DEFENCE AND SECURITY OF INDIA - DEC 2010/JAN 2011 ISSUE

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ARMED FORCES SPECIAL POWERS ACT

MUDDIED DISCOURSE The debate that is raging on AFPSA detracts from the essential character of the Act I Ajai Sahni SECURITY

CYBER CHALLENGES Although a global IT power, India lacks a comprehensive national cybersecurity policy I Subimal Bhattarcharya DECEMBER 2010

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DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA

DSI VOLUME 3

ISSUE 3

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Sixty three years after Independence India's defence policy remains fundamentally flawed and devoid of long-term planning K. SUBHRAMANYAM

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DECEMBER 2010

LETTER FROM THE

DSI

editor

I

ndia is waging a war on many fronts and not in the most obvious of ways. More than six decades after Independence, the nation still needs to evolve a future-oriented, comprehensive defence policy that ensures an effective level of defence preparedness.

The lack of urgency to put a meaningful defence policy in place is all the more puzzling surrounded as India is by antsy neighbours and her growing awareness of her security needs.

As the year draws to a close, DSI outlines why a radical change in our defenceplanning doctrine is required; one which raises fundamental questions on the relationship between the armed forces and bureaucrats, the intelligence community and policy makers and one that does not compartmentalise the sena and the sarkar into different operational wings. A nation’s defence policy not only defines it but also maps out its role in the world and the sense it has of itself as a nation.

We also examine why our defence policy, historically, has always remained fundamentally flawed. Conventionally, bureaucrats have seen the defence establishment as a pampered lot always craving for more equipment and authority while the armed forces see the civil service and the political class as nitpickers genetically prone to impeding modernisation.

This absence of a long-term, grounded defence policy has clearly impacted the Services. In this issue, DSI examines at the mismatch between the Navy’s expansion plans and its requirements.

Additional submarines and ships are desperately needed but orders have not kept pace with the phasing out of decommissioned ships. Modernisation is necessary if the force is to remain credible.

In an era of Wikileaks, we also look at the need for evolving a sharply-focussed, cybersecurity policy as an integral part of the nation’s defence policy especially as crucial channels of communication and infrastructure are all networked.

We also analyse the seemingly unending debate that is taking place over the Armed Forces Special Powers Act. The Act essentially applies to the operation of the Army in designated disturbed areas but its critics charge that it is unconstitutional and its implementation has led to human rights violations.

As usual, we look forward to your feedback. If you have any suggestions, comments or criticisms e-mail us at dsidelhi.feedback@gmail.com. Should you want to subscribe contact us at dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz and our marketing team will do the rest.

Mannika Chopra EDITOR Defence & Security of India

1

As the year draws to a close, we outline why a radical change in the defenceplanning doctrine is required; one which raises fundamental questions on the relationship between the armed forces and bureaucrats.

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COVER STORY

DSI

ARMED FORCES SPECIAL POWERS ACT 06

12

INCONVENIENT TRUTHS

MUDDIED DISCOURSE

The most damaging reality is that even after 63 years of Independence, India still lacks a coherent defence policy. In the absence of a long-term strategy and a policy developing body the future of the world’s fourth-largest military power hangs in limbo.

The debate over the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) has remained sentimental, misdirected and intellectually deficient. There is also a systematic effort to pretend that the Act is unconstitutional or that its constitutionality is under judicial challenge. However, the reality is that the Act applies only to the operation of the Army in designated disturbed areas and its constitutionality has repeatedly been upheld by the Supreme Court.

MODERNISATION

20

BILATERAL RELATIONS

38

LOW EXPECTATIONS A SEASON OF DEALS Despite an impressive line up of about 40 ships and submarines on order, the Indian Navy is today a shrinking force, mainly due to aging ships and submarines getting phased out faster than new inductions.

Future operations demand that India upgrades its naval force.

SECURITY

The ongoing flurry of high-voltage visits by the presidents of the United States, France, Russia and the prime minister of the United Kingdom at the tail end of 2010 maybe cloaked in diplomacy but they indicate the importance of the Indian market for these global defence majors.

26

CYBER CHALLENGES In an era of Wikileaks, India still lacks a secure and stable IT system to check cybercrimes. And the biggest threat to the country is the use of cyberattack tools by terrorists and their sympathisers.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

32

REFORM TO PERFORM To recharge India’s military intelligence system an intense organisational reorientation is required.

AFP

CONTENTS

DECEMBER 2010

2

3

AFP

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Page 2

COVER STORY

DSI

ARMED FORCES SPECIAL POWERS ACT 06

12

INCONVENIENT TRUTHS

MUDDIED DISCOURSE

The most damaging reality is that even after 63 years of Independence, India still lacks a coherent defence policy. In the absence of a long-term strategy and a policy developing body the future of the world’s fourth-largest military power hangs in limbo.

The debate over the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) has remained sentimental, misdirected and intellectually deficient. There is also a systematic effort to pretend that the Act is unconstitutional or that its constitutionality is under judicial challenge. However, the reality is that the Act applies only to the operation of the Army in designated disturbed areas and its constitutionality has repeatedly been upheld by the Supreme Court.

MODERNISATION

20

BILATERAL RELATIONS

38

LOW EXPECTATIONS A SEASON OF DEALS Despite an impressive line up of about 40 ships and submarines on order, the Indian Navy is today a shrinking force, mainly due to aging ships and submarines getting phased out faster than new inductions.

Future operations demand that India upgrades its naval force.

SECURITY

The ongoing flurry of high-voltage visits by the presidents of the United States, France, Russia and the prime minister of the United Kingdom at the tail end of 2010 maybe cloaked in diplomacy but they indicate the importance of the Indian market for these global defence majors.

26

CYBER CHALLENGES In an era of Wikileaks, India still lacks a secure and stable IT system to check cybercrimes. And the biggest threat to the country is the use of cyberattack tools by terrorists and their sympathisers.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

32

REFORM TO PERFORM To recharge India’s military intelligence system an intense organisational reorientation is required.

AFP

CONTENTS

DECEMBER 2010

2

3

AFP

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CONTRIBUTORS

DECEMBER 2010

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA DECEMBER 2010 VOLUME 3, NUMBER 3 EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

AJAI SAHNI

K. SUBRAHMANYAM

A.K. SINGH

SUBIMAL BHATTACHARJEE

BHASHYAM KASTURI

GURMEET KANWAL

Ajai Sahni is founding member and executive director Institute for Conflict Management. He is also editor, South Asia Intelligence Review; executive director, Faultlines:Writings on Conflict & Resolution. He has researched and written extensively on issues relating to conflict, politics and development in South Asia.

K. Subrahmanyam is a highly regarded international strategic affairs analyst and commentator. Joining the Indian Administrative Service in 1951, he was secretary, defence production till he became the founding director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in 1968. He has chaired the Joint Intelligence Committee in New Delhi.

He has also been a consulting editor with The Econmic Times and TheTimes of India.

Vice-Admiral Arun Kumar Singh (retd.), a nuclear submariner, has served as Director-General, Indian Coast Guard during the tsunami of December 2004 and was later Commander-inChief of the Port Blair-based Andaman & Nicobar Command. He retired as Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Vishakapatnam and currently writes on naval defence for leading publications.

Subimal Bhattacharjee is a widely recognised expert on global cybersecurity issues. A well-known columnist, he writes on issues related to global internet governance and cybersecurity with over 165 published articles and papers on the subject.

Currently he is the country head of General Dynamics International CorporationIndia (Liaison), New Delhi.

Dr. Bhashyam Kasturi heads the research and publications division at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.

Starting out as a lecturer at Delhi University, Dr. Kasturi subsequently became a journalist and was later associated with the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru. He has authored a book on India’s intelligence service and on Mahatma Gandhi and India’s partition.

Gurmeet Kanwal is director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi. He commanded an infantry brigade during Operation Parakram on the Line of Control in 2001-03. A soldierscholar, he has authored several books including Indian Army:Vision 2020 and Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal. He is a wellknown columnist and TV analyst on national security issues.

Maneesha Dube EDITOR

Mannika Chopra SENIOR SUB-EDITOR

Urmila Marak CREATIVE DIRECTOR

Bipin Kumar DESIGN

Sandeep Sharma SENIOR MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

Vishal Mehta DEPUTY MANAGER MARKETING

Tarun Malviya COORDINATOR

Ronald Micah CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

Sunil Gujral PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS

Sunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender Pandey MEDIATRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED

323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016 Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda PRESIDENT

Xavier Collaco CHAIRMAN

J. S. Uberoi

RAHUL BEDI

Ajai Shukla works in both the visual and the print media. He is consulting editor (Strategic Affairs) for Business Standard . He was also consulting editor (Strategic Affairs) for NDTV, a reputed news broadcaster in India, for which he has anchored prime time news and special programmes. He is currently working on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhi correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly, UK, and contributes to it on a diverse range of security and military-related matters.

He is also the India correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, London, and the Irish Times.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of India is obtained by subscription.

For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

www.mediatransasia.in/defence.html AFP

AJAI SHUKLA

GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES Australia Charlton D'Silva, Mass Media Publicitas Tel: (61 2) 9252 3476 Email: cdsilva@publicitas.com France/Spain Stephane de Remusat, REM International Tel: (33) 5 3427 0130 Email: sremusat@aol.com Germany/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UK Sam Baird, Whitehill Media Tel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646 E-Mail: sam@whitehillmedia.com Israel/Turkey Liat Heiblum, Oreet - International Media Tel: (97 2) 3 570 6527 Email: liat@oreet-marcom.com Russia Alla Butova, NOVO-Media Ltd, Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653 Email :alla@mediatransasia.com, allbbo@online.sinor.ru Scandinavia/Benelux/South Africa Tony Kingham, KNM Media Tel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465 E-Mail: tony.kingham@worldsecurity-index.com South Korea Young Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc. Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13 E-Mail: jesmedia@unitel.co.kr USA (East/South East)/Canada Margie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.

Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581 Email :margiespub@rcn.com USA (West/SouthWest)/Brazil Diane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc. Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557 Email: blackrockmedia@cox.net Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India Limited.

Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to Media Transasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit.

All correspondence should be addressed to Media Transasia India Limited.

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CONTRIBUTORS

DECEMBER 2010

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA DECEMBER 2010 VOLUME 3, NUMBER 3 EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

AJAI SAHNI

K. SUBRAHMANYAM

A.K. SINGH

SUBIMAL BHATTACHARJEE

BHASHYAM KASTURI

GURMEET KANWAL

Ajai Sahni is founding member and executive director Institute for Conflict Management. He is also editor, South Asia Intelligence Review; executive director, Faultlines:Writings on Conflict & Resolution. He has researched and written extensively on issues relating to conflict, politics and development in South Asia.

K. Subrahmanyam is a highly regarded international strategic affairs analyst and commentator. Joining the Indian Administrative Service in 1951, he was secretary, defence production till he became the founding director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in 1968. He has chaired the Joint Intelligence Committee in New Delhi.

He has also been a consulting editor with The Econmic Times and TheTimes of India.

Vice-Admiral Arun Kumar Singh (retd.), a nuclear submariner, has served as Director-General, Indian Coast Guard during the tsunami of December 2004 and was later Commander-inChief of the Port Blair-based Andaman & Nicobar Command. He retired as Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Vishakapatnam and currently writes on naval defence for leading publications.

Subimal Bhattacharjee is a widely recognised expert on global cybersecurity issues. A well-known columnist, he writes on issues related to global internet governance and cybersecurity with over 165 published articles and papers on the subject.

Currently he is the country head of General Dynamics International CorporationIndia (Liaison), New Delhi.

Dr. Bhashyam Kasturi heads the research and publications division at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.

Starting out as a lecturer at Delhi University, Dr. Kasturi subsequently became a journalist and was later associated with the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru. He has authored a book on India’s intelligence service and on Mahatma Gandhi and India’s partition.

Gurmeet Kanwal is director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi. He commanded an infantry brigade during Operation Parakram on the Line of Control in 2001-03. A soldierscholar, he has authored several books including Indian Army:Vision 2020 and Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal. He is a wellknown columnist and TV analyst on national security issues.

Maneesha Dube EDITOR

Mannika Chopra SENIOR SUB-EDITOR

Urmila Marak CREATIVE DIRECTOR

Bipin Kumar DESIGN

Sandeep Sharma SENIOR MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

Vishal Mehta DEPUTY MANAGER MARKETING

Tarun Malviya COORDINATOR

Ronald Micah CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

Sunil Gujral PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS

Sunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender Pandey MEDIATRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED

323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016 Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda PRESIDENT

Xavier Collaco CHAIRMAN

J. S. Uberoi

RAHUL BEDI

Ajai Shukla works in both the visual and the print media. He is consulting editor (Strategic Affairs) for Business Standard . He was also consulting editor (Strategic Affairs) for NDTV, a reputed news broadcaster in India, for which he has anchored prime time news and special programmes. He is currently working on a book on Sino-Indian frontier policy.

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhi correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly, UK, and contributes to it on a diverse range of security and military-related matters.

He is also the India correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, London, and the Irish Times.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of India is obtained by subscription.

For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

www.mediatransasia.in/defence.html AFP

AJAI SHUKLA

GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES Australia Charlton D'Silva, Mass Media Publicitas Tel: (61 2) 9252 3476 Email: cdsilva@publicitas.com France/Spain Stephane de Remusat, REM International Tel: (33) 5 3427 0130 Email: sremusat@aol.com Germany/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UK Sam Baird, Whitehill Media Tel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646 E-Mail: sam@whitehillmedia.com Israel/Turkey Liat Heiblum, Oreet - International Media Tel: (97 2) 3 570 6527 Email: liat@oreet-marcom.com Russia Alla Butova, NOVO-Media Ltd, Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653 Email :alla@mediatransasia.com, allbbo@online.sinor.ru Scandinavia/Benelux/South Africa Tony Kingham, KNM Media Tel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465 E-Mail: tony.kingham@worldsecurity-index.com South Korea Young Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc. Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13 E-Mail: jesmedia@unitel.co.kr USA (East/South East)/Canada Margie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.

Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581 Email :margiespub@rcn.com USA (West/SouthWest)/Brazil Diane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc. Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557 Email: blackrockmedia@cox.net Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India Limited.

Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to Media Transasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit.

All correspondence should be addressed to Media Transasia India Limited.

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ARMED FORCES SPECIAL POWERS ACT

DECEMBER 2010

DSI

The debate on the AFSPA remains emotionally charged, polarised, often contra-factual and detracts from the essential character of the Act

Soldiers move towards gunbattle in Dadsara Tral, south of Srinagar

AJAI SAHNI

KEY POINTS

The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) is essentially an enabling legislation that confers minimal powers on the Army to operate in a situation of widespread internal disorder.

Without the Act or a comparable legislation–which confers necessary powers of search, seizure, arrest and engagement–the Army cannot carry out internal security or counterinsurgency operations under the law.

AFP

O

MUDDIED DISCO URSE 6

n October 31, 2010 Irom Sharmila completed ten years of her hunger strike (she has been force-fed through a nasal tube for this entire duration) demanding the withdrawal of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) from Manipur.

For the preceding five months, an escalating separatist campaign of hartals, protests and stone pelting, peppered by occasional incidents of arson in the Kashmir Valley, had focussed repeatedly (among other things) on the demand for the withdrawal of the AFSPA. Indeed, throughout this orchestrated campaign of street violence, all alleged ‘excesses’ of the Security Forces (SFs) had been repeatedly attributed by separatist leaders to the existence of the AFSPA, despite the fact that the response to the ‘stone pelters’ was entirely in the hands of Central Paramilitary Forces and state police, neither of which is covered by the Act. For years now, human rights organisations have sustained a strident critique of the AFSPA, principally sourced in wide generalities, and at least occasionally, on pure falsification about the ‘draconian’ nature of this legislation; the incidence of human rights violations in areas of its operation; the ‘impunity’ it

7

supposedly confers on ‘security forces’ in case of such violation and the alleged ‘unconstitutionality’ of the Act. There has, in all this, been little real critique of the provisions of the Act or any effort to assess any significant correlation between its operation and the incidence of human rights abuses.

There has, moreover, been a continuous effort to blur lines. One prominent human rights organisation thus argues, “Under this Act, all security forces are given unrestricted and unaccounted power to carry out their operations once an area is declared disturbed.” There is also a systematic effort to pretend that the Act is unconstitutional or that its constitutionality is under judicial challenge. The reality is the Act applies only to the operation of the Army in designated disturbed areas and its constitutionality has repeatedly been upheld by the Supreme Court. However, after each such judgement a slew of new cases are registered to maintain the fiction that the issue remains ‘undecided’.

Suggested Checks and Balances Confusion has been further confounded by panicked and incoherent responses from the state and its agencies and from the highest offices of the land, including, in the recent past, repeated statements by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) Chief Minister Omar Abdullah on the need to make the AFSPA “more humane”.

Incoherence has been compounded by deceit and subterfuge on the part of the state. Thus, after strong and justified protests against the disgraceful incident of the rape and murder of Manorma Devi by Assam Rifles personnel in Manipur on July 10, 2004 and the even greater disgrace of the Army command’s cover-up in this case, the Centre appointed the Justice (retd.) B.P. Jeevan Reddy Committee to review the AFSPA in November that year. The

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ARMED FORCES SPECIAL POWERS ACT

DECEMBER 2010

DSI

The debate on the AFSPA remains emotionally charged, polarised, often contra-factual and detracts from the essential character of the Act

Soldiers move towards gunbattle in Dadsara Tral, south of Srinagar

AJAI SAHNI

KEY POINTS

The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) is essentially an enabling legislation that confers minimal powers on the Army to operate in a situation of widespread internal disorder.

Without the Act or a comparable legislation–which confers necessary powers of search, seizure, arrest and engagement–the Army cannot carry out internal security or counterinsurgency operations under the law.

AFP

O

MUDDIED DISCO URSE 6

n October 31, 2010 Irom Sharmila completed ten years of her hunger strike (she has been force-fed through a nasal tube for this entire duration) demanding the withdrawal of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) from Manipur.

For the preceding five months, an escalating separatist campaign of hartals, protests and stone pelting, peppered by occasional incidents of arson in the Kashmir Valley, had focussed repeatedly (among other things) on the demand for the withdrawal of the AFSPA. Indeed, throughout this orchestrated campaign of street violence, all alleged ‘excesses’ of the Security Forces (SFs) had been repeatedly attributed by separatist leaders to the existence of the AFSPA, despite the fact that the response to the ‘stone pelters’ was entirely in the hands of Central Paramilitary Forces and state police, neither of which is covered by the Act. For years now, human rights organisations have sustained a strident critique of the AFSPA, principally sourced in wide generalities, and at least occasionally, on pure falsification about the ‘draconian’ nature of this legislation; the incidence of human rights violations in areas of its operation; the ‘impunity’ it

7

supposedly confers on ‘security forces’ in case of such violation and the alleged ‘unconstitutionality’ of the Act. There has, in all this, been little real critique of the provisions of the Act or any effort to assess any significant correlation between its operation and the incidence of human rights abuses.

There has, moreover, been a continuous effort to blur lines. One prominent human rights organisation thus argues, “Under this Act, all security forces are given unrestricted and unaccounted power to carry out their operations once an area is declared disturbed.” There is also a systematic effort to pretend that the Act is unconstitutional or that its constitutionality is under judicial challenge. The reality is the Act applies only to the operation of the Army in designated disturbed areas and its constitutionality has repeatedly been upheld by the Supreme Court. However, after each such judgement a slew of new cases are registered to maintain the fiction that the issue remains ‘undecided’.

Suggested Checks and Balances Confusion has been further confounded by panicked and incoherent responses from the state and its agencies and from the highest offices of the land, including, in the recent past, repeated statements by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) Chief Minister Omar Abdullah on the need to make the AFSPA “more humane”.

Incoherence has been compounded by deceit and subterfuge on the part of the state. Thus, after strong and justified protests against the disgraceful incident of the rape and murder of Manorma Devi by Assam Rifles personnel in Manipur on July 10, 2004 and the even greater disgrace of the Army command’s cover-up in this case, the Centre appointed the Justice (retd.) B.P. Jeevan Reddy Committee to review the AFSPA in November that year. The

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DECEMBER 2010

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AFP

AFP

Adding to the unending debate on the AFSPA was the Report of the Second Administrative Commission headed by M. Veerappa Moily, which also concluded that the AFSPA must be abrogated.

The commission argued in favour of sweeping powers for the Centre to deploy armed forces in the states and asked for the enabling provisions of this Act to be included in the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

committee was intended, in Civil right’s activist function in the absence of its Prime Minister Manmohan Irom Chanu Sharmila enabling provisions.”

Singh’s words, “To suggest checks escorted by police Adding to the unending and balances in the Act or replace officers in New Delhi and utterly irrational debate it with a more humane law.” The on the AFSPA was the committee submitted its report to the Report of the Second Administrative government in June 2005 and it was widely Commission, headed by M. Veerappa propagated that the committee had Moily, which also concluded that the recommended a repeal of the AFSPA. AFSPA must be abrogated. Once again, While the contents of the report have never however, the Commission argued in been made public, significant details are favour of sweeping powers for the Centre now available. to deploy armed forces in the states and Crucially, the proposed ‘repeal’ was asked for the enabling provisions of this clearly intended as nothing but a sop and Act to be included in the Unlawful an eyewash to “erase the feeling of Activities (Prevention) Act. In effect, if the discrimination and alienation among the Jeevan Reddy Committee and the Moily people of the north-eastern States.” Commission are to be believed, the However, all the powers and provisions of dispute is only over a name not over the the Act were to be incorporated into the content of the legislation. wider Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 applicable to the whole country, so that The Army’s Argument “the complaint of discrimination would Meanwhile, as the demands for repeal or amendment of the AFSPA grow louder, then no longer be valid.”

Significantly, however, the then the Army leadership has entered the debate Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee had with, in the main, an equally incoherent rejected the withdrawal or significant defence of the Act on the grounds that any dilution of the Act on the grounds that, “...it dilution or withdrawal would impact directly is not possible for the armed forces to on operational effectiveness of the force.

8

Irom Sharmila’s stubborn courage cannot be denied nor can the fact of human rights violations in India. Indeed, Sharmila began her hunger strike after the infamous Malom incident of November 1, 2000 when ten civilians were killed at a bus stop in Imphal because soldiers suspected they were linked to an ambush of troops by rebels two days earlier. The brutal tragedy of Manorma Devi’s rape and killing and the shameful conduct of the Army leadership in its wake are equally inescapable.

The debate on the AFSPA, nevertheless, remains emotionally charged, polarised, often contra-factual and detracts from the essential character of the Act. It is necessary to recognise that no human rights violation or SF’s excesses enjoy even the slightest protection under this law. It is a matter of fact, moreover, that the presence or absence of the AFSPA has little to do with human rights abuses. For instance, between October 1993 and October 2009, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) registered 2,318 cases of custodial deaths across the country. Of these, Maharashtra accounted for the highest number (316) followed by Uttar Pradesh

(255), Gujarat (190), Bihar Former Defence Minister not the Army is to be deployed in particular areas of conflict.

(184) and West Bengal (164). Pranab Mukherjee Crucially, the constitutionality No part of any of these inspects a Guard of of the AFSPA and its various states is under the purview Honour during an provisions has been repeatedly of the AFSPA. On the other investiture ceremony examined and upheld by the hand, Manipur reported in New Delhi Supreme Court, especially in just 9 cases of custodial death and J&K, 12, over this period. great detail in the Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights vs. Union of India, 1997 where most of the misconceptions relating Content of the Law In view of the extraordinarily muddied to the AFSPA are explicitly treated. discourse on the issue, however, it is useful Critics of the AFSPA argue that powers to examine the real character and content of ‘arrest without warrant’ conferred by of the law, as against the caricature Section 4 (C) are ‘draconian’. The Supreme constructed by its committed opponents.

Court notes, however, that this power, “...is First, the AFSPA is essentially an enabling not very different from the power which legislation that confers minimal powers on has been conferred on a police officer the Army to operate in a situation of under Section 41 Cr PC. Moreover, Section 5 widespread internal disorder. Without the of the AFSPA puts a rider to this power, AFSPA or a comparable legislation—which requiring that any person so arrested confers necessary powers of search, seizure, should be handed over to the officer in arrest and engagement—the Army cannot charge of the nearest police station, with carry out internal security or counter- the “least possible delay.” Any detention insurgency operations under the law. beyond the “least possible delay”, any Consequently, the choice confronting custodial torture or other abuse, policy makers is not whether or not stet falls entirely outside the protection of AFSPA is to apply in situations of the Act and exposes perpetrators to insurgency and terrorism but whether or criminal prosecution.

9

”

It is claimed, however, that Section 6 of the Act confers ‘immunity’ against such prosecution. This contention, again, has been rejected by the Supreme Court, which notes that this provision which requires Central Government sanction for prosecution of Army personnel is similar to Section 197 Cr PC which covers an offence alleged to have been committed by any public servant, “while acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duties.” In other words, Section 6 only reiterates a provision that applies to all public servants.

It is useful to note that most terrorist and insurgent movements today create a large number of over-ground fronts on the human rights platform and these could immobilise the SFs with unfounded allegations and mischievous litigation, unless such a provision existed. There is, however, no immunity in case of any actual violation by Army personnel.

Significantly, the Army Chief General S.K. Singh disclosed on October 25, 2010 that 104 Army personnel, including 39 officers, had been punished for human rights violations in J&K since 1994. Instead of directing their ire against the AFSPA itself,

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AFP

Adding to the unending debate on the AFSPA was the Report of the Second Administrative Commission headed by M. Veerappa Moily, which also concluded that the AFSPA must be abrogated.

The commission argued in favour of sweeping powers for the Centre to deploy armed forces in the states and asked for the enabling provisions of this Act to be included in the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

committee was intended, in Civil right’s activist function in the absence of its Prime Minister Manmohan Irom Chanu Sharmila enabling provisions.”

Singh’s words, “To suggest checks escorted by police Adding to the unending and balances in the Act or replace officers in New Delhi and utterly irrational debate it with a more humane law.” The on the AFSPA was the committee submitted its report to the Report of the Second Administrative government in June 2005 and it was widely Commission, headed by M. Veerappa propagated that the committee had Moily, which also concluded that the recommended a repeal of the AFSPA. AFSPA must be abrogated. Once again, While the contents of the report have never however, the Commission argued in been made public, significant details are favour of sweeping powers for the Centre now available. to deploy armed forces in the states and Crucially, the proposed ‘repeal’ was asked for the enabling provisions of this clearly intended as nothing but a sop and Act to be included in the Unlawful an eyewash to “erase the feeling of Activities (Prevention) Act. In effect, if the discrimination and alienation among the Jeevan Reddy Committee and the Moily people of the north-eastern States.” Commission are to be believed, the However, all the powers and provisions of dispute is only over a name not over the the Act were to be incorporated into the content of the legislation. wider Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 applicable to the whole country, so that The Army’s Argument “the complaint of discrimination would Meanwhile, as the demands for repeal or amendment of the AFSPA grow louder, then no longer be valid.”

Significantly, however, the then the Army leadership has entered the debate Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee had with, in the main, an equally incoherent rejected the withdrawal or significant defence of the Act on the grounds that any dilution of the Act on the grounds that, “...it dilution or withdrawal would impact directly is not possible for the armed forces to on operational effectiveness of the force.

8

Irom Sharmila’s stubborn courage cannot be denied nor can the fact of human rights violations in India. Indeed, Sharmila began her hunger strike after the infamous Malom incident of November 1, 2000 when ten civilians were killed at a bus stop in Imphal because soldiers suspected they were linked to an ambush of troops by rebels two days earlier. The brutal tragedy of Manorma Devi’s rape and killing and the shameful conduct of the Army leadership in its wake are equally inescapable.

The debate on the AFSPA, nevertheless, remains emotionally charged, polarised, often contra-factual and detracts from the essential character of the Act. It is necessary to recognise that no human rights violation or SF’s excesses enjoy even the slightest protection under this law. It is a matter of fact, moreover, that the presence or absence of the AFSPA has little to do with human rights abuses. For instance, between October 1993 and October 2009, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) registered 2,318 cases of custodial deaths across the country. Of these, Maharashtra accounted for the highest number (316) followed by Uttar Pradesh

(255), Gujarat (190), Bihar Former Defence Minister not the Army is to be deployed in particular areas of conflict.

(184) and West Bengal (164). Pranab Mukherjee Crucially, the constitutionality No part of any of these inspects a Guard of of the AFSPA and its various states is under the purview Honour during an provisions has been repeatedly of the AFSPA. On the other investiture ceremony examined and upheld by the hand, Manipur reported in New Delhi Supreme Court, especially in just 9 cases of custodial death and J&K, 12, over this period. great detail in the Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights vs. Union of India, 1997 where most of the misconceptions relating Content of the Law In view of the extraordinarily muddied to the AFSPA are explicitly treated. discourse on the issue, however, it is useful Critics of the AFSPA argue that powers to examine the real character and content of ‘arrest without warrant’ conferred by of the law, as against the caricature Section 4 (C) are ‘draconian’. The Supreme constructed by its committed opponents.

Court notes, however, that this power, “...is First, the AFSPA is essentially an enabling not very different from the power which legislation that confers minimal powers on has been conferred on a police officer the Army to operate in a situation of under Section 41 Cr PC. Moreover, Section 5 widespread internal disorder. Without the of the AFSPA puts a rider to this power, AFSPA or a comparable legislation—which requiring that any person so arrested confers necessary powers of search, seizure, should be handed over to the officer in arrest and engagement—the Army cannot charge of the nearest police station, with carry out internal security or counter- the “least possible delay.” Any detention insurgency operations under the law. beyond the “least possible delay”, any Consequently, the choice confronting custodial torture or other abuse, policy makers is not whether or not stet falls entirely outside the protection of AFSPA is to apply in situations of the Act and exposes perpetrators to insurgency and terrorism but whether or criminal prosecution.

9

”

It is claimed, however, that Section 6 of the Act confers ‘immunity’ against such prosecution. This contention, again, has been rejected by the Supreme Court, which notes that this provision which requires Central Government sanction for prosecution of Army personnel is similar to Section 197 Cr PC which covers an offence alleged to have been committed by any public servant, “while acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duties.” In other words, Section 6 only reiterates a provision that applies to all public servants.

It is useful to note that most terrorist and insurgent movements today create a large number of over-ground fronts on the human rights platform and these could immobilise the SFs with unfounded allegations and mischievous litigation, unless such a provision existed. There is, however, no immunity in case of any actual violation by Army personnel.

Significantly, the Army Chief General S.K. Singh disclosed on October 25, 2010 that 104 Army personnel, including 39 officers, had been punished for human rights violations in J&K since 1994. Instead of directing their ire against the AFSPA itself,

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Paramilitary soldiers take position as they proceed to the Maoist-afflicted villages in Midnapore district in West Bengal

its critics would be more profitably engaged in highlighting specific human rights violations and raising a comparable clamour for sanction of prosecution of the guilty.

Significantly, in the Manorma Devi case, the Guwahati High Court eventually ordered the Manipur government to reopen the investigation. Clearly, while there may be a criminal conspiracy to cover up human right violations there is no ‘impunity’ under the Act. It is argued, further, that the powers of arrest, engagement, search and seizure, under Section 4 of the Act, can be exercised by a Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) and that conferring powers on an officer of such ‘inferior rank’ increases the likelihood of their misuse or abuse. This argument has also been rejected by the Supreme Court.

First, given the nature of deployment in counter-insurgency operations, they are usually carried out by a platoon, section or even a smaller team, units which cannot be headed by a commissioned officer.

Further, NCOs achieve their rank after an experience of between 8 and 15 years on the force and are considered mature persons, reasonably well versed with

Confusion on the need to make the AFSPA “more humane” has been further confounded by panicked and incoherent responses from the state and its agencies and from the highest offices of the land, including, in the recent past, repeated statements by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Jammu & Kashmir Chief Minister Omar Abdullah.

10

”

legal provisions. Generally, this criticism is based on the unawareness of the rank and responsibilities of officers at the level of havildars.

The Army is only deployed in areas of the most extraordinary violence or breakdown of law. In such circumstances, it must be equipped with a sufficient legal sanction if it is to operate effectively. The AFSPA is an enabling legislation that makes military operations possible in insurgency afflicted areas and as long as such operations are deemed a necessity the AFSPA or a comparable legislation will remain indispensable. Despite the deceptive recommendations of various government committees and commissions this is the inescapable conclusion each has reached.

The debate on the AFSPA has remained sentimental, misdirected and intellectually deficient. Human rights organisations have made the Act the symbol and embodiment of every real and imagined excess by all SFs. Their perspectives have substantially distorted public perceptions in a discourse that has been dominated by an ignorance of the law and a motivated neglect of the absence of any empirical links between its provisions and identifiable excesses.

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INCONVENIE NT TRUTHS The Indian political class, armed forces and the civil service establishment are yet to realise that the country lacks a national defence policy

K. SUBRAHMANYAM

KEY POINTS India has not had a coherent defence policy in the last six decades.

The issue of jointness in conceptualisation, operational and equipment planning, training and implementation of modern day military operations has not been addressed.

Currently, defence policy-making is adhoc; has very short-term relevance and is geared to be service-specific.

I

AFP

Paracommandos during Army Day parade in New Delhi

12

n 2001, the Indian Union Cabinet accepted the recommendations of the Group of Ministers (GoM) on reforming the national security system.

One part of this report proposed several new changes to the existing system of Military Intelligence (MI). While the report of the GoM was a result of the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee the need for reform in the Military Intelligence system has long been felt but inadequately addressed.

India is ranked as the fourth military power of the world. It has the thirdlargest Army next to China and the USA, the fourth-largest Air Force outranked only by the US, China and Russia, the tenth-largest Navy and is the world’s tenth-

13

biggest defence spender. It is also a nuclear and missile power.

In the last 63 years since Independence it had to fight four wars with its western neighbour and one with its northern neighbour. It has two nuclear adversaries between whom there has been an ongoing proliferation relationship for nearly three decades.

Both neighbours are revisionist states advancing territorial claims against India which is a status quo power. While India is the largest democracy in the world, pluralistic and secular, the two neighbours represent non-democratic forces: one represents the oligarchical philosophy and the other, an expansionist religious orthodoxy for which its Army claims to be the guardian. While one state has resorted to nuclear and missile proliferation as a strategy to expand its influence as a rising power to become the ‘Middle Kingdom’ of the world; the other has used terrorism as a derivative of nuclear deterrence.

In both countries, there has been advocacy to destabilise India and fragment it. Under these circumstances it is to be naturally expected that this country should have a vigilant and highly effective defence policy formulation and management.

But the harsh fact is that India has not had a coherent defence policy in the last six decades.

Policy is future and result-oriented to achieve certain goals and objectives. But

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DEFENCE POLICY

DECEMBER 2010

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INCONVENIE NT TRUTHS The Indian political class, armed forces and the civil service establishment are yet to realise that the country lacks a national defence policy

K. SUBRAHMANYAM

KEY POINTS India has not had a coherent defence policy in the last six decades.

The issue of jointness in conceptualisation, operational and equipment planning, training and implementation of modern day military operations has not been addressed.

Currently, defence policy-making is adhoc; has very short-term relevance and is geared to be service-specific.

I

AFP

Paracommandos during Army Day parade in New Delhi

12

n 2001, the Indian Union Cabinet accepted the recommendations of the Group of Ministers (GoM) on reforming the national security system.

One part of this report proposed several new changes to the existing system of Military Intelligence (MI). While the report of the GoM was a result of the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee the need for reform in the Military Intelligence system has long been felt but inadequately addressed.

India is ranked as the fourth military power of the world. It has the thirdlargest Army next to China and the USA, the fourth-largest Air Force outranked only by the US, China and Russia, the tenth-largest Navy and is the world’s tenth-

13

biggest defence spender. It is also a nuclear and missile power.

In the last 63 years since Independence it had to fight four wars with its western neighbour and one with its northern neighbour. It has two nuclear adversaries between whom there has been an ongoing proliferation relationship for nearly three decades.

Both neighbours are revisionist states advancing territorial claims against India which is a status quo power. While India is the largest democracy in the world, pluralistic and secular, the two neighbours represent non-democratic forces: one represents the oligarchical philosophy and the other, an expansionist religious orthodoxy for which its Army claims to be the guardian. While one state has resorted to nuclear and missile proliferation as a strategy to expand its influence as a rising power to become the ‘Middle Kingdom’ of the world; the other has used terrorism as a derivative of nuclear deterrence.

In both countries, there has been advocacy to destabilise India and fragment it. Under these circumstances it is to be naturally expected that this country should have a vigilant and highly effective defence policy formulation and management.

But the harsh fact is that India has not had a coherent defence policy in the last six decades.

Policy is future and result-oriented to achieve certain goals and objectives. But

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DEFENCE POLICY India has not had an effective defence policy because it lacks the basic structure and mechanism to formulate a long-term, future-oriented policy.

It has so far—except in 1962 against China—managed to repulse the aggressions launched against it on the basis of, partly, short-term preparedness measures and, partly, because of serious blunders committed by an overconfident adversary, Pakistan. The successes were achieved under conditions of force superiority in India’s favour.

The most damaging reality is that after 63 years of Independence the Indian political class, Parliament, the armed forces and the civil service establishment are yet to realise that the country lacks a national defence policymaking machinery and capacity.

What it has is the structure of the India command of the British Raj which was not a national policy-making one but was one of the theatre commands of the British Imperial defence system. Then all major decisions were taken in London and were communicated to Delhi for implementation.

DECEMBER 2010

The most damaging reality is that even after 63 years of Independence the Indian political class, Parliament, the armed forces and the civil service establishment have not realised that the country lacks a national defence policy-making machinery and capacity.

Unfortunately, this fundamental flaw in the system has not been recognised and there is no demand to rectify it.

DSI

A naval Chetak helicopter demonstrates a search and rescue mission as INS Ranjit sails in the Bay of Bengal

Fundamental Flaws

”

It is absurd to have an Army Chief of Staff commanding a million-strong Army and at the same time pretending to be attending to defence policy-making, planning and future force development.

He cannot find time for both tasks and the result is while he cannot neglect his immediate responsibilities of day-to-day running of the force he does not effectively and comprehensively focus on the essential task he has to perform as Chief of Staff, defence policy-making and defence planning.

Unfortunately, this fundamental flaw in the system has not been recognised and there is no demand to rectify it. Nor did our Service Chiefs, political establishment and civil servants draw the right conclusion from the fact that the field commanders, leading the armies during World War II in Britain, Germany and the US, were senior to the Chiefs of Staff and had direct access to the Defence Minister or the head of state.

This anomaly occurred because of our first generation Chiefs of Staff. The role model was Field Marshal Auchinleck, the

14

AFP

Post 1948, Lord Mountbatten and General Hastings Ismay did leave a framework to develop a national defence policy-making structure. However, in implementing it the Indian Service Chiefs, politicians and civil servants committed major mistakes which have not been rectified till today; even an awareness of the mistakes committed does not exist.

The cardinal mistake was flouting a basic principle that in any modern national defence organisation Chiefs of Staff cannot be in command of their respective forces.

The forces must be under the command of theatre commanders while the Chiefs of Staff become the principal professional advisers of the Defence Minister to whom the theatre commanders will report. All issues will be decided by the Defence Minister on the professional advice of the Chiefs of Staff. Such a system will enable the Chiefs of Staff to focus on defence policymaking, defence planning, procurement of equipment, human resource development and defence diplomacy while the administration, the day-to-day maintenance of the force operational planning and operational training will be handled by the theatre commanders. This is the practice in all modern armed forces especially very large-sized ones like India’s.

India theatre commander at the time of Independence, and not Field Marshal Alanbrooke, the then Chief of Imperial General Staff working in London.

The first generation senior officers were rapidly promoted to their ranks even though their knowledge and familiarity with national defence organisations elsewhere in the world was woefully inadequate. Therefore, they asked Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to enact a legislation that made the Chief of Staff the commander of forces and made the theatre commanders their direct subordinates.

That step prevented them from being an integral part of the government.

India is the only democratic country

where the armed forces headquarters is outside the government. It is a cardinal principle in democratic governance that a force commander should not be in a position to act in the name of the government but should be independent of and subordinate to it. That is civilian supremacy at the heart of democracy.

The Chiefs of Staff became the commanders of forces and the Defence Minister developed his own civilian secretariat consisting exclusively of civilians.

The Chiefs of Staff, as commanders, claimed the loyalty of every person in uniform and were in a position to determine the career progression of every one of them. What happened in the fifties is not the result of a

civil servant’s conspiracy, as the armed forces’ folklore has it, but sheer ignorance on the part of then Service Chiefs and the political establishment. The Indian Civil Service officers of the time were also too ignorant on defence matters to have provided any useful advice.

The mistake of the Service Chiefs was compounded by those of the political establishment and civil services. There was no attempt to develop a dedicated cadre of civil servants knowledgeable in defence matters. Once again, the culture of the Raj took over and generalism, that hallmark of the British Raj’s administration, became the culture of the Defence Ministry completely overlooking that a modern

15

defence apparatus cannot be run without adequate domain knowledge. Resultantly, many civilian defence ministers found it more comfortable to talk to a civilian bureaucrat than to a service officer.

If the armed forces headquarters is integrated with the Defence Ministry politicians and civil servants will not have an alibi that the armed forces are responsible for looking after the national security and for bringing issues to their notice, as and when necessary. The entire responsibility for national security policy and its management will be wholly that of the Cabinet Committee on Security, advised, within the governmental setup, by the Chiefs of Staff. The generalist civil

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Page 14

DEFENCE POLICY India has not had an effective defence policy because it lacks the basic structure and mechanism to formulate a long-term, future-oriented policy.

It has so far—except in 1962 against China—managed to repulse the aggressions launched against it on the basis of, partly, short-term preparedness measures and, partly, because of serious blunders committed by an overconfident adversary, Pakistan. The successes were achieved under conditions of force superiority in India’s favour.

The most damaging reality is that after 63 years of Independence the Indian political class, Parliament, the armed forces and the civil service establishment are yet to realise that the country lacks a national defence policymaking machinery and capacity.

What it has is the structure of the India command of the British Raj which was not a national policy-making one but was one of the theatre commands of the British Imperial defence system. Then all major decisions were taken in London and were communicated to Delhi for implementation.

DECEMBER 2010

The most damaging reality is that even after 63 years of Independence the Indian political class, Parliament, the armed forces and the civil service establishment have not realised that the country lacks a national defence policy-making machinery and capacity.

Unfortunately, this fundamental flaw in the system has not been recognised and there is no demand to rectify it.

DSI

A naval Chetak helicopter demonstrates a search and rescue mission as INS Ranjit sails in the Bay of Bengal

Fundamental Flaws

”

It is absurd to have an Army Chief of Staff commanding a million-strong Army and at the same time pretending to be attending to defence policy-making, planning and future force development.

He cannot find time for both tasks and the result is while he cannot neglect his immediate responsibilities of day-to-day running of the force he does not effectively and comprehensively focus on the essential task he has to perform as Chief of Staff, defence policy-making and defence planning.

Unfortunately, this fundamental flaw in the system has not been recognised and there is no demand to rectify it. Nor did our Service Chiefs, political establishment and civil servants draw the right conclusion from the fact that the field commanders, leading the armies during World War II in Britain, Germany and the US, were senior to the Chiefs of Staff and had direct access to the Defence Minister or the head of state.

This anomaly occurred because of our first generation Chiefs of Staff. The role model was Field Marshal Auchinleck, the

14

AFP

Post 1948, Lord Mountbatten and General Hastings Ismay did leave a framework to develop a national defence policy-making structure. However, in implementing it the Indian Service Chiefs, politicians and civil servants committed major mistakes which have not been rectified till today; even an awareness of the mistakes committed does not exist.

The cardinal mistake was flouting a basic principle that in any modern national defence organisation Chiefs of Staff cannot be in command of their respective forces.

The forces must be under the command of theatre commanders while the Chiefs of Staff become the principal professional advisers of the Defence Minister to whom the theatre commanders will report. All issues will be decided by the Defence Minister on the professional advice of the Chiefs of Staff. Such a system will enable the Chiefs of Staff to focus on defence policymaking, defence planning, procurement of equipment, human resource development and defence diplomacy while the administration, the day-to-day maintenance of the force operational planning and operational training will be handled by the theatre commanders. This is the practice in all modern armed forces especially very large-sized ones like India’s.

India theatre commander at the time of Independence, and not Field Marshal Alanbrooke, the then Chief of Imperial General Staff working in London.

The first generation senior officers were rapidly promoted to their ranks even though their knowledge and familiarity with national defence organisations elsewhere in the world was woefully inadequate. Therefore, they asked Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to enact a legislation that made the Chief of Staff the commander of forces and made the theatre commanders their direct subordinates.

That step prevented them from being an integral part of the government.

India is the only democratic country

where the armed forces headquarters is outside the government. It is a cardinal principle in democratic governance that a force commander should not be in a position to act in the name of the government but should be independent of and subordinate to it. That is civilian supremacy at the heart of democracy.

The Chiefs of Staff became the commanders of forces and the Defence Minister developed his own civilian secretariat consisting exclusively of civilians.

The Chiefs of Staff, as commanders, claimed the loyalty of every person in uniform and were in a position to determine the career progression of every one of them. What happened in the fifties is not the result of a

civil servant’s conspiracy, as the armed forces’ folklore has it, but sheer ignorance on the part of then Service Chiefs and the political establishment. The Indian Civil Service officers of the time were also too ignorant on defence matters to have provided any useful advice.

The mistake of the Service Chiefs was compounded by those of the political establishment and civil services. There was no attempt to develop a dedicated cadre of civil servants knowledgeable in defence matters. Once again, the culture of the Raj took over and generalism, that hallmark of the British Raj’s administration, became the culture of the Defence Ministry completely overlooking that a modern

15

defence apparatus cannot be run without adequate domain knowledge. Resultantly, many civilian defence ministers found it more comfortable to talk to a civilian bureaucrat than to a service officer.

If the armed forces headquarters is integrated with the Defence Ministry politicians and civil servants will not have an alibi that the armed forces are responsible for looking after the national security and for bringing issues to their notice, as and when necessary. The entire responsibility for national security policy and its management will be wholly that of the Cabinet Committee on Security, advised, within the governmental setup, by the Chiefs of Staff. The generalist civil

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DEFENCE POLICY

DECEMBER 2010

DSI

India is the only democratic country where the armed forces headquarters are outside the government. It is a cardinal principle in democratic governance that a force commander should not be in a position to act in the name of the government but should be independent of and subordinate to it.That is civilian supremacy at the heart of democracy.

Since the Chiefs of Staff became the commanders of forces, the Defence Minister developed his own civilian secretariat.

”

servants have very little of significance to contribute to the defence decision-making or policy formulation.

In the initial period of India’s Independence its defence policy, just as its foreign policy was made by one person— Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.

Its aim was to keep ahead of Pakistan in military capability, cultivate the Soviet Union as an insurance against China, and try to develop a defence production, research and development base. While within the overall grand strategy, called non-alignment, this policy proved itself Nehru failed to create an adequate institutional structure for policy formulation and management.

The culture of the armed forces headquarters was the command culture.

With Chiefs as the commander of the forces, a modern management culture required in the national security management was absent. Neither did Nehru pay any attention to train Service officers, civil servants and younger

the loss of nerve of its politicians in national security Defence Minister management nor did he have Y. B. Chavan with Indian Commander—a Military Cross and Mahavir Chakra. an adequate dialogue with Army officers in 1965 them on threat contingencies. (right) a Pakistani soldier In spite of the humiliation His strategy against China was during the Indo-Pak War of 1962, the right lessons were not wrong. He depended on not drawn. It is difficult to the USSR to restrain China as it did justify the failure of all subsequent Prime subsequently in 1971. But the Chinese chose Ministers, Defence Ministers and Army the time of the Cuban missile crisis to hit at Chiefs of Staff to develop a strategic India when a strategically preoccupied infrastructure in Arunachal Pradesh till a USSR could not intervene. few years ago.

During the Cold War defence policy making in India was relatively easy.

The Chinse Humiliation Our political leaders, intelligence Whenever the Soviet Union developed leadership and senior officers of the a new weapon system that was found armed forces had not developed applicable to the Indian context, the Services an adequate, sophisticated understanding moved to procure it. So the forces continued of international politics to anticipate that to be updated at the Soviet pace of the Chinese would humiliate India and modernisation. While that aspect of policy not occupy Arunachal Pradesh. Nor was taken care of when it came to could it be anticipated that the issues involving inter-Services coordination much celebrated Fourth Indian Division and future force planning there were which distinguished itself fighting major failures.

From the beginning till today, the against Rommel’s Afrika Corps would dissolve without a fight because of issue of jointness in conceptualisation,

16

operational and equipment planning; joint training and joint implementation of modern day military operations has not been addressed.

There have been many examples. In 1962, the Air Force was not used. In 1965, the Army went to war without telling the Air Force and consequently the Air Force suffered avoidable losses. In 1971, the Air Chief complained that the Army Chief was treating his Service as a subsidiary one.

During the Kargil war, there were controversies between the two Services.

Subsequently, there were unrealistic advocacies of cold start without addressing the issue of combined air-land operations.

A state of readiness of forces is yet another important area in which there was culpable negligence by the Services and the political executive.

The country was shocked by the statement of the then Army Chief during the Kargil War that the Army would fight with what it had. Was this not a colossal failure in defence policy and management?

Yet when the Kargil Committee Report suggested that the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) should have regular, institutionalised briefings the response was that when there was an issue or a development needing attention the concerned agency would bring it to the notice of the CCS. This reactive approach cannot meet the requirement of the 21st century defence policy-making or management. Effective defence policymaking dictates a proactive approach.

The Nuclear Era Yet another area in which the Services did not keep up with their professional skill and knowledge advancement was the nuclear issue. Though Nehru had quietly built up the country’s nuclear weapon production capability and though successive prime ministers pursued the programme clandestinely the Services were waiting to be told that they should be prepared for the nuclear age. Not every senior service officer adopted that line.

17

General K. Sundarji was able to make a unique contribution to the development of Indian nuclear strategic thought. But it was his personal contribution as a defence intellectual and not because of the Services. He initiated a debate on the issue as the Commandant of the College of Combat and came out with valuable publications contrary to the established traditions. But this was not followed up.

While Sundarji had some influence on India’s nuclear strategy and policy when she declared itself as a nuclear weapon state after the Shakti tests the armed forces had not thought through the issue of India’s nuclear policy and strategy.

When the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union folded up and ceased to be in a position to be the major provider of arms to India there was no attempt to formulate a strategy and policy on how India should keep itself adequately and effectively equipped as a major military power.

Today, the acquisition process is looked at equipment-wise. There has been no

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India is the only democratic country where the armed forces headquarters are outside the government. It is a cardinal principle in democratic governance that a force commander should not be in a position to act in the name of the government but should be independent of and subordinate to it.That is civilian supremacy at the heart of democracy.

Since the Chiefs of Staff became the commanders of forces, the Defence Minister developed his own civilian secretariat.

”

servants have very little of significance to contribute to the defence decision-making or policy formulation.

In the initial period of India’s Independence its defence policy, just as its foreign policy was made by one person— Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.

Its aim was to keep ahead of Pakistan in military capability, cultivate the Soviet Union as an insurance against China, and try to develop a defence production, research and development base. While within the overall grand strategy, called non-alignment, this policy proved itself Nehru failed to create an adequate institutional structure for policy formulation and management.

The culture of the armed forces headquarters was the command culture.

With Chiefs as the commander of the forces, a modern management culture required in the national security management was absent. Neither did Nehru pay any attention to train Service officers, civil servants and younger

the loss of nerve of its politicians in national security Defence Minister management nor did he have Y. B. Chavan with Indian Commander—a Military Cross and Mahavir Chakra. an adequate dialogue with Army officers in 1965 them on threat contingencies. (right) a Pakistani soldier In spite of the humiliation His strategy against China was during the Indo-Pak War of 1962, the right lessons were not wrong. He depended on not drawn. It is difficult to the USSR to restrain China as it did justify the failure of all subsequent Prime subsequently in 1971. But the Chinese chose Ministers, Defence Ministers and Army the time of the Cuban missile crisis to hit at Chiefs of Staff to develop a strategic India when a strategically preoccupied infrastructure in Arunachal Pradesh till a USSR could not intervene. few years ago.

During the Cold War defence policy making in India was relatively easy.

The Chinse Humiliation Our political leaders, intelligence Whenever the Soviet Union developed leadership and senior officers of the a new weapon system that was found armed forces had not developed applicable to the Indian context, the Services an adequate, sophisticated understanding moved to procure it. So the forces continued of international politics to anticipate that to be updated at the Soviet pace of the Chinese would humiliate India and modernisation. While that aspect of policy not occupy Arunachal Pradesh. Nor was taken care of when it came to could it be anticipated that the issues involving inter-Services coordination much celebrated Fourth Indian Division and future force planning there were which distinguished itself fighting major failures.

From the beginning till today, the against Rommel’s Afrika Corps would dissolve without a fight because of issue of jointness in conceptualisation,

16

operational and equipment planning; joint training and joint implementation of modern day military operations has not been addressed.

There have been many examples. In 1962, the Air Force was not used. In 1965, the Army went to war without telling the Air Force and consequently the Air Force suffered avoidable losses. In 1971, the Air Chief complained that the Army Chief was treating his Service as a subsidiary one.

During the Kargil war, there were controversies between the two Services.

Subsequently, there were unrealistic advocacies of cold start without addressing the issue of combined air-land operations.

A state of readiness of forces is yet another important area in which there was culpable negligence by the Services and the political executive.

The country was shocked by the statement of the then Army Chief during the Kargil War that the Army would fight with what it had. Was this not a colossal failure in defence policy and management?

Yet when the Kargil Committee Report suggested that the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) should have regular, institutionalised briefings the response was that when there was an issue or a development needing attention the concerned agency would bring it to the notice of the CCS. This reactive approach cannot meet the requirement of the 21st century defence policy-making or management. Effective defence policymaking dictates a proactive approach.

The Nuclear Era Yet another area in which the Services did not keep up with their professional skill and knowledge advancement was the nuclear issue. Though Nehru had quietly built up the country’s nuclear weapon production capability and though successive prime ministers pursued the programme clandestinely the Services were waiting to be told that they should be prepared for the nuclear age. Not every senior service officer adopted that line.

17

General K. Sundarji was able to make a unique contribution to the development of Indian nuclear strategic thought. But it was his personal contribution as a defence intellectual and not because of the Services. He initiated a debate on the issue as the Commandant of the College of Combat and came out with valuable publications contrary to the established traditions. But this was not followed up.

While Sundarji had some influence on India’s nuclear strategy and policy when she declared itself as a nuclear weapon state after the Shakti tests the armed forces had not thought through the issue of India’s nuclear policy and strategy.

When the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union folded up and ceased to be in a position to be the major provider of arms to India there was no attempt to formulate a strategy and policy on how India should keep itself adequately and effectively equipped as a major military power.

Today, the acquisition process is looked at equipment-wise. There has been no

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DECEMBER 2010

When the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union folded up and ceased to be in a position to be the major provider of arms to India, there was no attempt to formulate a strategy and policy on how India should keep itself adequately and effectively equipped as a major military power. Even now, the acquisition process is looked at equipment-wise.

18

”

AFP

That is why a significant assessment of the evolving Sukhoi aircraft being number of Chiefs of Staff international developments in used during an in the US become University the field of defence equipment exercise (right) dons and many others and defence technology. One can artillery soldiers fire became directors in highadd to the list of shortcomings: the 155mm Bofors tech companies. human resource development in guns in Kargil the armed forces and the creation of a comprehensive defence production ‘Super’ Chief base involving the private sector are other There has been a long pending demand issues which reveal acute policy deficits. that there should be a Chief of Defence Up to the end of World War II, it was Staff (CDS) in India and that will take care axiomatic that the armed forces took over of most of the problems of defence policy when the diplomats could not save peace formulation. The GoM set up for national and proceeded to win the war or frustrate security decision making reforms following the Kargil Committee Report endorsed this the enemy’s efforts.

However, after the dawn of the demand. The new government came close nuclear era that understanding needed to to appointing CDS. But finally, the view that a CDS in overall be revised. The role of the armed force in the nuclear age became essential on charge of all the three Services, with the how to prevent war from breaking out. Chiefs of Staff as commanders of forces For that purpose, the forces have to be would lead to a ‘Super’ Chief of forces, constantly ready exercising deterrence which would not be in harmony with our or dissuasion all the time. This is democratic structure appears to have achieved through a combination of prevailed. The Air Force as a Service was also appropriate weapon capabilities; force- opposed to it. level deployment patterns in one’s own The CDS specifically, never came into territory; development of infrastructure being. At the same time no initiative was exercises and defence diplomacy. This is a taken either by the Chiefs of Staff or the far more skilled task than the one government to relieve the Chiefs of Staff of performed in peacetime in the period their command functions and devolve before the World War II. It is also, in them to the Army commanders and their intellectual terms, a highly demanding role. equivalents in the other two Services.

As a compromise, an integrated Defence Staff was created to service the Chiefs of Staff Committee. While this is a marginal improvement over the previous situation, in the absence of an effective transformation of the offices of the Chiefs of Staff, from that of force commanders to chief defence planners and providers of inputs to defence policy-making, the integrated Defence Staff’s role is bound to be very limited. What this country needs is not a Chief of Defence Staff on the UK model but a Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee with a full-time chairperson on the US model. The role, responsibilities and the size of the Indian forces are closer to the US model than to the British one.

There have been two basic deficiencies in the defence policy-making process which have just started getting addressed and it will take some years before they will be fully remedied.

In mature democracies, defence policy will be derived from national strategy which in turn will be based on an assessment of long-term challenges to national security.

In India, intelligence assessments did not receive the attention they deserved.

When the National Security Council (NSC) was constituted in 1998, the post of chairperson Joint Intelligence Committee

19

DSI

was converted to be the head of the NSC secretariat and staff was diverted to man the new secretariat. It took some years for this decision to be reversed.

Secondly, there has been some resistance to decision makers getting regular briefings on intelligence. The Services intelligence directorates are not adequately equipped for long-term intelligence assessments and analyses but mostly for compilation. There have been no attempts to develop area specialisation in the Services intelligence directorates.

The Integrated Defence Staff has a net assessment directorate but for that to become fully effective thoughtful inputs are required from specialists. That highlights the need for think tanks.

When the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses was established as a Ministry-funded think tank the Chiefs of Staff Committee issued a directive forbidding service officers from having any contacts with it. It took two decades to get the Chiefs of Staff educated enough to get the ban lifted. It took another two decades before the Services realised that they needed think tanks and started financing service-specific think tanks. We have just arrived there and it will take more time for think tanks to develop their full potential and the relationship between the services and the think tanks to mature.

At present, defence policy-makingis adhoc; it has very short-term relevance and is geared to be service-specific.Two authors in the United States, Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, have brought out a study on India’s defence modernisation titled very aptly, Arming without Aiming.

The authors say that when India established the NSC there was an expectation that the policy of incoherence and absence of strategisation in defence would be addressed. Unfortunately, this has not happened since the NSC has not functioned as a strategy formulating and policy developing body.

As has happened in the case of the Chiefs of Staff overburdening themselves with responsibilities of commanding their Services at the expense of long-term planning and policy-making so did the first three National Security Advisors burden themselves with executive responsibility at the expense of ensuring that the NSC will be a strategising and policy formulating body.

There are some hopeful signs that this may change for the better.

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DECEMBER 2010

When the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union folded up and ceased to be in a position to be the major provider of arms to India, there was no attempt to formulate a strategy and policy on how India should keep itself adequately and effectively equipped as a major military power. Even now, the acquisition process is looked at equipment-wise.

18

”

AFP

That is why a significant assessment of the evolving Sukhoi aircraft being number of Chiefs of Staff international developments in used during an in the US become University the field of defence equipment exercise (right) dons and many others and defence technology. One can artillery soldiers fire became directors in highadd to the list of shortcomings: the 155mm Bofors tech companies. human resource development in guns in Kargil the armed forces and the creation of a comprehensive defence production ‘Super’ Chief base involving the private sector are other There has been a long pending demand issues which reveal acute policy deficits. that there should be a Chief of Defence Up to the end of World War II, it was Staff (CDS) in India and that will take care axiomatic that the armed forces took over of most of the problems of defence policy when the diplomats could not save peace formulation. The GoM set up for national and proceeded to win the war or frustrate security decision making reforms following the Kargil Committee Report endorsed this the enemy’s efforts.

However, after the dawn of the demand. The new government came close nuclear era that understanding needed to to appointing CDS. But finally, the view that a CDS in overall be revised. The role of the armed force in the nuclear age became essential on charge of all the three Services, with the how to prevent war from breaking out. Chiefs of Staff as commanders of forces For that purpose, the forces have to be would lead to a ‘Super’ Chief of forces, constantly ready exercising deterrence which would not be in harmony with our or dissuasion all the time. This is democratic structure appears to have achieved through a combination of prevailed. The Air Force as a Service was also appropriate weapon capabilities; force- opposed to it. level deployment patterns in one’s own The CDS specifically, never came into territory; development of infrastructure being. At the same time no initiative was exercises and defence diplomacy. This is a taken either by the Chiefs of Staff or the far more skilled task than the one government to relieve the Chiefs of Staff of performed in peacetime in the period their command functions and devolve before the World War II. It is also, in them to the Army commanders and their intellectual terms, a highly demanding role. equivalents in the other two Services.

As a compromise, an integrated Defence Staff was created to service the Chiefs of Staff Committee. While this is a marginal improvement over the previous situation, in the absence of an effective transformation of the offices of the Chiefs of Staff, from that of force commanders to chief defence planners and providers of inputs to defence policy-making, the integrated Defence Staff’s role is bound to be very limited. What this country needs is not a Chief of Defence Staff on the UK model but a Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee with a full-time chairperson on the US model. The role, responsibilities and the size of the Indian forces are closer to the US model than to the British one.

There have been two basic deficiencies in the defence policy-making process which have just started getting addressed and it will take some years before they will be fully remedied.

In mature democracies, defence policy will be derived from national strategy which in turn will be based on an assessment of long-term challenges to national security.

In India, intelligence assessments did not receive the attention they deserved.

When the National Security Council (NSC) was constituted in 1998, the post of chairperson Joint Intelligence Committee

19

DSI

was converted to be the head of the NSC secretariat and staff was diverted to man the new secretariat. It took some years for this decision to be reversed.

Secondly, there has been some resistance to decision makers getting regular briefings on intelligence. The Services intelligence directorates are not adequately equipped for long-term intelligence assessments and analyses but mostly for compilation. There have been no attempts to develop area specialisation in the Services intelligence directorates.

The Integrated Defence Staff has a net assessment directorate but for that to become fully effective thoughtful inputs are required from specialists. That highlights the need for think tanks.

When the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses was established as a Ministry-funded think tank the Chiefs of Staff Committee issued a directive forbidding service officers from having any contacts with it. It took two decades to get the Chiefs of Staff educated enough to get the ban lifted. It took another two decades before the Services realised that they needed think tanks and started financing service-specific think tanks. We have just arrived there and it will take more time for think tanks to develop their full potential and the relationship between the services and the think tanks to mature.

At present, defence policy-makingis adhoc; it has very short-term relevance and is geared to be service-specific.Two authors in the United States, Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, have brought out a study on India’s defence modernisation titled very aptly, Arming without Aiming.

The authors say that when India established the NSC there was an expectation that the policy of incoherence and absence of strategisation in defence would be addressed. Unfortunately, this has not happened since the NSC has not functioned as a strategy formulating and policy developing body.

As has happened in the case of the Chiefs of Staff overburdening themselves with responsibilities of commanding their Services at the expense of long-term planning and policy-making so did the first three National Security Advisors burden themselves with executive responsibility at the expense of ensuring that the NSC will be a strategising and policy formulating body.

There are some hopeful signs that this may change for the better.

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DECEMBER 2010

LOW EXPECTATIONS

ARUN KUMAR SINGH

If Indian sea power has to meet challenges of 2030 the Navy’s budget will need to be tripled

KEY POINTS

In the absence of long-term national security and defence goals and a joint mission statement each service is projecting its requirement by indulging in crystal-ball gazing.

It is more economical and effective for the Navy to induct smaller, more efficient vessels.

Despite an apparently impressive line-up of about 40 ships and submarines, on order, the IN is in reality a shrinking force.

I

AFP

A sailor walks past the Indian Navy's newly commissioned warship INS Shivalik in Mumbai

20

DSI

21

ndia is perhaps the only major country in the world without a written government document that clearly indicates its national goals, along with time frames, by which certain developmental and security milestones should be met.

The enunciation of such objectives is crucial because from national goals flow national security and defence goals, from which follow force levels and force architecture. In the absence of such a document, and also, importantly, in the absence of a Chief of Defence Staff and a joint mission statement, each service, per force, is projecting its own requirements, based, largely, on individual crystal-ball gazing.

It is against this background that a brief summary of India’s maritime force requirements in 2030 needs to be outlined given the fact that by then China is expected to achieve a limited two ocean (Pacific and Indian Oceans) Navy capability.

Only consider the threat that emanates in peace time from maritime terror and piracy to India’s seaborne trade—which forms 90 percent of our international trade—offshore oil rigs and coastal areas.

Countering the possibilities of such threats requires a different kind of force structure (which is generally considered to be ‘cheaper’than the heavy duty, blue water platform aircraft carriers and submarines.

Deploying expensive warships, which cost over Rs 5,000 crore each, is not cost effective. It is more economical and effective to induct smaller, more efficient craft.

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MODERNISATION

DECEMBER 2010

LOW EXPECTATIONS

ARUN KUMAR SINGH

If Indian sea power has to meet challenges of 2030 the Navy’s budget will need to be tripled

KEY POINTS

In the absence of long-term national security and defence goals and a joint mission statement each service is projecting its requirement by indulging in crystal-ball gazing.

It is more economical and effective for the Navy to induct smaller, more efficient vessels.

Despite an apparently impressive line-up of about 40 ships and submarines, on order, the IN is in reality a shrinking force.

I

AFP

A sailor walks past the Indian Navy's newly commissioned warship INS Shivalik in Mumbai

20

DSI

21

ndia is perhaps the only major country in the world without a written government document that clearly indicates its national goals, along with time frames, by which certain developmental and security milestones should be met.

The enunciation of such objectives is crucial because from national goals flow national security and defence goals, from which follow force levels and force architecture. In the absence of such a document, and also, importantly, in the absence of a Chief of Defence Staff and a joint mission statement, each service, per force, is projecting its own requirements, based, largely, on individual crystal-ball gazing.

It is against this background that a brief summary of India’s maritime force requirements in 2030 needs to be outlined given the fact that by then China is expected to achieve a limited two ocean (Pacific and Indian Oceans) Navy capability.

Only consider the threat that emanates in peace time from maritime terror and piracy to India’s seaborne trade—which forms 90 percent of our international trade—offshore oil rigs and coastal areas.

Countering the possibilities of such threats requires a different kind of force structure (which is generally considered to be ‘cheaper’than the heavy duty, blue water platform aircraft carriers and submarines.

Deploying expensive warships, which cost over Rs 5,000 crore each, is not cost effective. It is more economical and effective to induct smaller, more efficient craft.

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MODERNISATION

DECEMBER 2010

ASSETS, ACQUISITIONS AND SHORTFALLS

2 aircraft carriers (INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant) are due for induction in 2012 and 2015 respectively. A proposal for a third, a 65,000 tonne-aircraft carrier, is on the anvil.

16 MIG 29 K carrier-borne fighters are under induction, with orders placed with Russia for another 29 more. The naval version of the Light Combat Aircraft, if successful, will equip another two fighter squadrons.

1 SSBN (Arihant) is undergoing pre-harbour trial checks and its inductiondate, post-sea trials, is likely to be after 2012.

1Akula type SSN (INS Chakra) is expected to be inducted from Russia early 2011 on a ten-year lease.

Six Scorpene class conventional submarines (project 75) under construction in Mazagon Dock Limited, are eight to nine years behind schedule, with the first likely to be inducted by about 2014. By this time our submarine force levels will be at 40 percent of existing and 25 percent of the required strength. The case for a second conventional submarine production line is about 12 years behind schedule. Though the contract maybe signed, there is an urgent need to buy at least six conventional submarines.

AFP

Three Talwar class frigates are being built in Russia, while half a dozen destroyers (7,000 tonnes each) and frigates (4,000 tonnes each) and eight Anti-Submarine Warfare, 2,800 tonne-Corvettes, are being built in India.

Since our shipyards are already overbooked, there is a need to import another half a dozen frigates.

12 Hovercrafts—to be imported With this thinking, the Members of the Sikh Indian Navy (IN) is now in Light Infantry watch as from the United Kingdom; 12 the process of inducting a the Interceptor craft of Dornier aircraft manufactured by few indigenous, long range, the Indian Coast Guard Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and some new coastal radar helicopter-capable, offshore motors off the stations. This is apart from patrol vessels (OPVs). At the Porbandar coast commissioning new coastal ICG cost of about Rs 300 crore each of these vessels are useful for coastal stations in Veraval, Ratnagiri, Murud security and for protecting crucial offshore Janjira and Hut Bay (Andamans). oil rigs. To be sure, a dozen more such OPVs need to be inducted both by the IN and Securing Security Indian Coast Guard (ICG) but it’s a start.

The Indian Marine Police (IMP), like the Post 26/11, the IN assumed charge of the ICG, is responsible for security within 12 country’s overall coastal security and in nautical miles of territorial limits. It too, is order to make it an effective force new getting a makeover with the addition of vessels are being introduced gradually. The 300-odd small patrol boats (both 5 tonne long neglected ICG, with a measly strength and 12 tonne) and with over a hundred of 60 vessels and 45 aircraft, is also finally new coastal IMP stations. In addition, getting governmental approval to add to its Indian customs, now equipped with 109 inventory. The list includes 160 patrol craft, new, five-tonne boats, is also contributing ranging from 10-tonne Interceptor craft to to coastal security. Also helping in this task 2000-tonne pollution control vessels (PCVs) are the country’s countless fishermen, to 2,300 tonne OPVs—all built in Indian designated the “eyes and ears” of the shipyards. Additional inductions include nation. It is estimated, that the fisherfolk

22

own 300,000 small vintage fishing boats along with about 600 modern sea going trawlers.

The ICG has also been co-coordinating all security activities related to India’s territorial waters and liaising with various stakeholders. But the overlap of the ICG (which falls under the Ministry of Defence) and the IMP (which falls under the Ministry of Home Affairs) is not an ideal solution: both forces perform exactly the same security function in the same territorial waters and therefore end up having extensive, and basically avoidable, co-ordination meetings. It would be far more cost effective and time-efficient to have IMP merge with the ICG. The security of offshore oil rigs, which supplies about 3 percent of India’s oil and gas requirements, a highly specialised task, falls to a naval two-star officer designated as FODAG (Flag Officer Defence Advisory Group). In peace time, the offshore oil rigs, valued at over Rs 140,000 crore, require

The Navy’s maritime surveillance capability based on a few aging Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) will get a slight boost with expected induction by 2012-15 of 12 P-8I Boeing aircraft and a few more long-range UAVs. However, at least two more surveillance and communications satellites will be needed; one communications satellite will be available in 2011. The Indian regional GPS system which is expected to be ready by 2015 will help in navigation and precision strikes.

constant protection against seaborne terror attacks. To preempt these attacks, constant air and sea patrols are carried out by the IN and ICG. The IN has also been authorised to set up a 2,000-man Sagar Prahari Dal equipped with 85 small (15 tonne) patrol boats to provide security to ports and offshore oil rigs.

However, the new force structure is grossly inadequate and needs to be tripled, even for peacetime anti-terror security needs. During war time especially, rigs need to be constantly protected against attacks by enemy aircraft, ships, submarines and saboteurs: an activity that requires very expensive defence architecture along with real time situational awareness.

Future Scenario With regard to future IN operations— peace-time flag showing, humanitarian missions, deterring conventional war, fighting conventional war and strategic deterrence—perhaps it is necessary to

indulge in a little bit of crystal-ball gazing and to see whether we can cope against potential threats in 2030, especially since building a Navy takes about 20 years.

By 2030, it is believed, that the Chinese Navy will have three aircraft carriers, a dozen nuclear attack submarines (SSNs), along with a dozen nuclear strategic submarines (SSBNs), a hundred conventional submarines and numerous frigates and destroyers which will allow for blue water operations in the Pacific Ocean with regular forays in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

Ten years earlier, by 2020, China will also be an aerospace power and greatly enhance its sea power by using spacebased surveillance and communications systems. In addition, it will continue to support its two nuclear armed proxies (Pakistan and North Korea) with military hardware. Some of the ports that have already been outlined in the so-called String of Pearls , the Chinese sea lines of

23

DSI

We will need three aircraft carriers, six nuclear strategic submarines (each with 12 ballistic missiles having a 5,000 kmrange), 12 nuclear attack submarines, 18 conventional submarines, 12 tankers (presently, we have only two with two more on order) and 18 mine hunters by 2020.

”

communication which extend from Sudan and Hong Kong, are sure to become Chinese naval bases.

The Chinese presence in Pakistan is already very strong. There are 9,000-odd Chinese troops stationed in the PoK and Pakistan has announced that it is terminating its 40-year contract (signed in 2005) for running the Gwadar port with the Port of Singapore Authority. This year it will be handing over the port to China. Thus Gwadar will become a de facto Chinese naval base, located a mere 360 nautical miles from the Straits of Hormuz. Here, it needs to be noted, that with China importing 50 percent of its oil from the Middle East soon the Chinese will have an oil pipeline running directly from Gwadar to Xinjiang, through the proposed Karokaram Highway.

By 2030 then, potentially, Chinese warships, submarines and trawlers which have great range and make excellent intelligence gathering platforms, could be making regular forays into the IOR. This could lead to incidents or clashes at sea, already seen in two similar incidents in 2010. The first took place in March 27, 2010, called the Yellow Sea incident, where a 1,200-tonne South Korean war ship was sunk by a North Korean submarine. No retaliation was possible despite proof against China’s proxy perhaps because it is an estabalished nuclear-armed power. Any reaction it has forced could have initiated war in the region.

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MODERNISATION

DECEMBER 2010

ASSETS, ACQUISITIONS AND SHORTFALLS

2 aircraft carriers (INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant) are due for induction in 2012 and 2015 respectively. A proposal for a third, a 65,000 tonne-aircraft carrier, is on the anvil.

16 MIG 29 K carrier-borne fighters are under induction, with orders placed with Russia for another 29 more. The naval version of the Light Combat Aircraft, if successful, will equip another two fighter squadrons.

1 SSBN (Arihant) is undergoing pre-harbour trial checks and its inductiondate, post-sea trials, is likely to be after 2012.

1Akula type SSN (INS Chakra) is expected to be inducted from Russia early 2011 on a ten-year lease.

Six Scorpene class conventional submarines (project 75) under construction in Mazagon Dock Limited, are eight to nine years behind schedule, with the first likely to be inducted by about 2014. By this time our submarine force levels will be at 40 percent of existing and 25 percent of the required strength. The case for a second conventional submarine production line is about 12 years behind schedule. Though the contract maybe signed, there is an urgent need to buy at least six conventional submarines.

AFP

Three Talwar class frigates are being built in Russia, while half a dozen destroyers (7,000 tonnes each) and frigates (4,000 tonnes each) and eight Anti-Submarine Warfare, 2,800 tonne-Corvettes, are being built in India.

Since our shipyards are already overbooked, there is a need to import another half a dozen frigates.

12 Hovercrafts—to be imported With this thinking, the Members of the Sikh Indian Navy (IN) is now in Light Infantry watch as from the United Kingdom; 12 the process of inducting a the Interceptor craft of Dornier aircraft manufactured by few indigenous, long range, the Indian Coast Guard Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and some new coastal radar helicopter-capable, offshore motors off the stations. This is apart from patrol vessels (OPVs). At the Porbandar coast commissioning new coastal ICG cost of about Rs 300 crore each of these vessels are useful for coastal stations in Veraval, Ratnagiri, Murud security and for protecting crucial offshore Janjira and Hut Bay (Andamans). oil rigs. To be sure, a dozen more such OPVs need to be inducted both by the IN and Securing Security Indian Coast Guard (ICG) but it’s a start.

The Indian Marine Police (IMP), like the Post 26/11, the IN assumed charge of the ICG, is responsible for security within 12 country’s overall coastal security and in nautical miles of territorial limits. It too, is order to make it an effective force new getting a makeover with the addition of vessels are being introduced gradually. The 300-odd small patrol boats (both 5 tonne long neglected ICG, with a measly strength and 12 tonne) and with over a hundred of 60 vessels and 45 aircraft, is also finally new coastal IMP stations. In addition, getting governmental approval to add to its Indian customs, now equipped with 109 inventory. The list includes 160 patrol craft, new, five-tonne boats, is also contributing ranging from 10-tonne Interceptor craft to to coastal security. Also helping in this task 2000-tonne pollution control vessels (PCVs) are the country’s countless fishermen, to 2,300 tonne OPVs—all built in Indian designated the “eyes and ears” of the shipyards. Additional inductions include nation. It is estimated, that the fisherfolk

22

own 300,000 small vintage fishing boats along with about 600 modern sea going trawlers.

The ICG has also been co-coordinating all security activities related to India’s territorial waters and liaising with various stakeholders. But the overlap of the ICG (which falls under the Ministry of Defence) and the IMP (which falls under the Ministry of Home Affairs) is not an ideal solution: both forces perform exactly the same security function in the same territorial waters and therefore end up having extensive, and basically avoidable, co-ordination meetings. It would be far more cost effective and time-efficient to have IMP merge with the ICG. The security of offshore oil rigs, which supplies about 3 percent of India’s oil and gas requirements, a highly specialised task, falls to a naval two-star officer designated as FODAG (Flag Officer Defence Advisory Group). In peace time, the offshore oil rigs, valued at over Rs 140,000 crore, require

The Navy’s maritime surveillance capability based on a few aging Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) will get a slight boost with expected induction by 2012-15 of 12 P-8I Boeing aircraft and a few more long-range UAVs. However, at least two more surveillance and communications satellites will be needed; one communications satellite will be available in 2011. The Indian regional GPS system which is expected to be ready by 2015 will help in navigation and precision strikes.

constant protection against seaborne terror attacks. To preempt these attacks, constant air and sea patrols are carried out by the IN and ICG. The IN has also been authorised to set up a 2,000-man Sagar Prahari Dal equipped with 85 small (15 tonne) patrol boats to provide security to ports and offshore oil rigs.

However, the new force structure is grossly inadequate and needs to be tripled, even for peacetime anti-terror security needs. During war time especially, rigs need to be constantly protected against attacks by enemy aircraft, ships, submarines and saboteurs: an activity that requires very expensive defence architecture along with real time situational awareness.

Future Scenario With regard to future IN operations— peace-time flag showing, humanitarian missions, deterring conventional war, fighting conventional war and strategic deterrence—perhaps it is necessary to

indulge in a little bit of crystal-ball gazing and to see whether we can cope against potential threats in 2030, especially since building a Navy takes about 20 years.

By 2030, it is believed, that the Chinese Navy will have three aircraft carriers, a dozen nuclear attack submarines (SSNs), along with a dozen nuclear strategic submarines (SSBNs), a hundred conventional submarines and numerous frigates and destroyers which will allow for blue water operations in the Pacific Ocean with regular forays in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

Ten years earlier, by 2020, China will also be an aerospace power and greatly enhance its sea power by using spacebased surveillance and communications systems. In addition, it will continue to support its two nuclear armed proxies (Pakistan and North Korea) with military hardware. Some of the ports that have already been outlined in the so-called String of Pearls , the Chinese sea lines of

23

DSI

We will need three aircraft carriers, six nuclear strategic submarines (each with 12 ballistic missiles having a 5,000 kmrange), 12 nuclear attack submarines, 18 conventional submarines, 12 tankers (presently, we have only two with two more on order) and 18 mine hunters by 2020.

”

communication which extend from Sudan and Hong Kong, are sure to become Chinese naval bases.

The Chinese presence in Pakistan is already very strong. There are 9,000-odd Chinese troops stationed in the PoK and Pakistan has announced that it is terminating its 40-year contract (signed in 2005) for running the Gwadar port with the Port of Singapore Authority. This year it will be handing over the port to China. Thus Gwadar will become a de facto Chinese naval base, located a mere 360 nautical miles from the Straits of Hormuz. Here, it needs to be noted, that with China importing 50 percent of its oil from the Middle East soon the Chinese will have an oil pipeline running directly from Gwadar to Xinjiang, through the proposed Karokaram Highway.

By 2030 then, potentially, Chinese warships, submarines and trawlers which have great range and make excellent intelligence gathering platforms, could be making regular forays into the IOR. This could lead to incidents or clashes at sea, already seen in two similar incidents in 2010. The first took place in March 27, 2010, called the Yellow Sea incident, where a 1,200-tonne South Korean war ship was sunk by a North Korean submarine. No retaliation was possible despite proof against China’s proxy perhaps because it is an estabalished nuclear-armed power. Any reaction it has forced could have initiated war in the region.

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MODERNISATION By 2030, it is believed, that the Chinese Navy will have three aircraft carriers, a dozen nuclear attack submarines, along with a dozen nuclear strategic submarines , a hundred conventional submarines and numerous frigates and destroyers which will allow for blue water operations in the Pacific Ocean.

”

AFP

The second incident took place on October 27, 2010 in the disputed Senkaku Islands. Then a Chinese trawler deliberately collided with a Japanese Coast Guard ship. Its crew was arrested leading to a Japanese stand-off with China which resulted in temporarily suspending export of ‘rare earth materials’ to Japan and the arrest of three Japanese businessmen on charges of spying. Relations did not get onto an even keel till the Chinese trawler and its crew were released.

Shrinking Force However, the truth is that despite an apparently impressive line-up of about 40 ships and submarines on order, the IN is in reality a shrinking force, due to aging ships and submarines getting phased out at a faster rate then new inductions. The IN is in urgent need of more assets and manpower. Fortunately, some vessels are already in the pipeline (see box). And the good news is that India has also recently signed an agreement with Vietnam to use Haiphong port for logistics.

However, our experience in the Gulf of Aden anti-piracy patrols shows that to have even single IN warship present in the South and East China seas will require the current strength of IN frigates and destroyers to be doubled by about 36 units.

Similarly, we will need three aircraft carriers, six SSBNs (each with 12 ballistic missiles having 5,000 km range), 12 SSNs, 18 conventional submarines, four LPDs 20,000-

an ICG will quite simply need to tonne amphibious warfare ships, Chinese sailors be tripled. This might be difficult for the defence of our 1,197 islands stand on a given the equally important and humanitarian missions warship at a port competing requirements of the abroad, 12 tankers (presently, we in east China Army, Indian Air Force and other have only two with two more on security agencies. order) and 18 mine hunters.

In such a scenario the answer lies Additionally, the marine commandos strength needs to be doubled and there is a in deciding which items are absolutely need to have three brigades of regular essential and which can be delayed by a few marines. In addition, while the IN will have years with this loophole being temporarily its own dedicated satellite for data link compensated by a viable nuclear weapons shortly, we need to become a genuine aero- policy based on the presence of over 300 space power by 2020, so that the full nuclear warheads—Pakistan has about a benefits of space exploitation are made 100 and China more than 240 nuclear weapons. Perhaps our “no first use” available to Indian sea power. Also, additional naval bases will need to be set up nuclear weapons policy needs to be on both our coasts and some of our islands changed to cater for a combined Chinaneed to be made into “unsinkable aircraft Pak- terrorist threat. carriers” with dedicated surveillance and But overall a fresh look needs to be fighter aircraft based on them. taken at the requirements of the Indian If Indian sea power has to meet the Navy if Indian sea power is to become a challenges after 2030 the budgets of the IN force to reckon with.

24

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DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA

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DSI

ARMED FORCES SPECIAL POWERS ACT

MUDDIED DISCOURSE

The debate that is raging on AFPSA detracts from the essential character of the Act I Ajai Sahni SECURITY

CYBER CHALLENGES Although a global IT power, India lacks a comprehensive national cybersecurity policy I Subimal Bhattarcharya DECEMBER 2010

India’s only magazine on national security, strategic affairs & policy matters.

Focuses on defence & security issues through insightful & analytical articles on defence policy, procurement, terrorism, insurgency & border management

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SECURITY

DECEMBER 2010

DSI

Although considered globally as an IT power India lacks a comprehensive security policy to check cybercrimes

Security forces patrol Jawaharlal Nehru Stadium during the Commonwealth Games held in Delhi

SUBIMAL BHATTACHARJEE

KEY POINTS

India is confronted with three negative elements of cyberspace— essentially cybercrimes, cyberterrorism and cyberwarfare.

An effective national cybersecurity policy should have a multi-pronged approach covering institutions, infrastructure and legislation.

Cyberspace has been flooded with various cybercrimes and cyberattacks that have raised societal and e-commerce concerns and has become a sought-after tool by terrorists.

AFP

D

CYBER CHALLENGES 26

uring the Commonwealth Games in New Delhi, which was by far the most information technology network-enabled event that the country has hosted, not many know how there were over 5,000 attempts of cyberattacks to derail the networks. Almost 1,000 of them were of a serious nature. The six networks that constituted the complete IT ecosystem had over 3,000 computers, 2,000 networking switches and 3,000 closed-circuit televisions (CCTVs) besides the wires and wireless systems. The control room that manned these networks monitored traffic and data round-the-clock and the officials and private sector executives worked in tandem to prevent any of those 1,000 attacks bringing down the system.

This scenario is not rare and has become a regular phenomenon in cyberspace, which refers to the virtual community space, facilitated mainly by the medium of internet and the interaction therein by people and the emerging technology.

With all the advantages and changes that have been ushered in, cyberspace has today become flooded with various cybercrimes and cyberattacks which have not only raised societal and e-commerce concerns but have also become a sought-after tool by terrorists and many states and non-state actors for launching cyberwarfare. Today,

27

we are confronted with three negative elements of cyberspace—cybercrimes, cyberterrorism and cyberwarfare.

India is a country vulnerable to cyberattacks in all of the above mentioned three forms. With rising internet penetration of 6.9 percent of the total population, although mostly confined to urban areas, cyberattacks both on the individual, corporate and societal levels are on the rise.

With more internet usage, cybercrimes are also increasing expotentially. According to the statistics given by the Computer Emergency Response Team India (CERT IN), there have been 8,266 reported incidents in 2009 compared to 2,565 incidents the previous year.

Some of the most common form of attacks being undertaken today at an increasing level of frequency and sophistication are planting of malwares like malicious viruses, worms and Trojan horses and distributed denial of service attacks (DDOS) whereby a large number of computers—both compromised and uncompromised—are used to launch attacks at targetted networks for predetermined periods. Additionally, there is hacking, which refers to the unauthorised access to networks and accounts. The targets vary from individuals to banks and to governments.

Incidentally, website compromise and malware propagation happens to be the most prominent form of cybercrime in the country for the last couple of years followed by virus propagation and phishing.

But perhaps the biggest threat to India is the usage of cyberattack tools by terrorists and their sympathisers. The 26/11 Mumbai attacks, the bomb blasts in Delhi in September 2008, Ahmedabad and Bangalore in August 2008, Jaipur in May 2008, the blasts in Varanasi in March 2006, Hyderabad in August 2007 and the serial blasts in Uttar Pradesh in November 2007 all had trails that lead to some activity in cyberspace. The emails sent before the blasts in Delhi and Ahmedabad especially

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SECURITY

DECEMBER 2010

DSI

Although considered globally as an IT power India lacks a comprehensive security policy to check cybercrimes

Security forces patrol Jawaharlal Nehru Stadium during the Commonwealth Games held in Delhi

SUBIMAL BHATTACHARJEE

KEY POINTS

India is confronted with three negative elements of cyberspace— essentially cybercrimes, cyberterrorism and cyberwarfare.

An effective national cybersecurity policy should have a multi-pronged approach covering institutions, infrastructure and legislation.

Cyberspace has been flooded with various cybercrimes and cyberattacks that have raised societal and e-commerce concerns and has become a sought-after tool by terrorists.

AFP

D

CYBER CHALLENGES 26

uring the Commonwealth Games in New Delhi, which was by far the most information technology network-enabled event that the country has hosted, not many know how there were over 5,000 attempts of cyberattacks to derail the networks. Almost 1,000 of them were of a serious nature. The six networks that constituted the complete IT ecosystem had over 3,000 computers, 2,000 networking switches and 3,000 closed-circuit televisions (CCTVs) besides the wires and wireless systems. The control room that manned these networks monitored traffic and data round-the-clock and the officials and private sector executives worked in tandem to prevent any of those 1,000 attacks bringing down the system.

This scenario is not rare and has become a regular phenomenon in cyberspace, which refers to the virtual community space, facilitated mainly by the medium of internet and the interaction therein by people and the emerging technology.

With all the advantages and changes that have been ushered in, cyberspace has today become flooded with various cybercrimes and cyberattacks which have not only raised societal and e-commerce concerns but have also become a sought-after tool by terrorists and many states and non-state actors for launching cyberwarfare. Today,

27

we are confronted with three negative elements of cyberspace—cybercrimes, cyberterrorism and cyberwarfare.

India is a country vulnerable to cyberattacks in all of the above mentioned three forms. With rising internet penetration of 6.9 percent of the total population, although mostly confined to urban areas, cyberattacks both on the individual, corporate and societal levels are on the rise.

With more internet usage, cybercrimes are also increasing expotentially. According to the statistics given by the Computer Emergency Response Team India (CERT IN), there have been 8,266 reported incidents in 2009 compared to 2,565 incidents the previous year.

Some of the most common form of attacks being undertaken today at an increasing level of frequency and sophistication are planting of malwares like malicious viruses, worms and Trojan horses and distributed denial of service attacks (DDOS) whereby a large number of computers—both compromised and uncompromised—are used to launch attacks at targetted networks for predetermined periods. Additionally, there is hacking, which refers to the unauthorised access to networks and accounts. The targets vary from individuals to banks and to governments.

Incidentally, website compromise and malware propagation happens to be the most prominent form of cybercrime in the country for the last couple of years followed by virus propagation and phishing.

But perhaps the biggest threat to India is the usage of cyberattack tools by terrorists and their sympathisers. The 26/11 Mumbai attacks, the bomb blasts in Delhi in September 2008, Ahmedabad and Bangalore in August 2008, Jaipur in May 2008, the blasts in Varanasi in March 2006, Hyderabad in August 2007 and the serial blasts in Uttar Pradesh in November 2007 all had trails that lead to some activity in cyberspace. The emails sent before the blasts in Delhi and Ahmedabad especially

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SECURITY

DECEMBER 2010

DSI

In February 2009, there were reports of over 600 computers of the Ministry of External Affairs being hacked and the outgoing National Security Advisor, M. K. Narayan, had clearly stated this January that China was behind the cyberattacks on Indian networks, including his office.

Policemen outside Parliament during the December 13, 2001 attack

28

AFP

AFP

”

showed the meticulous planned usage of cyberspace by terrorists making it almost impossible to nab the senders of those emails. Even the attack on Parliament in December 2001 had a cyber angle to it.

Equally dangerous is the scenario where foreign state and non-state actors have started to attack and probe Indian networks recently. In the last few years, there have been instances where traces have pointed to a few countries that generally have not been favorable to India. Pakistan sponsored hackers have been targeting sensitive Indian networks for over a decade now although they have fallen much behind Chinese misadventures in cyberspace.

China has been regularly identified by many countries, including India, for being responsible for attacks on their networks.

In February 2009, there were reports that over 600 computers of the Ministry of External Affairs being hacked and the outgoing National Security Advisor M. K. Narayan had clearly stated this January that China was behind the cyberattacks, which included attacks on his office. To combat the growing onslaught of cyberattacks many nations are pursuing active and strategically fitted cyberwarfare programmes.

Though globally the menace of cyberattacks is being understood at various levels, yet India does not have a comprehensive national cyber-security

secretaries in the Central strategy that encompasses a Smoke billows out of broad approach of usage of the the Taj Mahal hotel in Government. The NIB acts as the highest policy formulation national cyberspace. We still Mumbai during the body at the national level have not drafted a national 26/11 terror attacks and reports to the Cabinet cyber-security policy similar to the Critical Information Infrastructure Committee on Security.

However, sadly, the meetings of the Protection (CIIP) policy already in place in NIB are sporadic and the essence behind other countries.

With more national critical infrastructures its forming is lost in a dynamically running on internet-based networks, changing field that requires regular vulnerabilities have increased. India, seen as updates on capabilities through the a global IT power is high on the radar of medium. The NIB is supported directly by terrorists and other adversaries: more than the National Technology Research ever cyber-security policy should be an Organisation (NTRO) to provide technical integral part of the national security cybersecurity and intelligence and the initiatives. The time has come when national National Security Council Secretariat security strategy has to broadly encompass (NSCS) which coordinates cyber-security activities across the country, both in public cyber-security considerations. and private sectors.

However, the NTRO’s track record has The Three I’s A national cyber-security policy has to be not been very encouraging ever since its devised to intrinsically cover three fronts— inception in 2004 while the NSCS’ activity is institutions, infrastructure and legislation almost defunct ever since an alleged besides strategy for implementation and espionage surfaced in 2005. enforcement. Such a policy also has to The CERT IN established in Delhi incorporate an effective usage of cyberspace in 2004, under the Ministry of and its tools in intelligence gathering Communications and IT, can act as the public and monitoring. interface for incident reporting, response On the institutional front, the National generation and also to create the Information Board (NIB), set up in 2002 cybersecurity awareness among Indian IT and chaired by the National Security users. The CERT IN has enhanced its Advisor, is the highest body to address capabilities over the last few years but needs cyber-security issues in India. It is more teeth to address emerging issues. As constituted of 21 members mostly part of its policy, the government needs to

29

demarcate a healthy work share between CERT and NTRO. Law enforcement authorities need to be trained and oriented for handling cyber incidents on a much more rapid scale.

Currently, the intelligence community, along with the NTRO, has been handling internet traffic monitoring and also generating leads and patterns for recognising attempts being made by terrorists in cyberspace. A common repository of all such intelligence gathering should be created whereby all the intelligence agencies, including those from the defence and financial sectors, will share their inputs. Besides, the setting up of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) should act as the nodal point for the purpose.

The intelligence agencies in the state police forces must be given support to organise a basic cyber-intelligence network.

Apart from a basic orientation to improve the cyber skills of policemen, there is a need to properly assess to what extent policemen should be trained directly for handling cyber incidents. The cybersecurity investigations’ functions can also be outsourced to some dedicated, sanitised cyber experts from the private sectors who are specialists in the field.

A major drive should be made to reorganise cyber investigations and cyberforensics avenues in the Central Bureau of Investigations (CBI) with a special focus

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SECURITY

DECEMBER 2010

DSI

In February 2009, there were reports of over 600 computers of the Ministry of External Affairs being hacked and the outgoing National Security Advisor, M. K. Narayan, had clearly stated this January that China was behind the cyberattacks on Indian networks, including his office.

Policemen outside Parliament during the December 13, 2001 attack

28

AFP

AFP

”

showed the meticulous planned usage of cyberspace by terrorists making it almost impossible to nab the senders of those emails. Even the attack on Parliament in December 2001 had a cyber angle to it.

Equally dangerous is the scenario where foreign state and non-state actors have started to attack and probe Indian networks recently. In the last few years, there have been instances where traces have pointed to a few countries that generally have not been favorable to India. Pakistan sponsored hackers have been targeting sensitive Indian networks for over a decade now although they have fallen much behind Chinese misadventures in cyberspace.

China has been regularly identified by many countries, including India, for being responsible for attacks on their networks.

In February 2009, there were reports that over 600 computers of the Ministry of External Affairs being hacked and the outgoing National Security Advisor M. K. Narayan had clearly stated this January that China was behind the cyberattacks, which included attacks on his office. To combat the growing onslaught of cyberattacks many nations are pursuing active and strategically fitted cyberwarfare programmes.

Though globally the menace of cyberattacks is being understood at various levels, yet India does not have a comprehensive national cyber-security

secretaries in the Central strategy that encompasses a Smoke billows out of broad approach of usage of the the Taj Mahal hotel in Government. The NIB acts as the highest policy formulation national cyberspace. We still Mumbai during the body at the national level have not drafted a national 26/11 terror attacks and reports to the Cabinet cyber-security policy similar to the Critical Information Infrastructure Committee on Security.

However, sadly, the meetings of the Protection (CIIP) policy already in place in NIB are sporadic and the essence behind other countries.

With more national critical infrastructures its forming is lost in a dynamically running on internet-based networks, changing field that requires regular vulnerabilities have increased. India, seen as updates on capabilities through the a global IT power is high on the radar of medium. The NIB is supported directly by terrorists and other adversaries: more than the National Technology Research ever cyber-security policy should be an Organisation (NTRO) to provide technical integral part of the national security cybersecurity and intelligence and the initiatives. The time has come when national National Security Council Secretariat security strategy has to broadly encompass (NSCS) which coordinates cyber-security activities across the country, both in public cyber-security considerations. and private sectors.

However, the NTRO’s track record has The Three I’s A national cyber-security policy has to be not been very encouraging ever since its devised to intrinsically cover three fronts— inception in 2004 while the NSCS’ activity is institutions, infrastructure and legislation almost defunct ever since an alleged besides strategy for implementation and espionage surfaced in 2005. enforcement. Such a policy also has to The CERT IN established in Delhi incorporate an effective usage of cyberspace in 2004, under the Ministry of and its tools in intelligence gathering Communications and IT, can act as the public and monitoring. interface for incident reporting, response On the institutional front, the National generation and also to create the Information Board (NIB), set up in 2002 cybersecurity awareness among Indian IT and chaired by the National Security users. The CERT IN has enhanced its Advisor, is the highest body to address capabilities over the last few years but needs cyber-security issues in India. It is more teeth to address emerging issues. As constituted of 21 members mostly part of its policy, the government needs to

29

demarcate a healthy work share between CERT and NTRO. Law enforcement authorities need to be trained and oriented for handling cyber incidents on a much more rapid scale.

Currently, the intelligence community, along with the NTRO, has been handling internet traffic monitoring and also generating leads and patterns for recognising attempts being made by terrorists in cyberspace. A common repository of all such intelligence gathering should be created whereby all the intelligence agencies, including those from the defence and financial sectors, will share their inputs. Besides, the setting up of the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) should act as the nodal point for the purpose.

The intelligence agencies in the state police forces must be given support to organise a basic cyber-intelligence network.

Apart from a basic orientation to improve the cyber skills of policemen, there is a need to properly assess to what extent policemen should be trained directly for handling cyber incidents. The cybersecurity investigations’ functions can also be outsourced to some dedicated, sanitised cyber experts from the private sectors who are specialists in the field.

A major drive should be made to reorganise cyber investigations and cyberforensics avenues in the Central Bureau of Investigations (CBI) with a special focus

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SECURITY On the institutional front, the National Information Board (NIB), set up in 2002 and chaired by the National Security Advisor, is the highest body to address cybersecurity warfare issues in India. It comprises 21 members, mostly secretaries in the Central government.The NIB acts as the highest policy formulation body at the national level and reports to the Cabinet Committee on Security.

on developing crack teams. Defence personnel Revising the IT Act The police modernisation working on a computer On the legislation front, in programme of the Central at base camp October 2000 the Information Government should proactively Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act) fund programmes for state police was enacted and India was one of the first modernisation on the cyber-security countries to enact such legislation. The IT front and should offer incentives to these Act paved the way for the introduction of epolicemen who take interest in doing commerce and digital signatures and network-related activities. addressed cybercrimes by introducing The Home Minister’s plan to equip penal provisions. However, in the eight police stations with better computers and years of the usage of the IT Act, many larger bandwidth and digitally connect all deficiencies were observed. Also newer the police stations in the form of a National technological feats needed to be covered.

Law Enforcement network is a step in the Therefore, the Act was revised in the latter right direction although the project has yet part of 2008 and notified in February 2009 to be implemented at the required pace and after a comprehensive evaluation was monitored effectively. done by the Parliamentary Standing Simultaneously, the legal fraternity Committee on IT. The revised Act has enlarged the needs to reorient the understanding of of cybercrimes, defined technology and the intricacies of scope cyberattacks. Both the legal profession cyberterrorism and also introduced and the judiciary have to be oriented to provisions whereby networks can be the changing nature of cyberspace and monitored and communications and its linkages with crimes in the real world. content in cyberspace blocked.

At a certain level, awareness is being India has also taken some positive steps created with the unique incidents which in the global diplomacy building around are being witnessed in various forms and cyberspace. Apart from the bilateral efforts, on a national scale, but training and India is also a member of the awareness programmes need to be 20-nation Group of Governmental Experts pursued aggressively.

(GGE) set up by the UN Secretary General in

30

”

October 2009 to look into the impact of information communication technology on international security and stability on the basis of the UN General Assembly resolution number 53/70 of 1998 after the first GGE in 2004 failed to come to a consensus. The report has been submitted and significant contributions have been made by India.

Similarly, some of the bilateral and multilateral efforts are also seeing some extra efforts to foster a better cyberspace.

The road map for the future is clear— understanding the crucial nature of cybersecurity has to be on the top of the national agenda for security. Apart from the growing threat angle from negative elements, the fact is that as more of the country gets computerised and moves towards e-governance and e-commerce there will be more vulnerabilities added to the system. A robust technical infrastructure that enables cyberspace to function and grow and an equally sharp law enforcement system will steer us clear of the challenges.

India’s reputation as an IT superpower will also be consolidated if the nation is able to run a secure and stable IT ecosystem that keeps cyberspace as an attractive medium.

dsi 216X276.indd 1

12/22/10 3:18:00 PM

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

DECEMBER 2010

REFORM TO

DSI

Armed troops head towards the hills of Zojila Pass in Kashmir

PERFORM For India’s military intelligence system to be revitalised, it needs to have an intense organisational reorientation

BHASHYAM KASTURI

India’s Military Intelligence (MI) functioning reveals that it is illequipped to handle various facets of intelligence operations.

Although the recent formation of the Defence Intelligence Agency has improved inter-service coordination, each service directorate has to be given greater scope and direction.

With the increasing use of the Army to help civil authority, the MI has had to adapt to the needs of counter-insurgency situations.

I

n 2001, the Indian Union Cabinet accepted the recommendations of the Group of Ministers (GoM) on Reforming the National Security System.

One part of this report proposed several new changes to the existing system of Military Intelligence (MI). While the report of the GoM was the result of the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee, the need for reform in the MI system had long been felt but inadequately addressed.

On top of the priority list in the report was the creation of a Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). It was additionally proposed

that the MI should be permitted to conduct cross-border operations, as they had been permitted to do in 1991 by the then government. Today, the Director General of the DIA is the principal intelligence advisor to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Defence Minister. The DIA controls the Army’s technical intelligence assets–the Directorate of Signals Intelligence and the Defence Image Processing and Analysis Centre (DIPAC). While the Signals Directorate is responsible for acquiring and decrypting enemy communications, the DIPAC controls India’s satellite-based image acquisition capabilities.

The DIA also controls the Defence Information Warfare Agency (DIWA) which handles all elements of the information warfare repertoire, including psychological operations, cyberwar, electronic intercepts and monitoring of sound waves.

The DIA is today able to conduct operations for tactical intelligence coverage in all of Pakistan. It is also permitted to independently execute ‘port-to-port’ and ‘airport-to-airport’ operations and movement of agents across national borders. On the other hand, the Indian Army’s Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) is authorised only to execute intelligence gathering for 5km across India’s borders or from the Line of Control (LoC).

32

AFP

KEY POINTS

33

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

DECEMBER 2010

REFORM TO

DSI

Armed troops head towards the hills of Zojila Pass in Kashmir

PERFORM For India’s military intelligence system to be revitalised, it needs to have an intense organisational reorientation

BHASHYAM KASTURI

India’s Military Intelligence (MI) functioning reveals that it is illequipped to handle various facets of intelligence operations.

Although the recent formation of the Defence Intelligence Agency has improved inter-service coordination, each service directorate has to be given greater scope and direction.

With the increasing use of the Army to help civil authority, the MI has had to adapt to the needs of counter-insurgency situations.

I

n 2001, the Indian Union Cabinet accepted the recommendations of the Group of Ministers (GoM) on Reforming the National Security System.

One part of this report proposed several new changes to the existing system of Military Intelligence (MI). While the report of the GoM was the result of the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee, the need for reform in the MI system had long been felt but inadequately addressed.

On top of the priority list in the report was the creation of a Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). It was additionally proposed

that the MI should be permitted to conduct cross-border operations, as they had been permitted to do in 1991 by the then government. Today, the Director General of the DIA is the principal intelligence advisor to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Defence Minister. The DIA controls the Army’s technical intelligence assets–the Directorate of Signals Intelligence and the Defence Image Processing and Analysis Centre (DIPAC). While the Signals Directorate is responsible for acquiring and decrypting enemy communications, the DIPAC controls India’s satellite-based image acquisition capabilities.

The DIA also controls the Defence Information Warfare Agency (DIWA) which handles all elements of the information warfare repertoire, including psychological operations, cyberwar, electronic intercepts and monitoring of sound waves.

The DIA is today able to conduct operations for tactical intelligence coverage in all of Pakistan. It is also permitted to independently execute ‘port-to-port’ and ‘airport-to-airport’ operations and movement of agents across national borders. On the other hand, the Indian Army’s Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) is authorised only to execute intelligence gathering for 5km across India’s borders or from the Line of Control (LoC).

32

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KEY POINTS

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”

AFP

Indian National Security Guard commandos patrol Mumbai’s Colaba Market

Synergising Three Services The DIA coordinates and synergises defence intelligence from the three services: from the technical assets which are placed under the command of the DG, the Defence Attaches and so on.

The Director-General of Military Intelligence (DGMI), the Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Intelligence) and the Director Naval Intelligence are all members of the Joint Services Intelligence Committee of

which the DG, DIA is the chairperson.

The three services have their own intelligence units and are headed by a Director of the MI under whom there is a directorate which collects intelligence and prepares it for dissemination.

The Army’s intelligence establishment, the DGMI, is commanded by a three-star General, while the operations of the Air Force and Navy are under the command of a twostar officer with the rank of a Major-General.

34

What prompted the GoM to make such recommendations in 2001? It is not as if the defence forces were unaware of the need for integration of their capabilities. This conflict is particularly relevant in the light of India’s historical experience.

The 1962 war with China and Kargil are telling examples. Additionally, the inability of our intelligence to trace the whereabouts of an additional armoured division in the 1965 war with Pakistan was

another example. Even in low intensity conflicts and out-of-area operations, like Operations Bluestar and Pawan in Punjab and Sri Lanka respectively, revealed the limitations of the national and military intelligence capability.

Prior to the creation of the DIA, intelligence capability in the armed forces was limited organisationally to the Field Intelligence Units (FIU) which was tasked with gathering intelligence during

ongoing operations and with maintaining liasion with foreign military forces.

Military intelligence both at the strategic and tactical level is a specialised task that requires the application of military knowledge to understand the information requirements of the battlefield and provide real time and meaningful assessments to the Armed Forces.

Clearly, the Kargil conflict raised the question of the efficacy of the military intelligence apparatus and therefore the need to improve the situation was evident.

What happened then was a reflection of the organisational set-up and its capacity to go beyond routine military work.

Without detailing the chronology of the role of the military intelligence, Indian MI did not provide a clear picture of Pakistani intentions, and when they were available, the higher military hierarchy failed to appreciate the value of such information. There could perhaps be no better illustration of this than the fact that even when the actual presence of Pakistani regular and irregular troops was detected on the Line of Control, the 15 Corps HQ took the sanguine view that this was just infiltration with a view to raise the ante of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. That this was not so was proved by subsequent events.

Kargil also demonstrated that the military chain of command was unwilling to take cognisance of the assessments of

35

DSI

its own intelligence officers as was evident in the reports of Pakistani infiltration being kept aside in the 15 Corps area. Thus, came the calls for a drastic review of the intelligence set-up.

History of Military Intelligence Historically, the roots of India’s MI organisation can be traced to 1885 when Major General Sir Charles MacGregor was appointed head of the Intelligence Department of the Indian Army. The new department had its headquarters in Simla and was principally concerned with gathering and evaluating information about Russian troop dispositions in Central Asia.

During the Second World War, after the retreat from Burma, the British Army set up a group, staffed by intelligence officers to collect information about Japanese designs and to tackle counterintelligence. Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) had a separate section looking after cryptology in the far east with its headquarters in Delhi.

In 1942, the Intelligence Corps was created with headquarters in Karachi for undivided India to train Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) and NonCommissioned Officers (NCOs). For most part of the war, the intelligence work was done by British officers, and when they left, the Intelligence Corps in 1947, nothing was left to build on. Not only did the British officers leave but they took a host of records which left the organisation in India with a scanty database. The other problem was that the newly set up MI was not given adequate authority and was staffed and headed by officers with little intelligence experience and virtually nil resources.

In 1951, the Himmatsinhji Committee (also known as the North and North-East Border Committee) recommended that the task of collecting intelligence on the border be entrusted to the Intelligence Bureau (IB). Whatever the judgment of the committee, they took away from the MI a task which in pre-1947 days had been a military job. The level of importance given to intelligence in the military hierarchy in those days can be seen by the fact that both the MI and military operations were headed by an officer of the rank of a Lt Col. Officers and jawans who were inducted into the Intelligence Corps during those early days were not trained for the job and the main function assigned to such people was field security. With little resources, cryptology also suffered. That

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Military intelligence, both at the strategic and tactical level, is a specialised task that requires the application of military knowledge to understand the information requirements of the battlefield and provide real time and meaningful assessments to the armed forces.

”

AFP

Indian National Security Guard commandos patrol Mumbai’s Colaba Market

Synergising Three Services The DIA coordinates and synergises defence intelligence from the three services: from the technical assets which are placed under the command of the DG, the Defence Attaches and so on.

The Director-General of Military Intelligence (DGMI), the Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Intelligence) and the Director Naval Intelligence are all members of the Joint Services Intelligence Committee of

which the DG, DIA is the chairperson.

The three services have their own intelligence units and are headed by a Director of the MI under whom there is a directorate which collects intelligence and prepares it for dissemination.

The Army’s intelligence establishment, the DGMI, is commanded by a three-star General, while the operations of the Air Force and Navy are under the command of a twostar officer with the rank of a Major-General.

34

What prompted the GoM to make such recommendations in 2001? It is not as if the defence forces were unaware of the need for integration of their capabilities. This conflict is particularly relevant in the light of India’s historical experience.

The 1962 war with China and Kargil are telling examples. Additionally, the inability of our intelligence to trace the whereabouts of an additional armoured division in the 1965 war with Pakistan was

another example. Even in low intensity conflicts and out-of-area operations, like Operations Bluestar and Pawan in Punjab and Sri Lanka respectively, revealed the limitations of the national and military intelligence capability.

Prior to the creation of the DIA, intelligence capability in the armed forces was limited organisationally to the Field Intelligence Units (FIU) which was tasked with gathering intelligence during

ongoing operations and with maintaining liasion with foreign military forces.

Military intelligence both at the strategic and tactical level is a specialised task that requires the application of military knowledge to understand the information requirements of the battlefield and provide real time and meaningful assessments to the Armed Forces.

Clearly, the Kargil conflict raised the question of the efficacy of the military intelligence apparatus and therefore the need to improve the situation was evident.

What happened then was a reflection of the organisational set-up and its capacity to go beyond routine military work.

Without detailing the chronology of the role of the military intelligence, Indian MI did not provide a clear picture of Pakistani intentions, and when they were available, the higher military hierarchy failed to appreciate the value of such information. There could perhaps be no better illustration of this than the fact that even when the actual presence of Pakistani regular and irregular troops was detected on the Line of Control, the 15 Corps HQ took the sanguine view that this was just infiltration with a view to raise the ante of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. That this was not so was proved by subsequent events.

Kargil also demonstrated that the military chain of command was unwilling to take cognisance of the assessments of

35

DSI

its own intelligence officers as was evident in the reports of Pakistani infiltration being kept aside in the 15 Corps area. Thus, came the calls for a drastic review of the intelligence set-up.

History of Military Intelligence Historically, the roots of India’s MI organisation can be traced to 1885 when Major General Sir Charles MacGregor was appointed head of the Intelligence Department of the Indian Army. The new department had its headquarters in Simla and was principally concerned with gathering and evaluating information about Russian troop dispositions in Central Asia.

During the Second World War, after the retreat from Burma, the British Army set up a group, staffed by intelligence officers to collect information about Japanese designs and to tackle counterintelligence. Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) had a separate section looking after cryptology in the far east with its headquarters in Delhi.

In 1942, the Intelligence Corps was created with headquarters in Karachi for undivided India to train Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) and NonCommissioned Officers (NCOs). For most part of the war, the intelligence work was done by British officers, and when they left, the Intelligence Corps in 1947, nothing was left to build on. Not only did the British officers leave but they took a host of records which left the organisation in India with a scanty database. The other problem was that the newly set up MI was not given adequate authority and was staffed and headed by officers with little intelligence experience and virtually nil resources.

In 1951, the Himmatsinhji Committee (also known as the North and North-East Border Committee) recommended that the task of collecting intelligence on the border be entrusted to the Intelligence Bureau (IB). Whatever the judgment of the committee, they took away from the MI a task which in pre-1947 days had been a military job. The level of importance given to intelligence in the military hierarchy in those days can be seen by the fact that both the MI and military operations were headed by an officer of the rank of a Lt Col. Officers and jawans who were inducted into the Intelligence Corps during those early days were not trained for the job and the main function assigned to such people was field security. With little resources, cryptology also suffered. That

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36

Field Security Service By the sixties, the MI had become a field security service rather than an external intelligence agency. This resulted in the MI policing the Army rather than carrying out intelligence activity. Worse, it was given the job of checking corruption and misuse of facilities/equipment amongst Army personnel which led to a level of antagonism and this animosity exists to a considerable degree even today.

In 1979, the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) was re-organised and three main branches dealing with cross-border intelligence collection, field security and counter-intelligence were set up. Later, a branch catering to intelligence requirements faced in counter-insurgency was also added.

Protection of Army operations and assets is the task of the Intelligence Field Security Units (IFSU) while the Liaison Units (LU) handle counter-intelligence and the Internal Security Groups (ISG) deal with counter-insurgency. Other units dealing with special issues like Psychological Warfare (MI-24), Remote Sensing (MI-17) and Order of Battle (ORBAT) have been created from time to time to meet operational requirements.

Intelligence collected at the lowest levels travels up a chain of intelligence command and finally reaches the Joint Intelligence Committee at Army headquarters and, today, at the desk of the DG, DIA. The DMI has a Signals Intelligence Directorate, which operates the Central Monitoring

Kargil also demonstrated that the military chain of command was unwilling to take cognisance of the assessments of its own intelligence officers as was evident in the reports of Pakistani infiltration being kept aside in the 15 Corps area. Thus, there were calls for a drastic review of the military intelligence set up.

”

Organisation (CMO) under the Ministry of Defence (MoD).

The CMO is responsible for most of the Army’s electronics, communication and signals intelligence gathering. It also monitors radio, television and encoded transmissions in the country and along the borders.

The DMI is the largest of the three intelligence directorates. The other two services have smaller but equally capable organisations, particularly with reference to Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). It is in the proper integration and utilisation of the assets of the three service directorates that the DIA faces the biggest challenge. In addition, tasking is a major challenge. Without tasking, the agencies will be unable to provide adequate real-time intelligence of value to the military decision maker.

The very organisation and functioning of the MI has meant that it is not prepared to handle the various facets of actual intelligence operations, both external and internal. The fact that since the IB was given the task of external intelligence from 1951 onwards, it did not give the MI the chance to recover from its state of disarray.

In various conflicts, India has been involved in since 1947 and in the

AFP

left the armed forces in a poor condition as far as intelligence was concerned. In the fifties, two suggestions did come up to improve this situation, but nothing came out of them.

One came from Lt Gen. S.P. Thorat, who suggested that officers from the armed forces be sent abroad on undercover assignments with the aim of building up a network of defence intelligence officers.

Then in 1954, the government decided to set up a Defence Intelligence Organisation to serve as a clearing house for intelligence from all services and to advise the Chiefs of Staff. Plans were drawn up to induct around 30 officers from the three Services.

The idea was for the organisation to work in liaison with the external cell of the IB. But due to the financial constraints and a shortage of suitable officers, the plan failed to take off. The Indian Army in the meantime went ahead with organising or rather re-organising its MI set up.

Commandos perform drills at a checkpoint on the Srinagar to Kargil road

DSI

numerous internal security Soldiers perch atop a information required by them for operations involving the troop vehicle as they most of their operational needs.

Armed Forces, the MI has been travel towards the Augmenting the capability of largely involved in providing Indo-Bhutan border defence services in TECHINT tactical intelligence. The scale in Assam assets of both strategic and of operations and levels of operational nature will improve success achieved so far in both their ability of obtaining real-time and conventional and unconventional conflicts actionable intelligence. Equally important leave little room for complacency. is orienting intelligence staff on the What has become clear is the fact specialised nature of their job and to ensure that with the increasing use of the Army in that the higher command appreciates the aid of civil authority, the MI has had to value of information emanating from the adapt quickly to the needs of counter- lowest level.

For India’s military intelligence system insurgency situations. be revitalised, organisational In terms of equipment, adequate systems to are available to provide tactical intelligence. reorientation is required. While the Much of the equipment is of Soviet origin, formation of the DIA has improved interincluding specialised direction finding and service coordination, each service monitoring equipment. There is provision directorate has to be given greater scope for organisations within the MI to deal and direction. The areas for study and with SIGINT—both COMINT and analysis should be foreign countries, Electromagnetic Intelligence. There is an science and technology, armed forces, inter-services Joint Cipher Bureau which is and intelligence-operation.

Equally, the Service HQs have to treat in-charge of cryptology. The problems really exist due to the multiplicity of organisations the MI as an equal partner if they want performing similar roles. What is needed meaningful intelligence. For instance, we still have some way to go in as far as the is proper command and control.

The intelligence requirements for Intelligence Corps occupying the same Armed Forces have increased manifold due pride of place as do other arms like the to their continuous involvement in a wide infantry, the Armoured Corps or the spectrum of conflicts. Modern Technical artillery is concerned. Therefore, to some Intelligence (TECHINT) resources provide degree mindsets must change so that the the defence services intelligence and future is ensured.

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36

Field Security Service By the sixties, the MI had become a field security service rather than an external intelligence agency. This resulted in the MI policing the Army rather than carrying out intelligence activity. Worse, it was given the job of checking corruption and misuse of facilities/equipment amongst Army personnel which led to a level of antagonism and this animosity exists to a considerable degree even today.

In 1979, the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) was re-organised and three main branches dealing with cross-border intelligence collection, field security and counter-intelligence were set up. Later, a branch catering to intelligence requirements faced in counter-insurgency was also added.

Protection of Army operations and assets is the task of the Intelligence Field Security Units (IFSU) while the Liaison Units (LU) handle counter-intelligence and the Internal Security Groups (ISG) deal with counter-insurgency. Other units dealing with special issues like Psychological Warfare (MI-24), Remote Sensing (MI-17) and Order of Battle (ORBAT) have been created from time to time to meet operational requirements.

Intelligence collected at the lowest levels travels up a chain of intelligence command and finally reaches the Joint Intelligence Committee at Army headquarters and, today, at the desk of the DG, DIA. The DMI has a Signals Intelligence Directorate, which operates the Central Monitoring

Kargil also demonstrated that the military chain of command was unwilling to take cognisance of the assessments of its own intelligence officers as was evident in the reports of Pakistani infiltration being kept aside in the 15 Corps area. Thus, there were calls for a drastic review of the military intelligence set up.

”

Organisation (CMO) under the Ministry of Defence (MoD).

The CMO is responsible for most of the Army’s electronics, communication and signals intelligence gathering. It also monitors radio, television and encoded transmissions in the country and along the borders.

The DMI is the largest of the three intelligence directorates. The other two services have smaller but equally capable organisations, particularly with reference to Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). It is in the proper integration and utilisation of the assets of the three service directorates that the DIA faces the biggest challenge. In addition, tasking is a major challenge. Without tasking, the agencies will be unable to provide adequate real-time intelligence of value to the military decision maker.

The very organisation and functioning of the MI has meant that it is not prepared to handle the various facets of actual intelligence operations, both external and internal. The fact that since the IB was given the task of external intelligence from 1951 onwards, it did not give the MI the chance to recover from its state of disarray.

In various conflicts, India has been involved in since 1947 and in the

AFP

left the armed forces in a poor condition as far as intelligence was concerned. In the fifties, two suggestions did come up to improve this situation, but nothing came out of them.

One came from Lt Gen. S.P. Thorat, who suggested that officers from the armed forces be sent abroad on undercover assignments with the aim of building up a network of defence intelligence officers.

Then in 1954, the government decided to set up a Defence Intelligence Organisation to serve as a clearing house for intelligence from all services and to advise the Chiefs of Staff. Plans were drawn up to induct around 30 officers from the three Services.

The idea was for the organisation to work in liaison with the external cell of the IB. But due to the financial constraints and a shortage of suitable officers, the plan failed to take off. The Indian Army in the meantime went ahead with organising or rather re-organising its MI set up.

Commandos perform drills at a checkpoint on the Srinagar to Kargil road

DSI

numerous internal security Soldiers perch atop a information required by them for operations involving the troop vehicle as they most of their operational needs.

Armed Forces, the MI has been travel towards the Augmenting the capability of largely involved in providing Indo-Bhutan border defence services in TECHINT tactical intelligence. The scale in Assam assets of both strategic and of operations and levels of operational nature will improve success achieved so far in both their ability of obtaining real-time and conventional and unconventional conflicts actionable intelligence. Equally important leave little room for complacency. is orienting intelligence staff on the What has become clear is the fact specialised nature of their job and to ensure that with the increasing use of the Army in that the higher command appreciates the aid of civil authority, the MI has had to value of information emanating from the adapt quickly to the needs of counter- lowest level.

For India’s military intelligence system insurgency situations. be revitalised, organisational In terms of equipment, adequate systems to are available to provide tactical intelligence. reorientation is required. While the Much of the equipment is of Soviet origin, formation of the DIA has improved interincluding specialised direction finding and service coordination, each service monitoring equipment. There is provision directorate has to be given greater scope for organisations within the MI to deal and direction. The areas for study and with SIGINT—both COMINT and analysis should be foreign countries, Electromagnetic Intelligence. There is an science and technology, armed forces, inter-services Joint Cipher Bureau which is and intelligence-operation.

Equally, the Service HQs have to treat in-charge of cryptology. The problems really exist due to the multiplicity of organisations the MI as an equal partner if they want performing similar roles. What is needed meaningful intelligence. For instance, we still have some way to go in as far as the is proper command and control.

The intelligence requirements for Intelligence Corps occupying the same Armed Forces have increased manifold due pride of place as do other arms like the to their continuous involvement in a wide infantry, the Armoured Corps or the spectrum of conflicts. Modern Technical artillery is concerned. Therefore, to some Intelligence (TECHINT) resources provide degree mindsets must change so that the the defence services intelligence and future is ensured.

37

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STRATEGIC OUTREACH Defence diplomacy, which includes military exercises and maritime cooperation, is a potent foreign policy tool

KEY POINTS

Defence cooperation is being effectively employed as a foreign policy tool to promote India's national interests.

Defence cooperation has many dimensions today, including the sale, purchase and joint development of military equipment.

The primary aim of joint military exercises is for officers and troops on both sides to acquaint themselves with each other's TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures).

O

ver the last two decades, in keeping with its growing stature as a regional power, India has shown enhanced interest in international military-to-military cooperation, including maritime cooperation.

Defence cooperation is being effectively employed as a foreign policy tool to promote India’s national interests, including strategic outreach.

It is now one of the main forms of engagement with many countries such as Bhutan, China, France, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Mauritius, Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, the United Kingdom and the United States. India’s military to-military

contacts are particularly vibrant and dynamic with countries like Bhutan, Nepal and the US. There is an increasing realisation in the Government of India that defence cooperation can play a key role in regional and global security; hence, it must be further enhanced with countries in the region so that bilateral and multilateral ties can be improved.

While inaugurating a seminar on defence cooperation in early 2008, A. K. Antony, India’s Defence Minister, had said that globalisation has affected defence as much as any other activity and there is a need to continually find avenues for exchanging points of view with colleagues overseas, as well as learning from successful innovations being implemented elsewhere.

Defence cooperation has many dimensions today, including the sale, purchase and joint development of military equipment, transfer of technology, intelligence sharing and coordination for counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation, cooperation in jointly providing relief and succour after natural calamities, coordination in transnational anti-drug trafficking activities and the joint patrolling of sea lanes of communication against piracy and terrorism. It is also about working together to maintain peace and stability under a cooperative security framework.

38

AFP

GURMEET KANWAL

The primary aim of joint military exercises is for officers and the troops on both sides to acquaint themselves with each other’s TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures), test the interoperability of their communications systems and gain confidence in conducting joint operations in a spirit of mutual trust.

In a rapidly globalising world, joint military operations in the future are likely to be conducted in four major areas: The United Nations’ peacekeeping and peace

While India does not support operations; maritime A sailor points towards enter into military alliances, security operations to make the aircraft carrier INS training with other wellthe seas safe for lawful Viraat during a joint use; military intervention India-US naval excercise organised and well-equipped armed forces helps to gain operations for humanitarian off the Goa coast knowledge and experience purposes or against rogue regimes— with or without the UN Security about best practices around the world Council approval; counter-insurgency and and to better prepare for the eventuality having to operate together counter-terrorism operations against of radical extremist organisations; and rescue in the future. Besides, joint military and relief operations during natural exercises also help to showcase India’s military preparedness. calamities, such as the recent tsunami.

39

Constructive Military Engagement In the recent past, India has conducted joint military exercises with a large number of countries, including regional neighbours and those in India’s extended neighbourhood or in areas of strategic interest. These countries include Botswana, China, Oman, Russia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, the United States and Vietnam.

With the US, India conducted nine land forces exercises in 2010 alone, besides naval and air force exercises.

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DSI

STRATEGIC OUTREACH Defence diplomacy, which includes military exercises and maritime cooperation, is a potent foreign policy tool

KEY POINTS

Defence cooperation is being effectively employed as a foreign policy tool to promote India's national interests.

Defence cooperation has many dimensions today, including the sale, purchase and joint development of military equipment.

The primary aim of joint military exercises is for officers and troops on both sides to acquaint themselves with each other's TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures).

O

ver the last two decades, in keeping with its growing stature as a regional power, India has shown enhanced interest in international military-to-military cooperation, including maritime cooperation.

Defence cooperation is being effectively employed as a foreign policy tool to promote India’s national interests, including strategic outreach.

It is now one of the main forms of engagement with many countries such as Bhutan, China, France, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Mauritius, Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, the United Kingdom and the United States. India’s military to-military

contacts are particularly vibrant and dynamic with countries like Bhutan, Nepal and the US. There is an increasing realisation in the Government of India that defence cooperation can play a key role in regional and global security; hence, it must be further enhanced with countries in the region so that bilateral and multilateral ties can be improved.

While inaugurating a seminar on defence cooperation in early 2008, A. K. Antony, India’s Defence Minister, had said that globalisation has affected defence as much as any other activity and there is a need to continually find avenues for exchanging points of view with colleagues overseas, as well as learning from successful innovations being implemented elsewhere.

Defence cooperation has many dimensions today, including the sale, purchase and joint development of military equipment, transfer of technology, intelligence sharing and coordination for counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation, cooperation in jointly providing relief and succour after natural calamities, coordination in transnational anti-drug trafficking activities and the joint patrolling of sea lanes of communication against piracy and terrorism. It is also about working together to maintain peace and stability under a cooperative security framework.

38

AFP

GURMEET KANWAL

The primary aim of joint military exercises is for officers and the troops on both sides to acquaint themselves with each other’s TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures), test the interoperability of their communications systems and gain confidence in conducting joint operations in a spirit of mutual trust.

In a rapidly globalising world, joint military operations in the future are likely to be conducted in four major areas: The United Nations’ peacekeeping and peace

While India does not support operations; maritime A sailor points towards enter into military alliances, security operations to make the aircraft carrier INS training with other wellthe seas safe for lawful Viraat during a joint use; military intervention India-US naval excercise organised and well-equipped armed forces helps to gain operations for humanitarian off the Goa coast knowledge and experience purposes or against rogue regimes— with or without the UN Security about best practices around the world Council approval; counter-insurgency and and to better prepare for the eventuality having to operate together counter-terrorism operations against of radical extremist organisations; and rescue in the future. Besides, joint military and relief operations during natural exercises also help to showcase India’s military preparedness. calamities, such as the recent tsunami.

39

Constructive Military Engagement In the recent past, India has conducted joint military exercises with a large number of countries, including regional neighbours and those in India’s extended neighbourhood or in areas of strategic interest. These countries include Botswana, China, Oman, Russia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, the United States and Vietnam.

With the US, India conducted nine land forces exercises in 2010 alone, besides naval and air force exercises.

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India’s experience in counter- A US infantry soldier military exchanges between insurgency and other internal greets Indian soldiers the two countries have been temporarily suspended by India. security operations is much at the Countervalued by overseas armies. Insurgency Jungle Like the Army, the Indian In fact, individual personnel Warfare School in Air Force (IAF) has conducted as well as platoons and Mizoram joint exercises with the companies from many friendly various other air forces of armies have trained at India’s Counter- other countries. The most notable Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School at exercises have been with the US Air Force Vairengete, Mizoram.

(USAF). These have been conducted over The Indian Army’s operational the skies at Gwalior and Kalaikunda in experience in the super high-altitude terrain India and Alaska and Nevada in the US. of Siachen glacier, the highest battlefield in The IAF pilots earned the admiration of the world, is also equally valued. In the USAF with their professional skills.

December 2007, China and India conducted Other nations with which similar Exercise Hand-in-Hand, a company-level exercises were successfully conducted (100 soldiers each) counter-terrorism exercise, include France, Russia, Singapore and the in Yunnan province in southern China. A United Kingdom. year later, a similar exercise was held at Belgaum in India. The aim was to get to know Maritime Might each other and the troops got on well.

Perhaps the maximum joint exercises have However, professionally, the Chinese been conducted in the maritime domain. soldiers came off second best as they Large naval exercises are not new to the appeared to lack basic tactical skills and were Indian Ocean Region and the Indian Navy relatively poorly equipped. Unfortunately, (IN) has always participated in them with in the wake of the denial of a Chinese visa to gusto. From 1949 up to the 1965 war, the IN the GOC-in-C, Northern Command, for a joined other Commonwealth navies, scheduled exchange visit in 2010, further including Australia, Britain and Pakistan to

40

participate in exercises called Joint Exercises Trincomalee. Then the Royal Navy pulled out of the Indian Ocean and the US Sixth and Seventh Fleets sailed in to fill the vacuum. Defence relations with the US gradually improved, particularly after the 1991 visit by General Claude Kicklighter of the Pacific Command.

The first joint exercises with the US Navy, part of the Malabar series, were held in 1994. In the beginning, the exercises were basic in nature and progressively improved in content and complexity with the introduction of advanced surface ships, while submarines and long range maritime patrol aircraft acted as a catalyst to the nascent naval cooperation.

With India’s unique position astride the shipping lanes of the Indian Ocean, which has over 100,000 ships transiting through annually, it was only natural that the maritime community that depended on these sea lanes of communications should befriend the sole regional Navy. The IN began to exercise with the navies of Britain (Konkan series), France (Varuna series), Indonesia, Oman, Russia (Indra series), Thailand, Singapore (Simbex series), and

A Sukhoi-30 fighter jet pilot before leaving for France to participate in an Indo-French air exercise

”

the US (Malabar series). In addition to these bilateral exercises in the Indian Ocean, the Indian Navy availed of the opportunity of port calls to Australia, China, Japan and New Zealand to carry out limited tactical manoeuvres at sea.

From bilateral exercises to multilateral ones, which reduce sailing time and costs and multiply operational benefits, was but a short step. According to Admiral Arun Prakash, former Chief of Naval Staff, “Over the past decade or so, our surfaceship operators, submariners and aircrew have gained tremendously in selfconfidence and expertise by pitting their professional skills against the best in the business. The Ministry of External Affairs was not very keen, but obviously the Navy managed to convince them.”

The Varuna series of Indo-French joint naval exercises were held in 1993, 1996, 1999 and 2000. In May and November 2002, there were two joint exercises, including with the Charles De Gaulle, a French nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. The two navies have also held passage exercises whenever an opportunity has presented itself. The two navies have now formalised

AFP

AFP

In a rapidly globalising world, joint military operations in the future are likely to be conducted in four major areas: United Nations peacekeeping and peace support operations; maritime security operations to make the seas safe for lawful use; military intervention operations for humanitarian purposes or against rogue regimes— with or without UN Security Council approval; counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations.

DSI

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JOINT MILITARY EXERCISES

DECEMBER 2010

India’s experience in counter- A US infantry soldier military exchanges between insurgency and other internal greets Indian soldiers the two countries have been temporarily suspended by India. security operations is much at the Countervalued by overseas armies. Insurgency Jungle Like the Army, the Indian In fact, individual personnel Warfare School in Air Force (IAF) has conducted as well as platoons and Mizoram joint exercises with the companies from many friendly various other air forces of armies have trained at India’s Counter- other countries. The most notable Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School at exercises have been with the US Air Force Vairengete, Mizoram.

(USAF). These have been conducted over The Indian Army’s operational the skies at Gwalior and Kalaikunda in experience in the super high-altitude terrain India and Alaska and Nevada in the US. of Siachen glacier, the highest battlefield in The IAF pilots earned the admiration of the world, is also equally valued. In the USAF with their professional skills.

December 2007, China and India conducted Other nations with which similar Exercise Hand-in-Hand, a company-level exercises were successfully conducted (100 soldiers each) counter-terrorism exercise, include France, Russia, Singapore and the in Yunnan province in southern China. A United Kingdom. year later, a similar exercise was held at Belgaum in India. The aim was to get to know Maritime Might each other and the troops got on well.

Perhaps the maximum joint exercises have However, professionally, the Chinese been conducted in the maritime domain. soldiers came off second best as they Large naval exercises are not new to the appeared to lack basic tactical skills and were Indian Ocean Region and the Indian Navy relatively poorly equipped. Unfortunately, (IN) has always participated in them with in the wake of the denial of a Chinese visa to gusto. From 1949 up to the 1965 war, the IN the GOC-in-C, Northern Command, for a joined other Commonwealth navies, scheduled exchange visit in 2010, further including Australia, Britain and Pakistan to

40

participate in exercises called Joint Exercises Trincomalee. Then the Royal Navy pulled out of the Indian Ocean and the US Sixth and Seventh Fleets sailed in to fill the vacuum. Defence relations with the US gradually improved, particularly after the 1991 visit by General Claude Kicklighter of the Pacific Command.

The first joint exercises with the US Navy, part of the Malabar series, were held in 1994. In the beginning, the exercises were basic in nature and progressively improved in content and complexity with the introduction of advanced surface ships, while submarines and long range maritime patrol aircraft acted as a catalyst to the nascent naval cooperation.

With India’s unique position astride the shipping lanes of the Indian Ocean, which has over 100,000 ships transiting through annually, it was only natural that the maritime community that depended on these sea lanes of communications should befriend the sole regional Navy. The IN began to exercise with the navies of Britain (Konkan series), France (Varuna series), Indonesia, Oman, Russia (Indra series), Thailand, Singapore (Simbex series), and

A Sukhoi-30 fighter jet pilot before leaving for France to participate in an Indo-French air exercise

”

the US (Malabar series). In addition to these bilateral exercises in the Indian Ocean, the Indian Navy availed of the opportunity of port calls to Australia, China, Japan and New Zealand to carry out limited tactical manoeuvres at sea.

From bilateral exercises to multilateral ones, which reduce sailing time and costs and multiply operational benefits, was but a short step. According to Admiral Arun Prakash, former Chief of Naval Staff, “Over the past decade or so, our surfaceship operators, submariners and aircrew have gained tremendously in selfconfidence and expertise by pitting their professional skills against the best in the business. The Ministry of External Affairs was not very keen, but obviously the Navy managed to convince them.”

The Varuna series of Indo-French joint naval exercises were held in 1993, 1996, 1999 and 2000. In May and November 2002, there were two joint exercises, including with the Charles De Gaulle, a French nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. The two navies have also held passage exercises whenever an opportunity has presented itself. The two navies have now formalised

AFP

AFP

In a rapidly globalising world, joint military operations in the future are likely to be conducted in four major areas: United Nations peacekeeping and peace support operations; maritime security operations to make the seas safe for lawful use; military intervention operations for humanitarian purposes or against rogue regimes— with or without UN Security Council approval; counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations.

DSI

41

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AFP

JOINT MILITARY EXERCISES

capabilities have been the scope and extent of A Chinese soldier interacts amply demonstrated. their cooperation and are with his Indian expected to hold joint naval counterpart during the During the 1991 Gulf War, exercises annually. Exercises Indo-Chinese military India evacuated approximately are also held annually with exercise in Belgaum 150,000 civilian personnel who the Singapore Navy. had been forced to leave Iraq.

Coordinated patrolling exercises are They were airlifted from the airfield at being undertaken with Indonesia twice a Amman, Jordan, over a period of 30 days. year in March and September to prevent During the South East Asian tsunami in 2004, illegal fishing, poaching, migration and the Indian Armed Forces were in the forefront smuggling of arms. India’s first integrated of rescue and relief operations. Over military command at the Andaman and 70 Indian Navy ships had set sail with rescue Nicobar Islands at Port Blair hosted MILAN teams and relief material in less than 72 hours 2003 from February 11, 2003. The gathering of the disaster even though the Indian people was a confluence of navies from several on the eastern seaboard had themselves Indian Ocean countries. Warships and suffered horrendously. Indian naval ships on naval delegates from Australia, Indonesia, a goodwill visit to European countries during Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Sri Lanka the Lebanon war in 2006 lifted and brought and Thailand participated in the event. back 5,000 Indian civilian refugees.

India has consistently favoured military interventions under a UN umbrella.

Intervention Capabilities In keeping with its growing power Though that position is unlikely to change responsibilities, India has been steadily quickly, India may join future coalitions of enhancing its expeditionary and military the willing when its vital national interests intervention capabilities for out-of- are threatened and need to be defended. area contingencies. Some of these growing Facing complex strategic scenarios and

42

living in an increasingly unstable neighbourhood, India has no option but to encourage a cooperative model of regional security and is willing to work with all friendly countries towards that end. At the same time, India finds it pragmatic to hedge its bets just in case “worst case� scenarios begin to unfold and threaten its economic development or territorial integrity.

Defence diplomacy, which includes military exercises and maritime cooperation, is a potent foreign policy tool and a viable instrument for promoting national interests. In recent years, the Indian armed forces have shed their hesitant approach to engage more widely with the armed forces of other friendly countries but most endeavours are still essentially in the fields of training and visits. The most notable engagement has been that with the US armed forces, especially the US Navy.

However, there is still obviously a long way to go before the operations of both the navies in the Indian Ocean region can be truly harmonised in the common interest of the international community.

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BILATERAL RELATIONS

DECEMBER 2010

DSI

Under the garb of diplomacy, global majors are clearly visiting India with a defence agenda

A SEASON OF DEALS US President Barack Obama greets Defence Minister A. K. Anthony (right) with First Lady Michelle Obama at a state dinner in New Delhi recently

AJAI SHUKLA

KEY POINTS

Obama’s visit resulted in an in-principle agreement to buy the expensive, C-17 Globemaster III transport aircraft for US $580 million apiece.

Sarkozy visit’s military centrepiece is the signing of a $2 billion contract for upgrading the IAF’s 52 Mirage 2000 aircraft to Mirage 2000.

The highlight of Russian President Medvedev’s visit is likely to be the Preliminary Design Contract for jointly developing the so-called Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft .

AFP

N

44

45

ovember and December are Delhi’s best months, an all-toobrief interregnum that blends the greenery of the monsoon gone by with the growing cool of the winter ahead. While the capital’s idyllic winter weather partly explains the timing of the ongoing flurry of visits by the presidents of the United States, France and Russia, the reason for their interest lies in India’s remarkable mix of attributes that make it an emerging superpower.

For Presidents Obama, Sarkozy and Medvedev, India is an increasingly crucial partner, a stable corner in a pivotal geopolitical arena that is defined by violent religious extremism and further darkened

by China’s looming shadow. India also lights up economic radars as a vast consumer market with a growth rate that could soon exceed China’s and an enormous buyer of nuclear power generation and military equipment.

For a western power elite that has been shaken simultaneously by the slump in

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BILATERAL RELATIONS

DECEMBER 2010

DSI

Under the garb of diplomacy, global majors are clearly visiting India with a defence agenda

A SEASON OF DEALS US President Barack Obama greets Defence Minister A. K. Anthony (right) with First Lady Michelle Obama at a state dinner in New Delhi recently

AJAI SHUKLA

KEY POINTS

Obama’s visit resulted in an in-principle agreement to buy the expensive, C-17 Globemaster III transport aircraft for US $580 million apiece.

Sarkozy visit’s military centrepiece is the signing of a $2 billion contract for upgrading the IAF’s 52 Mirage 2000 aircraft to Mirage 2000.

The highlight of Russian President Medvedev’s visit is likely to be the Preliminary Design Contract for jointly developing the so-called Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft .

AFP

N

44

45

ovember and December are Delhi’s best months, an all-toobrief interregnum that blends the greenery of the monsoon gone by with the growing cool of the winter ahead. While the capital’s idyllic winter weather partly explains the timing of the ongoing flurry of visits by the presidents of the United States, France and Russia, the reason for their interest lies in India’s remarkable mix of attributes that make it an emerging superpower.

For Presidents Obama, Sarkozy and Medvedev, India is an increasingly crucial partner, a stable corner in a pivotal geopolitical arena that is defined by violent religious extremism and further darkened

by China’s looming shadow. India also lights up economic radars as a vast consumer market with a growth rate that could soon exceed China’s and an enormous buyer of nuclear power generation and military equipment.

For a western power elite that has been shaken simultaneously by the slump in

2ND DEFENCE SHOPPING LIST.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd

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11:34 AM

Page 46

BILATERAL RELATIONS

Obama Sets the Tone Illustrating the difficulties that diplomats face in making a success of bilateral summits in this era of multilateral engagement was

India also lights up economic radars as a vast consumer market with a growth rate that could soon exceed China’s, and an enormous buyer of nuclear power generation and military equipment.

”

the fact that, leading into the Obama visit, the Indian Prime Minister and the US President already met at least six times in recent months, including within the G-20 framework; in Copenhagen, during the climate change negotiations; and in the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington DC. During this period, New Delhi and Washington have already signed a CounterTerrorism Cooperation Initiative and a Framework for Cooperation in Trade and Investment; launched a Financial and Economic Partnership; launched a dialogue on the Global Commons; and announced cooperation in the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership, being established by India. So much of the thunder had already rolled.

Adding to the difficulty of making the presidential visit a clear success was the absence of high-voltage signing ceremonies, since there had been little progress in negotiations on three crucial issues— cooperation in nuclear power generation, high value defence contracts and three “foundation” defence agreements.

Nevertheless, Barack Obama conjured a rabbit out of a hat, telling an applauding Indian Parliament that Washington would support India’s candidature for a permanent seat in a reformed UN Security Council and also linking Pakistan unambiguously to cross-border terrorism.

From Russia with Love While the US has clearly supplanted Russia as India’s key geo-political partner, with multiple areas of cooperation other then the strategic spheres, Obama’s visit has starkly illustrated Russia’s lead as India’s biggest defence partner. While the US defence industry is viewed in commercial

46

AFP

their economies and by the seemingly unstoppable rise of an increasingly muscular China and its inward looking, liberal, democratic, free-market culture.

Consider the figures. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, calling for foreign assistance during his recent visit to Malaysia, announced that India would spend US $1 trillion on infrastructure in the 12th Five-Year Plan (between 2011-2012 and 2016-17). Minister for Road Transport and Highways, Kamal Nath, has declared that India must develop 70,000km of highways each year. New Delhi’s expenditure on foreign military equipment is projected to soon exceed $50 billion a year.

And last, but not least, with domestic nuclear liability legislation passed, and with New Delhi having signed up in October to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC), India could buy a mindboggling $150 billion worth of nuclear reactors over the coming decade. With the wounds from a global economic slump still raw, these figures are like magic balm.

Also facilitating this string of visits is India’s unstated foreign policy of “multialignment”, effective since 1999, which has involved forging strong bilateral relationships with all global and regional powers, including those like China whose relations with India may be troubled in significant ways. Since each individual relationship is leveraged by the combined weight of all the others, Delhi punches well above its weight in the global arena. Look no further for an illustration of the effectiveness of “multi-alignment” than Premier Wen Jiabao’s acceptance of New Delhi’s invitation to visit, in the wake of three presidents.

“Multi-alignment” also drives the less visible, but equally important, relationships that can hardly be eclipsed by the big visits under way. The PM’s October dialogues with Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and Malaysia have drawn these important countries closer to India, a process also driven by China’s recent assertiveness. And India’s growing profile in multilateral forums was highlighted again at the just-concluded G-20 meeting in Seoul, where New Delhi ensured that the final communiqué included the need for the growth agendas to also cater for development.

DECEMBER 2010

terms—a source of cutting-edge, but expensive, over-the-counter equipment— Russia is an established strategic ally, a source of key technologies, of equipment like nuclear powered submarines that India could get from nowhere else and a partner for the cost-effective development of the most technologically-advanced military equipment, such as nextgeneration fighter aircraft.

The only defence deal that could be scraped together for the American president’s visit was an in-principle agreement to buy the amazingly capable, and astonishingly expensive, C-17 Globemaster III transport aircraft for an eyepopping US $580 million apiece (if India takes it with all the trimmings). In contrast, with President Medvedev’s visit still to take place, a raft of contracts are almost ready for signing, The highlight is likely to be the

Aircraft (MRTA). The Brahmos Preliminary Design Contract Prime Minister for jointly developing the so- Manmohan Singh with missile joint venture is developing an air-launched called Fifth Generation Fighter French President version of the world’s only Aircraft (FGFA), towards which Nicolas Sarkozy in supersonic cruise missile, New Delhi and Moscow will New Delhi which would be deployed on contribute an initial amount of Russian-designed Sukhoi-30MKI fighters.

US $6 billion apiece.

Moscow has custom-designed an Meanwhile, even before Medvedev touches down in Delhi, the Indian Navy engine for Hindustan Aeronautics (IN) will take delivery of the INS Chakra, an Limited’s Sitara Intermediate Jet Trainer Akula II class nuclear attack submarine, (IJT) aircraft. And the Defence Research which Russia is handing over on a ten year and Development, Organisation (DRDO) lease, for an estimated amount of between laboratory, Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE)—which does not $650 million and a billion dollars.

These landmark deals will be in possess engine flight-testing facilities— addition to several ongoing development continues to test its Kaveri aircraft jet programmes that testify to the breadth and engine on a flying test bed in the Gromov depth of the Russia-India defence Flight Research Institute near Moscow. relationship. Entities from the two sides Ironically, the US has long featured GTRE have already pledged US $300 million on its “Entities List” of foreign establishments each to co-develop a Multi-Role Transport under sanctions; at the time of going to press,

47

DSI

two weeks after Obama’s announcement that Indian entities will be removed from the list, nothing appears to have changed.

Washington forbade US companies, Boeing and Lockheed Martin, from providing consultancy to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) development programme.

And India’s unwillingness to put its signature on three “foundation” defence agreements that America wants it to sign— the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA); the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation (BECA); and the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA)—means that the Pentagon’s, and the US State Department’s notorious bureaucracy is unlikely to bury its obdurate reluctance to grant technology licences to India.

That notwithstanding, America’s defence sales to India continue to grow, a testament to the skill of US defence corporations at building some kinds of military systems better than anybody else in the world. India’s expenditure of $342 million on US defence equipment from 2001-2006, shot up in 2007-2009 to $4.1 billion, including the billion-dollar purchase of six C-130J Super Hercules; the $1.1 billion acquisition of Boeing VVIP jets for Indian political leaders; and the $2.1 billion contract for 8 Poseidon MMAs. In the pipeline today are American contracts for at least $8 billion. These include the $5.8 billion purchase of ten C17 Globemaster III strategic airlifters; and 145 M777 155mm ultralight howitzers (ULHs) from BAE Systems for $647 million.

India has also taken to buying US missiles: besides the 24 Harpoon II anti-ship missiles bought for the IAF’s maritime strike Jaguar squadron for $170 million, the Indian Navy is also considering the Harpoon II for its P8I Poseidon MMAs. And Defence Minister A.K. Antony has confirmed that Washington has been approached for the purchase of the fire-and-forget, manportable Javelin anti-armour missile through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route. With the Indian Army’s infantry battalions holding barely half their authorisation of over 80,000 missiles, the technology transfer contract for the Javelin is set to be a multi-billion dollar one.

The French Connection President Nicolas Sarkozy too brings to New Delhi a major defence agenda, especially given the European military

2ND DEFENCE SHOPPING LIST.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd

12/24/10

11:34 AM

Page 46

BILATERAL RELATIONS

Obama Sets the Tone Illustrating the difficulties that diplomats face in making a success of bilateral summits in this era of multilateral engagement was

India also lights up economic radars as a vast consumer market with a growth rate that could soon exceed China’s, and an enormous buyer of nuclear power generation and military equipment.

”

the fact that, leading into the Obama visit, the Indian Prime Minister and the US President already met at least six times in recent months, including within the G-20 framework; in Copenhagen, during the climate change negotiations; and in the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington DC. During this period, New Delhi and Washington have already signed a CounterTerrorism Cooperation Initiative and a Framework for Cooperation in Trade and Investment; launched a Financial and Economic Partnership; launched a dialogue on the Global Commons; and announced cooperation in the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership, being established by India. So much of the thunder had already rolled.

Adding to the difficulty of making the presidential visit a clear success was the absence of high-voltage signing ceremonies, since there had been little progress in negotiations on three crucial issues— cooperation in nuclear power generation, high value defence contracts and three “foundation” defence agreements.

Nevertheless, Barack Obama conjured a rabbit out of a hat, telling an applauding Indian Parliament that Washington would support India’s candidature for a permanent seat in a reformed UN Security Council and also linking Pakistan unambiguously to cross-border terrorism.

From Russia with Love While the US has clearly supplanted Russia as India’s key geo-political partner, with multiple areas of cooperation other then the strategic spheres, Obama’s visit has starkly illustrated Russia’s lead as India’s biggest defence partner. While the US defence industry is viewed in commercial

46

AFP

their economies and by the seemingly unstoppable rise of an increasingly muscular China and its inward looking, liberal, democratic, free-market culture.

Consider the figures. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, calling for foreign assistance during his recent visit to Malaysia, announced that India would spend US $1 trillion on infrastructure in the 12th Five-Year Plan (between 2011-2012 and 2016-17). Minister for Road Transport and Highways, Kamal Nath, has declared that India must develop 70,000km of highways each year. New Delhi’s expenditure on foreign military equipment is projected to soon exceed $50 billion a year.

And last, but not least, with domestic nuclear liability legislation passed, and with New Delhi having signed up in October to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC), India could buy a mindboggling $150 billion worth of nuclear reactors over the coming decade. With the wounds from a global economic slump still raw, these figures are like magic balm.

Also facilitating this string of visits is India’s unstated foreign policy of “multialignment”, effective since 1999, which has involved forging strong bilateral relationships with all global and regional powers, including those like China whose relations with India may be troubled in significant ways. Since each individual relationship is leveraged by the combined weight of all the others, Delhi punches well above its weight in the global arena. Look no further for an illustration of the effectiveness of “multi-alignment” than Premier Wen Jiabao’s acceptance of New Delhi’s invitation to visit, in the wake of three presidents.

“Multi-alignment” also drives the less visible, but equally important, relationships that can hardly be eclipsed by the big visits under way. The PM’s October dialogues with Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and Malaysia have drawn these important countries closer to India, a process also driven by China’s recent assertiveness. And India’s growing profile in multilateral forums was highlighted again at the just-concluded G-20 meeting in Seoul, where New Delhi ensured that the final communiqué included the need for the growth agendas to also cater for development.

DECEMBER 2010

terms—a source of cutting-edge, but expensive, over-the-counter equipment— Russia is an established strategic ally, a source of key technologies, of equipment like nuclear powered submarines that India could get from nowhere else and a partner for the cost-effective development of the most technologically-advanced military equipment, such as nextgeneration fighter aircraft.

The only defence deal that could be scraped together for the American president’s visit was an in-principle agreement to buy the amazingly capable, and astonishingly expensive, C-17 Globemaster III transport aircraft for an eyepopping US $580 million apiece (if India takes it with all the trimmings). In contrast, with President Medvedev’s visit still to take place, a raft of contracts are almost ready for signing, The highlight is likely to be the

Aircraft (MRTA). The Brahmos Preliminary Design Contract Prime Minister for jointly developing the so- Manmohan Singh with missile joint venture is developing an air-launched called Fifth Generation Fighter French President version of the world’s only Aircraft (FGFA), towards which Nicolas Sarkozy in supersonic cruise missile, New Delhi and Moscow will New Delhi which would be deployed on contribute an initial amount of Russian-designed Sukhoi-30MKI fighters.

US $6 billion apiece.

Moscow has custom-designed an Meanwhile, even before Medvedev touches down in Delhi, the Indian Navy engine for Hindustan Aeronautics (IN) will take delivery of the INS Chakra, an Limited’s Sitara Intermediate Jet Trainer Akula II class nuclear attack submarine, (IJT) aircraft. And the Defence Research which Russia is handing over on a ten year and Development, Organisation (DRDO) lease, for an estimated amount of between laboratory, Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE)—which does not $650 million and a billion dollars.

These landmark deals will be in possess engine flight-testing facilities— addition to several ongoing development continues to test its Kaveri aircraft jet programmes that testify to the breadth and engine on a flying test bed in the Gromov depth of the Russia-India defence Flight Research Institute near Moscow. relationship. Entities from the two sides Ironically, the US has long featured GTRE have already pledged US $300 million on its “Entities List” of foreign establishments each to co-develop a Multi-Role Transport under sanctions; at the time of going to press,

47

DSI

two weeks after Obama’s announcement that Indian entities will be removed from the list, nothing appears to have changed.

Washington forbade US companies, Boeing and Lockheed Martin, from providing consultancy to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) development programme.

And India’s unwillingness to put its signature on three “foundation” defence agreements that America wants it to sign— the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA); the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation (BECA); and the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA)—means that the Pentagon’s, and the US State Department’s notorious bureaucracy is unlikely to bury its obdurate reluctance to grant technology licences to India.

That notwithstanding, America’s defence sales to India continue to grow, a testament to the skill of US defence corporations at building some kinds of military systems better than anybody else in the world. India’s expenditure of $342 million on US defence equipment from 2001-2006, shot up in 2007-2009 to $4.1 billion, including the billion-dollar purchase of six C-130J Super Hercules; the $1.1 billion acquisition of Boeing VVIP jets for Indian political leaders; and the $2.1 billion contract for 8 Poseidon MMAs. In the pipeline today are American contracts for at least $8 billion. These include the $5.8 billion purchase of ten C17 Globemaster III strategic airlifters; and 145 M777 155mm ultralight howitzers (ULHs) from BAE Systems for $647 million.

India has also taken to buying US missiles: besides the 24 Harpoon II anti-ship missiles bought for the IAF’s maritime strike Jaguar squadron for $170 million, the Indian Navy is also considering the Harpoon II for its P8I Poseidon MMAs. And Defence Minister A.K. Antony has confirmed that Washington has been approached for the purchase of the fire-and-forget, manportable Javelin anti-armour missile through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route. With the Indian Army’s infantry battalions holding barely half their authorisation of over 80,000 missiles, the technology transfer contract for the Javelin is set to be a multi-billion dollar one.

The French Connection President Nicolas Sarkozy too brings to New Delhi a major defence agenda, especially given the European military

2ND DEFENCE SHOPPING LIST.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd

12/24/10

11:35 AM

Page 48

BILATERAL RELATIONS While the US has clearly supplanted Russia as India’s key geo-political partner, with multiple areas of cooperation other then the strategic spheres, President Obama’s visit has starkly illustrated Russia’s lead as India’s biggest defence partner.

Russia is an established strategic ally.

”

AFP

cost-cutting exercises that British Prime Minister replaced by the Rafale. Whether are most prominently David Cameron inspects or not Sarkozy touches on this symbolised by the UK a guard of honour at the subject, he would almost certainly Strategic Defence and Presidential Palace in talk up the capabilities of Security Review (SDSR). New Delhi Dassault’s Rafale MMRCA, which With London and Paris IAF sources say, has performed moving towards operating their naval well in flight evaluation trials. aircraft off a common British-built aircraft None of the other five MMRCA carrier, European defence industries are contenders underestimate the French more dependent than ever before on big President’s ability to politically support his foreign customers like India. defence industry. Brazil’s selection of a The Sarkozy visit’s military centrepiece fighter has been stalled for a year, even appears to be the signing of a $2 billion though Brazil’s air force has apparently contract for upgrading the IAF’s 52 Mirage preferred the Swedish, Gripen NG to the 2000 aircraft to Mirage 2000-5 standard. Rafale and the F/A-18, the other two fighters One of its mainstays for over two decades, in the fray. But a final decision remains the IAF lobbied early this decade for the deadlocked, allegedly because Sarkozy transfer to India of the Mirage 2000 plant, has convinced Brazil’s outgoing President, which Dassault was replacing with the Lula de Silva, that France would offer an Rafale assembly line. That would have unmatched technology partnership for made the Mirage 2000-5 the mainstay of the Brazil’s defence industry. During his visit IAF’s medium fighter fleet. But the to India, Sarkozy would, almost certainly, Ministry of Defence (MoD), reluctant to make a similar technology-based pitch enter into a single vendor contract, opted for the Rafale. Indian planners would instead to float a global tender for 126 certainly be interested in a package that Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft includes French nuclear submarine (MMRCA), for which Dassault fielded its technology, to diversify the almost total new Rafale fighter. dependence on Russia.

Finally, with India moving forward on Even today, a small coterie of Mirage 2000 enthusiasts still argue for scrapping the realising its second submarine line, Sarkozy expensive MMRCA contract and transferring will back French shipyard, Direction des the Mirage 2000 production line to India, or Constructions Navales (DCN), which is even buying up the French Air Force’s fleet of already partnering Mazagon Dock Limited Mirage 2000-5 fighters, which are being in the much-delayed $5 billion project to

48

build six Scorpene attack submarines. The French will argue that a second line of submarines will create issues of non-standardisation and inter-operability; instead, it would be better to double the Scorpene order to 12 boats. With the technology transfer already paid for, follow-on submarines would work out significantly cheaper.

Glimpses of the Future Other than American companies, the world’s major defence vendors, including Russian, Israeli, British and French companies, are all exploring joint development with Indian entities, rather than over-the-counter sales or the technology transfer route for selling military equipment to India. Interestingly, the DRDO has recently expressed interest in joint development projects with US companies.

Once joint development becomes the norm, and partnership negotiations are conducted between companies or entities rather than between ministries and government departments, visits by heads of states and governments might become more about diplomacy and economics and less about military sales. For now, though, that remains in the future; this New Delhi winter will see significant deal-making as global defence majors come to town.

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DECEMBER 2010

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a n

u p d a t e

o n

d e f e n c e

c o m m e r c i a l

n e w s

defencebuzz

RAHUL BEDI

SU-30MKI Combat Aircraft

Upgrading the Flying Machines THE Indian Air Force (IAF) presently leads the country’s substantial materiel purchases.

These include Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) engines for fitment onto the indigenously-designed Tejas Mk2 Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) and additional Very Heavy Lift Transport Aircraft (VHLTA).

The IAF is also conducting field trials for basic trainers, is poised to hold trials for attack and heavy-lift helicopters and to issue tenders for Multi-Role Tanker Transporters (MRTTs) and medium-lift transport aircraft.

In October, Air Chief Marshal P. V. Naik announced the acquisition of 250-300 advanced FGFA from 2017 onwards. India is co-developing the FGFA with Russia in a programme worth US$ 30-33 billion. The FGFA successfully carried out its maiden test flight in January 2010.

This advanced fighter induction will render it India’s largest ever defence purchase since Independence and it includes contributing US$ 8-10 billion towards developmental costs to jointly design the FGFA based on the Russian SukhoiT-50 PAK-FA (Perspektivnyi Aviatsionnyi Kompleks Frontovoi Aviatsy or Prospective Aircraft Complex of Frontline Aviation) programme.

Officials indicate that the two sides are expected to sign the FGFA preliminary design

49

contract during Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to New Delhi this December. A substantial portion of the payment towards the FGFA is also expected to be handed over by India to a cash-strapped Moscow after inking the deal to develop the 30-tonne fighter, which industry sources claim, compares more than favourably with its competitor, the Lockheed Martin-designed F- 22 Raptor.

Each PAK-FA—a swing-role platform with advanced avionics, stealth to increase survivability, 360 degree situational awareness, smart weapons, data-links and high-end mission computers — is expected to cost around US$ 100 million.

The IAF which earlier this year announced the procurement of an additional 42 Flanker-H Su-30MKI combat aircraft for US$ 3.33 billion in a bid to bolster its fast depleting fighter squadrons is also expected to confirm the purchase during Medvedev’s trip. The supplementary Su 30-MKI order will over the next six-eight years increase their total number in the IAF to 272, making it the single largest type of fighter in the force.

Alongside, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has selected General Electric’s GE-F414 engine over Eurojet’s EJ200 power pack for the LCA Mk2

Defence Buzz.qxd:DSI Defence Talk-May09.qxd

12/24/10

11:39 AM

Page 50

DEFENCE BUZZ trials of basic trainers at its Jamnagar fighter base featuring at least eight competitors. EADS’s PZLWarszawa-Okecie (with its PZL-130 Orlik TC-II), Brazil’s Embraer (EMB 312 Super Tucano), Germany’s Grob Aircraft Company (G 120 TP), Italy’s Finmeccanica (M-311), Korea Aerospace Industries (KT-1), Switzerland’s Pilatus (PC-21) and USA’s Hawker Beechcraft Corporation’s T-6C are competing for the IAF’s tender for the outright purchase of 75 desperately needed trainers.

An additional 106 aircraft will be licence-built by HAL to replace the IAF’s fleet of 180-200 locally-constructed Hindustan Piston Trainer—HPT32. The initial trainers had been grounded in July 2009 following a series of fatal accidents.

The selected vendor will need to supply the first 12 of 75 trainers to the IAF within 24 months of the contract being inked with the remaining deliveries completed within 48 months.

Further IAF procurements led to the issuance of a Request for Proposal (RfP) to at least three overseas vendors for six MRTT, estimated at around US$2 billion, to enhance the strike range of its combat fleet and support out of area operations.The RfP, dispatched nine months after a similar MRTT contract, was cancelled and sent to Europe’s EADS, Russia’s Rosonboronexport and USA’s Boeing with bids to be submitted

by December 15.

The earlier US$ 1.06 billion MRTT terminated contract had the EADS’s-built

C-130J Super Hercules Military Transport Aircraft

50

Airbus Military A330 platform as the IAF’s preferred choice over the rival Russian Ilyushin IL-78. The force has acquired six of these aircraft in 2004 for Rs 800 crore.

Repeated requests by the IAF to Defence Minister A. K. Antony not to cancel the MRTT deal following finance ministry objections to the A330’s high cost were summarily overruled. Recent media reports indicate that Airbus Military is expected to re-field the A330 MRTT. The IAF’s requirement for air tankers remains urgent as it adds 200-300 additional fighters to its inventory over the next 10-15 years.

The IAF is also in the process of negotiating the purchase of six more Lockheed Martin-designed and built C-130J Super Hercules tactical transporters and is finalising its requirement for 16 medium-lift transport aircraft for which Italy’s Alenia Aeronautica’s C27J Spartan and EADS’ CASA C 295 were under evaluation.

The two rival models have undergone field trials last December—conducted by the IAF—to facilatate the Border Security Force’s tender for two transport aircraft.

The 16 transporters for the IAF, for which a RfP is imminent to the two competitors, will supplement the IAF’s fleet of around 104 Russian-built Antonov-32 twin-engine turboprop planes currently undergoing an upgrade in Ukraine under a US$ 400 million contract.

Leap of Faith US President Barack Obama’s successful India visit during which he announced easing of the over three decade-old embargo on the export of dual use technology and hi-tech items to New Delhi will doubtlessly boost American materiel imports and collaborations as the two countries enhance their strategic partnership.

But removal of the veto imposed after India’s first nuclear test in 1974 and reinforced following the May 1988 multiple atomic explosions does not automatically mean that India will be the recipient of cutting-edge US military equipment and technology.

This remains overshadowed by Delhi not agreeing to two US pacts—the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMoA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation (BECA)—both of which encompass American defence technology transfers to overseas customers to preclude the possibility of any leakage.

The US also wants India to sign the Logistic Support Agreement (LSA) which Washington terms a “housekeeping pact” that will permit the two militaries reciprocal use of each other’s facilities for servicing, refueling and maintenance.

In late December, for instance, the IAF is scheduled to take delivery of the first of six C-130J Super Hercules military transport aircraft it has acquired two years ago for US$ 964 million at a facility in Georgia, USA. But with India not being a signatory to either CISMoA or BECA, the platform’s overall efficacy remains in doubt as it will not be fitted with five crucial communication and satellite navigational aids. IAF officers believe this will compromise the operational efficiency of the C-130Js customised in support of Special Forces operations.

Not agreeing to CISMoA and BECA will also adversely impinge on the capabilities of eight Boeing P-8I Poseidon multi-mission maritime reconnaissance aircraft which the Indian Navy (IN) has acquired for US $2.1 billion—and recently agreed to procure four more—and the C-17s as well as all future US defence equipment India might acquire.

This aspect will also considerably neutralise the big leap of faith undertaken by the Indian military in opting, after decades, for US materiel which comes not only with a heavy political tag but also deployment conditionalities and those concerning modifications and retrofitment to suit local climatic and terrain requirements.

Last year, however, India grudgingly agreed to the End-User Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) with the US following protracted negotiations lasting over two years but only after Delhi secured the concession that it will determine the time and location of the American equipment verification process by US inspectors. India has steadfastly opposed the EUMA provisions which mandate the US’s right to physically inspect all American materiel deployed by any customer.

Meanwhile, Air Chief Marshal (ACM) P.V. Naik has claimed that the absence of communication equipment aboard the C-130Js will in no way compromise their operational efficiency, an assertion strongly refuted by others who maintain that not having it will reduce the transporters to little more than sophisticated aerial platforms.

Ahead of Obama’s arrival ACM Naik and the IN chief Nirmal Verma also, reportedly, informed the Ministry of Defence (MoD) that there was ‘little’ to be gained by signing

DSI

AFP

programme.The DRDO, however, declined to confirm the price of the 99 GE F414s that would replace GE’s F404-GE-IN20 after burner engines that power the IAFs first two squadrons of 40 LCA MK1s. Industry sources, however, estimate the deal to be over US$ 800 million.

Ten of the 99 GE F414 engines will be imported and the remainder built locally by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in Bangalore through a transfer of technology.

Officials estimate some 200-250 engines will eventually be required for six-seven squadrons of 100-115 Tejas Mk2s, including twin-seat trainer models. The under-development LCA’s naval version too will be fitted with the GE F414s.

The GE F414 engine provides a 95-100 kilonewton (KN) thrust far more than the 80-85 KN thrust of the F404-GE-IN20 power pack which severely compromises the LCA’s weapons load and angle of attack in keeping with the IAF’s stipulated qualitative staff requirements.

US President Barack Obama meanwhile confirmed during his India visit, the sale of an additional 10 Boeing C-17 Globemaster III VHLTA to the IAF, an induction that will significantly augment its strategic reach.

Industry sources estimate the proposed acquisition of ten more C-17s—like the equal number agreed to earlier—to be around US$ 5.8 billion. Once inked, the 20 C-17s will be India’s most expensive US materiel purchase estimated at around US$ 11 billion.

In early October, the IAF began field

DECEMBER 2010

National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon the CISMoA and the Logistic Support Agreement (LSA) as to do so would convey “negative” signals to rival materiel suppliers like Russia, Israel and France in addition carrying with it larger political ramifications of being ‘tied’ to the US. The military’s argument is that CISMoA is aimed primarily at “interoperability” between NATO forces and India not being Washington’s military ally rendered this aspect, and hence the pact, redundant.

National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon speaking separately concurred declaring that the proposed pacts were “something new” for India and that it was unused to dealing with such agreements.

“We have to see whether this (signing them) is a feasible route,” Menon cautiously added.

Shopping Spree THE IN has dispatched a global Request for Information (RfI) for six-eight medium range maritime reconnaissance aircraft (MRMRA) and an unspecified number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to augment India’s coastal security.

The RfI for the outright purchase of twin-engine MRMRA with a 350-500 nm range, 3.5 hour endurance and speed of over 200 knots was sent to Canada’s Bombardier, Russia’s Antonov, Spain’s CASA and USA’s Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation and Lockheed Martin. The proposed MRMRA, with a 360 degree radar and open architecture avionics, will also be required to perform an anti-submarine and anti-ship role. All vendors are to respond by

51

December 31 and trials could well be scheduled for mid-2011.

The proposed MRMRA will replace the IN’s ageing 13 Pilatus Britten-Norman Islanders BN 2A/2B MRAs-retrofitted to BN 2T standard and constitute part of the IN’s evolving three-tier maritime aerial surveillance architecture being put in place after the November 2008 terror attacks on Mumbai by Pakistani gunmen that were launched via the Arabian Sea. This grid covering India’s 5,422-km long coastline, 1,197 islands and 2.01 million sq km of Exclusive Economic Zone—expected to increase to around 3 million sq km after the delineation of the Continental Shelf—will also eventually include 12 Boeing P12 P-8I Poseidon multi-mission maritime reconnaissance aircraft of which the import of eight had been agreed and the purchase of four more was nearing closure.

The IN’s proposed MRMRA and UAV acquisitions come alongside the study expansion of the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) that is presently evaluating Canada’s Bombardier-Q400 and Russia’s Beriev BE-200 amphibious aircraft with plans to eventually procure six of either model. The aerial dimension of the ICG’s 15-year perspective plan (2007-22) envisages inducting 42 new aircraft in addition to the existing 24 twin-turboprop Dornier Do 228s and 21 helicopters it operates.

In September 2010, India’s Cabinet Committee on Security, headed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, approved Phase-II of the country’s coastal security architecture to be implemented from April 1, 2011 for an estimated Rs 1,100 crore.

Defence Buzz.qxd:DSI Defence Talk-May09.qxd

12/24/10

11:39 AM

Page 50

DEFENCE BUZZ trials of basic trainers at its Jamnagar fighter base featuring at least eight competitors. EADS’s PZLWarszawa-Okecie (with its PZL-130 Orlik TC-II), Brazil’s Embraer (EMB 312 Super Tucano), Germany’s Grob Aircraft Company (G 120 TP), Italy’s Finmeccanica (M-311), Korea Aerospace Industries (KT-1), Switzerland’s Pilatus (PC-21) and USA’s Hawker Beechcraft Corporation’s T-6C are competing for the IAF’s tender for the outright purchase of 75 desperately needed trainers.

An additional 106 aircraft will be licence-built by HAL to replace the IAF’s fleet of 180-200 locally-constructed Hindustan Piston Trainer—HPT32. The initial trainers had been grounded in July 2009 following a series of fatal accidents.

The selected vendor will need to supply the first 12 of 75 trainers to the IAF within 24 months of the contract being inked with the remaining deliveries completed within 48 months.

Further IAF procurements led to the issuance of a Request for Proposal (RfP) to at least three overseas vendors for six MRTT, estimated at around US$2 billion, to enhance the strike range of its combat fleet and support out of area operations.The RfP, dispatched nine months after a similar MRTT contract, was cancelled and sent to Europe’s EADS, Russia’s Rosonboronexport and USA’s Boeing with bids to be submitted

by December 15.

The earlier US$ 1.06 billion MRTT terminated contract had the EADS’s-built

C-130J Super Hercules Military Transport Aircraft

50

Airbus Military A330 platform as the IAF’s preferred choice over the rival Russian Ilyushin IL-78. The force has acquired six of these aircraft in 2004 for Rs 800 crore.

Repeated requests by the IAF to Defence Minister A. K. Antony not to cancel the MRTT deal following finance ministry objections to the A330’s high cost were summarily overruled. Recent media reports indicate that Airbus Military is expected to re-field the A330 MRTT. The IAF’s requirement for air tankers remains urgent as it adds 200-300 additional fighters to its inventory over the next 10-15 years.

The IAF is also in the process of negotiating the purchase of six more Lockheed Martin-designed and built C-130J Super Hercules tactical transporters and is finalising its requirement for 16 medium-lift transport aircraft for which Italy’s Alenia Aeronautica’s C27J Spartan and EADS’ CASA C 295 were under evaluation.

The two rival models have undergone field trials last December—conducted by the IAF—to facilatate the Border Security Force’s tender for two transport aircraft.

The 16 transporters for the IAF, for which a RfP is imminent to the two competitors, will supplement the IAF’s fleet of around 104 Russian-built Antonov-32 twin-engine turboprop planes currently undergoing an upgrade in Ukraine under a US$ 400 million contract.

Leap of Faith US President Barack Obama’s successful India visit during which he announced easing of the over three decade-old embargo on the export of dual use technology and hi-tech items to New Delhi will doubtlessly boost American materiel imports and collaborations as the two countries enhance their strategic partnership.

But removal of the veto imposed after India’s first nuclear test in 1974 and reinforced following the May 1988 multiple atomic explosions does not automatically mean that India will be the recipient of cutting-edge US military equipment and technology.

This remains overshadowed by Delhi not agreeing to two US pacts—the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMoA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation (BECA)—both of which encompass American defence technology transfers to overseas customers to preclude the possibility of any leakage.

The US also wants India to sign the Logistic Support Agreement (LSA) which Washington terms a “housekeeping pact” that will permit the two militaries reciprocal use of each other’s facilities for servicing, refueling and maintenance.

In late December, for instance, the IAF is scheduled to take delivery of the first of six C-130J Super Hercules military transport aircraft it has acquired two years ago for US$ 964 million at a facility in Georgia, USA. But with India not being a signatory to either CISMoA or BECA, the platform’s overall efficacy remains in doubt as it will not be fitted with five crucial communication and satellite navigational aids. IAF officers believe this will compromise the operational efficiency of the C-130Js customised in support of Special Forces operations.

Not agreeing to CISMoA and BECA will also adversely impinge on the capabilities of eight Boeing P-8I Poseidon multi-mission maritime reconnaissance aircraft which the Indian Navy (IN) has acquired for US $2.1 billion—and recently agreed to procure four more—and the C-17s as well as all future US defence equipment India might acquire.

This aspect will also considerably neutralise the big leap of faith undertaken by the Indian military in opting, after decades, for US materiel which comes not only with a heavy political tag but also deployment conditionalities and those concerning modifications and retrofitment to suit local climatic and terrain requirements.

Last year, however, India grudgingly agreed to the End-User Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) with the US following protracted negotiations lasting over two years but only after Delhi secured the concession that it will determine the time and location of the American equipment verification process by US inspectors. India has steadfastly opposed the EUMA provisions which mandate the US’s right to physically inspect all American materiel deployed by any customer.

Meanwhile, Air Chief Marshal (ACM) P.V. Naik has claimed that the absence of communication equipment aboard the C-130Js will in no way compromise their operational efficiency, an assertion strongly refuted by others who maintain that not having it will reduce the transporters to little more than sophisticated aerial platforms.

Ahead of Obama’s arrival ACM Naik and the IN chief Nirmal Verma also, reportedly, informed the Ministry of Defence (MoD) that there was ‘little’ to be gained by signing

DSI

AFP

programme.The DRDO, however, declined to confirm the price of the 99 GE F414s that would replace GE’s F404-GE-IN20 after burner engines that power the IAFs first two squadrons of 40 LCA MK1s. Industry sources, however, estimate the deal to be over US$ 800 million.

Ten of the 99 GE F414 engines will be imported and the remainder built locally by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in Bangalore through a transfer of technology.

Officials estimate some 200-250 engines will eventually be required for six-seven squadrons of 100-115 Tejas Mk2s, including twin-seat trainer models. The under-development LCA’s naval version too will be fitted with the GE F414s.

The GE F414 engine provides a 95-100 kilonewton (KN) thrust far more than the 80-85 KN thrust of the F404-GE-IN20 power pack which severely compromises the LCA’s weapons load and angle of attack in keeping with the IAF’s stipulated qualitative staff requirements.

US President Barack Obama meanwhile confirmed during his India visit, the sale of an additional 10 Boeing C-17 Globemaster III VHLTA to the IAF, an induction that will significantly augment its strategic reach.

Industry sources estimate the proposed acquisition of ten more C-17s—like the equal number agreed to earlier—to be around US$ 5.8 billion. Once inked, the 20 C-17s will be India’s most expensive US materiel purchase estimated at around US$ 11 billion.

In early October, the IAF began field

DECEMBER 2010

National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon the CISMoA and the Logistic Support Agreement (LSA) as to do so would convey “negative” signals to rival materiel suppliers like Russia, Israel and France in addition carrying with it larger political ramifications of being ‘tied’ to the US. The military’s argument is that CISMoA is aimed primarily at “interoperability” between NATO forces and India not being Washington’s military ally rendered this aspect, and hence the pact, redundant.

National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon speaking separately concurred declaring that the proposed pacts were “something new” for India and that it was unused to dealing with such agreements.

“We have to see whether this (signing them) is a feasible route,” Menon cautiously added.

Shopping Spree THE IN has dispatched a global Request for Information (RfI) for six-eight medium range maritime reconnaissance aircraft (MRMRA) and an unspecified number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to augment India’s coastal security.

The RfI for the outright purchase of twin-engine MRMRA with a 350-500 nm range, 3.5 hour endurance and speed of over 200 knots was sent to Canada’s Bombardier, Russia’s Antonov, Spain’s CASA and USA’s Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation and Lockheed Martin. The proposed MRMRA, with a 360 degree radar and open architecture avionics, will also be required to perform an anti-submarine and anti-ship role. All vendors are to respond by

51

December 31 and trials could well be scheduled for mid-2011.

The proposed MRMRA will replace the IN’s ageing 13 Pilatus Britten-Norman Islanders BN 2A/2B MRAs-retrofitted to BN 2T standard and constitute part of the IN’s evolving three-tier maritime aerial surveillance architecture being put in place after the November 2008 terror attacks on Mumbai by Pakistani gunmen that were launched via the Arabian Sea. This grid covering India’s 5,422-km long coastline, 1,197 islands and 2.01 million sq km of Exclusive Economic Zone—expected to increase to around 3 million sq km after the delineation of the Continental Shelf—will also eventually include 12 Boeing P12 P-8I Poseidon multi-mission maritime reconnaissance aircraft of which the import of eight had been agreed and the purchase of four more was nearing closure.

The IN’s proposed MRMRA and UAV acquisitions come alongside the study expansion of the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) that is presently evaluating Canada’s Bombardier-Q400 and Russia’s Beriev BE-200 amphibious aircraft with plans to eventually procure six of either model. The aerial dimension of the ICG’s 15-year perspective plan (2007-22) envisages inducting 42 new aircraft in addition to the existing 24 twin-turboprop Dornier Do 228s and 21 helicopters it operates.

In September 2010, India’s Cabinet Committee on Security, headed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, approved Phase-II of the country’s coastal security architecture to be implemented from April 1, 2011 for an estimated Rs 1,100 crore.

Defence Buzz.qxd:DSI Defence Talk-May09.qxd

12/24/10

11:36 AM

Page 52

DEFENCE BUZZ Indo-Russia Bhai Bhai IN a bid to retain its dominant position in India’s highly lucrative but crowded weapons’ bazaar, Russia is broadening defence co-operation with New Delhi through military exercises it rarely ever conducted earlier to enhance ‘interoperability’ which too it is unlikely to ever operationalise.

Consequently, the two armies conducted their third edition of Indra battalion-level, counter-terrorism exercises at Chaubattia in Uttarakhand, featuring around 600 Russian and Indian soldiers simulating operations in a semi-urbanised environment.

And to retain its weapon’s sales preeminence with regard to India it is even considering selling Delhi strategic defence technologies to thwart competition from countries like Israel and the US. Since 2003, Israel has emerged as the second largest supplier of military equipment to Delhi after Russia.

“Growing international competition for the Indian defence market will push Russia to expand its cooperation with India into new sectors where it has no rivals, such as strategic weapons and technologies,” Konstantin Makienko of the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) said in Moscow ahead of the 10th session of the India-Russia intergovernmental commission on military-technical cooperation in Delhi.

Makienko suggested that the two countries can diversify their defence ties into nuclear submarine technologies despite continuing international restrictions against India.

“India’s de facto joining of the nuclear

DECEMBER 2010

club makes such restrictions rather pointless,” he declared, adding that Russia was interested in strengthening Delhi’s defence potential without any limitations.

Russia was already helping India acquire nuclear submarine capability having aided it considerably in developing the INS Arihant, the 6,000-tonne indigenous nuclear powered submarine (SSN) launched in July 2009, after decades of delay due to technological problems to bolster the sea leg of the country’s strategic deterrence.

And in March 2011 the IN will take delivery of one Project 971 (Akula II-class) SSN it had leased from Russia for US$ 650-700 million. The 12,000-tonne Nerpa (K-152) was part of a secret agreement concluded for two SSNs in January 2004 alongside the IN’s ‘related’ deal to acquire INS Vikramaditya (formerly Admiral Gorshkov), the second-hand 44,750 tonne Kiev-class aircraft carrier and 16 MiG 29Ks. For now, however, the IN was exercising its option to lease only one SSN. According to the Russian Centre for Analysis of International Weapons Trade in 2010-2013 India accounted for 54.4 percent of Russian weapon exports estimated at over US$ 15 billion, an amount Moscow was unwilling to see depreciated in ongoing troubled economic times.

India has annually conducted US$ 1,500 million worth of defence business with Russia and since the early 1960s had acquired military goods worth over US$ 40 billion from Moscow.

Along with Russia, the US, Israeli, Western and other global materiel suppliers were eyeing India’s projected allocation of US$ 30 billion between 2012-2017—an amount expected to increase to US$ 80 billion by 2022—to modernise its military equipped with obsolete Soviet and Russian equipment facing collective obsolescence.

Bit of Bolt Action

Indian and Russian soldiers during a counterterrorism exercise in Uttarakhand

THE Indian Army’s Special Forces (SF) is currently evaluating sniper rifles ahead of importing 900-1,000 pieces to bolster its insurgency fighting capability. A team of specialists has concluded visits to Finland, Israel and the US to assess three competing sniper rifles for outright purchase for an estimated US$ 10-12 million. These include Finland’s bolt-action SAKO TRG-22/24, Israel Weapon Industries (IWIs) semi-automatic Galil 7.62x54mm sniper model and Sig Sauer of USA’s SSG 3000 bolt-action, magazine-fed rifle.

52

DSI

Indian sniper aiming at a target In an associated development, the Army has also concluded field trials of two competing, single barrel, pump action 12-gauge shotguns of which the SF are acquiring around 800 for around US$ 4.4 million. Two subsidiaries of Italy’s Baretta-Beneli and Stoeger in Turkey are competing for the tender and a decision is expected soon. A repeat order for 1,000 additional shotguns for the SF and other units is likely in addition to ammunition purchases.

But despite the niche SF purchases modernisation of the Army’s 359 infantry battalions and 66 associated units of the Rashtriya Rifles (RR), the military’s ‘dedicated’ counter-insurgency force, remains mired in bureaucratic delays and inter-departmental disagreements within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and its numerous divisions.

Over six years ago, the infantry directorate had projected a requirement for the Indian Army’s long-pending requirement for varied infantry weaponry through imports and local manufacture valued at around Rs 113 billion (US $2.5 billion) remains mired in bureaucratic delays and inter-departmental disagreements within the MoD and its numerous divisions.

Its 359 infantry battalions and 66 associated units of the RR a specialised counter-insurgency (COIN) force has over six years ago projected a requirement for 420,000-odd close quarter and new generation protective carbines to replace their obsolete 9mm carbines.

Their other demands include some 210,000 assault rifles, over 200,000 close quarter battle carbines, around 210,000 new generation protective carbines and 15,000 general purpose machine guns and 1,100 anti-materiel rifles all of which were years away from acquisition.

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