectives,” he said. For example, an adver sary’s aviation may not be able to affect the ATG ships if they are well positioned and defended, but might still be able to affect or deny the beach to the landing force. During Cold Response, Gen. Henderson explained, “The CATF and the CLF reached agreements on targeting that were designed to not only reduce the threat to ATG shipping but to the ability of the landing force to get ashore and get a foothold, so it can conduct its opera tion.”“That’s what I mean by treating it as one continuous battle approach,” he concluded.
NALES, which began development in 2016 and has been demonstrated previously on the US Navy (USN)-led BALTOPS exer cise in 2019 and 2020, brings a requirement to develop C2 integration in amphibious operations to enable integration of national amphibious forces to deliver capability at scale for deterrence and collective defence. To achieve this, NALES is focused at several levels: to enable the seamless integration of CATF and CLF command components at ATG and ATF levels; to enable integration between multiple ATGs, particularly when they are operating together as part of a larger ATF; and, broadly, to improve integration between US and European amphibiousExercisesforces.andwider experimentation play a significant role in NALES develop ment, and this framework will help alliance amphibious forces to address collectively what they need to do in taking NALES forward. “How do we get NALES going
MULTINATIONAL INTEGRATION
Alongside closing any seams between the CATF and the CLF, including in doctrinal terms, Cold Response also present ed an opportunity to integrate the various amphibious doctrinal and operational con structs being developed by NATO’s major amphibious forces.
Using the UK’s LS/FCF construct as an example of how emerging force concepts can enable what could be considered as more traditional amphibious forces and approaches, Gen Henderson explained: “LS/FCF is designed as an advanced force, multi-modal, with deep-penetrating capability. That capability provides an understanding of the operating area and support to shape, through all-domain targeting means, that operating area.” “If you use that in advance of establishing or occupying the AOA, it helps you to set the conditions for other amphibious forces that may have skills relating more to the tradi tional seizure of ground – landing, holding positions, and manoeuvring against a land opponent,” said Gen. Henderson. “So, that advanced force, blended with what could be considered a more traditional integrated manoeuvre force, allows you to understand the battlespace and get the force ashore with potentially less risk to the larger force.”
“If you look at the Dutch concept, [when used] in conjunction with the German Sea Battalion, those are highly skilled naval ship-to-shore forces that can reduce an adversary’s high-threat positions, whether they are mines or other types of systems,” observed Gen. Henderson. “When you add this to the USMC capability we currently have and the capability we would advance in the future – our current capability to seize ground against a formidable, contest ing enemy, and our ability to manoeuvre air and surface assets as an integrated com bined arms force – those give the CATF and the CLF a lot of very capable options that most modern military forces don’t have… That’s the real power of the interoperability of NATO,” he said.
The USMC has developed several sep arate but inter-related constructs, namely Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), and Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE). The UK Royal Marines is developing its Littoral Strike/Future Commando Force (LS/FCF) concept and capability. The Royal Neth erlands Navy’s Korps Mariniers has been developing its Future Littoral Operating Concept (FLitOC). The various concepts and approaches raised the question of their integration during Cold Response and in wider NATO amphibious capability devel opment.“We’ve discussed a bit of amphibiosity from the science perspective,” said Gen. Henderson. “The interoperability of the current and future capabilities of multina tional forces is really the art.” “How do I take what is the strength of one country’s amphibious capability and apply it in a way that also supports and protects the limitations of another’s, and advances the overall capabilities of the am phibious task force (ATF),” he questioned.
NATO’S NALES
Italian aircraft carrier ITS Garibaldi was at the centre of one of three NATO amphibious task groups brought together for the exercise.
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8 armadainternational.com - april / may 2022
The Alliance’s high-level focus on Cold Response and on the enduring need to maintain the flexibility to project power ashore from the sea around NATO’s flanks underline the continuing requirement for amphibious capability into the future. This requirement is further underscored by the emergence of the various new amphibious concepts, as well as (in the United States’ case) increasing strategic and operational integration between the USMC and USN. The USMC’s EABO, DMO, and LOCE concepts all require for the seaward and landward force elements to be integrated. “As we distribute the fleet and it ‘pulses in’, it is ‘pulsing’ into somewhere, and the ma jority of requirements will require a ‘pulse’ in towards the littoral – but you can’t find yourself standing at the water’s edge unable to dominate your opponent landward,” said Gen.InHenderson.termsofUSN/USMC integration and amphibious operations more broadly, Gen. Henderson noted: “Naval power requires the ability to not only sustain freedom of navigation in peace and conflict, but in con flict the ability to project power ashore if you intend to shape the situation relative to your key and vital interests….That shaping and that projection ashore requires a viable land force … because the majority of those places that become contested are land ward,” he added.
9april / may 2022 - armadainternational.com Commander's Intent through its series of experimentations that develop a capability and a doctrine for how we blend those [different] types of ATGs?” Gen. Henderson asked. “We have to do a lot more experimentation, and we have to be very deliberate in that experimentation. We need to focus on our logistics and on our C4I systems, in order to enable all of the differ ent countries’ capabilities that are built for their national interests to be a capability as a part of NATO.”
Korps Mariniers with the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps help a US Marine off a Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel (LCVP).
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NATO amphibious forces come ashore in Sandstrand, Norway The USMC, UK Royal Marines Commandos, and the Netherlands Korps Mariniers, are working to integrate their national amphibious concepts to support NATO operational outputs.
FUTURE REQUIREMENT
MARCOMNATO
Always information intense, their problem has often been in getting the information gathered to those that can best use it. This is particularly a concern with ground forces at brigade level and below.
The objective of an ITN is the seamless con nection of all levels of the military force in a manner which allows dynamic and secure communication between its participants. This itself is not new, although the idea of expanding the access to information avail able within participants covered by the net work has not previously been possible. As Brigadier General Jeth Rey, director of the Army's Network Cross Functional Team, outlined: "Currently, our network centric environment is just [the commander] going to reach for data when he thinks he needs it. We want a data centric environment to produce information for the commander to make informed decisions.” The focus of ITN is providing manoeu vre brigades and below with smaller, lighter, faster, and more flexible communications systems. It is intended to allow unit leaders to not only readily pass and receive infor mation with their command chain, but for them to monitor their own unit and sur roundings in real-time. It makes it possible for the forward soldier to access observa tions and information from sensors that may be operating in their area of interest, expanding the soldier’s awareness of the immediate surroundings. Whereas tradi tional communications were vertical up and down the chain of command, with ITN it is also possible to exchange and access information laterally. In addition, it capital ises on the benefits of digital architectures.
TECHNOLOGY
10 armadainternational.com - april/may 2022
Stephen W. Miller
The global access to, and sharing of, data and information is growing at an exponential rate. Within the military, this is hav ing significant implications.
Information and electronics technol ogies available now and in development are not only changing the very way in how future battles may be fought, but also how a range of activities from supply to main tenance are practiced. In fact, many of the latest weapons, sensors, and other equip ment using digital architecture can already share data. The challenge is capitalising on these by expanding the capability to broadly exchange this information. The US Army’s Integrated Tactical Network (ITN) seeks to do exactly that. The premise is that sharing data quickly in creases real-time situational awareness not only of friendly but also enemy forces, as well as a myriad of other support, logistics and readiness aspects. Accomplishing this requires networking a range of divergent in formation gathering and communications systems.Theprimary objective of the ITN is to provide a reliable flow of information accessible to various parties. One focus has been to provide targeting information by making battlefield observations of mul tiple sensors directly available to tactical units. It directly enables what US Army Major General Ross Coffman, director Next Generation Combat Vehicles Cross Functional Team, refers to as a “connected battlefield” that allows engagement “from any sensor to the best shooter.” But the benefits extend beyond fighting. Being able to exchange the usage and maintenance status of individual vehicles and equipment from their own onboard health monitor systems offers unprecedented awareness of force readiness. Knowing the force status allows for commanders to anticipate and proactively correct impending failures.
The introduction of Integrated Tactical Networks will deliver a stepchange in the way data and communications is available over the battlefield.
Similarly, with logistics commanders able to monitor ammunition and other supply usage in near real-time, they would then anticipate the needs of forward units and advance resupply precluding any shortfall that could affect each unit’s combat power. Harnessing the interconnectivity of these diverse digital medium offers new possibil ities in military operations virtually across the board.
PURPOSE OF ITN
FOCUS
As Mikko Karppinen senior vice president, Mission Capability at Finland’s Patria defence company explained, “the transi tion from analog based systems to digital enables various new ways of interacting and handling of transmitted and collected data compared to analog systems. It is possible to automate processes rapidly, refine data ITN is intended to connect all tactical players in a network by presenting a common operational picture in real-time to help coordinate fires and manoeuvre as shown with this artillery observer team of the 1st/501st Parachute Infantry on exercise.
ArmyUS
SPREADINGTHEWORD
linkedin.com/company/lemo-safacebook.com/lemoconnectors faster and create complex workflows by utilising digitalised information. This leads to a more accurate and up to date common operational picture and situational aware ness.” Being able to pass more data faster using digital is an efficiency multiplier in every taking a novel approach to building its ITN.
® ®
Theapplication.USArmyis
CS2, the first iteration of ITN, includes enhanced satellite communications (SAT COM) capability over existing terminals and initial on-site cloud (edge) agile com puting. These are provided through new data radios, mission command applications and hardware, and more expeditionary satellite communications terminals and as sociated hardware. The reliance on selected commercial solutions integrated with exist ing fielded hardware helps to accelerate its introduction into service. Initial Capability Set 21 (CS21) was provided in 2021 to four Infantry Brigade Combat Teams with five additional units programmed for 2022. The Network CFT defined Capability Set 23 (CS23) increases the bandwidth avail able within the ITN to support sensor data, graphics, and video. It also expands commu nication routes capitalising on commercial low-earth and mid-earth orbit (LEO/MEO) satellites and introduces mesh networking to allow extending the range and ability of the network to support manoeuvre. Its stated application of the ‘tactical cloud’ will result in ‘converged mission applications, integrated intelligence, and an enhanced common operating picture (to) ensure usable information supports warfighter decision-making.” A further goal is to re duce susceptibility to jamming and decrease vulnerabilities. A primary focus is appro priately configuring the ITN for Stryker Brigade Combat Team operations entailing high mobility and tactical tempo, as well as configuring for mounted vehicle usage. Capability Set 25 (CS25)’s objectives include expanded application of the tac tical cloud including the introduction of artificial intelligence to aid decision-mak ing. It also seeks to incorporate variants of commercial 5G to formations for faster conductivity. A major focus will be on facili tating data networking between ground and aviation. CS25 will begin introduction to ITN provides forward leaders with not only a connection to command but also the monitoring of soldiers and information to enhance situational awareness.
Colonel Garthe Winterle program manager Tactical Radios shared that “ITN it is not a new network but rather incorporates the current tactical network environment with commercial-off-theshelf (COTS) components and transport ca pabilities. It is being developed and fielded in increments – starting with dismounted infantry, then Stryker units (which have a mix of mounted and dismounted needs), and then armoured units. As each incre ment is fielded the next is being developed, building on results of the previous.”
TECHNOLOGY FOCUS Designed for the most stringent high power distribution requirements • Up to 430A max rated current • Unipole & Multipole inserts including mixed high & low voltage contacts • Broad range of lightweight aluminium shells • Compact design for space savings • High shock and vibration resistance • Reverse gender configuration • Wide temperature range –55°C to 200°C • Sealed to IP68 mated; IP68 unmated as options • Ratchet-coupling mechanism • Scoop proof & IP2X finger protection
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CAPABILITY SETS (CS) DEFINED
“As a capability set is fielded, development of the next is underway with objective of in corporating lessons learned, defining new requirements, and incorporating promising technologies along the way,” explained Lieutenant Colonel Jon Judy, project man ager Capability Set Development.
ArmyUS
Maj Gen Thomas Pugh, the director of Networks, Services and Strategy for the Ar my's Deputy Chief of Staff, G-6, explained: “The US Army is staffing an implemen tation plan focusing on what can be done in 2022 and 2023 to begin integrating the enterprise network and then making the unified network operational by 2025.” This is being done incrementally each two years by developing, testing, and fielding ITN advances through capability sets.
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ATAK
Achieving the demands of an ITN for the next battlefield requires new digital equip ment that, unlike previous legacy systems, can operate across a number of frequency bands. Where previously separate radios were needed for VHF (mostly used for voice ground-to-ground) and UHF (typically used by aircraft), these have both. They are also compatible with satellite, data transmis sion, video, and Beyond-Line-Of-Site (BLOS) communication. These new systems allow not only voice and data but allow video feed. Where much of this capability such a multi-band software enabled tactical radios had been previous Programmes of Record (PoR), ITN weaves them more close ly. It also makes use of commercial devices like the Samsung End-User Device (EUD) with the Army NETT Warrior. LTC Judy explained that PoR radios being fielded are the core of ITN and a focus in Capability Set 21. The latest leader radios (LR) are for small unit use. These include the AN/PRC-163 from L3Harris and AN/ PRC-148 Thales Défense. Both are digital dual-channel, multi-mission software defined that offer UHF/VHF, SATCOM, or Mobile Ad-Hoc Networking (MANET) with ISR video and GPS. These handheld ‘team’ radios are around 2.2 pounds (1 kilogramme). These squad/team radios are complemented by digital Manpack radios; the AN/PRC158 from L3Harris and AN/ PRC-162 by Collins Aerospace. These offer two channels with simultaneous transmis sion and reception of voice and data. They can manpack with 20 Watt peak power or 50W with vehicle power amplifiers. They operate in frequencies from 30MHz to 1850MHz encompassing narrow band VHF and UHF, SATCOM, MUOS, and wide band UHF and L-Band and have embedded en cryption. Equally important is that they are compatible with SINCGARS, HAVEQUICK, and other legacy radios. Additional systems in the initial ITN contained in CS21which have been identi fied in field evaluations include its Android Tactical Assault Kit (ATAK), a government developed map-based application applied to a Samsung handheld end-user device (EUD), essentially a militarised cell phone or tablet. ATAK provides real-time Posi tion Information Location (PIL) covering terrain and troop locations. The device enhances situational awareness and unit coordination including tracking friendly forces, navigation, chat, and information exchange including video streaming. It can substitute for a number of dedicated devices as well as interfacing with other battlefield applications. Beyond planning and tactical employment ATAK has proved invaluable in unit sustainment efforts. Providing reliable communications to not only the unit leaders but to every front line soldier is a key concern. Col Winterle explained: “Not only are weight, size, and simple operation essential but so is price if is to be widely distributed.” A limited num ber of L3Harris’s AN/PRC-171 Line-of-Sight Compact Team radios with voice and data modes (compatible with the PRC-163) have been acquired for consideration. Another possibility being evaluated is the MPU5 Networked Radio by Persistent Systems. Already used by the British Royal Ma rines, it utilises wave relay mobile ad-hoc (MANET) technology with integrated Radio Voice over IP capability and Cloud Relay to provide coverage in a compact 13 ounce (368 gramme) L-band radio. The MUOS (Mobile User Objective System) capability originally developed by Lockheed-Martin for the US Navy has also been favourably received. Corporate litrature explains; ‘MUOS offers tactical terminals seamless connection to satellite supported voice, video, and mission data on a high-speed Internet Protocol-based system.’ It provides ten times the capacity of current UHF SATCOM. Col Winterle explained that MUOS in its improved Gen 2 configuration is relied on for medium to long range non-line-of-sight (NLOS) communication and is proving itself with US forces in Europe. SECURE BUT UNCLASSIFIED Secure But Unclassified (SBU) architecture is a key feature of ITN. This shift from a classified network to SBU opened the pos sibility for not only employing commercial products but enhanced the amount of data that could be moved. It permits leverage of cellular such as 4G, LTE and WiFi permit ting tools like video streaming. Another associated but critical aspect in ITN is the ability to access a ‘Cloud’ data base. Like a commercial Cloud, data would be centrally stored and therefore be available to users as needed. The structure of this “tactical Cloud” is a “work in progress”, commented Col Winterle.Anotherinnovation offered in ITN is the Tactical Scalable Ad-hoc Network (TSM). It allows the establishment of an interconnected, mutually supporting mesh network communications ‘bubble’. It employs commercial waveforms, such as the TrellisWare Technolgies’ (TSM) and Warrior Robust Enhanced Networking (WREN), to tie together the tactical radios of units. A mesh network allows expand ing its coverage and reach, as each device (node) shares its connection with the larger network. With TSM, even if one device can only directly access one other device it can, through that connect, still link to other
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TECHNOLOGY FOCUS service the needs of the armoured brigade combat teams. The following Capability Set 27 (CS27) intends to build on this by explor ing non-traditional waveforms, expanding artificial intelligence and machine learning tools, hardening 5G-like capabilities, and perfecting ‘full and seamless integration of applications and systems…improving interoperability, information sharing, and accelerated decision making.’
ITN ELEMENTS & EQUIPMENT
An example of the inclusion of commercial technology in the Army ITN is the End-User Device - an adapted Samsung product. It offers chat, texting, navigation and displays graphics, video, and other functions directly to leaders and individual soldiers.
ArmyUS
NEXT STEPS Even as CS21 is issued to active army infan try units, the components of CS2023 are being identified, refined, and incorporated into the projected package. LTC Judy shared that “a Critical Design Review (CDR) should occur in April 2022 to approve its direction and finalise the composition.” CS23 will go to the 2d Cavalry Regiment equipped with Stryker combat vehicles. Judy added “that the 2d Cav has an earlier version of Stryker which would increase the integration chal lenges particularly regarding available onboard power. However, the benefit is that successfully integrating on this version bet ter assures it can be done on the latest DVH A1 models.” That Stryker units tactically mix both mounted and dismounted operations, also offers a bridge between adapting the infantry focused ITN and the future armour ITN. Aspects to be addressed include onthe-move operations, transitioning from mounted to dismounted, providing mobile command posts, building a common oper ating picture for the force, and enhancing situational awareness in a high manoeuvre environment. CS2023 is targeted to be intro duced as early as January 2023. The impact of introducing the capa bilities offered in ITN are only beginning to be realised. How it may alter tactics will become evident only from hands-on opera tions in the field.
ArmyUS
The Manpack radio is for company and battalion use. These offer two channels with simultaneous transmission and reception of voice and data over VHF, UHF, SATCOM, MUOS, and wide band UHF and L-Band and have embedded encryption. The Rifleman Radio is the most compact for use within the platoon and squad (the PRC-163 used by soldier on the left), while the Manpack is larger and heavier and is used for higher command and supporting arms (the PRC-162 on shoulder on right). Yet, both radio types are fully compatible and can connect.
TECHNOLOGY FOCUS devices within the network. The Mesh net work is also ‘self-healing’, meaning if one link is lost a device automatically seeks new alternate connections. Use of wireless mesh networks are common in commercial and public Wi-Fi applications. The Army’s in clusion of variable height antenna further enhances the possibilities of the TSM. An other facilitator being actively evaluated is the use of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), both longer range and locally launched, to act as retransmission assets.
FIELD EXPERIENCE CS21 is reaching field units so end-user field experience on its capabilities, benefits and current shortfalls is now being generated. In an after-exercise briefing, LTC Andy Harris Commanding the 1st Battalion, 504th Infantry (Airborne) stated: “ITN offers 100 percent improvement…it offers visual confirmation of where your units are in space and time. You’re pulling real-time data.” The 3d IBCT, 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii also have experience with ITN. Considering the extended distances of the Indo-Pacific area, Col Josh Bookout, the 3/25 commander, explained: “the Manpack Mobile Objective System (MUOS) Tactical Satellite radio was a great capability. We are capable of TACSAT (tactical satellite) com munications down to company and troop level. That becomes a game changer.” Unsurprisingly, given the rapid fielding, some concerns were also identified. Cables linking the various devices were deter mined to be overly complex and, particu larly those carried by the individual soldier, heavy and awkward when wearing body ar mour and equipment. Another concern was the tendency for squad members to focus on the EUD rather than being heads-up watch ing their surroundings. LTC Judy noted that “it was recognised early on that building the ITN would be an iterative process. The object is to take lessons learned from each fielding and apply them to continuously improve it and address highlighted issues.” LTC Judy also identified a major issue has been training: “The rapid fielding has not allowed the training structure to keepup. An aspect of this is that ITN’s IP based radios require specific planning to operate together. Recognising this, the intent is to provide broader training support with Capability Set fielding.
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While the US Next Generation Air Domi nance/Penetrating Counter Air (NGAD/ PCA) fighter will undoubtedly use loyal wingmen, so too will the Northrop Grum man B-21 Raider strategic bomber, and it is also likely that next generation airborne early warning (AEW) and maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) will be accompanied by loyal wingmen of some kind. The Boeing P-8A Poseidon MPA already operates with the Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton, the latter extending area coverage, providing continuous sensor data for the P-8A and other networked capabilities across vast portions of the sea.
Jon Lake
Initially, there was an expectation that many manned combat aircraft would be entirely replaced by unmanned systems, but there has been a shift away from this vision in recent years. Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs) are now seen as being complementary to manned aircraft, with a man in the loop being acknowledged to be essential for practical as well as ethical reasons. Bandwidth constraints mitigate against an all-unmanned approach to airpower, and the human eye and brain still represent an unrivalled sensor, with an unmatched combination of field of view andMannedacuity! aircraft will increasingly rely on support from a range of unmanned sys tems, differing in size, cost, complexity and capability, including swarming drones and fully standalone systems. This makes these systems subject to different constraints - where the smallest and cheapest may be viewed as expendable while others will be re-useable, but as attritable. All are more expendable than manned systems, espe cially in for Western air forces which are increasingly intolerant of aircrew losses.
The FCAS industrial team currently in cludes BAE Systems, Leonardo UK, MBDA, Rolls-Royce, and Saab, with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and IHI (Japan) as well as the UK Ministry of Defence and Royal Air Force (RAF). Other partners will be added as the programme develops.
Today’s congested and highly contested operating environ ment complicates the task of delivering effect by air, and threatens high or even unsus tainable aircraft losses.
Richard Berthon, director of Future Air Combat at the UK Ministry of Defence, opines that the programme is on track to create a digital revolution: “Anything with the word ‘revolution’ … you should prob ably be suspicious and sceptical about — credit
FORCE MULTIPLIER A loyal wingman will act as a force multi plier by extending the area of airspace that a manned platform can cover. It can extend combined sensor coverage and potentially allow the primary manned platform to re duce its own aggressive sensor use, reducing emissions, and minimising the chances of detection by the enemy. It can also multiply the number of weapons available to the mis sion, but its main role is larger than just a ‘shotgun sidekick.’ A high level of autono my reduces the workload of the pilot of the manned platform, allowing them to focus more on the overall mission than on the close control of the loyal wingman. But this capability is not only relevant to tactical fast jet or combat air platforms.
FCAS A new generation of combat air pro grammes is focussed not on simply delivering a platform, but on delivering a capability through a ‘system of systems’. The United Kingdom led Future Combat Air System (FCAS) programme is perhaps the best known and most mature example of this approach. The FCAS programme has a manned aircraft (the Tempest) at the heart of the system, supported by a range of ‘ef fectors’ (including weapons, simple sensors and weapon- and sensor- carrying UAVs) and more complicated unmanned systems known as ‘adjuncts’.
The most advanced and least expend able unmanned systems are those that serve as ‘loyal wingmen’ – flying alongside a manned fighter and providing support in the same way that a traditional wingman might, but with the benefit of being more at tritable. They may be positioned ‘up-threat’, making a more immediate target than the manned aircraft it is supporting.
WHAT CAN WINGMANYOURDOFORYOU?
The push to develop ‘loyal wingmen’ is widening but still leaves questions over how much complexity/capability they should have verses their attritability.
FCAS/SCAF
Airbus is leading the UAV/UCAV de velopment pillar of the Next-Generation Weapon System (NGWS) element of the FCAS/SCAF programme, and unveiled a model of a new FCAS Remote Carrier at the 2019 Paris Air Show, with flip-out wings and tail surfaces. The company has put in place a range of ‘building blocks’ for unmanned elements within the FCAS/SCAF system of systems. The Barracuda UAV, which first flew in 2006, has demonstrated a raft of new technologies and has provided an in-depth understanding of autonomous operations by high-speed drones.
Airbus demonstrated a successful co-operation of DT-25 target drones and a LearJet aircraft in October 2018, confirm ing that it had mastered some of the key challenges related to Manned Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T). Airbus subsequently conducted a dual mission group demonstra The RAF's new Future Combat Air System (FCAS) will likely be accompanied by unmanned air systems known as 'adjuncts'.
DrwiegaAndrew
The RAF requires a sixth-generation aircraft that is flexible, agile, connected, quickly updatable and affordable. Tempest will bring a ‘plug and play’ approach, allow ing software and hardware to be changed in and out according to the requirements of a mission. This could be changing anything from sensors to fuel tanks. It will pro vide scalable autonomy to be flexible for several modes of operation. It will allow for manned, unmanned and optional ly-manned platforms, with onboard and offboard data processing. A range of pilot decision aids will be offered when manned flight is being conducted.
whether they mean something new rather than just business as usual. But I genuinely believe that we all have something revolu tionary, on many different levels,” he said.
SPIRIT MOSQUITO
and combat effectiveness. it is also planned to give FCAS its own loyal wingman.
The Future Combat Air System/Système de Combat Aérien Futur (FCAS/SCAF) being developed by France, Germany, and Spain has very similar aims to the UK-led FCAS programme, and aims to produce a similar ‘system of systems’ that includes manned and unmanned versions.
In January 2021, the Spirit Mosquito was chosen as a technology demonstrator for the RAF’s Lightweight Affordable Novel Combat Aircraft (LANCA) programme. This loyal wingman will be deployed alongside the RAF’s Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning IIs, Eurofighter Typhoon and the next gen eration BAE Systems Tempest to enhance protection, survivability and to help deliver information advantage to aircrew and mis sion commanders. The concept also aims to deliver huge reductions in the traditional cost and development timelines of combat air systems.SpiritAeroSystems is at the centre of Team Mosquito, which also includes Belfast-based Spirit Belfast, Northrop Grumman and Intrepid Minds. Spirit Belfast will adapt its resin transfer infusion technology to produce a lightweight vehicle, capable of unmanned, high-speed flight whilst Northrop Grumman will provide Distributed Autonomy/Responsive Control (DA/RC) technologies, gateway offerings and advanced mesh networking capabilities that will imbue the Mosquito with seamless human-machine collaboration and co-op erative mission management capabilities across distributed manned and unmanned assets.
The advanced and highly-integrated sensors, non-kinetic effects, and communi cations systems are being planned to allow the Tempest operator to act and think ahead of the enemy. All elements of the Tempest will be designed to work seamlessly togeth er, giving it a major advantage over current fighters that often comprise individual items such as a separate radar or electro-op tics. When drawn together, the combination of planned capabilities will certainly repre sent a ‘revolutionary’ step in what combat air can deliver, as well as in its survivability
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LANCA BusAir
The Airbus Do-DT25 unmanned aircraft being test launched from the rear ramp of an Airbus unmanned MQ-28 Ghost Bat is a joint venture development with the Royal Australian Air Force Spirit AeroSystems Belfast is leading Team Mosquito in the devleopment of the Royal Air Force's (RAF) Lightweight Affordable Novel Combat Aircraft
air Power 16 armadainternational.com - april/may 2022 tion in 2019. In February 2021, it launched a conceptual loyal wingman (actually a DT-25) UAV from an A400M ‘mother ship' aircraft. Airbus continues to invest in advanced communications and teaming intelligence, and a major multi-domain demonstration is planned for 2022. Three Spanish companies - GMV, SENER Aeroespacial and Tecnobit Grupo Oesia - joined the programme in February 2020 and will be participating in the UAV element of the NGWS that forms part of the wider FCAS/SCAF programme. Working with the Spanish MoD, the three companies have established SATNUS Technologies to co-ordinate all their activities although progress appears to have been stalled, with no agreement on workshare terms for phase 1B of the FCAS/SCAF project.
A400M.Boeing's
AustraliaBoeing
GHOST BAT A joint venture between the Royal Austra lian Air Force (RAAF) and Boeing Defence Australia (BDA) has resulted in the creation of the new MQ-28A (officially named as the ‘Ghost Bat’ at RAAF Base Amberley on 21 March this year). It is intended to operate with existing F-35s, Boeing F-18F Super Hornets and EA-18G Growlers. The aircraft has a range of more than 2,000 nautical miles (3,700 kilometres) and has completed a number of test flights to date. Australia has invested more than $112 million (AUD 150 million) since 2017 into this joint venture.During the naming ceremony Glen Ferguson, director of Boeing’s Airpower Teaming System, Australia and Interna tional, said, “Selecting the Ghost Bat, an Australian native mammal known for team ing together in a pack to detect and hunt, reflects the unique characteristics of the aircraft’s sensors and Intelligence, Surveil lance and Reconnaissance (ISR) abilities, and is a fitting name for this pioneering capability.”Understanding US indigenous develop ments is complicated by the fact that there are almost certainly both secret, unac knowledged ‘Black World’ programmes, and more open programmes sponsored by the Department of Defense (DoD) and by individual service branches. The US has committed to making loyal wingmen a mainstay of its air power. Secretary of the US Air Force (USAF) Frank Kendall, recently said: “The US Air Force is ready to move beyond experimentation with unmanned combat aircraft and toward acquiring and fielding next-generation unmanned air vehicles (UAVs). Fielding loyal wingman UAVs is a top priority for the service.”Kendall has said that the Air Force is looking for between one and five unmanned systems that will take commands from a fighter pilot, but that will operate somewhat autonomously. LONGSHOT In February 2021 the US Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) award ed contracts to General Atomics Aeronau tical Systems (GA-ASI), Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman for preliminary Phase I design work on an air-launched unmanned air vehicle (known as LongShot) with the ability to employ multiple air-toair weapons. LongShot will be used along side the new B-21 Raider stealth bomber, but it could also be teamed with legacy bombers such as the GA-ASIB-52H.hasdeclared that Longshot “could initiate a fighter sweep ahead of a strike wave without putting a human crew in danger, or it could join an attack along side the vanguard with manned warplanes.”
Meanwhile, the Lockheed Martin X-62A (previously the VISTA NF-16) has been fitted with SACS (System for Autono mous Control of Simulation), to allow it to support autonomy testing for the Skyborg programme.Afurther nine companies were given multiple indefinite-delivery/indefi nite-quantity (IDIQ) awards in September in an attempt to establish a vendor pool that will compete for up to $400 million in subsequent orders. Companies include AeroVironment, Autonodyne, BAE Systems Controls, Blue Force Technologies, Fregata System, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, NextGen Aeronautics, Sierra Technical Services, and Wichita State University.
Kratos
DARPA
The AFRL is working with the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) as part of an integrated team and aims to foster a seamless transition as Skyborg pro gresses into an acquisition programme. In July 2020 four companies - Boeing, GA-ASI, Kratos and Northrop Grumman - were selected to move forward with the Skyborg effort, with Kratos and General Atomics awarded contracts in order to ensure that all applicable technology is identified and rapidly injected into the pro gramme. Kratos will therefore continue to work on its XQ-58A Valkyrie, while GA-ASI will continue to develop its MQ-20 Avenger. But other programmes and aircraft will also feed into Skyborg. Northrop Grumman is developing its Model 437 based on work carried out on the Scaled Composites Model 401 Sierra, which could carry a side-looking radar and two Raytheon AIM-120 air-to-air missiles in its internal bomb bay.
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2020.DARPA's
Longshot programme is developing a weaponised air-launched unmanned air vehicle to accompany new and legacy bombers.
CONCLUSION There is broad agreement that tomorrow’s manned aircraft will operate as part of a wider ‘system of systems’, and that the manned element within such systems will be designed as ‘exquisite’ platforms with very high capability, while the unmanned systems that accompany them will be cheap enough to make their loss tolerable. For some missions, they might even be treated as being expendable – effectively being sent on a one-way mission. But there remains an unanswered challenge: how to make such unmanned platforms capable enough to be useful, yet still cheap enough to be attrita ble, especially if they are to have the perfor mance necessary to keep up with complex manned combat aircraft?
At the same time the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is moving forward with its Skyborg autonomous attritable aircraft programme. Skyborg aims to use a family of low-cost, teamed, autonomous unmanned aircraft alongside manned aircraft to increase airborne ‘combat mass’, which would add situational awareness, combat effectiveness and survivability, by rapidly defeating or disrupting hostile threats in contested environments.
STEALTHY MIUS Turkey’s Muharip İnsansız Uçak Sistemi (MIUS) Unmanned Combat Aircraft Sys tem, was revealed in July last year. Funded privately by Turkish manufacturer Baykar, this UAV is the result of a decade-long de velopment programme, and is due to enter service in 2023. The MİUS will be stealthy and used as a loyal wingman to support the new Turkish National Combat Aircraft (TFX/MMU), and as a light attack aircraft on board the new Turkish amphibious assault landing ship (LHD) TCG Anadolu. It will incorporate an aggressive AI-based autonomous manoeu vring capability to give it a real and robust air-to-airManufacturercapability.Baykar states that the MİUS will also perform missile attack, stra tegic attack and close air support missions, as well as the suppression of enemy air defences, and is expected to have an endur ance of up to five hours. The aircraft has an internal weapons bay, but on missions where low observability (stealth) is not critical, the MİUS will carry missiles and other weapons underwing. The aircraft will use SATCOM to enable control via satellite, though the aircraft will also have autono mousIndiacapabilities.Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL) is developing the Combat Air Teaming System (CATS) Warrior, a loyal wingman UAV, for flight testing from 2024. The aircraft uses a similar configuration to the Kratos XQ-58, and is intended to operate in co-operation with India’s AMCA indigenous Stealth Fighter.
Insight into the future: a USAF Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor and F-35A Lightning II flying in formation with a Kratos stealthy XQ-58A Valkyrie unmanned aerial vehicle in December,
By Dr Thomas Withington
QKD uses diamonds to generate entangled protons. These entangled protons provide the all-important cryptographic key between two or more communications systems.
Quantum technologies could help revolutionise military communications, not least in the field of encryption.
SixElement
Just a little quantum physics, there is no need to be afraid! Put simply, quantum physics is the study of atomic and subatomic particles. You would be forgiven for asking what this has to do with military communications? Potentially quite a lot. The emerging field of quantum communi cations has much to offer to the perennially vexing problem of how to keep military communications traffic secure. Military communications carry voice, written information (data), still or moving images across high frequency (HF), and very/ultra-high frequency (V/UHF) radio channels. Traffic zooms across networks from one radio to another. Communica tions can be tactical, from a platoon com mander to the company commander, for example. They can also be operational, from the brigade headquarters to the corps HQ. Beyond this, strategic communications link the corps HQ to the national command au thority. There reside the military chiefs and politicians directing the war. While these examples are from the land domain, they are as applicable to the air and sea domains. Traffic moving across these networks must be secure. Let us suppose a brigade is deployed to help a peacekeeping operation in a war-torn country. There is no way the brigade can tell whether hostile forces are eavesdropping on their radio traffic. In fact, this is the case for any user on a radio network, be they military or civilian. It is no more possible to tell if someone has bugged your cellphone than it is possible to tell if someone is listening to your conversation in a bar.
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QUBITS KEEP ‘HUSH-HUSH’COMMS
Other options include using entangle ment. Using a physical phenomenon, two photons are generated whose polarization is linked. The two resulting streams of photons are sent to two distant nodes, Radio A and Radio B. The polarization of each photon pair can be and chosen to be com pletely random. When Radio A measures the polarization of the incoming photon, it will know with 100 percent confidence the polarization of the corresponding entan gled photon received by Radio B. By using several photon pairs the two nodes can now build a shared encryption key.
The more complex the request, the longer the process takes. Consider how long takes your computer to download a complex video game compared to the time it takes to download a dinner reservation. In the field of encryption, a string of bits is used to define an encryption key and the longer this string is, the harder it is to break the encryption key.
“QKD does not transmit secure messages, it creates a shared secret between users over unsecured communication links,” explained Dr. Daniel Twitchen, chief technologist at Element Six. Element Six develops and manufactures the diamonds necessary to enable quantum communications. “The shared secrets are then used to create secure messages that can subsequently be transmitted,” he said.
Encryption could be revolutionised by a process known as Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). Light particles, photons, are used as the medium for QKD. This is thanks to the ability to encode information in a property of photons, namely their polarization. A single photon can have a particular polarization while they travel. For example, they can have a vertical or horizontal polarization. This can be visualised as the photon oscillating up and down (vertical) or left and right (horizontal). Likewise, photons can spin clockwise or anti-clockwise on their axis.
Krypterix
19april/may 2022 - armadainternational.com TECHNOLOGY FOCUS Steps can be taken to make radio traffic secure, but they cannot determine if someone is eavesdropping. One of the most ubiquitous means of securing radio traffic is encryption. Encryption follows a relatively simple principle which revolves around the use of a key. The key is like a password. It is typically a secret number shared with all the radios on a specific net work. In theory, only radios possessing the key can decrypt the encrypted traffic and access its contents. The security risk is that if someone gets hold of the key who should not, they can load this into their radio and eavesdrop on the traffic. Referring to the encryption and decryption process relying on a key is apt. The key unlocks the encryp tion to reveal the radio traffic and likewise it encrypts traffic allowing it to be securely sent to its destination.
Confused? This crib sheet provides a pictorial representation of the US National Security Agency’s AES-256 encryption standard used for top secret information.
Element Six manufactures diamonds that can be used for QKD. Particular defects in diamond, such as nitrogen and silicon atoms with the carbon lattice act as sources
QKD ENCRYPTION
Let us suppose we have two people communicating. One is sending some traffic and the other is receiving it. The sender has a source of photons. The source is switched on and its beam of light contains a stream of photon particles. Each photon is either horizontally or vertically polarised according to whether that photon is denot ing zero or one. Before diving into the nuts and bolts of QKD it is worth revisiting how binary works. Conventional computing encodes information into bits, hence why the power of your home Wi-Fi is measured in megabits-per-second. This shows how much information your Wi-Fi can handle each second. Each bit has a value of either zero or one, nothing else. These bits have a simple purpose. They denote the presence (one) or absence (zero) of an electrical sig nal. The bits tell a computer how to behave, and hence what task to perform. This is determined by which parts of that comput er should be off or on to perform that task.
Several QKD protocols were theoreti cally developed over the last decades, based on two quantum-mechanics phenomena, superposition and entanglement. The difference between a conventional bit and a quantum bit (or qubit) is that the qubit to be prepared into a ‘superposition’ of one and zero. Like the famous Schrodinger’s Cat, being dead and alive. The sender trans mits a stream of photons with a random superposition of polarizations. The receiver will measure each individual photon and compare the results with the sender. The sender only needs to share over an unsecure channel which polarization directions are ‘correct’. They will not share the outcome of the measurement. Only qubits that measured in the ‘correct’ polarization, for example ‘vertical’ and ‘clockwise’ are maintained and can be used as a common encryption key.
A US Air Force Staff Sergeant installs an AES (Automatic Encryption Standard) chip into a Motorola XTS-5000 handheld tactical radio.
One can see how QKD could be useful for fibre optic battlefield communications. Field telephones may seem antiquated but have good resistance to eavesdropping by the very nature of using a cable. QKD is clearly on the horizon and could improve the resilience of battlefield communica tions yet further.
DODUS
IN SERVICE Quantum communications is not the stuff of science fiction. A July 2021 article in Scientific America said that the People’s Republic of China had shown that sin gle photons could be transmitted across fibre optic links of up to 300 kilometres (187 miles). This was in excess of 100 times further than had been observed in previous experiments. “The technology is already there,” stated Dr. Twitchen. However, some hurdles must be jumped before the tech nology can proliferate. The strength of the signal sending the stream of photons down a fibre optic cable will invariably weaken the further it must travel. Dr. Twitchen said that quantum repeaters will be needed to ensure the photons can be moved efficiently around large networks. He believes there is some scope in the short term to begin using this technology for shorter distances. Deployed sensors on the battlefield could be connected using fibre optic cables carrying these communications. “This could happen in the next ten years,” he predicted.
The beauty of QKD is that any attempt by a third party to intervene in this process instantly changes the polarization of the stream of photons. To verify that the link sharing the key is secure, Radio A and Radio B only need compare the statistics of their individual measurement without exchang ing the results of the measurement, namely the encryption key. Should someone somehow gain access to the fibre optic link between Radio A and Radio B, the very act of trying to collate or decrypt the photon stream will corrupt the encryption key. This will destroy the correlation and thus they will immediately know the connection is not secure. Forget trying to eavesdrop on QKD encoded messages. “Even if two photons are on opposite sides of the galaxy, I must treat them the same. As soon as I at tempt to observe one photon this will have a discernible effect on the other, and the whole thing collapses. The very nature of a third party trying to observe the message stops the whole thing working,” noted Dr. Twitchen. This means “you can be 100 per cent certain that your message has not been intercepted by a third party.”.
TECHNOLOGY of photon qubits. They can also entangle a photon pair as well as acting as repeaters that extend the range of quantum commu nications. Dr. Twitchen said that Element Six’s diamonds can perform these tasks at room temperature. This will help to make this quantum communications technology practical to use on the battlefield.
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FOCUS
For more information, please visit moderndaymarine.com moderndaymarineFOLLOW US: To showcase your products and services, please contact: Jaymie Nielsen at 980.328.8801 or jaymie.nielsen@emeraldx.com Modern Day Marine is not open to the public. All registrants must provide proof of identity with a Government issued photographic ID and must demonstrate that they have an “identifiable relationship” with the Marine Corps. The Department of Defense, the Department of the Navy, or U.S. Marine Corps does not endorseany company, sponsor or their products or services. MAY 10-12, 2022 WALTER E. CONVENTIONWASHINGTONCENTER,D.C. MARINE CORPS ASSOCIATION EST 1913 TODAY’S TOMORROW’SINNOVATION,BATTLES WON 300+ companies, product demonstrations and industry briefings covering the latest in emerging military equipment, vehicles, technology and training systems.
sea power 22 armadainternational.com - april/may 2022
UNLOCKING POTENTIAL
As the authors note, “[it] refers to machines that can do calculations through analogue or digital functions faster than most hu mans do,” and can make decisions based on those calculations. Narrow AI refers to machines that can “learn and self-pro gramme, but only to perform a narrow or specialised range of activities.” Finally, general AI, also known as strong AI, refers to what people commonly understand as AI, that is, systems that can perform tasks mimicking human intelligence. ML and DL are enablers for the different levels of AI. ML is a process of trial-and-er ror through which AI-enabled machines label large volumes of data as they continue to learn and modify their decision-making. Both narrow and strong AI include different degrees of ML. DL is the process of creating layers of algorithms on the basis of ‘if-then’ statements and pieces of labelled data; “any system involving more than three layers is considered to constitute ‘deep learning’”, Tangredi and Galdorisi explain. DL enables strong AI.
According to Matthew Caris, senior director
SystemsBAE
ARTIFICIALUNDERSTANDINGINTELLIGENCEINANAVALCONTEXT
SEPARATING FACT FROM FICTION
“Artificial Intelligence (AI) has gone through many hype cycles (since Alan Turing first described the concept in the mid-1930s) and we are now coming back to another hype element,” Jake Rigby, research and development lead for Defence and Security at BMT, told Armada International.
By Alix Valenti
While artificial intelligence has long held an almost fictional status which has seemed long on promise, in actuality it is increasingly defining superior ways of managing complex data.
AI enables faster processing of large volumes of data, but the key issue of data collection and reliability remains to be addressed.
As is often the case with buzzwords, AI has been taken to mean many different things in the context of warfighting. The confla tion of AI with ML and DL has created the perception – and, for some, the fear – that tomorrow’s AI-enabled systems will replace humans in the battlefield. In reality, the relationship between these three concepts is similar to the notion of Russian Dolls: DL is a subset of ML, itself a subset of AI. In the introduction to their book AI at War - How Big Data, Artificial Intelligence, and Machine Learning are Changing Naval Warfare, Sam J. Tangredi and George Gal dorisi categorise AI in three groups: simple, narrow and general. Simple AI is, effectively, automation.
One merely had to walk around the exhibi tion floor of Sea Air Space 2022, or attend its various conferences, to see the full extent of this hype: AI was almost ubiquitous. Yet, as with most hypes, the gap between expectations and reality needs to be care fully assessed, and the devil is in the detail: How does AI relate to Machine Learning (ML) and Deep Learning (DL)? How are these concepts being applied to naval warfare? And, just as importantly, what safeguards are navies putting in place to promote human-machine teaming and not human-like machines?
The lack of (access to) sufficient data to train ML and, most importantly, DL systems is at the heart of what has been preventing navies and, in fact, armed forces in general, from adopting strong AI. Alessandro Massa, head of research laboratories at Leonar do, explained that the most significant hurdles are certification and reliability of AI for safety and mission critical systems.
TRUST THY NEIGHBOUR AI holds great potential for navies, and some of that potential is already being real ised in systems such as CMS or for specific missions such as mine counter-measure (MCM). As narrow and strong AI continue to evolve as a result of efforts to provide learning data, this technology will become trulyYet,ubiquitous.whileman-machine teaming is undoubtedly the way forward for more effi cient naval operations, one significant ob stacle remains: the ability of crew and com manders to trust the result. For instance, as Caris noted, “when relying on a CMS to have targeting information, sorting through in formation to determine what is real versus what is being jammed, there is a significant element of trust that the system is not being fooled.” Adversaries may tamper with the data fed into AI-enabled machines at many different levels, from the moment they are being trained to the moment they are gathering information on the battlefield to provide decision-aids. Yet as Tangredi told Armada: “how do you create a machine that knows not to trust itself because it might be being deceived by the enemy?” The use of AI systems to enable auton omous systems, as well as the role of AI in asymmetric warfare – including cyberse curity – will be explored in two separate articles in the next issue of Armada. Stay tuned.
AI will improve onboard naval decision making in such capabilities such as combat management systems.
ONES AND ZEROS Despite the considerable benefits AI can bring to the battlefield, a number of obstacles remain for the full integration of narrow and strong AI across a wide number of systems in the fleet. As noted by Tangre di and Galdorisi, while AI may be seen as superior to humans in its ability to process information much faster, “it is still the prod uct of collective human endeavour [with] its limits, costs and risks.” The data these systems rely on to learn and re-programme themselves is a critical part of these risks.
Finally, as navies continue to move toward unmanned systems, narrow and, eventually, strong, AI will play a significant role in enabling these systems’ autonomy. From navigation – alone or in swarms – to detection, identification and classifica tion, autonomous systems will continue to carry out a growing number of tasks that are currently unsafe for humans. Mine Countermeasure (MCM) systems are a good example of this progress, though currently they mostly run on narrow AI.
AI needs to be trained in all the different environments it will be operating in so as to be able to fully comprehend and distinguish threats; “the smallest chance of mistake, even one percent, can cost lives,” Massa added.For the BAE Systems’ spokersperson there are therefore two challenges: firstly, connecting innovation with high fidelity data sets and, secondly, creating alternative approaches that mitigate the lack of certain data sets. For Naval Group, Loic Mougeolle, director of the Naval Innovation Hub, said that “data collection and sharing issues in relation to AI are so vast and complex that Naval Group has chosen to address them in consortia with other partners.” They are currently doing so through the Confiance.ai consortium.Asforthe French Navy, it is in the processing of establishing the Maritime Data Service Centre (Centre de Service de la Donnée Marine - CSD-M). Based in Toulon, and opened in 2022, the CSD-M created new structures dedicated to data collection and valorisation: data collection is focusing on gathering the data generated by all the fleet’s digital systems; the data will then be labelled in order to facilitate ML and DL. The end-goal is the development of datasets that AI systems will rely on to learn about operational environments, threats, etc.
sea power 23armadainternational.com - april/may 2022 at Avascent, “navies and warships in general have had a high degree of automation for a long time, with the most common place use of AI being in the Combat Management System (CMS)”. When placed in automatic mode, these systems can detect a target, identify, classify and prioritise before deploying the weapon to engage the target. It is worth noting, however, that these systems are seldom put in automatic mode; the human is always in-the-loop for the final decision. Automation, as enabled by simple AI, is also widely used by navies for ship machinery controls and propulsion. In a context where ship crews are continuously decreasing, AI provides critical mainte nance and operations support. Beyond automation, narrow AI is widely used by navies for decision aids. As battle fields grow in complexity, characterised by faster, varied and numerous threats, it is in creasingly difficult for crew to process and comprehend all the potential threats. The advantage of AI in this context is its ability to process and label data much faster than humans. As such, it can sort through the clutter of the battlefield, allowing system operators to focus on the real threat. “With in the French Navy (Marine Nationale), AI is used to provide support to system operators, processing all the information to ease crew cognitive load and enabling them to focus on decision-making and key tasks,” Jean-Pierre, AI specialist for the French Navy, told Armada.
GroupNaval
“A particular challenge for AI in defence applications is the scarcity of accessible data to learn from,” a spokesperson from BAE Systems told Armada. “High fidelity data is often classified and as defence is often about preparing for the worst, data re lating to some of the most important types of event for learning simply do not exist as they have never happened.”
Andrew Drwiega, Stephen W. Miller and David Oliver
UKRAINE SPECIAL 24 armadainternational.com - april/may 2022
USAF RC-135W, callsign HOMER, track.
CONFLICT IN UKRAINE: ANALYSIS OF THREE FACTORS IN THE FIRST STAGE
An analysis of how Russia’s invasion was monitored by NATO, together with reflections on two key elements of the fight so far - the use of artillery and Russian logistical planning.
The brutal Russian invasion of Ukraine continues to head line globally, with war crimes now being discovered in many locations. At time of writing, after failing to take Ukraine’s capital Kyiv, the Russian Army has withdrawn from this area (perhaps temporarily), and has moved its strategic focus to the Donbas in the east of the country to capture the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in their entirety. Reflecting on the first phase of the inva sion, contributor David Oliver has brought together some observations on how has moved monitored by NATO from airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnais sance (ISR) aircraft operated by its member states, albeit in either NATO or unrestrict ed airspace. It must be recognised that an unidentified amount of this intelligence was passed to the Ukrainian armed forces as they struggled to hold back the initial Russian advance and in preventing the ultimate capture of Kyiv. Stephen W Miller also reflects on the artillery deployed by both sides, and gauges its use and effectiveness. Miller also analyses what appears to be a failure of the invading forces to organise their logistical plan, which not only effected the
USAF and NATO Boeing E-3A Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AEW&C) aircraft are also in the mix of surveillance capable platforms targeting Russian forces in Ukraine. Noticeable are the lack of RAF E-3D aircraft that were withdrawn from service last August, one of which has bee sold to Chile, and the Raythe on Sentinel R.1 fleet (based on a Bombardier Global Express aircraft) that were prema turely retired six months earlier leaving a capability gap in the RAF’s ISTAR force.
ARTILLERY The Russian Army, despite the coverage of tanks and armoured vehicles, is recognised as being primarily an artillery army. The use of massed gun batteries and multiple rocket launchers (MRL) and the devastation these cause to defenders was a hallmark of Soviet combat in World War II. Its effective ness seemed confirmed, when Russian MRL artillery directed by an unmanned aerial vehicle UAV) destroyed a Ukrainian ar moured brigade in July 2014 during fighting USAF MQ-4 Global Hawk, callsign FORTE, track over the Black Sea.
25april/may 2022 - armadainternational.com momentum but also the effectiveness of the Russian campaign.
NATO’S AIRBORNE ISR
Flying from Sigonella in Sicily, USAF Northrop Grumman RQ-4A Global Hawk high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) platforms (callsign Forte) have been patrolling over the Black Sea at 50,000ft (15,200m) performing long-duration persistent surveillance oper ations. At the other end of the UAV scale, the Romanian Border Police operates a Schiebel Camcopter S-100 over the Black Sea off the coast of Romania. Based at Mangalia south of Constanta, the rotary-wing UAV has a range of 108nm (200km) and an endurance of up to six hours. A Romanian Civil Avia tion (CAA) Beechcraft King Air 350i has also been observed patrolling the border with Moldova.USAF Boeing KC-135s, KC-10As and RAF Voyager KC.2 have been flying racetracks over eastern Romania refuelling NATO jet fighters. An Italian Air Force KC-767A tanker has also carried out the type's first mission over Eastern Europe in support of fighter jets tasked with NATO's enhanced Air Policing mission.
During March, there was a ramping up of NATO surveillance flights along the borders of Ukraine with most activity seen taking place in Romanian airspace. This includes flights by US Navy Lockheed EP-3Es flying along the border between Romania and Moldova. The EP-3E Aries II is a land-based multi-intelligence reconnaissance aircraft based on the P-3 Orion airframe, 16 of which were recently upgraded from signals intelli gence (SIGINT) to a multi-intelligence gath ering capability. With sensitive receivers and high-gain dish antennas, the EP-3E exploits a wide range of electronic emis sions from deep within targeted territory. The crew fuses the collected intelligence along with off-board data and disseminates the collaborated information for direct threatRoyalwarning.AirForce (RAF) Boeing Airseeker and US Air Force (USAF) RC-135W Rivet Joint airborne SIGINT platforms, with a sensor suite that allows the mission crew to detect, identify and geolocate signals throughout the electromagnetic spectrum, have been flying along the Ukraine and BelarusBasedborders.atRAF Waddington, for the pur poses of sensor and system upgrades, No 51 Squadron’s three Airseekers are considered an extension of the USAF Rivet Joint fleet, ensuring they remain at the cutting edge of capability.Theyhave been joined by USAF E-8C Northrop Grumman Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS). Its 24 foot (7.3 metre) long, side-looking phased array antenna can be tilted to either side of the aircraft where it can develop a 120-degree field of view covering nearly 19,300 square miles (50,000 square km) and is capable of detecting targets at more than 135 nautical miles (250 kilometres). The radar also has some limited capability to detect helicopters, rotating antennas and low, slow-moving fixed wing aircraft. Operating in Poland’s airspace is one of the Italian Air Forces’s two Gulfstream G550 Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Target Acquisition, Elec tronic Warfare (AISREW/ISTAR) acquired from Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). Equipped with Leonardo Osprey 50 AESA surveillance radar and a Spydr suite by L3Harris, they are operated by the 14th Air Wing based at Pratica di Mare Air Base. The US Army has deployed its Beech craft RC-12X Guardrails to Lithuania where they conduct Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions along the border with Belarus and Kaliningrad, the exclave of Russia located on the coast of the Baltic Sea. The US Army’s Airborne Reconnais sance Targeting & Exploitation Multi-Mis sion Intelligence System (ARTEMIS) aircraft is based on the Bombardier Chal lenger 650. The high-speed, ISR-gathering demonstrator built by Leidos in response to a US Army requirement to replace its RC-12X Guardrail aircraft. One of only two ARTEMIS aircraft has both electronic collection and ground scanning radar so it could see the movement of military vehicles in real time, and collect RF [radio frequen cy] signals emitted by adversaries. Its sen sors can reach hundreds of miles, and based at Constanta in Romania, it can see well into Belarus, Kaliningrad, and perhaps even into the Donbas region. The route is probably the closest that the US would want to take this plane to Russia and Belarus, while keeping the plane safely in NATO airspace.
UKRAINE SPECIAL
MoDUkraine
COUNTER-BATTERY
MRLs fire salvos of rockets covering a large area. The BM27 has a 35km (21.7mi) range and BM30, with a 90km (56mi) range, can release 16 or 12 rockets in 38 seconds. The latter, which can use a bomblet payload, was one of the principle Russian weapons bombarding Kyiv. Images of destroyed or abandoned artillery pieces on roads suggest that, at least in the initial Russian advance in the north, some Russian guns were caught in march order and unable to support the leading tank elements. This is reinforced by other videos showing forward armoured columns engaged by Ukrainian defenders without any Russian artillery responding. Having artillery prepared to fire pre planned targets “on-call” to support an advance would be standard procedure for mostWhenmilitaries.thetempo of Russian advances has slowed or even stopped, the use of Russian artillery has usually escalated, seemingly randomly battering and de stroying large swaths of residential areas with day and night shelling. This massive artillery employment only as the combat front stabilises suggests Russian artillery are apparently more comfortable with setpiece tactics. Here batteries can establish fixed known positions, stockpile ammuni tion, and deliver massed fires on predeter mined targets. So far, providing responsive fires to forward manoeuvring battle groups seems either not a priority, something Russian artillery has not trained for, or been hampered for other reasons, possibil ity poor communications. With its artillery again massed, the next Russian attacks in the Donbas are likely to be preceded by the same ferocious barrages against Ukraine’s entrenched defenders as delivered against German positions in 1945.
The 2S3 Akatsiya 152mm self-propelled howitzer is employed by both Russia and Ukraine and was a mainstay of Soviet artillery since 1971. With a modest 18.5 km range it is intended to move close behind mobile armoured forces to provide fire support. This has also made them a target for attack by Ukrainian incursions.
Effective counter-battery first requires locating the enemy guns. This can be done using counter-battery radar like the US AN/ TPQ-48, AN/TPQ-30 and TPQ-36 of which around 20 have been provided to Ukraine since 2014. Destruction of these systems are, however, a Russian priority and loses have beenAnotherdocumented.means is observation by ISR UAVs, which can then direct artillery fires or, if armed, attack themselves. The announced supply of AeroVironment’s Switchblade loitering UAV munitions could offer a highly effective tool against Russian artillery. Able to circle undetected overhead for up to 40 minutes they could identify batteries and then attack, specifi cally targeting command centres or stocked ammunition. Such use offers significantly greater benefits than destroying individual guns. Unfortunately, the 100 or so muni tions promised are not nearly sufficient to have the necessary impact on the multiple
ISR UAVS
As the Russians are able to increasingly mass artillery its effects will become of far greater concern than its main battle tanks. It is prudent then to recognise this and shift priority to challenging this superi ority. Capability for targeting and dimin ishing the Russian artillery has, however, not yet been given sufficient attention in the weapon systems aid being provided.
UKRAINE SPECIAL 26 armadainternational.com - april/may 2022 in the Donbas. Anticipating a rapid advance and victory, the Russians did not initially use its typical massed fires to precede the attack. Yet, the presence of Russian artillery is confirmed by photos of both destroyed and abandoned self-propelled guns and MRLs on the roadways. It is also evident in the random destruction these are inflicting on Ukrainian cities. Ukraine’s artillery has, at least until recently, been less featured in releases by its military. In terms of artillery systems fielded, the Ukrainian and Russian forces share many of the same systems. Russia has a consid erable active inventory with large numbers stored in reserve. These consist of tracked 122- and 152-mm self-propelled howitzers, towed howitzers of the same calibres, truck mounted multiple rocket launchers, and tactical ballistic missiles. The self-propelled 2S19 Mista and 2S3 Akatsiya are 152mm howitzers with ranges of 25km (15 miles) and 18.5km (11.5mi) respectively. They have some armour protection and are intended to move behind armoured forces deploying to firing positions to support the attack. Both armies also have wheeled howit zers towed by tactical trucks including the D-20, D-30, the MSTA-B, and Giatsint-B. MRLs include the BM21 Grad, BM27 Uragan, and BM30 Smerch, all on truck chassis.
Another question from combat so far is the seeming lack or unreported use of Russian
ISR UAVs observing and directing artillery, as occurred in 2014. Its fleet of Granat 1 and 2, Eleron-3, Zala, Orlan-10, and Takhion were all prominent in Syria and earlier Donbas campaigns. Having ‘eyes-on-target’ is critical to the most effective use of artil lery. This spotter can be on the ground or use a drone to identify and direct artillery further to the rear. It may be that Russia forces will expand their use of ISR drones, but the Ukrainian forces have aggressively embraced not only military UAVs like the TB2 Bayraktar but commercial models as well. Ukraine may have also adapted its ar tillery tactics using batteries of fewer guns which employ their own commercial drone to directly find targets and direct shots. This offers the advantage of being immediately responsive and reducing radio communi cations that might be detected, jammed, or tracked. It also further disperses artillery assets making it more difficult to destroy them. Demonstrated in a video released by the Ukrainian Army, it is not clear if this is a local tactic or more widely adopted.
27april/may 2022 - armadainternational.com UKRAINE SPECIAL READ THE LATEST ISSUE TODAY
UKRAINE SPECIAL 28 armadainternational.com - april/may 2022 TAI battlefronts. Still, demonstrating a viable and reliable threat that challenges Russian artillery use could reduce its effectiveness. Batteries can be expected to be reluctant to fire knowing that they are assured of being attacked once they do. Artillery combat losses on both sides have been serious with one report tabulat ing over 76 Russian and 31 Ukrainian pieces destroyed. Both armies have reintroduced guns like the 2S7 203mm howitzer that had been retired. Russia, with ground advances stalled is, as in Grozny Chechnya in 19992000, once again attempting to rely on mass artillery bombardment. As the conflict round of fighting evolves, countering Rus sia’s artillery is likely to become as critical as killing tanks.
RESUppLY - FUEL
RUSSIAN LOGISTICS
The Ukraine Army conducts refuel on the move (ROM) by prepositioning refuelling points forward on the route of march that top off each vehicle in under 30 seconds. The Russians have no equivalent. It is further evident from photos that fuel trucks
The adage: “For want of a nail the horse was lost, for want of a horse the knight was lost, for want of a knight the battle was lost” could not find a more fitting example than Russia’s campaign invasion into Ukraine. Sufficient logistics support is essential to success by combat forces. On today’s bat tlefields this includes not only the resupply of fuel, food, water and ammunition but also assuring the continuous flow of these supplies. The later means keeping routes open and secure against both disruption and enemy action. This was of critical im portance to the initial Russian objective of moving armoured and mechanised columns quickly to take deep objectives quickly – an approach that quite nearly succeeded partly due to a delayed Ukrainian response. In addition, the rapid repair and maintenance of equipment being used in the advance prevents the reduction of unit strength as much as a combat losses. Indi cations are clear that Russian forces have failed in each of these requisites. Equally important is that the Ukrainian military appears to have quickly recognised this weakness and focused on aggravating it with its actions. It is becoming increasingly apparent that logistics failures can be traced to deci sions and actions that compounded what was already going to be a demanding logisti cal operation; namely the support of at least five different attacks separated by nearly 1000km (620mi) - and in different countries/ regions. On top of this, assaulting Russian units were required to move extended dis tances, in some cases 50-100km (30-60mi) from their staging areas in Russia, Belarus and the Crimea, to jump off points and to do so in extreme cold and winter conditions. Many of these units, particularly in the north, had been conducting exercises and in the field since December. Such exercises and extended road marches can be hard on equipment. Tanks and tracked vehicles typically require three hours maintenance for each operating hour. Given the numbers of vehicles and equipment breakdowns and abandoned vehicles in just the first days of the advance suggests these units may not had time to recover. Lack of attention to maintenance appears, however, to have been evident across Russian forces. The number of wheeled combat and logistics vehicles, including vital weapons like the Pantisir air defence system, displayed with flat tires or otherwise broken-down stands out. Trent Teletenko, a US Army logistics expert, suggested many of these tires may have failed due to poor quality and neglected maintenance. Given the Russian Army’s practice, inherited from the Soviets of often holding the majority of a unit’s equipment in storage until needed, some of this may have occurred over time in depots with lim ited supervision. Yet, the question remains, why they were not recovered, repaired and returned to service? This may be a result of the lack of technical skill and training of conscript soldiers. With in-depth maintenance and repair the responsibility of technical offi cers, not enlisted soldiers, forward repair and recovery are likely limited to brigade and division. With the scale of equipment failures, as well as combat damage, capabil
ities can be stretched thin. Michael Kofman, director of Russian Studies at the Center for Naval Analysis, concluded: “Taking a cursory look at Russian losses…it reads as a failure to maintain and support the equip ment.” The old Soviet concept as laid-out in a Department of the Army publication The Soviet Army: Specialised Warfare and Rear Area Support, outlines that Russian units centralise these functions, thereby limiting forward repair possibilities. If so the seeds for the problems that were experienced in Ukraine had already been planted years and even decades earlier.
There were several reports of miles-long Russian columns at a standstill or moving very slowly. The failure of the presumed quick capture of Kyiv combined with the hard resistance of the Ukrainian Army caused logistical problems.
For modern mechanised armies, fuel is the life blood. Tanks and combat vehicles are huge consumers. The T80 tank fuel capacity is 1,100 litres which, by the specification, offers 335km (208mi) range. The reality is much less, with more time spent stationary with the engine running. Recognising this, most tanks in the advance looked to feature external 740 litre fuel drums that should have increased their range to 415km (258mi). Yet, the fuel required of a single Russian Battalion Tactical Group is over 60,000 litres. Considering a single heavy 8x8 refuelling truck may carry at best 9-10,000lt, multiple of trucks would be required even if they were only topping off vehicles before they are empty (the preference in combat).
Note: The complete reports from David Oliver and Stephen W Miller can be found online at armadainternational.com
The Russian assault, especially from the northern border, required crossing a number of “wet gaps”, a particularly difficult task for armoured forces. As the Ukrainian’s destroyed bridges Russian columns often found themselves halted. Assault bridgelayers, though clearly somewhere in the Russian columns as evidence by this captured MTU-70, do not appear to have been efficiently employed further delaying the Russian
29april/may 2022either followed far to the rear, becoming stuck in traffic jams or travelled so closely with armoured columns that they were destroyed in fighting.
RESUppLY – AmmUNITION Given the Russian emphasis on massed fires, the resupply of ammunition needs to be a priority. Being both heavy and high vol ume it is also the most difficult to move. US Army Lieutenant Colonel Alix Vershinin, with experience of the Army’s Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) Sus tainment Battle Lab explains: “The (Rus sian) Army’s MRLs alone would require up to 90 trucks to replenish its rocket loads one time. In addition are the needs of six battal ions of tube-artillery, 15 mechanised / tank battalions, anti-air battalions all with their own specific demands. Considering that even over good roads a convoy could expect to maintain 70km/hr (45mph) the best that could be expected would be completing a 150km (90 mile) trip to the front and back onceThedaily.”shift made by Russian forces, initially in the north and later in the east, showed that the bogged down ground as saults likely severely strained their ability to move the necessary munitions. To support the struggle for ground, artillery ammu nition would have likely received priority.
armadainternational.com UKRAINE SPECIAL
This in turn would have reduced assets for resupplying the tanks, anti-tank missiles, and other weapons of the ground assault units reducing their combat effectiveness. It has become apparent that the concept of the initial Russian assault was to rapidly drive armoured columns down narrow corridors along roads from the border.
The objective was to quickly move on and seize Kyiv and other key cities, essentially resulting in a fait accompli. Speed was of the essence. So it is confounding that despite moving on routes requiring crossing water obstacles, Russian forces appear not to have deployed assault bridging with their columns. No accounts demonstrate or suggest opposed gap crossing operations, one of the most difficult combat tasks, or the use of assault bridging. As a result, as the Ukrainian’s destroyed bridges the Russian’s were halted and suffered not only significant delays but created tail-backs of following combat and support units. These units lined along the roads then become vulnerable to UAV and ground hit-and-run attacks. Although pontoon support bridges were employed, these appear to have been located to the rear. The lack of assault bridging forward is puzzling since images appeared to show MTU-72 armoured bride layers on rail cars at staging areas as well as one captured by Ukrainian forces. The MTU-72 can emplace a 20m or 30m bridge in three minutes. Whether due to poor plan ning or unlucky circumstance, this lack of a bridgelayer was observed creating delays that allowed the Ukrainian defenders to ral ly and ultimately contributed to the failure of the Russian attack.
The serious deficiencies demonstrated by Russian forces in logistics and main tenance are not issues that will be easily addressed simply by reorganising units behind the battle front. To a degree, these reflect assumptions reflected in the Russian concept of operations and which is less easy to change. Yet, even where appropriate Rus sian/Soviet tactical doctrine existed, such as assuring engineering and gap crossing assets are placed forward to assure main taining momentum of an attack, it seem ingly was not followed. For want of simple assets the fate of battles were determined.
advance.UAWeapons
midable
bytransferred,onhasadministrationalreadytheeasythatprovidingcurrentdrivenobstacleslogisticalhaveNATOtoitspolicyofsystemsareeithertouseorthatUkrainiansoperate.”TheBidenbeenbuildingtheassistancewhich6Aprilreached
SUPPORTING UKRAINE - A PERSPECTIVEWASHINGTON
Note: Greg Sanders is Fellow and deputy director for Research at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington DC, USA.
he discussions in Washington have influenced events in Ukraine but also have been regularly reshaped by the changing parameters of the war. There are active debates over topics such as the nature of deterrence and high stakes arguments over possible peace agreements and the nature of Russian red lines and nuclear weapons. As the Russian military refocuses on the Donbas region and Ukraine retakes once occupied terri tory, evidence of alleged Russian atrocities mounts. In parallel the role of munitions and security assistance is receiving consid erable attention in Washington as the Biden administration and members of Congress choose their next step and debate the defence budget.ใ
$2.4 billion since the start of the admin istration. The extent of past and planned US transfers is considerable, including 4,600 Javelin anti-armour systems and 1,400 Stinger anti-aircraft system, The $13.6 billion aid package passed by Congress in early March gave the administration unusu ally broad discretion to use the funding to restock and also included foreign military financing to potentially aid allies that transfer equipment. Many of the options for platforms that Ukrainian troops already operate would involve systems Eastern Eu ropean NATO allies rely on as part of their defence and thus would have to be back filled. The US is also making posture shifts, including the planned transfer of Patriot missile batteries to Slovakia to make up for the loss of protection after they transferred their only S-300 air defence battery to Ukraine.Ukraine’s remarkable success against the Russian invasion is multi-faceted but early assessments underline the effective ness of anti-tank and anti-air systems that can be carried by individual soldiers, nota bly the US produced Javelin with its ease of training and ‘fire and forget’ ability. Beyond munitions, Ukraine’s success in denying Russia air superiority has also upended as sumptions and allowed continued use of the Ukrainian air force as well as slower moving drones like the Turkish Bayraktar TB-2. However as stockpiles run down, sending more munitions, and new systems like the Switchblade loitering munition, is not just a matter of costs. My colleague John Schaus has found that the transfers “accounts for more than half of the 8,885 javelins the Department of Defense (DoD) acquired in the past decade.” In his confirmation hearing, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, Bill LePlan te, emphasised a willingness to invest in maintaining hot production lines for both established munitions and uncrewed aerial systems. Unfortunately, despite five years of increased defense contract spending, DoD has assessed the industrial base for munitions and missiles as vulnerable due to consolidation and high barriers to entry, in part due to inconsistent demand. Address ing a smaller supplier base will also involve facing challenges prompted by stressed supplyMoralechains.factors deserve a central role when discussing Ukraine’s inspiring success with key supporting roles to the President Zelesnkyy’s rallying of public opinion to defeat Russian information warfare, the Biden administration’s use of intelligence transparency, as well as more subtle strength of information economy on the Ukrainian side. The United States, European nations, as well as other close US allies have made it clear that Ukraine does not stand alone and that there is a will to de ter future egregious violation of norms that this invasion represents. Managing logistics and industrial base issues is a small part of this larger picture, but also is a prereq uisite for translating will and budgets into usable equipment. Finally, logistics will be just as vital to prepare for the rebuilding of Ukraine when the war concludes.
One of the more persistent discussions is how to best support Ukraine. Writing in late March my colleague Seth Jones argued for expansive transfers, including not just the range of ordnance and munitions that were central to the initial stages of the war, but also air defence and ‘higher end plat forms.’ In speaking with NATO, President Zelenskyy called for a transfer of one per cent of the alliance’s planes and tanks, but my colleague Mark Cancian is skeptical of the practicality of this request, noting “for
30 armadainternational.com - april/may 2022 ARMADA COMMENTARY
Greg Sanders
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