Defence and Security of India - June 2011 issue

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AEROSPACE

NEW CHALLENGES The serviceability of aircraft is dependent on its logsitics system I Jasjit Singh INDO-FRENCH DEFENCE RELATIONS

GREAT EXPECTATIONS There has been a renewed spotlight on the defence cooperation between India and France I Kanwal Sibal JUNE 2011

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA

DSI VOLUME 3

ISSUE 6

` 250

MAKING

HEADWAY WHY HAVE THE DASSAULT RAFALE AND EUROFIGHTER TYPHOON BEEN SHORTLISTED FOR THE LUCRATIVE MEDIUM MULTI-ROLE COMBAT AIRCRAFT DEAL? I V.K. BHATIA

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Letter from the Editor 2nd time.qxd:contents-aug.qxd 28/06/11 9:28 AM Page 2

JUNE 2011

LETTER FROM THE

DSI

editor

W

ay back in 1909 the Paris automobile show dedicated a section of its exhibition to planes. That was the beginning of the 102-year-old Paris Air Show now held every alternate year. Over the decades, the Air Show has become a landmark event for both the defence and commercial aviation industries. The current 49th edition has over 2,000 exhibitors from 50 countries showing 140 aircraft. This edition of the air show is particularly significant as it comes at an important turnaround of the industry after four years of recession and crippling petroleum prices.

Conventionally, the biggest buzz in the air show has always been the American Boeing and European Airbus rivalries, but this year the buzz at Le Bourget was around the downselecting of two European vendors, the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Dassault Rafale for the $10 billion Indian contract for the Multi-Medium Role Combat aircraft. The other platforms competing for the 126-aircraft tender were Boeing’s F/A-18E/F, Lockheed Martin’s F-16IN, the Russian United Aircraft Corporation’s MiG-35 and Saab’s JAS 39 Gripen NG. DSI scrutinises why the American fighter jets had not made that crucial final cut. Did important political and economic considerations and domestic compulsions play a role?

The possibility that France’s Dassault Rafale may be the final choice once again puts the spotlight on defence relations between India and France. Despite a history of strong linkages, France’s share in India’s defence market remains a negligible 2.45 percent compared to Russia’s 76.65 percent. Should France be the eventual winner for the MMRCA deal, France will move up the ladder.

Fifty years ago, for 30 chilling days it seemed the two giants of Asia, India and China, were playing out the possibility of a war that could suck in the entire region and, possibly, go beyond. The SinoIndian war of 1962 was a mighty moment in Asia’s military history. For both these Asian powers it was a kind of test. The crisis did not blow up suddenly it took its time coming. In hindsight, it served some purpose. Though there has been no comparable collision since then, the rivals have not exactly warmed up to each other. There are endemic border disputes, India is uncomfortable with the Chinese military build-up in the Northeast and a further irritant is the presence of the People’s Liberation Army in Gilgit-Baltistan, which shows that China remains a reliable ally of Pakistan. Fifty years on, DSI replays history and focuses on how tensions have continued.

As usual we welcome all your suggestions, criticisms and comments. Write to us at feedback.

DSI@mitil.biz. Should you want to subscribe then contact us at dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz and our marketing department will do the rest.

Mannika Chopra EDITOR Defence & Security of India

1

Conventionally, the biggest buzz in the air show has always been the Boeing and European Airbus rivalries but this year the buzz was around the downselecting of two European vendors, the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Dassault Rafale, for the $10 billion contract for the Multi-Medium Role Combat aircraft.

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CONTENTS

JUNE 2011

AEROSPACE MAINTENANCE

DSI

16

NEW CHALLENGES Technology in general, especially if it is connected to aerospace systems, has been advancing at an exponential rate. One obvious challenge of such a rapid advancement is the high rate of obsolescence of systems, subsystems and components which is taking place particularly given the longer life of a platform. For example, a combat aircraft today has a productive life of at least 30-40 years compared to the 10-15 years it had five decades ago.

INDO-FRENCH DEFENCE RELATIONS 22

REGION

40

The shortlisting of the French Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon as the final contenders for the highly lucrative Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft deal puts a renewed spotlight on Indo-French defence relations, particularly as the US combat aircraft have been excluded.

troops in Pakistan’s Northern Areas should be a cause for concern for the region. India needs to study the full implications of this activity, especially as China seems to have shifted its policy relating to the Kashmir issue from one of noninterference to that of actively supporting Pakistan.

DISORDER ON GREAT THE BORDER EXPECTATIONS The noticeable presence of Chinese

MARITIME STRATEGY

28

FROM BROWN TO BLUE WATER COVER STORY

6

AND THE WINNER IS...

India’s shortlisting of French Dassault Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon and the elimination of four aircraft vendors in the $10 billion Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft deal has raised questions over the process of selection

2

The emphasis of India’s maritime strategy has been to play a greater role in the security of the Indian Ocean.

NEIGHBOURS

34

UNFINISHED FIGHT The immediate fallout of Osama Bin Laden’s death will bring a qualitative change in Afghanistan with its inevitable effects on Pakistan.

3

Contents-June:contents-feb-R.qxd 28/06/11 10:30 AM Page 2

CONTENTS

JUNE 2011

AEROSPACE MAINTENANCE

DSI

16

NEW CHALLENGES Technology in general, especially if it is connected to aerospace systems, has been advancing at an exponential rate. One obvious challenge of such a rapid advancement is the high rate of obsolescence of systems, subsystems and components which is taking place particularly given the longer life of a platform. For example, a combat aircraft today has a productive life of at least 30-40 years compared to the 10-15 years it had five decades ago.

INDO-FRENCH DEFENCE RELATIONS 22

REGION

40

The shortlisting of the French Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon as the final contenders for the highly lucrative Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft deal puts a renewed spotlight on Indo-French defence relations, particularly as the US combat aircraft have been excluded.

troops in Pakistan’s Northern Areas should be a cause for concern for the region. India needs to study the full implications of this activity, especially as China seems to have shifted its policy relating to the Kashmir issue from one of noninterference to that of actively supporting Pakistan.

DISORDER ON GREAT THE BORDER EXPECTATIONS The noticeable presence of Chinese

MARITIME STRATEGY

28

FROM BROWN TO BLUE WATER COVER STORY

6

AND THE WINNER IS...

India’s shortlisting of French Dassault Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon and the elimination of four aircraft vendors in the $10 billion Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft deal has raised questions over the process of selection

2

The emphasis of India’s maritime strategy has been to play a greater role in the security of the Indian Ocean.

NEIGHBOURS

34

UNFINISHED FIGHT The immediate fallout of Osama Bin Laden’s death will bring a qualitative change in Afghanistan with its inevitable effects on Pakistan.

3

Contributors-June 2011-3rd Time.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 28/06/11 11:23 AM Page 4

CONTRIBUTORS

JUNE 2011

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA JUNE 2011 VOLUME 3, NUMBER 6 EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

VINOD KUMAR BHATIA

JASJIT SINGH

KANWAL SIBAL

P.K. GHOSH

ASAD DURRANI

VIJAY OBEROI

A fighter pilot, Air Marshal Vinod Kumar Bhatia (retd) has 5,500 hours of flying to his credit. A qualified pilot attack instructor, he has spent several years on flying instructional duties both in India and abroad. He was the Deputy Director General in the Defence Planning Staff; Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Operations) and the Inspector General Flight safety and inspection. He was awarded Vir Chakras in the Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971; Ati Vishisht Seva Medal in 1992 and Param Vishisht Seva Medal in 1998.

Currently, he writes on aviation and defence issues.

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh (retd) served in the IAF for 34 years as a fighter pilot in key command and staff appointments, including as Director of Operations and has been decorated for gallantry. He was awarded with the Padma Bhushan for life-time contribution to national defence and security. He was director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses for 14 years and since 2001 he has been heading the Centre for Air Power Studies in New Delhi.

Kanwal Sibal was Foreign Secretary to the Government of India from 2002 to 2003.

Most recently he was India’s Ambassador to Russia (20042007). Joining the Indian Foreign Service in 1966, he began his career in France.

He has been the Deputy Spokesperson in the Ministry of External Affairs (1973-1975). Currently, he is a member of the National Security Advisory Board and is the President of Association of Indian Diplomats.

Dr P.K. Ghosh is a senior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, India and lead co-chairperson and India representative at the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific International Study Group on Maritime Security.

He has also served with many think tanks and was a research fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. He is the founder-member of the National Maritime Foundation. He has edited three books and written many research articles in national and international journals.

Lt Gen Asad Durrani (retd) joined the Pakistan Army in 1959. During his military career he was an instructor at the Pakistan Military Academy and the Command and Staff College. He also headed the Military and then the Inter-Services Intelligence. After a General Staff Course in Hamburg, he was appointed the country’s Defence Attaché in Germany. He took part in Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971. Post-retirement he was Pakistan’s Ambassador to Germany and to Saudi Arabia.

Vijay Oberoi, founderdirector of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) for over four years is also the founder-president of the War Wounded Foundation which works for the rehabilitation of war disabled personnel. A post graduate in Defence Studies and an International Fellow at the Army War College in USA, he was commissioned into the Army in 1961. He retired as Vice-Chief of Army Staff in 2001 and has travelled extensively, including to Pakistan in 2003, as part of the Track II level talks. He has also edited several books on security and intelligence.

INDER MALHOTRA

RAHUL BEDI

Inder Malhotra has been a syndicated columnist since taking premature retirement as editor of TheTimes of India, New Delhi. He was with The Statesman for 15 years and wrote for The Guardian.

He has lectured widely in India and abroad, including major universities in the United States and England.

His publications include Indira Gandhi: A Personal & Political Biography, Dynasties Of India And Beyond and a fresh biography of Indira Gandhi. He is presently working on a book on Indian Security: Past, Present and Future.

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhi correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly, UK, and contributes to it on a diverse range of security and military related matters.

He is also the India correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, London, and the Irish Times.

Maneesha Dube EDITOR

Mannika Chopra SENIOR SUB-EDITOR

Urmila Marak CREATIVE DIRECTOR

Bipin Kumar DESIGN

Ajay Kumar (Sr Designer), Sujit Singh SENIOR MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

Vishal Mehta DEPUTY MANAGER MARKETING

Tarun Malviya SALES & MARKETING COORDINATOR

Atul Bali CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

Sunil Gujral PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS

Sunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender Pandey MEDIATRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED

323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016 Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 CHAIRMAN

J. S. Uberoi PRESIDENT

Xavier Collaco FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES Australia Charlton D'Silva, Mass Media Publicitas Tel: (61 2) 9252 3476 Email: cdsilva@publicitas.com France/Spain Stephane de Remusat, REM International Tel: (33) 5 3427 0130 Email: sremusat@aol.com Germany/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UK Sam Baird, Whitehill Media Tel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646 E-Mail: sam@whitehillmedia.com Israel Liat Heiblum, Oreet - International Media Tel: (97 2) 3 570 6527 Email: liat@oreet-marcom.com Russia Alla Butova, NOVO-Media Ltd, Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653 Email :alla@mediatransasia.com Scandinavia/Benelux/South Africa Tony Kingham, KNM Media Tel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465 E-Mail: tony.kingham@worldsecurity-index.com Singapore Constance Lee Tel: (65) 91814747 Mobile: (65) 98863762 Email: constance.lsc@gmail.com South Korea Young Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc. Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13 E-Mail: jesmedia@unitel.co.kr USA (East/South East)/Canada Margie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.

Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581 Email :margiespub@rcn.com USA (West/SouthWest)/Brazil Diane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc. Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557 Email: blackrockmedia@cox.net Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India Limited.

Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to Media Transasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit.

All correspondence should be addressed to Media Transasia India Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of India is obtained by subscription.

For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

www.mediatransasia.in/defence.html http://www.defencesecurityindia.com

Contributors-June 2011-3rd Time.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 28/06/11 11:23 AM Page 4

CONTRIBUTORS

JUNE 2011

DSI

DEFENCE and SECURITY of INDIA JUNE 2011 VOLUME 3, NUMBER 6 EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

VINOD KUMAR BHATIA

JASJIT SINGH

KANWAL SIBAL

P.K. GHOSH

ASAD DURRANI

VIJAY OBEROI

A fighter pilot, Air Marshal Vinod Kumar Bhatia (retd) has 5,500 hours of flying to his credit. A qualified pilot attack instructor, he has spent several years on flying instructional duties both in India and abroad. He was the Deputy Director General in the Defence Planning Staff; Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Operations) and the Inspector General Flight safety and inspection. He was awarded Vir Chakras in the Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971; Ati Vishisht Seva Medal in 1992 and Param Vishisht Seva Medal in 1998.

Currently, he writes on aviation and defence issues.

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh (retd) served in the IAF for 34 years as a fighter pilot in key command and staff appointments, including as Director of Operations and has been decorated for gallantry. He was awarded with the Padma Bhushan for life-time contribution to national defence and security. He was director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses for 14 years and since 2001 he has been heading the Centre for Air Power Studies in New Delhi.

Kanwal Sibal was Foreign Secretary to the Government of India from 2002 to 2003.

Most recently he was India’s Ambassador to Russia (20042007). Joining the Indian Foreign Service in 1966, he began his career in France.

He has been the Deputy Spokesperson in the Ministry of External Affairs (1973-1975). Currently, he is a member of the National Security Advisory Board and is the President of Association of Indian Diplomats.

Dr P.K. Ghosh is a senior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, India and lead co-chairperson and India representative at the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific International Study Group on Maritime Security.

He has also served with many think tanks and was a research fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. He is the founder-member of the National Maritime Foundation. He has edited three books and written many research articles in national and international journals.

Lt Gen Asad Durrani (retd) joined the Pakistan Army in 1959. During his military career he was an instructor at the Pakistan Military Academy and the Command and Staff College. He also headed the Military and then the Inter-Services Intelligence. After a General Staff Course in Hamburg, he was appointed the country’s Defence Attaché in Germany. He took part in Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971. Post-retirement he was Pakistan’s Ambassador to Germany and to Saudi Arabia.

Vijay Oberoi, founderdirector of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) for over four years is also the founder-president of the War Wounded Foundation which works for the rehabilitation of war disabled personnel. A post graduate in Defence Studies and an International Fellow at the Army War College in USA, he was commissioned into the Army in 1961. He retired as Vice-Chief of Army Staff in 2001 and has travelled extensively, including to Pakistan in 2003, as part of the Track II level talks. He has also edited several books on security and intelligence.

INDER MALHOTRA

RAHUL BEDI

Inder Malhotra has been a syndicated columnist since taking premature retirement as editor of TheTimes of India, New Delhi. He was with The Statesman for 15 years and wrote for The Guardian.

He has lectured widely in India and abroad, including major universities in the United States and England.

His publications include Indira Gandhi: A Personal & Political Biography, Dynasties Of India And Beyond and a fresh biography of Indira Gandhi. He is presently working on a book on Indian Security: Past, Present and Future.

Rahul Bedi is the New Delhi correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly, UK, and contributes to it on a diverse range of security and military related matters.

He is also the India correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, London, and the Irish Times.

Maneesha Dube EDITOR

Mannika Chopra SENIOR SUB-EDITOR

Urmila Marak CREATIVE DIRECTOR

Bipin Kumar DESIGN

Ajay Kumar (Sr Designer), Sujit Singh SENIOR MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETING

Vishal Mehta DEPUTY MANAGER MARKETING

Tarun Malviya SALES & MARKETING COORDINATOR

Atul Bali CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

Sunil Gujral PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS

Sunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender Pandey MEDIATRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED

323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016 Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 CHAIRMAN

J. S. Uberoi PRESIDENT

Xavier Collaco FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES Australia Charlton D'Silva, Mass Media Publicitas Tel: (61 2) 9252 3476 Email: cdsilva@publicitas.com France/Spain Stephane de Remusat, REM International Tel: (33) 5 3427 0130 Email: sremusat@aol.com Germany/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UK Sam Baird, Whitehill Media Tel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646 E-Mail: sam@whitehillmedia.com Israel Liat Heiblum, Oreet - International Media Tel: (97 2) 3 570 6527 Email: liat@oreet-marcom.com Russia Alla Butova, NOVO-Media Ltd, Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653 Email :alla@mediatransasia.com Scandinavia/Benelux/South Africa Tony Kingham, KNM Media Tel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465 E-Mail: tony.kingham@worldsecurity-index.com Singapore Constance Lee Tel: (65) 91814747 Mobile: (65) 98863762 Email: constance.lsc@gmail.com South Korea Young Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc. Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13 E-Mail: jesmedia@unitel.co.kr USA (East/South East)/Canada Margie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.

Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581 Email :margiespub@rcn.com USA (West/SouthWest)/Brazil Diane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc. Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557 Email: blackrockmedia@cox.net Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India Limited.

Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to Media Transasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit.

All correspondence should be addressed to Media Transasia India Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Defence and Security of India is obtained by subscription.

For subscription enquiries, please contact: dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

www.mediatransasia.in/defence.html http://www.defencesecurityindia.com

Combat Aviation-2nd Time.e$S:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 9:41 AM Page 2

COMBAT AVIATION

JUNE 2011

AND THE WINNER IS...

The elimination of four out of six aircraft vendors from the $10 billion global competition to buy 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft has raised questions over the process of selection

KEY POINTS n Out of an exhaustive 643 parametres examined by the IAF during the flight evaluation phases only the European fighters met the most criteria. n The selection of two European jet combat fighters, Eurofighter Typhoon and Dassault Rafale, prove that the heavy-weights have been shortlisted. n Defence experts are baffled as to why Boeing’s Super Hornet did not make the cut.

fter another agonising lull since the completion of the field evaluations of all the contending aircraft in pursuit of India’s mother of all defence deals, the winds seem to be favouring West European skies for the finalising of the $10 billion Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) contract. India has finally shortlisted two out of the six vendors

A

competing for the 126 MMRCA programme and both are from Europe. The final race is now between the French Dassault Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon, built by a four European-nation consortium of European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) — a global pan-European aerospace and defence corporation.

The Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has accordingly asked the two European companies to extend their commercial bids which were to have expired by end-April till December 31. Ministry officials have also confirmed that the other four vendors: the US Boeing (F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet) and Lockheed Martin (F-16 IN Super Viper), Russian UAC Mikoyan (MiG-35) and the Swedish Saab (JAS-39 Gripen NG) have been asked not to extend their commercial bids. A defence ministry official who did not want to be identified said: “The four companies that have not made the shortlist have been rejected on technical grounds and the

DSI

reasons for rejection have been conveyed to them individually.”

Separately, Saab, Boeing and Lockheed Martin confirmed their exit from contention in what is being termed as one of the most highly prized defence contracts in recent times. “We have received this decision and will closely monitor the future process and provide additional information if requested by the Indian ministry of defence,” Saab has said in a statement. The Seattle-based US company Boeing reacted strongly at its Super Hornet proposal not being listed in the initial down-select, adding, “Our next step is to request and receive a debrief from the Indian Air Force. Once we have received the details, we will make a decision concerning our possible options…”

Lockheed Martin restricted its comments stating it had been told by US authorities that Washington will respond to the Indian defence ministry’s letter on the competition. There was no response from the Russian side.

V. K. BHATIA

EAD’s Eurofighter Typhoon

6

7

Combat Aviation-2nd Time.e$S:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 9:41 AM Page 2

COMBAT AVIATION

JUNE 2011

AND THE WINNER IS...

The elimination of four out of six aircraft vendors from the $10 billion global competition to buy 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft has raised questions over the process of selection

KEY POINTS n Out of an exhaustive 643 parametres examined by the IAF during the flight evaluation phases only the European fighters met the most criteria. n The selection of two European jet combat fighters, Eurofighter Typhoon and Dassault Rafale, prove that the heavy-weights have been shortlisted. n Defence experts are baffled as to why Boeing’s Super Hornet did not make the cut.

fter another agonising lull since the completion of the field evaluations of all the contending aircraft in pursuit of India’s mother of all defence deals, the winds seem to be favouring West European skies for the finalising of the $10 billion Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) contract. India has finally shortlisted two out of the six vendors

A

competing for the 126 MMRCA programme and both are from Europe. The final race is now between the French Dassault Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon, built by a four European-nation consortium of European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) — a global pan-European aerospace and defence corporation.

The Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has accordingly asked the two European companies to extend their commercial bids which were to have expired by end-April till December 31. Ministry officials have also confirmed that the other four vendors: the US Boeing (F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet) and Lockheed Martin (F-16 IN Super Viper), Russian UAC Mikoyan (MiG-35) and the Swedish Saab (JAS-39 Gripen NG) have been asked not to extend their commercial bids. A defence ministry official who did not want to be identified said: “The four companies that have not made the shortlist have been rejected on technical grounds and the

DSI

reasons for rejection have been conveyed to them individually.”

Separately, Saab, Boeing and Lockheed Martin confirmed their exit from contention in what is being termed as one of the most highly prized defence contracts in recent times. “We have received this decision and will closely monitor the future process and provide additional information if requested by the Indian ministry of defence,” Saab has said in a statement. The Seattle-based US company Boeing reacted strongly at its Super Hornet proposal not being listed in the initial down-select, adding, “Our next step is to request and receive a debrief from the Indian Air Force. Once we have received the details, we will make a decision concerning our possible options…”

Lockheed Martin restricted its comments stating it had been told by US authorities that Washington will respond to the Indian defence ministry’s letter on the competition. There was no response from the Russian side.

V. K. BHATIA

EAD’s Eurofighter Typhoon

6

7

Combat Aviation-2nd Time.e$S:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 9:42 AM Page 4

COMBAT AVIATION

JUNE 2011

DSI

India’s MMRCA saga unfolded with the IAF’s request in 2001 for the immediate acquisition of 126 combat jet fighters from foreign sources to offset the country’s lagging indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programme.

The LCATejas has been under development since the late 1980s and was aimed to fulfill deficiencies arising in India’s fighter fleets.

A pilot gets into the cockpit of a Rafale jet fighter

AFP

”

MMRCA Saga India’s MMRCA saga unfolded with the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) request in 2001 for the immediate acquisition of 126 combat jet fighters from foreign sources to offset the country’s lagging indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programme. The LCA Tejas has been under development since the late 1980s, aimed to fulfill deficiencies arising in our fighter fleets due to the compulsory retirement of older

aircraft — the MiG-21s and the MiG-23s.

But the ambitious programme had reached only the first prototype stage in 2001 and was nowhere on the horizon for eventual induction into the IAF. In the meantime, the IAF started to lose its combat squadrons strength at an alarming rate.

Initially, the IAF was targetting a lightweight fourth generation combat aircraft of the Mirage 2000-5 class with around 15 to 20 tonnes AUW (All Up Weight), capable of

8

both air defence and ground attack.

However, in 2005, following a revision of the IAF’s requirements to fulfill its emerging roles of ‘air dominance’ and ‘strategic reach,’ the capability-envelope of the proposed MMRCA was restructured to include heavier aircraft in the 25 to 30 tonnes AUW. The outcome was more contenders joining in the competition such as Boeing with its F/A-18 Super Hornet offer and the Eurofighter with its Typhoon while the French Dassault offer of Mirage 2000-5 was replaced by its latest swing-role fighter, the Rafale.

Following the dispatch of the Request for Proposal (RfP) in 2006, six frontrunners emerged: Lockheed Martin’s latest F-16 Fighting Falcon; Boeing’s F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet; Russia’s RAC MiG-35; Dassault’s Rafale; Saab JAS-39 Gripen and the Eurofighter Typhoon.

The heady mix of contenders vying for the same deal with similar, as well as differing, characteristics and performance attributes, was almost like mixing apples with oranges. The contenders could be placed under two weight categories — that is, light-weight and heavy-weight, depending on their individual AUW. The second classification was based on the single/twin engine configurations. Yet another categorisation related to the age of

WE GUARAN T EE YOU R EN EM IES WON ’ T L IK E T H IS

For today’s warfighter and homeland protectors, L-3 WESCAM continually reinvests in turret and sensor development to provide unambiguous clarity in its

MX-20

full-motion video. Because critical decisions depend on seeing what the eye can’t, WESCAM incorporates the very best imaging technology into the MX-Series to protect your people and national infrastructure. WESCAM’s 2011 product line enhancements include: HD IR, full-motion video channels, a laser spot tracker, an embedded navigation grade IMU, short wave IR and a 10-sensor payload capacity.

MX-15HDi

MX-10

To learn more, visit www.wescam.com WESCAM

216X276.indd 1

L-3com.com 5/24/11 11:35:14 AM

Combat Aviation-2nd Time.e$S:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 9:44 AM Page 6

COMBAT AVIATION

JUNE 2011

C L E A R E D F O R TA K E - O F F, O R N O T

MiG-35 fighter jets against Moscow’s skyline

Rafale

F-16 C/D Block 60)

Gripen JAS-39

MiG-35

10.95

13.62

10.80

10 (with tip missiles)

8.40

11.99

15.96

18.38

15.27

15.03

14.10

17.37

5.28

4.88

5.34

5.09

4.50

5.18

11,150

14,009

9,850

8,581

6,620

10.000+

25,500

29,937

25,000

22,500

14,000

22,400

2xKlimov RD-33

2 x Eurojet

2xF 414GE-400

2xSNEC MA M88-2

1xF 110-132

1xRM 12 (F404-GE-400) (alternative One GE/Volvo Flygmotor

2x90

2x98

2x73

130

80.5

2x85

EAD’S Eurofighter has offered the latest Tranche-3 Typhoon, equipped with the Captor-E (Caesar) AESA radar. EADS has also invited India to become a partner in the Eurofighter Typhoon programme.

If the Typhoon wins the contract it will be given technological and development participation in future models of the aircraft.

If India becomes the fifth partner of the Eurofighter programme it will be able to manufacture assemblies for the new Eurofighters.

The manufacturer has also offered to include thrust vectoring nozzles with the Eurofighter’s EJ200 engines for India.

The Super Hornet variant being offered to India, the F/A-18IN, is based on the F/A18E/F model flown by the US Navy.

Raytheon’s APG-79 AESA radar being offered with the aircraft will come with limited transfer of technology, up to the level approved by the US government but meeting India’s RfP requirements. Boeing has also proposed the joint manufacture of the fighters with Indian partners. In order to satisfy the offset requirements, Boeing has signed long-term partnership agreements with HAL, Tata Industries and Larsen & Toubro.

The Rafale has the advantage of being logistically and operationally similar to the Mirage 2000, which the IAF has been operating for over two decades now. The French government has cleared full technology transfer of the Rafale to India, including that of the RBE2-AA (active array) AESA radar, which will be integrated with the Rafale being offered to the IAF. The IAF will also have full access to the source codes, which will allow Indian scientists to reprogramme any sensitive equipment.

Lockheed Martin has offered a customised version of the F-16, the F-16IN Super Viper. It is more advanced than the F-16 block 52s sold to Pakistan. Based closely on the F-16E/F Block 60, the features of the F-16IN included conformal fuel tanks, a Northrop Grumman AN-APG-80 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, a General Electric F110-132A engine with 143 kN full reheat thrust with Full Authority Digital Engine Control and advanced all-colour glass cockpit.

The single-engine Saab JAS 39 Gripen has been in contention for the MMRCA competition from the very beginning. The aircraft, both the single and twin-seat versions, have flown extensively during many of the Aero India air shows.

Gripen International offered the Gripen Next Generation for the IAF with increased fuel capacity, more powerful engine, higher payload and upgraded avionics.

It is also to be fitted with AESA radar.

The Mikoyan MiG-35 is the production version of the latest MiG-29 incorporating mature development of the MiG-29M/M2 and MiG-29K/KUB technology, such as glass cockpit and fly-by-wire and AESA radar. The Russian manufacturer was also offering full transfer of technology.

If continuity play a major role in aircraft selection, MiG-35 would have had a decisive advantage as the IAF already operates 65 MiG-29s and the Navy 16 MiG-29Ks for its forthcoming aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya (ex- Admiral Gorshkov).

BRIEFING

POWR PLANT

F/A-18E/F

10

AFP

L I G H T- W E I G H T

Eurofighter Typhoon

THRUST (kN)

WEIGHTS Max T-O Empty (kg) (kg)

DIMENSIONS Height Length Wing (m) Span (m) (m)

H E AV Y- W E I G H T

DSI

the aircraft. Among the contending platforms, the F-16 Fighting Falcon and the JAS-39 Gripen were single-engine platforms, while the remaining were twin-engine.

Again, the F-16 and the Gripen could be clubbed in the light-weight class, whereas their twin-engine cousins, the F-18 Super Hornet, Rafale and the Typhoon, belonged to the heavy-weight class. The Russian MiG-35 on the other hand was really a fence-sitter between the two classes but could have been grouped with the lightweights owing to its other attributes.

From the initial issuance of the Request for Information (RfI) in 2003, India’s MRCA project continued to move up the accretion scale as bigger and more advanced jet fighters started to join the lucrative programme. As a matter of fact another ‘M’ was added to the MRCA nomenclature and the whole deal came to be known as the MMRCA project.

The roaring skies of Bengaluru during as many as three biennial Aero India air shows (2007, 2009 and lately, 2011) stood testimony

to the fact that the selection process, though long, was fiercely competitive. How each vendor had been jostling for the contract, trying hard to outdo the others could be gleaned from their individual offerings (see table on facing page).

Strong Dissensions With the IAF gradually moving into a mission creep mode, it was clear that there were greater chances of the heavy-weights getting the nod for shortlisting. That the Russians and the Swedes had already got a whiff of which way the winds were blowing was evident in view of the total absence of the MiG-35 fighters from the Russian side and a comparatively low profile participation by the Swedish Saab’s Gripen team during the Aero India 2011 air show. Lockheed Martin’s F-16IN Super Viper, though a superb fighter in its own right, apart from being bracketed in the light-weight category, also had to contend with the psychological disadvantage of the F-16s being in service with the Pakistan Air

11

Force. In the end, the selection of the Eurofighter Typhoon and Dassault Rafale amply proved the point of the heavyweights being shortlisted.

However, what baffled many defence experts and industry watchers was why Boeing’s Super Hornet had not made the final cut. But, perhaps, even this should not come as a surprise. Even with the excellent addition of the latest avionics and weapons capabilities there was the possibility that the aircraft’s older airframe design (without the fore canards and other aerodynamic refinements) could be found wanting in aerodynamic manoeuvring vis-àvis its more recently designed fourth generation competitors.

Needless to say, the initial reaction in American defence circles to the non-inclusion in the shortlist of US jet fighters contending for India’s MMRCA’s programme was one of deep disappointment. Though not openly acknowledged, it was generally believed that India discarding the US airplanes to

Combat Aviation-2nd Time.e$S:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 9:44 AM Page 6

COMBAT AVIATION

JUNE 2011

C L E A R E D F O R TA K E - O F F, O R N O T

MiG-35 fighter jets against Moscow’s skyline

Rafale

F-16 C/D Block 60)

Gripen JAS-39

MiG-35

10.95

13.62

10.80

10 (with tip missiles)

8.40

11.99

15.96

18.38

15.27

15.03

14.10

17.37

5.28

4.88

5.34

5.09

4.50

5.18

11,150

14,009

9,850

8,581

6,620

10.000+

25,500

29,937

25,000

22,500

14,000

22,400

2xKlimov RD-33

2 x Eurojet

2xF 414GE-400

2xSNEC MA M88-2

1xF 110-132

1xRM 12 (F404-GE-400) (alternative One GE/Volvo Flygmotor

2x90

2x98

2x73

130

80.5

2x85

EAD’S Eurofighter has offered the latest Tranche-3 Typhoon, equipped with the Captor-E (Caesar) AESA radar. EADS has also invited India to become a partner in the Eurofighter Typhoon programme.

If the Typhoon wins the contract it will be given technological and development participation in future models of the aircraft.

If India becomes the fifth partner of the Eurofighter programme it will be able to manufacture assemblies for the new Eurofighters.

The manufacturer has also offered to include thrust vectoring nozzles with the Eurofighter’s EJ200 engines for India.

The Super Hornet variant being offered to India, the F/A-18IN, is based on the F/A18E/F model flown by the US Navy.

Raytheon’s APG-79 AESA radar being offered with the aircraft will come with limited transfer of technology, up to the level approved by the US government but meeting India’s RfP requirements. Boeing has also proposed the joint manufacture of the fighters with Indian partners. In order to satisfy the offset requirements, Boeing has signed long-term partnership agreements with HAL, Tata Industries and Larsen & Toubro.

The Rafale has the advantage of being logistically and operationally similar to the Mirage 2000, which the IAF has been operating for over two decades now. The French government has cleared full technology transfer of the Rafale to India, including that of the RBE2-AA (active array) AESA radar, which will be integrated with the Rafale being offered to the IAF. The IAF will also have full access to the source codes, which will allow Indian scientists to reprogramme any sensitive equipment.

Lockheed Martin has offered a customised version of the F-16, the F-16IN Super Viper. It is more advanced than the F-16 block 52s sold to Pakistan. Based closely on the F-16E/F Block 60, the features of the F-16IN included conformal fuel tanks, a Northrop Grumman AN-APG-80 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, a General Electric F110-132A engine with 143 kN full reheat thrust with Full Authority Digital Engine Control and advanced all-colour glass cockpit.

The single-engine Saab JAS 39 Gripen has been in contention for the MMRCA competition from the very beginning. The aircraft, both the single and twin-seat versions, have flown extensively during many of the Aero India air shows.

Gripen International offered the Gripen Next Generation for the IAF with increased fuel capacity, more powerful engine, higher payload and upgraded avionics.

It is also to be fitted with AESA radar.

The Mikoyan MiG-35 is the production version of the latest MiG-29 incorporating mature development of the MiG-29M/M2 and MiG-29K/KUB technology, such as glass cockpit and fly-by-wire and AESA radar. The Russian manufacturer was also offering full transfer of technology.

If continuity play a major role in aircraft selection, MiG-35 would have had a decisive advantage as the IAF already operates 65 MiG-29s and the Navy 16 MiG-29Ks for its forthcoming aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya (ex- Admiral Gorshkov).

BRIEFING

POWR PLANT

F/A-18E/F

10

AFP

L I G H T- W E I G H T

Eurofighter Typhoon

THRUST (kN)

WEIGHTS Max T-O Empty (kg) (kg)

DIMENSIONS Height Length Wing (m) Span (m) (m)

H E AV Y- W E I G H T

DSI

the aircraft. Among the contending platforms, the F-16 Fighting Falcon and the JAS-39 Gripen were single-engine platforms, while the remaining were twin-engine.

Again, the F-16 and the Gripen could be clubbed in the light-weight class, whereas their twin-engine cousins, the F-18 Super Hornet, Rafale and the Typhoon, belonged to the heavy-weight class. The Russian MiG-35 on the other hand was really a fence-sitter between the two classes but could have been grouped with the lightweights owing to its other attributes.

From the initial issuance of the Request for Information (RfI) in 2003, India’s MRCA project continued to move up the accretion scale as bigger and more advanced jet fighters started to join the lucrative programme. As a matter of fact another ‘M’ was added to the MRCA nomenclature and the whole deal came to be known as the MMRCA project.

The roaring skies of Bengaluru during as many as three biennial Aero India air shows (2007, 2009 and lately, 2011) stood testimony

to the fact that the selection process, though long, was fiercely competitive. How each vendor had been jostling for the contract, trying hard to outdo the others could be gleaned from their individual offerings (see table on facing page).

Strong Dissensions With the IAF gradually moving into a mission creep mode, it was clear that there were greater chances of the heavy-weights getting the nod for shortlisting. That the Russians and the Swedes had already got a whiff of which way the winds were blowing was evident in view of the total absence of the MiG-35 fighters from the Russian side and a comparatively low profile participation by the Swedish Saab’s Gripen team during the Aero India 2011 air show. Lockheed Martin’s F-16IN Super Viper, though a superb fighter in its own right, apart from being bracketed in the light-weight category, also had to contend with the psychological disadvantage of the F-16s being in service with the Pakistan Air

11

Force. In the end, the selection of the Eurofighter Typhoon and Dassault Rafale amply proved the point of the heavyweights being shortlisted.

However, what baffled many defence experts and industry watchers was why Boeing’s Super Hornet had not made the final cut. But, perhaps, even this should not come as a surprise. Even with the excellent addition of the latest avionics and weapons capabilities there was the possibility that the aircraft’s older airframe design (without the fore canards and other aerodynamic refinements) could be found wanting in aerodynamic manoeuvring vis-àvis its more recently designed fourth generation competitors.

Needless to say, the initial reaction in American defence circles to the non-inclusion in the shortlist of US jet fighters contending for India’s MMRCA’s programme was one of deep disappointment. Though not openly acknowledged, it was generally believed that India discarding the US airplanes to

Combat Aviation-2nd Time.e$S:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 9:44 AM Page 8

COMBAT AVIATION

JUNE 2011

AFP

F/A-18C Hornets and F/A-18E/F Super Hornets line up on the flight deck of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan in Pusan, South Korea

12

DSI

favour one of their European competitors may have led to Timothy Roemer resigning from his ambassadorial post. Critics of the decision asked, how could India do this to the US which, under the Bush Administration, had gone out of its way to see the passage of the extraordinary Indo-US civilian nuclear deal despite strong disapproval — both in local and international circles. Along with the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal, a new framework for the Indo-US defence cooperation had also been signed with both countries joining hands to build a strong long-term defence relationship.

Earlier restrictions had been cast aside and the US had opened its defence sector with almost its entire range of advanced military equipment, including the latest versions of the F-16 and F-18, to India.

When the Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Agreement (also known as the Indo-US 123 Agreement) was passed wags openly asked whether, as a quid-pro-quo, a 123 was going to equal 126? In other words, would the nuclear deal give the US fighters a definitive edge over other contenders in the fiercely competitive IAF project?

But that, unfortunately for the Americans, proved to be an elusive equation as Defence Minister A.K. Antony strictly adhered to three guiding principles in the selection process — IAF’s operational requirements; a final choice that would be competitive, fair and transparent and thirdly, an opportunity through this deal for India’s defence industry to grow to global scales through the transfer of technology. That these principles were followed meticulously — even dogmatically some said — was clearly seen in the absence of all other major considerations such as India’s security and strategic interests and cost factors in the selection process.

Out of an exhaustive 643 parametres examined by the IAF during the technical and flight evaluation phases, out of the six contenders, the European Eurofighter and Rafale were the only finalists which met the most criteria. A former IAF Chief openly commented: “The IAF diligently completed the evaluation and selection process keeping in mind the capabilities required in the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft. Both the Eurofighter Typhoon and Dassault Rafale were found compliant with the IAF’s requirements.”

Inevitably, disparate explanations emerged as to why the US companies had been excluded from the MMRCA contract.

It was said that the US was perceived as an unreliable arms supplier; that India was

216X276.indd 1

5/25/11 9:00:43 AM

Combat Aviation-2nd Time.e$S:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 9:44 AM Page 10

COMBAT AVIATION

JUNE 2011

DSI

The Americans may have lost the MMRCA deal but in the few years of opening up of its defence market it remains a major beneficiary of Indian defence orders. Starting with the Boeing Business Jets, other IAF orders include the C-130J Super Hercules and the C-17 Globe Master III. The US would do well to remember that many more defence deals are coming its way.

A giant billboard of a Swedish Saab JAS39 Gripen multi-role fighter aircraft displayed at the Aero Show 2011, Bengaluru

AFP

”

unhappy about America’s policy of continuing to arm Pakistan; that the final list was linked fundamentally to issues of technology transfer vis-à-vis US companies; and that India desired to be a strategic partner of the US’s rather than a client. Some critics even went to the extent of suggesting that the recent spate of Wikileaks stories published by The Hindu,

which had somehow shown India leaning towards America, was instrumental in rejecting the US fighters.

Actually none of these factors individually influenced India’s decision in favouring the European fighter jets. While Indo-US defence cooperation may be faced with different challenges, in the long run, none of these elements, especially the idea of

14

an abortive military sale, could have impinged on the growing strategic partnership between two of the world’s two biggest democracies. As outgoing US Ambassador Roemer said: “The US-India relationship continues on a positive historic trajectory,” and that, “horizons of our relationship truly have no limits.” But some cynics still believed, as Prime Minister

Manmohan Singh had said in the context of the MMRCA contract, that, “The maximum possible geo-political and diplomatic mileage should be derived from military deals of such nature.” Inevitably, there was a latent feeling that the selection of the two European companies though ostensibly merit-based could have been the result of a subtle geo-political angle.

Still a Beneficiary The Americans may have lost the MMRCA deal but in the few years of the opening up of its defence market it remains a major beneficiary of Indian defence orders.

Starting with the Boeing Business Jets, other IAF orders include the C-130J Super Hercules and the C-17 Globe Master III. The Indian Navy on its part has not only

15

acquired the USS Trenton (now INS Jalashwa) and helicopters but also placed an order for eight P-8I Poseidon with options for more running into billions of dollars.

America may be lamenting at having lost the MMRCA race but they would do well to remember that many more defence deals are coming their way. For example, the IAF is seriously thinking in terms of giving orders to Lockheed Martin for additional C-130J aircraft.

Similarly, the order for the acquisition of C-17 aircraft from Boeing is being revised upwards which could, in dollar terms, come close to the MMRCA outlay. The US companies, especially the F/A-18 Super Hornet manufacturer Boeing, will hopefully look at the bigger picture than myopically challenge the shortlisting. The IAF can hardly afford to have the entire acquisition process getting stalled on some flimsy or slippery technical grounds resulting in a further erosion of its already depleted combat potential.

Undoubtedly, the expeditious conclusion of the MMRCA contract will usher in a much healthier atmosphere for India’s future defence deals in a quest to modernise its armed forces – with favourable winds blowing in every direction.

Combat Aviation-2nd Time.e$S:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 9:44 AM Page 10

COMBAT AVIATION

JUNE 2011

DSI

The Americans may have lost the MMRCA deal but in the few years of opening up of its defence market it remains a major beneficiary of Indian defence orders. Starting with the Boeing Business Jets, other IAF orders include the C-130J Super Hercules and the C-17 Globe Master III. The US would do well to remember that many more defence deals are coming its way.

A giant billboard of a Swedish Saab JAS39 Gripen multi-role fighter aircraft displayed at the Aero Show 2011, Bengaluru

AFP

”

unhappy about America’s policy of continuing to arm Pakistan; that the final list was linked fundamentally to issues of technology transfer vis-à-vis US companies; and that India desired to be a strategic partner of the US’s rather than a client. Some critics even went to the extent of suggesting that the recent spate of Wikileaks stories published by The Hindu,

which had somehow shown India leaning towards America, was instrumental in rejecting the US fighters.

Actually none of these factors individually influenced India’s decision in favouring the European fighter jets. While Indo-US defence cooperation may be faced with different challenges, in the long run, none of these elements, especially the idea of

14

an abortive military sale, could have impinged on the growing strategic partnership between two of the world’s two biggest democracies. As outgoing US Ambassador Roemer said: “The US-India relationship continues on a positive historic trajectory,” and that, “horizons of our relationship truly have no limits.” But some cynics still believed, as Prime Minister

Manmohan Singh had said in the context of the MMRCA contract, that, “The maximum possible geo-political and diplomatic mileage should be derived from military deals of such nature.” Inevitably, there was a latent feeling that the selection of the two European companies though ostensibly merit-based could have been the result of a subtle geo-political angle.

Still a Beneficiary The Americans may have lost the MMRCA deal but in the few years of the opening up of its defence market it remains a major beneficiary of Indian defence orders.

Starting with the Boeing Business Jets, other IAF orders include the C-130J Super Hercules and the C-17 Globe Master III. The Indian Navy on its part has not only

15

acquired the USS Trenton (now INS Jalashwa) and helicopters but also placed an order for eight P-8I Poseidon with options for more running into billions of dollars.

America may be lamenting at having lost the MMRCA race but they would do well to remember that many more defence deals are coming their way. For example, the IAF is seriously thinking in terms of giving orders to Lockheed Martin for additional C-130J aircraft.

Similarly, the order for the acquisition of C-17 aircraft from Boeing is being revised upwards which could, in dollar terms, come close to the MMRCA outlay. The US companies, especially the F/A-18 Super Hornet manufacturer Boeing, will hopefully look at the bigger picture than myopically challenge the shortlisting. The IAF can hardly afford to have the entire acquisition process getting stalled on some flimsy or slippery technical grounds resulting in a further erosion of its already depleted combat potential.

Undoubtedly, the expeditious conclusion of the MMRCA contract will usher in a much healthier atmosphere for India’s future defence deals in a quest to modernise its armed forces – with favourable winds blowing in every direction.

Aerospace.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 9:57 AM Page 2

AEROSPACE MAINTENANCE

JUNE 2011

DSI

The technological and maintenance challenges of an aerospace power rests on the logistics system and its effective functioning

JASJIT SINGH

KEY POINTS n One challenge of a rapid advancement in technology is the high rate of obsolescence of systems, subsystems and components. n The increasing dependence on Original Equipment Manufacturer leads to problems especially if it is located in another country. n The most difficult period in the maintenance of an aircraft are its early years.

Indian Air Force officers work on the Light Combat Aircraft, Tejas, at Yelhanka, Bengaluru

16

17

AFP

T

echnology in general, especially if it is connected to aerospace systems, has been advancing at an exponential rate. One obvious challenge of such a rapid advancement is the high rate of obsolescence of systems, subsystems and components which is taking place particularly given the longer life of a platform. For example, a combat aircraft today has a productive life of at least 30-40 years compared to the 10-15 years it had five decades ago.

On the face of it, a modern aircraft’s lifecycle cost is lower than that of older aircraft.

Compared to the relatively higher cost of the platform of the earlier decades, the cost of a modern aircraft platform is a mere 3040 percent of the total price. But because of the maintenance of the systems and subsystems the life-cycle cost of the total system increases both in terms of spare parts support as well as the replacement of parts due to obsolescence. Smaller production runs further increases costs.

Because of the dynamics of these factors new types of challenges are facing the aerospace industry. Firstly, there is the dependence on the OEM (Original

Aerospace.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 9:57 AM Page 2

AEROSPACE MAINTENANCE

JUNE 2011

DSI

The technological and maintenance challenges of an aerospace power rests on the logistics system and its effective functioning

JASJIT SINGH

KEY POINTS n One challenge of a rapid advancement in technology is the high rate of obsolescence of systems, subsystems and components. n The increasing dependence on Original Equipment Manufacturer leads to problems especially if it is located in another country. n The most difficult period in the maintenance of an aircraft are its early years.

Indian Air Force officers work on the Light Combat Aircraft, Tejas, at Yelhanka, Bengaluru

16

17

AFP

T

echnology in general, especially if it is connected to aerospace systems, has been advancing at an exponential rate. One obvious challenge of such a rapid advancement is the high rate of obsolescence of systems, subsystems and components which is taking place particularly given the longer life of a platform. For example, a combat aircraft today has a productive life of at least 30-40 years compared to the 10-15 years it had five decades ago.

On the face of it, a modern aircraft’s lifecycle cost is lower than that of older aircraft.

Compared to the relatively higher cost of the platform of the earlier decades, the cost of a modern aircraft platform is a mere 3040 percent of the total price. But because of the maintenance of the systems and subsystems the life-cycle cost of the total system increases both in terms of spare parts support as well as the replacement of parts due to obsolescence. Smaller production runs further increases costs.

Because of the dynamics of these factors new types of challenges are facing the aerospace industry. Firstly, there is the dependence on the OEM (Original

Aerospace.qxp:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 9:57 AM Page 4

JUNE 2011

AFP

A pilot in a Sukhoi-30 fighter jet

18

Equipment Manufacturer) which is increasing both on account of replacing spare parts as well as the critical necessity of upgrading systems and subsystems. This potentially leads to serious problems if the OEM is located in another country since the cost of upgrading the system, replacing spares and product support can be very high. In this context, the cost of the Mirage 2000 is a telling example.

Further, this dependence also implies a degree of control by the OEM country on future upgrades and the technological improvement of the aircraft. This makes geopolitical relations between the OEM country and the buyer-country extremely important, more so when their interests may not converge.

Second, because of the long life of the platform, it is almost inevitable that mid-life upgrades will be necessary if the total system has to remain competitive. Actually, a life of 30 years (which takes into account the time for induction and de-induction of the aircraft), implies a planning life of over 40 years. During this period, technology in many areas like radar, missiles and enterprise content management system are almost certain to require at least two upgrades. If this is not catered for in the original contract the buyer-country may end up paying a heavy price or live with suboptimal systems in a rapidly changing technological environment.

In addition, this also raises the issue of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). Here we face an even more complex challenge.

Technology actually rests in the minds of men. Almost all the upgrades and improvements in the MiG-21 (like the four underwing hardpoints and an integral gun) have evolved from concepts and ideas developed in the Indian Air Force (IAF). But when India wanted to upgrade the MiG21bis (the last in the series, according to the Russians) Moscow insisted that it must be a partner in the upgrade and the project was actually delayed because of huge cost over-runs and Russia’s involvement. This issue of IPR will become even more relevant in the coming years because of the repetitive upgrades required during the life-span of an aircraft.

A solution to this problem can be found through the offsets route. In fact, one of the key requirement for offsets should be the establishment of research and development facilities in India by the OEM. The OEM should begin working on the development of designated systems so that a decade after the first aircraft enters service, its first

DSI

An Indian Air Force official inside the cockpit of the newlyinducted Embraers 135 BJ aircraft

upgrade can be undertaken in India by a joint venture between the OEM and India, preferably through the IAF’s Base Repair Depots (BRDs) or with private industry, possibly in a ratio of 70:30.

A second upgrade required another decade later should be similarly undertaken in India but with the proportion of designers and scientists reversed to 30:70. This approach will allow for the development of technology suitable to the Indian environment and create the foundations of such facilities to provide systems and subsystems in say, 10-20 years, for a new combat aircraft that will be required four decades from now whose design work will have to be started in another decade at the latest.

The involvement of the Base Repair Depots will not only enhance the stake of the IAF in the future improvement of the aircraft but also utilise the enormous highquality technological manpower and equipment already available.

While the quality and expertise of maintenance crews plays a major role in keeping aerospace systems operational, the core concern of technological and maintenance of an aerospace power paradoxically rests with the logistics system and its effective functioning. This may

Today, the very basis of logistics is undergoing changes from an inventorybased linear just-in-case logistics system, in which large quantities of all types of spares are stocked in large depots and stations to a just-in-time supplychain approach, in which the user does not stock large inventory of spares but the manufacturer supplies them when a particular spare part is needed.

19

surprise many people — including professional air warriors in the IAF. The serviceability of an aircraft is most influenced by the availability of spare parts. The most difficult period in the maintenance of an aircraft are its early years since adequate data about the rate of consumption of specific parts and frequency of their failure is normally not available then. A reliable data base requires time and experience to be built up to ensure that information is based on a sufficiently large sample. In case of a newly designed aircraft this is an intrinsic deficiency except where design data of the life of spares and components is available.

It is not surprising that the serviceability of an aircraft for the first five-seven years after it enters service — which is directly affected by spare support, besides the ability to diagnose and rectify faults — is generally low — closer to 50 percent if not lower.

Today, the very basis of logistics is undergoing changes from an inventorybased linear just-in-case logistics system, in which large quantities of all types of spares are stocked in large depots and stations to a just-in-time supply-chain approach, in which the user does not stock large inventory of spares but the manufacturer supplies them when a particular spare part is needed. Both approaches have their

AFP

AEROSPACE MAINTENANCE

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JUNE 2011

AFP

A pilot in a Sukhoi-30 fighter jet

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Equipment Manufacturer) which is increasing both on account of replacing spare parts as well as the critical necessity of upgrading systems and subsystems. This potentially leads to serious problems if the OEM is located in another country since the cost of upgrading the system, replacing spares and product support can be very high. In this context, the cost of the Mirage 2000 is a telling example.

Further, this dependence also implies a degree of control by the OEM country on future upgrades and the technological improvement of the aircraft. This makes geopolitical relations between the OEM country and the buyer-country extremely important, more so when their interests may not converge.

Second, because of the long life of the platform, it is almost inevitable that mid-life upgrades will be necessary if the total system has to remain competitive. Actually, a life of 30 years (which takes into account the time for induction and de-induction of the aircraft), implies a planning life of over 40 years. During this period, technology in many areas like radar, missiles and enterprise content management system are almost certain to require at least two upgrades. If this is not catered for in the original contract the buyer-country may end up paying a heavy price or live with suboptimal systems in a rapidly changing technological environment.

In addition, this also raises the issue of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). Here we face an even more complex challenge.

Technology actually rests in the minds of men. Almost all the upgrades and improvements in the MiG-21 (like the four underwing hardpoints and an integral gun) have evolved from concepts and ideas developed in the Indian Air Force (IAF). But when India wanted to upgrade the MiG21bis (the last in the series, according to the Russians) Moscow insisted that it must be a partner in the upgrade and the project was actually delayed because of huge cost over-runs and Russia’s involvement. This issue of IPR will become even more relevant in the coming years because of the repetitive upgrades required during the life-span of an aircraft.

A solution to this problem can be found through the offsets route. In fact, one of the key requirement for offsets should be the establishment of research and development facilities in India by the OEM. The OEM should begin working on the development of designated systems so that a decade after the first aircraft enters service, its first

DSI

An Indian Air Force official inside the cockpit of the newlyinducted Embraers 135 BJ aircraft

upgrade can be undertaken in India by a joint venture between the OEM and India, preferably through the IAF’s Base Repair Depots (BRDs) or with private industry, possibly in a ratio of 70:30.

A second upgrade required another decade later should be similarly undertaken in India but with the proportion of designers and scientists reversed to 30:70. This approach will allow for the development of technology suitable to the Indian environment and create the foundations of such facilities to provide systems and subsystems in say, 10-20 years, for a new combat aircraft that will be required four decades from now whose design work will have to be started in another decade at the latest.

The involvement of the Base Repair Depots will not only enhance the stake of the IAF in the future improvement of the aircraft but also utilise the enormous highquality technological manpower and equipment already available.

While the quality and expertise of maintenance crews plays a major role in keeping aerospace systems operational, the core concern of technological and maintenance of an aerospace power paradoxically rests with the logistics system and its effective functioning. This may

Today, the very basis of logistics is undergoing changes from an inventorybased linear just-in-case logistics system, in which large quantities of all types of spares are stocked in large depots and stations to a just-in-time supplychain approach, in which the user does not stock large inventory of spares but the manufacturer supplies them when a particular spare part is needed.

19

surprise many people — including professional air warriors in the IAF. The serviceability of an aircraft is most influenced by the availability of spare parts. The most difficult period in the maintenance of an aircraft are its early years since adequate data about the rate of consumption of specific parts and frequency of their failure is normally not available then. A reliable data base requires time and experience to be built up to ensure that information is based on a sufficiently large sample. In case of a newly designed aircraft this is an intrinsic deficiency except where design data of the life of spares and components is available.

It is not surprising that the serviceability of an aircraft for the first five-seven years after it enters service — which is directly affected by spare support, besides the ability to diagnose and rectify faults — is generally low — closer to 50 percent if not lower.

Today, the very basis of logistics is undergoing changes from an inventorybased linear just-in-case logistics system, in which large quantities of all types of spares are stocked in large depots and stations to a just-in-time supply-chain approach, in which the user does not stock large inventory of spares but the manufacturer supplies them when a particular spare part is needed. Both approaches have their

AFP

AEROSPACE MAINTENANCE

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AEROSPACE MAINTENANCE

JUNE 2011

DSI

The IAF has an excellent pool of high quality technical manpower whose work efficiency at its Base Repair Depots (BRDs) can take on the most advanced technology systems for third and fourth-line servicing, repair and overhaul. Curiously though South Block is not thinking of the BRDs as potential Maintenance Repair and Overhaul providers and instead prefers to leave it to HAL.

Employees of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited at work at the helicopter division

usefulness and challenges. India, as an importing country has been forced to adopt a just-in-case approach leading to large inventories of spares, a major segment of which may never be used while a small segment is over-used and then not available at crucial times.

Additionally, because of an increasing proportion of electronic systems in the aircraft, spare parts are being replaced by LRU (Line Replacement Units) — black

boxes that can simply be taken out and replaced by serviceable units. This enhances serviceability, reduces time and effort for field maintenance and enhances operational availability. But this is sensitive to capability for test and repair of LRUs at the second-line servicing infrastructure, where they may be termed RRU — Rear Replacement Units. This clearly emphasises the importance of second-line servicing infrastructure and capabilities.

20

From a different perspective, it is worth recalling that while the IAF acquired the Mirage 2000 and the MiG-29 around the same time, a second-line servicing was set up only in the former case. One result was that, for nearly a decade, the ingestion of small bits of concrete or even solidified tar sucked in during the take-off runs in the MiG-29’s low slung air intakes led to the damage of turbine blades. The absence of second-line servicing facilities forced the IAF to remove the engine

and despatch the plane all the way back to its factory in Russia, where, according to their standard operating procedure, the complete engine was overhauled, costs charged to the IAF even if only one turbine blade was due for a change and the engine had logged less than ten hours since its manufacture. No wonder the costs and the large amount of time an aircraft is on the ground has attracted cricital comments from the Comptroller and Auditor General.

Arising from the same set of issues is the question of MRO (Maintenance Repair and Overhaul) capabilities. The IAF has an excellent pool of high quality technical manpower whose work efficiency at its Base Repair Depots (BRDs) can take on the most advanced technology systems for third and fourth-line servicing, repair and overhaul. Curiously though South Block is not thinking of the BRDs as potential Maintenance Repair and Overhaul

21

AFP

”

providers and instead prefers to leave it to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). But given the fact that an exodus of quality manpower is taking place from HAL, its ability to take on MRO, in addition to the licence manufacture of aircraft is doubtful.

Lastly, though not the least, the most important technological and maintenance challenges are of accidents. By and large the cause of accidents can be attributed to technical reasons, pilot error or other causes like bird strikes. Every Air Force aims to minimise accidents down to irreducible levels. Accidents due to technical factors can be mostly traced to individual failures in maintenance, design deficit and poor quality control. Pre-empting these factors requires dedication, self-discipline and repetitive training to enhance skill levels.

These, especially the issue of quality control, have to be consistently attended to. In many cases the sequence of events leading to pilot error-accident gets initiated by a technical failure and the inability of the pilot to deal with it appropriately.

Once again there is no alternative to repetitive training to develop high levels of skill development. Simulators, though expensive to acquire and maintain, become a crucial element in this process.

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AEROSPACE MAINTENANCE

JUNE 2011

DSI

The IAF has an excellent pool of high quality technical manpower whose work efficiency at its Base Repair Depots (BRDs) can take on the most advanced technology systems for third and fourth-line servicing, repair and overhaul. Curiously though South Block is not thinking of the BRDs as potential Maintenance Repair and Overhaul providers and instead prefers to leave it to HAL.

Employees of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited at work at the helicopter division

usefulness and challenges. India, as an importing country has been forced to adopt a just-in-case approach leading to large inventories of spares, a major segment of which may never be used while a small segment is over-used and then not available at crucial times.

Additionally, because of an increasing proportion of electronic systems in the aircraft, spare parts are being replaced by LRU (Line Replacement Units) — black

boxes that can simply be taken out and replaced by serviceable units. This enhances serviceability, reduces time and effort for field maintenance and enhances operational availability. But this is sensitive to capability for test and repair of LRUs at the second-line servicing infrastructure, where they may be termed RRU — Rear Replacement Units. This clearly emphasises the importance of second-line servicing infrastructure and capabilities.

20

From a different perspective, it is worth recalling that while the IAF acquired the Mirage 2000 and the MiG-29 around the same time, a second-line servicing was set up only in the former case. One result was that, for nearly a decade, the ingestion of small bits of concrete or even solidified tar sucked in during the take-off runs in the MiG-29’s low slung air intakes led to the damage of turbine blades. The absence of second-line servicing facilities forced the IAF to remove the engine

and despatch the plane all the way back to its factory in Russia, where, according to their standard operating procedure, the complete engine was overhauled, costs charged to the IAF even if only one turbine blade was due for a change and the engine had logged less than ten hours since its manufacture. No wonder the costs and the large amount of time an aircraft is on the ground has attracted cricital comments from the Comptroller and Auditor General.

Arising from the same set of issues is the question of MRO (Maintenance Repair and Overhaul) capabilities. The IAF has an excellent pool of high quality technical manpower whose work efficiency at its Base Repair Depots (BRDs) can take on the most advanced technology systems for third and fourth-line servicing, repair and overhaul. Curiously though South Block is not thinking of the BRDs as potential Maintenance Repair and Overhaul

21

AFP

”

providers and instead prefers to leave it to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). But given the fact that an exodus of quality manpower is taking place from HAL, its ability to take on MRO, in addition to the licence manufacture of aircraft is doubtful.

Lastly, though not the least, the most important technological and maintenance challenges are of accidents. By and large the cause of accidents can be attributed to technical reasons, pilot error or other causes like bird strikes. Every Air Force aims to minimise accidents down to irreducible levels. Accidents due to technical factors can be mostly traced to individual failures in maintenance, design deficit and poor quality control. Pre-empting these factors requires dedication, self-discipline and repetitive training to enhance skill levels.

These, especially the issue of quality control, have to be consistently attended to. In many cases the sequence of events leading to pilot error-accident gets initiated by a technical failure and the inability of the pilot to deal with it appropriately.

Once again there is no alternative to repetitive training to develop high levels of skill development. Simulators, though expensive to acquire and maintain, become a crucial element in this process.

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INDO-FRENCH DEFENCE RELATIONS

JUNE 2011

DSI

GREAT EXPECTATIONS The shortlisting of the French Rafale and the Eurofighter as the final contenders for the highly lucrative Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft deal once again puts the spotlight on Indo-French defence relations

KANWAL SIBAL

The nearly $10 billion MMRCA deal will build a relation lasting 40 years, during which upgrades and supply of spare parts will add several billion dollars to its value. n Despite impressive defence projects, France’s share of the Indian defence market in value terms has been small. n French leadership is promising a defence partnership with India that includes major technology transfers. n

T

he shortlisting of the French Rafale and the Eurofighter as the two final contenders for the nearly $10 billion Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) deal puts a renewed spotlight on Indo-French defence cooperation, particularly as the US aircraft have been excluded. The comprehensive and impartial technical evaluation of the

competing aircraft attests to the high quality of the French-made fighter. It is unclear which aircraft will win eventually but it is clear that India has opted for the European option.

India’s long experience with French aircraft has been positive. It is widely acknowledged that the Mirage 2000 with the Indian Air Force (IAF) have rendered excellent service, proving their reliability and high levels of serviceability. They have performed effectively during the 1999 Kargil intrusion and it has been decided to retain the 52 Mirage aircraft in service for a couple of decades more by comprehensively upgrading them and equipping them with new missiles. The $2.5 billion contract, after arduous negotiations, over cost and legal issues with the suppliers and the French government, is now on the verge of conclusion.

Were the Rafale to bag the 126 aircraft deal eventually, that, coupled with the Mirage upgrade project, will mean a

22

French Rafale (right and centre) jets and a Mirage 2000 (left) during a refuelling operation AFP

KEY POINTS

23

Indo-French Relations-2nd Time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 10:01 AM Page 2

INDO-FRENCH DEFENCE RELATIONS

JUNE 2011

DSI

GREAT EXPECTATIONS The shortlisting of the French Rafale and the Eurofighter as the final contenders for the highly lucrative Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft deal once again puts the spotlight on Indo-French defence relations

KANWAL SIBAL

The nearly $10 billion MMRCA deal will build a relation lasting 40 years, during which upgrades and supply of spare parts will add several billion dollars to its value. n Despite impressive defence projects, France’s share of the Indian defence market in value terms has been small. n French leadership is promising a defence partnership with India that includes major technology transfers. n

T

he shortlisting of the French Rafale and the Eurofighter as the two final contenders for the nearly $10 billion Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) deal puts a renewed spotlight on Indo-French defence cooperation, particularly as the US aircraft have been excluded. The comprehensive and impartial technical evaluation of the

competing aircraft attests to the high quality of the French-made fighter. It is unclear which aircraft will win eventually but it is clear that India has opted for the European option.

India’s long experience with French aircraft has been positive. It is widely acknowledged that the Mirage 2000 with the Indian Air Force (IAF) have rendered excellent service, proving their reliability and high levels of serviceability. They have performed effectively during the 1999 Kargil intrusion and it has been decided to retain the 52 Mirage aircraft in service for a couple of decades more by comprehensively upgrading them and equipping them with new missiles. The $2.5 billion contract, after arduous negotiations, over cost and legal issues with the suppliers and the French government, is now on the verge of conclusion.

Were the Rafale to bag the 126 aircraft deal eventually, that, coupled with the Mirage upgrade project, will mean a

22

French Rafale (right and centre) jets and a Mirage 2000 (left) during a refuelling operation AFP

KEY POINTS

23

Indo-French Relations-2nd Time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 10:02 AM Page 4

INDO-FRENCH DEFENCE RELATIONS dramatic expansion of the size and scope of the Indo-French defence relationship in the years ahead. The nearly $10 billion MMRCA deal will build a relationship lasting 40 years, during which upgrades and supply of spare parts will add several billion dollars more to its value. The offset obligations — 50 percent for the MMRCA — should entail big investments in India’s defence sector, contributing, hopefully, to creating a sorely needed indigenous manufacturing capacity.

JUNE 2011

Indian Air Force personnel display Russian-made Igla surface-to-air missiles in front of a Mirage 2000

Long History Indo-French defence ties have a long history. India made sizable purchases in the 1950s, including 71 Ouragan aircraft, 110 Mystere fighters, 164 AMX-13 tanks, 12 Alize anti-submarine aircraft, 50 air-to-surface missiles and several thousand anti-tank missiles. The 1960s saw a deal to produce, under licence, 330 Alouette helicopters, with the last one delivered in 2003.

To the 40 Lama helicopters procured earlier were added 230 Lama helicopters in the 1970s for high altitude operations. The French-origin helicopters have played a vital role in our Siachen operations.

In 1979, India went in for the AngloFrench Jaguar aircraft, besides a thousand R.550 Magic-1 short range air-to-air missiles

”

AFP

Indo-French defence ties have a long history. India made sizable purchases in the 1950s, including 71 Ouragan aircraft, 110 Mystere fighters, 164 AMX-13 tanks, 12 Alize anti-submarine aircraft, 50 air-to-surface missiles and several thousand anti-tank missiles.The 1960s saw a deal to produce under licence 330 Alouette helicopters, with the last one delivered in 2003.

24

25

DSI

and 40 PA-6 diesel engines for its offshore patrol vessels. The 1980s saw India procuring the Mirage aircraft, delivered in 1985-86. A transfer of technology agreement was signed in 1983 for 30 TRS surveillance radars and for another 7 PSM surveillance radars in 1988. To give an institutional framework to the expanding defence cooperation a Defence Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 1982 and an Indo-French Defence Cooperation Working Group was constituted.

In the late 1980s, the French, under pressure from US competition were apprehensive of the declining prospects of their defence manufacturing industry.

Desirous of cutting manufacturing costs, through partnerships with countries like India with a relatively technically competent, lower-cost defence manufacturing base, they wanted to expand their market. Taking into consideration India’s independentminded policies, France proposed a comprehensive defence relationship that would transcend a buyer-seller relationship.

However, without a base of strategic understanding with France tested over time, India was reluctant to bite the bait.

In fact, things greatly soured during this period with the suspicion that the French had a role in the exposure of the Bofors deal because their Sofma gun had lost out to the Swedish one. The espionage scandal, involving French penetration of the Prime Minister’s Office, led to the expulsion of the then French Ambassador to India.

The 1990s was a difficult period for India’s external relations. The foreign exchange crisis had put her economy under stress. India also came under US pressure on non-proliferation issues, especially on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Post-Soviet Union’s break-up was a heady period for the West: the French too pushed vigorously to implement the global non-proliferation agenda, including the permanent extension of an unamended Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Despite dissonances, the Indo-French Defence Cooperation Working Group was revived in 1995 aimed at promoting high level visits, joint training and exercises, research and development programmes and arms procurement.

India’s nuclear tests in 1998 tangibly changed the political backdrop of IndoFrench defence ties. The politically accommodating position France took on the

Indo-French Relations-2nd Time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 10:02 AM Page 4

INDO-FRENCH DEFENCE RELATIONS dramatic expansion of the size and scope of the Indo-French defence relationship in the years ahead. The nearly $10 billion MMRCA deal will build a relationship lasting 40 years, during which upgrades and supply of spare parts will add several billion dollars more to its value. The offset obligations — 50 percent for the MMRCA — should entail big investments in India’s defence sector, contributing, hopefully, to creating a sorely needed indigenous manufacturing capacity.

JUNE 2011

Indian Air Force personnel display Russian-made Igla surface-to-air missiles in front of a Mirage 2000

Long History Indo-French defence ties have a long history. India made sizable purchases in the 1950s, including 71 Ouragan aircraft, 110 Mystere fighters, 164 AMX-13 tanks, 12 Alize anti-submarine aircraft, 50 air-to-surface missiles and several thousand anti-tank missiles. The 1960s saw a deal to produce, under licence, 330 Alouette helicopters, with the last one delivered in 2003.

To the 40 Lama helicopters procured earlier were added 230 Lama helicopters in the 1970s for high altitude operations. The French-origin helicopters have played a vital role in our Siachen operations.

In 1979, India went in for the AngloFrench Jaguar aircraft, besides a thousand R.550 Magic-1 short range air-to-air missiles

”

AFP

Indo-French defence ties have a long history. India made sizable purchases in the 1950s, including 71 Ouragan aircraft, 110 Mystere fighters, 164 AMX-13 tanks, 12 Alize anti-submarine aircraft, 50 air-to-surface missiles and several thousand anti-tank missiles.The 1960s saw a deal to produce under licence 330 Alouette helicopters, with the last one delivered in 2003.

24

25

DSI

and 40 PA-6 diesel engines for its offshore patrol vessels. The 1980s saw India procuring the Mirage aircraft, delivered in 1985-86. A transfer of technology agreement was signed in 1983 for 30 TRS surveillance radars and for another 7 PSM surveillance radars in 1988. To give an institutional framework to the expanding defence cooperation a Defence Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 1982 and an Indo-French Defence Cooperation Working Group was constituted.

In the late 1980s, the French, under pressure from US competition were apprehensive of the declining prospects of their defence manufacturing industry.

Desirous of cutting manufacturing costs, through partnerships with countries like India with a relatively technically competent, lower-cost defence manufacturing base, they wanted to expand their market. Taking into consideration India’s independentminded policies, France proposed a comprehensive defence relationship that would transcend a buyer-seller relationship.

However, without a base of strategic understanding with France tested over time, India was reluctant to bite the bait.

In fact, things greatly soured during this period with the suspicion that the French had a role in the exposure of the Bofors deal because their Sofma gun had lost out to the Swedish one. The espionage scandal, involving French penetration of the Prime Minister’s Office, led to the expulsion of the then French Ambassador to India.

The 1990s was a difficult period for India’s external relations. The foreign exchange crisis had put her economy under stress. India also came under US pressure on non-proliferation issues, especially on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Post-Soviet Union’s break-up was a heady period for the West: the French too pushed vigorously to implement the global non-proliferation agenda, including the permanent extension of an unamended Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Despite dissonances, the Indo-French Defence Cooperation Working Group was revived in 1995 aimed at promoting high level visits, joint training and exercises, research and development programmes and arms procurement.

India’s nuclear tests in 1998 tangibly changed the political backdrop of IndoFrench defence ties. The politically accommodating position France took on the

Indo-French Relations-2nd Time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 10:02 AM Page 6

INDO-FRENCH DEFENCE RELATIONS

JUNE 2011

AFP

Small Share

26

Despite the impressive list of projects with France, its share of the Indian defence market in value terms remains small.

Between 1998 and 2005, France bagged only 2.48 percent of the Indian weapon projects, compared to the Russian share of 76.65 percent. To take another figure, between 1992 and 2006 Russia’s share amounted to $13.75 billion and that of France $797 million, placing it in fifth place behind the Netherlands, Germany and the UK. Another major project under active negotiation is the joint development and manufacturing of the Maitri, the short range surface-to-air missile (SR-SAM). The French, as the lowest bidders expect the Kaveri engine project to be awarded to them in the near future. They are also eyeing the contract for six additional submarines following up on the Scorpene deal.

Despite extensive mutual dealings over decades, Indo-French defence cooperation

French nuclear aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle at Mormugao port, Goa

AFP

tests, encouraging a dialogue with India rather than following the US-led sanctions route, opened a space of confidence between the two countries, with a positive impact on defence relations. The Strategic Dialogue with India instituted in 1998 was complemented with the setting up of a High Committee on Defence Cooperation headed by representatives of the respective Defence Ministers.

A steady exchange of high level visits from 1998 onwards followed, including the French Chiefs of Defence Staff, the respective Air, Army and Naval Chiefs as well as Defence Ministers, with the high level Defence Committee meeting regularly.

In 2006, Pranab Mukherjee as Defence Minister signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement with France. Regular naval exercises (Varuna), with the participation of the nuclear carrier Charles de Gaulle and air exercises (Garuda) have continued.

The French expectation of a major naval purchase to mark the upsurge in political ties after our nuclear tests was fulfilled with the $3 billion Scorpene deal in December 2005, amid some controversy. In the area of research and development, identified projects with France included aero-engines for the Advanced Light Helicopter, the Kaveri engine for the Light Combat Aircraft, the Shakti engine for Dhruv, the transfer of technology to the Defence Research and Development Organisation for missile development.

Separately, France was also involved in the upgradation of MiG 21s.

Chief of Staff of the French Army, General Elrick Irastorza (right) with Chief of Army Staff General V. K. Singh, New Delhi

DSI

has erratic undercurrents with negotiations buffeted by difficulties and controversies.

Our side complains about high prices, commercial cupidity and political leveraging while the French express frustration with slow decision making a lack of transparency, bureaucratic apathy and arbitrariness.

The cancellation in December 2007 of the $500 million-197 helicopter deal won by the French AS550 Fennec over the American Bell 407 exasperated the French political leadership, convinced that it was done under US pressure. In the re-tender, the French, pitted against the Russians and Italians — with the Americans choosing not to bid — are confident about success.

The French received another blow with the decision in 2009 to cancel, after completion of negotiations, the tender for six refuelling aircraft worth $1 billion won by the military version of the Airbus 330 aircraft against competition from the Russian IL-78. A fresh call for bids has been made by the Defence Ministry with the lifecycle costs of acquisition to be evaluated this

In the area of research and development, identified projects with France included aero-engines for the Advanced Light Helicopter, the Kaveri engine for the Light Combat Aircraft, the Shakti engine for Dhruv and the transfer of technology to the Defence Research and Development Organisation for missile development.

27

time. The French believe that while their equipment may be more expensive to begin with, its life-cycle cost involving a number of operational parameters is lower.

Under pressure from competitors, with a limited scope for domestic orders in Europe’s peaceful environment and with China under an arms embargo, the attractiveness of the large Indian defence market for the French defence industry is manifest. The highest level of French leadership promises to build a genuine defence partnership with India, including major technology transfers.

The importance of France’s record as a trustworthy supplier is obvious. With India in mind, France remains cautious about the supply of advanced weaponry to Pakistan. It will have to compete with other rivals such as Russia, Israel and, of course, the US for a share of the US $200 billion expected Indian acquisitions in the next 12 years.

Mutual interest should, however, assure France a befitting position in the Indian defence space.

Indo-French Relations-2nd Time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 10:02 AM Page 6

INDO-FRENCH DEFENCE RELATIONS

JUNE 2011

AFP

Small Share

26

Despite the impressive list of projects with France, its share of the Indian defence market in value terms remains small.

Between 1998 and 2005, France bagged only 2.48 percent of the Indian weapon projects, compared to the Russian share of 76.65 percent. To take another figure, between 1992 and 2006 Russia’s share amounted to $13.75 billion and that of France $797 million, placing it in fifth place behind the Netherlands, Germany and the UK. Another major project under active negotiation is the joint development and manufacturing of the Maitri, the short range surface-to-air missile (SR-SAM). The French, as the lowest bidders expect the Kaveri engine project to be awarded to them in the near future. They are also eyeing the contract for six additional submarines following up on the Scorpene deal.

Despite extensive mutual dealings over decades, Indo-French defence cooperation

French nuclear aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle at Mormugao port, Goa

AFP

tests, encouraging a dialogue with India rather than following the US-led sanctions route, opened a space of confidence between the two countries, with a positive impact on defence relations. The Strategic Dialogue with India instituted in 1998 was complemented with the setting up of a High Committee on Defence Cooperation headed by representatives of the respective Defence Ministers.

A steady exchange of high level visits from 1998 onwards followed, including the French Chiefs of Defence Staff, the respective Air, Army and Naval Chiefs as well as Defence Ministers, with the high level Defence Committee meeting regularly.

In 2006, Pranab Mukherjee as Defence Minister signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement with France. Regular naval exercises (Varuna), with the participation of the nuclear carrier Charles de Gaulle and air exercises (Garuda) have continued.

The French expectation of a major naval purchase to mark the upsurge in political ties after our nuclear tests was fulfilled with the $3 billion Scorpene deal in December 2005, amid some controversy. In the area of research and development, identified projects with France included aero-engines for the Advanced Light Helicopter, the Kaveri engine for the Light Combat Aircraft, the Shakti engine for Dhruv, the transfer of technology to the Defence Research and Development Organisation for missile development.

Separately, France was also involved in the upgradation of MiG 21s.

Chief of Staff of the French Army, General Elrick Irastorza (right) with Chief of Army Staff General V. K. Singh, New Delhi

DSI

has erratic undercurrents with negotiations buffeted by difficulties and controversies.

Our side complains about high prices, commercial cupidity and political leveraging while the French express frustration with slow decision making a lack of transparency, bureaucratic apathy and arbitrariness.

The cancellation in December 2007 of the $500 million-197 helicopter deal won by the French AS550 Fennec over the American Bell 407 exasperated the French political leadership, convinced that it was done under US pressure. In the re-tender, the French, pitted against the Russians and Italians — with the Americans choosing not to bid — are confident about success.

The French received another blow with the decision in 2009 to cancel, after completion of negotiations, the tender for six refuelling aircraft worth $1 billion won by the military version of the Airbus 330 aircraft against competition from the Russian IL-78. A fresh call for bids has been made by the Defence Ministry with the lifecycle costs of acquisition to be evaluated this

In the area of research and development, identified projects with France included aero-engines for the Advanced Light Helicopter, the Kaveri engine for the Light Combat Aircraft, the Shakti engine for Dhruv and the transfer of technology to the Defence Research and Development Organisation for missile development.

27

time. The French believe that while their equipment may be more expensive to begin with, its life-cycle cost involving a number of operational parameters is lower.

Under pressure from competitors, with a limited scope for domestic orders in Europe’s peaceful environment and with China under an arms embargo, the attractiveness of the large Indian defence market for the French defence industry is manifest. The highest level of French leadership promises to build a genuine defence partnership with India, including major technology transfers.

The importance of France’s record as a trustworthy supplier is obvious. With India in mind, France remains cautious about the supply of advanced weaponry to Pakistan. It will have to compete with other rivals such as Russia, Israel and, of course, the US for a share of the US $200 billion expected Indian acquisitions in the next 12 years.

Mutual interest should, however, assure France a befitting position in the Indian defence space.

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MARITIME STRATEGY

JUNE 2011

DSI

FROM BROWN TO BLUE WATER The emphasis of India’s maritime strategy has been to play a greater role in the security of the Indian Ocean

P.K. GHOSH

KEY POINTS The emphasis has been on the need for India to play a greater role in the security and stability of the IOR. n The biggest challenge for the Navy is that of organisational change, doctrinal evolution and combat efficiency. n The Navy’s vision document envisages a three dimensional force, that is technology-enabled, networked and capable of projecting its power across the IOR and beyond. n

In consonance with changing strategic requirements, the IN released its Maritime Doctrine in 2004 that has provided limited articulation of its vision of the future. Taken from various western thought processes that are not fully acclimatised to Indian conditions this was followed by the Maritime Capability Perspective Plan (MCPP) a classified blueprint of the envisaged force-level structure plans for the next 15 years, that is, till 2020, which was approved by the Annual Commanders Conference in April 2006.

Guidance Documents The final segment of this trilogy, has been formed by the ‘Freedom of the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy,’ released during the annual Navy Senior Officers’ Conference in October 2006. An unclassified version of this document followed in May 2007.

For effecting this transformational change from brown water to blue water status, a set of three guidance documents have been produced. The overarching one, is the ‘Vision Statement of the Indian Navy.’ The second, identifying drivers of this transformation is titled, ‘What Does Transformation Mean for the Navy?’ The final and third document is the ‘Strategic Guidance for Transformation’ which was released by the Naval Chief in 2006.

The Navy’s vision document envisages a three-dimensional force, technologyenabled, networked and capable of projecting its power across the IOR and beyond. The document also highlights the fact that the Navy expects to operate across

28

Corvette INS Vibhuti near Paradeep, Bhubaneswar AFP

I

ndia’s global, economic, political and military profile has seen a sharp upward trajectory in recent years leading to a redefinition of its strategic interests in increasingly expansive terms.

The traditional focus of India’s maritime strategy has always been the Indian Ocean which has been historically viewed as India’s strategic backyard. The emphasis has been on the need for India to play a greater role in the security and stability of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) especially with declining US influence.

Concurrently, with evolving regional dynamics and threat perceptions, the Indian Navy (IN) has emerged as an indispensable tool in India’s grand strategy. While China remains a significant concern along with that of evolving threats from non-state actors, piracy and even natural calamities, the biggest challenge for the IN remains that of organisational change, doctrinal evolution, combat efficiency and more capable inventorial assets.

29

Maritime Strategy-2nd Time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 10:06 AM Page 2

MARITIME STRATEGY

JUNE 2011

DSI

FROM BROWN TO BLUE WATER The emphasis of India’s maritime strategy has been to play a greater role in the security of the Indian Ocean

P.K. GHOSH

KEY POINTS The emphasis has been on the need for India to play a greater role in the security and stability of the IOR. n The biggest challenge for the Navy is that of organisational change, doctrinal evolution and combat efficiency. n The Navy’s vision document envisages a three dimensional force, that is technology-enabled, networked and capable of projecting its power across the IOR and beyond. n

In consonance with changing strategic requirements, the IN released its Maritime Doctrine in 2004 that has provided limited articulation of its vision of the future. Taken from various western thought processes that are not fully acclimatised to Indian conditions this was followed by the Maritime Capability Perspective Plan (MCPP) a classified blueprint of the envisaged force-level structure plans for the next 15 years, that is, till 2020, which was approved by the Annual Commanders Conference in April 2006.

Guidance Documents The final segment of this trilogy, has been formed by the ‘Freedom of the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy,’ released during the annual Navy Senior Officers’ Conference in October 2006. An unclassified version of this document followed in May 2007.

For effecting this transformational change from brown water to blue water status, a set of three guidance documents have been produced. The overarching one, is the ‘Vision Statement of the Indian Navy.’ The second, identifying drivers of this transformation is titled, ‘What Does Transformation Mean for the Navy?’ The final and third document is the ‘Strategic Guidance for Transformation’ which was released by the Naval Chief in 2006.

The Navy’s vision document envisages a three-dimensional force, technologyenabled, networked and capable of projecting its power across the IOR and beyond. The document also highlights the fact that the Navy expects to operate across

28

Corvette INS Vibhuti near Paradeep, Bhubaneswar AFP

I

ndia’s global, economic, political and military profile has seen a sharp upward trajectory in recent years leading to a redefinition of its strategic interests in increasingly expansive terms.

The traditional focus of India’s maritime strategy has always been the Indian Ocean which has been historically viewed as India’s strategic backyard. The emphasis has been on the need for India to play a greater role in the security and stability of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) especially with declining US influence.

Concurrently, with evolving regional dynamics and threat perceptions, the Indian Navy (IN) has emerged as an indispensable tool in India’s grand strategy. While China remains a significant concern along with that of evolving threats from non-state actors, piracy and even natural calamities, the biggest challenge for the IN remains that of organisational change, doctrinal evolution, combat efficiency and more capable inventorial assets.

29

Maritime Strategy-2nd Time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 10:06 AM Page 4

MARITIME STRATEGY

The Navy envisages a three aircraft carrier Navy, with current plans to build the 37,000 tonne Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC) at the Kochi shipyard to be delivered by 2014 along with INS Vikramaditya, which is now likely to join the Navy only by 2012.

security of island territories and/or for a power projection role; enhanced Reach and Sustainability across the IOR; a network-centric capability and a dedicated geostationary naval satellite and augmentation of mine-warfare capability.

At the inventory level, the overall focus of the Maritime Strategy is to enhance ship building through rapid production. It is acknowledged that for the Navy to achieve its target it will need to induct four to six ships per year to compete with obsolescence, however, with the present capacity of our indigenous yards of producing only three ship units per year, the shortfall will either demand a new capacity generation or extensive imports.

The Navy also envisages a three-aircraft carrier Navy, with current plans to build the 37,000 tonne indigenous aircraft carrier at the Kochi shipyard to be delivered by 2014, along with INS Vikramaditya(ex-Admiral Gorshkov) which is now likely to join the Navy only by 2012. A larger air defence ship is likely to follow subsequently.

30

YARD Mazagon Dock Limited

CLASS OF SHIP P-15A Destroyers P-17(Shivalik) P-75 (Scorpene)

ON ORDER 03 02 06

Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers

Landing Ship Tank (Large) LST(L) P-28 (Anti-Submarine Warfare Corvette) Fast Attack Craft

01 04 10

Cochin Shipyard

Indigenous Aircraft Carrier

01

Goa Shipyard

Offshore Patrol Vessels Sail Training Ship

04 01

Alcock Ashdown Ltd

Survey Vessels

06

Imports

Talwar Follow-on Vikramaditya (ex-Admiral Gorshkov) Fleet Tanker

03 01 01

Note: Additional four LPDs, and four P-8Is have been approved for purchase

primacy. This capability is being augmented by the five refurbished IL-38 aircraft equipped with the Sea Dragon suite. In addition, the procurement of twelve stateof-the-art P-8Is Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (variants of P-8A) are expected to enhance this capability to the far reaches of the IOR replacing the current eight obsolete TU-142s. The first P-8I is likely to be delivered by early 2013.

In addition, the Navy has laid considerable importance to the UAV technology and has acquired an entire squadron to be based at Parundu base in Tamil Nadu.

Underwater Fleet With the nuclear submarine Arihant being built indigenously, the scheduled leasing of the Akula II Project 971 (Chakra) SSN from Russia by end-2011 will provide the Navy with the much needed third leg of the nuclear triad. Currently, the conventional underwater fleet of the Navy comprises 16 Russian Kilo/Foxtrot and German Shishumar class submarines with plans to add up to 30 platforms over the next few years. These are part of the Navy’s 30-year submarine building plan. Six new Scorpene class, currently under construction will join the Navy in 2012, by which time 63 percent of the existing submarine fleet will have reached their end of life. It has been estimated that between 2016 and 2018, 60 percent of the remaining fleet, will have to be phased out due to obsolescence requiring the induction of a submarine every two years to maintain its present underwater fleet of 16.

To enhance its carrier-borne aircraft capability one squadron of MIG-29Ks has presently been acquired, however, it is presumed that around 50 more could well be purchased in the future, according to a former Naval Chief’s statements. In addition, the procurement of the naval version of the Hawk is also in progress.

With a dramatic rise in its constabulary functions and the requirement to keep large areas under constant surveillance, long range airborne surveillance has assumed

DSI

THE NAVY’S CURRENT ACQUISITION PROGRAMME

Amphibious Capability

A naval officer walks on a deck of the Indian Navy's newly-commisioned warship INS Shivalik, Mumbai AFP

the entire spectrum of combat and conflict from LIMO (Low intensity Maritime Operations) to conventional war fighting to nuclear deterrence.

In this transformation, the Maritime Strategy has preferred to adopt generic capacity building, based on a capability based approach, that obviates the necessity to name states as adversaries and create diplomatic storms, thus, giving credence to the well-known dictum that there are no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent (maritime) interests.

Consequently, the Navy’s MCPP has adopted a significant emphasis on holistic capability building rather than enhancing sheer inventory numbers. The everincreasing cost of naval platforms has also led to the realisation that a modern force requires lesser numbers of more capable platforms to meet its numerous tasks. The MCPP is the road map for force modernisation over the next three plan periods, that is, till 2022 being based on an anticipated availability of funds that coincides with a 6.5 percent growth in the Gross Domestic Product and a 17.7 percent naval share of the Defence Budget.

The thrust areas as proposed in the Maritime Strategy are — Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), using a variety of sensor platforms inclusive of satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); the provision for long range air defence and AMD (anti-missile defence); anti-submarine warfare capability; long range anti-surface warfare capability using precision-guided weapons; an amphibious capability for the

JUNE 2011

Power projection and the protection of India’s island territories are two missions outlined in the Maritime Doctrine that require the Navy to possess an amphibious capability and an ability to sealift troops expeditiously. In addition to these combat missions, the peacetime requirement of providing humanitarian assistance during natural calamities often arises in the calamity prone IOR. The induction of the 16,900 tonne LPD (Landing Dock Platform) Jalashva was a benchmark in this direction. Together with five, three commissioned in 2006-09, LST–Ls (Landing Ship, Tank–Large), the Navy will have a sealift capability for over 3,500 troops and a squadron of armour. To boost this capacity further, the Defence Acquisition Council has recently approved the purchase of four additional LPDs like the Jalashva.

The above acquisitions by the Navy provide an overview of the inventorial

31

transition, enhanced capability and the accentuation towards acquiring blue water capability. The force, having shed its previous cold war isolationistic attitude, is gearing towards more distant reach and expeditionary capabilities though it is equally capable of playing benign peace time roles like those of constabulary functions arising out of continuous anti-piracy patrols near the Horn of Africa and coastal patrol.

Its stellar role in carrying out extensive Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in the aftermath of the 2005 tsunami, subterraneously projected the Navy’s phenomenal operational capability, quick response ability and its flexibility in the true ‘blue water fashion.’ At another level, the Indian desire of playing the role of an ‘unobtrusive fulcrum’ in the IOR has come true in many ways — primarily with the successful commencement of the maritime initiative (IONS) Indian Ocean Naval Symposium for IOR littorals.

The naval participation in exercises with navies across the globe, including with the Chinese PLAN (PLA Navy), and the hosting of the 13-nation MILAN exercise — is an aspect that has reinforced Indian aspirations and projected India in the desired non-hegemonistic terms.

Clearly, the IN is fast evolving and acquiring all the characteristics of a blue water Navy. However, it remains to be seen if these capacities can help India to play the primary role of ‘an unobtrusive fulcrum’ and a ‘balancer of power’ in its own backyard — the IOR — in the future.

Maritime Strategy-2nd Time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 10:06 AM Page 4

MARITIME STRATEGY

The Navy envisages a three aircraft carrier Navy, with current plans to build the 37,000 tonne Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC) at the Kochi shipyard to be delivered by 2014 along with INS Vikramaditya, which is now likely to join the Navy only by 2012.

security of island territories and/or for a power projection role; enhanced Reach and Sustainability across the IOR; a network-centric capability and a dedicated geostationary naval satellite and augmentation of mine-warfare capability.

At the inventory level, the overall focus of the Maritime Strategy is to enhance ship building through rapid production. It is acknowledged that for the Navy to achieve its target it will need to induct four to six ships per year to compete with obsolescence, however, with the present capacity of our indigenous yards of producing only three ship units per year, the shortfall will either demand a new capacity generation or extensive imports.

The Navy also envisages a three-aircraft carrier Navy, with current plans to build the 37,000 tonne indigenous aircraft carrier at the Kochi shipyard to be delivered by 2014, along with INS Vikramaditya(ex-Admiral Gorshkov) which is now likely to join the Navy only by 2012. A larger air defence ship is likely to follow subsequently.

30

YARD Mazagon Dock Limited

CLASS OF SHIP P-15A Destroyers P-17(Shivalik) P-75 (Scorpene)

ON ORDER 03 02 06

Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers

Landing Ship Tank (Large) LST(L) P-28 (Anti-Submarine Warfare Corvette) Fast Attack Craft

01 04 10

Cochin Shipyard

Indigenous Aircraft Carrier

01

Goa Shipyard

Offshore Patrol Vessels Sail Training Ship

04 01

Alcock Ashdown Ltd

Survey Vessels

06

Imports

Talwar Follow-on Vikramaditya (ex-Admiral Gorshkov) Fleet Tanker

03 01 01

Note: Additional four LPDs, and four P-8Is have been approved for purchase

primacy. This capability is being augmented by the five refurbished IL-38 aircraft equipped with the Sea Dragon suite. In addition, the procurement of twelve stateof-the-art P-8Is Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (variants of P-8A) are expected to enhance this capability to the far reaches of the IOR replacing the current eight obsolete TU-142s. The first P-8I is likely to be delivered by early 2013.

In addition, the Navy has laid considerable importance to the UAV technology and has acquired an entire squadron to be based at Parundu base in Tamil Nadu.

Underwater Fleet With the nuclear submarine Arihant being built indigenously, the scheduled leasing of the Akula II Project 971 (Chakra) SSN from Russia by end-2011 will provide the Navy with the much needed third leg of the nuclear triad. Currently, the conventional underwater fleet of the Navy comprises 16 Russian Kilo/Foxtrot and German Shishumar class submarines with plans to add up to 30 platforms over the next few years. These are part of the Navy’s 30-year submarine building plan. Six new Scorpene class, currently under construction will join the Navy in 2012, by which time 63 percent of the existing submarine fleet will have reached their end of life. It has been estimated that between 2016 and 2018, 60 percent of the remaining fleet, will have to be phased out due to obsolescence requiring the induction of a submarine every two years to maintain its present underwater fleet of 16.

To enhance its carrier-borne aircraft capability one squadron of MIG-29Ks has presently been acquired, however, it is presumed that around 50 more could well be purchased in the future, according to a former Naval Chief’s statements. In addition, the procurement of the naval version of the Hawk is also in progress.

With a dramatic rise in its constabulary functions and the requirement to keep large areas under constant surveillance, long range airborne surveillance has assumed

DSI

THE NAVY’S CURRENT ACQUISITION PROGRAMME

Amphibious Capability

A naval officer walks on a deck of the Indian Navy's newly-commisioned warship INS Shivalik, Mumbai AFP

the entire spectrum of combat and conflict from LIMO (Low intensity Maritime Operations) to conventional war fighting to nuclear deterrence.

In this transformation, the Maritime Strategy has preferred to adopt generic capacity building, based on a capability based approach, that obviates the necessity to name states as adversaries and create diplomatic storms, thus, giving credence to the well-known dictum that there are no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent (maritime) interests.

Consequently, the Navy’s MCPP has adopted a significant emphasis on holistic capability building rather than enhancing sheer inventory numbers. The everincreasing cost of naval platforms has also led to the realisation that a modern force requires lesser numbers of more capable platforms to meet its numerous tasks. The MCPP is the road map for force modernisation over the next three plan periods, that is, till 2022 being based on an anticipated availability of funds that coincides with a 6.5 percent growth in the Gross Domestic Product and a 17.7 percent naval share of the Defence Budget.

The thrust areas as proposed in the Maritime Strategy are — Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), using a variety of sensor platforms inclusive of satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); the provision for long range air defence and AMD (anti-missile defence); anti-submarine warfare capability; long range anti-surface warfare capability using precision-guided weapons; an amphibious capability for the

JUNE 2011

Power projection and the protection of India’s island territories are two missions outlined in the Maritime Doctrine that require the Navy to possess an amphibious capability and an ability to sealift troops expeditiously. In addition to these combat missions, the peacetime requirement of providing humanitarian assistance during natural calamities often arises in the calamity prone IOR. The induction of the 16,900 tonne LPD (Landing Dock Platform) Jalashva was a benchmark in this direction. Together with five, three commissioned in 2006-09, LST–Ls (Landing Ship, Tank–Large), the Navy will have a sealift capability for over 3,500 troops and a squadron of armour. To boost this capacity further, the Defence Acquisition Council has recently approved the purchase of four additional LPDs like the Jalashva.

The above acquisitions by the Navy provide an overview of the inventorial

31

transition, enhanced capability and the accentuation towards acquiring blue water capability. The force, having shed its previous cold war isolationistic attitude, is gearing towards more distant reach and expeditionary capabilities though it is equally capable of playing benign peace time roles like those of constabulary functions arising out of continuous anti-piracy patrols near the Horn of Africa and coastal patrol.

Its stellar role in carrying out extensive Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in the aftermath of the 2005 tsunami, subterraneously projected the Navy’s phenomenal operational capability, quick response ability and its flexibility in the true ‘blue water fashion.’ At another level, the Indian desire of playing the role of an ‘unobtrusive fulcrum’ in the IOR has come true in many ways — primarily with the successful commencement of the maritime initiative (IONS) Indian Ocean Naval Symposium for IOR littorals.

The naval participation in exercises with navies across the globe, including with the Chinese PLAN (PLA Navy), and the hosting of the 13-nation MILAN exercise — is an aspect that has reinforced Indian aspirations and projected India in the desired non-hegemonistic terms.

Clearly, the IN is fast evolving and acquiring all the characteristics of a blue water Navy. However, it remains to be seen if these capacities can help India to play the primary role of ‘an unobtrusive fulcrum’ and a ‘balancer of power’ in its own backyard — the IOR — in the future.

ROE.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 28/06/11 11:07 AM Page 1

LEGENDARY

WEAPONS

High repairability characteristics

HERE ARE just a few items of close combat weapons that can have a claimto global fame.The Kalashnikov assault rifle and RPG-7V grenade launcher are among them.They are the choice that all belligerents make notwithstanding assignedmissions, set objectives and changing combat situation.

Soldiers seek to capture them in combat, even in armies fighting with indigenously made

T

weapons.These weapons are rightfully held in respect by many soldiers and officers worldwide, who see them as symbols of Russian arms reliability, robustness and effectiveness. They have earned such high esteem in combat actions conducted in diverse geographical and climatic conditions, including on highlands, in hot deserts or humid tropics.

Designer of legendary AKMikhail Kalashnikov and Rosoboronexport Director General Anatoly Isaikin

AK-10Xs adhere to the best traditions The AK-47 assault rifle is themost famous and mass-produced small arms brand in history.

One can hear hundreds of stories extolling amazing robustness, simplicity and reliability of its design.A soldier is always confident, even inmost critical situations, that his AK will not fail him.

It is worthy of noting that during all its life the Kalashnikov assault rifle has been continuously upgraded: the AK-47 was superseded by the AKMmodel, later appeared the AK-74 and then itsmodernised AK-74Mversion.

Today's heirs to the legendary weapon are the AK assault rifles of the hundredth series – AK-10X.The new family comprises the AK-101 and AK-103models and small-size AK-102 and AK-104.They all retain the best qualities of their predecessors, and boast new advantages allowing themtomeet requirements of moderntime armed conflicts.

Russian armourers havemanaged to decreasemuzzle flame volume and shot recoil energy of the new Kalashnikovs.These assault rifles have increased stability of fire and closer hit pattern in the automatic firemode.

The hundredth seriesmodels boast improved operational reliability and durability

thanks to advanced high-strengthmaterials used.The rifles are produced with the application of innovative small arms manufacturing technologies.A good deal of their components ismanufactured by precision casting.The butt stock, forearm, hand guard, grip andmagazine aremade of shockproof glass-nylon black-colour composite (for this reason this AK series is named abroad "black Kalashnikovs"). They also use new anticorrosive coatings.

Moreover, their unique design allows for creating modifications meeting varying customer requirements.Considering popularity of the Kalashnikov brand on the world market, Russian designers have created modifications of the new series adapted to different calibre cartridges.The AK-101 and AK-102 assault rifles are made to fire with 5.56-mm NATO cartridges, while AK-103 and AK-104 with 7.62-mm Soviet-type 1943 cartridges.

Thanks to component unification all assault rifles of the hundredth series also have high repairability characteristics.

The need for adjustment of individual components and units duringmanufacture is totally excluded.

The Kalashnikov assault rifle has long transformed froma simple firing arminto a versatile combat complex. It can accommodate a wide range of accessories offered by Russian and foreign vendors.For example, the new assault rifles are fitted with a standard attachment rail tomount optical scopes, night sights, and GP-34 underbarrel antipersonnel grenade launchers.

RPG-7V: a portable close-range artillery weapon The RPG-7 was inducted into service by the Soviet Army in 1961, and it is still in service with some 50 countries all over the world, including Russia.Like the Kalashnikov assault rifles, it has been effectively employed in allmoderntime conflicts.Such long service life of the grenade launcher is due not only to its simple and unique design but also to the systematic upgrading and, what'smore important, to new munitions developed with the account of the combat employment experience.

Initially the RPG-7 grenade launcher was designed to fight tanks, but nowadays it is seen as amulti-purpose weapon. Its highly effective munitions allow the upgraded RPG-7V2 to performa wide variety of tasks.

Thus, the cumulative jet produced by the PG-7VR tandem antitank rocket grenade easily pierces a 600-mm armour plate at the angle of 60 degrees to normal, after having

penetrated modern explosive reactive armour.

The OG-7V fragmentation grenade is employed against infantry troops both located in the open and concealed in shelters and buildings. It can also destroy non-armoured materiel.This grenade is especially effective for engaging enemy weapon emplacements when conducting military operations in urban terrain and on industrial sites.The TBG-7V fuel-air explosive grenade, nearly as powerful as a 120-mm artillery shell or mine, allows effective engagement of enemy manpower located in fortifications.Besides the RPG-7, the Russian RPG-29 is another world’s only grenade launcher capable of firing thermobaric grenades.

The RPG-7V2 grenade launcher is capable of performingmost varied tasks: from destroying enemy heavy armour to suppressing fortified areas and even shooting down helicopters. It can be further upgraded by adopting existing and prospective sights as well as new types of ammunition.

Unique design allows for creating various modifications

Adapted to different calibre cartridges

RPG-7V2 grenade launcher.

Cartridges (left to right, including the loaded one) PG-7VM, PG-7VR, PG-7VL, TBG-7V, OG-7V

DSI Marketing Promotion

License-made weapons guarantee unique reliability In recent years Russia has been actively opposing unlicensed production of Soviet and Russian-designed weapons.A great part of 100 million units of various Kalashnikov assault rifle modifications are counterfeit.Unlicensed production is fraught not only with legal and commercial repercussions: for users quality and safety issues are also at serious stake.

Practice shows that assault rifles produced without licence as well as non-Russian-made samples based on Kalashnikov's design have notably inferior characteristics and, what is evenmore important, reliability as compared with the original.

In these circumstances Rosoboronexport offers themost flexible andmutually beneficial cooperation schemes allowing customers to become lawful owners of effectivemodern weapons.For instance, Russia is ready to hand over to India a licence for production of the new Kalashnikov assault rifles and render its assistance in setting up andmastering their production. It will allow an access to advanced technologies, and will guarantee high quality and reliability of the weapons produced. It is a logical and economical step for India to take since it is producing a similar weapon – the INSAS assault rifle.

Only licence weapons aremeeting highest technical specifications and have tremendous endurance.And it is only weapon designers, in this case - Russia, who can offermodern weapon systems based on best traditions and huge experience.

ROE.qxd:contributors-aug.qxd 28/06/11 11:07 AM Page 1

LEGENDARY

WEAPONS

High repairability characteristics

HERE ARE just a few items of close combat weapons that can have a claimto global fame.The Kalashnikov assault rifle and RPG-7V grenade launcher are among them.They are the choice that all belligerents make notwithstanding assignedmissions, set objectives and changing combat situation.

Soldiers seek to capture them in combat, even in armies fighting with indigenously made

T

weapons.These weapons are rightfully held in respect by many soldiers and officers worldwide, who see them as symbols of Russian arms reliability, robustness and effectiveness. They have earned such high esteem in combat actions conducted in diverse geographical and climatic conditions, including on highlands, in hot deserts or humid tropics.

Designer of legendary AKMikhail Kalashnikov and Rosoboronexport Director General Anatoly Isaikin

AK-10Xs adhere to the best traditions The AK-47 assault rifle is themost famous and mass-produced small arms brand in history.

One can hear hundreds of stories extolling amazing robustness, simplicity and reliability of its design.A soldier is always confident, even inmost critical situations, that his AK will not fail him.

It is worthy of noting that during all its life the Kalashnikov assault rifle has been continuously upgraded: the AK-47 was superseded by the AKMmodel, later appeared the AK-74 and then itsmodernised AK-74Mversion.

Today's heirs to the legendary weapon are the AK assault rifles of the hundredth series – AK-10X.The new family comprises the AK-101 and AK-103models and small-size AK-102 and AK-104.They all retain the best qualities of their predecessors, and boast new advantages allowing themtomeet requirements of moderntime armed conflicts.

Russian armourers havemanaged to decreasemuzzle flame volume and shot recoil energy of the new Kalashnikovs.These assault rifles have increased stability of fire and closer hit pattern in the automatic firemode.

The hundredth seriesmodels boast improved operational reliability and durability

thanks to advanced high-strengthmaterials used.The rifles are produced with the application of innovative small arms manufacturing technologies.A good deal of their components ismanufactured by precision casting.The butt stock, forearm, hand guard, grip andmagazine aremade of shockproof glass-nylon black-colour composite (for this reason this AK series is named abroad "black Kalashnikovs"). They also use new anticorrosive coatings.

Moreover, their unique design allows for creating modifications meeting varying customer requirements.Considering popularity of the Kalashnikov brand on the world market, Russian designers have created modifications of the new series adapted to different calibre cartridges.The AK-101 and AK-102 assault rifles are made to fire with 5.56-mm NATO cartridges, while AK-103 and AK-104 with 7.62-mm Soviet-type 1943 cartridges.

Thanks to component unification all assault rifles of the hundredth series also have high repairability characteristics.

The need for adjustment of individual components and units duringmanufacture is totally excluded.

The Kalashnikov assault rifle has long transformed froma simple firing arminto a versatile combat complex. It can accommodate a wide range of accessories offered by Russian and foreign vendors.For example, the new assault rifles are fitted with a standard attachment rail tomount optical scopes, night sights, and GP-34 underbarrel antipersonnel grenade launchers.

RPG-7V: a portable close-range artillery weapon The RPG-7 was inducted into service by the Soviet Army in 1961, and it is still in service with some 50 countries all over the world, including Russia.Like the Kalashnikov assault rifles, it has been effectively employed in allmoderntime conflicts.Such long service life of the grenade launcher is due not only to its simple and unique design but also to the systematic upgrading and, what'smore important, to new munitions developed with the account of the combat employment experience.

Initially the RPG-7 grenade launcher was designed to fight tanks, but nowadays it is seen as amulti-purpose weapon. Its highly effective munitions allow the upgraded RPG-7V2 to performa wide variety of tasks.

Thus, the cumulative jet produced by the PG-7VR tandem antitank rocket grenade easily pierces a 600-mm armour plate at the angle of 60 degrees to normal, after having

penetrated modern explosive reactive armour.

The OG-7V fragmentation grenade is employed against infantry troops both located in the open and concealed in shelters and buildings. It can also destroy non-armoured materiel.This grenade is especially effective for engaging enemy weapon emplacements when conducting military operations in urban terrain and on industrial sites.The TBG-7V fuel-air explosive grenade, nearly as powerful as a 120-mm artillery shell or mine, allows effective engagement of enemy manpower located in fortifications.Besides the RPG-7, the Russian RPG-29 is another world’s only grenade launcher capable of firing thermobaric grenades.

The RPG-7V2 grenade launcher is capable of performingmost varied tasks: from destroying enemy heavy armour to suppressing fortified areas and even shooting down helicopters. It can be further upgraded by adopting existing and prospective sights as well as new types of ammunition.

Unique design allows for creating various modifications

Adapted to different calibre cartridges

RPG-7V2 grenade launcher.

Cartridges (left to right, including the loaded one) PG-7VM, PG-7VR, PG-7VL, TBG-7V, OG-7V

DSI Marketing Promotion

License-made weapons guarantee unique reliability In recent years Russia has been actively opposing unlicensed production of Soviet and Russian-designed weapons.A great part of 100 million units of various Kalashnikov assault rifle modifications are counterfeit.Unlicensed production is fraught not only with legal and commercial repercussions: for users quality and safety issues are also at serious stake.

Practice shows that assault rifles produced without licence as well as non-Russian-made samples based on Kalashnikov's design have notably inferior characteristics and, what is evenmore important, reliability as compared with the original.

In these circumstances Rosoboronexport offers themost flexible andmutually beneficial cooperation schemes allowing customers to become lawful owners of effectivemodern weapons.For instance, Russia is ready to hand over to India a licence for production of the new Kalashnikov assault rifles and render its assistance in setting up andmastering their production. It will allow an access to advanced technologies, and will guarantee high quality and reliability of the weapons produced. It is a logical and economical step for India to take since it is producing a similar weapon – the INSAS assault rifle.

Only licence weapons aremeeting highest technical specifications and have tremendous endurance.And it is only weapon designers, in this case - Russia, who can offermodern weapon systems based on best traditions and huge experience.

Terrorism.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 10:09 AM Page 2

NEIGHBOURS

JUNE 2011

DSI

DISTANT

PEACE The immediate fallout of Osama Bin Laden’s death will bring a qualitative change in Afghanistan with its inevitable effects on Pakistan

KEY POINTS Even if not ‘officially’ aware of Osama Bin Laden’s whereabouts, it appeared Pakistan was on board during the operation to attack him. n Pakistan’s dilemma is that it had to deny any advance knowledge of Bin Laden’s presence or of the raid. n The aftermath of the Bin Laden episode augers well for the process set in motion by civil society’s support of an independent judiciary and a free media. n

W

hen the US de-hyphenated, what was once an Indo-Pak contrivance many Indians who resented being lumped with a troublesome neighbour felt gratified. One, therefore, understood the discomfiture at home with the AfPak (Afghanistan and Pakistan) nomenclature even when it makes sense, with or without a hyphen.

Clearly, any significant development on either side of the Durand Line creates effects on the other. These two countries also span what British historian Arnold Toynbee once described as the, ‘eastern crossroads of history.’ Post-9/11, this very relationship had won Pakistan a special status — a major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) ally; a frontline state in the global war on terror and so on. Of course, all these ‘advantages’ came at a price.

In our first mission, self-assigned and laudable as it was, we fell short of our goals.

The Taliban had been endlessly beseeched to handover Osama Bin Laden and a few of his colleagues to spare the region another war. Some grounds for their reluctance are well known — for example, the time honoured tradition of granting protection to anyone who sought it. Their rejection to expel the wanted men to a third country, ‘to ensure a fair trial,’ was in fact to save the regime from the ignominy of abandoning a

34

Taliban militants stand with their weapons in Herat, Afghanistan

guest. The US may have rejected this relevant explanation for any number of reasons, even now that the main accused is no more, but it is the immediate fallout of the American operation, code-named Geronimo, that killed Bin Laden that must be dealt with first.

Assuming that someone in Pakistan,

essentially the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), had gotten hold of Bin Laden and company after their escape from Afghanistan, Pakistan would have had the option of handing them over to the US, provided the returns were worth it.

These included the exit of foreign forces, preferably leaving behind a stable

dispensation in Kabul; a reasonable arrangement to manage the fallout on Pakistan — since it would have been an unpopular act; and an adequate compensation for ‘services’ (and it can be assumed that it was not about money).

Since that did not happen, it can be conjectured that we were not in possession

35

of the main prize or perhaps the expected quid-pro-quo was not good enough.

Even if not ‘officially’ aware of Bin Laden’s whereabouts or not, I still suspect that Pakistan was on board during the operation. According to the first available reports, police and Army cordons were in place before the raid, our helicopters were

AFP

ASAD DURRANI

Terrorism.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 10:09 AM Page 2

NEIGHBOURS

JUNE 2011

DSI

DISTANT

PEACE The immediate fallout of Osama Bin Laden’s death will bring a qualitative change in Afghanistan with its inevitable effects on Pakistan

KEY POINTS Even if not ‘officially’ aware of Osama Bin Laden’s whereabouts, it appeared Pakistan was on board during the operation to attack him. n Pakistan’s dilemma is that it had to deny any advance knowledge of Bin Laden’s presence or of the raid. n The aftermath of the Bin Laden episode augers well for the process set in motion by civil society’s support of an independent judiciary and a free media. n

W

hen the US de-hyphenated, what was once an Indo-Pak contrivance many Indians who resented being lumped with a troublesome neighbour felt gratified. One, therefore, understood the discomfiture at home with the AfPak (Afghanistan and Pakistan) nomenclature even when it makes sense, with or without a hyphen.

Clearly, any significant development on either side of the Durand Line creates effects on the other. These two countries also span what British historian Arnold Toynbee once described as the, ‘eastern crossroads of history.’ Post-9/11, this very relationship had won Pakistan a special status — a major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) ally; a frontline state in the global war on terror and so on. Of course, all these ‘advantages’ came at a price.

In our first mission, self-assigned and laudable as it was, we fell short of our goals.

The Taliban had been endlessly beseeched to handover Osama Bin Laden and a few of his colleagues to spare the region another war. Some grounds for their reluctance are well known — for example, the time honoured tradition of granting protection to anyone who sought it. Their rejection to expel the wanted men to a third country, ‘to ensure a fair trial,’ was in fact to save the regime from the ignominy of abandoning a

34

Taliban militants stand with their weapons in Herat, Afghanistan

guest. The US may have rejected this relevant explanation for any number of reasons, even now that the main accused is no more, but it is the immediate fallout of the American operation, code-named Geronimo, that killed Bin Laden that must be dealt with first.

Assuming that someone in Pakistan,

essentially the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), had gotten hold of Bin Laden and company after their escape from Afghanistan, Pakistan would have had the option of handing them over to the US, provided the returns were worth it.

These included the exit of foreign forces, preferably leaving behind a stable

dispensation in Kabul; a reasonable arrangement to manage the fallout on Pakistan — since it would have been an unpopular act; and an adequate compensation for ‘services’ (and it can be assumed that it was not about money).

Since that did not happen, it can be conjectured that we were not in possession

35

of the main prize or perhaps the expected quid-pro-quo was not good enough.

Even if not ‘officially’ aware of Bin Laden’s whereabouts or not, I still suspect that Pakistan was on board during the operation. According to the first available reports, police and Army cordons were in place before the raid, our helicopters were

AFP

ASAD DURRANI

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JUNE 2011

DSI

more importantly, what now needs to be done. It may also not be necessary, not only because history cannot be rolled back or much is ever learnt from it, but also because no course correction follows a blueprint. It is a process of evolution.

AFP

The Aftermath

Our predicament, however, is hovering over the area and the Supporters of Army Chief was in his office pro-Taliban party so acute that even that position is of even at that late hour. It also Jamiat Ulema-i- no help. Denial of complicity with would have made sense for the Islam-Nazaryati the ‘Great Satan’ has not saved us from the subsequent acts of US to take us into confidence shout anti-US even at this late stage. Failure of slogans in Quetta vengeance: the US has not taken too kindly to our confession of the operation was too big a cost after Osama Bin benign ignorance and the public for any caution — read mistrust. Laden’s death has finally found an opportunity to Pakistan’s dilemma is that even if this premise is more or less correct, break all barriers protecting the holiest of all the government had to deny any advance cows — the Army and the ISI. Obviously, knowledge of Bin Laden’s presence or of irate public reaction is not merely, even the raid. If forced to choose between an mainly, because of Bin Laden and his ilk. inability to defend its borders and cooperate Only the cumulative effect of a range of with the US against someone like Bin policies and acts, past and present, have led to Laden, the nation’s leadership would this situation — the ultimate Catch 22 bind.

In a country like Pakistan with its rather opt for incompetence. It is possible though that the official versions from oligarchic state structures and a huge Washington and Islamabad, that Pakistan disconnect between the elitist and popular knew nothing about Bin Laden’s hideout views, we are not likely to reach a consensus on what all went wrong, or or the US raid, is closer to the mark.

36

The aftermath of the Bin Laden episode, dismal as it may seem, augers well domestically for the process lately set in motion by civil society and its support of an independent judiciary and a free media. However, an early turnaround is unlikely because of the adverse impact of the past and, paradoxically, due to a vibrant non-state sector, a collateral beneficiary of a dysfunctional state, which provides employment to the poor and keeps them off the streets.

Removal of Bin Laden from the scene may, however, bring about a more qualitative change in Afghanistan, with its inevitable effects on Pakistan and on the latter’s role in the so called war on terror — a euphemism for growing insurgencies in the twin countries.

During the last few weeks it has been argued that since the US and NATO were not making much headway in Afghanistan, the cost of war and waning support in their homelands, urgently required them to claim ‘victory’ and beat a hasty retreat.

This would be good thinking and may even be doable, regardless of their initial war objectives, declared or hidden, or any others acquired overtime. The American strategic community, always adept at inventing new terminology, calls this repositionary ‘mission creep.’

An exit from war is, however, not simply a matter of packing bags and hitting the road.

For one thing, even if the US invaded Afghanistan to bring Bin Laden to book and can now declare ‘mission accomplished,’ it has also in the meantime dug itself deeply in a hole. The vested interest of the infamous military-industrial complex, inflated by thousands of defence contractors, will do its best to prolong the war.

And then there is always the military’s image. No armed force, understandably, likes to lose. The US too, since it has routinely lost to ragtag militias, is rather sensitive about its image. It will therefore insist on continuing the war till its last detractor has conceded that the Taliban have been beaten on the battlefield. In its frustration, it rejects the age-old wisdom that the insurgents win merely by surviving.

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NEIGHBOURS

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AFP

A NATO supply oil tanker burns following an attack by gunmen on the outskirts of Quetta

NATO, too, has significant stakes in a ‘military victory,’ especially now that it has a militant secretary-general. After the demise of the Soviet Union, the organisation avoided disbandment by transforming its role to keeping peace in Europe. Having failed in Bosnia and Kosovo, and after its relegation to irrelevance in the Balkans, it is now desperately fighting for life in an out-ofarea operation. The rest of us too have a stake; in its ‘defeat’ the world’s most powerful military alliance might grow into a most meddling mafia. And lastly, the various military bases in Afghanistan, having been fortified by long-term use might raise doubts about the Alliance’s future designs in this strife-torn region.

Eventually, the withdrawal of foreign forces, total or partial, will depend upon the resilience of the Afghan resistance and the staying power of the occupation forces — with the Bin Laden card only to be used, if required, for ‘face saving.’

The first serious effort is already underway to negotiate with the Taliban — through Germany’s good offices. Peace in Afghanistan therefore looks less distant.

NATO, too, has significant stakes in a ‘military victory,’ now that it has a militant secretary-general. After the demise of the Soviet Union, the organisation avoided disbandment by transforming its role to keeping peace in Europe.

Having failed in Bosnia and Kosovo, and after its relegation to irrelevance in the Balkans, it is now desperately fighting for life in an out-of-area operation.

38

An internal consensus in a tribal society is indeed the only durable solution. Not easy to achieve, but more doable than keeping all the others, including its neighbours, away from the table and preferably out of the room.

The withdrawal of troops may not resolve all of Pakistan’s tribulations, some of which are endemic, but it would certainly help lighten its Afghanistan and war on terror related burdens. If the state of affairs in the country has nosedived during the last decade, there is no harm looking afresh at some of the developments during this period: the decision to throw in our lot with a distant power against people in the neighbourhood; the inability to exploit our hyped-up status to secure long-term gains; acting as mercenaries more than as an important player; and most crucially, failure to discriminate between those who were with us and the rogue groups, thus leaving both of them with no option but to gang up against us.

Lately, we have tried to change track, and violent protests from our estranged allies indicate that this new approach may be making a difference.

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DISORDER ON THE BORDER The noticeable presence of the armed forces of China, People’s Liberation Army, in Pakistan’s Northern Areas should be a cause for concern for the region

KEY POINTS n Though China has denied the presence of troops in Pakistan’s Northern Areas there are large numbers of combat support troops of People’s Liberation Army. n China has shifted its Kashmir policy from one of non-interference to actively supporting Pakistan. n This move is an indication that the leadership of China views India as militarily weak.

T

he presence of the armed forces of China, People’s Liberation Army, (PLA) in the Northern Areas of Pakistan was first reported in late August 2010. The Indian media picked up the news and the activity made headlines for a few days. Surprisingly, after a statement by the foreign office of China denying any presence, the issue disappeared from the public domain.

Now, recently after our Northern Army Commander warned about the presence of Chinese troops close to the Line of Control (LoC), the issue is again back on the radar.

Unfortunately, the Ministry of External Affairs continues to be non-alarmist with the outgoing Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao stating that, “Raising tension between the two countries was not the right way of handling the situation.” Sadly, the response indicates the government’s penchant to brush key strategic issues under the carpet.

The presence of the PLA in Pakistan’s Northern Areas is strategically very significant and needs to be highlighted extensively both at the domestic and the international level. India needs to study the full implications of this activity especially as China seems to have shifted its policy relating to the Kashmir issue from one of non-interference to that of actively supporting Pakistan.

Before Independence and the partition of India in 1947, Maharaja of Jammu and

The Karakoram Highway

40

41

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VIJAY OBEROI

JUNE 2011

DSI

DISORDER ON THE BORDER The noticeable presence of the armed forces of China, People’s Liberation Army, in Pakistan’s Northern Areas should be a cause for concern for the region

KEY POINTS n Though China has denied the presence of troops in Pakistan’s Northern Areas there are large numbers of combat support troops of People’s Liberation Army. n China has shifted its Kashmir policy from one of non-interference to actively supporting Pakistan. n This move is an indication that the leadership of China views India as militarily weak.

T

he presence of the armed forces of China, People’s Liberation Army, (PLA) in the Northern Areas of Pakistan was first reported in late August 2010. The Indian media picked up the news and the activity made headlines for a few days. Surprisingly, after a statement by the foreign office of China denying any presence, the issue disappeared from the public domain.

Now, recently after our Northern Army Commander warned about the presence of Chinese troops close to the Line of Control (LoC), the issue is again back on the radar.

Unfortunately, the Ministry of External Affairs continues to be non-alarmist with the outgoing Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao stating that, “Raising tension between the two countries was not the right way of handling the situation.” Sadly, the response indicates the government’s penchant to brush key strategic issues under the carpet.

The presence of the PLA in Pakistan’s Northern Areas is strategically very significant and needs to be highlighted extensively both at the domestic and the international level. India needs to study the full implications of this activity especially as China seems to have shifted its policy relating to the Kashmir issue from one of non-interference to that of actively supporting Pakistan.

Before Independence and the partition of India in 1947, Maharaja of Jammu and

The Karakoram Highway

40

41

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JUNE 2011

Kashmir, Hari Singh’s rule extended to Gilgit and Baltistan, where his troops were also located. After 1947, J&K remained an independent state till it was attacked by Pakistan in October 1947. Subsequently, J&K had acceded to India and the Indian Army had launched operations to drive back the Pakistani invaders. When a Cease Fire Line came into being, parts of the erstwhile state still remained under the control of Pakistan. The northern part was called Northern Areas and the southern part became PoK. The Northern Areas was formed by the amalgamation of the Gilgit Agency, the Baltistan District of the Ladakh Wazarat and the states of Hunza and Nagar. While Pakistan considers the territory separate from Kashmir, India considers the territory as a part of the larger disputed territory of Kashmir. The territory, with Gilgit as its administrative centre, became a single administrative unit in 1970, under the name Northern Areas, which remains one of the most neglected and poorest parts of Pakistan.

On August 29, 2009, the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order 2009 was circumvented by Pakistan and self-rule was granted to the people of the former Northern Areas which was renamed Gilgit-Baltistan. There was opposition to this move in India as well as in Gilgit-Baltistan and in Pakistan. By early September 2009, Pakistan signed an agreement with China for a mega-energy project in this area which included the construction of a 7,000-megawatt dam at Bunji in the Astore District, again under protests from India.

ON DEEP BACKGROUND ACCESS: Before 1978, Gilgit-Baltistan was cut off from Pakistan because of a lack of accessible roads. All the roads to the south opened towards PoK and to the southeast towards Jammu and Kashmir. With help from China, Pakistan began constructing the Karakoram Highway, which was completed in 1978.

The 805km-long, dual carriage metalled road starts from Havelian, 100km from Islamabad, passes through ChilasGilgit-Hunza connecting to the Chinese frontier, via the 4,733 meter-high Khunjerab Pass and then to Tashkurgan and Kashgar in China.

DEMOGRAPHICS: The estimated population of 1.5 million of GilgitBaltistan is divided here into many ethnic groups but unlike the rest of Pakistan, the Northern Areas have a Shia majority.

The Pakistani establishment has long supported an anti-Shia programme in this region and has also been involved in efforts to alter the demographic profile of the region, reducing the indigenous people to a minority. Since 1988, the Northern Areas have witnessed sectarian violence a number of times.

Pakistan has, over a period, inducted a large number of Sunnis from Punjab and the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa provinces to settle in Gilgit, thus radically altering the demographic profile of the area.

In Denial

A forward camp of the Indian Army at 16,000 ft on the Siachen Glacier in Baltistan province near the Chinese border AFP

GEOGRAPHY: Gilgit-Baltistan, formerly known as the Northern Areas, is the northernmost political entity in Pakistan today. It borders Pakistan’s Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province, which was earlier known as the North-West Frontier Province to the west; Afghanistan’s Wakhan corridor to the north; China to the Northeast; Jammu and Kashmir to the southeast and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) in the south. It covers an area of 72,971 sq km. A part of Northern Areas, called the Shaksgam Tract, was illegally ceded to China by Pakistan in 1963.

42

China has denied the presence of troops but it appears quite certain that while combat troops may not be deployed there are large numbers of combat support troops from the construction, engineering and communication units of the PLA falling under the command of the Xinjiang military district which may be about 7,000 strong. On the China side of the Khunjerab Pass, there are many more PLA troops.

Such a large foreign presence in a thinly populated, undeveloped region has a profound impact, both at the local level and in adjoining countries. For India, it amounts to the opening of a new front in the near future. Similarly, Afghanistan, although busy fighting the Taliban should be equally worried with its Wakhan corridor immediately next door. The presence of these troops also presents a challenge for the

43

DSI

China is trying hard to open surface links from the Chinese hinterland to the Indian Ocean. It is attempting to do so from both its south western and south eastern flanks. In the south east it is progressing its road-building activities fromYunnan through Myanmar towards the Bay of Bengal. It wants a similar opening on its south western flank. It is already building a rail link between Kashgar in Xinjiang province and Havelian near Rawalpindi.

”

United States as all its strategic plans in West Asia and the Central Asian Republics (CAR’s) may get negated if China manages to reach its goals. The activity cannot be innocent, seen simply as assisting a friendly country, but rather a cover for China’s true intentions that can have very serious security implications especially for South Asia and even the greater Southern Asian region.

India would do well to remember that these new activities fall in with a marked change in China’s Kashmir policy, following in the wake of the ‘visa controversy’, whereby personnel of the Indian military and others have been denied visas for visiting China and residents of J&K have been receiving stapled visas. Till recently, China was a neutral observer as far as the Kashmir issue was concerned and espoused the bilateral approach between India and Pakistan to solve the issue. China seems to have radically changed its stance with an obvious bias towards Pakistan. This development is inimical to the interests of India and needs to be countered vigorously.

The presence of the PLA, whether of combat troops or combat support troops,

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JUNE 2011

Kashmir, Hari Singh’s rule extended to Gilgit and Baltistan, where his troops were also located. After 1947, J&K remained an independent state till it was attacked by Pakistan in October 1947. Subsequently, J&K had acceded to India and the Indian Army had launched operations to drive back the Pakistani invaders. When a Cease Fire Line came into being, parts of the erstwhile state still remained under the control of Pakistan. The northern part was called Northern Areas and the southern part became PoK. The Northern Areas was formed by the amalgamation of the Gilgit Agency, the Baltistan District of the Ladakh Wazarat and the states of Hunza and Nagar. While Pakistan considers the territory separate from Kashmir, India considers the territory as a part of the larger disputed territory of Kashmir. The territory, with Gilgit as its administrative centre, became a single administrative unit in 1970, under the name Northern Areas, which remains one of the most neglected and poorest parts of Pakistan.

On August 29, 2009, the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order 2009 was circumvented by Pakistan and self-rule was granted to the people of the former Northern Areas which was renamed Gilgit-Baltistan. There was opposition to this move in India as well as in Gilgit-Baltistan and in Pakistan. By early September 2009, Pakistan signed an agreement with China for a mega-energy project in this area which included the construction of a 7,000-megawatt dam at Bunji in the Astore District, again under protests from India.

ON DEEP BACKGROUND ACCESS: Before 1978, Gilgit-Baltistan was cut off from Pakistan because of a lack of accessible roads. All the roads to the south opened towards PoK and to the southeast towards Jammu and Kashmir. With help from China, Pakistan began constructing the Karakoram Highway, which was completed in 1978.

The 805km-long, dual carriage metalled road starts from Havelian, 100km from Islamabad, passes through ChilasGilgit-Hunza connecting to the Chinese frontier, via the 4,733 meter-high Khunjerab Pass and then to Tashkurgan and Kashgar in China.

DEMOGRAPHICS: The estimated population of 1.5 million of GilgitBaltistan is divided here into many ethnic groups but unlike the rest of Pakistan, the Northern Areas have a Shia majority.

The Pakistani establishment has long supported an anti-Shia programme in this region and has also been involved in efforts to alter the demographic profile of the region, reducing the indigenous people to a minority. Since 1988, the Northern Areas have witnessed sectarian violence a number of times.

Pakistan has, over a period, inducted a large number of Sunnis from Punjab and the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa provinces to settle in Gilgit, thus radically altering the demographic profile of the area.

In Denial

A forward camp of the Indian Army at 16,000 ft on the Siachen Glacier in Baltistan province near the Chinese border AFP

GEOGRAPHY: Gilgit-Baltistan, formerly known as the Northern Areas, is the northernmost political entity in Pakistan today. It borders Pakistan’s Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province, which was earlier known as the North-West Frontier Province to the west; Afghanistan’s Wakhan corridor to the north; China to the Northeast; Jammu and Kashmir to the southeast and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) in the south. It covers an area of 72,971 sq km. A part of Northern Areas, called the Shaksgam Tract, was illegally ceded to China by Pakistan in 1963.

42

China has denied the presence of troops but it appears quite certain that while combat troops may not be deployed there are large numbers of combat support troops from the construction, engineering and communication units of the PLA falling under the command of the Xinjiang military district which may be about 7,000 strong. On the China side of the Khunjerab Pass, there are many more PLA troops.

Such a large foreign presence in a thinly populated, undeveloped region has a profound impact, both at the local level and in adjoining countries. For India, it amounts to the opening of a new front in the near future. Similarly, Afghanistan, although busy fighting the Taliban should be equally worried with its Wakhan corridor immediately next door. The presence of these troops also presents a challenge for the

43

DSI

China is trying hard to open surface links from the Chinese hinterland to the Indian Ocean. It is attempting to do so from both its south western and south eastern flanks. In the south east it is progressing its road-building activities fromYunnan through Myanmar towards the Bay of Bengal. It wants a similar opening on its south western flank. It is already building a rail link between Kashgar in Xinjiang province and Havelian near Rawalpindi.

”

United States as all its strategic plans in West Asia and the Central Asian Republics (CAR’s) may get negated if China manages to reach its goals. The activity cannot be innocent, seen simply as assisting a friendly country, but rather a cover for China’s true intentions that can have very serious security implications especially for South Asia and even the greater Southern Asian region.

India would do well to remember that these new activities fall in with a marked change in China’s Kashmir policy, following in the wake of the ‘visa controversy’, whereby personnel of the Indian military and others have been denied visas for visiting China and residents of J&K have been receiving stapled visas. Till recently, China was a neutral observer as far as the Kashmir issue was concerned and espoused the bilateral approach between India and Pakistan to solve the issue. China seems to have radically changed its stance with an obvious bias towards Pakistan. This development is inimical to the interests of India and needs to be countered vigorously.

The presence of the PLA, whether of combat troops or combat support troops,

REGION-China-Vijay Oberoi-2nd Time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 10:17 AM Page 6

REGION

JUNE 2011

Pakistani troops in the country’s Northern Areas

Khunjerab Pass on the northern border of Gilgit-Baltistan and the Xinjiang Autonmous Region of China

AFP

China has denied the presence of troops, but it appears quite certain that while combat troops may not be deployed, there are large numbers of combat support troops from the construction, engineering and communication units of the PLA falling under the command of the Xinjiang military district.

serves China’s strategic interests in South Asia. Besides questioning India’s sovereign right over J&K and highlighting it as ‘disputed territory’, this presence internationalises the issue, something Pakistan has been wanting for a very long time. Although the Shaksgam Tract has been ceded to China a long time ago, (see box) it can fully incorporate it only if these areas become a permanent part of Pakistan in any future settlement over Kashmir.

China may also want additional territory in areas that adjoin the Xinxiang Province

DSI

with a view to keep its restive Uyghur population as far away as possible from the Jihadi elements of Pakistan.

The larger strategic interests of China are also significant. It is well known that China is trying hard to open surface links from the Chinese hinterland to the Indian Ocean. It is attempting to do so from both its south western and south eastern flanks.

In the south east it is progressing its roadbuilding activities from Yunnan through Myanmar towards the Bay of Bengal with vigour. It wants a similar opening on its

44

south western flank. It is already building a rail link between Kashgar in Xinjiang province and Havelian near Rawalpindi.

Combined with the road links already underway, it seems to be converting the erstwhile ‘string of pearls’ into a potent and visible stranglehold of India which it sees as its main rival in Asia in the medium and long terms. With this infrastructure, Chinese oil tankers, using the Pakistani ports of Gwadar, Pasni and Ormara, will be able to move oil to China’s hinterland in a few days.

China has been touting ‘its peaceful rise’ for decades, in an attempt to lull its detractors. Many Indian analysts as well as the government, seem to have bought that argument. But the reality is that having surpassed Japan in economic terms, it seems to be confident of taking risks in the frontier areas of its borders, as part of its overtly resurgent phase. Besides trying to slowly marginalise the traditional US role in the Asia-Pacific region and West Asia, it wants to increase its pressure on India. China’s current presence in the

”

Northern Areas needs to be seen as a strong message not only to India but also to the international community that it has arrived.

No Ordinary Development

Geo-politically, this move by China also indicates that its leadership views India as a weak nation in military terms. The Chinese tactics may well be that this is a good time to increase pressure and force India to negotiate on the disputed border question from a position of strength.

45

Some analysts argue, that this move by China is actually a reflection of an internal struggle in the communist country. The recent cases of military bellicosity, not only in the areas bordering India, but also in many parts of the Asia-Pacific region, is the result of a power struggle between the old guard of PLA and the current political leadership. Such arguments are based on the perception that the change in leadership in China in 2012 is unlikely to be smooth. The PLA, it is argued, is not happy with the way military strategy is being overshadowed by economic, and diplomatic issues by the current political leadership. There may be some merit in the analysis but when one looks at the larger picture, this move is surely based on a well thought out and comprehensive plan thought out collectively. In today’s China, no group or individual can take an independent line and succeed.

These new strategies must not be treated as another ordinary development. This overt operation by China needs to be analysed as it is bound to adversely affect India’s strategic position in J&K and in the highly sensitive area of Ladakh, especially when the PLA is already deployed on our eastern flank in the Aksai Chin area.

This comes at a time when there are renewed moves by Pakistan and its proxies to ‘settle’ the Siachin issue. Unfortunately, there are many in India who do not understand the deeper implications of China’s maneuvering or are so driven by their personal agendas that they are willing to sacrifice the interests of the country.

REGION-China-Vijay Oberoi-2nd Time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 10:17 AM Page 6

REGION

JUNE 2011

Pakistani troops in the country’s Northern Areas

Khunjerab Pass on the northern border of Gilgit-Baltistan and the Xinjiang Autonmous Region of China

AFP

China has denied the presence of troops, but it appears quite certain that while combat troops may not be deployed, there are large numbers of combat support troops from the construction, engineering and communication units of the PLA falling under the command of the Xinjiang military district.

serves China’s strategic interests in South Asia. Besides questioning India’s sovereign right over J&K and highlighting it as ‘disputed territory’, this presence internationalises the issue, something Pakistan has been wanting for a very long time. Although the Shaksgam Tract has been ceded to China a long time ago, (see box) it can fully incorporate it only if these areas become a permanent part of Pakistan in any future settlement over Kashmir.

China may also want additional territory in areas that adjoin the Xinxiang Province

DSI

with a view to keep its restive Uyghur population as far away as possible from the Jihadi elements of Pakistan.

The larger strategic interests of China are also significant. It is well known that China is trying hard to open surface links from the Chinese hinterland to the Indian Ocean. It is attempting to do so from both its south western and south eastern flanks.

In the south east it is progressing its roadbuilding activities from Yunnan through Myanmar towards the Bay of Bengal with vigour. It wants a similar opening on its

44

south western flank. It is already building a rail link between Kashgar in Xinjiang province and Havelian near Rawalpindi.

Combined with the road links already underway, it seems to be converting the erstwhile ‘string of pearls’ into a potent and visible stranglehold of India which it sees as its main rival in Asia in the medium and long terms. With this infrastructure, Chinese oil tankers, using the Pakistani ports of Gwadar, Pasni and Ormara, will be able to move oil to China’s hinterland in a few days.

China has been touting ‘its peaceful rise’ for decades, in an attempt to lull its detractors. Many Indian analysts as well as the government, seem to have bought that argument. But the reality is that having surpassed Japan in economic terms, it seems to be confident of taking risks in the frontier areas of its borders, as part of its overtly resurgent phase. Besides trying to slowly marginalise the traditional US role in the Asia-Pacific region and West Asia, it wants to increase its pressure on India. China’s current presence in the

”

Northern Areas needs to be seen as a strong message not only to India but also to the international community that it has arrived.

No Ordinary Development

Geo-politically, this move by China also indicates that its leadership views India as a weak nation in military terms. The Chinese tactics may well be that this is a good time to increase pressure and force India to negotiate on the disputed border question from a position of strength.

45

Some analysts argue, that this move by China is actually a reflection of an internal struggle in the communist country. The recent cases of military bellicosity, not only in the areas bordering India, but also in many parts of the Asia-Pacific region, is the result of a power struggle between the old guard of PLA and the current political leadership. Such arguments are based on the perception that the change in leadership in China in 2012 is unlikely to be smooth. The PLA, it is argued, is not happy with the way military strategy is being overshadowed by economic, and diplomatic issues by the current political leadership. There may be some merit in the analysis but when one looks at the larger picture, this move is surely based on a well thought out and comprehensive plan thought out collectively. In today’s China, no group or individual can take an independent line and succeed.

These new strategies must not be treated as another ordinary development. This overt operation by China needs to be analysed as it is bound to adversely affect India’s strategic position in J&K and in the highly sensitive area of Ladakh, especially when the PLA is already deployed on our eastern flank in the Aksai Chin area.

This comes at a time when there are renewed moves by Pakistan and its proxies to ‘settle’ the Siachin issue. Unfortunately, there are many in India who do not understand the deeper implications of China’s maneuvering or are so driven by their personal agendas that they are willing to sacrifice the interests of the country.

Military History-Inder Malhotra-2nd Time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 10:23 AM Page 2

HISTORY

JUNE 2011

DSI

WAR IN THE HIMALAYAS Fifty years later, the 1962 Sino-Indian war lingers in the Indian consciousness as a reason for national humiliation

INDER MALHOTRA

KEY POINTS Tension between the two great Asian neighbours was rising since the second half of 1950s. n Nehru remained convinced that while there would be border skirmishes and patrol-level clashes, the Chinese would do ‘nothing big’. n Having eliminated Indian military posts, the Chinese offered border negotiations but on terms that no Indian government could have accepted. n

N

(Clockwise from top left) Nehru visits Indian troops during the 1962 India-China war and troops soldier on

46

o Indian who lived through it is ever likely to forget the trauma of the brief but brutal border war with China in the high Himalayas in 1962. So swift and overwhelming was the Chinese advance that the sparse Indian defences then in existence were swept away in four days flat both in the Northeast in what was then called North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and is now known as Arunachal Pradesh and in Ladakh in the northwest. In the words of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s official biographer, S. Gopal, things went so wrong that “had they not happened, it would have been difficult to believe them”. No wonder national morale disintegrated almost overnight.

Almost exactly half a century later, 1962 lingers in Indian consciousness even though at this distance of time thinking people realise that since only an infinitesimal part of the Indian and Chinese armies were involved in the month-long

47

fighting in remote regions, Indian panic and despair were uncalled for.

However, at that time a whole generation brought up on the heady slogan, Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers) was appalled that China, whose cause India had espoused even at the cost of annoying the mighty United States, have been so ‘perfidious.’ It also saw the war’s outcome as a combination of ‘military debacle, political disaster and national humiliation.’

India’s president, S. Radhakrishnan, accused his own government of ‘credulity and negligence.’ A shaken Nehru, whose China policy was responsible for all that happened, acknowledged, “We had been living in a make-believe world.”

Tension Brews Up This rueful remark arguably is the core of all that went wrong. Tension between the two great Asian neighbours, initially over rival claims on the border, had been rising since the second half of 1950s. It surged hugely after the revolt in Tibet in March 1959, the Dalai Lama’s flight from Lhasa and the granting of asylum to him by India.

In September, 1959, Zhou Enlai startled Nehru by going back on what he had ‘indicated’ to the Indian Prime Minister in 1956: that though the ‘so-called McMahon Line’ was a ‘legacy of British Imperialism,’ because of ‘friendly relations between China and India,’ his government, after ‘consulting the Tibetan authorities,’ would give it recognition. Zhou also repudiated that he had ‘confirmed’ Nehru’s impression that there was ‘no major boundary

Military History-Inder Malhotra-2nd Time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 10:23 AM Page 2

HISTORY

JUNE 2011

DSI

WAR IN THE HIMALAYAS Fifty years later, the 1962 Sino-Indian war lingers in the Indian consciousness as a reason for national humiliation

INDER MALHOTRA

KEY POINTS Tension between the two great Asian neighbours was rising since the second half of 1950s. n Nehru remained convinced that while there would be border skirmishes and patrol-level clashes, the Chinese would do ‘nothing big’. n Having eliminated Indian military posts, the Chinese offered border negotiations but on terms that no Indian government could have accepted. n

N

(Clockwise from top left) Nehru visits Indian troops during the 1962 India-China war and troops soldier on

46

o Indian who lived through it is ever likely to forget the trauma of the brief but brutal border war with China in the high Himalayas in 1962. So swift and overwhelming was the Chinese advance that the sparse Indian defences then in existence were swept away in four days flat both in the Northeast in what was then called North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and is now known as Arunachal Pradesh and in Ladakh in the northwest. In the words of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s official biographer, S. Gopal, things went so wrong that “had they not happened, it would have been difficult to believe them”. No wonder national morale disintegrated almost overnight.

Almost exactly half a century later, 1962 lingers in Indian consciousness even though at this distance of time thinking people realise that since only an infinitesimal part of the Indian and Chinese armies were involved in the month-long

47

fighting in remote regions, Indian panic and despair were uncalled for.

However, at that time a whole generation brought up on the heady slogan, Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers) was appalled that China, whose cause India had espoused even at the cost of annoying the mighty United States, have been so ‘perfidious.’ It also saw the war’s outcome as a combination of ‘military debacle, political disaster and national humiliation.’

India’s president, S. Radhakrishnan, accused his own government of ‘credulity and negligence.’ A shaken Nehru, whose China policy was responsible for all that happened, acknowledged, “We had been living in a make-believe world.”

Tension Brews Up This rueful remark arguably is the core of all that went wrong. Tension between the two great Asian neighbours, initially over rival claims on the border, had been rising since the second half of 1950s. It surged hugely after the revolt in Tibet in March 1959, the Dalai Lama’s flight from Lhasa and the granting of asylum to him by India.

In September, 1959, Zhou Enlai startled Nehru by going back on what he had ‘indicated’ to the Indian Prime Minister in 1956: that though the ‘so-called McMahon Line’ was a ‘legacy of British Imperialism,’ because of ‘friendly relations between China and India,’ his government, after ‘consulting the Tibetan authorities,’ would give it recognition. Zhou also repudiated that he had ‘confirmed’ Nehru’s impression that there was ‘no major boundary

Military History-Inder Malhotra-2nd Time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 10:23 AM Page 4

HISTORY

AFP

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru with Zhou Enlai during an official visit to China

disputes’ between the two countries. The Chinese premier insisted that the entire Sino-Indian boundary was ‘un-delimited’ and had to be negotiated afresh. This was unacceptable to Nehru who was prepared to ‘negotiate to the bitter end’ and make minor adjustments along the existing alignment but not the entire boundary.

In October, the Chinese attacked an Indian patrol of the armed policemen at Kongka-La in Ladakh where they drew blood for the first time, fatally wounding 4 and capturing 11 Indian personnel. They then added insult to injury by returning the bodies of those killed on November 14, Nehru’s birthday. Things worsened because of the Indian decision to set up more and more posts in Indian territory in Ladakh at least up to the point where the Chinese hadn’t intruded. Foolishly, this step was called Forward Policy, something that Beijing found provocative. The failure of the Nehru-Zhou summit in Delhi in April 1960 escalated the strife. In 1961, the Chinese started firing on Indian patrols again.

In spite of all this, Nehru remained convinced that while there would be border skirmishes and patrol-level clashes, the Chinese would do ‘nothing big.’ His conviction was based on the rather dated

Balance of Power doctrine. India was ‘too big a prize,’ he believed. So if China or Russia or any other country invaded India, it would quickly turn into a ‘much wider war.’ It did not occur to him — or to any of his civilian or military advisers — that China could well launch a limited and calibrated operation, which is precisely what it did after meticulous preparations.

Tension between India and China, initially over rival claims on the border, had been rising since the second half of 1950s.

It surged hugely after the revolt inTibet in March 1959 and the Dalai Lama’s flight from Lhasa.

48

”

Changing Stance How the Chinese strategy evolved and why is an instructive story. Henry Kissinger, in his latest book On China has endorsed what other sinologists have asserted earlier — that before deciding to ‘teach India a lesson’ Mao Zedong (who had resumed the role of Great Helmsman after lying low because of the death of 20 million people in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward) had secured from the United States at regular talks at Warsaw an assurance that it would not unleash Taiwan on China. Also, China obviously had prior knowledge of the looming Cuban missile crisis because it used this to temper, temporarily at least, the support to India that the Soviet Union had started giving since the start of the SinoSoviet split in 1959.

Mao also took personal charge of the military operation with top political and military advisers by his side. His initial instructions to his troops were not to fire on Indians unless they were fired upon but not to allow them to intrude into ‘Chinese territory.’ Wherever the Indian troops withdrew, they were not to be pursued.

These changed radically in July when the decision to take military action was taken. If Indian troops intruded into any area of

China, the Chinese frontier guards must ‘hit them hard’ and eventually ‘exterminate them.’ (Source: Declassified Chinese documents recovered by Harvard Sinologist Roderick Macfarquhar.)

Remarkably, Indian intelligence didn’t have a clue about this or to the massive reinforcements that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had sent to the Indian border for the planned action.

Ironically, the Intelligence Bureau had with it a report that the Chinese consulgeneral in Calcutta, now Kolkata, had told Indian communist leaders that the Indian nibbling of Chinese territory and ‘other provocations’ had gone so far that China would have to ‘take strong action.’

Before unleashing their massive offensive the Chinese chose the casus belli with characteristic skill and cunning. It was in Ladakh that competitive occupation of territory, with inevitable skirmishes, had gone on throughout 1961 and the summer of 1962. On September 8, they suddenly staged a major infiltration in the eastern sector, and established their presence to the south of the Thagla ridge that India considered unquestionably to be its territory. China retorted that Thagla was to the north of the ‘so-called McMahon Line.’

After hurriedly sending reinforcements to the area, Nehru told the press at Delhi airport before leaving for Colombo, “I have ordered the Army to throw the Chinese out of Thagla … It is for the Army to decide the timing.” The Chinese let the acrimony increase but said nothing.

Here came into play a major factor of Indian politics one that has undermined Indian defences against China and continues to do so. It was Krishna Menon, the highly controversial Defence Minister who was, however, Nehru’s closest adviser.

Parliamentarians who attacked Nehru for his ‘weak-kneed’ policy towards aggressive China wanted Menon to be dismissed. But Nehru would not countenance this. Menon also had a penchant for playing favourites among top military officers. This was to lead to a most unfortunate choice of the Corps Commander in what was to be the main battlefield. The choice fell on LieutenantGeneral B. M. Kaul, an excellent and highly ambitious military bureaucrat but lacking in experience of combat.

This led to the catastrophe from the start of the Chinese invasion on October 20 until the end a month later. On October 24, having eliminated all Indian military posts they had objected to, the Chinese halted.

They offered India border negotiations but

DSI

AFP

JUNE 2011

Tibetan orphans arrive in Pathankot in April 1963, en route to Dharamsala, where the Dalai Lama took refuge after he fled Tibet

on terms that no Indian government could have accepted. Ironically, around this time, the Indian Parliament was spending as much time and energy on ejecting Menon from the Defence Ministry as on expelling the invaders. A reluctant Nehru eventually sacked Menon on November 7.

Chinese Offensive Around the same date, the Chinese resumed their offensive. However, the Indians were by this time more confident as defences in the war zone had been strengthened demonstrably. This was particularly so at Sela, arguably the most strategic mountain pass where India could have stopped the Chinese from marching to the foothills. That, however, never happened because once again the military leadership failed miserably.

A cowardly divisional commander of the

49

once famous Fourth Division panicked and decided to withdraw despite loud protests

by Brigadier Hoshiar Singh, sitting atop Sela and determined to fight. Kaul was not present at the Corps Headquarters. Two generals senior to him, including the Army Chief, were. But so scared were they of Kaul’s political connection that they did nothing to prevent the retreat from turning into a rout.

The state of the political leadership in Delhi was hardly better. On November 19, Nehru wrote two letters within a few hours to President John F. Kennedy telling him that almost the entire eastern India was lost to the Chinese, and asking for massive military help including the services of American pilots to fly US aircraft. That night the Chinese declared unilateral cease-fire and withdrawal to their original positions.

Military History-Inder Malhotra-2nd Time.qxd:INDO-PAK.qxd 28/06/11 10:23 AM Page 4

HISTORY

AFP

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru with Zhou Enlai during an official visit to China

disputes’ between the two countries. The Chinese premier insisted that the entire Sino-Indian boundary was ‘un-delimited’ and had to be negotiated afresh. This was unacceptable to Nehru who was prepared to ‘negotiate to the bitter end’ and make minor adjustments along the existing alignment but not the entire boundary.

In October, the Chinese attacked an Indian patrol of the armed policemen at Kongka-La in Ladakh where they drew blood for the first time, fatally wounding 4 and capturing 11 Indian personnel. They then added insult to injury by returning the bodies of those killed on November 14, Nehru’s birthday. Things worsened because of the Indian decision to set up more and more posts in Indian territory in Ladakh at least up to the point where the Chinese hadn’t intruded. Foolishly, this step was called Forward Policy, something that Beijing found provocative. The failure of the Nehru-Zhou summit in Delhi in April 1960 escalated the strife. In 1961, the Chinese started firing on Indian patrols again.

In spite of all this, Nehru remained convinced that while there would be border skirmishes and patrol-level clashes, the Chinese would do ‘nothing big.’ His conviction was based on the rather dated

Balance of Power doctrine. India was ‘too big a prize,’ he believed. So if China or Russia or any other country invaded India, it would quickly turn into a ‘much wider war.’ It did not occur to him — or to any of his civilian or military advisers — that China could well launch a limited and calibrated operation, which is precisely what it did after meticulous preparations.

Tension between India and China, initially over rival claims on the border, had been rising since the second half of 1950s.

It surged hugely after the revolt inTibet in March 1959 and the Dalai Lama’s flight from Lhasa.

48

”

Changing Stance How the Chinese strategy evolved and why is an instructive story. Henry Kissinger, in his latest book On China has endorsed what other sinologists have asserted earlier — that before deciding to ‘teach India a lesson’ Mao Zedong (who had resumed the role of Great Helmsman after lying low because of the death of 20 million people in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward) had secured from the United States at regular talks at Warsaw an assurance that it would not unleash Taiwan on China. Also, China obviously had prior knowledge of the looming Cuban missile crisis because it used this to temper, temporarily at least, the support to India that the Soviet Union had started giving since the start of the SinoSoviet split in 1959.

Mao also took personal charge of the military operation with top political and military advisers by his side. His initial instructions to his troops were not to fire on Indians unless they were fired upon but not to allow them to intrude into ‘Chinese territory.’ Wherever the Indian troops withdrew, they were not to be pursued.

These changed radically in July when the decision to take military action was taken. If Indian troops intruded into any area of

China, the Chinese frontier guards must ‘hit them hard’ and eventually ‘exterminate them.’ (Source: Declassified Chinese documents recovered by Harvard Sinologist Roderick Macfarquhar.)

Remarkably, Indian intelligence didn’t have a clue about this or to the massive reinforcements that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had sent to the Indian border for the planned action.

Ironically, the Intelligence Bureau had with it a report that the Chinese consulgeneral in Calcutta, now Kolkata, had told Indian communist leaders that the Indian nibbling of Chinese territory and ‘other provocations’ had gone so far that China would have to ‘take strong action.’

Before unleashing their massive offensive the Chinese chose the casus belli with characteristic skill and cunning. It was in Ladakh that competitive occupation of territory, with inevitable skirmishes, had gone on throughout 1961 and the summer of 1962. On September 8, they suddenly staged a major infiltration in the eastern sector, and established their presence to the south of the Thagla ridge that India considered unquestionably to be its territory. China retorted that Thagla was to the north of the ‘so-called McMahon Line.’

After hurriedly sending reinforcements to the area, Nehru told the press at Delhi airport before leaving for Colombo, “I have ordered the Army to throw the Chinese out of Thagla … It is for the Army to decide the timing.” The Chinese let the acrimony increase but said nothing.

Here came into play a major factor of Indian politics one that has undermined Indian defences against China and continues to do so. It was Krishna Menon, the highly controversial Defence Minister who was, however, Nehru’s closest adviser.

Parliamentarians who attacked Nehru for his ‘weak-kneed’ policy towards aggressive China wanted Menon to be dismissed. But Nehru would not countenance this. Menon also had a penchant for playing favourites among top military officers. This was to lead to a most unfortunate choice of the Corps Commander in what was to be the main battlefield. The choice fell on LieutenantGeneral B. M. Kaul, an excellent and highly ambitious military bureaucrat but lacking in experience of combat.

This led to the catastrophe from the start of the Chinese invasion on October 20 until the end a month later. On October 24, having eliminated all Indian military posts they had objected to, the Chinese halted.

They offered India border negotiations but

DSI

AFP

JUNE 2011

Tibetan orphans arrive in Pathankot in April 1963, en route to Dharamsala, where the Dalai Lama took refuge after he fled Tibet

on terms that no Indian government could have accepted. Ironically, around this time, the Indian Parliament was spending as much time and energy on ejecting Menon from the Defence Ministry as on expelling the invaders. A reluctant Nehru eventually sacked Menon on November 7.

Chinese Offensive Around the same date, the Chinese resumed their offensive. However, the Indians were by this time more confident as defences in the war zone had been strengthened demonstrably. This was particularly so at Sela, arguably the most strategic mountain pass where India could have stopped the Chinese from marching to the foothills. That, however, never happened because once again the military leadership failed miserably.

A cowardly divisional commander of the

49

once famous Fourth Division panicked and decided to withdraw despite loud protests

by Brigadier Hoshiar Singh, sitting atop Sela and determined to fight. Kaul was not present at the Corps Headquarters. Two generals senior to him, including the Army Chief, were. But so scared were they of Kaul’s political connection that they did nothing to prevent the retreat from turning into a rout.

The state of the political leadership in Delhi was hardly better. On November 19, Nehru wrote two letters within a few hours to President John F. Kennedy telling him that almost the entire eastern India was lost to the Chinese, and asking for massive military help including the services of American pilots to fly US aircraft. That night the Chinese declared unilateral cease-fire and withdrawal to their original positions.

Defence Buzz-2nd Time.qxd:DSI Defence Talk-May09.qxd 28/06/11 10:26 AM Page 2

DEFENCE BUZZ BAE’S FH77 B05

a n

u p d a t e

o n

d e f e n c e

c o m m e r c i a l

n e w s

defencebuzz

RAHUL BEDI

Battling the Enemy Within RECURRING delays in the Indian Army’s (IA) badly-needed artillery modernisation has gone through another setback after BAE Systems recently announced the withdrawal of its FH77 B05 howitzer from the Army’s ` 8,000 crore acquisition of 1,580 towed guns.

BAE Systems’ decision conveyed to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in late April maintained it was based primarily on commercial considerations. In response to an earlier tender for 155mm/52 calibre howitzers in mid-2010 — later withdrawn — the manufacturer has claimed that it carried out extensive and costly modifications to its Bofors FH77 B05 gun in keeping with the Indian Army’s taxing qualitative requirements (QRs).

But BAE Systems has said that with a view to enlarging the competition beyond its gun and possibly that of just another competitor, the Request for Proposal (RfP) subsequently re-issued in January 2011 for the howitzers has resulted in the earlier QRs being diluted, a change that ‘compromised’ the FH77 B05’s customised capabilities achieved at a great expense.

Hence, BAE Systems has said that its option, “not to bid is a commercial one based on the high

50

investment costs required to participate in a complex artillery competition of this nature where the win probability has been reduced.” It also added that, “The new RfP includes technical and performance relaxations that allow less capable weapon systems to enter the competition. This significantly reduces the competitive advantage FH77 B05 derives from its greater capability.”

Recent media reports, however, have indicated that BAE Systems was re-considering its decision and since the deadline for submitting proposals has been extended by two months to June 28, it might well end up bidding for the highly lucrative towed 155mm/52 calibre howitzer contract in an otherwise shrinking global market.

The company believes its presence can be a force multiplier in selling India the heavier guns as it is in the final stages of concluding negotiations with Delhi for the 145 M777 155mm/39 calibre Lightweight Howitzer (LWH) and Laser Inertial Artillery Pointing Systems for $ 647 million via the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme.

Delivery of the LWHs being acquired for deployment along India’s disputed Northeast frontier with China is expected to begin within

216X276.indd 1

6/1/11 1:50:04 PM

Defence Buzz-2nd Time.qxd:DSI Defence Talk-May09.qxd 28/06/11 10:26 AM Page 4

DEFENCE BUZZ 18-24 months of the contract being confirmed possibly within the present financial year ending March 2012.

BAE Systems has also tied up with Mahindra to establish the Defence Land Systems’ joint venture with a purpose-built manufacturing facility at Faridabad that will, among other military hardware, also have the capability to build howitzers in India.

Earlier, BAE Systems’ FH 77 B05 L52 gun participated in four rounds of field trials between 2001 and 2006 which were abandoned on nebulous grounds. These trials also featured South Africa’s Denel Ordnance G5/2000 gun and Soltam’s TIG 2002 for the first three and just BAE Systems and the Israeli howitzer in the final round.

The G5/2000 was knocked out as Denel was blacklisted in October 2005 following allegations of corruption involving an earlier import of 400 anti-materiel rifles from the South African materiel maker.

Presently, however, it is not clear which howitzers will participate in the forthcoming trials for which there is no schedule but armament industry sources say that at least two other towed 155mm/52 calibre howitzers from Russia and Slovakia are expected to respond to the RfP. Singapore Technologies Kinetics (STKs) IFH-2000 howitzer is also expected to participate in the tender despite the trade ban imposed on the company following charges of corruption against it in its dealing with India’s Ordnance Factory Board that were being inquired into by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). SKT denies any wrongdoing and has been allowed to participate in the trials but the MoD has indicated that in the event of the IFH-2000 being selected its eventual acquisition will require CBI clearance.

American Bonanza THE two US aircraft manufacturers participating in the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) $10 billion tender for 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) may have been discarded but large materiel procurements from American companies are imminent that more than make up for this rejection.

The over $4 billion deal for ten C-17 Globemaster-III advanced airlift aircraft via the US’ Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme is likely to be cleared soon making it the largest American procurement after military commerce between Washington and Delhi began in 2002.

Once inked, the C-17 deal will surpass the January 2009 $2.1 billion procurement of

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C-17 Globemaster-III

eight Boeing P-8I long-range Maritime Reconnaissance Aircraft (MRA) and the earlier $962 million acquisition of six Lockheed Martin-built C-130J-30 Super Hercules military transporters specially configured for Special Forces (SFs) operations. Deliveries of the C-130J began last December and are expected to be completed by the year-end.

Military sources said all issues regarding offset obligations under which 30 percent of the C-17s contract value will be invested in India had been resolved and the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) headed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was expected to clear the deal ‘shortly’ significantly augmenting the IAF’s airlift capacity for military and humanitarian requirements.

At present, the IAF operates barely a dozen Russian-origin Ilushin IL-76 Gajraj transporters capable of carrying cargoes of around 45 tonnes and some 104 mediumlift Russian-built Antonov-32 twin-engine turboprop planes that are undergoing an upgrade in Ukraine under a $400 million contract.

But the IAF’s entire transport fleet has for years been plagued by a shortage of spares and unsatisfactory after sales service and it has desperately been seeking a substitute. Consequently, at the IAF’s behest, the Letter of Request for the 10 C-17s has already been dispatched to Washington and the complex process of finalising the procurement is well underway.

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The IAF maintains that the C-17s powered by four Pratt & Whitney F117-PW100 turbofan engines were preferred not only for their ability to ferry up to 70 tonnes to a distance of 2,400 nm but also for their operational efficiency and capability to use short, even make-shift runways at high altitudes. The C-17 trials were successfully conducted last June at the Gaggal or Kangra civilian airport in the Himalayan foothills normally used by 50-seat civilian aircraft.

According to Boeing, the high-wing, T-tailed C-17 can carry equipment like tanks, supplies and troops directly to small airfields in harsh terrain during the day or night. Operated by a two-man crew and one loadmaster it can seat two observers and can also double as an aerial ambulance.

Around 212 C-17s were in service around the world, the majority of them with the US Air Force but were also operated by Australia, Britain, Canada, Qatar and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Procurement of additional C-17s for the IAF was also under consideration.

Since 2002, shortly after Washington lifted the embargo against India for its 1998 multiple nuclear tests, Delhi has either acquired or is in the process of acquiring nearly $13 billion worth of US material mostly via the Foreign Military Sales route.

This includes 12 Thales-Raytheon Systems AN/TPQ-37(V)3 Firefinder artillery for $142.4 million and the USS Trenton (re-named INS Jalshawa), a 16,900 tonne refurbished Austin-class landing

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The IAF’s Garud Special Forces during a joint India-US air excercise in Agra

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platform dock and six second hand UH-3H Sea King helicopters for $92.5 million in 2006. Six C-130J Super Hercules aircraft — with the option for another six — and eight P-8I Maritime Reconnaissance Aircraft (MRA) have also been acquired.

Negotiations were nearing conclusion for another four P-8Is for the Indian Navy (IN).

India has also acquired three widebodied Boeing Business Jets (BBJs) for over $212 million for the IAF’s VVIP squadron three years ago to transport officials like the President, Prime Minister and other dignitaries, 21 Harpoon Block II missiles to equip the IAF’s Jaguar fleet for $200 million and 512 Textron Systemsdesigned cluster bombs and 41 training units for $257.73 million for fitment onto frontline Su-30MKI fighters. The IAF is also considering the acquisition of the Lockheed Martin-designed Patriot Advanced Capability-3 anti-ballistic missile systems.

The Indian Army too is in talks with Lockheed Martin for 8,000-12,000 rounds of Hellfire II modular missile systems for air and ground-based platforms and various US manufacturers were engaging in the joint development of defence and electronic warfare related software with India’s capable and burgeoning information technology sector.

Meanwhile, Boeing’s Apache AH-64D helicopter, upgraded to Longbow standard is, alongside Russia’s Mi-26, competing for the IAF’s $1.4 billion contract for 22 attack helicopters while Boeing’s Chinook CH-47F and Mi-26s are vying for the heavy lift helicopter tender to replace Soviet-era platforms. Military sources say that US’s Hawker Beechcraft Corporation’s T-6C Texan II model too is in the running for the IAF’s tender for the outright purchase of 75 trainers.

An additional 106 units will be licencebuilt by the state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in Bengaluru to replace the IAF’s fleet of 180-200 locallyconstructed Hindustan PistonTrainer (HPT)32 initial trainer aircraft grounded in July 2009 following a series of fatal accidents.

US platforms are also contenders to fulfill the IN’s requirement for helicopters armed with cruise missiles and lightweight torpedoes for advanced anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare for an estimated $550-650 million to replace a similar number of Sea King Mk42Bs and Sea King MK42Cs that are nearing retirement, all collectively amply compensating American companies for the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft setback.

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But Delhi’s hesitancy in confirming the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation forecloses the option of the US transferring advanced avionics and communication equipment and satellite navigational aids aboard the P-8I MMRA, the C-130Js and the C-17s. Air Chief Marshal P. V. Naik has recently said that India will develop its own systems to make good this shortfall. Under the US law both pacts need bilateral confirmation to ensure client compliance with sensitive technology control transfers.

In July 2009, however, India and the US confirmed the long pending End-Use Monitoring Agreement in New Delhi mandatory under American law to facilitate the export of sophisticated materiel to Delhi. But India strongly opposes US demands to agree to the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) — otherwise known as the Access and Cross-Servicing Agreement — as a part of their expanding bilateral strategic and nuclear partnership.

It is wary of the LSA’s provisions that will permit the two militaries reciprocal use of facilities for maintenance, servicing, communications, refueling and medical care. Approving the LSA, India believes can drag it into the US’s proliferating military engagements in the region.

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Handicapped Force THE audacious May 1 raid on Abbottabad by the US Navy SEALs (Sea, Air and Land teams) to take out Osama bin Laden prompted the Indian Army chief General V. K. Singh to claim that his Special Forces (SF) too were capable of undertaking such a mission, triggering the usual inflammatory reaction from General Headquarters in Rawalpindi.

But General Singh’s braggadocio seems to be erring more on the side of optimism than reality as the Indian Special Forces’ equipment remains an operational handicap and one that was exhibited publicly during the November 2008 Mumbai siege by ten Pakistan gunmen lasting nearly three days.

Over the years, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and even military bureaucratic procedures has led to delays in importing some 20 crucial items for the SF from the US like laser designators, underwater weaponry and communication systems and various robotic devices in addition to a complete lack of robust and modern rotary assets essential to undertake such a deadly and precise mission.

“By rapidly expanding our SF we have diluted their capabilities as strategic force multipliers,” laments the recently retired Lt General P.C. Katoch, a former SF officer.

The SF lacked not only the requisite training

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INS Vikramaditya

but also the equipment and orientation essential for such an elite specialised force, he declared adding that SF cannot be “mass produced and competent SF cannot be created after emergencies arise”.

SF units have also been handicapped by a shortage of officers of up to 30 percent despite which the Army planned on shortly commissioning its eighth SF battalion — the 11th SF — but without providing this growing band of elite soldiers a specific operational doctrine or organisational support.

Serving SF officers have maintained that the rapid expansion in SF units has taken place in an ad hoc manner after the US SF were deployed to Afghanistan in 2001 and it will take years of ‘focussed’ effort before their training school at Nahan in the Himalayan foothills has caught up with the expanded force’s requirements.

India’s SF units currently total around 20,000 personnel, including seven Army battalions or around 4,000 officers and men — converted mostly from the Parachute Regiment — the Special Action Groups (SAGs) of the recently expanded National Security Guard (NSG) and Special Groups (SGs) of the Special Frontier Force (SFF) under the Federal Interior Ministry and the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Secretariat respectively. The SAGs and SGs are manned exclusively by Army personnel on deputation to the two forces.

In 2004, the Indian Air Force (IAF) raised its own 300-strong Garud SF — citing inadequate cooperation from the Army as its reason for doing so — while the Indian Navy has between 300-400 Marine Commandoes.

But senior officers have said that India’s SF lack a ‘coherent organisational and

employment philosophy that preclude their overall development as an important national or service asset.’ Besides their tactical employment in localised roles as merely better equipped and trained infantrymen in counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir and in the Northeast has led to the SFs’ ‘lopsided’ capability development and duplication of tasks.

The Watchdog Barks THE country’s watchdog Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) has warned the Indian Navy (IN) that inordinate delays and massive cost overruns in its numerous local shipbuilding programmes will adversely impact force levels by 2012. At present, the IN has 39 warships, including an aircraft carrier under construction at State-owned shipyards.

Other than refurbishing INS Vikramaditya (the ex-Admiral Gorshkov), the second hand 44,750 tonne Kiev-class aircraft carrier which the IN was acquiring from Russia for over $2.34 billion following a contentious price war over its refit, an additional three 4,000tonne Russian Project 1135.6 Talwar-class (Krivak III) frigates were under construction in Russia for delivery by 2013-14.

The IN is also planning on locally building six additional submarines, seven additional Project 17A guided missile frigates and four landing dock platforms with overseas assistance, tenders for all of which were due shortly.

In its report tabled in Parliament in late March the CAG has cautioned that these impediments can over the next two years result in the IN retaining merely 61,44 and

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20 percent of its envisaged frigates, destroyers and missile corvettes.

The CAG has also criticised the five-year delay in Project 17 to build three 4,900-tonne Shivalik-class stealth frigates and Project 15A to construct three 6,500-tonne Kolkataclass destroyers at the Mazagon Dockyard Limited in Mumbai. These, it maintained were due to holdups in finalising structural drawings, timely availability of steel and ‘grossly inadequate infrastructure’ of the public sector dockyards.

Frigate and destroyer costs too had escalated 260 percent and 226 percent respectively from a collective ` 5,830 crore to `19,763 crore and the CAG has cautioned that this can increase further. Alongside, the construction of four 2,400-tonne antisubmarine warfare corvettes under Project 28 at the Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers at Kolkata too was facing similar design and price problems.

“The costs projected to the Cabinet Committee on Security were simplistic, ad hoc and based upon incorrectly estimated build periods,” the CAG has stated.

Meanwhile, in February the IN issued a global Request for Information (RfI) for the outright purchase of 12.7 mm heavy machine guns (HMG) for its shore-based marine assets and ships and rigid hull inflatable boats to provide ‘fire support in combat operations, including asymmetric warfare’.

At a time when it is deeply involved in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the Indian coastline, the IN’s RfI requires the HMGs to possess a minimum effective range of 1,800m, ability to fire 450 rounds per minute and with each barrel firing a minimum of 10,000 rounds.

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